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Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları DergisiJournal Of Modern Turkish History StudiesXIII/26 (2013-Bahar/Spring), ss. 249-271.

* Prof.Dr.,AtılımÜniversitesi,([email protected]).

BLOODY CHRISTMAS OF 1963 IN CYPRUS IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN DOCUMENTS

Ulvi KESER*

AbstractTheislandofCyprusis,throughoutthehistory,supposedandbelievedtobethat

oftheimmigrationandthatoftheissues.Takingaglanceatthelastcentury,itisobviouslyseenthat,eventhoughtheislandseemstobeoutofthewarsandthestrugglesinsomepoints,the island itself just takes a place in the verymidst of those above-mentioned struggles,disputes and the conflicts. Especially starting from theWWI, the island occupies a veryunusualplace both in the conflict of interest and the struggles of the island-centered andvariousconflictssurroundingCyprus,andinadditionto theEnosisconflictcausedbytheGreekCypriots,theeffortsfortheannexationoftheislandtoGreece,andtheBritishpolicytowardsGreeceall increase theproblemsmoreandmore.Considering thepositionof theislandespeciallystartingfromApril1,1955onwhichGreekCypriotterroristorganizationnamedEOKAstartedterroristactivitiesnotonlyagainstBritish,andTurkishCypriotsbutalso againstGreekCypriot ones up toAugust 16, 1960 onwhich theRepublic ofCypruswasfoundedontheguaranteeoftheUK,TurkeyandGreece,theislandspentalongwayofatrocityandbloodyshedperiodcausingthedeathofagoodmanyinnocentpersonsontheisland.TurkishCypriotstryingtogetridoftheatrocitycommittedagainstthemselveshavealso established someundergroundorganizations suchasVolkan, 9Eylül (9thSeptembersymbolizingthesalvationofNicosiaaswellasthatofIzmir),andTürkMukavemetTeşkilatı(TurkishResistanceOrganization) but except the last one, all the efforts have come to anendwith failure sinceEOKAwasbackedbyGreeceanddonatedby thewell-trainedandexperiencedmilitarypersonnel.DespitethefactthatRepublicofCyprushasbeenfounded,GreekCypriotattacksagainsttheTurkishpeoplecontinueandtherepubliccomestoanendwithatragicend,thatistosay,withBloodyChristmas.AsthefirstandthelastpresidentofRepublicofCyprus,andArchbishopMakariosfranklydeclared,RepublicofCyprusseemedtobe justaspringingpoint towardstheannexationof the islandtoGreeceat long last. Inthisscientificstudy,itisaimed,inpriority,startingfromthefirstdayof1963,tofocusonthepoliticaldevelopmentsandthetrapscreatedbyMakarioshimselfuptotheendof1963inthelightoftheUSdocuments.

Keywords: Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots, EOKA, Makarios, Bloody Christmas.

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ÇTTAD, XIII/26, (2013/Bahar)

AMERİKAN BELGELERİ IŞIĞINDA KIBRIS’TA 1963 KANLI NOEL’İ

ÖzKıbrısadasıtarihboyuncagöçlervesorunlaradasıolarakbilinmiştir.Sonyüzyıla

göz atıldığındagörülecektir ki savaşınvemücadelelerindışındaymışgibi görünsede adaherzamankendisiniçatışmaların,savaşlarınvemücadelelerintamortayerindebulmuştur.Özellikle Birinci Dünya Savaşı’ndan başlayarak ada hem menfaat çatışmalarının hemdeadamerkezlibaşka çatışmaların tamortasındayeralır.AyrıcaKıbrıslıRumlarınadayıYunanlaştırmaya yönelik Enosis girişimleri yanınnda İngilizlerin Yunanistan’a yönelikpolitikasıdaadaetrafındakisorunlarıkatbekatartırır.Adanındurumunuözellikle1Nisan1955tarihindenitibarenbaşlayaraksadeceİngilizlereveTürkleredeğilkendilerineyardımcıolmayan Rumlara yönelik de terör girişimlerine başlayan ve 16 Ağustos 1960 tarihindeTürkiye, Yunanistan ve İngiltere garantörlüğündeKıbrıs Cumhuriyeti kuruluncaya kadardevamedenEOKAsaldırılarınagözatılacakolursaadapekçokmasuminsanınölümüneyolaçansaldırılarvetedhişeylemleriylesarsılmıştır.KıbrıslıTürklerbiryandanbusaldırılardankurtulmayaçalışırkenbiryandandaVolkan,9EylülveTürkMukavemetTeşkilatıgibiyeraltıteşkilatlarıkurmuşlardır. ÖteyandansonuncusuhariçbütünorganizasyonlarYunanistandestekli profesyonel EOKAyapılanması karşısında başarısız olmuştur.Öte yandanKıbrısCumhuriyetikurulmasınarağmenKıbrısTürklerineyönelikRumsaldırılarıdevamedervecumhuriyet trajikbirolayla,KanlıNoeldenilen süreçte sonaerer.KıbrısCumhuriyeti’ninilk ve son cumhurbaşkanı Makarios’un da açıkça ifade ettiği üzere Kıbrıs CumhuriyetiadanınYunanistan’a ilhakı içinbiratlamatahtasıolmuştur.Bubilimselçalışmada1963’ünilkgünündenitibarenyaşanılansiyasigelişmelerveMakariostarafındanyaratılantuzaklarAmerikanbelgeleriışığındairdelenecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kıbrıs, Kıbrıslı Türkler, EOKA, Makarios, Kanlı Noel.

Introduction

Initscombinationofscenicbeautyandromantichistoricalassociations,CyprusholdsauniquepositionamongtheislandsoftheMediterranean1.FromthedawnofhistoryCyprushasbeenthemeetingplaceofEastandWest.Themoderntravelerwill,asthepoetnaturallyexpressesinhisline,finditidealalikeforcapturingtheatmosphereofthepastaswellaspurelyenjoyingpeaceandrelaxationonitssandybeachesoramongitspine-cladforestsundertheseldom-hiddenMediterraneansun.Ontheotherhand,Cyprushasnever,unfortunatelybeensuchanislandofsilencethroughoutthehistory.EspeciallytakingWorldWarIandWorldWarIIperiodsintoconsideration,itishardlypossibleforalmostallmannerofpeopletosayortoconfessthattheislandofparadisehasgotsuchasheltertorelaxforthepeoplelivingon.TheislandofCyprushasalwaysbeenthat of immigration and the problems throughout the history. Starting from

1 RobinParker,Aphrodite’s Realm,Nicosia,1962,p.XXXIX.

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April 1, 1955, the rising EOKA organization and activities firstly against theBritishsubjectsontheislandandthenagainstTurkishandGreekCypriots,whodidnotsupportEOKAactivities,causedseveraldisruptionsincommunicationand communicationmeans. Despite the founding of the Republic of Cyprusdated16thAugust1960seemedtoputanendtothepoliticalcrisisatfirstsoonproblemscontinuedtoexistleadingtoTurkey’sinterventionof15thJuly1974ontheislandtoprotectTurkishCypriotrights2.

Starting from 1stApril 1955 up to 1960, EOKA terrorist organizationturnedtheislandofCyprusintoabloodyspot,andthelifeontheislandbecameveryunbearable3fortheTurkishcommunityaswellastheGreekCypriotsandtheBritish communities.On theotherhand, at two conferencesheld inbothLondon and Zurich, the Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis andTurkish PrimeMinister AdnanMenderes negotiated a settlement of Cyprusissue,consultingArchbishopMakarios,andDr.FazılKüçük.Finallythetreatiesweresignedbytheabove-mentionedleadersandbytheBritishPrimeMinisterHarold Macmillan on February 19, 1959 so as to establish an independent,bi-communalCyprusRepublic4. As soon as the treatieswere put signatures,everybodyinvolvedintheissueontheislandthoughtthatEnosisideaandtheobsessionofMegaliIdeawouldofficiallybeabandonedbytheGreekCypriots,andTurkishCypriotswouldget the legalprotectiontheyalwaysneededandlongedfor5.Unfortunatelynoneofthesehappened,andneitherdidtheGreekCypriotsleavetheirMegaliIdeapurposenordidtheTurkishCypriotsliveinsafety6.ThusthenewRepublicofCypruscameintobeingonAugust16,1960,18monthsafterthesigningoftheLondonAgreement.RepublicofCyprus,beingabilingual,withTurkishandGreeklanguages,wasadministeredbyArchbishop

2 CharlesFoley,Island in Revolt,LongmanYay.,Londra,s.180.3 CharlesFoley,The Memoirs of General Grivas,LongmanYay.,Londra,1964,s.133.CharlesFoley,

