4Philological Hermeneutics

Philip August Boeckh

PHILIP AUGUST BOECKH (1785-1867) was born in Karlsruhe where he attended the Gym-nasium or classical high school. He went to Halle to study with Schleiermacher and withF. A. Wolf, the classical philologist and famous author of the Prolegomena adHomerem.In 1809 he began teaching at Heidelberg and subsequently moved to the newly foundedUniversity of Berlin (1811), where he also served as the director of the philological andpedagogical seminar for a number of years. Boeckh made substantial contributions toclassical scholarship and covered many aspects of ancient and Greek civilization fromAthenian political economy to Greek philosophy (Plato and the Pythagoreans) to Atheniantragedy and the poetry of Pindar and others. The collection of his minor writings comprisesseven volumes. In his approach to hermeneutics Boeckh combined the ideas of Schleier-macher with the exacting methods of classical philology taught to him by Wolf and Ast.As early as 1809 he designed a special course, entitled Encyclopedia and Methodology ofthe Philological Sciences, which was to serve as a scholarly introduction to the entire fieldof classical philology. This course was revised and amplified over the years by Boeckhuntil 1866 (two years before his death), when he offered it for the twenty-sixth time. Hisstudent, Bratuschek, produced an integral text from Boeckh's notes and from studentnotebooks (including his own) which appeared in 1877. A revised edition (edited byKlussmann) of the Encyclopedia was published in 1866. The book contains a special sec-tion, "Theory of Hermeneutics," and one entitled "Theory of Criticism." Boeckh con-sidered hermeneutics the basis for all philological studies, and philology the universaldiscipline concerned with all aspects of human culture in its historical manifestations. Ourselections are taken from the (partial) English translation of the Encyclopedia by J.Prichard (Sect. A, Bibl.).

FORMAL THEORY OF PHILOLOGYA formal theory of philological knowing is as superfluous as logic, the formal

theory of philosophical understanding, is unnecessary. Men thought logicallybefore logic was discovered, and understood unfamiliar thoughts without any

132

Philip August Boeckh 133

theory of understanding—as they do every day. . . . Correct understanding, likelogical thinking, is an art, and therefore rests partly on a half-unconsciouspreparation. And yet the many mistakes made daily in interpretation of unfamiliarthoughts teach us that special skill and talent are needed for understanding asmuch as for any art. Both religion and philosophy, for example, are directed likepoetry entirely toward inner contemplation, and both work by a priori reasoning.Since understanding requires a directly opposite mode of thinking, it is no wonderthat religious men and philosophers, like poets, have only the slightest knowledgeof interpretation—especially if they subscribe to mysticism. The Orient, on ac-count of its suppression of the understanding, has on the whole little talent forinterpretation.

Understanding is essentially ability to judge, aided of necessity by imagination.It demands objectivity and receptiveness; the more subjective a man is, the lesshas he the gift of understanding.

For philosophy, the Neoplatonists in their exposition of Plato furnish a shiningillustration how exposition can be practiced counter to all understanding. Of theNew Testament there is neither beginning nor end of false exposition. And yetamong its expositors are gifted, well-informed men whose understanding is wide,but not for this kind of interpretation. Celebrated philologists, too, often mis-understand their own understanding; even the best of them frequently go astray.If there is an art of understanding, it must have its theory, which must com-prehend the scientific development of the laws of understanding, not merely prac-tical rules such as are generally found in most treatments of interpretation andcriticism. These rules, though good in themselves, are first clarified in theory andthen better learned in their application, just as the philological art is best learnedthrough practice. From practice the laws of the theory can be inductively derived.

The value of theory consists not in any ability it has to make a man a goodexegete or critic, any more than knowledge of logic makes one a philosophicalthinker, but in its capacity to bring unconscious activity to the level of con-sciousness. The goal toward which interpretation and criticism strive, and thepoint of view by which they must be guided, are much the same as that whichphilology practices dimly and vaguely by mere empiricism, until it is elevated bytheory to scientific clarity. Theory, then, rules practical philological activity. Itsharpens the vision and guards against errors by showing their causes and theboundaries of sure knowledge. Theory makes philology an art, though manyphilologists regard mere empirical dexterity in interpretation and criticism as art.

According to our definition of understanding, we distinguish interpretation andcriticism as separate but essential elements in it. ... The two are obviouslydifferent functions. When we assign to hermeneutics the task of understanding thesubjects themselves, we surely do not imply that anything can be understoodwithout reference to much besides. For interpretation many auxiliaries must beused. The aim of hermeneutics is to understand the essential nature of the subject.

134 Philological Hermeneutics

When criticism establishes whether a manuscript reading is correct, or whethera work belongs to a specific author, decision is reached through investigating therelation of that reading to its context or the relation in which the peculiar char-acteristics of the work stand to the specific author. This research shows theagreement or difference of the two compared objects, and therefrom further con-clusions are drawn.

