Big Business for Small Farmers? The Sustainable...

DRAFT2017June12–Notforciting.

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BigBusinessforSmallFarmers?

TheSustainableDevelopmentGoalsandCross-SectorPartnershipsinAsianAgriculture

AnnFloriniandMarkusPauli

Abstract

Partnershipsbetweengovernments,civilsocietyandtheprivatesectorareexpectedtoplaya

key role in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Those ambitious goals,

adoptedbythe leadersofnearlyallcountriesattheUnitedNations in2015,aimtoeliminate

extremepovertyandhunger,whilemakingmajorprogresstowardenvironmentalsustainability

andbroaderhumanwell-being.Theworld’s500millionsmallholderfarmersandtheirfamilies

areakeySDGtargetgroup,astheyconstitutethevastmajorityofpeoplelivinginpovertyand

astheenvironmentalSDGsrequiresignificantchangesinagriculturalpractices.Thismakesthe

recent emergence of a plethora of “market-driven” and ostensibly pro-development cross-

sector partnerships involving major agri-businesses a phenomenon worthy of attention by

development scholars. Such collaborations, which aim to incorporate smallholders into

agribusinessvaluechains,garnerhighpraiseinsomequartersaskeytoprogressonsmallholder

wellbeingandfoodsecurity,butcriticsattackthemasdisguisedexploitationofthepoorinthe

interestsofprofit.Thispaperexaminestheconditionsofinterestalignment,institutionalization,

and process management under which market-driven cross-sector collaborations could

contributetotheachievementoftheSDGs,drawingonseveralcasesinAsia.Thisfocusallows

for theory-building and empirical investigation at the nexus of three arenas of inquiry:

governance,corporatesocialresponsibility(CSR),anddevelopment.Thearticlefindsthatwhile

variations in national political economy and partnership design matter to the likelihood of

contributing to SDG implementation, the relative power of actors within the partnership

mattersmore.

Keywords: Sustainable Development Goals, Agriculture, Smallholder Farmers, Agri-business,

Governance,ValueChains,PPPs,Cross-sectorPartnerships,Vietnam,Indonesia,Asia


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Introduction

ThankstotheUnitedNations´(UN)SustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs),theworldnowhasa

sharedglobalframeworkofobjectivesthatareintendedtobuildaworldofgreaterwell-being

and resilience. The UN´s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development defines 17 SDGs and

concretizesthemin169targets,tobeachievedbytheyear2030.Theprogresstowardsthemis

measuredthrough304indicators.Forexample,SDG2,“Endhunger,achievefoodsecurityand

improvednutritionandpromotesustainableagriculture”containseightconcretetargets,such

asdoublingtheagriculturalproductivityandincomesofsmall-scalefarmers,and14indicators.

These measurements focus on outputs, such as total flows into agriculture (2.A.2.) and

agricultural export subsidies (2.B.2) as well as outcomes, such as prevalence of

undernourishment (2.1.1.), average income of small-scale farmers (by sex and indigenous

status)(2.3.2)andproportionofagriculturalareaunderproductiveandsustainableagriculture

(2.4.1.).

TheSDGsalsoprovideasharedglobalvisionofhowtheSDGsaretobeachieved.Goal17ofthe

SDGsisastatementofmeans,ratherthanends,focusedon“partnerships”acrosscountriesand

acrossbusiness,government,andcivilsociety.Thecallforsuchmulti-stakeholderpartnerships

growsoutofan increasinglywidespreadviewthatgovernmentsalonecannotmeet thegreat

challengesoftheday,andthatnon-stateactorsmustparticipatewithgovernmentsinaformof

collaborativegovernance(Zadek,2004;Glasbergen,Biermann,&Mol,2007).Thousandsofsuch

partnerships exist, addressing everything from health to energy to security (Selsky & Parker,

2005;Johnston&Finegood,2015;Forsyth,2007;Pinkse&Kolk,2012).Butunderstandingofthe

conditionsunderwhichcross-sectorcollaborationcan,orshould,complementorsubstitutefor

government-drivendevelopmentisstillinearlystages.

Anarrayofsuchcross-sectorcollaborationsisnowunfoldinginSoutheastAsia.Theregionisof

particular interest for a study of the effects of cross-sector collaborations in smallholder

agriculture. It is home to some 100 million of the world’s 500 million smallholder farm

households.ThesehouseholdsarekeytargetsfortheSDGs,assmallholdersrepresentmostof

theworld’s poorest and hungriest. The region is also of considerable interest to global agri-


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businesses,whichseedevelopingAsia(includingSoutheastAsia)asbothakeysourceofinputs

fortheirvaluechainsandasatopmarketforthefuturegivengrowingpopulationsandwealth

in the region. Manyof thecollaborationsare “market-driven”: i.e., theyaim to leverage for-

profitbusinessmodels toachievebothbusinessanddevelopmental goals. It is thesemarket-

drivenpartnershipsthatarethefocusofthisstudy.

Market-drivenagriculturalpartnershipsmayhavegeneralgoalssuchasimprovingnationalfood

securityand/orsmallholderwell-being,orspecificgoalssuchasraisingfarmer incomeby20%

by 2020.Whether the partnership goals are general or specific, they generally fitwell in the

categoryofcross-sectorcollaborationsexpectedtocontributetoachievementofrelevantSDGs,

andthus it is reasonabletoassessthemintermsofwhetherandunderwhatconditionssuch

cross-sectorpartnershipsdomakesuchcontributions.

Allthecollaborationsassessedinthisarticleshareakeycommonality:theirstatedaimistouse

marketmechanisms toachieve social andenvironmental goals that stateshaveaccepted (via

theSDGsorothermechanisms)butthatgovernmentsarenotachievingalone.Moreover,they

oftenoperateinremote,decentralizedarenaswherestatecapacityandauthorityisparticularly

challenged.Inotherwords,thecollaborationsoperateunderconditionsoflimitedstatehood–

wherestatecapacitytocontrolviolence,providepublicgoods,and/ordefine, implement,and

enforcerulesmaybelimitedterritorially,demographically,orincertainissueareas(Risse2011).

Thesecross-sectorcollaborationsalsorespondtoachangingagendaforbusiness.Startinginthe

1980s and gathering speed in recent years, the private sector – particularlywesternMNCs –

havefacedgrowingpressurestointernalizetheirenvironmentalandsocialexternalitiesevenin

the absence of governmental regulation, report publicly on the remaining externalities, and

sometimeprovidepublicgoodsthatgovernmentshavefailedtoprovide.Inotherwords,social

expectationsarerisingforbusinesstocarryout“state”functions.Asbusinessesgenerallylack

the capacity and incentive to do all this on their own, partnerships with civil society and

governmenthaveemergedasawayoffacilitatingsuchaction.


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In short, these collaborations may constitute not just a short-term bridge along the way to

developmentofconsolidatedstatecapacity,butadifferentmodeofgovernancethatneedsto

beassessedforitsabilitytoprovidethefunctionalequivalentof“stateness”inspecificarenas.

That raisesprofoundtheoreticalandpolicyquestionsacrossnumerousdisciplines.Supporters

of the cross-sector partnership approach claim that market-driven collaborations are an

effectivemeansofachievingsocialgoals.Criticsarguethatthepartnershipsaredominatedby

business concernswith profit, constituting exploitation in a new guise. Can, should, andwill

market-drivencross-sectorcollaborationsprovidethefunctionalequivalentofsuchstateroles

as serviceprovision, rule-making, implementation, enforcement, or knowledge transfer? Can

partnershipsbedesignedtoaddress issuesofpowerdistributionamongthecollaboratorsand

otherstakeholders?

Thispaperexplorestheimplicationsofseveraleffortsatcross-sectorcollaborationinagriculture

inSoutheastAsia,assessingwhethercollaborationsarelikelytoprovideameaningfuldegreeof

public goods and improve human well-being and environmental sustainability – functions

normally left to the state. As in other regions, agriculture in Southeast Asia is increasingly

aggregated intoglobalvaluechains thatstretch ‘fromfarmto fork’,creatingpressures to link

smallholder producers into integrated networks. But the fragmented and low-productivity

natureofsmallholderproduction,alongwiththeabsenceofcrucialelementsinthevaluechain,

createsdifficultiesinestablishingsystemsthatbenefitbothsmallholdersandthosewhowantto

buy what the smallholders produce. At the same time, growing environmental pressures

constrain previous resource-intensive practices to improve agricultural productivity, meaning

that agriculture production practices must change dramatically. The FAO estimates that

“feeding a world population of 9.1 billion people in 2050 would require raising overall food

production by some 70 percent between 2005/07 and 2050. Production in the developing

countrieswouldneed toalmostdouble”with some90percentof the increase to come from

higheryields, given thatmostarable land in theworld isalready inuse (FAO2009).Yet such

productivity increase cannot continue the usual path of large greenhouse gas emissions and

fertilizer use (FAO 2016), both of which are pushing the world far beyond the planetary

boundaries for a safely sustainable future (Steffen et al., 2015). Many of the various


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experiments inmarket-driven collaboration involving smallholders in Southeast Asia claim to

address simultaneously address productivity, environment, andpoverty concerns, providing a

usefulwayofexploringwhetherandunderwhatconditionssuchpartnershipscanbeexpected

tocontributetotheachievementoftheSustainableDevelopmentGoals.

TheSDGs,SmallholderAgriculture,andPartnership

Therearesome500millionsmallholderfamilyfarmsworldwide,producingaround80percent

ofthefoodsupplyindevelopingcountriesandcultivatingabout80percentoffarmlandinAsia

andAfrica(Gibbon2012).Asmall-holderfarmisdefinedascultivating lessthan10(Kharaset

al.,2015).Themajorityoffarmsworldwideareactuallylessthan1hectare(72%),another12%

arebetween1and2hectares.However,all farmsbelow2hectares togetheroperatemerely

12%ofthefarmlandworldwide(Lowderetal.2016,page23,26).Globally98%ofallfarmsare

familyfarmsandtheyoperate53%ofagriculturalland(Graeubetal.2016).