Guerilla Warfare and EOKA Struggle; General Grivas ,LongmanYay.,Londra,1964,s.109.4 Thearticlesofthetreatywerealsosupposedtobeveryoriginalandunique,notcopiedor

compiled fromvarious sources, but themost important characteristics of the treatywasthattheessentialarticlesofthetreatycouldnotbechangedwithouttheagreementandthemutualconsensusevenifitwassupposedtobeimposedbyBritain,GreeceandTurkeyasanimpossibleconstitution.Bytheway,thisisthemostimportantpointhere,andforexample,theacceptanceoftheGreekCypriotcommunitytotheEuropeanUnionas“theRepublicofCyprus”isobjectedbyTurkeyandTurkishRepublicofNorthernCyprus.Turningbackagain to themainpoint;beforesigning the treaty inLondon,ArchbishopMakarioshad,in reality, some certain reservations with regard to certain provisions contained in theagreements,andheofferedsomegraveamendmentswhichwerenotaccepted.Thereforehewas completely reluctant to sign the agreements.Outof thediscussionsanddebateshere,itwasalsosaidinCypruseventodaythatMakarioswasforcedtosigntheagreementssinceEOKAleaderGeorgesGrivasthreatenedhimshowingsomeindecentpicturesofthearchbishop, sohe seemed toapprove the treatiesa littlebitunwillingly.ClementDodd,StormCloudsoverCyprus;ABriefing,EothenHuntingdon,Cambridgeshire,2002,p.11.See also John Reddaway,Burdened with Cyprus; The British Connection, Rustem BrothersBookstore,Nicosia,2004,p.124.

5 ByfordJones,Grivas and The Story of EOKA,RobertHaleLimitedYay.,Londra,1959,s.14.6 SirHughFoot,A Start In Freedom,HoddrandStoughton,Londra,s.143.

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MakariosasthefirstPresidentofthecountry,andaTurkishvice-president-Dr.FazılKüçükunder thesupervisionofaCouncilofMinisters, sevenofwhomwerefromtheGreekCypriotcommunityand3ofwhomfromTurkishCypriotsaccordingto%70-%30proportionsthatseemedtobeadaptedforalltheofficialassignments, as would be applied for the police and security forces of thecountry.TheHouseofRepresentatives,ontheotherhand,consistedof50seats,35ofwhichwereoccupiedbytheGreekCypriots,and15ofwhichweretakenbytheTurkishCypriots.SimilartothePresidency,thepresidentoftheHouseofRepresentativeswasaGreekCypriotwhilethevice-presidentwastobeaTurkishCypriotdeputy.Outoftheofficialandlegitimatepositionofthegovernment,For thepurpose of the local administration, thefivemajor townsofNicosia,Limassol,Famagusta,Larnaca,andPaphoshadtheirownseparateTurkishandGreekCypriotmunicipalitiestobeelected.Thus,aTreatyofGuaranteebetweenTurkey,GreeceandGreatBritainwasput into thesignaturesoas toprovide“the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity,andsecurityoftheRepublicofCyprusbypreventingdirectorindirectEnosisorPartitionor annexationbyanyof the threeguarantor states”7.Besides theguaranteeofthesocialandlegitimatesituationontheisland,aTreatyofAlliancebetween the above-mentioned guarantor states was signed and a militarycontingentof950Greekand650Turkishsoldiers landedonthe islandunderthecommandofaTripartiteHeadquarters.Thecommandofthejointarmywastoberotatedannuallyamongtheguarantorstates,andthenewly-establishedCyprusArmywastobetrainedbythemaswell8.

UnfortunatelyArchbishopMakarioswhowas thought tobeamanofpeacebysomesincehebroketherelationsagainstGeorgesGrivaswhoupto1960 ruled and commanded EOKA terrorist organization backed by GreeceappearedoncemorethathewasstillcommittedtobringingaboutEnosisasdidMinisterofInteriorPolikarposYeorgadjiswhowastheareachiefofNicosia9, declaringfranklyandwithnohesitationonApril1,196010;

“The realization of our hopes and aspirations is not complete under the Zurich and London Agreements. The glorious liberation struggle, whose fifth anniversary we celebrate today, has secured for us advanced bastions and impregnable strongholds for our independence. From these bastions we will continue the struggle to complete victory.”

7 PierreOberling,The Road to Bellapais,ColumbiaUniversityPress,NewYork,1982,p.66.SeealsoPNVanesiz,Cyprus;Crime without Punishment;RegalPrintingHouse,HongKong,2000,p.70.FriedrichAugust,ModernIrregularWarfare,NewYork,1986,s.92-102.

8 UlviKeser,1955-1963 Kıbrıs’ta Yeraltı Faaliyetleri ve Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı,IQPublications,Istanbul,2007,p.56-125.

9 RaufR.Denktaş,The Cyprus Problem,CyrepPublications,Nicosia,2004,p.24.10 SimilarlyArchbishopMakariosmadeanotheroathatthePhaneromenyChurchinNicosia

onOctober20,1950saying“ItaketheholyoaththatIshallworkforthebirthofournationalfreedomandshallneverwaiverfromourpolicyofannexingCyprustomotherGreece.”SpecialCommitteeonCyprusAffairs,(EditedbySuatBilge)“Cyprus; Past, Present, Future”, AjansTürkMatbaası,Ankara,1963,p.9.SeealsoPierreOberling,ibid,p.68.


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WhatheannouncedasapresidentnotasanordinaryEOKAmemberthere showed that the struggle forMegali Ideaand for theannexationof theisland to Greece would continue using all the possible means he has had.Similarly,hecontinuedtothreatTurkishCypriotsandcheertheGreekCypriotsashedidonAugust15,196211;

“Greek Cypriots must continue to march forward to complete the work begun by the EOKA heroes. The struggle is continuing in a new form, and will go on until we achieve our goal.”

Similarlyhe also adds that “Until this small Turkish community thatformspartoftheTurkishracewhichhasbeentheterribleenemyofHellenismisexpelled,thedutytotheheroesofEOKAcannotbeconsideredasterminated”12. ArchbishopMakarios,neverholdinghisofficialpositions impartially, insteadof acquiring the importance and the necessity of the unity, and developingcloser relationsbetweenGreekandTurkishCypriots13 thusmademostlyuseoftheGreekCypriotschools,CyprusBroadcastingCorporation,alltheofficialinstitutions,associations,andtheorganizationssoas tocreateGreekCyprus,declaring“CyprusisGreek,andthattheTurksareintruders.”NottheRepublicofCyprusonebuttheGreekflaghoistedoverthePresidentialPalaceinadditionaltoPresidentialblackCadillac,bearingthenumberplateAK114.WhatMakariosandhis teamon the islanddesired to dowas to present the situation to theUnitedNationsandarguetheZurich-LondonAccordsclaimingthattheaccordshadneverbeensubmittedforapprovaltotheCypriotpeople,andtheprincipleof self-determinationwhichcanbe,outof theethniccommunities living inacolonialterritory15,anoblerightsoastoservethehighesthumanitarianidealsso as to supply the freedom and the liberty of the people from the colonialadministrationorthetyrannicaldictatorshipshouldbeappliedtoseethewillofthemajorityofthepeople.Ontheotherhand,MakariosrealizedthatnosupportfromtheUNandthewesterncountrieswouldcomeforhisdemands,andheheaded for the pro-ThirdWorld and pro-Soviet foreign policy.Makarios bytheway from the very beginning believed thatTurkishCypriots hadgainedexcessiveprivilegesunderConstitutionanddidnotintendtoletthemhavethem.Makarioshadalsonotpermittedfullimplementationofprovisionsrelatingtocivilservice,taxation,andCyprusArmy16.Thechaosandturmoilatmosphereovertheislandthengotdarkenanddarken,andalmostallthedecision-makinganddecision-takingauthoritieswereallcontrolledandassignedbyMakarios.11 PierreOberling,ibid,p.68.12 JohnReddaway,Ibid,p.133.13 N.C.Lanitis,Our Destiny;A Consideration of Some Problems Pertaining to Cyprus,Nicosia,1963,p.4.14 H.ScottGibbons,Peace Without Honor,AdaPublishingHouse,Ankara,1969,p.7.SeealsoH.

ScottGibbons,The Genocide Files,CharlesBravosPublishers,London,December1997,p.7–48.15 MetinTamkoç,The Turkish Cypriot State;The Embodiment of the Right of Self-Determination,K.

Rustem&BrotherPublications,London,1988,p.44.16 TelegramfromtheEmbassyinCyprustotheDepartmentofState (DOS);DOS,CF(CF),

780A.00/1-1663.Confidential,January16,1963Nicosia.

