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Blame Discourse versusRealistic Conflict asExplanations of EthnicTension in UrbanNeighborhoodsDANIEL ROMER , KATHLEEN H. JAMIESON ,CATHARINE RIEGNER , MIKA EMORI &BRIGETTE ROUSONPublished online: 29 Jun 2010.

To cite this article: DANIEL ROMER , KATHLEEN H. JAMIESON , CATHARINERIEGNER , MIKA EMORI & BRIGETTE ROUSON (1997) Blame Discourse versusRealistic Conflict as Explanations of Ethnic Tension in Urban Neighborhoods,Political Communication, 14:3, 273-291, DOI: 10.1080/105846097199326

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Political Communication, 14:273– 291, 1997Copyright ã 1997 Taylor & Francis

1058-4609/97 $12.00 + .00

Blame Discourse versus Realistic Conflictas Explanations of Ethnic Tension

in Urban Neighborhoods

DANIEL ROMERKATHLEEN H. JAMIESONCATHARINE RIEGNERMIKA EMORIBRIGETTE ROUSON

Annenberg School for CommunicationUniversity of Pennsylvania

Urban neighborhoods are major sites of ethnic tension in the United States.One explanation (realistic conflict) attributes this tension to competing interestsamong ethnic groups that create neighborhood social problems, while another(blame discourse) attributes it to discursive practices that transform otherwisenegotiable differences into ethnic conflict. Analysis of interviews with 517 resi-dents of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (ages 16–65 years) found considerable sup-port for the discourse explanation. As both explanations predict, tension wasgreater among residents who experienced recent entry of ethnic newcomersand whose neighborhoods had severe social problems. However, blame dis-course played a key role in explaining these relations. The tension associatedwith recent entry was more related to communication of blame than to neigh-borhood problems. Problems were especially likely to be associated with ten-sion when respondents’ own ethnic groups were the target of blame. Consistentwith the discourse explanation, respondents who lived in cooperative neighbor-hoods reported less tension even when problems were severe. The results indi-cate that current ethnic tension may be created by discursive processes as muchas or more than by realistic conflicts of interests.

Keywords blaming, conflict theories, discourse, immigration, racial tension,urban neighborhoods

Despite four decades of improved racial attitudes (Schuman, Bobo, & Steeh, 1985)and stronger anti-discrimination statutes, conflict among ethnic groups continues toplague large urban areas (Berry, 1994; Levin & McDevitt, 1993). In Philadelphia,where this research was conducted, there are approximately 25 police reports ofinter-ethnic conflict and violence each month with a disproportionate number in-volving people under the age of 30.1 Identifying appropriate interventions to reducethis conflict requires not only theoretical but also empirical understanding of thefactors that influence ethnic tension. This research tested two major alternative ex-planations for such conflict.

The authors thank Elihu Katz and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.This research was supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation.

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274 Daniel Romer et al.

According to “realistic-conflict” theories, ethnic groups have objective intereststhat come into conflict as members of those groups compete for scarce resources(Blalock, 1967 ; Levine & Campbell, 1972; Olzak, 1992). In the United States, re-cent immigrants from Mexico, the Caribbean, and Asia have settled in the centralcities to join ensconced African-American and non-Latino white residents who them-selves are struggling to survive in an economy that no longer values physical labor(Adams, Bartelt, Elish, et al., 1991) As newcomers enter urban neighborhoods, theirinterests may conflict with those of the established residents (Fossett & Kielcolt,1989 ; Schwirian, 1983), leading to social and economic problems that either pro-duce ethnic tension, such as fighting between youths of different ethnicity, or thatare precursors to tension, such as lowered property values. The poverty that existsin many urban neighborhoods probably increases the severity of these problemsand the resulting tension (Blalock, 1967; Olzak, 1992).

Other explanations focus on the social construction of conflict and the dis-course that surrounds discussion of ethnic difference (Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, &Sasson, 1992; Spector & Kitsuse, 1987; Ross, 1993; Wetherell & Potter, 1992).Discourse that blames or dehumaniz es others is a recurrent ethnocentric reaction toboth domestic and foreign ethnic groups during periods of stress (Goldberg, 1993;du Preez , 1994). Analyses of newspaper accounts of ethnic group conflict point tomore subtle but similar discourse that casts blame on disadvantaged groups (vanDijk, 1991). At the core of this “ethnic blame discourse” is the presumption thatethnic groups have competing interests that lead to conflict and social problems.Widespread exposure to this discourse predisposes actors to interpret the behaviorof ethnic others as motivated by divergent ethnic group interests and legitimizesaction to respond to those interests even when no ethnic group interest is involved.

We saw evidence of ethnic blame discourse when we initially interviewedresidents living in multiethnic Philadelphia neighborhoods. We selected neighbor-hoods that were experiencing significant ethnic tension as well as ones that hadaccommodated ethnic diversity. As both these explanations would predict, we heardfrequent descriptions of tensions between residents of different ethnicity, rangingfrom disagreements over where to place household trash to more serious concernsabout excessive noise, delinquent children, and failures to maintain property. Ten-sions often involved conflicts between newcomers and established residents. New-comers were more likely to be perceived as violating the norms of the establishedresidents and standing out as sources of problems. However, consistent with thediscourse explanation, established residents often blamed conflicts on ethnic differ-ence rather than on newcomer status or other causes. As one Latino resident put it,when he moved into a non-Latino white neighborhood, he felt obligated to tell theneighbors that

. . . we’re not here to disrupt the neighborhood. We’re coming in, (but)we’re responsible. (My wife) works; I work. I was on my job for almostfive years. I mean, a person that’s on his job for five years doesn’t comein and buy a house and just let it go down the drain like that.