Such a procedure is followed in every critical project. In order, for example,to form an opinion concerning a historical transaction, the critic investigateswhether it agrees or not with the end sought from it, or with the law, etc. Inaesthetic criticism of a poem, the investigation considers whether it conforms tothe artistic principles of the genre to which it belongs. The task of criticism is,in fine, not to understand a subject in itself, but to discover the relation of severalsubjects. It will later be shown that the hermeneutic and critical functions actreciprocally.

Both interpretation and criticism are always busied with something handeddown or at least communicated. This thing communicated is either a symbol ofthe thing known, differing from it in form, e.g., in the shape of letters, musicalnotation, etc.; or it is a picture agreeing in form with the object expressed in it,as in works of art or craft. Recent kinds of intellectual expression are to someextent hieroglyphics, which must be interpreted through hermeneutics and criti-cism in order that one may proceed from right understanding of the forms to theirsignificance in the works of human activity, or rather to their content and mean-ing. This is a special aspect, still little considered.

THEORY OF HERMENEUTICSThe term hermeneutics is derived from hermeneia, which obviously related to

the name of the god Hermes. . . . From the original significance of Hermes, whoclearly is one of the deities of earth, there developed the concept of him as themessenger of the gods, the go-between of gods and men. He makes manifest thedivine thoughts, translates the infinite into the finite, the divine spirit into sensoryphenomena, and therefore he denotes analysis, measure, and particularizing. Thediscovery of everything that becomes understood is ascribed to him, especiallylanguage and literature. The essence of hermeneia consists in that which theRomans called elocutio: the expression of thought—not the understanding, butthe rendering intelligible. Consequently, hermeneia has long signified the render-ing of one person's language intelligible to another, the work of the interpreter.As such it is not essentially different from exegesis, and the two words may beused as synonyms. They are concerned not so much with interpreting as withactually understanding, which becomes possible only through interpretation.

Philip August Boeckh 135

This understanding is the re-forming process of hermeneia as elocutio.As the actions of the understanding, or the principles according to which one

will understand, are everywhere the same, no specific distinction of interpretationcan be made with respect to the subjects to be interpreted. Such distinctions assacred and secular interpretation are accordingly untenable. If a sacred book isof human origin, it must be understood according to human rules in the usualtreatment applied to books. If it is of divine origin, it stands on a level above allhuman interpretation, and can be apprehended only through divine inspiration.Obviously, every truly sacred book, like every highly gifted man's work that isthe product of inspiration, may become fully intelligible only through both humanand divine means at once. The human spirit, which gives shape to all ideas afterits own laws, is itself of divine origin.

There is notwithstanding a special application of general interpretative prin-ciples with reference to specific areas. We have a special hermeneutics of the NewTestament, of Roman law, of Homer, etc. Here belongs the branch of artisticinterpretation, which has to explain works of plastic art as one explains worksof literature. Archaeological interpretation is not treated here.

Since the great mass of verbal tradition is fixed through written record, thebusiness of the philologist is with the text, in which he must gain understandingof three things:

1. The writing, the symbol of the thing signifying.2. Language, the thing signifying.3. The thing signified, the knowledge contained in language. The palaeog-

rapher stops with the proof of the symbol. The mere grammarian confines himselfto the symbol of the thing signified, language. Only when one presses on to thething signified, the thought, does genuine knowledge arise. We shall now presumethe comprehension of the letters and shall not busy ourselves with the art ofdeciphering them, which, when there is no key to it, is itself an interpretation ofinfinite, unknown areas. Nor are we concerned with the difference between nota-tion for oral speech and for thought, since we treat not the audible aspect of lan-guage but only the concepts bound up with the words as objects for interpretation.And though we restrict ourselves here to speech as the most general instrumentof communication, the principles we arrive at must be valid for expression byother means than language.

Effective divisions of interpretation may be drawn only from the essential natureof interpretative activity. Essentially as regards understanding and its expression,interpretation is consciousness of that through which the meaning and significanceof the thing communicated are conditioned and defined. Here belongs first theobjective significance of the means of communication, language in its most widelysignificant sense. The meaning is first conditioned by the literal meaning of thewords and thus can be understood only when the common expression is fullyunderstood. But every speaker or writer employs language in a special, personal

136 Philological Hermeneutics

way, modifying it according to his own individuality. To understand anyone,therefore, his subjective qualities must be taken into account.

Exposition from that common, objective aspect of language, we denote by theterm grammatical interpretation; from the subjective standpoint, individualinterpretation.

