Bipartition of the Soul in the Early AcademyAuthor(s): D. A. ReesSource: The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 77, Part 1 (1957), pp. 112-118Published by: The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/628642 .Accessed: 26/03/2011 09:13

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BIPARTITION OF THE SOUL IN THE EARLY ACADEMY

AMONG the topics this paper will discuss, the leading one is that of the moral psychology of the Laws; it will not, however, attempt a general study of this, but will confine itself to the question whether that work presupposes any particular division of the soul into parts. The problem seems to have been on the whole neglected by scholars. Apelt in his Platon-IndexI says briefly that the soul is there treated as tripartite, which is certainly not true without qualification. Neither England's commentary nor Ritter's affords much help. The latter does, indeed, touch on the question in Volume II of his Platonz; he there states that the Laws treats the soul as tripartite, and supports this by referring to I. 644C and IX. 863B, but neither passage proves his point, the second actually suggesting that it requires some modification, as will be argued below. The best treat- ment known to me is the discussion of the second of these passages by L. Gernet in his translation (with commentary) of Book IX,3 but it requires some expansion and supplementation.

It will be well to begin by recapitulating briefly the main points in the moral psychology of the Republic.4 The soul is there divided into three parts or (better) elements, the rational, the spirited and the appetitive, and this division has two aspects: (a) an analysis is thus provided which can be used in the interpretation and appraisal of all action whatever, the soul being in the right state and the agent's actions right in consequence when the rational element controls the appetitive through the agency of the spirited; (b) at the same time each of the three elements represents a drive towards one of three goals, the rational towards knowledge, the spirited towards honour and public distinction, and the appetitive towards pleasure (interpreted as bodily pleasure), or towards material gain as a means to the attainment of pleasure. Secondly, each of these three drives may predominate in any individual soul (though it is commonest for the last to do so, and least common for the first), and the three are therefore to be correlated with three ways of life, that of the thinker, that of the soldier or man in public life, and that of the merchant or other person engaged in a money-making enterprise, and further these ways of life are specially characteristic of different races.5 Thirdly, the three elements in the soul and the three types of character are correlated by Plato with the three classes in his ideal state, the rulers, the auxiliaries and the artisans.6 Fourthly, the distinction of three elements in the soul is made the basis for interpreting the four virtues, wisdom being the virtue of the rational element and courage of the spirited (ideally under the control of the rational), while justice consists in the maintenance of the proper relation between the three elements, the rational controlling the appetitive through the agency of the spirited, and temperance in the willing acquiescence of the appetites in the rule of reason.7 On the larger canvas of state organisation, the three classes will have as their specially characteristic virtues wisdom, courage and temperance respectively,8 while the state as a whole will be just if the correct relation between the three classes is maintained and the reason of the rulers preserves its control with the help of the auxiliaries.9 Fifthly, the tripartition of the soul is applied in Book IX to the discussion of pleasure, pleasures being graded as higher or lower according to the element in the soul which enjoys them; indeed, Plato argues that the pleasures of the rational element are not simply superior to those of the other two but more real as well.Io Finally, Book X suggests at least that the rational element is the real self, that it alone is immortal, and that the other two exist merely in virtue of our temporary attachment to a body."I The theory that the soul is tripartite occurs also in the Phaedrus. Here, however, the setting is a myth, and rigid exactitude of doctrine is not to be expected. The soul is likened to a team consisting of a charioteer and two horses which he is attempting to drive; in the case of the gods the charioteer and the two horses are all of noble breed, but the same is not true in other species, and in that of mankind one horse is of noble breed and the other of ignoble, so that the charioteer has difficulty in driving.I2 The charioteer is clearly reason. In saying that in the case of the gods both horses are of noble breed, Plato is indicating the unity and harmony that reign in the divine soul; in fact, he seems to suggest a little later that the soul of the gods is intellect through and through-a suggestion which seems to render inappropriate the introduction of the horses into the picture at all (just as it might be urged that in the phrase we have used above 'unity', taken strictly,

s.v. 'Seelenlehre'. P. 451.

3 Paris, 1917. See pp. 105-6 (n. 70). 4 Cf. esp. IV. 435 B ff. 5 Rep. 435E-436A. 6 Ibid., e.g. 440E-441A. 7 Ibid. 44 1C ff., 443C ff.

8 Ibid. 428C ff. 9 Ibid. 433A, etc. Io 58oD ff. 1 61 IB-612A. One might add that the imperfect

types of state and character depicted in Books VIII-IX can be interpreted in terms of the relations of the three parts of the soul. 1- Phdr. 246A-B.

BIPARTITION OF THE SOUL IN THE EARLY ACADEMY 113

is incompatible with 'harmony').I3

Of the composition of the human soul sufficient indication can be obtained from what is said later in the myth. One horse is good, the other bad ;4 the good is a lover of honour conjoined with modesty and temperance,Is needing no whip, but controlled sufficiently by the word of command and by reason ;6 its fellow, on the other hand, is the com- panion of insolence and wantonness, deaf, and amenable only to whip and spur.I7 It is plain that the three constituents of the myth are the parts of the soul figuring in the Republic.

