Global Development Assistance

Professor Changrok Soh

GSIS - Korea University

Spring 2011

Blind in Rwanda

Development Aid, Genocide and Human Rights

Cosmin M. Visan

7 June 2011

Korea University

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Introduction

When dealing with donors you are dealing with humans, and you have to deal with them as you would milking a cow. Treat

them nicely and more milk flows than you would have expected; treat them badly and they kick over the bucket.

- Rwandan Ministry of Finance official, quoted by Rachel Hayman.

Prior to the 1994 genocide, Rwanda was seen by many in the international community as a model

country in terms of development. It was called by some a development dictatorship,1 and ranked, since

independence in 1962, as one of the largest per capita recipient of foreign aid on the continent. The World

Bank praised Rwanda for its political stability as well as its ethnic and socioeconomic homogeneity.2

After the genocide, Rwanda regained its place as one of the most aided countries in sub-Saharan Africa. It

also won the esteem of donors as one of the safest, cleanest and least corrupt nations on the continent, a

darling of the foreign aid world and something of a central African utopia.3 Josh Ruxin, former director

of a health program at the John F. Kennedy School of Government was optimistic: Ive worked in fifty

countries and I think this is the only country that stands a chance of migrating from extreme poverty to

middle income in the space of the next fifteen years.4

These views are false. Even though the interactions between aid and human rights in Rwanda are

complex, the picture that emerges is that the international community has often acted out of good

intentions but not with clear understanding or insight. This kind of blindness will be explored by looking

at a number of questions. Part One focuses on the role of development assistance in causing the 1994

genocide. Part Two briefly examines the international political context in which the genocide took place.

Part Three considers the nature of the post-genocide government, including in passing its actions in

the Congo/Zaire. Part Four builds on that understanding in order to ponder the actions and dilemmas of

the aid community in Rwanda after the genocide. A number of theoretical considerations will round up

this study and attempt to provide a framework for the interaction between aid and human rights.

1 Regine Andersen, How Multilateral Development Assistance Triggered the Conflict in Rwanda, Third World Quarterly,

vol.21, no.3, (2000), p.443. 2 Peter Uvin, Development, Aid and Conflict, (Helsinki: UNU/Wider, 1996), p.14.

3 Jeffrey Gettleman, Rwanda pursues dissenters and the homeless, New York Times, April 30, 2010. 4 Quoted by Stephen Kinzer in Big Gamble in Rwanda, The New York Review of Books, March 29, 2007.

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1. The Role of Development Aid in the 1994 Genocide

Prior to the 1990s, development aid accounted for 11.4 percent of its GNI in 1989-90, above the

average for Africa. By the 1990s, there were about 300 donors in Rwanda, managing more than 1,000

projects. Per capita, aid had increased from an average of US $45 per person in the 1980s to US $80 and

above in the early 1990s.5 As mentioned before, the World Bank saw Rwanda as a socially cohesive place,

where the government was pursuing appropriate objectives. Indicators offered an impression of objective

progress, with GDP growing an average of 1.5% a year from 1965 and 1988,6 and life expectancy at birth

growing from 42.3 in 1960 to 47 in 1984.7 The overall view of the donor community was that, while there

were plenty of challenges, Rwanda had a government committed to development, a development

dictatorship, that offered a model for other countries.

This optimistic view was shattered by the horrific genocide of 1994, a fact that traumatised many

a donor. But a number of studies make the point that it was more than a case of blindness on the part of

the donor community; a strong claim has been made that development aid was one of the triggers of the

genocide. This is not the claim that the Hutu extremists who perpetrated the killings are thereby excused,

or that aid was the only or the main cause of genocide. It is, however, a claim that aid played a significant

role in bringing it about. The argument has been explored by a number of researchers, with important

contributions from Peter Uvin, Regine Andersen, Andy Storey and Michel Chussudovsky. The main

thread connecting these is that the international community ignored (and aggravated) the political and

social situation in Rwanda, preferring instead to treat development as a separate sphere and that when it

started to focus on democratization and peace it chose exactly the wrong actions and promoted them with

destabilizing vigour.

1.1. Structural Violence

Peter Uvin has argued, with great effectiveness, that the aid community acted in a way that

created and perpetrated structural violence. This violence, in turn, was one of the triggers for acute

violence, the physical extermination of opponents.8 Structural violence is understood as actions directed

against the poor. These actions and policies widen inequality, increase corruption, arbitrariness and

impunity; create social and economic exclusion; create a lack of access to health, education, information,

5 Uvin, Development, Aid, and Conflict, p.15. See also Table 1 for OECD stats.

6 Uvin, p.13. 7 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN/countries/RW?display=graph. It is interesting to note that life expectancy starts declining after 1984, to a low of 26.4 in 1993, before the genocide! 8 See the argument in Development, Aid, Conflict, (1996), expanded into a book in 1998 (Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, West Hartford: Kumarian Press).

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and basic necessities, and deprive the poor from access to power or representation.9 In Rwanda, even

before 1990, increasing numbers of people were subjected to this structural violence. This kind of

violence bred acute violence: anti-Tutsi racism gave the poor a convenient ideological explanation for

why their lives were getting worse, and this racism in turn led to physical attacks that acted as a pressure

release for frustration and opportunity for plunder.

Central to all of this is the importance of history. The aid community insisted on looking at

development issues at the same time as Hutus and Tutsis were reacting to each other based on very real

and vivid memories of trauma and murder. A full recapitulation of history is not necessary here, but a

brief sketch will provide a useful context. Rwandas independence in 1962 was accompanied by a Hutu

social revolution. The Belgian colonists, and the Germans before them, had favoured the traditional

Tutsi ruling class (or caste). European ways of reading race and superiority into people they met were

grafted on what had been a real historical difference. The colonizers, though, rigidified the difference

between Hutus and Tutsis, proclaiming the latter as scientifically superior, introducing a system of racial

identity cards, and centralizing power in the hands of the Tutsi court through which they ruled. In the late

50s, the Belgians became rather wary of the Tutsis, which they perceived as being more radical and left-

leaning, and switched their preference to the majority Hutus. The latter came to power, overthrew the

Tutsi king, and engaged in pogroms that saw hundreds killed and many exiled. Tutsis tried to return by

force of arms in 1961-6310

only to be repulsed. Following this, around 30,000 Tutsis were killed and

around 130,000 fled to neighbouring Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi. By the 1990s, these escapees would

number over 1 million. In neighbouring Burundi, where Hutus were also the majority, the Tutsi army

engaged into one of the first genocides after the Holocaust: around 100,000 to 200,000 educated Hutus

were eliminated between April and November 1972. Another 300,000 fled across the border into Rwanda.

The world has largely forgotten the Burundi genocide, but it lived on in the memory of Hutus and Tutsis

in the region.11

One of its more immediate effects was the spur it had on Rwandan General Habyarimana,

a northern Hutu from Gisenyi: in 1973 he removed the southern Hutu Kayibanda, and instituted harsher

systematic controls on the Tutsis.12

The Hutu elite (mostly from around the presidents home town)

excluded Tutsis from the army, diplomatic service, and the parliament. Ethnic quotas of up to 9% were

imposed for higher education and state jobs. Everyone had to carry ethnic identity cards and were the

9 Uvin, Aiding Violence, p.107.

10 Uvin, Development, p.7.

11 See Rene Lemarchand, Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which Genocide? Whose Genocide? (African Studies Review, vol.41, no.1, April 1998), p.10. 12 Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa, (New York: Public Affairs, 2005) p.489.