The sense of each communication is further conditioned by the actual circum-stances in which it came into being, the knowledge of which is presumed in thoseto whom it was addressed. To understand it, one must transplant himself intothese circumstances. A book derives its true significance first from ideas currentat the time when it was written. This exposition from the aspect of its actual milieuwe call historical interpretation. This is not what one usually means by explana-tion of the subject, i.e., an amassing of historical notes; these can be dispensedwith for understanding the work, for exegesis needs to supply only as much asconditions this understanding. Historical interpretation, in this sense closelyallied to grammatical interpretation, investigates how the literal meaning of thewords is modified through objective conditions.

The individual aspect of the communication is moreover modified through thesubjective conditions under whose influence it was composed, which determinethe purpose and direction of the work. In communication goals exist that are com-mon to many writers. Out of these arise well-defined species of communication,the literary genres. The characteristics of poetry and prose, and of their varieties,lie in the subjective aim and goal of the literary performance. Under these generaldifferences are classed the individual aims of the several authors, which constitutevarieties in the genres. The goal is the ideal, higher unity of the communication;this, established as a norm, is the standard of art and as such is always imprintedin a particular form or genre. Exegesis of the work of art from this aspect is bestnamed generic interpretation. It is as closely related to individual interpretationas historical interpretation is to grammatical.

The following outline indicates that in these four kinds of interpretation allrequirements for understanding are comprehended; the list is complete. Inter-pretation is:

I. Understanding from the objective conditions of the thing communicated:a. from the literal meaning of the words—grammatical interpretation;b. from the meaning of the words in reference to the material relations and

context of the work—historical interpretation.II. Understanding from the subjective conditions of the thing communicated:

a. from the subject itself—individual interpretation;b. from the subject in reference to subjective relations which lie in the aim

and direction of the work—generic interpretation.How are these different kinds of interpretation interrelated? We have made our

analysis on the basis of the concept given above; in practice, the kinds constantlyintermingle. Without individual interpretation the literal meaning is unintelligible,

Philip August Boeckh 137

for each word spoken by anyone is drawn from the common vocabulary but in-vested with an additional, peculiar meaning. To obtain this latter meaning, onemust know the individuality of the speaker. Likewise the general sense of wordsis modified by their actual relations in discourse and by the kinds of discourse.To interpret these modifications, one needs historical and generic interpretation,the bases of which are in turn to be found only through grammatical interpreta-tion, from which all interpretation starts.

We have here a circle of reasoning that points backward to the aforementionedproblem, in which the formal and material functions in philology were mutuallydependent. For example, grammatical interpretation requires knowledge of thehistorical development of grammar; historical interpretation is impossible with-out special knowledge of general history; individual interpretation requiresknowledge of matters pertaining to individual man; and generic interpretationrests upon historical knowledge. In fine, the various kinds of interpretationpresume substantial amounts of factual knowledge, and yet these different bodiesof knowledge become known first through interpretation of all the sources. Thiscircle can, however, be broken in the following way. Grammatical interpretationprovides the literal meaning of the word, treats it under various conditions, andrelates it to the language as a whole. The history of language is established; gram-mars and lexica are made, which in turn serve grammatical interpretation and arethemselves perfected with the progressing interpretative activity. This workprovides a basis for the other sorts of interpretation and at the same time for con-stituting the material disciplines. The further these disciplines are developed, themore nearly complete becomes the interpretation.

For instance, New Testament interpretation must lag behind interpretation ofthe Greek classics because its grammar, stylistic theory, and historical condition-ing forces are far less perfectly known. The grammatical usage of Attic writersis far more accurately formulated than is the grammar of New Testament dis-course, which is the product of a bad mixture of Greek and oriental usage, aninferior jargon. The New Testament writers, moreover, were unlettered men,with no concept of such highly developed art as is found in Attic writing. Tounderstand their way of writing, one must become familiar with the religious en-thusiasm and oriental warmth of their ideas. A mythical darkness also cloaks thecircumstances in which these works came into being.

As another example, for the classical period in Greece lyric poetical form isthe least known, and consequently interpretation of the lyrics is especially diffi-cult. The style of the poet is to be discovered through interpretation from hisworks themselves, and yet the interpretation depends in its most significant pointsupon the concept which one has derived from his literary style. To shun thepetitioprincipii here requires particular skill.

The fact that while the kinds of interpretation always co-operate, they are notalways equally applicable, lightens the task of interpretation. Grammatical

138 Philological Hermeneutics

interpretation applies at its maximum where individual interpretation is at itsminimum. Writers like Cicero, who expresses the general spirit and usage of histime, are above all to be grammatically interpreted—a characteristic which sim-plifies the exposition. The more original, on the other hand, a writer is, the moresubjective his views and his linguistic expression, the greater is the preponder-ance of individual interpretation. For this reason Tacitus is harder to interpretthan Cicero. Entire literary types differ in like manner. The more objective thepresentation, the more does the task devolve upon grammatical interpretation. Inepic and history, one must abandon extensively not only individual, but alsohistorical interpretation when the subjective quality of the author does not relievethe need. In like manner, the most complicated interpretation occurs in prose insuch works as private letters, in poetry in the lyric.