Major improvements in smallholder agriculture are necessary to achieve many of the

SustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs).TheSDGsincludetwosweepinggoalsthatarecoming

todefinetheagenda:theeliminationofextremepoverty(SDG1),andtheeliminationofhunger

(SDG2).Thesegoalscannotbeachievedwithoutattentiontosmallholders,whoaregenerally

thepoorestandhungriest,aswellasproducersoffood(Kharasetal.2015).Around2.5billion

people in poor countries depend for their livelihoods directly on the food and agricultural

sector;1.5billionofthemliveinsmallholderhouseholds(FAO2012).Manyofthesesmallholder

households live in extreme poverty: FAO (ibid.) finds that “the highest incidence of workers

livingwiththeirfamiliesbelowthepovertylineisassociatedwithemploymentinagriculture.”

Around 925million peoplewere under-nourished in 2010; 75%of them live in rural areas in

developing countries, depending directly or indirectly on agriculture (Gibbon 2012). Because

manysmallholders,particularlypoorersmallholders,arewomen,theGenderEqualitygoal(SDG

5) is highly relevant.1 And given the water and energy intensity and the climate impacts of

1Women constitute 43 percent of the agricultural labor force in developing countries. The Food andAgriculture Organization (FAO) assets that women in agriculture are “especially disadvantaged, with

fewerendowmentsandentitlementsthanmen,evenmore limitedaccessto informationandservices,


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agriculture, other SDGs with essential links to smallholder farming include CleanWater and

Sanitation(SDG6),AffordableandCleanEnergy(SDG7),andClimateAction(SDG13).Looking

attheconcretetargetsoftheSustainableDevelopmentGoals itbecomesevenmoreapparent

how many of them are directly linked to smallholder farming. (See Table 2 Targets of the

SustainableDevelopmentGoalsLinkedtoSmallholderFarming,intheAppendix.)

Developmentspecialistshavelongrecognizedtheimportanceoftargetingsmallholderfarming

toreducepoverty.Lipton(2005,pageviii)arguesthatsince1700masspovertyreductionalways

started with “sharp rises in employment and self-employment income due to higher

productivity in small family farms”. This initial poverty reduction normally leads to “further

povertyreductionviacash-cropping,ruralnon-farmwork,andshiftstourbanemploymentand

incomegrowth”(ibid.).

Ofcourse,muchoftheimprovementinruralwell-beingmayresultfrompeoplemovingoffthe

farm,withacrucialdeterminantforhouseholdincomeintheruralSouthbeingaccesstoyear-

round work via salaried jobs or self-employment (Desai at al 2010, 11). In the rural South

livelihoodstendtobecome increasinglydelinkedfromagricultureas theprofitabilityofsmall-

holderfarmingdeclines(duetoenvironmentaldegradation,landshortages,andotherfactors)

and as new non-farm opportunities emerge with social and cultural changes like education,

mobilityandmedia-ledconsumerism(Rigg2006188f).

Education and job-creation, not least through industrialization, may indeed be key to

overcoming poverty in the long run (Roodman 2012). However, the hundreds of millions of

peoplestilldependentonagriculturefor–atleastpartoftheir–livelihoodintheruralSouth,

including Southeast Asia, means that making smallholder farming more productive and

profitable,whiledecreasingthenegativeenvironmentalimpact,willremainanurgentnecessity

at least during the SDG timeframe – out to 2030. And as Birner and Resnick (2010, p. 1442)

gender-determined household responsibilities, and increasingly heavy agriculturalworkloads owing to

maleout-migration.”(FAO2016,xii)


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pointout, “implementingpolicies tosupport theeconomicdevelopmentof small farmershas

proventobeaparticularlysuccessfulstrategytoreduceruralpoverty”.

Buthowtochangesmallholderfarming?Manyhavepointedtotheimportanceoflandreforms

inreducingmasspoverty,but,asLipton(2005)notes,landreformispoliticallychallenging.He

referstoVietnamastheonlyexampleinSoutheastAsiaof“egalitarianprivatizationofstateand

collective land” (Lipton 2005). As Lipton’s subtitle, “The Role of Crop Science in Alleviating

Poverty,”suggests,progresscanstillbemadeviaafocusontechnologicalimprovements,higher

yielding crops and farmers´ training to achieve higher productivity and incomes for

smallholders.This insight isalsoreflected intheBillandMelindaGates initiatedAlliancefora

GreenRevolutioninAfrica(AGRA),foundedin2006.2

Butwhobearsresponsibilityforbringingaboutthesechanges?TheWorldBankandothersare

advocating “market-smart” approaches to foster the emergence of a broader private sector

(World Bank 2008). Interestingly, theWorld Bankmeans input subsidies when it talks about

“market-smart” interventions. The rational is to underwrite risks for those early adopters of

new(ornotyetlocallyestablished)technologies,ultimatelytoachieveeconomiesofscaleand

toreduce inputsprices. (ibid.,13,152).Theadvocacyof this“market-smart”approachbythe

World Bank puts the government and (international) donor agencies in charge of fostering

infantindustries.ThisapproachshowsthattheWorldBankin2008doesnotfollowreligiously

the 1989Washington Consensus call for switching public expenditure away from non-merit

subsidiestobasichealthcare,educationandinfrastructure.3

2 See: Gates Foundation, www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work/Resources/Grantee-

Profiles/Grantee-Profile-Alliance-for-a-Green-Revolution-in-Africa-AGRA3 The Washington Consensus is a term coined by JohnWilliamson in 1989. It describes ten reforms

replacingeconomicpolicies,whichdominatedLatinAmericasincethe1950s.Williamsonperceivedthem

asaconsensusatthetimeintheOECDcountries.Theyinclude:(1)FiscalDiscipline,(2)ReorderingPublic

ExpenditurePriorities, (3)TaxReform, (4)Liberalizing InterestRates, (5)ACompetitiveExchangeRate,

(6) Trade Liberalization, (7) Liberalization of Inward Foreign Direct Investment, (8) Privatization, (9)

Deregulation, (10) Property Rights.When re-visiting his paper in 2004,Williamson advocates poverty

alleviationthroughaccesstoassets,sothatthepoorcanproduceandsellthingsothersarewillingtopay

for. He focuses on four elements: education, property titles, land reform and micro-credit. See

Williamson(2004).


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Indeed, a reliance on pure market forces would risk running afoul of the variety of market

failuresthatplaguesmallholderagriculture.BirnerandResnick(2010,p.1442)summarizethese

as including “the non-excludability ofmany agricultural technologies, coordination challenges

thatpreventexploitingeconomicsofscale, informationasymmetries,a lackofassetsthatcan

serveascollateral,andthevulnerabilityofsmallholders tothebiological,climaticandmarket

risksinherentinagriculturalproduction.”Andsmallholdersfacesubstantialrisksinattempting

to improve their lot by connectingwith value chains, asotherparticipants in the value chain

may not make the complementary investments that would make smallholder action

worthwhile.

Onestrategyforovercomingthesechallengestoapurelymarket-basedprivatesectorfocusin

agriculture is to bring together a wider range of actors in “market-driven” collaborations

involvingmultinationalcorporations (MNCs),governments,NGOs,andahostofothers.These

collaborationsaimtoincorporatesmallholdersintoglobalagriculturalvaluechainsinwaysthat

aimtoserveprivateandpublicgoalssimultaneously.Thisstrategyhasreceivedaboostwiththe

SDGs,whichhaveprovidedaconsensusnotjustaboutgoals(andtheirassociatedtargets)but

also,somewhatsurprisingly,aboutmeans.Goal17–Partnerships fortheGoals–differs from

therestinfocusingsolelyonmeans,andthedesignatedmeansispartnership.Thus,achieving

theSDGs is explicitlynotexpected tobeaccomplished solely through traditional government

action,butfrequentlybymeansofcross-sectorcollaborationsinvolvingbusiness,government,

andcivilsociety.

This strategy is now at the top of many agendas, given the recent shift to dominance by

agribusiness and global value chains in the global food system (World Bank 2007). They are

increasingly common in agriculture and rural development. Partnerships aremore andmore

“market-driven” – i.e., they are intended to integrate smallholder farmers into larger

agribusinessvaluechains.Agricultureproduction inSoutheastAsia,aselsewhere, increasingly

consists of producers integrated into agribusiness-driven global value chains “from farm to

fork.”Butsmallholders,whotendtobefragmentedandlow-productivityproducers,arerarely


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incorporatedintothesevaluechains,whicharemissingkeyelementsthatwouldbenecessary

tobringinsmallholders.

Relianceonmarket-drivenpartnershipsasa(partial)strategytoimprovesmallholderwellbeing

and achieve the SDGs assumes that such incorporation will improve the productivity of

smallholder farming sufficiently to raise incomes past the poverty threshold, and/or increase

foodproduction sufficiently to contribute tohungeralleviationand improvednutrition,while

simultaneously reducingnegativeenvironmental impacts fromagriculture.Theseassumptions

needtobetestedasrelianceoncross-sectorcollaborationgrows.Littleempiricalresearchhas

beenconductedtodemonstratewhattypesof“market-smart”interventionsworkunderwhat

conditions(BirnerandResnick2010,p.1445).Noristhereconsensusonwhatitmeansforsuch

interventionsto“work.”Dothesevaluechainpartnershipsworktomovesmallholderfarmers

outoflow-levelequilibriumtrapsandthusprovideapowerfulmeansofachievingtheSDGson

poverty and hunger? And do they do so in a way that also achieves the environmental

sustainabilitygoals?Towhatdegreedothepartnershipsshapeinnovativesolutionstocollective

actionproblemsthatcouldnotbereachedintheabsenceofcross-sectorcollaboration?Arethe

goods being provided public, club, or private? Are goods being provided at all or is it

exploitation?Wouldtraditionalgovernmentalagriculturalextensionservicesanddevelopment

processesachievethesamegoals,andifso,whyisthepartnershipapproachbeingused?Are

there structures for collaboration that are necessary and sufficient to overcome the

vulnerabilitiesofsmallholders?