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subject of prejudicial propaganda. It is important to note that southern Hutus were also discriminated

against13

in access to universities to and jobs.

This state of affairs continued until the 1990s: Habyarimana ruled autocratically, to the benefit of

northern Hutus and a northern mafia-like network, akazu (meaning Little House). Tutsis were

discriminated against but not killed; the population of exiled Tutsis grew, and so did their longing for

return; and the aid agencies focused on developing Rwanda. Peter Uvin makes the point that the aid

agencies were not only blind to this history of violence, and to the reality of ethnic discrimination in

Rwanda.14

Their blindness to the political, to the reality of discrimination, had a very real effect: their

projects went to enrich the northern Hutu elite. This elite, after all, of which the very top was the akazu,

was urban, educated, and had access to the development projects and contracts offered by the aid agencies.

Uvin looks at one such project, the Mutara agricultural project, which began in 1974.15

The aim of the

project was to settle 7,000 families on government-sponsored farms; in exchange for the land, the farmers

had to agree to apply certain agricultural techniques. By 1991, it was clear the project was an abysmal

failure. Not everyone lost, however: up to 40% of the lands were given to absentee landlords (i.e. not

people for whom the project had been designed), and urban elites got control of the buildings too.

This project, as many others, failed to do what it set out to do, but instead enriched those with connections,

the evolues (evolved in Rwandan parlance) at the expense of the rural poor.

It is in the background provided by projects such as these that we can look at the statistics of

development. After 30 years of development following independence, Rwanda remained one of the

poorest country in the world. Access to education, safe water, or sanitation, had stagnated for decades.

The World Bank indicates that the poverty rate in fact grew from 40% in 1985 to 53% in 1993. Even

these figures are suspect, according to Uvin16

as the World Bank arbitrarily set the poverty rate at 40% for

1983-85. In fact, the number of the ultra-poor,17

derived from data on children malnutrition or stunting,

hovered around 50%. At the same time, the growth in population, and the fact that Rwanda did not allow

people to move into urban areas without a permit, led to ever increasing pressures on land. These were

aggravated by the governments confiscation of land for the benefit of development projects, and the

increasing acquisition of land by urban elites. The situation was aggravated by a series of external shocks:

the price of coffee, Rwandas main export, fell starting in 1985, debt increased, and the government was

forced to sign a structural adjustment programme with the World Bank. The currency was devalued twice,

13 Uvin, Development, p.10. 14 The aid agencies did not, for example, protest against the ethnic identity cards, regardless of the ominous connotations and

Nazi parallels. These cards would be later used during the 1994 genocide. 15 Uvin, op. cit, p.20-22. 16 Op cit, p.19. 17 Defined as those who spent more than 75% of income on food, and are often malnourished or sick.

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public job hiring was frozen, salaries eroded. A severe agricultural and food crisis hit Rwanda, lowering

the average calorie intake from 2,055/day to 1,509/day.

It seems clear the aid community ignored the human rights situation, the violent history, the

dictatorial nature of the Habyarimana regime, the systematic discrimination, and the growing inequality.

It may even be argued that the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s worsened the poverty. In

the face of this deteriorating situation, the Hutu regime intensified its propaganda: the Tutsis were offered

up as scapegoats, and the population was encouraged to see them as the cause of their misery.

This propaganda acquired a ring of truth to it when the Tutsi exiles, under the aegis of the

Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from Uganda. These were English-speaking Tutsis,

hardened by years of battle on behalf of Museveni, the man who won the Ugandan civil war in 1986. The

RPF caused a panic in Rwanda and nearly took over, but were pushed back after France rushed troops

into Kigali. A few years of stalemate followed, with the RPF confined to the north of the country. A

series of peace talks resulted in the Arusha Peace Accord, signed in 1993 in Tanzania. The Accord called

for power-sharing with the RPF, and was bitterly opposed by extremist Hutus in the military, akazu, and

security services. Meanwhile, in neighbouring Burundi, the Hutu president, Ndadaye, was assassinated by

the Tutsi army in 1993 (soon after being elected, due to fears of a Hutu takeover). Over 20,000 Tutsis

were hacked to death following this, and the Tutsi army responded by killing at least an equal number of

Hutu civilians. 300,000 Hutus fled across the border into Rwanda, fuelling Hutu conviction that the Tutsis

were their blood enemies, and that they would never accept rule by the majority Hutus in either country.

1.2. The World Bank, the Multilaterals and State Weakening

There is a debate, conducted mostly between Regine Andersen and Andy Storey, as to the effect of World

Bank and multilateral agencies on stoking the conflict. Regine Andersen argues that the multilaterals

pushed for three policies in Rwanda: economic structural adjustment, the multi-party democratisation

process, and the peace negotiation and implementation process. All of these had the effect of weakening

the state, which allowed extremist elements to take over. Storey argues that aid actually increased after

the structural adjustment program was announced, and that this money enhanced state legitimacy and

power. The main problem, according to Storey, is that the World Bank and others were blind to the reality

of Rwanda, and that this blindness is partly explained by a view of the state as a neutral arbiter of

competing interests. The World Bank, in other words, viewed the Rwandan state through a technocratic

lens, as problem-solver, as a partner in development; the main failure is that of ignoring the true nature

(exploitive, discriminatory, authoritarian, racist) of the Habyarimana regime.

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Rwanda was pushed into democratizing in 1990. A multiparty system was introduced, and

Habyarimana was finally forced to share power in 1992.18

This, remember, was during a civil war, and a

structural adjustment programme (SAP). The latter led to a devaluation of the currency, inflation, a freeze

in state hiring, and higher fees for health and education. We can combine the factors mentioned so far in

order to see how the push for democratization would work in 1992: the SAP combined with the external

shocks (price of coffee, food crisis) to deepen structural violence (inequality, deprivation). At the same

time, the ideological underpinnings of the regime increasingly relied on calling the Tutsis as threat and

offering them as scapegoats. Multilateral conditionality restricted the governments choices in a time of

economic hardship; at the same time, large sums of cash were handed over to the regime in order to ease

the effect of the SAP. The parties that formed were, unsurprisingly, more radical than the government,

more violent in their rhetoric against the Tutsis. The militias that formed around this time, composed

largely of poor landless Hutus, fed on the increasingly violent rhetoric coming from the politicians. At the

same time, the international community pushed for the implementations of the Arusha Accords.

Conditionality was actually practiced this time, and the US and the World Bank threatened to interrupt

disbursements19

unless the Accords were implemented. Habyarimana had no choice but to comply, to the

extreme distaste of the akazu, who would be sure to lose their privileges under the new regime. Shortly

after the signing of the accords, Habyarimanas plane was shot out of the sky and the killings of Tutsis

and moderate Hutus began. Andersens argument is that this was partly because of the way in which the

multilaterals had acted: their three-pronged approach destabilized the Habyarimana regime, weakened the

state and allowed the extremists to take over.