The circle which embraces the interpretative task cannot be resolved in allcases, and can never be resolved completely. From this fact come the limits whichare placed upon interpretation. First, it is obviously impossible to establish themeaning of an expression or a trope through comparison with other instances ofits use if it appears nowhere else. When precisely the same specimen is at oncethe sole basis for grammatical and individual interpretation, or for individual andgeneric, or for historical and generic, the problem is insoluble. Besides this,every single utterance is conditioned by an infinite number of circumstances, andit is therefore impossible to bring to clear communication. Gorgias stated in hiswork on nature, in which he declares that nobody thinks like another man, thatthe speaker and his auditor do not have the same idea; and not even the individualviews a subject always in the same light, for which reason he fails to understandhimself completely. Thus the task of interpretation is to reach as close an approxi-mation as possible by gradual, step-by-step progression; it cannot hope to reachthe limit.

In certain instances complete understanding is reached in response to a feeling,and the interpreter will approach completeness accordingly as he becomes morein possession of such a feeling. It can cut the Gordian knot of uncertainty, butcan proceed no further. Thanks to this feeling, he re-cognizes what another haspreviously known; without it, there could exist no capacity for communication.Though individuals of course differ, they yet correspond in many respects. Onecan, therefore, understand an alien individuality to a certain degree through rea-soned calculation; but in many utterances one can apprehend completely throughvivifying contemplation what is intuitively conveyed to him. To the above-quotedstatement by Gorgias another stands opposed: like knows like. This is the onlymeans through which understanding becomes possible; kindred spirits are requi-site. He who thus practices exposition can alone be termed a kindred interpreter,for the intuition which proceeds from the interpreter's identification with the workto be interpreted brings out what lies within. Here imagination takes the place ofunderstanding as hermeneutic activity.

Philip August Boeckh 139

Hence it also comes to pass that, aside from quality of training, not everyonecan be equally good as an expositor; and above all an original talent belongs tointerpretation. What Ruhnken says of the critic—Criticus nonfit, sed nascitur("the critic is born, not made")—is valid also for interpretation: interpres nonfit,sed nascitur. This means that one can generally acquire no knowledge, but canonly develop and discipline what is innate in him. Character is shaped throughdiscipline; through speculation the penetration is sharpened; but clearly characteritself must first be present. Some naturally have penetration into understanding,and conversely many expositions are fundamentally perverted, because man canbe born to misunderstanding as well as to understanding.

Interpretative talent is not developed by mechanical practice of hermeneuticalprecepts; these must rather, after they become vividly alive through actual inter-preting, become so familiar through practice that one unconsciously observesthem. They must at the same time combine to form a conscious theory, whichalone guarantees the trustworthiness of the clarifying interpretation. In genuineinterpreters, this theory is itself elevated into intuition; and so arises correct taste,which guards against sophistical, strained interpretations.

The author composes according to the laws of grammar and style, but is as arule unconscious of them. The interpreter, however, cannot fully explain withoutconsciousness of these laws. The man who understands must reflect on the work;the author brings it into being, and reflects upon his work only when he becomesas it were an expositor of it. The interpreter consequently understands the authorbetter than the author understands himself.

The interpreter must bring to clear awareness what the author has uncon-sciously created, and in so doing many things will be opened to him, manywindows will be unlocked which have been closed to the author himself. Butthough he must come to know what lies objectively in the work alien to theauthor's awareness of it, the interpreter must keep it separate from the author'ssubjective knowledge of the work. If he does not so separate them, he followsthe practice of the allegorical interpretation in Plato, of ancient exposition ofHomer, and of the New Testament. The result is quantitative error; he under-stands too much. This is as faulty as its opposite, quantitative lack of understand-ing, which occurs when the sense of the author is not fully understood.

One can also misunderstand qualitatively, which occurs when something otheris understood than the author had in mind and is put in its place. This takes placeespecially in allegorical interpretation, as in incorrect interpretation of an alle-gory already there.

Here we draw nearer to allegorical interpretation, which many view as aseparate kind. The Middle Ages derived from Alexandrian philosophy and theol-ogy the controlling view that a fourfold sense could be distinguished in literature:literal, allegorical, moral, and anagogical or mystical. Here are four sorts ofinterpretation, which may be reduced to two: literal interpretation on the one

140 Philological Hermeneutics

hand, and on the other the remaining three, which are all allegorical, i.e., show-ing a sense different from the literal. Moral and anagogical interpretation are onlysubdivisions of the allegorical. The sense which is substituted for the literal ismoral when, as in a parable or fable, one finds a moral idea in the actual picturepresented. In anagogical signification the allegorical meaning is on the specula-tive level; for example, a concept in a fable is comprehended supersensually: itis elevated from the aesthetic to the noetic. The literal interpretation can alsosignify an ideal picture or a sensory object, for which allegorical interpretationsubstitutes another sensory object. Such an allegory may be called simple orhistorical.