The widespread distrust reportedly directed against newcomers invited reciprocalresponses from newcomers who could no longer be sure if complaints were motivatedby prejudice or some legitimate purpose. As the same respondent put it, to gaincooperation from noisy newcomers who happened to be Latino, he found that

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Blame Discourse versus Realistic Conflict 275

. . . if a H ispanic and a white person go together and say to the guy,“Look, your music is too high at this time of night. Can you do me alittle favor, if you want to listen to it, turn it down.” Then there’s noway they can say it’s racial.

However, if “one white person goes and says it by himself, then it’s racial.” As thisexample suggests, ethnic blame discourse prevents effective problem solvingamong neighbors by introducing threats to ethnic identity that are much more diffi-cult to address than the actual sources of conflict. By influencing the way residentsperceive and discuss problems, ethnic blame discourse transforms neighborhoodsocial problems into more intractable ethnic conflicts.

We observed ethnic blame discourse in white respondents who felt their neigh-borhoods were being invaded by non-whites. However, we also observed it amongAfrican-American respondents in neighborhoods experiencing significant entry ofnew Asian residents. The widespread appearance of these discursive practices sug-gested that ethnic blame discourse had become a significant practice regardless ofthe ethnicity of the actors.

Despite the debilitating influence of blame discourse, we anticipated that thetension that resulted from it would depend on the neighborhood culture. Anthro-pologists have long argued that cultures that promote “cross-cutting ties” within acommunity experience less conflict among residents (Levine & Campbell, 1972;Ross, 1993). The Chicago School of sociology also emphasiz ed the benefits of orga-nized social networks in preventing neighborhood problems (Bursik & Grasmick,1993; Sampson, 1995). Neighborhood organizations that promote social ties amongresidents in the interests of the entire community should counteract the influence ofblame discourse by helping residents identify cooperative solutions to neighbor-hood problems, including disputes among persons of different ethnicity (Bach, 1991;Goode & Schneider, 1994 ; Saltman, 1991).

Our interviews suggested that neighborhoods with stronger cooperative capacitiesdid have greater success in accommodating ethnic diversity. Although newcomersto these neighborhoods were expected to respect the norms of the community,neighborhood organizations with experience in resolving disputes provided venuesfor residents to discuss their differences. As a result, disputes between new andestablished residents were less vulnerable to the debilitating effects of ethnic blamediscourse.

Although our interviews supported a discourse interpretation of ethnic tensionin urban neighborhoods, it was still possible that ethnic blame discourse and itsassociated tensions were expressions of genuine ethnic-based conflicts of interests.From this perspective, discourse serves to express preexisting conflicts rather thancreate ethnic conflict. To test these competing explanations, we conducted a larger,more representative survey of Philadelphia residents that would allow us to quan-tify the relation between ethnic blame discourse and tension as well as determine ifthe discourse was linked to perceived neighborhood problems (realistic conflict) orwas a source of tension in its own right (discourse).

In conducting this research, we examined three predictions that distinguishedthe explanations. Although both explanations predict that ethnic newcomers to neigh-borhoods are a source of tension, the discourse explanation predicts that thetension will be mediated by increased communication of ethnic blame betweennewcomers and established residents. In contrast, the realistic conflict explanation

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276 Daniel Romer et al.

predicts that the tension will be mediated by increases in neighborhood problemsresulting from contact between ethnically different neighbors.

Both explanations also predict that the perceived severity of neighborhood prob-lems will be related to tension. However, according to the discourse explanation,problems lead to ethnic tension primarily when residents blame each other forthose problems on the basis of ethnicity—that is, problems and exposure to blamediscourse interact in causing tension. According to the realistic conflict explanation,both tension and blame are direct expressions of neighborhood problems.

Finally, the discourse explanation predicts that whatever the level of perceivedproblems in a neighborhood, residents who live in neighborhoods with a coopera-tive culture will experience less tension than residents living in noncooperativeneighborhoods. Realistic conflict explanations acknowledge the cooperative ben-efits of pursuing “superordinate goals” (Sherif, 1958 ; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood,& Sherif, 1988). However, as the severity of realistic conflict increases, the abilityto identify superordinate goals declines. As a result, the realistic conflict explana-tion predicts that cooperative neighborhoods will experience less tension primarilywhen perceived neighborhood problems are mild, whereas the discourse explana-tion predicts that cooperative neighborhoods will be effective across a wider rangeof problem severity.