Andy Storey disagrees. He thinks that the World Bank and other donors did not weaken the state;

on the contrary, their liberal cash advances as part of the SAP and their technocratic view of government

actually strengthened the state: much of that support was absorbed into a structure of elite enrichment and

militarisation.20

It wasnt corruption which did this, says Storey, nor the all-too-human desire to airbrush

reality and see only what you want; it was, in effect, the inability of the Bank to read the regime

accurately because they were committed to a specific view of the state: not the state as an ideological

actor, a vehicle for elite enrichment, an expression of the power-structures in society, but the state as a

bureaucracy, a neutral arbiter of various interests. They saw the state basically as they saw themselves: as

an authoritarian enclave by which is meant a group of experts not influenced by populist passions, who

follow the dry and precise laws of economic growth. The task of the state was, then, to persuade people of

18 Regine Andersen, How multilateral development assistance triggered the conflict in Rwanda, (Third World Quarterly, vol.21, no.3, 2000), p.449 19 Op cit, p.451. 20 Andy Storey, Structural Adjustment, State Power & Genocide: the World Bank and Rwanda, (Review of African Political Economy), vol. 28, no.89, Sep. 2001, p.377.

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the wisdom of the proposed reforms, and failure would be measured by the inability to sell the reforms

to the electorate. Note how this vision departs from the reality of Rwanda, where the state was not neutral

at all; it was in fact, a very interested actor, one with strong preferences as to the outcome. The Bank,

though, was also an interested actor, in the sense that it had a high opinion of itself, of the rightness of its

mission, and of the neoliberal policies it was promoting.21

At the same time that it was committed to

neoliberal reforms, which called for a reduction of the role of state in favour of the market, the Bank and

other neoliberal actors were also forced to interact with States. They did so by building the fantasy image

of a State which was technocratic and shared the neoliberal vision of the Bank itself.

I dont believe that it is necessary to take sides in the Storey-Andersen debate. The answer is that

international donors both strengthened and weakened the Rwandan state. What does that mean? Let us

start by looking at Storeys remarks about the role of the akazu in Rwanda. The akazu were a mafia-like

network from Gisenyi, the home-area of Habyarimana and his wife. They received one-third of the jobs in

government, they made up almost all the leaders of the security forces, and took a great share of

development projects and higher education places. In addition, they were involved in drug smuggling,

prostitution, arms dealing, siphoning off of foreign aid and legitimate commercial enterprises. Storey also

mentions the worsening economic situation, the concentration of land ownership into fewer hands, the

costs of the civil war, and of the internally displaced.22

All of this led to a rupture between the rulers and

the ruled, and to anti-government discontent. What can we conclude from all of this? The state was

weakened in the sense of being unmoored. It helps if we think of the Rwandan state as being partially

privatized, in the sense of serving the interests of a private group, the mafia-like akazu. Now, the state

was not completely privatized, but the economic crisis, combined with the civil war, and the structural

adjustment programme drastically limited its choices. It had less and less money to distribute to the

ordinary people; wealth could no longer trickle down through state jobs, for instance, or health care,

education, or cash from exports. So the combination of all these factors, including the SAP and the push

for democracy, had the following effect: the State was weakened in its ability to deliver services, jobs,

a standard of living. At the same time the state was strengthened, but only temporarily, and mostly in its

ability to engage in violence; it was clear that the edifice was under attack, and that if the Arusha Accords

were implemented, the akazu would lose power and privilege. So the Rwandan state was unmoored from

its social obligations: the ties, feeble as they were, that connected the population to the government, were

21

Op. cit. p.380. 22

Following the RPF invasion, the Rwandan army grew from 5,000 in 1990 to 30,000 in 1994. The RPF army grew

as well after it was initially repelled in 1990, to over 25,000. The Hutu government spent millions of dollars a year

on the military, funds diverted from official aid. The RPF invasion displaced over 900,000 Hutus, which fled the

northern areas. See Human Rights Watch Arms Project: Arming Rwanda, January 1994.

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cut. Everybody knew that changes were coming. The Hutus with power resisted them viscerally while the

population was whipped into a frenzy by real and imagined fears.

This combination of factors had a number of possible outcomes, but one of the strongest and most

predictable ones was that the regime would solve its political problems violently. War, after all, has been

called the continuation of politics by other means. This should have been obvious to the international aid

agencies, and to the international community. It was clear that the groups with real power in Rwanda

believed that only violence could solve the bind they were in: violence could eliminate the internal

problem (Tutsi civilians) and the external one (the RPF).

To this scenario one must a further, aggravating fact: the Habyarimana government used SAP

funds in order to buy weapons, and recruit more soldiers. These funds were diverted from the general

budget, without the donors noticing.23

Chossudovsky also says that the US was behind the RPF, and that

it acted to establish an American Protectorate in Central Africa. This is a controversial claim, to say the

least. It is not necessarily one that should be dismissed, but at this point the evidence for it is rather sparse.

It does bring us to the next point in the story: the role of international politics in the Rwandan genocide.

Before moving on, let us summarize some of the main points regarding the role of the international

development community:

1. The actions of the development community bear a significant responsibility in creating a situation of

structural violence. Development projects were blind to the nature of the Habyarimana regime, and

favoured the akazu elites, all the while contributing to rising inequality.

2. After the 1990 RPF attack, the response of the international community served to push the

Habyarimana regime in a corner, allow the rise of extremists, and deepen the effects of the economic

crisis. At the same time, an influx of cash from the World Bank and other donors gave the regime the

means to militarise, and allowed elements inside it to plan for a final solution to their problems.24

Preliminary Conclusion #1:

For most of its history in Rwanda, the donor community ignored the political. When they started focusing

on it, their actions betrayed a profound misunderstanding of the situation.

23 Michel Chossudovsky, Rwanda: Installing a US Protectorate in Central Africa, (http://www.globalreserach.ca/articles/CHO305A.html, May 2003) p.2 24 It is clear that the genocide was planned, and that Radio Mille Collines played a crucial role in it. Who exactly planned it, and

whether there was a Zero Network behind it, is still a matter of controversy.

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2. International politics and the genocide: France and the Anglos

A full exploration of the politics of the 1994 genocide is impossible in this space. There are,

however, certain reference points that can be sketched, albeit with a large brush. Starting with 1990, and

the RPF attack on Rwanda, the situation in the country was aggravated by a series of policy decisions that

showed a large degree of cognitive dissonance. The attack of the English-speaking Tutsis from the

English Uganda set off alarm bells in France, which considered francophone Africa as its exclusive

domain. This is not just a metaphor: France had extensive military alliances with French Africa, the

currency (CFA franc) was supported by the Bank of France, and its military forces routinely intervened to

prop up client dictators and quell rebellions. France thinking was dominated by the Fashoda Syndrome, a

reference to the famous French humiliation at the hands of the British in southern Sudan in 1898. France

saw American actions in Central Africa as part of larger plot to impose Anglo dominance on an arc of

countries from Ethiopia to Uganda, Rwanda, and the Congo.25

In 1990, as RPF troops made their surprise

attack and Habyarimana looked close to collapse, the French rushed in military reinforcements in

Operations Noroit and Panda. The RPF was halted, and it had to withdraw back to Uganda to regroup.

After that, France played a key role in arming the Rwandan army, including heavy weapons and missiles.

It provided extensive on-the-ground training of the army, the Presidential Guard, and the security forces.