Allegory has by its very nature extended application for it is a kind of represen-tation founded deep in the nature of speech and thought. Myths, as sensory sym-bols of the suprasensible, must first be allegorically explained, for they includeanother than the meaning expressed in the words. Accordingly it is justifiable tointerpret Holy Writ allegorically, for its basic principle is that of myth; only itis a debatable question to what extent its writers were conscious of its allegoricalsense. All classical poetry is full of myth, and art as a whole generally proceedssymbolically, so that all branches of ancient art require allegorical interpretation.All epic is mythical narrative; the ancients have therefore already interpretedHomer allegorically. Here, however, this kind of interpretation goes beyond thepoet's meaning; he knows nothing of the myth's primitive meaning. The expositormust carefully distinguish where he interprets Homer and where the myth itself.Quite otherwise is the case with Dante; in the Divina Commedia he uses the myththroughout with full awareness. Allegorical interpretation is quite at home withhim; we have from his own words in his remarkable Convivio authentic allegori-cal expositions. It contains a philosophy of love like that in Plato's Symposium.He explains there how every work can be understood in a fourfold sense, and howhe himself in his own poems had always in view the other, higher kinds besidesthe literal. So Beatrice, for example, in the Divina Commedia is at the same timean allegorical representation of the highest science, speculative theology. InDante's allegories there is a noble, exalted aspiration, which was in keeping withthe spirit of his time, yet in many peculiar and wondrous concepts also draws toitself the weaknesses of that time.

In lyric poetry, there is the most conscious employment of allegory. In Pindar,allegory appears only in a specific sense, as application of the myth or historywhich he treats to the circumstances of his contemporaries whom he celebratesin his idea. He uses myths not for their own sake; they are means of setting inan ideal light something actual and nonmythical. They are idealized pictures ofhuman life, and consequently may have a moral thought as their meaning. Al-though in many lyric forms no consciously intentional allegory has a place, yetall forms have the symbolic character peculiar to the art as a whole. In all of themthe problem is to understand the thought, which reveals itself even in the slightest

Philip August Boeckh 141

play of imagination. Here, indeed, the understanding is transmitted chieflythrough a delicate intuitive feeling.

The most difficult allegorical interpretation occurs in drama. Drama is essen-tially the presentation of an action, but the kernel of the action, its soul, is thethought which is made evident through it. The symbolic character is especiallyevident in plays like the Prometheus of Aeschylus; but in all tragedies a general,governing idea hovered before the eyes of the ancient poet. This symbolic qualityin Sophocles is most deeply imprinted in the Antigone, where the ethical idea isvividly embodied in the dramatis personae that moderation is best and that evenin righteous activity no one may be overweening or give way to passion.

Comedy expresses not merely a general, but often a particularized, thought,referring to events and circumstances of the times. Of this second sort is Aris-tophanes. He is symbolic through and through, as the names of his chorusesindicate: wasps, clouds, frogs, etc. The Birds contains a thoroughgoing allegory:the founding of the state of the birds satirizes the Athenian political situation atthe time of the Sicilian enterprise. This comedy is an example of historicalallegory, as Antigone exemplifies the moral sort, and Prometheus the speculative.

In prose, too, allegorical interpretation is applicable, so far as the mythical ele-ment reaches, for instance in religious prose and in philosophy. The myths ofPlato must be allegorically explained. On account of their artistic structure, it isnecessary on the one hand to explain the philosophical thought in them, and onthe other to investigate whence the picture is derived and how its form and essenceare conditioned. In Phaedrus, for example, they derive from the concept of theuniverse held by Philolaus. But Plato has clothed his thoughts in allegorical garbnot merely in his myths, and allegorical interpretation is not to be denied him.In all the realms of prose allegorical parts are found.

The criterion for the applicability of allegorical interpretation can obviously lieonly in the decision whether the literal meaning does not suffice for understand-ing. It becomes necessary when the grammatical interpretation gives a sense notconsonant with the situations imparted through individual, historical, and genericinterpretation. When, for example, the literal sense of a Pindaric ode fails to cor-respond to its purpose and to the historical references that lie at its base, one isobliged to go beyond its literal meaning. The allegorical sense will always havethat metaphorical significance of the literal words which corresponds equally tothe character of the language and to the other conditions. In order then to ascertainthe proper metaphorical meaning, it is necessary to choose that one among theseveral possible meanings which the spirit of the whole work and the relationsof all its parts require. This can be found only through individual and genericinterpretation; at the same time historical interpretation brings the actual condi-tions under consideration. The allegorical sense must not be sought beyond thepoint of the motivation, and it is not at all easy to keep within the proper bounds.In a pedantic writer, generally speaking, the allegory must be sought in details

142 Philological Hermeneutics

only. In a truly classical work it will be always on a grand scale. Playful ormeticulous interpretation is allowable only in the case of a playful or meticulouswriter.

