Blitzkrieg - Kris Thompson

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Part I appeared in the May-June 1998 issue. - Ed.

Introduction

The introduction of the internal com-bustion engine into the military at thebeginning of this century changed war-fare in a fundamental way. Mobility andmounted warfare took on a whole newmeaning. The ability to use the engine topower all sorts of vehicles caused mili-tary theorists to compete in developingthe best way to employ this new way of waging war. In the previous two thou-sand years, only the advent of gunpow-der had such a revolutionary effect.

Blitzkrieg - The Theory

After WWI, which proved to be abloody experiment for the proponents of tanks, there was rigorous debate in everycountry that was a major power aboutthe proper employment of motorized andmechanized forces. One man eventuallydominated the debate — Heinz Gu-derian.

He had a friendly face with piercingeyes and a close-cropped, graying mus-tache. He had a lopsided smile with adimple in one cheek when he smiled —which was not often. It was said of himthat he was a difficult officer to work

with, a poor listener, critical and direct tothose (even his superiors) who disagreedwith him, and that he had little feeling ortact. Yet, at the same time, he was imagi-native, analytical, energetic, and tena-cious. 1 Heinz Guderian had originallybeen an infantry officer. In January1922, Guderian was appointed to theMotorized Transport Department of theGerman Army as a captain. For the next15 years, Guderian studied, analyzed,experimented, reasoned, and finally de-veloped a concept for using mountedforces to win campaigns.

What was Blitzkrieg, as envisaged byGuderian? Everyone has their own ver-sion. Len Deighton, in Blitzkrieg, fo-cused on the materiel side, listing infil-tration tactics, tanks, and the radio as the

three vital components.2

Bryan Perretlists tanks, the use of air power, the indi-rect approach, effort aimed at a strategicobjective, with the “keystone” of blitz-krieg being a breakthrough with pursuitof the routed army until its will to fighthad been broken. 3 Of course, both Mr.Deighton and Mr. Perret, as well asmany other authors who have written onthe subject, are correct in some aspects.But because of the fascination with thematerial side, analysis often gets boggeddown on tactics. Many writers focus onhow the panzer division conducted busi-ness. This approach, I think, misses amajor component of the blitzkrieg phi-losophy — which is at the operationallevel of war.

Guderian’s Concept

Guderian’s refined ideas were publish-ed in 1937 in Achtung - Panzer ! This isa remarkable book, and is must readingfor every armor officer. His true geniuswas demonstrated by his conceptualizinghow tank and motorized forces couldbring about tactical victory “and then ex-ploit it into the operational dimension.” 4He placed great emphasis on this basictheme. 5 Winning rapidly in the opera-

tional dimension was a must because of the economic stress of warfare. Guderianviewed mounted warfare as a “means tobring an armed conflict to a rapid andtolerable end.” 6

Guderian’s basic principles for employ-ment of tank forces were:• Surprise - attained through speedy and

well-concealed movements, or newtechnology.

• Deployment en masse - the concentra-tion of tank forces where we seek togain the decision.

• Suitable terrain - enough to allow thetank forces to move through it in suffi-cient breadth and depth.

Guderian also pounded away at severalother main points. He stressed combinedarms in mounted units. He believed allcombat arms necessary to support thetank formations had to be mechanized ormotorized and able to move at the samespeed. This brought about the forming of panzer and panzergrenadier divisionswhich were, at least in theory, com-pletely mounted.