In the relevant portion of the Timaeus, after various metaphysical preliminaries, Plato goes on to speak of the accession of sensation, and of desire, pleasure and pain and the various emotions, when immortal souls are implanted in bodies.I8 Once again the second and third elements in the soul make their appearance when reason has received bodily attachments, and when the soul is subject, through sensation, to violent intrusions from the physical world, the Timaeus being careful to distinguish what is mortal in the soul from what is immortal.'9 The Timaeus differs from the Republic in that the parts of the soul are now located in organs of the body. A. E. Taylor seems to have thought that Plato believed them to be so located when he wrote the Republic,2o and this is certainly possible (it had, as a matter of fact, been suggested as a possibility by Wilamowitz),21 but the evidence is inconclusive. In the Timaeus, however, the rational element is explicitly located in the brain, the spirited in the heart and the appetitive in the abdomen,22 while the faculty of divination is assigned to the liver.23

There are two further points to be noted about the Timaeus. The former arises from a brief passage on which no great weight can be laid. 64A-65B provides a discussion of pleasure on physiological lines which contrasts sharply with that of Republic IX, and is much closer to the more extended treatment of the Philebus. It is like the Philebus in not explicitly correlating pleasures with the three parts of the soul in the manner of the Republic, though it is difficult to build anything on this since the passage is so brief and since 65A does speak of the 'mortal part' of the soul as that experiencing the pleasures there discussed,24 while not specifying that part any further; the pleasures of smell are, indeed, a little hard to fit into the tripartition.25 There is equally little to be inferred from the second point. This is that the Timaeus opens with a brief outline of a discussion on the ideal state which the participants are supposed to have held on the previous day,26 and in this the main features of the political institutions of the Republic are recapitulated (the purely ethical and metaphysical discussions and the higher education being left aside), but nowhere is it stated that the number of classes in the state is to be three, the only distinction made being that between those: whose business it is to rule and guard the state and, on the other hand, the farmers and artisans.27 However, one can build nothing directly on this (though we may be reminded of it by what we shall find later in the Laws), in view of the cursoriness of the outline and the fact that in the Republic itself Plato is able to proceed some considerable distance without dividing the guardians into rulers proper and auxiliaries. The nearest approach to a mention of the tripartition of the soul in the political sketch in the Timaeus is the demand at 18A that the nature of the guardians shall be both 'spirited' and 'philosophical'.28

Plato nowhere explicitly abandons the tripartition of the soul, but in the later dialogues it falls into the background, and it is difficult to say that in any of them, the Timaeus apart (if it be counted as late), it is unambiguously presupposed.29 Writing in dialogue form, Plato does not set out an ordered system but deals with problems as and when they occur in the course of the discussion, without feeling any need to repeat himself by going once again over the ground covered in earlier- dialogues. But in the present instance there seems to be more to it than this, for the rational element tended naturally to stand apart from the other two as that which alone was immortal and divine, not owing its existence to any corporeal attachments. This is illustrated both by Republic X and by the Timaeus, the latter of which (as has been mentioned already) speaks of a mortal form of soul, contrasting it with the divine.3o A division of the soul into two elements is, as a matter of fact, ascribed to Plato in Magna Moralia I. II82a23 ff., where the division into three is not mentioned, the contrast intended being that with the theory (ascribed to Socrates) of the soul as an indivisible

13 Phdr. 247D. 14 Ibid. 253D, cf. 246B. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. D-E. '7 Ibid. 253E. I8 Ti. 42A-B. '9 Cf. Ti. 65A, 69C-D, 7oA, 72D. 20o A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (1928), p. 496. 21 Platon, vol. i, p. 395 (ed. 1920). 2" 44D-45B, 69D-7 IA. 23 71A-72C. 24 Cf. 42A-B. 25 65A. But the pleasures of smell are also mentioned

in Rep. IX. 584B. 26 17C-19B.

27 erd w6 v yewopycov (sc. y'vog) 6crat te iAAat Tr'evat, I 7C.

a8 lta Iv Ovzoetf6, nia 6N qStAodaooqov. 29 There seems to me to be great force in Mr. G. E. L.

Owen's arguments for placing the date of the Timaeus not long after that of the Republic ('The Place of the Timaeus in Plato's Dialogues' (Cl. Qu., N.S., vol. iii (1953), PP. 79-95)). Perhaps the Phaedrus was written about the same time, though this too is a matter of controversy.

30 Ti. 65A, 69C-D, 72D. Burnet (The Ethics of Aristotle (900oo), p. 63 n.) questions the relevance of these passages and of Plt. 309C (discussed below) to the bi- partition of the soul into a rational element and an irra- tional, but he presents no good reasons for his view.