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TheMinisterofForeignAffairs,ambassadorstotheUN,theUSA,andtheUKwere all the Greek Cypriots, and Turkish community had no responsibility,control,andmissionoverthem,andTurkishCypriotswereallconvincedthatiftheycompromisedwithMakariosonmunicipalities,theirrightswhichwerebeingputasidewouldbeconsideredagain17:

“The clandestine recruiting, training and organizing of the Greek Cypriot ‘secret army’ began early in 1961. Although the EOKA organization of the 1955-1959 campaign had been disbanded, many of its weapons had never been handed over to the Cyprus Police and the loyalties and obligations of its cells remained intact. These cells became the cadres of the new force. In 1962, in the Trodos Mountains under the guidance of the Greek Cypriot officer-cadets of the Cyprus Army and using arms ‘borrowed’ from government armories. By December 1963, there were up to 10.000 Greek Cypriots who had been recruited and trained to some extent.”

The activities led and assisted by the former EOKA organizationsclandestinely,Makarios’ignorancetoseeTurkishCypriots’rightsinthecountry,unjustandunequalbehaviorstowardsTurkishcommunityfinallycauseagoodmany controversies, all ofwhichwere certainly resistedbyTurkishCypriotstoo such as the security services controversy, theArmedForces controversy,thecivilservicecontroversy,themunicipalitiescontroversy,thetaxcontroversy,the Constitutional Court controversy. Thus Makarios entrusting PolykarposYeorgadjis18, Tassos Papadopoulos and Glafkos Klerides to prepare a plannamedAkritasPlan,firstlypublishedandappearedonApril21,1966by theGreek newspaper Patris, and signed by “TheChief,Akritas” so as to kill alltheTurkishCypriotsontheislandregardlessoftheage,sex,status,militaryorcivilian.Whilecomingcloserto1963,TurkishCypriotswouldlivethedarkandbloodydaysdeterioratingmoreandmore19;

“…The plan was in fact a conspiracy to dissolve the Republic of Cyprus. It had three objectives; to get rid of the 1960 treaties so as to re-open the way to self-determination and eventual Enosis; to create the impression that the constitution was unworkable and then to amend it on this pretext so as to eliminate the powers it conferred on the Turks and to reduce them to the status of a politically impotent minority; and to suppress immediately and forcefully any Turkish reaction so as to create fait accompli before there could be any external intervention; if widespread clashed occurred, suppression of the Turkish Cypriots would be completed at once and would be accompanied by an immediate declaration of Enosis…”

17 PierreOberling,ibid,p.70.SeealsoTelegramfromtheEmbassyinCyprustotheDOS;DOS,CF,780A.00/1-1663.Confidential,January16,1963Nicosia.

18 Yeorgadjis have clandestinely established within the Civil Service and Police Forces;a sophisticatednetwork of EOKAmembers, andprepared them for the final atatcks onTurkishCypriotsonNovember21,1963.ZenonStavrinides,The Cyprus Conflict;National, Identity and Statehood, CyrepPublications,Nicosia,1999,p.4.

19 JohnReddaway,Ibid,p.134.


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1963 And In The Eve Of The Bloody Events

Deteriorationofthesituationontheisland,andGreekCypriotignorancebroughttheislandtoanewambiguity,andTurkeyexpresseditsconcernsaboutthe hardening of positions byGreek andTurkishCypriots, andwarned thatTurkeywould support the TurkishCypriots naturally as a guarantor state20. DeclarationmadebyTurkeycausedsomeproblemsintheUSAaswell,andtheDepartment of State (DOS) was concerned lest current dispute between thecommunitiesontheislanddevelopintoseriousconflictbetweenhardenedandirreconcilablepositions,realizingthatsuchconflictcouldaffordopportunitiesfor expansion communist power in Cyprus, endanger Greek and TurkishgovernmentsandseriouslyweakenNATO.21TheUSthoughtthatnoinflexibleconstitutional provisions and the solutions imposed from abroad would besuitabletosolvetheissuebutthepragmaticadjustmentsofrelationsbetweenthecommunities,andtheUSwasveryreadyagainstanyeffort,drawingtheUSinto the dispute, and to politely but firmly reject. The US government thenpointedoutsomecertainaspectsfortheinvolvedparties,expressedforNicosiato avoid indicationsundueUS concern, and counselmoderationandmutualadjustmenttotheleadersofthecommunities.Somewarningswereexpressedfor Athens that at convenient opportunities, they should continue counselGovernmentofGreecetourgeMakariostoseeksolutionwithDr.Küçük,andsome warnings for Turkey that Turkey should see American sympathy fordifficultsituationinwhichTurkeyhasbeenplaced;TurkeywouldexerciseitsinfluenceonDr.KüçüktoendthathewouldcontinuetoseekadhoccompromisewithMakarios22.Someoneweeklater,GreekForeignMinisterAveroffexpressedhisconcernthattheCyprussituationwasbecomingdangerousandstressedthattheGreekGovernment’sdesireforamoderatesolutionanditseffortstorestrainMakarios23.ButAveroffalsourgedtheUStorestrainTurkeyaswellconsideringthatPrimeMinisterİnönüwouldcompletelybacktheTurkishCypriotleadershipontheisland.TheUSDepartmentofStatewasverygladforAveroff’sfranknessin communicating his views on Cyprus as well as American Ambassador’swordsinAthens,saying“ItoldAveroffwedonotwishtobecomeinvolvedinsituation, asweconsidered thisamatter forparties toworkout, and theUSwouldurgeallthepartiestotakeamoderateapproach”24.Onedaylater,Vice-

20 TelegramfromtheDOStotheEmbassyinCyprus;DOS,CF,780A.001-763,Confidential,January9,1963WashingtonDC.



23 TelegramfromtheDOStotheEmbassyinGreece;DOS,CF,780A.00/1-1463.Confidential,January15,1963WashingtonDC.

24 TelegramfromtheDOStotheEmbassyinGreece;DOS,CF,780A.00/1-1463.Confidential,January15,1963WashingtonDC.

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President Dr. Fazıl Küçük called American Ambassador tomake a courtesyvisit, saying thatTurkishCypriotsduring recent conversationshad sincerelytriedtofindsolutionwithinConstitution,byagreeingtojointboardsandatthesame time maintaining separate municipal councils25. On the other handMakarioswhojustturnedbackfromAnkaravisitinsistedthattherecouldbenoseparatemunicipalcouncils,andhadendeavoredtoplaceblameforbreakdownof talksonDr.Küçükbysayinghehadwithdrawnhis consent.ActuallyDr.Küçükhadnevergivenconsent to theabolishmentof separatecouncils26.OnFebruary7,1963,AmericanAmbassadorinNicosiatelegrammedhiscapitalcitythat TurkishCypriot communitywas very surprised anddismayedbypressreportsannouncingthatGovernmentofCyprusmightwithhold400.000poundsannualgranttoTurkishCypriotcommunalchamberunlessmunicipalitiesissuewasresolved27.SoDr.KüçükwouldnotmeetwithMakariosas threatof thiskindwouldmakeitpoliticallyimpossibletojustifytoTurkishCypriotsfurtherdiscussionwithMakarios,andTurkishcommunitywasat losstounderstandwhyMakarioswascreatingthisnewroadblock28.Ontheotherhand,RaufR.DenktaşwouldmeetanddiscusswithGlafgosCleridesevenifDr.Küçükdidnotwishtodoso.EveniftheUSAtriedtobeoutofthedisputeandtheissuesinCyprus,theGreekpartyhadagreatinsistencetoforcethemforaninterventionintheissue.OntheotherhandtheUSambassadorinNicosiathoughtthatsuchaninterventionwouldoffernonewprospectsfortheagreementbutcausesomedelaysinresolutionoftheproblem29.TurkeyinthispointdeclarestotheUSAthatinfringementorthedeviationfromconstitutionwasoncealloweditwouldopendoortoproposalsandpressureforfurtherchanges,andthefundamentalconcernwasthatbreakdownthegovernmentalsysteminCypruswouldleadtoEnosis“whichwasthecauseofthelong-standingpoliticalCyprusissueandthedangerousGreekfanaticismderivedfromtheMegaliIdea,aimedatachievingthefinalaim;Enosis”30withGreece31.Afewdayslater,theUSambassadorinNicosiastatedthatthemunicipalitiesissueinCyprusreachedapointthatthey

25 TelegramfromtheEmbassyinCyprustotheDOS;DOS,CF,780A.00/1-1663.Confidential,January16,1963Nicosia.

26 Assomanytimesdiscussed,theUSAhadagoodmanyproblemstotackle,soitseemedtobeveryreluctanttoinvolveinandtheambassadorinNicosiasaidinresponsetoDr.KüçükthatmoderationandrestraintonbothsidesinreconcilingdifferencesofopinionwouldbebettertofindsolutionsformunicipalitieswithinframeworkofConstitution.

27 TelegramfromtheEmbassy inCyprus to theDOS;DOS,CF,POL18Cyp.Confidential,February7,1963,Nicosia.



30 VenharKeskin,Besieged,Nicosia,December2004,p.7.31 For the Americans, another important aspect here was that Makarios’ handling the

municipalityquestionhascausedthelossoffaithitmayhavehadinhisassurancesandgoodintentionstowardsTurkishcommunity.TelegramfromtheEmbassyinCyprustotheDOS;DOS,CF,POL18Cyp.Confidential,February13,1963Nicosia.