If one fails to recognize an expressed allegory, he has made a quantitative error,since he has understood too little though he may have understood the rest cor-rectly. Thus in a relief or a painting it is possible to understand all the separateparts and the significance of the whole without learning its allegorical meaning.If one understands an allegory where none is intended, he has also made a quan-titative error, which is, however, qualitative as well; for he has read a falsemeaning into it. While allegory is a particular and very important kind of repre-sentation, understanding it is by no means a separate kind of interpretation. It con-sists rather, like every other work, in the co-operation of the four kinds ofhermeneutic activity: grammatical, historical, individual, and generic.

THEORY OF CRITICISMCriticism is, according to our definition given above, that philological per-

formance through which an object becomes understood not by itself nor for itsown sake, but for the establishment of a relation and a reference to somethingelse, so that the recognition of this relation is itself the end in view. This perform-ance is signified in the name criticism. The basic meaning of krinein is analysisand separation; every analysis and separation is, moreover, determination ofdefinite relation between two objects. The expression of such a relation is a judg-ment; to judge signifies also to separate and is a synonym of passing sentence.

For the concept of criticism the kind of judgment that is passed is quite imma-terial. However, the unbounded possible scope of judgments is limited by the goalof critical activity. It can concern itself only with understanding the relation ofwhat is communicated to its conditioning circumstances. Since interpretation ex-plains the communication itself out of these conditioning circumstances, criticismmust subdivide into the same classes into which interpretation is divided. Thereare accordingly grammatical, historical, individual, and generic criticism, andthese four kinds of critical activity must naturally be internally connected just likethe corresponding interpretative performances. As what is communicated arisesfrom the conditioning circumstances of the communication, these are its measure.What is communicated may conform to its conditioning circumstance or not, thatis, it may conform to the measuring principle inherent in them or it may deviatefrom that principle. If also a communication is handed down through tradition,as in the ancient authors, criticism has to investigate its relation to this tradition.What is communicated can be dimmed through destructive natural influences orthrough error and oversight of the transmitters, or it can be deliberately changed

Philip August Boeckh 143

by them. It is therefore necessary to establish whether the form of the work beforeus agrees with the original or deviates from it.

Criticism has consequently a threefold task. First, it must investigate whethera literary work, or its parts, are in keeping with the grammatical, literal senseof the language, with its historical basis, with the individuality of the author, andwith the characteristics of its genre. In order not to follow a merely negativecourse, it must secondly establish, when something seems not in keeping, howit may be made more conformable. Thirdly, it has to investigate whether the formhanded down is original or not. It will be seen that with this all specifically criticalefforts are exhausted. I shall demonstrate this fact through detailed developmentof the theory which runs parallel to the statement of interpretation that is mypersonal theory. I shall first, however, present several general remarks about thevalue of criticism, the critical talent, the levels of critical truth, and the relationof criticism to interpretation.

The essence of criticism is not the tracking of all possible meanings. It must,to be sure, ponder which forms of a document may be possible under the giventerms, but it does so only to select from these possibilities what is effective andappropriate. In this, then, lies its value. When it falls foul of all tradition, criti-cism is a destructively annihilating force. But it negates only error, and sinceerror is denial of truth, in this negation it works positively. If one were to removecriticism and permit erroneous tradition to survive unchallenged, both knowledgeand life, in so far as they rest upon historical footing, would soon fall into extremeerror, as they did in the Middle Ages, which were hampered most of all by lackof criticism. Without criticism, all historical truth founders. Furthermore, criticalactivity disciplines through discovery of what is out of keeping with the subject.Thereby, it destroys all hollow phantasy and chimera in relation to historical data.At the same time it works effectually upon one's own development when itbecomes self-criticism.

For every science it is the balance of truth which weighs the import of the basicdata, teaches discernment between the probable and the merely plausible, the trueand the untrue, the merely subtle and the intuitively evident. If there were morecriticism in the world, the literary granaries would not be filled with chaff insteadof wheat, chaff served by uncritical minds, which very frequently carries thename of criticism; nothing is less truly critical than the disgraceful conjecturesof many so-called critics.

It has been wisely said that every genuine scholar in a science must be ipso factoa critic. Since critical examination and comparison together establish correctnessin the tradition, they refer all scientific progress as it advances to the ideal ofknowledge; thus they become on this positive side a necessary instrument of allscientific investigation; they form judgment and taste.

One should not, however, over-value criticism as the characteristic task ofphilology. It was once thought that the salvation of the world lay in investigating

144 Philological Hermeneutics

syllables and punctuating words; and with that vanity which is often characteristicof the philologists this grammatical labor was described as the peak of all knowl-edge, so that it was called diva critica ("the goddess criticism"). A rare divinityindeed! Many a man might with Faust in such a case become fearful of his god-likeness. It was a biased, false criticism which became thus over-valued; truecriticism keeps on guard against excessive self-esteem. Overweening criticismcan only act destructively, since it rejects the self-effacing exposition which is theonly sure basis of judgment.