I I4 D. A. REES

unity: pLET i-a'r'a 84 (sc. after Pythagoras and Socrates) HAc-wv 3LEldAo -4nv

~,b7V E& TE Td v A-yov

EXOV KGat E ' 7T yAOyOV 3pC0 , Kac K7E'ICEV EKarTOV (?OKacrrTo) LTpE 7 S 7 POUTKOvGas. The expres-

sions '7 Adyov ̀ 'Xov and T-o EAoyov are nowhere used in the dialogues in the sense required, but one may compare the manner in which the doxographical tradition represents Plato. Aftius reports as follows: FHvOaydpac IHArwvo KaiT

aIxV 7Y- V•V-7C-o Adyov

6LLEPp7 77V ?~UbX ,

7"Y t~ V8 Y P EXELY

OYLK T 8 AOYOV. ica"

8E TO TPOUEXES Ka aKpt PLtLEP. TO yp T

aoyov EtaSpoortv eL4 Aoyco'v, TO ry TatioTO'qJ p,7.

r ,A poa IV-p4- . .. TE

T' O•vLtKb KaG

7' ;L8r rftKyv, ATt. Plac. IV. 4. I. One may compare the way in which the

same idea is expressed by Theodoret, who was shown by Diels to be dependent on Aetius: HvOayo'pa-

tLv yyap Kav HA'rwv

rpqLEpp Tatr v [sc. '7v i/vx'v] tpE'Ca'Et a

T, FLEv avT7S Etvat Aoyut'v rO 3S

E"iAoyov. StXl

-8 [av' rrdAtv] To adAoyov ETE•ov. aKGt

TO; ' v a-roi3 OvLKv Et'VC O7

'

7rv1-/7LtKv", Theodoret, Cur.

Graec. Aff., V. 19 (cf. H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci [Berlin, 1879], PP- 389-90). Such a bipartition was certainly familiar in the discussions of the Academy; it will be argued later that it provided the psychological basis of Aristotle's Protrepticus, and it is alluded to in the De Anima.31

Further, if there were to be two elements postulated, a rational and an irrational, instead of three, it was natural that the two selected should be the first and the third. It can be plausibly argued, as some years ago by Cornford and Hackforth,32 that the spirited element was always in an ambiguous position, or even that the main justification for its inclusion lay in the political structure of the ideal state. If one examines it not as the pursuit of honour and distinction in particular but as an element involved in action in general, it may be thought of as strength of will or of character (normally co-operating with reason), or as self-respect (perhaps not widely different), while on the other hand it seems difficult to dissociate the notion entirely from that of anger, conceived purely as an emotion. In the Republic its function seems to be primarily executive, that of putting into effect the pronouncements of reason, so that, as the rulers control the artisans through the instru- mentality of the auxiliaries, so reason rules the appetites by means of the spirited element. But, if once it were conceded that reason could be effective of itself in ruling the appetites, this function of the spirited element would disappear, while Ovos, as spirit or anger would fall without difficulty into the ranks of the appetites and desires.

There is in fact evidence of a tendency in Plato in this direction. That evidence is negative for the most part, but merits investigation nevertheless. The Politicus, discussing the way in which the ideal legislator will rule his subjects, states that he will maintain the right relation-the meta- phor actually used is taken from weaving-between that part of the soul which has existed eternally and that which is 'of animate kind'.33 We are inevitably reminded of the Timaeus. There is little of relevance in the Philebus, but perhaps one may tentatively draw some indications from its ethical argument, which is based on a consideration of the two claimants put forward for the title of the good for man, knowledge and pleasure. The life of knowledge alone, devoid of pleasure, may, it is conceded, satisfy a god, but it is not one which a man can desire,34 while the choice of pleasure without knowledge is even less acceptable.35 For man the good life must unite both.36 There will inevitably be some hazard in the attempt to infer a moral psychology from these data, but it is clear that divine existence is thought to be pure intellect, as in the Phaedrus and Timaeus;37 in man, on the other hand, a distinction between a rational and an irrational and appetitive soul seems to be involved-a purely intellectual being would not, on this view, experience pleasure, and the gods are such-and, though there is nothing to preclude any third element, there is nothing to necessi- tate one. In particular, the list of goods at the end of the dialogue contains nothing which could be the special goal of a spirited element, such as is conceived in the Republic.38 This by itself is not much to build on, particularly as the picture of the ideal life for the individual is constructed on the same lines as that in the Republic, where even in the ideal state the philosophers undertake to rule merely because they are conscious of a moral constraint to do so, while in such states as actually exist it is the part of a wise man to avoid the political arena as far as possible: his aim, and theirs, will be, as in the Philebus, knowledge accompanied by the appropriate pleasure. There is, however, a further characteristic of the Philebus to be mentioned, namely that, in fact, though it discusses pleasure at length, distinguishes different types of pleasure and (like the Republic) differentiates true pleasures from false, it nowhere classifies pleasures in accordance with a tripartition or any other similar analysis of the soul. It may well be argued that all that this proves is that Plato did not here need any such analysis; whether anything more is involved is difficult to say, and it is impossible to be dogmatic, though perhaps an examination of the Laws will give some little help.