TheoriesofGovernanceandPartnership

Cross-sector collaborations in agriculture are one type of governance carried out through (at

leastpartially)non-statemechanisms.Thus,itishelpfultodrawontheoriesofgovernancethat

increasingly focus beyond the state, considering the roles of non-state actors and non-

hierarchical modes of political steering (Risse 2011, p. 2). The contrast is to the fully

consolidated statehood ideal type, which includes the Weberian monopoly on legitimate

violence within a given territory, the capacity to make, implement, and enforce rules

throughoutthatterritory,andtheprovisionofwelfareservicesexpectedfromamodernstate


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tothepeopleresidinginthatterritory.Suchcapacityisseenasdefining“domesticsovereignty”

(Krasner1999).Sincethedaysofmodernizationtheory,practitionersandscholarshavelargely

assumedthatfullyconsolidatedstatehoodistheachievableendgoalofdevelopment,despite

thenumerousfrustrationsalongtheway.

Somegovernancescholars,however,pointoutthatthereis littlereasontoacceptthatsucha

goal is necessarily achievable, or evennecessary. Limited statehoodmay in fact be thenorm

andheretostay,requiringadifferentapproachtothenotionofgovernance(Risse2011,p.2).

The limits can take various forms– territorial (state capacityonly applies topart of the legal

territory),sectoral(certainpolicyarenasgounmet)ordemographic(someinhabitantsarenot

providedgovernment servicesor arenot included in rules) (Risse2011, 5, 20). Thus,market-

drivencross-sectorcollaborations,however,donoteffectively take intoaccount the limitson

statehood. Their design often reflects standard assumptions about the relative roles and

interestsofstateandprivateactors,arguingthataligningthoseinterestssufficestoensurethat

thepartnershipwillservepublicaswellasprivategoals.

The rapidly growing literature on “collaborative governance”, “multi-stakeholder initiatives

(MSIs)” “partnership”, “polycentricity,” and “complex governance,” to give just some of the

emergingtermsforgovernancebeyondtraditionalgovernment,ismakingincreasingeffortsto

delvedeeperintoquestionsabouttheconditionsunderwhichnon-stateactorsandcross-sector

collaborations can supplement or compensate for the shortcomings of limited statehood.

Emerson et al. (2012), for example, call attention to the system context in which such

partnershipsoperate–fromthepolitical, legalandsocio-economicmeta-leveltotheconcrete

network-level regarding power, resources, conflict/ trust, connectedness and prior failures to

addressthechallenge.Oneweaknessofthisframeworkisthattheimportanceofthedifferent

aspectsisnotclear.Thecoreaspectsofinterestsandpowerareonlypresentwithinthesystem

context.Whereas, Ansell andGash (2008, 550) introduce the key notion of ‘power-resource-

knowledgeasymmetries’. Yet, theyonly regardpartnerships initiatedbypublic institutions as

collaborativegovernance.Wearguethatpartnerships,ifgovernment-initiatedornot,aretaking

ongovernancetasks.


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Broadly speaking, the concept of collaborative governance is a reaction to ‘failures of

downstreamimplementationandtothehighcostandpoliticizationofregulation(…)(and)asan

alternative to adversarialism of interest group pluralism and to the accountability failures of

managerialism’ (Ansell and Gash 2008, 544). But why is the market-driven approach so

dominant inthedesignofpartnerships?First,amongdonorstherehasbeenatrendsincethe

1980stowardsabeliefinmarkets,oftenreferredto(especiallybycritics)asneoliberalthinking,

spearheadedbytheWorldBankandotherinter-governmentalorganizations.Asecondfactoris

thepromotionofmarket-drivenpartnershipsbynon-governmental internationalorganizations

such as theWorld Economic Forum (WEF). As amembership organization,with dues paid by

largemultinationals(MNCs),ithasthenecessaryfinancialmeansaswellasthestandingamong

MNCs to make its agenda heard. The World Economic Forum is long known as the most

influential convener of corporate and government leaders at fora such as Davos. The WEF

becameformallyincorporatedas“theworld’sNGOforpartnership”underSwisslawin2015.

For each partnership for market driven value chains in agriculture, we examine what

combination of the following actors is in place, and what appears to be happening on the

ground regardingwhose interests prevail andwhether progress toward the SDGgoals seems

likely.

Weinvestigateinterestalignmentregardingthefollowingactorsengagedinpartnerships:

a. Government: we assume its interest in achieving the SDG targets, and explore its

capacity (“limited statehood”). The alternative hypotheses is that the government is

interested primarily in keeping key constituencies happy. Hence, we explore which

constituencieshavegovernments’ear–farmers,business,others.(ADD:AnsellandGash

rewhygovernmentsdoingpartnerships.)

b. Business:weassumeitsinterestisprofit,nuancedbyshortvslong-termfocusandbythe

CSR/social licensetooperatepressures thatmayaffectbusinessplanning. (CITErecent

Zadekwork(2017)aboutbusinessandpartnerships.)

c. Donors and NGOs: we assume the interest is in achieving the SDG targets. The

alternative hypotheses is that they are interest in having visible projects, respectively


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securingfundingthroughsuchpartnerships.

d. Farmers´organizations:weassumetheirinterestinmakingthepartnershipsworkforthe

targeted farmers, i.e. increasing their production and incomes. The alternative

hypothesesisthattheyaremainlyinterestedintheirpoliticalinfluence.

e. Platforms: we assume the interest is to achieve the SDG targets and to continue the

existenceofthepartnershipanditsplatform.

ItishighlycontestedwhetherpuremarketprocessescandelivertheSustainableDevelopment

Goals. Given the incentives business faces and the nature of agriculture (Birner and Resnick

2010,1442),itisnotclearthatmarketscanprovidethemultiplepublicgoodsthatareneeded.

Butaconstructivisttakewouldexplorewhetherengagementincross-sectorpartnershipswould

causeprivatesectoractorstoredefinetheirintereststohavealonger-termperspectiveonthe

returnstheycouldreapbyinvestinginnewwaysinsmallholderagriculture,buildingonthekey

constructivist insight that socialization matters. Such socialization – towards more SDG

engagement–couldarguablyhappenindiversefora,suchastheWorldEconomicForumorthe

UnitedNationsGlobalCompact,whichpromotessustainableandsociallyresponsiblebusiness

practicesandreportingonthem.Thus,akey initialquestiontoexplore iswhether,andunder

what conditions, partnership institutionalization and process management compensate for

powerdifferentialsanddifferentinterestsamongthepartners.

AgriculturalPartnershipsinAsia

Multi-stakeholdernetworksintheagri-foodsectorinSoutheastAsiainclude:

Regional

• Better Rice Initiative Asia (BRIA), initiated by the German development agency GIZ

(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit); focuses on improving rice

valuechainsandoperatesinIndonesia,thePhilippines,Thailand,andVietnam;

• Global Agri-business Alliance (GAA), CEO-led, private sector alliance, operating sector-wide, initiated by theWorld Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD),

focusesonsustainabilityanddevelopmentchallengesalongthevaluechaininbothfood

andnon-foodcrops;basedinGenève,Switzerland,globaloutlook;


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• Grow Asia, initiated by theWorld Economic Forum (WEF) under its New Vision forAgriculture,focusesonsmallholderagricultureinawiderangeofcropsandoperatesin

Cambodia,Indonesia,Myanmar,thePhilippines,Vietnam.

Countries4

• Agriprofocus,initiatedbyaDutchdonorpartnershipnetwork,operatesinMyanmar;

• Feed the Future and Helping Address Rural Vulnerabilities and Ecosystem StabilityProgram (HARVEST), initiated by the United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment(USAID),operatesinCambodia;

• MEDA–Creatingbusinesssolutionstopoverty,initiatedbyCanadiandonor,operatesinMyanmar;

• PRISMA, initiated by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT),operatesinIndonesia;

• VSAT (Vegetable Sector Acceleration Taskforce), initiated by Dutch donor, operates in

Myanmar;

For context,we describe a few of them inmore detail regarding their governance structure,

goalsandapproaches.

GrowAsia:GrowAsiaisamulti-stakeholderpartnershipplatform.Ithassetatargetofreaching

10millionoftheapproximately100millionsmallholderfarmersintheregionbytheyear2020

to incorporate them into agricultural value chains, enabling them to increase their yield and

profits by 20%, using 20% less water and emitting 20% less greenhouse gases per ton of

production.”5GrowAsiapartnerswiththeASEANSecretariatandtheagriculturalministriesof

thecountriesinwhichitoperates.Thenumerousagri-businessmembersarerepresentedonits

Business Council and the NGO members form its Civil Society Council. Donors, farmer

associations and theWorld Economic Forum as well as a small, Singapore-based secretariat

comprise the other elements of Grow Asia´s governance structure. The implementation of

projectsisinthehandsofworkinggroupsthatfocusoncommodities(likecoffee)orsolutions

(likeagri-finance)withinonecountry.GrowAsia’sparentageintheWorldEconomicForumhas

4Therearedozensofotherdonor-fundedprojects focusingonagricultureand/or fisheries in

oneormoreSoutheastAsiancountrieswithmoreorlessinvolvementofthepublic,privateand

civil society sector, some with a focus on small-holder farmers. They include for example:

Agence Française de Développement (AFD), Danish International Development Agency(DANIDA), European Commission (EC), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), KoreaInternational Cooperation Agency (KOICA), Netherlands Enterprise Agency, SNV Netherlands,Swisscontact,SwissDevelopmentandCooperation(SDC).5www.growasia.org,accessedFebruary13th,2017.