His writing strongly stresses the use of joint air-ground operations. He repeat-edly emphasizes the use of close air sup-port in halting or delaying the movementof enemy reserves. He also repeated aSheridan theme — that the maneuver of mobile forces, now mounted in tanksrather than on horses, should not be tiedto the infantry and artillery:

“Tanks will lose the capacity toconcentrate on the decisive spot if they are incorporated as organicelements of all the infantry divi-sions...The possibility of speed iskilled stone dead, and we forfeit allreal hope of attaining surprise and decisive success in combat... Wewill...lose thereby the means of ex-

ploiting at speed any successes onthe part of the first echelon. We willgrant the enemy time to bring up re-

serves, re-establish themselves inrearward defenses, beat off our en-veloping movements, and concen-trate for counter-attacks.” 7

Of course, by concentrating tanks enmasse for the breakthrough and exploi-tation , moving them deep into the en-emy rear at speed, the enemy does nothave time to commit reserves, constructnew defensive positions in depth, orlaunch counterattacks. Guderian pre-dicted this would result in operationallevel success. It is interesting that Ger-

ARMOR — July-August 1998 55

Trends in Mounted Warfare: Part II

BLITZKRIEG And the Operational Level of Warby Lieutenant Colonel Kris P. Thompson


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man panzer leaders, such as Guderian

and Von Thoma, routinely favoredlighter, faster tanks with longer ranges(able to go deeper and faster in penetra-tions to the operational level) for themain armor force. 8

Guderian was somewhat vague onwhat would be the principal target of themounted forces. Given the raging debategoing on at the time, he probably did notwant to tie himself down. At one point,Guderian suggests the tanks are meant to“execute deep breakthroughs aimed atreaching the enemy command centersand reserves and destroying the hostileartillery.” 9 At another place, Guderian

adds in the necessity of victory over theenemy anti-tank defenses and tank re-serves as the gateway to a pursuit. Atstill another point he lists the tank forces’“principal foes” as hostile tanks, antitank guns, and artillery, in that order. 10 Butthen Guderian returns to his theme of having an impact at the operationallevel:

“One could imagine how at thebeginning of a war the armored

forces could strike at vital enemyairfields or other relevant objectivesclose to the border; again, after successes on the ground at a later stage of the war, the tactical air-craft, airlanding troops, and tank

forces could be assigned commonobjectives deep in the enemy rear,with the aim of breaking the en-emy’s power of resistance with theleast loss of life. This is a concept of warfare which has so far re-ceived little attention.” 11

Thus, “blitzkrieg,” in Guderian’s mind,was a mounted force centered on thetank (supported by mounted infantry,ground attack bombers, and mobile artil-

lery), used to break through enemy de-

fenses with mass and speed, and thenexploit to break the enemy’s will, result-ing in operational level victory. Indeed,Guderian’s subtitle for the book was“The Development of Armored Forces,Their Tactics and Operational Poten-tial .” (emphasis added)

The 1940 Campaign in France

We all know the story of how the Ger-man Army ran roughshod over France in1940. This campaign was certainly con-ducted very close to Guderian’s blueprintfor success. This campaign gives us astark comparison of two ways to employ

mounted forces.The Germans adhered to Guderian’s

principle of mass. The Germans attackedwith 2,400 tanks and around 2,600 air-craft. The French and allies defendedwith approximately 3,400 tanks and1,700 aircraft. The Germans concen-trated their armored units into compact,all-mounted forces with five of the tenavailable panzer divisions concentratedin a Panzer Group (two corps) at themain point of attack. These divisionswere followed by three motorized infan-try divisions. The French and British frit-tered away their tanks by scattering themamong the infantry corps, for the mostpart. Of the 3,400 tanks available, abouthalf were penny-packeted in battalions tothe infantry, one quarter were formed incavalry divisions for security missions,and the remaining quarter were formedinto small tank divisions. 12 Even thissmall tank reserve was not under a corpsheadquarters.

The Germans also achieved surprise.The French, much like the Americansfour years later, negligently ignoredmany intelligence indicators of an as-

sembly of German forces in the area of the main attack. 13 They were banking onthe assurances of the French IntelligenceService that they would give the Army24 hours warning of any invasion. 14 Andone aspect of the surprise was the terrainconsidered by the Germans to be suit-able for a large armored thrust. The at-tack came through a “no-go” area — theArdennes. The French had declared thisregion “impenetrable.” 15 In the Germanplanning process, however, Guderianhad personally certified the area as feasi-ble for the maneuver of the armoredforces. Another aspect of the surprisewas the use of airborne and airlanding

units in surprise pre-invasion assaults onkey enemy positions.