3' De An. iii. 432a24-6. 32 F. M. Cornford, 'Psychology and Social Structure

in the Republic of Plato' (Cl. Qu., vi (1912), pp. 246-65); R. Hackforth, 'The Modification of Plan in Plato's Republic' (Cl. Qu., vii (1913), pp. 265-72).

33 HPJ7 TOv IV KaT L T• avyyevig'

Ti• daeyeveg 6v

T(s4 I?vXyi ard~ovy p'pog 6Oep cavvptorapovaiy &weeic- (sc. '

flaatAtK?) 'rtaT?77), petd 6d t6d OeSov Tod 'poyevg airt cv ad3Ot dvOpcnm'vot , 309C.

34 Phlb. 2iD-22C, 6oE. 35 Ibid. 2rA-D, 22D, 23A, 6oD-E. 36 Ibid. 22A ff., 6IB. 37 Phlb. 22B-C; cf. Arist. E.N. X.

II77b26-I•178a2. 38 Cf. Rep. IX. 58IC-583A, with IV. 435E-436A.

BIPARTITION OF THE SOUL IN THE EARLY ACADEMY I15 Here our primary evidence is provided by IX. 863B-C, where Plato, discussing the nature of

criminal responsibility, enumerates three sources of wrong action, 'spirit' (Ovpod), pleasure and ignorance. The crucial words on the subject of Ov~Lds are as follows: v iv iv arj~ 7J

9'ac~TE• ET0E T 9 ITCLOS ELTE TL tLE*POS WV O GV1LLS, 3vcrEpt Kal V K9I71La Ep4TEc VKoSE , JAToY11 ola 7TAd

Jva-rp•r•E.39 Plato is careful to distinguish spirit from pleasure (or, rather, from the impulse

towards pleasure), but what he says about it is studiously vague. The classification of the sources of wrong action is reminiscent of the tripartition of the soul in Republic IV, where, though it is stated that in the conflict of reason with the appetites the spirited element normally sides with reason, it is not denied that this may fail to occur;40 on the other hand in the Republic, by contrast, the reader is left in no doubt that spirit is a part of the soul on its own account.

The other relevant passages occur largely, though not entirely, in Book I, which sets out the psychological preliminaries. The phrase 'to be master of oneself' (r~ Vt-v avTdov ai-rdv, KpELTOWV a6roi0) is discussed at 626E in terms which presuppose a division of the soul (Plato had not abandoned that), as does also what Plato says a little later, when advancing the ideal of harmony in the state.4' These conceptions set the key for the whole of the rest of Book I, as when the four virtues are introduced at 63oA-B.42 On the other hand, while in the Republic these are set out as bound up with, and dependent on, the tripartite nature of the soul, nothing is said of that here. What we find in the Laws-at least in the early books-is that the virtues to receive the greatest atten- tion as virtues are courage and temperance,43 and between these an elaborate parallelism is main- tained, courage being the virtue appropriate in the face of pain, temperance that appropriate in the face of pleasure.44 In both cases the virtue consists in self-command, and moral education in the steps taken to inculcate it, while the educational ideal laid down at the beginning of Book II is similarly that the child shall feel pleasure and pain at the right things.45

To touch on a few isolated passages later in the work, the same themes of pleasure, pain and self-control recur at III. 689A-E, and those of pleasure, pain and right thinking at 696C.46 VIII. 84oB-C, where Plato stresses the regulation of desire for pleasure in the sexual sphere, is of no great importance for us. More significant is IX. 863E-864A, shortly after the passage on Ov~du quoted above, where Plato, discussing criminal responsibility, gives definitions of justice and injustice which it is instructive to compare with those in Republic IV: 'Wrong (dQ&Kia) is the name I give to the domination of the soul by passion, fear, pleasure or pain, envy or cupidity, alike in all cases, whether damage is the consequence or not. But where there is a conviction that a course is best- wherever a society or private individuals may take that best to lie (v.1.)-where that conviction prevails in the soul and governs a man's conduct, even if unfortunate consequences should arise, all that is done from such a principle, and all obedience of individuals to it, must be pronounced right (&'Katov) and for the highest good of human life, though detriment thus caused is popularly taken to be involuntary wrong (dKoCLtov cLtKGav ELVLa).'47 As in the Republic, though here applied only to the individual soul and not to the state, we have what may be termed an 'internal' definition ofjustice. Finally we may note that a little later, at IX. 870, the sources of wrong-doing are listed as three in number, desire for money, ambition (q!Ao7rtgla) and fear of detection.