Method

A survey of 517 Philadelphia residents was completed in October 1994 using “list-assisted” random-digit dialing of telephone subscriber households (Brick, Waksberg,Kulp, & Starer, 1995). Respondents ages 16 through 65 years, who had lived inPhiladelphia for more than five months, were selected in a random manner fromwithin households (Hagan & Collier, 1983). Persons of Latino origin were sampledat a higher rate than non-Latino persons with the goal of achieving at least 10percent representation of Latino people. Depending on the preference of the re-spondent, interviews were conducted in either English or Spanish and lasted ap-proximately 35 minutes.2

Respondent Characteristics

Table 1 lists the distribution of respondents by ethnicity and other demographiccharacteristics. Despite efforts to select respondents randomly within households,more women than men completed the interview (63% versus 37%), attributable inpart to the fact that there are more women than men in Philadelphia (53.5% versus46.5% in the 1990 census). Additionally, women as opposed to men tended toanswer the phone more often and to complete interviews once started. In analyses,differences between men and women were held constant to remove bias that mightoccur as a result of overrepresentation of women.

Our sample also underrepresented African-American or black residents (31%versus 40% in the 1990 census), a result partly of our oversampling of Latinorespondents. However, according to the 1990 census, African-American residentswere also more likely than white residents to lack telephones in their households(7.50% versus 1.87%). As we had with gender, we controlled for differences inethnicity in all analyses and examined interactions with ethnicity whenever rel-evant.3

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Variable Definitions

Respondents identified themselves as living in a recognized neighborhood (N = 59neighborhoods) in all but 21 (4%) of the cases. To determine if respondents agreedon neighborhood characteristics, we calculated intraclass correlation coefficients(ICCs) using those neighborhoods (N = 54) in which at least two respondents

Table 1Sample characteristics by respondent gender (N = 517)

Men Women TotalRespondent characteristic (%) (%) (%)

EthnicityLatino 14.3 11.0 12.2African-American 29.6 31.7 30.9Non-Latino White 51.3 53.7 53.8Asian-American 2.6 1.2 1.7Other 2.1 2.4 2.4

Age16–19 9.0 7.0 7.720–24 11.1 10.4 10.625–29 14.3 13.1 13.530–39 25.4 26.5 26.140–49 21.2 22.3 21.950–59 13.2 13.4 13.360–65 5.8 7.3 6.8

Education9 years or less 3.7 5.8 5.010–11 years 12.7 9.5 10.6H igh school graduate 38.6 43.3 41.6Some college 20.1 20.4 20.3College graduate 13.2 12.8 13.0Post-college 11.6 7.6 9.1

Household incomeUnder $15,000 11.6 20.1 17.0$15,000–$25,000 22.2 25.3 24.2$25,000–$40,000 29.1 24.7 26.3$40,000–$60,000 14.3 13.1 13.5Over $60,000 12.7 8.5 10.0Don’t know 6.3 5.1 5.6Refused 4.8 2.4 3.3

Current economic statusversus five years agoBetter off 47.6 44.2 45.5About the same 34.4 38.4 36.9Worse off 18.0 16.5 17.0

Total by gender 36.6 63.4 100.0

Note: N = 189 for men and 328 for women.

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278 Daniel Romer et al.

had been interviewed. To determine if the variables were reliable, we calculatedinternal consistency scores (coefficient alphas). Table 2 contains the ICCs and coef-ficient alphas (where applicable) for the major neighborhood variables. The coeffi-cient alphas indicate that all the variables with multiple measures were reliable. Inaddition, the significant ICCs indicate that respondent perceptions within neighbor-hoods were more similar than would be expected by chance, suggesting thatgenuine neighborhood differences influenced the perceptions. Exposure to blamediscourse did not appear to vary consistently by neighborhood. 4

We asked three questions about potential signs of cooperative neighborhoodculture: whether or not the neighborhood had a) many active community organiza-tions, b) residents who cared about the neighborhood, and c) residents who showedeach other respect. Respondents who reported all three of these characteristics wereconsidered to have “cooperative neighborhoods” (47%); respondents with any oneof the items absent were considered to live in less cooperative neighborhoods (53%).

We also asked ten questions concerning neighborhood problems (cf. Skogan,1991) that residents frequently named in our earlier interviews and that they oftencited as reasons for assigning blame. Respondents were asked to indicate whetherthe problem was “very much, somewhat, or not a problem in their neighborhood.”Although the problems were seen as co-occurring, factor analysis indicated that theitems formed two separate clusters reflecting differential prevalence of youth prob-lem behaviors and overall neighborhood deterioration. The youth problems cluster(with percentage indicating “very much” of a problem) included “kids not going toschool” (15%), “people drinking too much alcohol” (26%), “people getting intofights” (21%), and “gangs” (13%). The neighborhood deterioration cluster included“declining property values” (23%), “people using drugs” (36%), “drug dealing” (34%),“not enough recreational facilities” (29%), and “prostitution” (14%). The presenceof “graffiti or vandalism” (34%) loaded on both clusters. We constructed three-pointscales for each cluster (excluding the graffiti item) representing severe, moderate,

Table 2Intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) and internal consistencycoefficients (coefficient alphas) for major neighborhood variables

Variable ICC Alpha

Neighborhood cooperation .102* .61Youth problems .183* .80Neighborhood deterioration .285* .82Recent entry of ethnic newcomers .080* n.a.Ethnic tension .079* .73Blame of others .000 n.a.Blame of own group .000 n.a.