It also trained Rwandans in guerrilla and information warfare, with techniques developed by the French

from its colonial adventures from Vietnam and Algeria among other places. This training and arming

continued through the months of genocide, up to the victory of the RPF. As it became clear that the RPF

was going to win, France rushed in troops in the Operation Turquoise, sanctioned by the UN Security

Council. The Operation established a safe haven in the south of the country, incidentally allowing the

genocidal Hutu regime, its army, and over a million of the Hutu population to escape into Zaire/Congo.

The Rwanda policy was conducted in secret, at the highest levels of the Francois Mitterand government.26

So it was French paranoia which led to very concrete material support of the genocide; a wilful blindness

caused by strong memories of historical humiliation, and a neo-colonial sense of entitlement in Africa.

But was the paranoia real? Huliaras says no, that the US policy may have appeared conspiratorial but was

in fact ad-hoc, and often driven by short-term considerations and inter-agency fights. There was,

according to him, no grand plan to replace the French in Central Africa, a master plan to establish an

English cordon from Ethiopia to the Congo. But the paranoia was not completely fabricated: Kagame did

receive training in the US, the Ugandan president did support the RPF invasion of Rwanda, and American

25 This is commonly accepted by commentators on France in Africa. See especially, Asteris C. Huliaras, The anglosaxon

conspiracy: French perceptions of the Great Lakes Crisis, The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 36, no.4, Dec. 1998. 26 His son, Jean-Cristophe Mitterand, was deeply involved. See the accounts written by Patrick de Saint-Exupery, including his

interviews online (Rwanda, 15 ans aprs Patrick de Saint Exupery, 15 April 2009, youtube.com)

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officials did make statements to the effect that the African market is open to everyone, that France could

no longer keep Africa as its private domain after the Cold War, that neocolonialism is no longer

tolerated.27 As US diplomats started pushing francophone leaders for US contracts for oil and

telecommunications, as the US military trained Ugandan (later RPF) officers, one could see how this

would feel deeply threatening to France. A full account of US actions in Central Africa will not be

possible until there is full declassification of documents, but one conclusion seems clear: power politics

between France and the US played a major role in fuelling the fires that led to the genocide.28

France

feared losing power and influence in Africa, and it acted to support a deeply racist and genocidal regime.

To this day, a full investigation of French actions has not been possible, and French government has

refused to accept full responsibility for its actions in Rwanda.

It is clear that French realpolitik considerations led it to turn a blind eye to the genocide; it is also

possible that American actions also played a part, but that is not well documented.

Preliminary Conclusion #2:

Power politics realist considerations about the loss of power and influence in Frances African sphere (a

collection of client African states) played a major role in the genocide.

3. The Nature of the Kagame Regime

The RPF has been in power since winning the war in 1994. It came to power as an army that stopped a

genocide, and as a Tutsi force that was returning after decades of exiles in order to claim their rights as

Rwandans. It is to be noted that the RPF portrayed itself as a force composed of moderate Hutus and

Tutsis, that the first head of the RPF was a Hutu, Kanyarengwe. This, however is a facade. The RPF is

Tutsi, and the real power at least since 1990 has been Paul Kagame.29

In 2003, Kagame won his first

elections with 95% of the vote. The RPF won the legislative elections in 2008 with 98.3% of the vote,

which they then lowered to 78.76% in order to avoid embarrassment. Kagame won re-election in 2010,

after gaining only 93% of the vote. This is remarkable to say the least, considering that the RPF is a Tutsi

27 Huliaras, p.603-604. Statements by Herman Cohen, assistant secretary of State for African Affairs under the Bush

administration, and Daniel Simpson, the US Ambassador to Zaire. 28 French Minister for Cooperation Bernard Depre, in the government of Henri Balladur: What one forgets is that, if France was on one side, the Americans were on the other, arming the Tutsis who armed the Ugandans. I dont want to portray a showdown between the French and the Anglo-Saxons, but the truth must be told. In Chussudovsky, p.3. 29 Stephen W. Smith, Rwanda in Six Scenes, London Review of Books, 17 March 2011, v33. No.6. There is no real controversy on this point.

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party in a country where the Tutsis are still only around 15% of the population, whereas the Hutus are

around 84%.The RPF, however, claims to have gone beyond ethnicity and to govern for all Rwandans in

the name of national unity.

The nature of the Kagame government matters for the same reasons that the nature of

Habyarimana government mattered: its actions determine the existence or obliteration of human rights in

Rwanda, and also the levels of poverty, or the effectiveness of its economic programme. It is this

government that must be engaged by international organizations and donor countries.

The first point to notice is that Kagame is well-respected and praised, especially in the United

States. Stephen Kinzer calls him an intriguing man, guided by a doctrine of security, reconciliation, anti-

corruption, and a drive towards self-reliance. Under him, Rwanda has avoided becoming a Tutsi

dictatorship.30

Indeed, even though Kinzer notes human rights problems and criticisms, it is clear that he

sees those as understandable under the circumstances. Madeleine Albright characterized Kagame and

Museveni as part of a new breed of African leaders; they know the greatest authority any leader can

claim is the consent of the governed they share a common vision of empowerment for all of their

citiziens.31 As the elections of Kagame demonstrate, he has mastered over 90% of the consent of the

governed.

The second point of note is that Kagame and the RPF are very skilled at manipulating public

opinion. This task is made easier by the fact that the international community, especially the UN and the

United States, is suffering from intense guilt for not stopping the genocide. There are, however, a number

of reports that paint a different picture from the one offered by the Kagame government:

The Gersony Report. These are the findings of a 1994 report by a team led by Robert Gersony

for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. It concerns the activities of the RPF

behind the lines in 1994, and after they won the war. The findings were suppressed by the United

Nations, and its existence was denied. An authentic summary of the report is now available online,

however. The report documents killings of Rwandan civilians by the Tutsi RPF between April

and September 1994. The killings appeared systematic,32

included entire families, with no attempt

to establish complicity in the genocide of the Tutsis by the Hutus. The report estimates a number

of between 5,000-10,000 being killed per month, between late April and September, 1994.

30 Stephen Kinzer, Big Gamble in Rwanda, The New York Review of Books, March 29, 2007. 31 Quoted in Rene Lemarchand, US Policy in the Great Lakes: A Critical Perspective, Issue: A Journal of Opinion, vol. 26,

no.1, 1998, p.43. 32 Summary of UNHCR Presentation Before Commission of Experts, UNHCR, 10 October 1994, p.4. Can be downloaded through: http://rwandinfo.com/eng/unearthed-the-un-%E2%80%9Cgersony-report%E2%80%9D-on-rwandan-rpf-rpa-mass-

killings-in-1994/

13

UN Mapping Report on the Congo, 1993-2003. This massive report, published in August

2010,33

was vehemently denounced by the Rwandan government. The report maps crimes

committed during the wars of the Congo. Among these, it documents massive crimes against

humanity committed by Rwandan troops. The latter attacked Hutu refugee camps (some of the

camps holding people guilty of the 1994 genocide), and massacred large numbers of Hutu

civilians. The report finds grounds for saying that these mass killings constitute crimes against

humanity, but it does not commit itself to as to whether they constitute genocide.34

Others,

including respected scholars like Rene Lemarchand, have not hesitated to talk about three

genocides: the 1972 one of Tutsis against Hutus; the 1994 one against Tutsis; and the one after

the 1996 invasion of Congo by Rwanda, against Hutus.