Further, the Germans directed theirmain attack so as to avoid the moststrongly held portion of the French posi-tion — the Maginot Line to the south of the intended decisive point. It alsoavoided the area in Belgium to the northwhere the Germans expected the Alliesto advance and occupy defensive posi-tions. The main effort of the attack camein the middle, against Sedan, which theGermans knew was the boundary be-tween two second-class divisions. Thiswas an operational level weak point.And although the invasion planners werenot counting on political turmoil in theallied governments to aid them, thelaunching of the attack happened the dayafter both the English Prime Minister,Neville Chamberlain, and French PrimeMinister, Paul Reynaud, had offeredtheir resignations. 16

The Mechanisms of Defeatat the Operational Level

The employment of the Germanpanzers clearly resulted in the rapid, op-erational-level victory promised byGuderian. What were the mechanisms of defeat in the way the exploitation andpursuit was carried out by the panzers?There were both physical and psycho-logical effects which reduced, and even-tually broke, the enemy’s will and capa-bility to carry on the fight.

Physical Effects

There were two significant physical ef-fects. The first is isolation. The penetra-tion by the German main effort was de-signed to go all the way to the coast andthereby cut off the allied forces in Bel-

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Panzers in Poland. Guderian’s concept — the use of armor penetrations to break through andparalyze enemy command and control — was further developed in France in 1940, when the nu-merically inferior Germans quickly defeated the French and the British.


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gium. These isolated units would be de-stroyed in an attack from the rear, 17while the French reserves to the southwere prevented from massing by spoil-ing attacks by forces on that flank of thepenetration. Then, after defeating theseisolated units, France would be on itsown. This plan was strikingly similar toNapoleon’s “central position” concept. Itwas key that the penetration occurquickly, preventing the two allied wingsfrom reestablishing ground lines of com-munication with each other. It also cutlines of communication within theFrench Army on the southern flank of the penetration.

After the penetration by the massedmounted units of the German Army,there was no delay or slowing. Just theopposite occurred — the pace of the ma-neuver quickened. The average rate of advance was about 30 miles per day,with some units achieving a staggering60 mile advance.

The second physical effect is exposureand destruction/displacement of com-mand, communication, logistics andother “soft” assets . By penetratingfaster than the defending Army couldprepare a cohesive defense in depth, allof the “soft” targets and installationsnecessary for an army to function werecontinually subject to direct attack bytanks, infantry, and dive bombers. Thesesoft targets include logistics sites, com-mand posts, transportation assets, and

airfields.18

The exposure to direct attack caused these soft targets to be destroyed,or to continually be displaced, whichgreatly reduced their effectiveness. It isvery clear that it was the intent of theGerman plan to destroy the isolated al-lied units in the north by attacking theirvulnerable rear areas and destroying orcutting them off from their ports. 19 Thus,the “target” of the penetrating mountedunits was the “soft” assets of the Alliedunits in Belgium.

Rommel reported that French soldiersfrom artillery and supply units “tumbledheadlong into the woods at the approachof our tanks...” Such units cannot pro-vide fire support or supply hard-pressedcombat units. The displacement led todestruction as the panzer troops fired onthe move, destroying military vehicles,and sending soldiers and civilians alikeinto “wild flight.” 20 Artillery units disap-peared without ever firing a shot afterunexpected encounters with Rommel’stank columns.

When the Allied air assets were forcedto displace, their usefulness erodedquickly as secondary airfields were not

as good as the original airfields, and thetransportation and supply organizationwere not quite up to the task.