*p < .01.Note: The ICC measures agreement within neighborhoods that exceeds what

would be expected by chance, and coefficient alpha measures consistency of re-sponse across multiple indicators. (Alpha is not reported for variables with onlyone indicator.) Both scores have a range of 0 (no consistency) to 1 (completeconsistency).

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Blame Discourse versus Realistic Conflict 279

and low levels of problems. The two problem clusters were correlated (r = .62)but were sufficiently unique to warrant separate analysis.

To determine the respondent’s perception of the neighborhood’s ethnic compo-sition, respondents were asked if people from seven different ethnic groupings livedin the neighborhood (i.e., Latino or H ispanic, African-American or Black, Asian-American, White, Jewish, Arab-American, or people from India) and which two ofthese groups were the largest in the neighborhood. The latter question was asked toidentify the largest other ethnic grouping in the neighborhood and to create a scoremeasuring the perceived diversity of the neighborhood. About 35 percent of therespondents identified six or seven groups in the neighborhood. Only about 4 per-cent saw their own ethnic group as the sole group in the neighborhood. We alsoasked if any of the groupings had recently “grown in size” in the neighborhood, aquestion used to classify respondents who perceived their neighborhoods as under-going recent entry of ethnic newcomers. H igh proportions of respondents (73% ofLatinos, 81% of African-Americans, 68% of Non-Latino Whites, and 77% of others)reported such experience.

We asked several questions adapted from a recent national poll (National Con-ference, 1994) to determine if respondents were aware of racial or ethnic tensionin various neighborhood locations (i.e., on the streets, at the schools, with thepolice, or in stores or restaurants) and at respondents’ work sites or schools (de-pending on respondents’ working status). Ethnic and racial tensions were cited as a“significant problem” in the neighborhood by about 20 percent of respondents and“somewhat of a problem” by another 40 percent (Table 3). These results greatlyexceeded reports of tension in respondents’ schools or work sites, confirming ourexpectation that the neighborhood was the dominant source of tension among thecity’s residents. The rates of significant tension across the four neighborhood set-tings of Philadelphia were from five to ten times greater than the national average

Table 3Intergroup tension reports by site and ethnicity

Respondent ethnicity

Latino African-American Non-Latino WhiteSite (%) (%) (%)

Neighborhood totalSignificant 22.6 22.0 20.7Somewhat 43.5 34.6 44.6None 33.9 43.4 34.7

At work or school oroutside neighborhoodSignificant 2.6 4.8 3.8Somewhat 25.6 21.9 13.7None 71.8 73.3 82.5

Note: N = 63 for Latino respondents, N = 160 for African-American respondents, andN = 273 for non-Latino White respondents. Neighborhood total includes any reports fortension on the streets, at the schools, with the police, and in stores or restaurants.

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280 Daniel Romer et al.

(National Conference, 1994), confirming our expectation that urban settings aremore subject to ethnic tensions. To create a single measure of tension, we averagedthe four scores representing severity of tension in the neighborhood (alpha = .73).Because this measure was highly skewed, we divided it into four categories (1 to 4)ranging from no tension at all (38%) to very high tension (7%), making the scalemore appropriate for analysis.

We assessed the validity of tension perceptions by comparing them with re-ports of ethnic tension received by the Philadelphia Commission on Human Rela-tions (PCHR). This city agency receives reports of ethnic tension from citizens andintervenes when possible to prevent escalation of conflicts. The majority of thesereports concern attacks or threats on people’s homes and property. Because surveyrespondents were asked to provide their neighborhood zip code, mean scores foreach z ip code (with more than two respondents) could be calculated from oursurvey results (N = 41). To obtain a comparable measure from reports to the PCHR,we aggregated reports for the year of the survey (N 1994 = 284) and the year follow-ing the survey (N 1995 = 263) by the z ip code of each tension site. Although z ipcodes are imperfect representations of neighborhoods, survey tension scores werecorrelated with log transformed PCHR reports in 1995, r = .37, p < .02. Thecorrelation for 1994 was somewhat lower, r = .23, p = .15. Furthermore, thecomponent of the survey score that measured tension in the streets was signifi-cantly related to PCHR reports at both time points with a higher correlation in1995 (r = .50, p < .01) than in 1994 (r = .31, p. < .05).

These results suggested that our survey perceptions, especially those concern-ing street-based tensions, were related to official reports of ethnic tension and thatthe perceptions were even better predictors of subsequent reports than of reportsprior to and coincident with the time of the survey. Because the overall tensionscore had high internal consistency (alpha = .73) and measured some tensions thatmight not be reported to the PCHR, we analyzed this score rather than relyingsolely on the component concerning street-based tensions.

We asked a series of questions to determine whether the respondent had beenexposed to blame discourse (“Do the people you know ever blame problems intheir neighborhoods or at work or school on . . . people?”). Five different ethnicgroupings were randomly rotated in the question (African-American or Black, Asian-American, Jewish, Latino or H ispanic, or White). We distinguished between blamedirected toward the respondent’s own group and blame directed toward any of theother groups in the list. As seen in Table 4, over 50 percent of Latino respondentsand over 60 percent of African-American and non-Latino White respondents re-ported some exposure to this discourse. Exposure to blame of the respondent’s owngroup tended to occur as frequently as exposure to blame of other groups. In ahigh percentage of cases (20%), three or more groups were said to receive blamefor problems. Although the two forms of blame discourse tended to co-occur (r =.53, p < .01), we analyz ed each type of blame separately.