All these passages can be interpreted on the assumption that the tripartite soul is, however hesitantly, presupposed throughout. But nevertheless Plato studiously avoids mentioning it, and this is remarkable in so long a work paying so much attention to moral psychology, even though it might be objected that Plato is more concerned with detailed legislation here than he was in the Republic-after all, he also manages to say not a little about theology. But there is more to it than this: the Laws operates on the basis of the familiar set of four virtues, wisdom, courage, temperance and justice, which were expounded in the Republic as resting on the character of the soul as tri- partite, but this same set is found also in Aristotle's Protrepticus,48 which analyses the soul not into three elements but into two, a rational and an irrational, and elsewhere in Aristotle also.49 To presuppose four 'cardinal' virtues does not necessarily involve presupposing three parts of the soul, even if the soul be divided into parts and if further this division be taken to be the basis of the dis-

39 Ovtudj

is classed by Aristotle as a ard'Oo at De An. I. 403aI6-I7 and E.N. VII. 1i47a14-I6. The threefold classification of appetite, spirit and thought occurs at E.E. II. 1223a26-1224a7 (cf. also ibid. I225b25 and E.N. III. 11I Ibo ff.).

40 Cf. 7roA') j•uiAAov atix' (sc. tx' Ovyoet6C) Evy x-7

v"g' ?bvXii r TdaetCrtxOOa Tt d J-Aaa rp6 x AoYta~tLKdo'v, Rep. IV. 44oE; i . . zpitov zoiy0d aTet Td Ov9ZOet6, edTtKOVpOV av x< AoyutrtIKC taeat, &iv /Z?' 7•m KaK /g 'poo~i 6taqOapfj; ibid. 44oE-44 IA.

4' 627D ff., esp. 628D-E and 63oA-D. Cf. tai5ra ydp to 7 roApcov e8v 8'KUOT /W )fj VTro0 7Tpd6

tpUd ala'to TO /zaLLvet,

626E.

42 Cf. 631C-D, 647C-D. 43 Cf. esp. 635E. 44 633E-634A, 636D-E, 647C-648E, and cf. also the

juxtaposition of pleasure, pain and desire at 631E. 45 653A-C. 46 -rd !/dg I57oVdiKat' AiAV7ag KEK)7JtEvoV V aVjtoobov? roT

dpOT Adyot' Katl Ogro7,va;. 47 A. E. Taylor's translation. Similar views have been

adopted in recent centuries, as by Kant and T. H. Green (cf. also Rousseau).

48 Fr. 5, P- 33.15-2o Ross = Fr. 5a, p. 29.20-25 Walzer. 49 Pol. VII. 1323b33-36, 1334a22-36. E.E. III. devotes

special attention to courage and temperance.

116 D. A. REES

tinction between the virtues. If the alternative bipartition be employed, contrasted with the rational part of the soul there will be an irrational, characterised by the capacity for feeling pleasure and pain; temperance and courage will be shown in the control of pleasure and pain by reason, while wisdom, as previously, will be the specific virtue of the rational element and justice will be shown in the maintenance of a total balance. IX. 863B-C, quoted above, suggests a certain hesitation in Plato's mind, and it has been seen that there were tendencies in other dialogues pointing in that direction. The Laws does, in fact, suggest a bipartition of the soul more naturally than a tripartition, as is confirmed by IX. 863E-864A (also quoted above): reason is simply contrasted with the emotions, and the absence of the rigid scheme of the Republic means that the treatment is freer and more empirical. Again, when the sources of wrong-doing are given as desire for money, ambition and fear of detection,50 we have a list that could indeed be brought within the old three- fold framework, since fear of detection amounts to a desire for freedom from pain, the opposite of pleasure, but Plato does not make any such point explicitly, and his treatment is no longer forced in the same way. A further point which is perhaps of some significance in so long a work is that, as in the Philebus, though so much is said about pleasure, Plato does not grade pleasures in accord- ance with any division of the soul into parts; but then, he is no longer concerned, as he was in Republic IX, to vindicate the primacy of the pleasures of the intellect.

It is difficult to be sure how far it is relevant here to refer to the ideal state of the Laws, which differs from that of the Republic in certain respects in which the latter is closely connected with the tripartition of the soul. To this it may be objected that Plato has not really abandoned his earlier ideal state, but is only putting forward his new political scheme as something second-best. However, examination of the most directly relevant passage of the Lawss5 shows no more than that Plato still regarded his early communism as ideal, and this does not mean that he was still committed to the Republic as a whole, even on its political and institutional side, while the new religion of the Laws is certainly brought forward with the utmost seriousness. We find in the Laws a greater complexity of social structure. The old third class, that of the artisans, is now placed outside the ranks of the citizens altogether;5z the citizens of the Laws correspond to the two upper classes of the Republic, and among them the established order is slightly less authoritarian, elements of both monarchy and democracy (if these are the proper terms) being found, though the former pre- dominates.53 The primary distinction is that of rulers and ruled, but how far this is to be connected with the tentative shift in the direction of a bipartite soul it is difficult to say.