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fundamentallyshapeditsoutlook.WEF’sNewVisionforAgriculture,formallylaunchedin2010,

describesitselfasaninitiativetosupportnationalandregionalplatformsforpartnershipsthat

are: (i) “Country-led, drivenby local stakeholders inpartnershipwith global organizations; (ii)

Multi-stakeholder, engaging government, private sector, international organizations, civil

society, farmers associations and others; (iii) Market-based, focusing on catalyzing and

expanding sustainable, inclusive investments and market-based activity; (iv) Aligned with

national plans, regional strategies and global goals” (World Economic Forum 2015, emphasis

added).

TheGlobalAgri-businessAlliance(GAA):TheGAA,launchedin2016inSingapore,isaCEO-led,

privatesectoralliance,operatingsector-wide.ItemergedoutoftheWorldBusinessCouncilfor

SustainableDevelopment (WBCSD),whichalsofunctionsas its interimsecretariat. Itsdeclared

aimis“harnessingthecollectivestrengthsoftheglobalagri-businesssector(…)toimprovethe

resilienceoffarmersacrosstheworld”.TheGAAengagesits36membersthroughavaluechain

approachforfoodandnon-foodcrops.Themembersinclude“growersandproducers,traders,

fertilizer and agro-chemicalsmanufacturers, seed suppliers, primary processors and agri-tech

suppliers.”6Itclaimsto“addresssustainability,social,laborandenvironmentalissueswherethe

agriculturalsector isseentohaveasharedresponsibility“.7GAAdeclaresthat it isparticularly

interested in helping to achieve SDG 2 “end hunger, achieve food security and improved

nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture”. While its members are all corporates, it

“emphasize(s)thespiritofpartnershipandwillseekopportunitiesforcollaborationwithother

stakeholders in the design, execution and delivery of its activities.”8 GAA aims to achieve its

goals by establishing working groups, creating targets, tools, and measurement/reporting

methods for itsmembers, andby engaging “decision-makers to remove structural andpolicy

barriers that prevent the agri-business sector from fully contributing to achievement of the

SDGs”(ibid.).

6http://globalagribusinessalliance.com/who-we-are/

7http://globalagribusinessalliance.com/our-mission/

8http://globalagribusinessalliance.com/our-mission/


15

OtherprojectsfocusedonsmallholdersintheregionaredrivenbyNGOs,industryassociations,

andotheractors.TheFrenchinternationaldevelopmentNGOGRET(GroupedeRechercheand

d’EchangeTechnologique), forexample,whichcountsagricultureasoneof its sevenareasof

expertise, provides financing and technical assistance to support farmer-led Committees in

somesoutheastAsiancountriesthatcanofferaffordableloansandfacilitatemarketlinkages.9

Therearealsoindustryinitiativeswithadhocpartnershipelements.CropLifeAsiaispartofthe

global federationCropLife International (founded in2001),whichrepresentstheplantscience

industrywithsuchmajorcorporatemembersasBASF,BayerCropScience,DowAgroSciences,

DuPont, FMC, Monsanto, Sumitomo Chemical and Syngenta. CropLife Asia focuses on crop

protection biotechnology – promoting genetically modified organisms (GMO), international

trade, stewardship, regulation and fighting counterfeiting.10 Finally, several individual

companies have strategies focused around utilizing cross-sector collaboration. Some major

agricultureandfoodbusinesseshavefullyembracedtheideaofpartnershipsforsustainability.

AgricultureinSoutheastAsia

Southeast Asian countries are insightful case studies for cross-sector partnerships for

agricultural value chain interventions. While fast numbers of smallholders (100 out of 500

million smallholder familiesworldwide)are living in the region, it is sometimesoverlooked in

the shadow of China and India. The six largest Southeast Asian countries by population size

showaclear(andcommon)pattern.ThehighertheGDPpercapitaandthehumandevelopment

indexrank,thelowerthepercentageofruralpopulationandagriculturalemployment.Malaysia

is the richest among the populous countries in Southeast Asia (USD 9,500), has merely 9%

agricultural employment and 25% rural population.On theother endof the spectrum in our

sampleisMyanmarwiththelowestGDPpercapita(USD1,300)andtwoofthreepeopleliving

inruralareasandbeingemployed inagriculture.Yet,also in inthemoreprosperousVietnam

9www.gret.org/2017/03/gret-is-supporting-the-emergence-of-farmers-organisations-in-

myanmar/?lang=en10http://www.croplifeasia.org/about-us/organization/


16

twoof threepeopleare living in rural areasandnearlyhalfof thepopulation isemployed in

agriculture.

InsertTable1.

The more agriculture contributes to the GDP, the lower the value added per worker in

agriculture. This is due to smaller parcels of land, less mechanization, less technology, less

efficientinputsandlessknowledgeofbestpractices.Indonesiaisaclearoutlieronemissions.11

This is due to slash-and-burn agricultural practices in Indonesia, which are illegal and are

recentlytackledmoreseriouslybycross-sectorpartnerships,involvingproducers,investors,civil

societyandgovernments–afteryearsofseveresmogintheregion(called“TheHaze”).12

Government expenditure on agriculture is a good indicator for the role of agriculture as

perceivedbytherulingelite.Theclearoutliersare Indonesiawith0.9%ofGDPandMyanmar

with6.3%.Malaysia,ThailandandIndonesiaarethewealthiestpopulouscountriesinSoutheast

Asiaandareallnetfoodexporters.Theyexportmorethandouble(ortriple)thevalueoffood

than they import.ThePhilippinesareanet food importerand thevalueof food importsand

exportsequalsoutinVietnam.WheresocialistVietnamoutdoesIndonesiaandthePhilippinesis

the ease of doing business. Yet, Vietnam´s rank in theWorld Bank index (82) is well behind

11Indonesia´smainemissionsandremovalsfromagriculture,forestsandotherlanduseare:Emissions/

removalsfromforests(629milliontonsin2014),emissionsfromburningbiomass(390),emissionsfrom

net forest conversion (369), emissions from croplands (285) and only then emissions fromagriculture

(166).These166million tonsemissionsonly fromagriculture in2014are thehighestemissions inour

countrysample,comparedto67inMyanmar,63inThailandandVietnam,53inthePhilippinesand14in

Malaysia. Though Indonesia´s population is also the largest in the region,with a distance. (FAO2016,

134)12TheFire-FreeAlliance(FFA)isacross-sectorpartnership,thatincludesthegovernmentofIndonesia,

forestry and agriculture companies and NGOs. It was launched in February 2016 and claims to have

implemented community-based fire prevention initiatives inmore than 200 villages. The Jakarta Post,

“Fire FreeAlliance claims tohavedramatically reduced forest fires in Sumatra since2015”,March16,

2017. URL: www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/03/16/fire-free-alliance-claims-to-have-dramatically-

reduced-forest-fires-in-sumatra-since-2015.html


17

Thailand(46)andMalaysia(23).ForeigndirectinvestmentinagricultureishighestinIndonesia

(344millionUSD),followedbyMalaysia(103)andVietNam(99).

CaseSelection

Regardingthepoliticaleconomyofstates,SoutheastAsiaoffersawealthfromwhichtoselect

cases forempirical investigation.Becausethepurposeof thisarticle is theory-building for the

emergingphenomenonofmarket-drivencollaborationfordevelopment,ratherthanthetesting

ofafully-fledgedtheoreticalframework,itisusefultoselectcasesfromsuchdiversity.Vietnam

is highly centralized with a ruling communist party that aims to make the country the next

China. It has an agriculture sector that is achieving high yields, attracting substantial foreign

direct investments and is more business-oriented than other Southeast Asian countries.

IndonesiaandthePhilippinesareboth largelycontrolledby influential familieswhoseholding

companiesspantheeconomy,includingtheagriculturesector.Myanmarisintransitionfroma

military dictatorship, with foreign investors eager to get in early to invest in the country’s

naturalresourcewealth.

ThisstudyfocusesprimarilyonVietnamandIndonesiaforthreereasons.First,theiragricultural

sector is more representative for Asian developing countries than the economic outliers

MalaysiaandMyanmar.Also,regardingstatecapacityandgovernance,VietnamandIndonesia

aremorerepresentativethan,again, theoutliersamongthepopulousSoutheastAsianstates,

MalaysiaandMyanmar.Second, theyattract farmore foreigndirect investment thanthenet-

food-importer Philippines and Thailand. This is relevant as many of the market-driven

partnerships under investigation are initiated and dominated by Western multinational

corporations (MNCs). Third, Vietnam and Indonesia achieve the highest cereal yields in the

regionwithlevelsoffertilizerusein-betweenthoseofMyanmar(verylow)andMalaysia(very

high). This is important as some of the major players in these agricultural cross-sector

partnershipsarethemajorcropscienceinputproviders.


18

The selectionof Indonesia andVietnamwasdone toensure adegreeof economic similarity.