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shouldsupplementtheircurrentpolicyofcounselingmoderationbutwithmorepositiveaction,notifyingthat“anydirectUSapproachtothefactionsinCypruswouldbecounterproductiveandwouldsaddleuswithproblemforindefinitefuture”32.DespiteallthedevelopmentsandthenegotiationsinCyprus,theUSgovernmentbelievedthatitwasnotthetimeforthemtopushTurksonCyprusissue. Similarly Turkish ForeignMinister Erkin’s attempt tomake ameetingwith Averoff in Istanbul or Alexandropolis in context of “gentleman’sagreement”wasrefusedbyAveroffdeclaringthatheknewofnosuchagreementandnever replied toErkin’sproposal33.On theotherhand, theambassador’sconcern in Turkey was worth paying attention, asking “Was Makariosdeliberately trying todrive theproblem topoint ofdesperationwhich couldleadtouseofforce?ItseemedfantasticbutwhatareTurkstothink?”34MeanwhileMakarios’speechonMarch31commemoratingthe1954uprisingagainstBritishcolonialruleandsuggestinghiscommitmenttoeventualEnosiscausedTurkishreactions in Ankara, and the US ambassador in Ankara mentioned about apossible Turkish intervention in Cyprus. Moreover the US government tooagreedthatMakarios’statementswereunhelpful inbothcontentandtiming.AccordingtotheUSambassadorinNicosia,“Makarios’long-termobjectiveisnotunionwithGreecebutrathereliminationorneutralizationoftheprovisionsinLondonandZurichagreementsandconstitutionwhichineffectcircumscribesovereigntyofrepublic”35.Justonedaylater,aletterwrittenbytheAmericanambassador to Greece to Secretary of State was received with disturbing

32 For theAmericans, “in past fewdays British have demonstratedwillingness to involvethemselvesmoredeeplyinquestionbyapproachestoTurksinLondonandAnkaraandtofactionsinNicosia.Howevertheindicationsarethattheirapproachistoopiecemealandisnothavingdesiredeffect.”TelegramfromtheDOStotheEmbassyintheUK;DOS,CF,POL18Cyp.Confidential,February16,1963WashingtonDC.

33 Telegram from theEmbassy in theUK to theDOS;DOS,CF,POL18Cyp.Confidential,February23,1963Nicosia.

34 TurkishForeignMinisterErkin,accordingtotheambassador,madeaseriousbutemotionalspeech,askingforonlytherespectfortheagreementssignedin1959.ErkinalsopointedoutthatGreekjournalshadbitteranti-TurkcampaignsnowincontrasttothecalmnewsinTurkishjournals.TelegramfromtheEmbassyinTurkeytotheDOS;DOS,CF,POL18Cyp.Confidential,April1,1963Ankara.

35 ForAmericans,MakariosappearsveryconfidentthathecanalwaysrefertheissuetotheUNandreceivewidesupportuncommittedandneutralistnationsinhisstruggleagainstTurkishintervention,andMakariosthinksthateventhereferraltotheUN,orthethreattodosowouldimpeltheUKandtheUSAexertpressureonTurkeytobe“reasonable”ofcoursenottothinkofamilitaryinterventioninCyprus.TheUSpointofviewisthatMakariosis“mistakeninhisbelief,butperhapspresentsensitiveperiodisnotappropriatetimetomakepoint.”WhatMakarios tries todo is clearly realizedbyTurkishCypriots andRaufRaifDenktaşwritesalettertothePresidentoftheSecurityCounciloftheUN,saying“GreekCypriotinsistenceonrecognitionoftheintegrityandsovereigntyofCyprusbytheSecurityCouncilisatrickforfindingtheuntenableexcusetoarguethattheTreatyofGuaranteeeisnon-effectivewiththeintentionofgettingafreelicensetocontinuethemassacreoftheTurksundertheumbrellaoftheUnitedNations…”MichaelMoran,SovereigntyDivided,CyrepPublications,Nicosia,1999,p.4.SeealsoTelegramfromtheDOStotheEmbassyinCyprus;DOS,CF,POL18Cyp.Confidential,April4,1963WashingtonDC.

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information to inform the organization of a possible coup d’état against theGreekgovernment,andthedecisionofacoupd’étathasalreadybeentaken,andit is no longer a question ofwhether, butwhen36. Thus theUS involves in asophisticatedprobleminAthenstooapartfromtheoneinCyprus.5dayslater,ontheotherhand,AmericanambassadorinGreecewroteareporttotheUSAdeclaringthat“GreeceispreparedtocontinuetohelpCyprustoreachreasonablesolution, as in the past, but if Makarios should seek to force revision ofconstitution,GreeceandCyprusmustthengoseparateways.Greecehasalwayshonored its signature andwill continue todo so…”37According toMr.FazılKüçükontheotherhand,thepresentproblemaboutthemunicipalitystartedout as of minor importance and “has been blown up to unreasonableproportions”38. In contrast to Küçük’s evaluations upon the issue, Makarioshimselfhadalsopessimismoverthepossibilityofacompromisesolutiontothemunicipalities issue as he desired39, frightening and surprising the US thatMakarios’attemptswereregardedasdangerouslyerroneoustocausedifficultjudgmentsandchoicesontheUSandtheUKaswellasGreeceandTurkey40. Meanwhileanyouterinterferencebytheguarantorstatesininternalaffairsof

36 AdditionallytheUSregardsthis“disturbingsolutionasablemishonGreece’sgoodnameparticularlyintheUSA.”And“theuseofUSequipmenttoachievesucha‘solution”wouldberegardedwithgravemisgivinganddisappointmentbytheUS.”TheUSpolicyuponthissituationwasthattheorganization“wouldbeadvisedinemphatictermsofthedamagetoGreece’sinternationalreputation,theblowtoNATOconfidenceinGreece.”TelegramfromtheEmbassyinGreecetoSecretaryofState,DOS,CF,POL18Cyp.Secret,April27,1963.

37 AccordingtotheUSEmbassyinAthens,“Averoff,similarly,believeshisletterhasmadedeepimpressiononMakarioswho‘turnedwhite’whenhereadit.ItisAveroff’sopinionthatMakarioshadeveryreasontobelieveGreeksarenotspeakingidlyandthatMakarioswill realizeGovernmentofGreece isdeadlyserious.”,and this letterwasconsideredbytheDOSasa“conscientiousandseriouseffort”tobringMakarios into line,undertakenpoliticalrisks.DOSalsoannouncedthat“Athens’lettertoMakariosappearstobematurestatesmanlikedeclarationGovernmentofGreece’srespectforruleoflawanddemonstrationitsdeterminationtodoallpossible,evenatriskbeingattackedbypoliticalopposition,topersuade and pressure ArchbishopMakarios into adopting similar responsible outlookandtominimizeCyprusasboneofcontentionwithTurkey…”Twodayslater,AmericanambassadorinNicosiavisitedMakariosandemphasizedtohimthat“ConstitutionalCourthandeddownitsjudgments,andtherewasnewopportunitytosolvethisissueforpoliticaland economic benefits ofCyprus” and their continued belief in validity of London andZurichagreements.TelegramfromtheEmbassyinCyprustotheDOS;DOS,CF,POL18Cyp.Confidential,April30,1963Nicosia.SeealsoLetterfromtheAmbassadortoGreecetoSecretaryofState,DOS,GreekDeskFiles;Lot66D232,Athens,ToSecret,April5and22,1963.

38 TelegramfromtheEmbassyinCyprustotheDOS;DOS,CF,POL18Cyp.Confidential,April30,1963Nicosia.

39 TelegramfromtheDOStotheEmbassyinCyprus;DOS,CF,POL18Cyp.Confidential,May23,1963WashingtonDC.

40 HeretheUShassomehesitationthatMakariosmayhavebeenthrowingouttheideaofhispossibleappealtotheUNsoastotesttheUSreactionbeforeattemptingfurtherwiththeplansupontheissue.ThatmeansnotonlyMakarioshimselfbutalsotheUSisalsoveryconfused anddon’t knowwhat todo andhow todo beforemonitoring and evaluatingMakarios’steps.TelegramfromtheDOStotheEmbassyinCyprus;DOS,CF,POL18Cyp.Confidential,May23,1963WashingtonDC.