Dispatches from Disaster Zones. It is to be noted, that during the first invasion of Congo by

Rwanda (1996), and the second (1998), the Kagame government made sure to isolate the conflict

areas from journalists and NGOs. The Rwandan governments skills at information warfare were

apparently honed in the United States (psy-ops training and media handling), and may have been

bolstered by private security firms hired from outside.35

As a result of this manipulation, the

extent of the Rwandan involvement was hidden, and so were the killings committed by the

Rwandan troops.

Human Rights Watch. Various country reports, the latest one in 2011, tell a story of a

government that imprisons opponents, assassinates critics abroad, shuts down opposition parties,

closes newspapers, and arrests journalists. It seems that journalists are indeed free to say what

they want, as long as it supports the Kagame government.36

To these reports one might add a more general and even more worrying picture painted by studies

such as Filip Reyntjens.37 His charge is that the international community has been complicit in the

rebuilding of a dictatorship under the guise of democracy. Despite certain achievements, amply

documented by the World Bank, Rwanda has been turned into a Tutsi dictatorship. The initial feeling of

inclusiveness, when officials from the old regime returned to Rwanda and were ready to co-operate with

the RPF has long been gone. Hutu elites were harassed and some forced into exile; they were followed by

33 Can be downloaded through http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ZR/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_EN.pdf 34 See UN Mapping Report, p.13. The question is whether the Hutus were targeted as such, and this, says the report, should be

established by a court. 35

See Nik Gowing, Dispatches from Disaster Zones, Conference Paper, London 27 and 28 May 1998. http://www.sergiocecchini.it/tesi/documenti/DISPATCHES%20FROM%20DISASTER%20ZONES.pdf Gowing, who now

works for the BBC, mentions an interview with Kagame, where he said central to my studies at Leavenworth were organisations, tactics Psy-Ops, psychology and information.. p.16. 36Human Right Watch, various publications, http://www.hrw.org/en/by-issue/publications/117. 37 Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship, African Affairs (2004), 103.

14

Tutsi genocide survivors, and then the RPF old hands. It is a fact not often noted that there is a tension

between Tutsi of the interior, those who lived under Habyarimana in Rwanda, and those of the exile,

who lived in the camps around Rwanda. The interior Tutsi were the main victims of the genocide

(estimates say two quarters of them were butchered), and were always seen by Kagame and the exiles as

somewhat inferior to the exiles.38

The exiled Tutsis, between 500,000 and 1 million, returned after the

RPF victory and took over many businesses in cities (the Tutsization of cities). Despite talk of ethnic

inclusiveness, over 80% of mayors and university staff and students are Tutsi, and so are the majority of

MPs, most Supreme Court presiding judges, almost the entire army command and intelligence services.

The instruments of power and enrichment are concentrated in small networks based on a shared past in

certain refugee camps in Uganda, belonging to same schools and kinship links.39 The government has

also profited massively from the plunder of the Congo, all of which was done off the books, in accounts

parallel to the national accounts.

It is this which leads Stephen W. Smith to say that eager to pay off our moral debt, we are

blinded by guilt.40 Indeed, when one superimposes the reality of countless human rights reports with the

praise lavished on Rwandas development efforts, one cannot help but gasp with the shock of recognition:

this is a developmental dictatorship, albeit one where ethnicity is unmentioned in the name of national

unity.

Preliminary Conclusion #3

Blinded by guilt, the international community has ignored or found excuses for RPFs massive crimes,

and the establishment of a Tutsi dictatorship in Rwanda. The focus has been on developmental success,

and on the rebuilding effort - in other words, on economics and stability.

4. The Development Community in post-genocide Rwanda

Go to the World Bank website, and the page on Rwanda greets you with a number of positive

indicators. GDP has gone up from 1.7 billion in 1985 to 5.2 billion in 2009. The literacy rate has grown

from 58% in 1991 to 71% in 2009. Life expectancy has risen from 29 in 1995 to 50.6 in 2009.41

The

poverty headcount ratio has gone from 60.4% in 2000 to 58.5% in 2009. GDP per capita has gone from

38 Reyntjens, p.180. 39 Op cit, p.188-89. 40 Stephen W. Smith, Rwanda in Six Scenes, p.11. 41 Note, however, that life expectancy had plummeted from a high of 47 in 1984 to a low 26.3 in 1993. It then slowly rose until

reaching 47.5 in 2004.

15

333 US$ in 1993 to 521$ in 2009. GNI per capita (PPP) has gone from 640$ in 1993 to 1,130$ in 2009.42

Rwanda is praised as one of the safest country in Africa, committed to development, with a strong anti-

corruption ethos and a technocratic and cosmopolitan bureaucracy. The World Bank gushes with praise:

Rwanda continues to be considered a model partner, which uses financial assistance effectively, and

continues to attract a large number of donors.43

If, however, one looks a little deeper, the reality does not seem so encouraging. The UNDP

Human Development Report for 2007 was endorsed by the Rwandan Minister of Finance. It makes the

requisite noises regarding democracy: in 2003, it says, Rwanda has adopted a new constitution that

guarantees basic political freedom and human rights for all.44 The report delicately skirts around the

human rights and political repression issues, mentioning some criticisms, but excusing them by saying

that, given Rwandas violent past, an excessively rapid democratization could crystallize ethnic

tensions.45

It is in the area of poverty, however, that we see some figures which balance the World Banks

rosy assessments. Recall that Peter Uvin had drawn attention to the high rate of ODA per capita ($80/year

in the early 1990s, one of the highest in Africa). By 2009, ODA per capita had reached 93$ (Table 3).

The UNDP report notes that the high aid and increase in per capita income had not really affected the

ranks of the poor: by 2007, the Gini coefficient had almost doubled in the last 20 years, placing Rwanda

among the top 15% most unequal countries in the world.46

Whereas the bottom 20% of the population had

a 9.7% share of the national wealth in 1985, by 1995 this had gone down to 6.7% and by 2000 to 5.4%. In

fact, every quintile except the top had seen losses. The top 20% had increased their share of wealth from

39.1% in 1985 to 48.3% in 1995, to 51.4% in 2000. By 2006 this had gone up to 58.2% while the lowest

20% had gone down to 4.2% Even the World Bank (once one looks a bit at the data), shows a rise in the

poverty headcount rate at 1.25$ a day (PPP) from 76.6% of the population in 2000 to 76.8% in 2006.

Malnutrition prevalence for children under five (stunting) has risen from 47.8% in 1996 to 48.3% in 2000,

to 51.7% of children in 2005. Recall again, that this is the indicator that Peter Uvin has used in order to

gauge the true levels of ultra poverty for Rwanda prior to the genocide. The UNDP Report adds to this

picture by noting that the indices for food poverty are very high: from 62% to 80% for every area of the

country, except for Kigali urban, where it is 20%. Over 80% of adults currently work in agriculture, with

71% classified as subsistence farmers; the Rwandan government, however, invests barely 3% of its ODA-

supported budget in agriculture.47

One reason for this may be because the Rwandan government relies on

42 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/rwanda?display=graph 43 Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report for Rwanda, World Bank, August 7, 2008, (published in February 2011), p.3. 44

Turning Vision 2020 into Reality, UNDP National Human Development Report- Rwanda 2007, p.1. 45 Op cit., p.75. 46 Op, cit. p.17. 47Op, cit. p.11. ODA constitutes some 18% of GNI for 2009: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CFPEXT/Resources/299947-1266002444164/index.html

16

economic growth and lacks a specific focus on poverty; it expects poverty reduction to come from

economic growth.48

All of this sounds depressingly familiar in some ways. It bears strong echoes of the Habyarimana

regime, even despite the fact that the Kagame government is widely considered one of the most efficient

and non-corrupt in central Africa. It seems that we are once again seeing the familiar outlines of structural

violence, of government based on ethnic preferences, of specific networks gaining the lions share of

developmental projects. The urban dwellers, and the upper-echelon Tutsis seem to be benefitting the most,

while most of the population remains rural, Hutu, uneducated, and at a high level of food insecurity.