We assessed prejudicial stereotypes with a series of 13 questions concerningpossible characteristics of four ethnic groupings (African-American, Asian-American,Latino and White people). The list was composed of items taken from other recentsurveys on race relations and from comments made by respondents in our face-to-face interviews in Philadelphia. Respondents were asked if the target group was“more likely than other people,” “about as likely as other people,” or “less likelythan other people” to display those characteristics. A prejudice score was defined

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that indexed the degree to which respondents held unfavorable stereotypes aboutthe largest other ethnic group in their neighborhoods. 5

To determine the role of political ideology, we asked respondents to “describeyour own personal political views. Would you say you are very conservative, con-servative, moderate, liberal, or very liberal?” Although liberal ideology was correlatedwith education (r = .19, p < .01), we were interested in whether conservativeideology predisposed persons to greater exposure to blaming other ethnic groups.

Results

We conducted multiple regression analysis to identify statistically significant predic-tors of neighborhood problems, exposure to blame discourse, and neighborhoodethnic tension. Because theoretical predictors might reflect differences in backgroundcharacteristics of respondents (i.e., ethnicity, age, gender, educational attainment,household income, length of residence in the neighborhood, prejudicial stereotypestoward the largest other ethnic group in the neighborhood, and political ideology),we only report results (standardized regression coefficients) holding backgroundvariables constant. Separate predictors for age and neighborhood diversity werealso entered for African-American and Latino respondents to control for the possi-bility that these variables could interact with ethnicity. To assess the mediating roleof social problems and blame discourse, we entered these variables in stages asdiscussed in the following paragraphs.

Our analysis of the background correlates of neighborhood problems reinforcedour confidence that the survey sample was a valid representation of urban con-ditions in Philadelphia. Respondents who lived in poorer households experiencedboth sets of problems more intensely (b ’s = –0.173, –0.156, p’s < .01), andAfrican-American and Latino persons were especially likely to live in deterioratingneighborhoods (b ’s = 0.284, 0.287, p’s < .01). Younger respondents were alsomore likely to report youth problems (b = 0.237, p < .01).

A critical prediction of the realistic conflict explanation—that recent entry ofethnic newcomers would lead to increased neighborhood problems—was only

Table 4Exposure to blame discourse by respondent ethnicity

Ethnicity

African- Non-Latino TotalLatino American White sample

Type of blame (%) (%) (%) (%)

Blame of own group 36.5 51.3 56.4 55.7Blame directed towardother groups 46.0 56.9 57.5 56.1

Total exposure to blame 47.6 66.3 63.0 62.5

Note: N = 63 for Latino respondents, N = 160 for African-American respondents, andN = 273 for non-Latino White respondents. Blame directed toward other groups was codedas 1 for exposure to any other group and 0 for no exposure to blame of other groups.

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partially confirmed. Recent entry was related to neighborhood deterioration ( b =0.124, p < .01) but not to youth problems (b = 0.066, p > .20). Furthermore,neighborhood ethnic diversity was unrelated to either problem cluster, b ’s = 0.009,0.094, p’s < .10. These results suggest that neighborhood ethnic diversity was notstrongly linked to realistic conflicts, a finding that will be critical in our later analy-sis of tension.

To identify predictors of blame discourse, we conducted multiple logistic re-gression analysis of exposure to each type of blame.6 Consistent with the discourseexplanation, recent entry was associated with greater exposure to blame of boththe respondent’s ethnic group (r = 0.161, p < .01) and of other groups (r =0.144, p < .01). Furthermore, these associations were significant apart from per-ceptions of problems in the neighborhood. Indeed, the realistic conflict explanationwould predict that recent entry will precipitate both problems and blame. How-ever, holding problems constant did not reduce the relation between recent entryand either form of blame—both coefficients were nearly identical with and withoutproblems in the equation.

Consistent with the realistic conflict explanation, severe youth problems wererelated to blame but only of the respondent’s own ethnic group, r = 0.094, p <.05. The relation between blame of other groups and youth problems was notsignificant (r = 0.056, p > .10), and no relation between neighborhood deteriora-tion and either form of blame was observed (r = 0.0, p > .20). The absence ofany relation between problems and blame directed toward other groups was alsoconfirmed when associations between each problem and blame were tested. Theseresults indicate that, with the exception of youth problems and blame of the respondent’sown group, exposure to blame discourse was largely unrelated to neighborhoodproblems.