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Cyprus was thoroughly unacceptable for the US, and they declared it veryfrankly. June-July 1963 period was full of complicated and sophisticatedhappenings not only in Greece but also in Cyprus and Makarios was tornbetweenthechoiceswhichhewasunabletospottherightandthecorrectone,applying “the restatements of extremeGreekCypriot revisionist demands”41 Makarios on the other hand continued to provoke the Turkish Cypriots,forgettingandignoringtheirpoliticalandsovereignequalityaswellastheUS,the UK, and Turkey, making a speech on the withdrawal of the Treaty ofGuarantee. It was a clear and frank indication that Makarios tried to makemostlyuseofalltheadvantageshehashadasArchbishopandasthePresident,but the society around was sick and tired of his threats and challengingexplanationsderivingCyprusintoabloodyhellinthefollowingdays.TheUS,apartfromMakarios’clandestineandopenactivities,dealtwiththeproblemsinGreece aswell, regarding the feasible andproper level of theGreekdefenseeffortduetotheprobableavailabilityofGreekresourcesandNATOassistanceand of the competing needs of the growing Greek economy42. Greek PrimeMinister Pipinelis on the other hand tried to solve some seen and unseenproblemswith Turkey and recently he sent a proposal to Turkey for a jointconsortiumaboutthefishingrightintheAegeanSea,territorialwaters,,andthecontinentalshelfthere,wishing“ThiswouldleaveplentyoftimeforGreeceandTurkey toworkout theirmutualproblems”43. Having turnedback from theUSAtrip,MakariosseemedtoberelaxedandconfidentinhimselfsayingthatTurkishCypriotsandTurkeywouldsoonerorlaterseemeritinhissuggestionsfortheamendments,suppressingquicklyandforcefullyanyopposition44andtheobjectionsbytheTurkishCypriots,andwouldacceptthemevenifhemightbe, as stated by himself, forced to take unilateral action. Years later, whatArchbishopMakarios’attemptsderivingCyprusintoabloodyspotwasnamednothistorybut“hysteria”45.FortheUSparty,Makarioswasonthewrongtrackindealingwiththeproblem,andwithsincereandrespectfuleffort,itwouldbebetterandwisertomakesomearrangementsandnegotiationsbehindthesceneswithTurkishCypriots.

OutofCyprusissue,theUSAalsohasdealtwiththehappeningsinGreeceaswellandinadditiontothecoupd’étataction,GreekmilitaryexpendituresandGreekpressuretoreimburseithaveannoyedWashingtonDCalot.OnJune3,1963,theUSPresidentforexamplewarnedinalittlebitrudewaythatthey

41 TelegramfromtheEmbassy inCyprus to theDOS;DOS,CF,POL18Cyp.Confidential,June27,1963Nicosia.

42 Memorandum of Conversation;DOS, CF, POL US-Gr.Confidential, August 7, 1963WashingtonDC.

43 GreekoptimismhereasstatedbytheUSambassadorinAthensgotthesamereflectionfromTurkishpartyjustafewdayslater.TelegramfromtheEmbassyinGreecetotheDOS;DOS,CF,POL15-5Cyp,Secret,August16,1963Athens.

44 ClementDodd,Ibid,p.13.45 JohnReddaway,Ibid,p.125.

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didn’twanttopushGreekmilitaryexpenditurestothepointwhereittookawayfromeconomicdevelopment,and“thethreatwasalwaysthere(intheBalkans,inparticular inGreece)butnoanticipationaboutanymajorattackonGreeceorgenerally46.ThatmeanstheUSAwasactuallyfedupwithGreekbluffsandthetrickydiplomacytosupplyfinancialandmilitaryaidfromthemselves,anddemanded thatGreececoncentrateon the internalgrowthoutof themilitarythreats around if existing. Five days later Greece came into another chaoticatmospheresincePrimeMinisterKaramanlisresigned,followingadisagreementwiththeRoyalfamily.CurrentlytheUSambassadorinNicosiamadeagrandpressureuponMakariosnotifyingthateconomicprogresswhichCypruswasmaking didn’t parallel with the political progress, and Makarios defendedhimself thathewaspreoccupiedwithotherquestionsandtherehadbeennonewpoliticaldevelopmentsrecently47.MakariosalsodeclaredthatRepublicofCypruswasnotafreecountryandLondonandZurichagreementsdidn’tgivesucharighttotheguarantorcountriestointerferewiththeisland,andforhim,iftheotherpartieshadsucharightofinterventionandhadtheirmilitarypersonnelsituatedontheislandasGreeceandTurkeydidin1960,Cypruscouldneverbedescribedasanindependentcountry.InthispointMakariosseemedtoforgetorbehavedasifheforgottheBritishsovereignbasesinCyprus,regardingthemasdifferentmattersastheywerethesubjectofseparatebilateralagreements.OncemorehehashadagreatconcernandpolitenessnottodisturbandannoyBritishgovernment here as a step life preserver. The efforts created byMakarios tochangetheconstitutionalstructureandhiswayoftalksresultedaBritishnoteofprotest,withtheaimoftheminimumharmtoBritishrelationswiththeCyprusgovernment48.SimilarlyMakarios’wayoftalkingandhismannerscompletelydisappointedtheUSambassadorinNicosia,andtheambassadorrepliedhimthathehadtalkedtoagoodmanyTurkishCypriotleaderssothattheycouldstartoncemoretheearliertalksandthenegotiationsunlikeMakarios’opinionthatitwouldbefruitlessanduselesstohavedirecttalkswithTurkishCypriots.Despite the fact that theambassadorpressedMakariosveryhardtocontinuethedirecttalkswithTurkishCypriots,Makariosfrustratedeverybodyaroundconsidering different ways of solution such as reference to the UN and to

46 GreekMinisterofCoordination;Papaligourasontheotherhand,showedtheirwillaboutthe possibility of aUSparticipation in the formof a grant in theNATOGreekdefenseexercise in 1964.WhatGreecewanted todowas in fact to see theUSA in collaborationwith Greece, especially as a military partner against the “neighbors” and the threats.MemorandumofConversation;DOS,CF,POLGr-US.Secret,June3,1963WashingtonDC.SeealsoMemorandumofConversation;DOS,Secretary’sMemorandaofConversation;Lot65D330.Confidential,June6,1963WashingtonDC.

47 UnfortunatelyMakarioswasasobstinateasarockandwasdeterminedtorealizewhatheplannedbefore,declaringthatitwouldbenecessarytoreviseCyprusConstitution.Doingso,hewouldgraspalltherightsofthecitizenship,equalityofTurkishcommunity,safety,and theguarantee to liveon the island in a secureway.Telegram from theEmbassy inCyprustotheDOS;DOS,CF,POL1Cyp.Confidential,June6,1963,WashingtonDC.

48 AhmetC.GazioğluandMichaelMoran,Past-MastersofIllegality,Cyrep2000,Nicosia,p.13-14.


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guarantorstates.OutofCyprus,GreekgovernmentregardeditselfasaninterimgovernmentandthesituationinGreeceseemedtobeverypessimisticduetotheinternalproblems.SuchasituationinGreeceforcedtheUSAtoregardtheBalkansoncemoreandthequestion“IsthereanythingtheUSAcouldorshoulddoaboutit?”49cametothesurfaceagain.

OnOctober 1, 1963, at the 18th session of theUNGeneralAssembly,CypriotPermanentrepresentativeRossidesinreplytoTurkishForeignMinisterErkinsaidthatMakarios’currentbehaviorsandtheactionsdidn’tmeanthattheconstitutional guarantees of the Turkish Cypriots were in question. TurkishForeign Affairs Minister also, in turn, demanded that the agreements bethoroughlyandsolemnlybeimplementedassignedbythreeguarantorstates,recognizingtheequalexistenceofthetwocommunitiesontheisland.Accordingto Turkish minister, the municipalities question was not that of perpetualpartition of the municipalities but just a question of good will and mutualconfidenceasexpressed“thesoonertheGreekCypriotleadersareabletocreatethenecessarydegreeofinter-communalconfidence,thesoonerthepartitionofmunicipalities can be ended, at which point no one could be happier thanTurkey”50.WhileTurkeypresentingsuchabranchoftreetoGreece,Makarioswho had never been affected and influenced by anybody except forGlafgosCleridesalittleappearedagainonthestage,anditwasclearthatnoindividualpossessed any influence over Makarios striking a match over Cyprus andendangeringallthecommunitiesthere.TheweatheroverCyprusseemedtobeverygloomyandtheatmospherewasuncertainforallthepartiesinvolved,andMakariosoncemorewantedtheUStoparticipate inthe issuebyOctober28,1963topresenttherecommendationsonwhatmeasuresmightbetakensoastofinishthedangerousissue.Ontheotherhand,Turkeypaidagreatimportanceto US role in Cyprus in influencing the communities on the island and theguarantorstates,meanwhiletheUSembassyinTurkeyisatnerve,regarding“TurkishpopularreactiontoanychangeaffectingTurkishminorityinavolcanicway”51. To do so, the US government prepared a detailed plan to lessencommunal tensions and to enhance thepossibility for a settlement ofGreek-

49 ThisisalsojustadilemmafortheUSAandtheyfeellikeplanningthefollowingstrategicplansverycautiously,refrainingthemselvesfromsuchunexpectedsteps.NationalSecurityActionMemorandumNo251;DOS,S/S-NSCFiles;Lot72D316,NSAM251,Secret,July8,1963WashingtonDC.