Bothcountries,classifiedasLowerMiddleIncomebytheWorldBank(2016),areinthemedium

GDPpercapitarangeofSoutheastAsiancountries–incontrasttoThailandandMalaysiawith

farhigherGDPpercapita,andMyanmar, farbehind (seeTable2).Outof thethreecountries

withasimilarpercapitaGDP,namelyPhilippines,IndonesiaandVietnam,wedecidedtofocus

on the latter two. This was because of two reasons: (1) the longer-established partnerships

operating in IndonesiaandVietnamand, (2) there is, toacertainextent,anexistentbasis for

collaborative initiatives due to the comparatively advanced efficiency of agriculture as

evidencedbythehighercerealyieldoutputsinthesetwocases(seeTable2).Inaddition,there

oughttobebetterprospectsformarket-drivenapproachesnotleastbecausethetwocountries

donotlackbasicinfrastructureandcapacityassomeoftheirSoutheastAsianpeers.Thus,they

provideahardcaseforthepropositionthatmarket-driveninterventionsareunlikelytobenefit

farmerssustainably.Inaddition,bothcountrieshavelargeruralpopulations,rankinginthetop

tenof rural population shares globally (Kharas et al., box 3.4, p. 51).We investigate towhat

extentthevaryingstatecapacityintheagriculturalsectorinIndonesiaandVietnamexplainsthe

differing outcomes regarding the partnerships and explore how best to measure this state

capacity.

Method

We conducted eleven semi-structured interviews with core public, private and civil society

stakeholders involved in cross-sector agricultural partnerships in Vietnam and Indonesia. The

audio-recordedinterviewsweretranscribedandcodedinthequalitativedataanalysissoftware,

maxqda. The coding was done both inductive and deductive – based on a theoretical and

empirical literature review. A comparative case study design was implemented, focusing on

VietnamandIndonesia,countriesinwhichmajorpartnershipsforagriculturalchangeoperate.

Additionally, we had dozens of exploratory, follow-up and off-the-record conversations with

people involved in cross-sector partnerships as well as experts. Most of these additional

conversationstookplaceinVietnam,Indonesia,Singapore,Malaysia,Thailand,theNetherlands


19

andtheUSA.Whilewedrawonthisbackgroundinformationweonlycitethetranscribedsemi-

structuredinterviews.

ResearchQuestions

The central question driving the research is whether the ostensible shared benefits for

agribusiness, smallholders, and the environment are likely to materialize from cross-sector

partnershipsdrivenbyagribusiness invaluechain interventions.Arangeofperspectives from

the literature suggests quite different expectations about the likely impacts of such

interventions.Thoseinsupportclaimthatmarket-ledinterventionsarenecessaryforreaching

small-holder farmers on a large scale. Critics argue that such schemes mainly benefit the

corporations and cement the status quo without targeting underlying issues of rights-based

empowermentor addressing suchnegative externalities as environmental degradation (Grain

2016). We draw from the theories outlined below to elucidate theoretically and practically

importantquestionsabouttheconditionsunderwhichmarket-drivencross-sectorpartnership

mightmeaningfullycontributetothosegoals.

1.TheState

Akeysetofquestionsrelatestotheroleofthestate,statecapacity,andthespecificnatureof

state-market policy economy relations in the polity where the partnership operates. The

“limited statehood” framework (Risse2010) suggests that attention to state capacitymatters

notonly in statesusuallydeemed fragile,but inmoststatesbecause limitedstatehood is the

norm.Weoperationalizestatecapacityandgovernanceusingtwoindices.(SeeTable2.)First,

the IndexofStateWeakness in theDevelopingWorldby theBrookings Institution. It assesses

thecapacityofstatestofulfillcoregovernmentresponsibilitiessuchas(i)Economic–„fostering

an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth“; (ii) Political –

„establishing and maintaining legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions“;

(iii)Security–„securingtheirpopulations fromviolentconflictandcontrollingtheir territory“;

(iv) Social welfare – „meeting the basic human needs of their population“. (Rice and Patrick

2008,3)


20

Second, the Worldwide Governance Indicators by the World Bank.13 Governance, in their

definition, „consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is

exercised.“ The indicators cover the dimensions:(i) Voice & Accountability (participation in

selection of government, freedom of expression, association, media);(ii) Political Stability &

Absence of Violence (including terrorism); (iii) Government Effectiveness (quality of public

services, civil service, policy formulation and implementation);(iv) Regulatory Quality

(government´sability„toformulateandimplementsoundpoliciesandregulationsthatpermit

and promote private sector development“);(v) Rule of Law (confidence in and abidance by

society´s rules, quality of contract enforcement, property rights, police, courts; likelihood of

crimeandviolence);(vi)ControlofCorruption („extent towhichpublicpower isexercised for

private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, aswell as "capture" of the

statebyelitesandprivateinterests“).(WorldBank2016.)

TheoutliersinbothindicesregardingSoutheastAsiaareclear.AtthebottomMyanmar,which

after the 2010 general election transformed from a military junta to a (formally) civilian

governmentandamoreopeneconomy.AtthetopMalaysia,whichoutperformsitsneighbors

economically (GNI of USD 5500) and in all governance indicators. Except for voice and

accountability,whereIndonesiaandthePhilippinesareahead.14Vietnamwithlessthanhalfthe

GNIpercapitacomparedtoIndonesiaandthePhilippinescomesinsecond–afterMalaysia–in

theStateWeakness Index. This ismainlydue to its farbetterperformance regarding security

compared to itspeers. Its laggingbehind in thepolitical sphere isalso reflected in theWorld

Bank´sgovernanceindicators.Regardingvoiceandaccountability itperformsevenworsethan

Myanmar.And its regulatoryquality is regardedaswell behind its regionalneighbors, expect

Myanmar.Ourin-depthcasestudycasesofVietnamandIndonesiamainlydifferongovernance

regarding (i) political freedom (far lower in Vietnam), (ii) political stability and security

13 It reports indicators formore than200countries (and territories) for theperiod1996–2015. (World

Bank2016.)14 The data refer to 2015. Hence, before the election of Rodrigo Duterte as new President of the

PhilippinesinMay2016.


21

(substantially lower in Indonesia), (iii) economic level (substantially lower in Vietnam), (iv)

regulatoryquality(lowerinVietnam).(SeeTable2.)

Onehypothesisisthatpartnershipsaremostlikelytosucceedincountrieswithwell-functioning

states,wheretheoverallcapacityforcollectiveactionismuchhigherandwherethestatehas

implicitcapacitytocoercecompliancewithrulesortomandatecontributionstotheprovisionof

public goods –what is sometimes referred to as the “shadowof hierarchy,”which creates a

credible threat of coercive state action such as regulation if non-state actors fail to act

“voluntarily.”

2.ReplacingtheShadowofHierarchy

Analternativehypothesisisthatthepartnershipapproachismostlikelytosucceedinareasof

“limited statehood”, where the government has demonstrated a lack of capacity to achieve

collective action goals, leaving space for private sector or donor driven alternatives. The

literaturesuggeststhatalignedinterestscansufficeinsomecases.Onehypothesisisthatinthe

absence of the shadow of (state) hierarchy, collaborative forms of governance can act as a

substituteandinvolvemarginalizedgroupsinameaningfulway.AsAnsellandGash2008(551)

contend:“If therearesignificantpower/resource imbalancesbetweenstakeholders,suchthat

important stakeholders cannot participate in a meaningful way, then effective collaborative

governancerequiresacommitmenttoapositivestrategyofempowermentandrepresentation

ofweakerordisadvantagedstakeholders.”Wherethatstrategycancomefromandhowitisto

be executed is an open question.Many collaborations have a central secretariat intended to

serveasaneutralplatform.Insuchcases,isthesecretariatadequatelyresourced?Doesithave

the capacity, authority and mandate to spend resources appropriately and ensure that the

collaborationmeetstheinterestsofallparticipants?Whodeterminestheresourceallocation?

Many partnerships depend on the involvement of NGOs that have substantial experience in

sustainable rural development – are they engaged andwhose interests do they serve?What

capacitydothesmall-holderfarmersthemselvesmustrepresenttheirinterests?


22

Togaininsightintothesesweepingquestions,welookforevidenceintheformofpartnerships’

institutionalstructuresandprocessesinthespecificcasesweinvestigate.Arecompaniessimply

promoting their products or finding new suppliers in the interests of short-termprofits,with

only rhetorical commitment to smallholder farmer empowerment and well-being and to

environmental sustainability goals? Or does the collaborative governance structure, with

representation from business, government, NGOs, and farmers’ associations, along with the

partnershipsecretariat,overcomethe inertiaofstandardcorporateoperatingproceduresand

enablelong-termcommonintereststogaintraction.

EMPIRICALFINDINGS

Our researchexplored twodistinctaspectsofpartnership to investigate theconditionsunder

which market-driven cross-sector collaborations in agriculture are likely to achieve progress

towardpovertyreduction,environmentalsustainability,andfoodsecurity. Thefirstisagency:

how individual actors and organizations shape partner interests and identities to align very

diverse actors around a shared, operational agenda. The second is structure: both the broad

political institutions within a country, and the institutional arrangements and processes of a

givenpartnership.

AGENCY

AgencyofDonors,Governments,Businesses,Partnerships

Drawinguponaconstructivistapproach,theimportanceofindividualagencybecomesclearfor

understandingunderwhichconditionspartnershipswork.Agentsmustbecommittedbecause

theyenduppayingthetransactionscoststhatbenefitthewholepartnership–inotherwords

theyprovidepublicgoodstothepartnership.Wearguethatagencycancomefromanysector

orfromplatformssupportingthepartnership.Empirically,wehaveinvestigatedtheconditions


23

under which this happens, and we find that it can happen because of 1) donor funding; 2)

government involvement;3)corporate internalizationofaredefinedself-interest.Anexample

of corporate internalization of redefined self-interest include the case of a major European

chemical company, whose leadership transformed the business model from a fertilizer

manufacturertoafarmer-centriccompany.(i9:48)Infactweseetheimpetuscomingfromall

three sectors in our cases, but we also find that there is a key role to be played by a

coordinatingorganizationorplatform.