It remains to ask what further evidence there is to support the thesis I have been suggesting. The Epinomis (whoever its author may be) provides very little, but what it says may be worth noting. The motion of the stars is, it holds, like all other motion, due to a soul attached somehow to the body and governing it;54 the perfectly circular movements of the stars are evidence not of the lack of an indwelling soul but of its perfection.55 Moving according to reason, in the course which deliberation pronounces to be the best and with a perfectly orderly motion, they are contrasted with men and with other 'earthy' creatures whose movements are characterised by disorder, though man is indeed able to contemplate the heavenly bodies and the order in which they move.56

It is difficult to be sure of the psychological theory of movement and action which underlies this classification, if indeed a very precise one underlies it at all. The tripartition of the human soul is naowhere mentioned, but it is certainly possible that it is envisaged, and if so it will be helpful to compare the passage of the Timaeus in which it is said that a rational element exists not only in the human soul but in those of the lower animals also, though more seriously distorted than in that of man.57 In that case, the contrast envisaged between the activity of divine beings, that of men and that of the lower animals, will be one between different types of being all of which possess reason; but while in the first type reason is hindered by no disturbing elements, in the second appetite and spirit provide a certain degree of disturbance and in the third a greater. The nature of the star-souls-their connection with bodies composed of aether-will mean also that corporeal attach- ment as such will not bring upon the soul the disturbance of appetite: that happens only in the case of 'earthy' creatures.58

All this is possible, but, as in the case of the Laws, it is possible, and even tempting, if we look at the Epinomis without reference to the Timaeus, to see here not a tripartition but a bipartition into a rational element and an irrational. If so, the star-souls will be purely rational, their movement being for that reason perfectly orderly, while the souls of the lower animals will be completely

50 Lg. IX. 870. 5' V. 739. 52 VIII. 846D. 53 III. 69oA ff., 693D-E, IV. 712B ff. 54 Epin. 98IC-985B, esp. 983D-E. 55 Ibid. 982A-E. 56 This seems to be the implication ofrd o I'v o~y 'v dxraVla

KovotJUevovr 'pov Xp vo/gietv, 6'~rep oCg

'd 7ToA) dpq rd rept

7fd L pov, T6 o' v T v EtL TE KCat Opav~ -) rdpov EXov iaa TEKy •LOv Xpt T7roLteaOat rov bpd6vtov Elvat, 982A-B, taken with the emphatic injunction that man must study astronomy if he would be perfect.

57 Ti. 4ID-42D, 9oE-92C. 58 Contrast the Phaedo: but the theory of aether is later

than that dialogue.

BIPARTITION OF THE SOUL IN THE EARLY ACADEMY 117

irrational (or should we say 'non-rational'?) and their movements will exhibit disorder throughout. The human soul, on the other hand, will contain both a rational element and an irrational; its movements will in the ordinary course of things be disorderly, but it will be capable of virtue and, above all, of the contemplation of the divine.59 Against this interpretation one can allege (for what they are worth) the passages of the Timaeus referred to above. In its favour two facts can be adduced: first that, apart from a few passages, Aristotle seems to deny intelligence to animals while allowing them both imagination and appetition, and that there is perhaps in the Epinomis a tendency in this direction;6o secondly, the known prevalence (of which we shall have shortly to speak) of such a bipartition in the circles in which the Epinomis was composed.

It is clear that not much can be built on the above. What is much more important is that a bipartition of the soul is explicitly put forward in the Protrepticus of Aristotle, which seems to belong to the late fifties.6' The relevant portion argues that the soul and its goods are to be preferred to the body and its goods, and a distinction is further made within the soul of a rational element and an irrational; and as the soul is superior to the body and rules over that, so the rational element within the soul is superior to the irrational and rules over that.62 The simile is found also in the Politics.63 The argument for the absolute superiority of the rational element is clinched by the assertion, repeated later in the Nicomachean Ethics, that this is the real self.64

The Protrepticus follows the Academic tradition of distinguishing four cardinal virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance and justice, the primacy belonging to wisdom (aoola), the virtue of the part which is highest and is alone immortal. But the bipartition of the soul is found here in uneasy collocation with the theory of the four virtues, since there is now no reason why their number should be limited to four. Aristotle's subsequent evolution shows a gradual change: in the Eudemian Ethics, though specially detailed attention is bestowed on courage and temperance, many other virtues are discussed also, with no suggestion that they are purely derivative (while justice and the intellectual virtues now receive separate treatment), while in the Nicomachean Ethics, though they are still dealt with first, they scarcely receive special prominence. The treatment of the moral virtues has no longer an a priori basis but an empirical.