50 Mr.ErkinalsoemphasizedthatGreecehasseveraltimesattemptedwithlittlesuccesstowarnGreekCypriotleaders.That’swhysuchanissueincreasedinadangerousandtragicwayuptoBloodyChristmasonDecember21,1963,andTurkishPeaceOperationonJuly20,1974.Erkin’ssuggestionwasthattheUSaidtoCyprusbewithheldsoastopressureuponMakarios into adopting amore sensible and communal policy, emphasizing verycarefullythathehadnevermentionedaboutthepartitionoftheislandasasolutionduetothehardshipsandthedifficultieswhichwouldbeinvolved.MemorandumofConversation;DOS,CF,POLCyp.Confidential,October1,1963,NewYork.

51 TelegramfromtheEmbassyinTurkeytotheDOS;DOS,CF,POL15-5Cyp.Confidential,October20,1963,Ankara.

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Turkish differences through cooperation in Cyprus and its economicdevelopment. Thefirst priority for theUS seemed to urge theUK to call onGreeceandTurkey toagreeona three-powerapproach toMakariosandDr.KüçükwithanassuranceofUSsupport,andthenecessityoftheleadersontheisland to reaffirm support of the London-Zurich agreement and the CyprusConstitution,someamendmentssubjecttochangeintheagreementssignedin1959ifnecessary.TheprincipalchangespresentedanddemandedbyMakariosare the unification ofmunicipalitieswithin definite time period, no separatemajoritiesfortaxmeasures,smallarmyornoneatall,civilserviceemploymentonmorerationalbasis,eliminationofVicePresident’svetopowers,consolidationofjudicialsystem,andeliminationofcommunalchambers.SimilarlyMakariosalsodesiredtoabolishandcancelTreatiesofGuaranteeandAlliancesignedbytheinvolvedstates.OnNovember11,1963,anothergentleandlogicalstatementcamefromMr.ErkintotheBritishForeignAffairsMinisterthattheCyprusissuehad escalated from a simple question of municipal to a broad attack onConstitution,notonlybecauseofMakariosbutalsobyClerides.SimilarlyDr.KüçükwhosevetopowerswantedtobeeliminatedbyMakariosstatedthathewasreadytonegotiateGreekCypriotproposalsforinstitutionalchangebuthewouldrejectanydocumentpresentingthemasamendmentstotheconstitutionofCyprus.OnNovember25-26,1963,QueenFrederikaofGreece,andSophoclesVenizelos; Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Greece were inWashington DC, the USA, and come together with the newly-appointedPresidentLyndonBaidenJohnson52.VenizelosexpressedthedeepgriefoftheGreekpeoplefortheassassinationofthelateJohnF.KennedyonNovember22,1963inDallas,andexpressingthathispartyfor11yearshadbeeninoppositionbefore forming thepresentgovernment.Venizelosalsoexpressed thatall themembersofthenewcabinetinAthenswerepro-WestandgreatfriendsoftheUSA53.Ontheotherhand,theonlyexternalquestiononwhichthenewly-electedgovernment would differ with the previous Caramanlis government wasCyprus.AccordingtoVenizelos,asMakariosalsorequestedanddemanded,soas to live on the island, it would be essential tomake some changes in theconstitution54.VenizeloswasverygladthattheBritishgovernmentunderstoodwellwhattheywantedontheisland.VenizelosalsocalledonPrimeMinisterIsmetInonuandForeignAffairsMinistertomeetatthefollowingNATOsubmitin addition to the guarantor states’meeting to be held in Paris to negotiateCyprusissue.ForVenizelosasheexpressedtotheAmericanofficials,“thegreat52 DOS,Secretary’sMemorandaofConversation;Lot65D330.Confidential,November26,

1963WashingtonDC.53 BythewayVenizelosalsoaddedthatgovernmentofCyprus,thatistosay,Makariosand

hisstaff,hadBritishsupport,andhedemandedthattheUSAcontributefindingsolutionasMakarioswantedtomakeamendmentswithoutTurkishCypriotagreement.TelegramfromtheDOStotheEmbassyinCyprus;DOS,CF,POL15-5Cyp.Confidential,November27,1963WashingtonDC.

54 DOS,Secretary’sMemorandaofConversation;Lot65D330.Confidential,November26,1963WashingtonDC.


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concernwouldbe toeliminate fromtheCyprusConstitution thoseparts thatcausedgreat friction between the communities inCyprus, and thus betweenGreeceandTurkey”55.WhathealsoaddedonCyprus“ThishadnothingtodowithanysteptowardsEnosis.”alsoshowedthatVenizelosknewalmostnothingaboutTurkishCypriotsandabouttheirdemands.AccordingtoVenizelos,theonlypurposeherewastoeliminatethedangerousfrictionsandthecontroversies,andcontrary to the storiesofdesire toprepare the island for theunionwithGreece,theoffersandtheproposalswereallintendedtomaketheislandmorelivableforthepeoplethere.ItwasalsoannouncedtherebyVenizelosthathisgovernmentwould be very glad and content to see not Cyprus as a part ofGreecebutasecondGreece inCyprus.Thus, it is franklyrealizedthatGreekgovernmenthasnoobjectionandhesitationonMakarios’activitiesontheisland,andthattheysupportMakariosblind-folded.Ontheotherhand,theUSpartseemedtobehaveverycarefulandneutralonthetopicdeclaringthattheUShadnospecificformulatosuggestforCyprusandtheirgreatinterestwasingoodrelationsbetweenTurkeyandGreeceinastablepositioninCyprus.MeanwhileamemorandumpreparedbyMakarioswasdelivered to the involvedpartiesincluding the US embassy in Nicosia, named “Suggested Measures forFacilitatingtheSmoothFunctioningoftheStateandfortheRemovalofCertainCauses of Intercommunal Friction.” Dr. Küçük had almost no suitable andenoughtimetoreadthememorandumbuthisfirstreactionwas“verybad”asexpressedbySpirosKyprianou56.Interestingly,theUSembassyinNicosiastatedthatDr.KüçükaccompaniedbyCemalMüftüzadeallthetimewouldneedonemoreweektoreadandtostudythememorandum,discussingitwithnoTurkishCypriots.Duetothedelicacyoftheissue,theUSwantedtokeepintouchwiththeGreekgovernment,butrestrainingtotakeanyinitiativeontheisland.FortheGreek delegation, the British party viewed the issuewith sympathy andunderstanding, and the USA government was also expected to do so. ForVenizelos, Makarios was ready to make concessions beyond the CyprusConstitution, and the vice-president (Dr. Fazıl Küçük) rather than theGreekSpeakerof theHouse shouldact inhis steadwhen thePresidentwasabsentfromthecountry.GreekignoranceuponTurkishexistence,andconstitutionalrights on the islandwas respondedby theUSparty that anythingwouldbeaccomplishedbynegotiationandagreement.AfewdayslateritwasclearthatTurkish government would declare Turkish decision rejecting the plancompletely,andregardingtheCyprusquestionstiffening.Turkishpositionwassupposed to be verydisappointing for theUS since ForeignAffairsMinisterFeridun Cemal Erkin’s former thought was “to study carefully and replyspecifically”,andtheUSAhadseemedsuchabehaviorwisest57.Theatmosphere55 DOS,Secretary’sMemorandaofConversation;Lot65D330.Confidential,November26,

1963WashingtonDC.56 TelegramfromtheEmbassyinCyprustotheDOS;DOS,CF,POL15-5Cyp.Confidential,

November30,1963WashingtonDC.57 TelegramfromtheEmbassyinTurkeytotheDOS;DOS,CF,POL15-5Cyp.Confidential,