Despite the absence of relations between blame and problems, several per-sonal characteristics were related to exposure to blame. African-American respon-dents (r = 0.067, p < .05), persons with higher income (r = 0.055, p < .05), andthose who experienced recent change in economic status (r = 0.108, p < .01)reported greater exposure to blame of their own group. Blame of other groups wasespecially likely to be reported by persons with prejudicial stereotypes of the larg-est other ethnic group in their neighborhood (r = 0.189, p < .01), as well as bypersons who had recently experienced downward changes in economic status (r =0.123, p < .01). Blame of others was also more likely to be reported by respondentswith more education (r = 0.066, p < .05) and more income (r = 0.155, p < .01).Political ideology was unrelated to blame exposure independent of other character-istics. Because personal characteristics predicted blame exposure even after control-ling for neighborhood problems, it is unlikely that their association with blame wasrelated to realistic conflicts in respondents’ neighborhoods.

We conducted linear regression analysis of perceived ethnic tension with back-ground variables and recent entry of ethnic neighbors entered first, followed byexposure to blame, neighborhood problems, cooperation, and interactions that wererelevant to each explanation. As expected, respondents who experienced recententry of ethnic newcomers reported greater neighborhood tension, b = 0.156,p < .01. If this relation was mediated by increased blame or neighborhood prob-lems, then these variables should also be linked to tension, and the relation be-tween entry and tension should decline when these variables are entered into theequation.

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The coefficient for recent entry did decline by about 35 percent (b = 0.102,p < .05) when both forms of blame were entered, suggesting that blame was amediator of this relation. Consistent with this interpretation, both forms of blamewere related to tension, b = 0.134 (p < .01) for blame of own group, and b =0.179 (p < .01) for blame of other groups. Although respondents living in neigh-borhoods with severe problems experienced more tension (b = 0.211, p < .01 foryouth problems and b = 0.193, p < .01 for neighborhood deterioration), thecoefficient for recent entry only declined by 10% (b = 0.086, p < .05) whenproblems were entered into the equation. Furthermore, this was true even whenproblems were entered before blame. The more important role of blame in mediat-ing the relation between recent entry and tension is consistent with our previousfindings that recent entry was more strongly related to blame than to neighborhoodproblems. Problems were not sufficiently linked to recent entry to account for therelations between entry and tension. Other relations between background variablesand tension also suggested that blame played a role in creating tension. Respon-dents with prejudicial stereotypes (b = 0.120, p < .01) and with recent declines ineconomic status (b = 0.137, p < .01) reported greater tension. However, both ofthese relations also declined once exposure to blame was held constant, b = 0.070,p > .10; b = 0.099, p < .05.

Our finding that both problems and blame were strongly related to tension isconsistent with both explanations. However, the discourse explanation predicts thatproblems will be related to tension primarily when problems are blamed on ethnicdifference. To test this hypothesis, we examined interactions between blame andproblems. There was no evidence that blame of others interacted with problems inpredicting tension. However, blame directed toward the respondent’s own grouppredicted perceived tension in interaction with neighborhood problems. As seen inFigure 1, neighborhood deterioration was more strongly related to tension for re-spondents who were exposed to greater blame of their own group. This interactionpredicted tension above and beyond the simple relations with blame and neighbor-hood deterioration across all age groups, b = 0.136, p < .05. When the interac-tion for youth problems was also included in the equation, the coefficient declinedonly slightly (b = 0.134, p < .07).

As seen in Figure 2, neighborhood youth problems were also more stronglyrelated to tension as exposure to blame increased; however, this interaction oc-curred most prominently among respondents between the ages of 30 and 49 years.Respondents under age 30 years may have reached a ceiling at moderate levels ofyouth problems, making the interaction more difficult to detect. Respondents overage 50 years did not appear to exhibit the interaction between blame and youthproblems. However, the three-way interaction between age (30 to 49 years), blame,and problem severity was significant, b = 0.117, p < .05. Here again, the resultswere consistent with the discourse prediction that blame would have a defininginfluence on the creation of tension.

The final predictions concerned the role of neighborhood cooperation. Neigh-borhood cooperation was inversely related to both problem clusters, b ’s = –0.291,–0.350, p’s < .01, indicating that it was critical to hold problem perceptions con-stant when analyz ing the role of neighborhood cooperation in ethnic tension. Asseen in Figure 3, respondents who perceived their neighborhoods as more co-operative experienced less tension, and this relation held even when controllingfor the severity of neighborhood problems, b = –0.140, p < .05. There was no

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Figure 1.Mean neighborhood ethnic tension for three age groups as a function of perceived neighborhood deterioration and exposure to blame

of own ethnic group.

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285

Figure 2.Mean neighborhood ethnic tension for three age groups as a function of perceived youth problems and exposure to blame of own

ethnic group.

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286 Daniel Romer et al.

Figure 3. Mean neighborhood ethnic tension as a function of perceived neighborhooddeterioration (panel A) and youth problem behavior (panel B) by high versus low levels ofperceived neighborhood cooperation.

interaction between problem severity and neighborhood cooperation for either prob-lem cluster, b ’s = 0.031, –0.009, p’s > .20.

The role of neighborhood cooperation was also important in the case of youngerrespondents (ages 16 to 29 years). Although they reported greater tension thanolder respondents (b = 0.222, p < .01), this association declined once neighbor-hood cooperation was held constant (b = 0.130, p > .05). Younger persons sawtheir neighborhoods as less cooperative than did older persons, and this was impli-cated in their greater reports of tension.