Preliminary Conclusion #4

Development aid agencies since the 1994 genocide has given the Rwandan government a pass on crimes,

human rights abuses, the lack of democracy, and the Tutsization of the state. At the same time, poverty

levels seem to stagnate or even rise, and economic and social inequality is rising.

Conclusion

We can, at this point, bring together some of our conclusions:

1. For most of its history in Rwanda, the donor community ignored the political. When they started

focusing on it, their actions betrayed a profound misunderstanding of the situation.

2. Power politics realist considerations about the loss of power and influence in Frances African sphere

(a collection of client African states) played a major role in the genocide.

3. Blinded by guilt, the international community has ignored or found excuses for RPFs massive crimes,

and the establishment of a Tutsi dictatorship in Rwanda. The focus has been on developmental success,

and on the rebuilding effort - in other words, on economics and stability.

4. Development aid agencies since the 1994 genocide have given the Rwandan government a pass on

crimes, human rights abuses, the lack of democracy, and the Tutsization of the state. At the same time,

poverty levels seem to stagnate or even rise, and economic and social inequality is rising. This perpetrates

48 Rachel Hayman, Rwanda: Milking the Cow, in The Politics of Aid, ed. Lindsay Whitfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) p.160.

17

a situation of structural violence similar to that that existed prior to 1994, but this time with a Tutsi elite

on top.

These conclusion should not give the impression that they are exhaustive, in the sense of covering every

important issue. There are still important topics, such as the role of the aid community in the refugee

camps along the Zaire-Rwanda border in 1994, and their actions just after the 1996 Rwandan attack on

Zaire. Suffice it to say, however, that a common thread linking these factors is a blindness to the political

aspect of the situation. Political should here comprises the distribution of power ( a core function of

politics) but also the actions of the state on the bodies of its citizens (human rights). It seems painfully

clear the Regine Andersen is mistaken in one aspect of her story: the push for the Arusha Accords did

weaken the Habyarimana regime in some ways (it pushed it into a corner and deprived it of legitimacy in

the eyes of Hutu power extremists). But the alternative would have been what? To keep this racist regime

in power while allowing a foreign armed group (RPF) control of part of the country? It seems that the

only way out would have been for the international community to accept the logic of its involvement and

guarantee security over all of Rwanda in the run-up to the implementation of the Arusha Accords. A

robust UN force, one deployed all over the country, was apparently planned; it was quickly scaled back

by the UN, as the great powers became unwilling to commit troops and were afraid of a Somalia-type

disaster. But here we have not so much an example of blindness but also of cowardice: the international

community, including the US and the World Bank, got political and pushed the Rwandan government

into a power-sharing agreement. But it did not want to admit that getting political is a version of laying

down the law (in this case, the fundamental, constitutive law of Rwanda). We have known, however, at

least since Thomas Hobbes, that laying down the law involves a monopoly of coercive power; a

monopoly, in other, more Weberian terms, of legitimate violence. A muscular military presence could

have provided that coercive power that stands behind any law, and gives it effectiveness. A country-wide

UN presence would have increased the costs and risks of any possible military action on the part of Hutu

regime. That didnt happen. The Hutus, still in power, stronger militarily since 1990 due to the French,

feared losing power to an enemy that they perceived as thirsting to avenge the wrongs of 1962; an enemy

that had proven it could not live under a majority Hutu rule in neighbouring Burundi; an enemy that had

engaged in an anti-Hutu genocide in 1972 in Burundi. What would happen next was predictable and was

predicted, but there was no short-term incentive for the international community to act.

Some of the commentators on Rwanda seem confused when it comes to the role of democracy

and human rights. Regine Andersen, for example, says that from a tactical point of view, pushing for

democracy in the 1990s proved to be a disaster. Similarly, it is said that pushing for democracy now

would be a disaster. What is needed is stability, and long-term reconciliation. Democracy would bring the

18

ethnic genie out the bottle again, with violent consequences. I think that it would helpful if the

international development agencies thought of the relationship between state and society in terms of a

political compact.49

The state has a monopoly on legitimate violence in order to lift the body politic, its

people, from a life that is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. That is the political compact. Notice

how the famous Hobbesian phrase can be extended to cover social relations (solitary), economic

development (brutish), health and crime (short) and social inequality (poor). A government working

towards these goals may be seen as legitimate in the eyes of its population, even if its failing in some of

them, or slightly favouring a group of people over another. Note that this does not imply that the form of

government will be a democracy; an aristocracy may be acceptable, or even a dictatorship, as long as

enough of the elements of the political compact were to be fulfilled. People who are rather content with

the lack of democracy in Rwanda believe that the most important element of the political compact is the

lack of violence, the absence of a warre of all against all inside the state. They are right, to some extent

but only if the population is homogeneous. A system that places power in the hands of an ethnic

minority, and one that creates structural violence, is inherently unstable and will create a rupture between

the governed and rulers - a break of the political compact, in other words. It is in this sense that

democracy and the rule of law (based on a bill of rights) must be promoted: the first ensures that most of

the population can endorse the political compact, while the other should make sure that groups within a

state are not pushed outside of the implicit political and social contract.

The Arusha Accords seem like one of the few opportunities in the last 50 years to re-create the

political compact in Rwanda. One cannot blame developmental institutions, like the World Bank, for not

providing the military force to ensure a transfer of power from an unequal system to a more inclusive one.

One can blame those who could provide such military force and didnt. After 1994, the international

community has given the Kagame government a lot of credit, and the RPF has played the genocide-guilt

card masterfully. But the political compact created by Kagame is not a genuine one it relies on coercive

force, manipulation and wilful distortion of reality. The international community, including the

developmental agencies, have a duty to insist on a new political compact. It cannot focus on development

and ignore the political and social situation in Rwanda.

49 A somewhat similar idea appears in Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes, (London: Indiana University Press, 1997).

19

Table 1. Rwanda, 1980-1994.

Total Grants, 1980-1994.

Source: OECD Statextracts

http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE2A

Note how the former colonial powers, Belgium and Germany, provide a lot of aid; and how aid from

France almost triples after the anglosaxon invasion of the RPF in 1990.

1: 1 : Part I - Developing Countries

Grants, Total

Current Prices (USD millions)

All Donors,

Total

Multilateral Agencies,

Total

Belgium France Germany Netherlands United Kingdom

United States

EU Institutions

IDA

Year

1980 121.01 29.25 36.2 11.25 16.72 4.61 0.01 7 18.82 ..

1981 124.69 31.9 28.87 10.08 20.68 3.22 .. 10 18.83 ..