Psychological Effects

FM 100-5 apparently defines “shock”to mean firepower, armor, and speed. 21Yet, shock emanates from the psycho-logical makeup of soldiers, not thephysical. It was the psychological effectof the German attack which caused theFrench will to fight to “spring a leak,”then gush, then flow away as a ragingtorrent. What sprung the leak was thefear in the hearts of those soldiers at the“soft” targets — the artillery gunners,the truck drivers, the headquarters per-sonnel — of having to undergo an attack from tanks with no real means of de-fense.

The decisive point in the campaign oc-curred shortly after the assault crossingby the infantry at Sedan. A colonel fromthe French corps artillery in the area is-sued a report that he was displacing hisheadquarters and some heavy batteries tothe rear and that “German tanks were ar-riving” as he was moving out. 22 This of-ficer’s rumor spread like wildfire. An of-ficer from a French infantry unit indepth then witnessed:

“A wave of terrified fugitives, gun-ners and infantry, in transport, on

foot, many without arms but drag-ging their kitbags, swept down the

Bulson Road. ’The tanks are at Bul-son!’ they cried. Some were firingtheir rifles like madmen... Gunners,especially from the corps heavy ar-tillery, and infantry soldiers fromthe 55th Division, were mixed to-gether, terror-stricken and in thegrip of mass hysteria. All these menclaimed actually to have seen tanksat Bulson and Chaumont... Panicbrooked no delay; command postsemptied like magic.” 23

In fact, no German tanks were actuallyin that area, although they were prepar-ing to cross the Meuse. 24 This “leak”

quickly impacted the French center of gravity — its artillery. For 150 years ithad been the case that if the guns stoodfast, the Army stood with it. When theguns pulled out, so did the rest of theArmy. The hysterical mob grew andgrew as the word spread that the gunshad pulled out. The rumors becameworse. Everyone started spreading re-ports of panzers in the rear areas. Com-mand posts displaced without warningtheir subordinate headquarters. Officersbegan assuming there was a generalwithdrawal and issuing orders to pull

out. Communications centers were aban-doned. Demolitions were triggered pre-maturely. Jittery infantrymen shot firstwithout confirming targets, resulting infratricide. All this displacement, of course, took place on the road, whichmade these units great targets for thedive bombers and fighters to strafe.Commanders issued conflicting, indeci-sive orders. This is breaking the enemy’swill to fight.

Blitzkrieg - Refined

For the remainder of WWII, command-ers on all sides attempted to emulate the1940 campaign. There were notable suc-cesses — such as Operation Cobra, thebreakout from Normandy; the initialstages of the campaign in Russia in1941; and the Afrika Korps’ initial cam-paigns. There were also notable failures— such as Operation Goodwood, Opera-tion Market Garden, and the Ardennescampaign of 1944. The successes weregenerally characterized by Guderian’srecipe of mass, surprise, and suitable ter-rain, together with attacking a weak point, exposing “soft” targets to attack,speed in the penetration, and penetrationto operational level depths. The failureswere caused by one or more of the fol-lowing: attacking strength or locationswhere the enemy had positions in depth,failure to have local air superiority, ter-rain difficulties, or by having a slow rateof penetration (allowing the enemy tomaneuver reserves to defeat the attack-ing units).

The American Experience

Of course, General George S. Patton,the “Godfather” of the Armor Force andthe most successful practitioner at theoperational level of using American ar-mored forces, was very much influencedby Guderian’s concepts. He read

Achtung Panzer immediately after thebook was translated, 25 along with numer-ous other books and treatises on Germanarmored doctrine. After the Carolina Ma-neuvers of 1941, he railed about being“reduced to the speed...of the infantry”by having the Armored Force under thecontrol of an infantry headquarters. 26 Histrain of thought on the use of armoredforces, expressed prior to his involve-ment in WWII, mirror Guderian’s con-cepts in many ways:

• 1940 - The brigade he commandedwas “designed to strike and penetrateweak points in the enemy’s defensiveline; or else to outflank and envelop theenemy’s defenses. In either case, the bri-gade was to destroy enemy commandposts, communications centers, supply

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