It remains to examine the passage on the bipartition of the soul in Nicomachean Ethics, I. 13, especially i o2a26-28,65 and also De Anima III. 432a24-26.66 The interpretation of the former is bound up with that of the phrase ol

iS'orEpLKO L Oyot, which, with others which are similar,

occurs several times in the treatises of Aristotle, and has been the subject of much controversy in the course of the last century. Bernays held that it referred consistently to Aristotle's lost dialogues -in other words, to his published works as distinct from his lectures, which were intended only for his pupils.67 E.N. I. Io02a26-28 he took to refer to the Eudemus.68 This interpretation of such terms as E'WEopTLKOL K oyot was, however, criticised by Diels, who was followed by Susemihl. Diels doubted if any single consistent meaning was to be given to these phrases running through all the passages where they occurred, but held that, if such were to be given, it would have to be 'discourses external to Aristotle's school'.69 But Bernays' interpretation found a supporter in Jaeger, who approached the problem afresh in his attempt to trace the course of Aristotle's development, and found no difficulty in the idea that Aristotle should, in his later years, have sometimes referred to earlier works of his own in which views were put forward with which he was no longer completely in accord; nor was he compelled to hold with Bernays that differences in doctrine were always due to the dramatic setting (though that may sometimes be the case).7o

Diels may perhaps have been right to the extent that one should not expect the phrases under discussion to bear the same meaning in every passage where they occur. They may not be in the

59 Epin. 977B-978B, 979C-D. 6o De An. II. 414bi6-19, III. 429a4-8, Met. A. 980a27-

98Ia5. But Bonitz's Index s.v. bpdviyog gives several passages where that word is used of animals. De An. II. 421a22-3 speaks of man as

bpovtyq)ra-ov 7vY 46ov.

6i The Protrepticus seems to have been written shortly after the Eudemus, which was written in or shortly after 354 (cf. P. Moraux, Les Listes anciennes des Ouvrages d'Aristote (1951), pp. 324-5, with the references there given; A. J. Festugibre, La Rivilation d'Hermis Trismigiste, vol. ii (1949), P. I68, n.2).

62 bvypi) iwv ackuatrog flAxtov (dpXtKndTepov ydp), vigg

6E d Atdo Y gZo

EX Kai LivotavLO ' o ydp TOLO TOV 6 KEteL6E Kat KWAvELt, KaK dev v p dEj y 6v olat 7 pdaTetv, ft. 6, p. 35, 11. 6-8 Ross (fr. 6 Walzer) (from Iambl. Protr., ch. 7). Jaeger (Aristotle, E.T., p. 65) claims to be the first to attribute this chapter of lamblichus to the Protrepticus; see, however, I. Bywater, 'On a Lost Dialogue of Aristotle' (J. Ph., ii (1869), pp. 55-69), esp. 57-8.

63 I. 1254a24-b24, esp. b4-8. 64 Loc. cit., 11. 11-12 Ross, Cf. E.N. IX. II168b28-

I I69a3, X. I I77b31-11 78a3. 65 Aye'yat d &7ept adZriT (sc. r-4 Tivxi-j)

v oT 19 E4CoeptpKOL A~yort dpKOvdvrOC o ta, Ka XPraoTov

avTol"g oov O T,/ IV

YAoyov adOril elvat, Td d A'dyov Eov. 66 Tp0d7ov yap tiva d7Tetpa balverat (sc. 'dpta Ti

bVXig'), Kai o'3 zdvov d xtveT A'yovot GtoptiovTOEg, AOyLOTLKd6V Kai OV~ULKOV KatO E7TLVUrTtK6dV, O 6 T% A6dyov eXoV Kat -d rAoyov.

67 J. Bernays, Die Dialoge des Aristoteles (Berlin, 1863), p. 91. For Bernays' view of the dialogues in general, see pp. 45, 127-8.

68 Ibid. pp. 63-9. 69 H. Diels, 'OIber die exoterischen Reden des Aristo-

teles' (Sitzungsberichte der preussischen Akademie der Wissen- schaften (1883), pp. 477-94, esp. p. 492); Aristotle, Politics, I-V (i.e. I-III, VII, VIII), ed. F. Susemihl and R. D. Hicks (1894), Pp. 56 -5-

70 Jaeger, Aristotle (E.T.), pp. 246 ff.

118 D. A. REES

proper sense technical terms: they may only seem to be such when they have first been isolated and tabulated by scholars. But it is at least certain that in several passages Bernays' interpretation can be seen to be correct ifJaeger's arguments are kept in mind, and this creates a presumption in its favour elsewhere also.

Heinze and Burnet, however, maintained that I Io2a26-28 referred to Xenocrates.7, Now it is perfectly possible that Xenocrates did hold the view in question, but there is little or no evidence on which to work, and even if he did it is unlikely that the reference here is to him. Heinze and Burnet were influenced by Diels, and also (probably) by the fact that there are several passages where, presumably for personal reasons, Aristotle criticises views of Xenocrates without mentioning his name72 (the only work where he does so being the early Topics73), while there seems to be no other thinker to whom he consistently alludes in this veiled and anonymous manner. But comparison of I I02a26-28 with the passage from the Protrepticus referred to above, taken in conjunction with what Jaeger has said about the term ~WeL'OpLKO o'yot, can leave no real doubt that it is to the Protrepticus that Aristotle is alluding: the other interpretation may have been helped by the fact that there is no good reason for supposing, as did Bernays,74 that the allusion is to the Eudemus, though it is certainly possible that that dialogue dealt with these topics. That the Protrepticus was in Aristotle's mind is made still more certain by the fact that an earlier passage in Nicomachean Ethics I alludes to the Protrepticus under the term r' ydyKUKAta,75 while the Eudemian Ethics and Politics do so under the term o

d••W'EpLKOT o'dot.76 Nuyens, in his L'tvolution de la Psychologie,

d'Aristote, does indeed state that i i 02a26-28 refers to the Protrepticus, but he mentions no particular fragment and gives no supporting reasons.77