Discussion

The results provide considerable support for the discourse explanation of ethnictension. Exposure to ethnic blame discourse was strongly related to tension in neighbor-hoods. However, blame was not strongly linked to neighborhood problems as therealistic conflict explanation predicts. Instead, the tension associated with recententry of ethnic newcomers was better explained by increased communication of

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Blame Discourse versus Realistic Conflict 287

blame among ethnic groups than by increases in problems. Furthermore, problemswere more associated with tension when residents were exposed to blame of theirown ethnic group, suggesting that blame discourse transforms problems into ethnicconflict. These findings indicate that ethnic blame discourse can create tension quiteapart from realistic conflicts of interests among ethnic groups.

The finding that recent entry was associated with blame and tension in excessof perceived problems is consistent with our initial neighborhood interviews, whichsuggested that the discourse transformed disputes between new and establishedneighbors, over even trivial conflicts, into ethnic tension. Because ethnic blamediscourse impaired effective neighborhood problem solving, recent entry could eas-ily be associated with tension in excess of the problems those newcomers pro-duced. A study of recent entry into all-White suburban neighborhoods also showedthat initial concerns of the established residents were based largely on fears that thenewcomers would disrupt the neighborhood. Once these expectations were discon-firmed, attitudes toward the newcomers became more favorable (Hamilton & Bishop,1976).

The results also indicate that neighborhoods with greater problems experiencedmore tension. However, the interactions between problems and blaming suggestthat the tension associated with those problems was a function of the interpretationattached to them. When respondents were exposed to low levels of blame dis-course, increases in neighborhood problems were less likely to be associated withtension. The finding that blame of one’s own group had greater potential to trans-form problems into tension than blame of others suggests that being the object ofethnic blame is particularly threatening to residents.

Because our measure of blame discourse was not limited to problems in therespondent’s neighborhood, it is possible that the blame that respondents reportedreferred to problems beyond their neighborhoods. Nevertheless, exposure to blamewas related to recent entry of ethnic newcomers and to youth problems in theneighborhood. These associations reinforce the interpretation that blame discoursecreated tension by impeding effective problem solving in the neighborhood. Whetherthe discourse might also lead residents to view their own neighborhoods as moretension-ridden is an intriguing question for future research.

Despite the strong evidence favoring the discourse explanation, it is also pos-sible that realistic conflicts precipitated some ethnic tension. This was especiallytrue for youth problem behavior. The interaction between blame and youth prob-lems was significant primarily for persons between the ages of 30 and 49 years.Older residents reported tension in association with youth problems independentlyof exposure to blame. Nevertheless, the finding that persons across our age rangedid not view these problems as inherently tension-laden suggests that problems aresubject to interpretation. There was no universal agreement across ages that socialproblems in the neighborhood were inherently a reflection of intergroup conflict.

Another interpretation of the results is that blame only exacerbates tensions thatare rooted in realistic group conflicts. Accordingly, the interactions between blameand problems simply reflect the intensification of tension and not its genesis. How-ever, other results suggest that blame is directly implicated in the creation of ten-sion. Recent entry of ethnic newcomers is a theoretical precursor of tension in bothexplanations, and yet the tension that was associated with this variable was betterexplained by increased communication of blame than by perceived problems. Fur-thermore, exposure to blaming of others was unrelated to problems and yet was a

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288 Daniel Romer et al.

strong predictor of tension in neighborhoods. These findings suggest that there wasconsiderable opportunity for blaming to create tension independently of problems.

The finding that residents living in more cooperative neighborhoods experi-enced less tension regardless of the severity of neighborhood problems is also moreconsistent with the discourse explanation. Cooperative neighborhoods should bebetter equipped to resolve ethnically neutral conflicts and thereby reduce the op-portunity for blame discourse to transform those conflicts into ethnic conflict. Tothe degree neighborhood problems were not the result of differences in ethnicgroup interests, cooperative neighborhood cultures should counteract the debilitat-ing effects of ethnic blame discourse and prevent the escalation of tension. Therealistic conflict explanation assumes that actual differences in ethnic group inter-ests place limits on the ability of cooperative neighborhoods to find solutions toproblems, especially when conflicts become severe. We found no evidence of theselimits.

Our initial interviews with residents indicated that more cooperative neighbor-hoods had stronger civic organizations committed to neighborhood vitality. Theseorganizations included recreation center and school advisory boards, business dis-trict associations, town watches, and other informal neighborhood groups. In somecases, neighborhoods created coalitions of local organizations to promote inter-group cooperation. The work of these organizations was facilitated by discoursethat emphasiz ed the residents’ common interests in the well-being of their commu-nity. When tension events occurred, these organizations were poised to involveresidents of different ethnicities to resolve the disputes. Furthermore, because suchorganizations encouraged multiethnic participation, their credibility to mediate dis-putes was less likely to be questioned than could be the case in neighborhoodswith weaker cooperative capacities.

Cooperative neighborhoods also appeared more likely to involve their youthin multiethnic cooperative activities. Young people are critical to intergroup co-operation because they are far more likely than older age groups to perpetrate biascrimes (Levin & McDevitt, 1993). Furthermore, as our results indicate, youth prob-lem behavior is a major correlate of neighborhood tension. The finding that youngpeople’s greater experience of tension was related, in part, to their reduced senseof cooperation in their neighborhoods also implies that increased youth involve-ment in neighborhood cooperative activities possibly reduces the tensions they ex-perience.

