Biothreats and Public PolicyIGCC/AAAS Wye River Biosecurity Workshop

Critical Infrastructure Preparedness

Michael Kleeman

(UC San Diego/American Red Cross)

Critical Infrastructure Elements

• Critical infrastructures underly the operation of our society– Power (electricity and natural gas)– Telecommunications– Transportation– Information technology– Water– Food– Health Care

Critical Infrastructure ElementsSizing Philosophy

• All resources need to be sized to meet an expected societal demand

• Different models exist for determining sizing– Average demand - food– Annual peak demand - 911 and other emergency services– X year maximum peak demand - bridges/dams– Economic optimum for supplier - cellular systems

• Each is driven by costs and benefit assumptions• Under monopoly conditions (power,

communications, water) the public good was a principal driver

Critical Infrastructure ElementsDeregulation and Policy

• There needs to be some economic rationale around sizing of infrastructure resources– There are not infinite funds for all purposes

• 911 resources – How they are sized– How they might fail

• Cellular systems– How they are sized– How they might fail

• Pure market forces in a for-profit model lead to hyper-optimization (JIT/WalMart effect)– This carries with it societal risks

Over-Optimized Systems

• When you remove robustness from systems they lose resilience– “Excess” or extra capacity needed for surges– But this extra capacity “wastes” resources

• Large vs. small horsepower engines

• When you push these systems too hard they tend to fail

• When critical infrastrucutures fail society pays– Power grids, food supply in emergencies, etc.

The Policy Question

• Why does business not respond appropriately?• Why put society at risk, especially in these times?

– The DHS question to business

• Who pays ?– Cellular, power, food, IT– Ultimately the consumer pays

• Business is aware of this but faces competitive risks• How best to move this issue forward

– A modest proposal

Local Resilience

• Critical for system survival– Dampens demand surges

• Permits better allocation of scarce resources

– Permits local survival if larger systems fail• A robust cell system vs. dedicated alternatives

– Less prone to supply chain disruption• A risk in terrorist events

• The Port of Los Angeles as an example• Levee example in California

Building Local ResilienceRed Cross Examples

• San Francisco– Prepare Bay Area, training one in four– Partnership with business, education, government

• Local capacity building, sheltering, food cache, etc.

• Gulf of Mexico Region– Pre-staging of resources– Deputizing agencies– Expanding shelter network– Distributed call center services

Recommendations

• Directly address the policy question of CIP– Convene business/government meeting

• Emphasize local preparedness– Supports community in natural and manmade

events

• Re-examine deregulation impacts– Consider resilience as part of operations

requirements in critical infrastructures