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inCypruswasverydangerousandriskyandthenegotiatingpartieshavestartedobservingthedangercomingcloser,andtheUSgatheredanurgentmeetinginWashington DC, inviting Turkish Ambassador Turgut Menemencioğlu, andCounselor of Turkish Embassy İlter Türkmen.Menemencioğlu theremade atalkandmentionedonthecurrentsituationinCyprus“bytracingrecenteventsrevolving around the amendmentsmadebyMakarios,whichwere regarded“negative,unworkableandunjust”58bytheGreekCypriots,andhetiedthistotheCypruscrisisofthe1950’swhichheexplainedintermsofGreekandTurkishpublic opinion developing extreme opinions and dragging their respectivegovernment intosimilarpositions”59, showingthatTurkeywantedtoavoidarepetitionof thisnowagainupontheheartof life-and-deathissues involvingTurkishCypriots60. Makarioswasmistakenandhe failed tounderstand thatanyTurkishgovernmentwouldhaveclearlythesamereactionandtheobjectionastheInonugovernmentdid61.TurkishForeignMinisterFeridunCemalErkin,on theotherhand,madeanadditional explanation inParisonDecember15,1963 that Makarios’ proposals to amend Cyprus Constitution were highlyunsatisfactory62.ErkinalsowarnedthatifMakariosdidnotcontinuetorespectConstitution, Turkeymight find it necessary to request guarantor powers tointerfere with Cyprus, either individually or collectively. Unlike Venizelos’opinions,ErkinannouncedthatMakarios’proposalsweredesignedtodestroyConstitution and to make chaotic atmosphere in Cyprus. Even if the USgovernmentseemedandtried tobeneutralonCyprus issue,ErindemandedthattheUSAmakestrongrepresentationinCyprusemphasizingtoMakariosthathisproposalsendangeredpeaceontheisland63.TheresponseoncemoretoErkin’sdemandfromtheUSpartywasthattheUStookpositionthatguarantor

December7,1963Ankara.58 ZenonStavrinides,ibid,p.4.59 Memorandum of Conversation; DOS, CF, POL Cyp. Confidential, December 12, 1963

WashingtonDC.60 One of the hesitation as well as the army and the police presented and restrained by

Turkishpartywasthevetopower,anditwasparticularlyveryimportantandnecessary“as a safeguard against communist strength in Cyprus, a subject which President JohnFitzgeraldKennedyhadreferredtoinhisconversationwithFeridunCemalErkin.”Bytheway,Kennedy,andSecretaryofDepartmentRusk,Mr.Erkin,andMenemencioğlucametogetheronJune1,1963butnomemorandumofthisabove-mentionedgatheringhasbeenfoundthere.MemorandumofConversation;DOS,CF,POLCyp.Confidential,December12,1963WashingtonDC.

61 ItisreallyveryimportantandworthmentioninganddecliningthatMenemencioğluduringthismeetingpointedoutanimportantaspectsayingthat“therearenorealCypriots,onlyGreekCypriots andTurkishCypriots”, andTurkish andGreek governmentwould alsospeakupforitsfellownationals.Doingso,Menemencioğluhasmadesomereflectionsandremembrancenotonlyforthedayatthetimebeingbutalsoforthedaywearelivingnow,especiallyrememberingtheartificealdiscussionsupon“Kıbrıslı,kıbrıslıtürk,kıbrıslırum,etc.”

62 TelegramfromSecretaryofStatetotheDOS;DOS,CF,POLTur.Secret;PriorityDecember15,1963Paris.



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statesweretheoneswhichcouldbestresolvetheCyprusissue,declaringthat“the US had already enough problems on its agendawithout taking on theCyprusdispute”64.TheNATOMinisterialMeetingheldinLondononDecember18-19tunedtobeagoodchanceandopportunityfortheministersinvolvedtonegotiate the issue indetail.On theotherhand, theproposalsmade there tosolvetheissue“onceandforall”seemedtobeillogicalandunacceptablefortheTurkishparty65;

“To solve Cyprus problem once and for all, one of two possible alternatives indicated; 1) union with Greece or 2) independence within British Commonwealth cutting alliance with Greece and Turkey. Greek and Turkish alliances were merely sources of friction. Troops maintained in Cyprus cannot defend the country and can only turn possible internal conflicts into broader ones. Greek and Turkish forces should leave and UK (should) remain.”

Asseenandexpressedclearly,BritishForeignMinistrythoughtthatonlyproblemherewasTurkishgovernment,Greekswouldagree,andtheUKwasfavorable.Doingso,theBritishauthoritiesalsoseemedtoforcenotonlyTurkishgovernmentbutalsoTurkishCypriots,declaringthatTurkishCypriots’refusaloftheamendmentsandthenegotiationswouldcausedangeroussituationsasin“speak softly and carry a big stick”66.

Bloody Christmas Butchery And Cyprus On December 1963

21st December 1963 is known and remembered throughout Cyprushistory,inparticular,fortheTurkishCypriotsastheBloodyChristmasortheBlackChristmas.ItisBloodyandBlackChristmasbecausetheEOKAgunmenhaveattackedonasmallNicosiadistrictwheretheİlhanFamilyhaslivedupto21stDecember1963.Dr.Major(thenBrigadierGeneralinTurkishArmy)wasassignedamissioninTurkishPeaceForcesCommandestablishedin1960,andstartedservingthereasamedicalmilitarypersonnel.AssoonastheGreekCypriotattacksbrokeoutinNicosia,healsodirectlywenttotheHQuntilDecember28,1963.WhenheturnedbacktoNicosiaagain,whathefoundandwitnessedtherewasatragedyandhumanitarianshamecausedbytheGreekCypriots.NotonlyMajorNihatİlhan’swifeMürüvet,his3childrenHakan,KutsiandMuratbut


65 TelegramfromSecretaryofStatetotheDOS;DOS,CF,POL25CYp.Confidential,December18,1963.London

66 ThisisaveryunfortunatesituationandunluckydeclarationmadebyBritishForeignMinisterthat“peopleofCyprus”shoulddecideforthem,andnowthat82%ofthepopulationisGreekCypriot, the issue should be solved and decided by “democraticmeans.” BritishMinister frankly andopenly expresses that themajority of thepopulationon the islandisGreekCypriots so they themselves should decide upon the destiny of Cyprus, using“democraticmethods”asdonein1950’sintheplebisciteofwhichtheresultwasknownintheverybeginning.

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alsothewifeofthelandlordHasanYusufGudum;FeridewereshottodeathwildlyandHasanYusufGudum,hisnephewAyşe,Növberandher2year-olddaughter IşınwereseriouslywoundedasexpressedbyLeFigaroon January25,1964asexpressedinthejournalbelow;“IhaveseeninabathtubthebodiesofamotherandofherthreeyoungchildrenmurderedjustbecausetheirfatherwasaTurkishofficer.”ThephotographshowingthemotherandthreeinnocentsonskilledinthebathturnedtobethesymboloftheGreekCypriotbrutalitythen. According to the report announced by Secretary General of the UNdatedSeptember10,1964,109evacuatedTurkishvillagesweredamagedwith507Turkishhouses,morethan2000houseswereseriouslydemolished,some25.000TurkishCypriotswere turned tobe refugees inaddition to the lossofagricultural,economic,social,educationalaspects67.Thenonedaylater,BritishHighCommissionerhadseparatetalkswithMakariosandDr.KüçükupontherecenthappeningsespeciallyinNicosia,andtheDepartmentofStateinformedBritishEmbassythereaboutthedesireforajointrepresentationofGreekandTurkishCypriot leaders around a circle table“with the aim of restraining both the police and Turkish rioters in the aftermath of violent clashes”68 between thecommunitiesresultingfivedeathsatonce.AccordingtoDr.KüçükwhowasverypessimisticaftersuchatrocityinNicosia,describingtheeventsasanewstepfortheGreekCypriots to change the constitutionand the treaties explained thatGreekCypriotpoliceforawhilehadbeenharassingTurkishCypriotsatnightandPolicarposYeorgadjisinchargeoftheİnteriorMinistryhadbeenirresoluteandbiasedinhisreportingtoArchbishopMakarios,andinhandlingtheevents.Dr.Küçükalsosuggestedthataquickcommissionofinquirybeplanned,andajointvisittothesceneofaltercationberealizedatonce.ModerationandrestraintwereDr.Küçük’skeypointsbuthedidn’tknowhowlonghecouldcontrolhisowncommunityinfaceofsuchcontinualGreekCypriotprovocation.YeorgadjiswasalsodemandedthattheGreekCypriotpoliceforcebekeptoutofTurkishvicinity, andoutofprovocativemanners against theTurkish community.BythewayMakariosalsoacceptedDr.Küçük’soffertosetajointcommissionofinquiry,hopingthatthemeasurestakeninCypruswouldbehelpfulinbringingdowntensionandrestoringpeace,andaddingthathewouldnotmoveforwardas quickly with his plans for the constitutional changes. Meanwhile GreekgovernmentunfortunatelygivesagreatamountofassistanceandsupporttotheGreekCypriot“genocidalactivities”69anddeployingclandestinelymorethan20.000soldiersandtheammunitionstotheisland.ThustheeventsfinallyshownthatGreekCypriotsunderthecommandofPolicarposYeorgadjisestablishedapara-militaryorganizationstartingfrom1960,and inadditionto theeffortstochangetheconstitutiontheysparkedoffDecembercrisisandcollapsedthe67 HalukBayülken,CyprusQuestionandtheUnitedNations,Ankara,July1983,28.68 Telegram from theEmbassy inCyprus to theDOS;DOS,CF,POL25Cyp.Confidential,

December22,1963Nicosia.69 Fatma Demirel, Never Again, TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence;Public

RelationsDepartment,Nicosia,p.6.