Realistic conflict models have frequently been tested using historical data relat-ing changes in interethnic conflict to changes in immigration rates (e.g., Olzak,1992). Although immigration appears to be linked with ethnic conflict, the underly-ing mechanism is difficult to isolate with historical data. The possibility exists, forexample, that immigration increases the prevalence of ethnic blame discourse, whichthen increases ethnic tension. This interpretation is consistent with the finding thatthe targets of racial violence (e.g., African-Americans) were often not the groupsthat had recently grown in size (e.g., White Europeans), presumably creating therealistic source of conflict (Bonacich, 1976; Olzak, 1992). Our findings also suggestthat recent declines in economic status were related to increased experiences oftension. Nevertheless, much of this relation appeared to be attributable to exposureto the blaming of other ethnic groups, indicating that personal economic problemswere conflated with ethnic conflict.

Our finding that residents with higher income and educational levels reported

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more blame of others is also inconsistent with a realistic conflict explanation, whichwould predict that the people most exposed to threats of ethnic conflict would bemost likely to blame others for that conflict (Blalock, 1967; Levine & Campbell,1972). Nevertheless, members of higher income groups were less likely to experi-ence the neighborhood problems that were associated with tension, and yet theywere more likely to report exposure to blaming of other groups.

Other explanations of ethnic tension have focused on the contrast betweenrealistic group conflicts and individual race prejudice (Bobo, 1988; Sears & Kinder,1985 ; Sears, 1988). According to the theory of symbolic racism, tensions betweenethnic groups continue because many non-Latino Whites still harbor deep-seateddislike for persons of color. According to this theory, race prejudice should be themajor factor in the transmission of blame. Our results imply that individual preju-dice is implicated in the transmission of blame but that it is only one amongseveral factors that facilitate widespread exposure to blame. Blame discourse wasalso prevalent in social networks less inclined to harbor race prejudice, such as theeducated and politically liberal, and in all three ethnic groupings studied in thisresearch. It appears that blame discourse has sources that extend well beyond indi-vidual race prejudice.

Considerable ethnic tension, we found, is attributable to discursive processesthat structure interaction as a conflict between ethnic groups. These processes inter-act with manifestations of social disorganization to yield tensions in multiethnicsettings. Our conclusions are interesting to consider in the context of an apparentdecline over the past four decades in cooperative activity at the neighborhood andcommunity level in the United States (Putnam, 1995). We have examined the prev-alence of ethnic blame discourse in local television news reporting in Philadelphiaand found it to be ubiquitous across the major stations (Romer, Jamieson, & DeCoteau,1996). Similar patterns have been observed in national surveys of local televisionnews (Klite, Bardwell, & Salzman, 1995). To the extent cooperative capacities ofcommunities have declined while ethnic blame discourse continues unabated, theprospects for reducing ethnic tension will continue to be problematic for the fore-seeable future.

Notes

1. The ethnic composition of Philadelphia according to the 1990 census was 53.5%White, 39.8% African-American or Black, 2.7% Asian, and 3.9% other. A sizable proportionof Philadelphians (5.6%) labeled themselves Latino, a category that could overlap with anyof the previously listed racial groups. Although the city population as a whole declined6.1% from 1980 to 1990, the Latino population grew approximately 40%, and the Asianpopulation approximately 140%. Our bias crime statistics are from the Philadelphia PoliceDepartment (personal communication, April 19, 1996).

2. The 517 completed interviews represented 47% of the respondents who were iden-tified as eligible, who spoke English or Spanish, and who were selected for interviewing(N = 1,112). Up to five attempts were made to reach households if the line was busy orwent unanswered. Although interviews were conducted in Spanish when requested, onlyfour interviews were completed among eligible Spanish-reliant respondents (44% comple-tion rate).

3. About 6% of respondents claimed not to know their household income, and another3% refused to divulge this information. We recorded the unknown responses to the mean ofthe distribution and treated the refusals as missing values.

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4. Our measure of blame discourse did not focus exclusively on neighborhood blame.A more sensitive measure may have uncovered greater variation by neighborhood.

5. The prejudicial stereotype score was a composite of separate scores defined byfactor analyses of responses to the 13 items according to the ethnicity of the respondent andthe ethnicity of the target. The scales had internal reliabilities ranging from .53 to .80. Forexample, the scale used to define prejudicial stereotypes held by non-Latino Whites towardAfrican-Americans included items indicating that African-Americans were “noisy and playloud music,” “don’t take care of their neighborhood,” “don’t work hard,” “have too manychildren,” “commit crimes and violence,” “don’t do better in school,” and “prefer welfare towork” (alpha = .79). The scores were divided approximately into quartiles indicating veryunfavorable, somewhat unfavorable, neutral (not different from other people), and favorableprejudices toward the largest other group in the neighborhood.

6. We report partial correlation coefficients from this logistic regression analysis usingthe procedure described by Norusis (1994) provided by the SPSS analysis package.

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