PartnershipPlatforms

Thecoreroles foroverarchingpartnershipplatformsare to (i) co-createacommonvision, (ii)

brokernewpartnerships,(iii)coordinate,guideanddirect,(iv)shareknowledgeand(v)report

onprogress.Suchpartnershipplatformsoftenmeldexistingprojectsoftheirmembersundera

commonumbrella.InoneSoutheastAsianvaluechainplatformtwothirdofitscurrentprojects

pre-existeditsformation.(i9)Thestrengthofsuchplatformsliesintheabilitytobringtogether

actorsfromallthreesectorsandthecross-fertilizationthatthisfacilitates.Inourcasestudies,

this led to a more “holistic or balanced group of stakeholders” participating in pre-existing

projects,onceitbecameapparentwhatnewactorscouldcontribute.

In value chain interventions, this ideally leads to an involvement of actors along the whole

chain.Forexample, incross-sectorprojects in Indonesiathebrokeringofnewpartnershipsby

the platform Secretariat brought in a NGO for measurement and evaluation and a bank for

farmer financing solutions – in addition to the pre-existing interventions in the input and

growingstage(i9:64.)Partnershipplatformscanfunctionasasafespaceforpublic,privateand

civil society actors to engage with each other, most importantly with clearly defined goals,

structuredforexamplearoundasmall-holderfarmerfocus.

AgencywithinPartnershipOrganizations


24

The respondents highlighted leadership onmultiple levels as themost important element of

successful partnering. (i1, 5, 6, 9) We distinguish between senior buy-in and individual

operational leadership in the daily work of partnerships. Multinational corporations were

perceived as best toworkwith in a partnership if the senior leadership team is “driving the

agenda”and ifCEOshavemadecommitmentspublicly (i1:22).Partnershipconvenors insisted

thatthisseniorbuy-inmustthentranslateintoamandateandcreateroomtomaneuverforthe

individual leadactors inthedailyoperations.Thosecoordinatingpartnershipsreportedthat it

wasveryapparent,whichcompaniesandNGOshadaclearmandateandwhichdidnot–evenif

thatwasnevermadeexplicit(i9:46).

Members of partnership convening platforms identified “wavering commitment from

leadership” – especially from CEOs andMinisters – as themost severe challenge formaking

partnershipswork (i9:43.) Securingpersonal commitmentmainlydependson soft skills anda

constanteffort,theconvenorsstated(i9:56),addingthatitisverydifficulttopersuadeactorsto

participate on a one to one basis, that one must be “in meetings to sense the energy and

enthusiasm”(i9:143).

A continuous disruption for partnership convenors is political change – less regarding

subsequentmajorpolicychangesbutregardingtheneedtosecurethepersonalcommitmentof

the new senior leaders (i9:44). Regular leadership changes are common in theMinistries of

Agriculture in the ASEAN countries. For example, there were four consecutive Coordinating

MinistersforEconomicAffairsinIndonesiasince2009.15ThatMinister´sportfolioincludesinter

alia the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Environment & Forestry. Similarly, the

leadershipchangedthreetimessince2009 in theMalaysianMinistryofAgricultureandAgro-

basedIndustryandfourtimesinthePhilippineDepartmentofAgriculture.16

15TheofficeofCoordinatingMinisterforEconomicAffairswasfilledinrecentyearsbyHattaRajasa(22

Oct2009–13May2014),ChairulTanjung(19May2014–20Oct2014),SofyanDjalil(27Oct2014–12

August2015)andDarminNasution(12August2015–today).16TherecentMinistersofAgricultureandAgro-basedIndustryinMalaysiawereNohOmar(10Apr2009

–15May2013),IsmailSabriYaakob(16May2013–29Jul2015)andAhmadShaberyCheek(29Jul2015

– today). Their counterparts in the Philippines, the Secretary of Agriculture in the Department ofAgriculture,wereArthurC.Yap(25Oct2006–February24,2010),BernieFondevilla,(8Mar2010–30


25

Partnerships´ContributionstoActor’sCoreInterests

A danger facing cross-sector partnerships is capture by vested interests or being steered by

individualactorsintoadirectionnotreflectingtheagreed-onmission.Partnershipplatformscan

play a core role in ensuring that this does not happen. The danger can arise from all three

sectors.Forexample,aNGOinthesampleredefiningitselfasaprofitorientedconsultancyand

trying to shape the partnership along these lines. (i9:52) In one value chain partnership in

Indonesia, for example, interviewees pointed to the importance of the regional partnership

platforminmovingthecollaboration inoneproject fromamarketingopportunity forasingle

corporationtoabroaderengagementbetweenfarmersandmultiplecorporatesuppliersabout

early flowering technologies. (i9:92-93)While a government extension service can provide a

neutral channel for farmers training, the company-led approach is “completely biased” as a

partnershipconvenorpointedout.(i9:93)Thisexampleofacompanyattemptingtomakeuseof

a partnership project for its own commercial interest points to the importance of having an

overarchingorganizationorplatformthatcanprovidesomeneutrality.

Businesses

Oneofourkeyfindingisthatparticipationinpartnershipscanpartiallyshapehowcorporations

and others see their self-interest.More andmore companies realize thatwhen it is a public

goodtoimprovetheirsector,itwilleventuallybenefitthemasaprivateorganization.(i9:99)

The only way a value chain works is if the commercial aspect of it works – with the ideal

scenariobeinganoff-takerthatcommitstobuyingallthecropsproducedinthatvaluechain,as

apartnershipconvenorunderlined. (i9:123)A functioningvaluechainalso reduces the riskof

lending to the involved farmersand ishenceattractive tobanksandmicro-financeproviders.

June2010),ProcesoAlcala(30Jun2010–30Jun2016),EmmanuelPiñol(30Jun2016–today).


26

(i9:129)Therespondentinourinterviewwasconvincedthatthosevaluechainprojectsthatdid

nothaveagoodoff-take–agoodpull–wouldsimplyneverwork.(i9:127)

A real challenge is convincing for example an off-taker company to involve another off-taker

company(i9:64).Givenhowcost-andtime-intensiveitistobuildupasustainablevaluechain,

thisreluctanceto“share”avaluechainwithadirectcompetitorisnotsurprising.Butthefact

thatmostvaluechainprojectsarecontingentonaspecificoff-takingcompanymakesthemvery

vulnerable(i9:127).Projectsthatdonotfocusonaspecificcropbutoncross-cuttingissueslike

finance,agrochemicalsortelecommunicationforsmall-holderfarmingaremainlydonorfunded

astheself-interestofspecificcompaniesislessclear(i9:127).

Partnerships can attract free-riders and rogues with little interest in the goals of the

partnership. In a case reported by a partnership convenor, small domestic businesses with

problematicbusinesspractices trying togain legitimacy throughthepartnershipsbrandname

soonstoodisolatedandleftthepartnershipafterawhile.(i9:51)Atthesametime,ithighlights

theimportanceofmembershipmanagementaroundaco-createdvisionandhowdifficultthisis

whentryingtomaintainaninclusiveapproach.

Governments

Governmentsinoursamplehaddifferentvestedinterestinengagingincross-sectorvaluechain

partnerships. Several governments in our sample are very keen on attracting private sector

investmentinagriculture,notleastfrommultinationals.Whileitmightbebeyondthemandate

ofapartnershipplatformtoengageinthedetailsofpurchasingagreements,regardingpricing,

volumes, etc., part of their attractiveness for governments lies in their ability to “bring in”

companies.Therealizationbygovernmentsintheregionthataparticularpartnershipplatform

wasnotanotherdonor initiative,butactuallybroughtprivate sector investmentwaskeyand

changed a lot of behavior. (i9:66) One government saw the partnership platform as a good

frameworkforfacilitatingadialoguewiththeagri-businessesonwhatgoodagriculturalpolicy

wouldlooklikeforthem.(i9:67)


27

CivilSociety

NGOs are often dependent on the cooperation or endorsement of the government in the

countrytheyareoperatingin.Thisisespeciallytrueforcountrieswithstrongstatecapacityand

strong government-involvement in development, like inVietnam.Hence,NGOs recognize the

strategicbenefitofbeingpartofagovernment-endorsedpartnershipinitiativeandjoinoutof

their core self-interest. (i9:51) While such partnerships would focus on socio-economic and

environmental challenges, it would be clear that “the NGOs were not there as activists”,

ensuringaconstructivenothostiledialogue(i9:70).

Farmers organizations is not a useful collective term, as a partnership convenor pointed out.

(i9:76)First, farmers´organizationscanbetradeorganizations,farmers´cooperatives,political

organizations, activist groups mobilizing around land rights, et cetera. Second, talking about

“farmers´ organizations” is misrepresentative of the complexity of this section of society in

countrieswherehalfof thepopulationdependsonagriculture.Somemajor regional farmers´

associationswereperceivedaslobbygroupswithlittleinterestinengagingwiththepublicand

privatesectoragentsonthequestionofprivatesectorinvestment.(i9:77)

Theoutlookof farmers differs substantially between countries. The farmers inVietnamwere

perceived by partners in value chain projects as far more commercially oriented than their

Indonesiancounterparts.(i9:81)ManyVietnamesefarmers inhighvaluecropssuchaspepper

andcoffee,earnreasonableincomes,notleastduetogoodextensionservicesandthegenerous

useofchemicals.WithproductivityandoutputbeingtheclearfocusofVietnamesefarmersthe

overuseofchemicalsisawidespreadissue.(i9:83)Thisleadstothechallengeof(i)foodsecurity

on the domestic market and (ii) fulfilling the stricter regulations on residuals for the export

market. In addition to the overuse of chemicals in Vietnam, comes the issue of illegal or

questionablesourcesofagrochemicalsaswellasofanimalfeedanddrugsforanimalbreeding.