1982 126.06 32.18 24.07 9.21 25.26 4.27 0.03 9 16.37 ..

1983 117.72 25.21 20.16 7.8 23.75 4.45 0.13 10 8.79 ..

1984 120.64 26.69 20.59 7.27 20.12 4.17 0.04 18 12.32 ..

1985 129.3 33.62 20.15 7.9 23.59 3.04 0.12 15 11.53 ..

1986 141.54 30.54 24.63 10.01 19.3 2.95 0.17 21 18.98 ..

1987 150.62 32.92 33.49 11.18 22.03 6.6 0.31 14 19.31 ..

1988 184.02 57.75 29.05 10.59 25 7.23 0.52 17 38.3 ..

1989 174.11 48.6 26.71 11.83 27.15 5.57 0.52 9 32.43 ..

1990 231.45 53.54 43.39 31.47 31.82 10.71 0.85 13 35.25 ..

1991 262.21 42.91 55.8 33.77 40.05 3.86 0.58 27 21.25 ..

1992 280.54 103.96 45.65 19.6 43.59 6.88 0.34 7 80.89 ..

1993 298.92 97.23 36.11 32.33 38.56 7.18 1.2 26 29.86 ..

1994 701.39 206.16 29.03 28.87 46.57 32.22 44.59 194 45.68 ..

20

ODA Gross Disbursements, 1980-1994.

Source: OECD Statextracts

http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE2A

1: 1 : Part I - Developing Countries

Memo: ODA Total, Gross disbursements

Current Prices (USD millions)

All Donors,

Total

Multilateral Agencies,

Total

Belgium France Germany Netherlands United Kingdom

United States

EU Institutions

IDA

Year

1980 154.27 56.32 36.2 15.8 16.83 4.61 0.01 7 21.38 10.33

1981 155.31 50.29 28.87 21.51 20.68 3.22 .. 10 19.52 7.96

1982 153.69 54.09 26.26 11.84 25.26 4.27 0.03 9 17.12 14.69

1983 150.66 53.71 20.16 9.17 23.75 5.48 0.13 10 8.79 18.1

1984 166.56 63.88 20.59 9.52 20.12 4.17 0.04 18 15.37 24.9

1985 182.5 72.16 20.22 15.95 23.59 3.04 0.12 15 11.68 29.6

1986 214.62 82.22 24.63 20.92 19.3 6.01 0.17 21 19.42 37.6

1987 247.97 100.82 33.49 33.18 22.03 6.6 0.31 14 20.58 38.95

1988 255.3 111.31 29.05 23.68 25 7.23 0.52 17 39.07 25

1989 237.41 95.1 26.71 19.57 27.15 5.57 0.52 9 32.53 27

1990 299.91 100.33 43.39 37.17 31.82 10.71 0.85 13 36.01 22

1991 370.35 128.49 55.8 43.06 40.05 3.86 0.58 27 21.36 49

1992 359.11 166.54 45.65 30.16 43.59 6.88 0.34 7 82.59 31.83

1993 363.39 153.81 36.66 35.53 38.56 7.18 1.2 26 36.01 39.22

1994 718.2 221.85 29.1 29.8 46.57 32.22 44.59 194 45.68 11.77

21

Table 2. Rwanda, 1994-2009.

Rwanda, Grants Total, 1994-2009.

1: 1 : Part I - Developing Countries

Grants, Total

Current Prices (USD millions)

All Donors,

Total

Multilateral Agencies,

Total

Belgium France Germany Netherlands United Kingdom

United States

EU Institutions

IDA

Year

1994 701.39 206.16 29.03 28.87 46.57 32.22 44.59 194 45.68 ..

1995 655.29 310.94 14.04 11.74 52.06 46.67 34.5 101 18.5 ..

1996 422.72 165.99 31.29 16.56 45.64 41.11 19.28 10 55.99 ..

1997 181.54 -3.13 21.09 16.07 26 29.21 10.04 9 46.57 ..

1998 260.57 46.04 23.17 33.17 20.55 29.01 20.59 22.98 27.21 ..

1999 287.5 92.26 21.04 14.48 18.76 20.34 26.53 39.78 39.62 ..

2000 266.93 90.94 16.03 10.13 13.77 20.42 52.67 22.93 49.75 ..

2001 241.07 89.36 11.55 8.44 14.59 19.16 36.76 31.08 42.22 12.17

2002 293.56 91.2 21.61 9.27 10.75 19.61 52.63 46.37 41.72 13.77

2003 319.17 101.98 20.81 10.94 13.87 23.05 42.88 52.58 54 16.75

2004 427 210.71 18.96 10.7 16.6 25.5 53.51 50.32 63.07 75.21

2005 529.38 235.69 27.4 12.78 18.5 28.41 81.95 57.13 85.26 83.22

2006 1691.62 1316.95 36.24 63.6 19.39 24.65 95.33 77.59 65.68 896.58

2007 610.24 233.57 42.69 6.54 23.08 27.84 94.94 90.76 79.77 73.39

2008 832.5 377.86 65.42 5.16 24.58 38.77 99.81 117.38 105.71 99.65

2009 887.37 365.36 82.36 4.62 44.16 54.22 89.47 145.9 104.51 103.34

Source: OECD Statextracts

http://stats.oecd.org

Note how aid from France drops dramatically after 1994 (genocide and RPF comes to power), while aid

from the United Kingdom and the United States increases dramatically.

22

Rwanda, ODA Total Gross Disbursements, 1994-2009.

Source :

OECD Statextracts

http://stats.oecd.org

1: 1 : Part I - Developing Countries

Memo: ODA Total, Gross disbursements

Current Prices (USD millions)

All Donors,

Total

Multilateral Agencies,

Total

Belgium France Germany Netherlands United Kingdom

United States

EU Institutions

IDA

Year

1994 718.2 221.85 29.1 29.8 46.57 32.22 44.59 194 45.68 11.77

1995 713.72 367.57 14.04 11.75 52.06 46.67 34.5 101 18.5 34.79

1996 479.71 220.13 31.29 16.56 45.64 41.11 19.28 10 55.99 42.6

1997 246.92 62.25 21.09 16.07 26 29.21 10.04 9 46.57 52.9

1998 365.6 151.07 23.17 33.17 20.55 29.01 20.59 22.98 27.21 66.69

1999 403.1 206.12 21.04 16.22 18.76 20.34 26.53 39.78 39.62 69.19

2000 341.77 160.94 16.03 12.69 13.77 20.42 52.67 22.93 49.75 37.19

2001 333.69 179.74 11.55 10.61 14.59 19.16 36.76 31.08 45.24 65.43

2002 387.71 185.35 21.61 9.27 10.75 19.61 52.63 46.37 41.72 87.02

2003 363.91 146.72 20.81 10.94 13.87 23.05 42.88 52.58 54 40.53

2004 528.08 307.12 18.96 10.7 16.6 25.5 58.18 50.32 65.9 157.48

2005 631.36 337.14 27.4 12.78 18.5 28.41 81.95 57.13 92.25 130.06

2006 1822.31 1407.63 36.24 103.54 19.39 24.65 95.4 77.59 67.69 933.57

2007 729.97 353.3 42.69 6.54 23.08 27.84 94.94 90.76 79.77 100.97

2008 939.91 485.2 65.42 5.16 24.58 38.77 99.88 117.38 105.71 140.18

2009 940.97 416.85 82.36 4.62 44.16 54.22 89.85 145.9 104.51 113.83

23

Table 3.