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republic in thisway70.OnDecember 23, 1963, theUS ambassador inAnkarawasaskedtovisitTurkishForeignMinisterErkin,andErkintoldhimthathehadmadevery fruitful negotiationswithVenizelos inParis onDecember 20just one day before theGreekCypriot attacks against TurkishCypriots, andtheyhadcometoanagreementthatmutualeffortshouldbemadetosolvetheproblemsabouttheconstitutionalchangesinCyprus.NeverthelessassoonasheturnedbacktoAnkara,helearnedofseriousdisordersandtheGreekCypriotattackskillingsomeinnocentpeopleinNicosia.ThenPrimeMinisterinAnkarademandedthattheattacksonTurkishCypriotsceaseatonceandMakariosbeheldresponsible for theviolencecausedby theex-EOKAmilitias71. It isoncemoreworthunderliningherethattheUSdidn’tbelievethehostilitiesoccurredin Cyprus were not planned by either side, declaring “…that leadership ofboth communities making genuine effort to halt fighting, and that armedundergroundorganizationsinbothcommunitiesareoutofcontrol.Extremistsonbothsidesaccuseleadershipofothersideofplottingattacks”72.MeanwhileTurkishambassador inWashingtonDCdescribed theworsening situation inCyprus,emphasizingallegedmergerofpoliceunitswithEOKAandattacksonTurkishCypriotwomenandchildren73.ThenTurkishambassadorwarnedtheUSauthoritiesinWashingtonDCthatTurkisharmedforceswouldactwithorwithoutciviliangovernmentinCyprus.ThatmeantTurkishmilitaryexistenceinCypruswhichwaslocatedafterthefoundationofRepublicofCypruswith650militarypersonnelorTurkisharmyfromTurkeywouldpushthebuttontomake an operation on the island. SuccessivelyTurkishNATO representativeonDecember25,1963madea longspeechpayingattention toespecially twoimportantpointsofTurkishcommunityindangerofmassacrebyGreekCypriotsand of the intention of Turkish government to act unilaterally by deployingTurkisharmytoCyprusiftripartiteactionbyguarantorstatesprovedunabletocontrolthesituationthere74.SurprisinglyoncemoretheUKcalledTurkishandGreekambassadorsinLondonandproposedthemajointmilitaryinterventioninCyprusimmediatelyandthemilitaryinterventionwouldbeunderthecontrolofBritishcommand,andatfirstwouldbeverylimitedandconfinedtomilitaryunits75. That offered seemed tobebaloney andnot acceptedby the involvedpartiesatall.Makarios’andhisgovernment’srequestforaUNSecurityCouncil

70 ZaimM.Necatigil,TheCyprusQuestionand theTurkishPosition in InternationalLaw,OxfordPressPublications,Essex,1999,p.25.

71 TelegramfromtheDOStotheEmbassyinTurkey;DOS,CF,POL25Cyp.Secret,December24,1963WashingtonDC.

72 TelegramfromtheDOStotheEmbassyinTurkey;DOS,CF,POL25Cyp.Secret,December24,1963WashingtonDC.

73 TelegramfromtheDOSto theEmbassy inCyprus;DOS,CF,POL25Cyp.Confidential,December24,1963WashingtonDC.

74 TelegramfromtheDOSto theEmbassy inCyprus;DOS,CF,POL25Cyp.Confidential,December25,1963WashingtonDC

75 TelegramfromtheMissiontotheNATOandEuropeanRegionalOrganizationstotheDOS;DOS,CF,POL25Cyp/NATO.Secret,December25,1963Paris

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meetingaboutthefutureoftheislandcausedseriousreactionsinAnkaraandTurkish government declared that Makarios’ first and real purpose was tomake lifesounbearableon the islandforTurks that theywouldbe forced toleaveCyprus so as tomakeCyprus aGreek island forGreece.On the otherhand theUSembassy thought thatTurkishCypriotswouldacceptandsettlefor autonomywithmore effectiveguarantees suchas largerTurkishmilitarycontingentinCyprus.

Conclusion

Because all theGreek efforts tomake the island aGreekone startingfrommainly1950scametoanendwithfailureintheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil,andtheresultoftheplebicitewasalsoinvalidtoaccepttheislandasaGreekone,Greecehadonlyone solution for themselves, that is the armedstruggleagainstTurkishCypriots.Thenwhatwecamefacetofaceontheislandwas the EOKA terrorist organizaton turning the island into a bloody lake.Thus1955-1960periodwasfullofagoodmanyatrocities,imprisonmentoftheTurkishCypriots,embargoandtherestrictionadopteduponTurkishCypriots,immigrationandrunawayfromtehriskyvillagestotherelativelysecurepartsof the island, lossof innocent lives, tears, and the innocentblood.Under theguaranteeoftheUnitedKingdom,TurkeyandGreece,thebloodyspotpositionoftheislandgotwantedtobechangedandonAugust16,1960,theRepublicofCypruswasdeclared to the international public but unfortunately even iftheRepublicofCypruswasestablishedunderthesignatureofthreeguarantorstates,ıtdidnotunfortunatelywork,andtherepubliccametoatragicendwiththeBloodyChristmas.Theeventsleadingtotheoverthrowoftheconstitutionalstructure of the republic, Makarios’ attempts to demolish the governmentalsystemdisregardingandignoringtheequalrightsandtheexistenceoftheTurkishCypriotsontheislandcausednothingbuttheturmoil,chaos,andfinallyBloodyChristmas.MegaliIdeaobsessioncomingwithEnosistargetneverlessenedthetensioninCyprus,buthigh-rocketedthecommunaldispute,fightingandthetyrannythere.Doingso,therepubliclivedonly3yearsand4months.NotonlythePresidenthimselfbutalsoeventheMinisterof InteriorAffairsPolicarposYorgacishadagreatintentiontobutchertheinnocentTurkishCypriotsontheisland, andnaturally such a republic having such bloody-handedpersons inchargecouldlastnolonger,anditdidn’t.Makarioshimselfwasveryconfidentthat the newly-established government and the administration on the islandwerejustaforwardstepandasteppingstonetoservetheaimofeventualEnosis.EvenaftertheverysignaturedayoftheLondonTreaty,MakarioshadtoldtheoneswhocametowelcomehimthathisEnosisstruggleonthe islandwouldcontinue. Such an archbishop and the presidentwas surely unable to follow


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theconstitutionalrightsforallthecommunitieslivingontheisland,andhedidwhatheplannedwithhisassociatessuchasYerogadjis,Papadopoulos,andtheothers,assassinatingthegovernmentalstructureoftherepublicandcausedtherepublictodemolishonNovember21,1963.

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RESOURCESI. Archives

TheUSDepartmentofStateArchive/WashingtonDC

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BAYULKEN,Haluk,Cyprus Question and the United Nations,Ankara,July1983.

DEMIREL,Fatma,Never Again,TRNCMinistryofForeignAffairsandDefence;PublicRelationsDepartment,Nicosia.

DENKTAŞ,RaufR.,The Cyprus Problem,CyrepPublications,Nicosia,2004.

DODD, Clement, Storm Clouds over Cyprus; A Briefing, Eothen Huntingdon,Cambridgeshire,2002.

FOLEY,Charles,Island In Revolt,LongmanYay.,Londra.

FOLEY,Charles,The Memoirs of General Grivas,LongmanYay.,Londra,1964.

FOLEY, Charles, Grivas, General, Guerrilla Warfare, Longman Yay., Londra,1964.

FOOT,SirHugh,A Start In Freedom,HodderAndStoughtonYay.,Londra.

GAZIOĞLU, Ahmet and MORAN, Michael, Past-Masters of Illegality, Cyrep2000,Nicosia.

GIBBONS,H.Scott,Peace Without Honor,AdaPublishingHouse,Ankara,1969.

GIBBONS, H. Scott, The Genocide Files, Charles Bravos Publishers, London,December1997.

JONES,Byford,Grivas And The Story of EOKA,RobertHaleLimitedYay.,Londra,1959.

PARKER,Robin,Aphrodite’s Realm,Nicosia,1962.

KESER,Ulvi,1955-1963 Kıbrıs’ta Yeraltı Faaliyetleri ve Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, IQPublications,Istanbul,2007.

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OBERLING,Pierre,the Road to Bellapais,ColumbiaUniversityPress,NewYork,1982.

Special Committee on Cyprus Affairs, (Edited by Suat Bilge) Cyprus; Past, Present,Future,AjansTürkMatbaası,Ankara,1963

STAVRINIDES, Zenon, The Cyprus Conflict; National, Identity and Statehood, CyrepPublications,Nicosia,1999.

TAMKOÇ,Metin,The Turkish Cypriot State;The Embodiment of the Right of Self-Determination,K.Rustem&BrotherPublications,London,1988.

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