(i3:63) This focusonproductivity andoutputmakes inspections and traceability a corepolicy

concern not only in Vietnam but across Southeast Asia. (i2,3,4) A international organization


28

employeepointedtotheneedofovercomingthelackoftrustregardingdomesticfoodandits

safetybyfocusingmorestandardization,lawsandregulationtobuildup“trustchains”.(i3:122)

Partnerships–ConditionsforInterestAlignment&ChangeofInterestDefinition

Interestalignmentandinfluencingapartnertochangethewaytheydobusinessortochangea

policyisalong-termproject(i1:8).Whilepolicychangesinanarrowsensewerenotreportedby

partnership stakeholders, change in business or government thinking were reported. A

prominent example for a change in business thinking relates to the Agri-Agra Law in the

Philippines.Itrequiresbankstolend25%oftheirloanportfoliotoagricultureandfisheries,beit

toagriculturalcompaniesor farmers. Itoriginatesfromthemid70sandwasamendedbythe

Agri-Agra Reform Credit Act of 2009. Yet, the 25 percent allocation was retained. The

comparatively low fines (of 0.5 percent) did notmotivate the banks to comply.17 The banks

lobbied for revisionsof theAgri-Agra Law.However, starting fromwithin the foundationofa

major bank and then developed in a cross-sector, small-holder focused consortium several

banks started to change their compliance behavior by trying to developmeaningful ways of

workingwith farmers. In themedium term the thinkingwithinbanksand theirwillingness to

engagechanged,arguablyduetoaleadactorchangingitsbehaviorandengagingthesectorin

discussionsandeffortstomakethebestofthisregulation.

A good example for change in government thinking and behavior due to cross-sector

partnerships activities is the case of a government-launchedmicrofinance law for farmers in

Myanmar.Inthebeginning,itwasaone-sizefitsallschemes–withoneloanproductwiththe

same amount and payback period for all farmers, nomatterwhat crops theywere growing.

Whenabroadindustryvoiceemergedfromtheexistingcross-sector,crop-specificpartnerships,

17 For example, the combined allocation of loanable funds for agriculture was 14.5 percent

(comparedtothe25percentmandatedbylaw)inthefirstquarter2016.Source:ThePhilippineStar, Banks push Agri-Agra Law revisions, by Lawrence Agcaoili. Last updated 21 September

2016.www.philstar.com/business/2016/09/21/1625700/banks-push-agri-agra-law-revisions


29

the government considered their recommendations for adopting it per crop, per region, per

farmertype(i9:133).

There are examples of how value chain projects grow into an organization,which comprises

mostactorspertainingtoaparticularcommodity, includingallkindofdirectcompetitors.The

Vietnamese Coffee Coordination Board is such an example, where a government endorsed

commodityboardcomprisingadozenstakeholders.

STRUCTURE

Inthispaper,weinvestigatedtowhatextentdifferentstructuresalsomatterorwhetheragency

issufficienttoexplainwhencollaborationsachievetheirgoalsandarelikelytohelpimplement

the SDGs. Structure includes both the broad political institutions within a country, and the

institutionalarrangementsofagivenpartnership.

InstitutionalVariationinVietnamversusIndonesia

We find that in general, cross-sector partnerships in Indonesia are predominantly led by the

privatesector.TheIndonesianstateplaysanimportantrole–howevermoresoattheregional

anddistrictlevels(i9).InVietnam,cross-sectorpartnershipsaremoststronglyinfluencedbythe

central government. This is also true for the implementation on the ground, due to the

Communistparty´sstrong localpresence.Farmersorganizations inVietnamaregenerallypart

of the Communist political system. Hence, they appeared to be an efficient channel for

partnerships to communicate, for example, the responsible use of chemicals. (i9:84) Yet, in

decentralized Indonesia – being the fourth most populous country in the World – farmers´

organizationsandextensionservicesarecomparativelylessefficient.Whilesomeactorsmight

seethearmyasanefficientinstitutiontocommunicatewithIndonesianfarmers,thisideawas

quicklydismissedforobviouspoliticalandhistoricalreasons.(i9:84)


30

Askedabout the trust levels of farmers, vis-a-vis the three sectors active in thepartnerships,

partnershipconvenorsperceivedthatfarmersinVietnamtrustthegovernment,donottrustthe

companiesand trustcivil societyvery little. (i9:112)Unsurprisingly,aNGOworker inVietnam

perceivedahightrustgapbetweenfarmersandcompaniesaswellasthegovernment,which

wasfilledbyNGOs.(i1:58)

InIndonesia,farmerswouldtrustNGOsthemost,intheperceptionofapartnershipconvenor

we interviewed. Generally, the respondents perceived a low trust of farmers towards the

governmentandcompaniesandastrongvariationintrustdependingonthecrop,withpalmoil

small-holders highly distrusting the palm oil companies (i9:112) and similarly so with rubber

companies(i10:67).TheCSRspokespersonofaninternationalcompanypointedtothehanding

out of tools, seedling material and gifts to farmers by the Indonesian state, which in his

perception,hadlittleimpactontheirincome(i10:66).ANGOworkerinIndonesiaperceivedthe

trust levels of farmers as being generally low, with farmers not trusting the companies, not

trusting the government and not trusting each other, making it evenmore difficult to bring

themtogetheringroups(i7:49).

Institutionalization–TheArtofFormingPartnerships&Measuringitseffects

The self-reported biggest achievement of a Southeast Asian value chain platform was the

formationandformalizationofsecretariatsineachofthecountrieswheretheirpartnershipsare

operating.(i9)Developingaformalgovernancemodel,includingaprocessofrevenuecollection

and membership management, is a critical, time-consuming and delicate challenge. As the

governancemodelmustconsiderthecountry´spolitical,legalandadministrativeframeworkthe

solutionsdiffer substantially. For example, inMyanmarone such governancemodel took the

formofaregisterednot-for-profit,whichhadaBoardwithrepresentativesfromeachstate in

Myanmar.(i9)

Thecoreconcernfortheformalizationofapartnershipandthedefinitionofapre-competitive

spacearethenecessarychecksandbalancesandgrievancemechanismsthatpartnerscanuse


31

toreportbadbehavior(i9:148).Furthermore,themisallocationoffundsisapotentialdangerin

manycountries.Hencetheeminentneedfortransparentaccounting, thirdpartyauditingand

financialreporting.

Measuringtangibleoutputsregardingtheformationofpartnershipswasidentifiedasoneofthe

mostdifficultaspectsbyexperiencedpartnershipconvenors(i9:56). Inanswertothequestion

of, when do you know that you have formed a functioning partnership, the long timeframe

needed to build and nourish a partnership, was repeatedly mentioned (i1,4,7,9,12).

Respondentspointedoutthat“failed”partnershipscanoftenbere-adjustedtolearnfromtheir

mistakes(i7:28).

Whilemeasuringtheoutputsandeffectsofpartnershipsisessential,itcantakealongtimeto

convince the core stakeholders of its value. NGOs and civil society are generally very

comfortableininvestingtimetogathersuchdata,asapartnershipconvenorobserved(i9:58).

Thisisnotsurprisingasithasbecomeastandardpracticetoreportdataonoutputs,outcomes

andideallyimpactsofdevelopmentprojects–notleastduetothedemandofdonoragencies.

Ontheotherhand,companiesare,intheperceptionofstakeholders,notusedtomeasuringor

disclosing data on greenhouse gas emissions or the returns on investment in development

projects.Partnershipparticipantsreportedthatprivatesectoractorsmaynothaveseenmuch

valueinhavingsuchdatabutchangedtheirattitudeandcommitmentovertime,realizingthe

communicativepowerofconcretenumbers (i9:58).However, theywereonlywillingtotakea

first step, reporting on outputs such as the number of farmers´ trainings conducted and

financialdataonaggregatedinvestmentofallcompaniesintegratedintovaluechainprojects.

Conclusion

Thanks to theSustainableDevelopmentGoals, theworldnowhasacommonvocabulary that

business,government,civilsociety,andotheractorscanusetoframeeffortstowardadvancing

humanwell-being. Tomakeanalysiscomparableacrossdifferentpartnerships, it ishelpful to


32

use the SDGs as the benchmark, in addition to referencing the stated goals of some of the

partnerships. The SDGs provide a globally legitimized benchmark with clear metrics for pro-

poor, sustainable development. And given that the SDGs explicitly call for cross-sector

collaborationtoachievethosetargets(SDG17),itseemsparticularlyappropriatetoapplythem

toananalysisofsuchpartnerships.

The call in the SDGs and other global accords, such as the Paris climate agreement, for

collaborationacrossthesectorsandastrongrolefornon-stateactors,bothreflectsandislikely

toaccelerateanever-growingemphasisoncross-sectorcollaborationasakeymechanismfor

achievingglobalgoals.Thus,understanding theconditionsunderwhich suchpartnershipsare

morelikelytoachievegoalsisanimportantareaofresearch.

This paper has shown that collaborations can bring progress and may offer at least partial

solutionstotheendemicshortcomingsoflimitedstatehood–butonlyundercertainconditions.

First istheneedforapartnershipentrepreneur,acentraldrivingforcethathelpstoalignand

reshape how the various actors define their own interests and identities. Second is the

importance of a process of management and institutionalization to ensure that the

collaborationgoesbeyondshort-termeffortsdrivenbyahandfulofpersonalrelationships.