As for Xenocrates, we learn from Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of his works that he wrote on topics of moral psychology, but of what he said nothing is known directly.78 Heinze recon- structed psychological and eschatological theories from Plutarch, De Facie in Orbe Lunae, and attri- buted them to him, but these attempts fall to the ground.79 More to the point, but nevertheless puzzling, is a passage in a Neoplatonic commentary on the Phaedo found in conjunction with part of that of Olympiodorus. According to this, Xenocrates and Speusippus regarded the soul as immortal tdXpt i-s

•g• oylas-. In this they are compared with lamblichus and Plutarch, and

contrasted with various other philosophers, and an examination of the other cases confirms that the use of /''XPt is inclusive, i.e. that the meaning is that Xenocrates and Speusippus held that there were in the soul both a rational element and an irrational, and that both were immortal.8o But unfortunately this does not settle the issue definitely in favour of attributing a bipartition of the soul to Xenocrates and Speusippus; the language would also be compatible with their having held that there were more irrational elements in the soul than one, and the doxographical tradition (as has been seen) makes it clear that the two lower divisions of the soul were regarded frequently as subdivisions of the irrational, to be contrasted with the rational.

Of De An. III. 432a24-26 all that needs to be said or that can be said definitely is that, like E.N. I. I Io2a26-28, it confirms that the bipartition of the soul was familiar in the early Academy. In part Aristotle would be criticising his own earlier self, but we may take it that it was not himself alone that he had in mind. Similar confirmation comes from Magna Mloralia I. i 182a23 ff.81

D. A. REES. Jesus College, Oxford.

7i R. Heinze, Xenokrates (1892), pp. 141-3; J. Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle (I900), note ad loc., and pp. 63-4.

72 Met. E. I028b24; Met. M and N (frequently); De An. I. 404b27, 4o8b32-409bI8.

73 Top.II. 11. I I2a37, VI. 14ia6, VII. 152a7, a27. 74 Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, pp. 63-9. 75 E.N. I. 1o95b32-Io96a4 (cf. Kat• T KaOev6etv i6taTov

Lv v ovX aipezxv 6', Ka•Y "

7ToOcb$1ueOa 7mdaag ZT KaOev6ovxt 7rapovaag d T ' 6ovk, Protr. fr. 9, p. 38 ad fin.-p. 39, 1.J Ross.

76 E.E. II. 1218b32-34, Pol. VII. 1323a2I-7. 77 P. 191, n. I33. 78 D.L. IV. I I-I4. The list includes a Hept 'bvXiyg in

two books, and several works on ethics, among them a Hepi 7TaO6&v.

79 Heinze, Xenokrates, pp. 123-47. But cf. R. M. Jones, 'Posidonius and Solar Eschatology' (Class. Phil., xxvii (1932), pp. 13-35); W. Hamilton, 'The Myth in

Plutarch's De Facie (94oF-945D)' (Class. Quart., xxviii

(I934), pp. 24-30). 8o o0 1dv dn7Td T4r AoyuKij j 4vXijX 9i pt Tij Ew/ 'xOU

(divxov coni. Bernays) g$ewm d7raOavaxi~ovatv, co" NovZinvto~ o- 6~ 'LptIXL PZST •or Oew, C) gHAw~rivo) vt ri7Tov ot 6? 1xpt T?7 dAoyila, cOg zTxv Itv 7TaAatLSv evOKpdaTy? Kat:

7'T8re0atTOrTo, t5v 6' vewT)Tpmv "'IcdgflAtXo KaG HAorgapo " oi 68 lImpt IdOv T x A4Y? AOYLK47, Ctb Hpd6KAoK Kati Hopqv'ptog" ot 68 gIXpt dI'vov o voY, 0qOdpovat ydp xiv 664av, do'g

7roAAot xtCv Hept7TaZrnLKCV " 0' O d p 68' bt8* vX Zij v SOelpovat ydp txg ' eptKda ed Tgvv 6Ah7v, Anonymus ap..

Olympiodori In Platonis Phaedonem Commentaria, ed. W. Norvin (1913), p. I24, 11. 13-20; Xenocrates,fr. 75 Heinze. Cf. Speusippus, fr. 55, ed. P. Lang (De Speusippi Academici Scrijptis, accedunt Fragmenta, 191 I1). The Plutarch is Plutarch of Athens, a Neoplatonic philosopher of the first half of the fifth century.

s8 See above, p. I 13 f.