ODA for Rwanda, 2000-2009.

Year IDA Disbursements

Net ODA Disbursements

2000 45.52

518.03

2001 88.42

496.97

2002 114.22

555.14

2003 36.81

447.53

2004 171.56

588.19

2005 133.35

675.49

2006 66.8

665.13

2007 106.33

752.77

2008 140.18

933.15

2009 117.29

965.87

Source: World Bank

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CFPEXT/Resources/299947-1266002444164/index.html

Year

Net ODA as percent of GNI

2000

18.69

2001

18.44

2002

22.37

2003

19.19

2004

25.26

2005

24.43

2006

20.99

2007

21.27

2008

21.1

2009

18.68

Year

Net ODA Disbursements Per Capita

2000

40.39

2001

36.68

2002

42.5

2003

38.59

2004

55.51

2005

64.17

2006

63.95

2007

76.38

2008

95.99

2009

93.46

24

Taken verbatim from the BBC website(with a few edits)

Timeline Rwanda

A chronology of key events:

1300s - Tutsis migrate into what is now Rwanda, which was already inhabited by the Twa and Hutu peoples.

1600s - Tutsi King Ruganzu Ndori subdues central Rwanda and outlying Hutu areas.

Late 1800s - Tutsi King Kigeri Rwabugiri establishes a unified state with a centralised military structure.

1858 - British explorer Hanning Speke is the first European to visit the area.

1890 - Rwanda becomes part of German East Africa.

1916 - Belgian forces occupy Rwanda.

1923 - Belgium granted League of Nations mandate to govern Ruanda-Urundi, which it ruled indirectly through

Tutsi kings.

1946 - Ruanda-Urundi becomes UN trust territory governed by Belgium.

Independence

1957 - Hutus issue manifesto calling for a change in Rwanda's power structure to give them a voice commensurate

with their numbers; Hutu political parties formed.

1959 - Tutsi King Kigeri V, together with tens of thousands of Tutsis, forced into exile in Uganda following inter-

ethnic violence.

1961 - Rwanda proclaimed a republic.

1962 - Rwanda becomes independent with a Hutu, Gregoire Kayibanda, as president; many Tutsis leave the country.

1963 - Some 20,000 Tutsis killed following an incursion by Tutsi rebels

based in Burundi.

1973 - President Gregoire Kayibanda ousted in military coup led by Juvenal Habyarimana.

1978 - New constitution ratified; Habyarimana elected president.

1988 - Some 50,000 Hutu refugees flee to Rwanda from Burundi following ethnic violence there.

1990 - Forces of the rebel, mainly Tutsi, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invade Rwanda from Uganda.

1991 - New multi-party constitution promulgated.

Genocide

1993 - President Habyarimana signs a power-sharing agreement with the Tutsis in the Tanzanian town of Arusha,

ostensibly signalling the end of civil war; UN mission sent to monitor the peace agreement.

1994 April - Habyarimana and the Burundian president are killed after their plane is shot down over Kigali; RPF

launches a major offensive; extremist Hutu militia and elements of the Rwandan military begin the systematic

massacre of Tutsis. Within 100 days around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus are killed; Hutu militias flee to

Zaire, taking with them around 2 million Hutu refugees.

25

1994-96 - Refugee camps in Zaire fall under the control of the Hutu militias responsible for the genocide in Rwanda.

1995 - Extremist Hutu militias and Zairean government forces attack local Zairean Banyamulenge Tutsis; Zaire

attempts to force refugees back into Rwanda.

1995 - UN-appointed international tribunal begins charging and sentencing a number of people responsible for the

Hutu-Tutsi atrocities.

Intervention in DR Congo

1996 - Rwandan troops invade and attack Hutu militia-dominated camps in Zaire in order to drive home the refugees.

1997 - Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed rebels depose President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire; Laurent Kabila becomes

president of Zaire, which is renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo.

1998 - Rwanda switches allegiance to support rebel forces trying to depose Kabila in the wake of the Congolese

president's failure to expel extremist Hutu militias.

2000 March - Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, resigns over differences regarding the composition of

a new cabinet and after accusing parliament of targeting Hutu politicians in anti-corruption investigations.

2000 April - Ministers and members of parliament elect Vice-President Paul Kagame as Rwanda's new president.

.

DR Congo pull-out

2002 October - Rwanda says it has pulled the last of its troops out of DR Congo, four years after they went in to

support Congolese rebels against the Kabila government.

2003 May - Voters back a draft constitution which bans the incitement of ethnic hatred.

2003 August - Paul Kagame wins the first presidential elections since the 1994 genocide.

2003 October - First multi-party parliamentary elections; President Kagame's Rwandan Patriotic Front wins absolute

majority. EU observers say poll was marred by irregularities and fraud.

2004 March - President Kagame rejects French report which says he ordered 1994 attack on president's plane, which

sparked genocide.

2004 June - Former president, Pasteur Bizimungu, is sentenced to 15 years in jail for embezzlement, inciting

violence and associating with criminals.

2005 March - Main Hutu rebel group, FDLR, says it is ending its armed struggle. FDLR is one of several groups

accused of creating instability in DR Congo; many of its members are accused of taking part in 1994 genocide.

2006 November - Rwanda breaks off diplomatic ties with France after a French judge issues an international arrest

warrant for President Kagame, alleging he was involved in bringing down Habyarimana's plane. .

2007 October - Inquiry launched into 1994 presidential plane crash that sparked genocide.

26

Arrests abroad

2008 February - A Spanish judge issues arrest warrants for 40 Rwandan army officers, accusing them of genocide,

terrorism and crimes against humanity.

2008 April - President Paul Kagame says the Spanish judge who issued arrest warrants for Rwandan army officers

can "go to hell". .

2008 August - Rwanda accuses France of having played an active role in the genocide of 1994, and issues a report

naming more than 30 senior French officials. France says the claims are unacceptable.

2008 September - President Paul Kagame's Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) wins large majority in parliamentary

elections.

2008 October - Rwanda decides all education will be taught in English instead of French, officially as a result of

joining the English-speaking East African Community.

2008 November - Rwanda expels German ambassador and recalls own ambassador in row over detention in

Germany of presidential aide Rose Kabuye in connection with the shooting down of President Habyarimana's plane.

Theoneste Bagosora sentenced to life imprisonment at UN tribunal for masterminding genocide.

2009 February - Rwandan troops leave the Democratic Republic of Congo five weeks after entering to attack Hutu

rebels.

2009 November - Rwanda is admitted to the Commonwealth, as only the second country after Mozambique to

become a member without a British colonial past or constitutional ties to the UK.

France and Rwanda restore diplomatic relations, three years after they were severed over a row about responsibility

for the 1990s genocide.

2010 February - French President Nicolas Sarkozy pays official visit to mark reconciliation after years of

accusations over the genocide. Rwanda said France armed Hutu extremists, and a French judge accused President

Kagame of involvement in the death of President Habyarimana.

2010 August - President Kagame wins new term in elections.

2010 October - UN report into 1993-2003 conflict in DR Congo says Rwandan forces took part in attacks on Hutu

civilians which - if proven in court - could amount to genocide.

BBC - http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1070329.stm

27

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