Genuine criticism is unassuming, and its beneficial effects are unpretentious,because it produces no creations of its own. Its value is shown only in the devasta-tion which enters as soon as it is absent. When an age is hostile to criticism,because it is viewed as either pedantic or destructive, either false criticismprevails or true criticism is unrecognized. There must always be a counterweightto criticism to keep it from curtailing productivity and weakening the power ofthe idea. It has been well said: "Criticism is a very cunning guide, always nega-tive; like the daimon of Socrates, it halts you, but does not make you proceed."

Few men practice genuine criticism; it belongs to a higher endowment thandoes interpretation. If it is to reproduce the original or what is in conformity tothat, it demands more spontaneity than does interpretation, in which the subject'scontribution predominates. This ratio varies, however, when one takes into con-sideration the corresponding kinds of both activities. Individual interpretation,for instance, possesses far more spontaneity than criticism of words, but less thanbelongs to individual criticism.

The nature of the critic's talent parallels the problems which the critic has tosolve. In order to distinguish the inappropriate from the appropriate in the tradi-tion, he must unite objectivity with delicate judgment. Acuteness and sagacity arerequisite for the restoration of the original, but in addition the critic, as Bentleydemands in the preface to his edition of Horace, must have a suspicious mind(animus suspicax) to prevent his accepting as appropriate and genuine whateveris presented. Finally, for all three tasks of criticism the greatest exactness isrequisite. Specious critical talent consists in subtlety and impertinence; it substi-tutes for the demands of the subject its own subjective concepts and starts tocriticize without entering interpretatively into understanding.

One must never suppose that the critic has the power to solve his problem withhis understanding alone, or that the critical talent consists merely in a higher levelof acuteness, a gift of discrimination. Obviously, criticism shares in the logicalcircle which arises in the interpretative task: the single part must be judged onthe basis of the including whole, and this whole in turn on the basis of the singlepart. The final decision must here lie for criticism in the immediate awarenesswhich arises from an incorruptible sense for historical truth. To bring this aware-ness to its inner strength and clarity must be the critic's highest ambition. It isdeveloped into an artistic driving force, which intuitively hits the target. This

Philip August Boeckh 145

power, however, is the product of great interpretative practice.The true critic will accordingly be always a good interpreter. The reverse is

not always the case. As there are many grammatical interpreters who comprehendnothing of individual interpretation, many interpreters likewise know nothingabout criticism. This lack occurs especially in expositors of factual knowledge,whom their material at times so overwhelms that they forget judgment, the siftingprocess. An uncritical interpreter can accomplish nothing with a work until agood critic has blazed the trail for him. As a rule, however, exceptional interpre-tative talent is also critical.

The true divining power of criticism lies only in its inner union with the inter-pretative sense; it becomes capable of divination when by means of its creativeimaginative power is supplies what is lacking in the tradition. That is generativecriticism; it wells up from its own power, not from the page. It arises in varyingform: in some it shows clarity and cheer; in others it is obscure, deep, butsupremely excellent in its inner quality. This difference lies not merely in theperformance, but in the sort of critical perception of the idea itself. This diviningpower must always be united with a wise prudence. His suspicious mind easilyleads the critic astray, unless it is restrained through an objective point of view.One can in general assert that of one hundred conjectures made by critics, notfive are correct. The best critic is swift to conjecture but slow to expressjudgment.

Criticism, in union with interpretation, should impart historical truth. Histori-cal truth is based upon the same logical conditions as truth in general, specifically:(1) on the correctness of the premises; (2) on the correctness of the proceduretoward the conclusion. The premises may be immediately recognized as true, likethe mathematical principles or indeed all such clear, simple intuitions of thehuman intellect; or they may be recognized only through inference from othertrue principles which need no further special attention. In so far now as a critical-exegetical assertion rests upon immediately certain or surely proved premises,and in so far as the conclusion based on these premises is correct, we have dis-covered the actual historical truth.

Akin to the truth are the plausible (verisimile), the presumable (probabile), andthe credible. These are demonstrable levels of truth. We call plausible that whichapproximates the whole truth without being thoroughly proved to be true. We callpresumable that which agrees with other truths without being itself confirmed.We call credible that which agrees with our ideas without objective proof of itstruth. All this depends on following inferential statements from the premises; forif the conclusion is false, one cannot speak of any level of scientific truth at all.The essence of the credible lies, to be sure, in the uncertainty of the premises toan otherwise certain conclusion. Since its premises rest upon and agree only withour presumption, but are otherwise unproven ideas, all that is logically concludedfrom them is merely possible.

