Biodiversity conservation in the context of poverty, greed and weak institutions
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Transcript of Biodiversity conservation in the context of poverty, greed and weak institutions
Biodiversity conservation in the context of poverty, greed and weak institutions
– lessons learned from IBESo research programme, Indio Maíz, El Castillo, Nicaragua
Helle Munk Ravnborg, DIIS, October 2006
Biological Reserve Indio Maíz (RBIM) as part of the Biosphere Reserve Río San Juan
decree 527 (1990)
decree 66-99 (1999)
decree 66-99 and UNESCO recognition (2003)
Biodiversity and ecosystems of RBIM 3,157 km2 (an area the size of Fyn) protected as IUCN category I - biological reserve recognized for its good state of conservation
high biological diversity high ecosystem diversity
yet diversity is insufficiently documented two expeditions undertaken by FUNDAR (NGO)
(2002 y 2004) – both in the RBIM itself
IBESo themes and teams
1aPreliminary inventory of flora in RBIM and buffer zone
Nelson Toval
Ricardo Rueda
Elvira Cotton
1bUseful plants and local knowledge in the buffer zone of RBIM
Alvaro Noguera
Henrik Balslev
2Environmental governance in El Castillo between 1999-2004
Mariana Barrios
José Luís Rocha
Rikke Broegaard
3Social capital and its importance for strengthening local organization
Ligia Gómez
Helle Munk Ravnborg
4Incentives for stimulating sustainable natural resource management
Alfredo Ruíz
Preliminary inventory of flora in RBIM and its buffer zoneObjectives: contribute to the knowledge of the biological
diversity existing in RBIM and its buffer zone design a participatory method to allow the local
population appreciate the biological values present in the zone
create economic benefits at the local level based upon the biological richness
Method: train and supervise local ‘para-taxonomist’
Some results
254 254
763
425
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Zona de amortiguamiento RBIM
Núm
ero
de e
spec
ies
Encontradas en ZA y RBIM Encontradas solamente en ZA/RBIM
Note: FUNDAR documented 436 species from the RBIM
8 new species for Nicaragua
Generation of an average monthly income of US$ 50 for the para-taxonomists
A total of 1,442 species
4 of these were collected in populated parts of the buffer zone
Implications
the exclusive focus on the RBIM in biological research undertaken in support of the development the management plan for RBIM and its buffer zone is mistaken the management category for the RBIM is already
defined the buffer zone possess much biological value
But El Castillo is much more than a biological reserve an area of cheap and ‘free’ land 13% of the population has stayed less than 5 years
in the zone, 35% less than 10 years an area rich in forest resources in 1999-2000, it was estimated: 4 planes de
manejo21%
1493 permisos domiciliares
27%planes
operativos anuales sin respaldo en
plan de manejo4%
tala clandistino48%
Fuente: Paniagua (2003)
incentives for illegal timber cutting and for sale of illegal timber
Three options for protecting the RBIM and its buffer zone provide economic incentives favouring
conservation (theme IV) stimulate and facilitate participation of the
local population in the protection and control (theme III)
support the control undertaken by the government institutions (theme IV)
Economic incentives favouring sustainable use of natural resources in the RBIM buffer zone sustainable production systems (e.g. of
cocoa) payment for environmental service schemes
(like the direct conservation payments or payments in return for Lapa Verde nests)
Typology of producers in El CastilloLivestock farmers
at the agricultural frontier
Peasants at the agricultural frontier
Poor agricultural
frontier peasants
Landless peasants and newcomers
Local timber dealers
60–100 acres of land
40–75 heads of cattle
donkeys hire labourers
(50% of needed labour force)
provide land for newcomers in order to secure labour force
60–70% of their area in pastures
30–40% of their area in forest
40–100 acres of land
6–15 heads of cattle horses (no donkeys) family labour force
(90% of needed labour force)
take part in labour exchange relations
occasionally sell their own labour
10–30% of their area in pastures
40–60% of their area in forest
20–40% of their area under crops
none or a maximum of 2 heads of cattle
small-stock engage in
temporal migration to Costa Rica
50–60% of their area in forest
recently arrived in the area
get access to rented or borrowed land or get permission to stay at livestock farmers’ land
offer labour to livestock farmers
50–200 acres of land
buy and sell timber
major part of their land in forest
Implications
experiences with payments for environmental services are incipient – monitoring of the agreements constitutes an important challenge
what constitutes an economic incentive to some, will not appear as such to others – a payment of USD 20 per acre of conserved forest is probably not attractive to livestock farmers e.g. unlikely that organic production of cocoa represents an
attractive alternative to the livestock farmers to effectively change the natural resource use of the
livestock farmers, a combination of incentives, taxes and regulations has to be applied
Importance of social capital for the local organizationObjectives: characterize existing social networks and
analyze who form part and how they are constituted
Methods: ‘affinity’ ranking supplemented by
conversational interviews and focal group discussions
Some results
a high level of unfamiliarity among local inhabitants – particularly among men – within the communities (in non-agricultural frontier communities, the level of unfamiliarity is generally around 5%)
men – social networks among men as overlapping circles overlaid by hierarchical relations
women – social networks as non-overlapping circles very limited experience and willingness to execute social control
with respect to environmental issues
Hombres - El Padilla
0
5
10
15
20
25
I* II III IV
Conglomerados
Núm
ero
de p
ers
onas
no miembros de comité local miembros de comité local
Mujeres - Las Maravillas
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
I II* III
Conglomerados
Núm
ero
de p
erso
nas
no miembros de comité local miembros de comité local
* unknown to all interviewed informants
Implications
communities do not function as entities but function by sectors
environmental and legal institutions should actively back attempts to execute social environmental control made by local inhabitants
in some communities, participating in local committees is correlated with belonging to certain social networks
Dilemmas of frontline workers from environmental governance institutionsObjectives: understand the dilemmas which frontline
environmental workers face
Methods: interviews with environmental workers, local
inhabitants and archival studies
Some results forest governance is limited to issuing permits and there is hardly
any control of forest exploitation each forest guard is responsible for patrolling 8 km of forest
border and an area of 70 km2 and lacks equipment very limited legal basis for environmental governance in the
buffer zone as long as no management plan has been elaborated forest guards (55) constitute 77% of SERBSEN’s personnel and
receive 23% of the salary budget (USD 47 000) (corresponding to USD 16/month) – the cost of elaborating the management plan for the Biosphere Reserve Río San Juan is estimated at USD 75 000
lack of feed-back and institutional support with respect to environmental cases reported by forest guards
Implications
to be efficient, the level of control undertaken by forest guards needs to be increased (number of forest guards, equipment to facilitate the patrolling and to document infractions)
improve the institutional support to forest guards (feed back on reported cases, transparent procedures, management plan)
apply forest control as a means to increase the costs of illegal timber
Three conclusions for conservation and development efforts Avoid partial coverage
efforts to generate local support for conservation through development initiatives tend to reach only part of the population – this limits support for conservation
Don’t overlook external actors ICD initiatives tend to address development needs and
environmental awareness of local people. Interests related to timber and agricultural frontier land tend to be held by powerful external actors – these actors tend to be overlooked when adopting the ICD lens
Recognize the limits of social control many protected areas are located in ‘agricultural frontier’ areas with
lack of generalized social networks, trust and security. Here, local people are unlikely to exert social control to ensure conservation and sustainable use of natural resources if not consistently backed by environmental and legal institutions
Samaria - 2005
RBIM - 2005
Samaria - 2005
- an illegal community inside
RBIMPublications available from www.diis.dk/ibeso