146 Philological Hermeneutics

In the case of the plausible, the premises are objectively capable of demonstra-tion. The essence of truth lies in the fact that if one thing exists, the other isnecessary; the essence of the plausible, however, depends on the fact that if theone thing exists, the other is not indeed necessary but possibly and indeed usuallyis so. The level of probability is arranged, therefore, according to the complete-ness of the induction upon which one or both premises of the conclusion arebased. But since in actual experience no such induction can be complete, inter-pretation and criticism cannot attain to the full degree of truth unless the premisesare immediately certain.

The presumable is obviously only a lower level of the plausible. The measuringscale for the certainty of the premises is of course very subjective and dependsheavily upon the level of one's intuitive capability. One who is steeped in the loreof the past looks upon something as immediately certain which to another isthoroughly uncertain. Yet the greater knowledge conceals a danger of error if theperson making the decision thinks he has in his view a complete induction. Any-one whose areas of knowledge are incomplete, that is, anyone who lacks adequateperception of antiquity, overlooks innumerable relations, and can believe hispremises to be true, nearly true, or in harmony with the truth, whereas they aredirectly opposed to it.

No fruitful critical or exegetical undertaking is to be thought of without a basison the greatest possible fullness of observation of the past. The scope of theseobservations lies in one's erudition, their depth in one's native talent; premisesare to be validated only according to the measure of these two. The credible, asit merely agrees with one's idea, is therefore a doubtful and almost entirely uselesscategory. What is credible to one man, who has fullness of learning and naturaltalent, the unlearned and dull man finds incredible; and what is credible to thelatter, the former frequently sees as quite impossible.

The levels of certainty are extremely subjective not only by reason of theirpremises, but frequently also by reason of demonstration. By the term "form ofdemonstration" I understand here not the general logical meaning. Philologicaldemonstration has a form which is not given through ordinary logic alone. Noone can demand that a man write in syllogisms. Leibnitz, who often expressedhis teaching syllogistically in appendices, says: "Just as it is improper to be alwaysmaking verses, so also it is improper always to fling about syllogisms." It is aquestion of the correct dialectic method, for dialectic is possible with or withoutsyllogisms; it is possible without syllogisms, in so far as the deduction may beabbreviated without any incorrectness resulting from the brief statement. It isenough that the conclusion stand up under the test of syllogistic form.

An investigator of greater mental acuteness may find finer distinctions in thesame object than those seen by another; he is in a position to bring to even greatercertainty what the other may have presented as only plausible. He defines moreexactly through more accurate analyses and draws conclusions through synthesis

Philip August Boeckh 147

of these which the other has been unable to draw. This is philological criticaldialectic. Fruitful synthesis allows the premises to be brought into such a positionand union that more emerges from them than one usually sees. But the greatestacuteness falls into error if certainty of perception deserts it; the most acute in-vestigations become a web of mistakes if the premises are false. One must accord-ingly be more on his guard against nothing than against a vain acuteness andagainst merely subjective decisions. As far as in him lies, he must seek to arriveat a sort of mathematical objectivity; and however much active synthesis is re-quired, holding to this objectivity he must never abandon clear vision, at whichas alpha and omega everything culminates.

Paramount for criticism is the synthesis of every fragment where the wholemust be made up of individual pieces. Here a high level of attentiveness is requi-site, and often, as one fails to hold fast to this level, as he does at times inuninteresting matters, a successful outcome is attainable only step by step.

Historical truth is ascertained through co-operation of interpretation and criti-cism. We must accordingly investigate more closely how this co-operation pro-ceeds. Interpretation always culminates, as we have seen, in the observation ofcontradictions and relations; but it considers them only in order to understand theseparate situations in themselves. On the contrary, criticism must everywherepresuppose the interpretative activity, the explanation of separate items, in orderto proceed thence to solve its specific problem, which is to comprehend into aninclusive whole the relation of these details. One cannot judge without under-standing the thing in itself; criticism accordingly presupposes the interpretativeproblem to have been solved. Frequently, however, it is impossible to understandthe subject to be interpreted without first having reached a decision about itsnature; interpretation accordingly presupposes the solution of the critical prob-lem. From this arises again a circle in reasoning, which limits our activity foreach difficult interpretative or critical problem and can be solved only throughapproximation. Since in these circumstances one must continually pass from theone to the other, in practice criticism and interpretation cannot be separated.Neither of them can precede the other in time. But for the expression of what iscomprehended this combination can be preserved only when clarity does notsuffer from it. For difficult and extensive problems the critical notes must beseparated from the interpretative commentary.

In the great circle of reasoning which the relation of interpretation to criticismpresents, there lie then new and ever new circles, since every kind of interpreta-tion and criticism presupposes the completion of all the other interpretative andcritical problems. We shall consider this situation through more precise inspec-tion of the four kinds of critical activity, to which we now turn.