Beyondtheseimmediatefindings,theresearchtodatesuggeststhatattentiontothegrowing

roleof cross-sectorpartnershipsopensawealthof important researchquestions, farbeyond

thescopeofanysinglepaper,andcrossingnumerousscholarlydisciplines.Thepotentialtopics

rangefromtherelativelynarrowlyfocusedtobroadandsweepingissues.Onthemorefocused

side,forexample,akeyquestionisthedegreetowhichcollaborationscanprovidepublicgoods

across the full range of crops and agricultural support services such as finance. This kind of

government-producerinteractionvariessubstantiallybycommodity(seeMcMillanandMasters

2000,citedinBirnerandResnick2010).Researchisneededtoinvestigatewhattheintroduction

of external non-state actors in the form of big agri-business does to these relationships in

different value chains Does it empower existing elites, create new elites, or succeed in

empowering poor smallholders? Similarly, to what degree does variation in the nature of


33

smallholders, includingtheireducation levels,culture,collectiveactioncapacityandthesocial

capitalavailable,affecttheoutcomes?

Formanagementscholars,researchcouldfocusonthenatureoftheparticipatingfirm.Thecore

firmsthatdrivespecificpartnershipsmayvaryregardinghowtheydefinetheir incentivesand

goals in ways that may affect the outcomes of the collaboration. Firms may choose to

participateinthepartnershipsinsearchofanyorallofthefollowinggoals:(i)shorttermprofit;

(ii) developing a long term secure supply chain; (iii) pleasing the government to continue

operating in country (which then requires attention to what firms believes will please the

government;(iv)marketdevelopmentincountry(especiallyforinputproviders);and(v)global

PR, especially for firms serving international rather than purely domesticmarkets (Pope and

Meyer2015).Firmsalsovaryregardingtheirlevelsofparticipationincross-bordervoluntarybut

quasi-regulatoryprocesses such as codesof conduct and certifications,whichmay serve as a

proxy indicator forthedegreetowhichfirmsaresocialized intoabroadersenseofcorporate

responsibilityandlong-termenlightenedself-interestasopposedtoshortertermprofitseeking

The hypothesis to be tested here could be: Variations in political institutions and political

economy do not cause changes in partnership structure or outcomes (i.e., agribusiness and

partnershipmodelaretheimportantindependentvariables).

Alargersetofquestionsforfurtherresearchwouldaddresstheeffectsofvariationsinpolitical

institutions and political economy on partnership structure or outcomes. We have seen

tantalizinghintsintheresearchtodatethatpre-existingstate-marketrelationshipsleadtoquite

differentpartnershippractices,asthispaperhasshownregardingtheoutcomesinVietnamand

Indonesia. But does that subsequently lead to significant differences in the impacts that

partnerships have regarding farmer incomes, environmental sustainability, or food security?

Doesagreaterroleofthegovernmentleadtobetteroutcomesforthefarmers?Doesagreater

role of the multinational corporations (MNCs) leads to more farmer income but less

environmentalimprovement?


34

TheSDGsareonly twoyearsold,butalready theyarebecominga shared frameworkaround

whichactorexpectationsandpracticesarebeginningtoconverge.Theexistenceofsuchfocal

points,incombinationwiththelackofprogresstowardfullyconsolidatedstatehoodinmuchof

theworld,isreinforcingtheturntocross-sectorpartnershipsasakeymechanismforachieving

developmentgoals.Thus,scholarsofdevelopment,governance,collectiveaction,andbusiness

strategy all have a stake in contributing to greater understanding of such collaborations and

theirimplications.


35

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AppendixTable1AgricultureinSoutheastAsia

18InternationalMonetaryFund,WorldEconomicOutlookDatabase,Datafor2016,October2016.19UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme,HumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI),Datafor2014,http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/137506.20WorldBank,Data,Ruralpopulation(%oftotalpopulation),Datafor2015,http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?view=chart.21FAO,http://fenixservices.fao.org/faostat/static/syb/syb_101.pdf;Myanmar:Datafor2000;Allotherdatafor2014.22FAO,http://fenixservices.fao.org/faostat/static/syb/syb_101.pdf.23WorldBank,Data,Fertilizerconsumption(kilogramsperhectareofarableland),Datafor2014,http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.CON.FERT.ZS.24WorldBank,Data,Easeofdoingbusinessindex,Datafor2016,http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ?view=chart.25IncludingForestry,Fishing;DataforIndonesiaandThailand:2011;Allotherdata:2012.

Myanmar VietNam Philippines Indonesia Thailand MalaysiaSOCIO-ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT Population(inmillion)18 52 93 103 259 69 31GDPpercapita,USD1 $1,307 $2,164 $2,991 $3,636 $5,662 $9,546HumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI)Rank19 148 116 115 110 93 62Ruralpopulation(%oftotalpopulation)20 66% 66% 56% 46% 50% 25%Employmentinagr.(%)21 63% 47% 32% 35% 40% 9%AGRICULTURE

Valueaddedas%ofGDPbyagr.22 28% 18% 11% 13% 10% 9%ValueaddedperWorkerinagr.(const.US$) NA $489 $1,152 $1,079 $1,195 $10,127Fertilizeruse(kgperhectarearableland)23 20.5 397.4 183.1 211.8 152.3 2,063.9Emissions(NetGHG)fromAFOLU(CO2eq,Mt) 153 46 50 1,383 70 160POLITICALECONOMY

Governmentexpenditureonagr.(%total) 6.3 2.5 3.7 0.9 NA 2.6Foodexports(inmillionUS$) 1,584 7,147 3,280 24,711 18,764 21,754Foodimports(inmillionUS$) 898 7,062 4,745 11,598 6,443 12,373EaseofDoingBusiness24(1=mostbusiness-friendly) 170 82 99 91 46 23ForeignDirectInvestmentinagr.(mill.US$)25 NA 99 1 344 21 103


39

Table2:StateCapacity&GovernanceIndicators


40

Figure1:MotivationofCorporationstoEngageinPartnerships

Table3TargetsoftheSustainableDevelopmentGoalsLinkedtoSmallholderFarming

SustainableDevelopment

Goal Target

1NOPOVERTYEndpovertyinall

itsforms

everywhere

1.1

By 2030, eradicate extremepoverty for all people everywhere, currently

measuredaspeoplelivingonlessthan$1.25aday

1.2

By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and

children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to

nationaldefinitions

1.4

By2030,ensure thatallmenandwomen, inparticular thepoorand the

vulnerable,haveequalrightstoeconomicresources,aswellasaccessto

basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of


41

property,inheritance,naturalresources,appropriatenewtechnologyand

financialservices,includingmicrofinance

1.5

By2030,buildtheresilienceofthepoorandthoseinvulnerablesituations

and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme

eventsandothereconomic,socialandenvironmentalshocksanddisasters

1.A

Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources,

includingthroughenhanceddevelopmentcooperation,inordertoprovide

adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular

leastdevelopedcountries,toimplementprogrammesandpoliciestoend

povertyinallitsdimensions

1.B

Createsoundpolicyframeworksatthenational,regionalandinternational

levels,basedonpro-poorandgender-sensitivedevelopmentstrategies,to

supportacceleratedinvestmentinpovertyeradicationactions

2ZEROHUNGEREndhunger,

achievefood

securityand

improved

nutritionand

promote

sustainable

agriculture

2.1

By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the

poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe,

nutritiousandsufficientfoodallyearround

2.2

By2030, endall formsofmalnutrition, includingachieving,by2025, the

internationallyagreedtargetsonstuntingandwastinginchildrenunder5

years of age, and address the nutritional needs of adolescent girls,

pregnantandlactatingwomenandolderpersons

2.3

By 2030, double the agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale

foodproducers, inparticularwomen,indigenouspeoples,familyfarmers,

pastoralistsandfishers,includingthroughsecureandequalaccesstoland,

other productive resources and inputs, knowledge, financial services,

marketsandopportunitiesforvalueadditionandnon-farmemployment

2.4

By 2030, ensure sustainable food production systems and implement

resilient agricultural practices that increase productivity and production,

thathelpmaintainecosystems,thatstrengthencapacityforadaptationto

climate change, extremeweather, drought, flooding and other disasters

andthatprogressivelyimprovelandandsoilquality

2.5

By 2020, maintain the genetic diversity of seeds, cultivated plants and

farmedanddomesticatedanimalsandtheirrelatedwildspecies,including

through soundly managed and diversified seed and plant banks at the

national,regionalandinternationallevels,andpromoteaccesstoandfair


42

and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic

resourcesandassociatedtraditionalknowledge,asinternationallyagreed

2.A

Increase investment, including through enhanced international

cooperation, in rural infrastructure, agricultural research and extension

services, technology development and plant and livestock gene banks in

ordertoenhanceagriculturalproductivecapacityindevelopingcountries,

inparticularleastdevelopedcountries

2.B

Correctandpreventtraderestrictionsanddistortionsinworldagricultural

markets, including through the parallel elimination of all forms of

agricultural export subsidies and all export measures with equivalent

effect,inaccordancewiththemandateoftheDohaDevelopmentRound

2.C

Adopt measures to ensure the proper functioning of food commodity

markets and their derivatives and facilitate timely access to market

information, including on food reserves, in order to help limit extreme

foodpricevolatility

12RESPONSIBLECONSUMPTIONANDPRODUCTIONEnsuresustainable

consumptionand

production

patterns

12.3

By 2030, halve per capita global foodwaste at the retail and consumer

levels and reduce food losses along production and supply chains,

includingpost-harvestlosses

12.4

By 2020, achieve the environmentally sound management of chemicals

and all wastes throughout their life cycle, in accordance with agreed

international frameworks, and significantly reduce their release to air,

waterandsoilinordertominimizetheiradverseimpactsonhumanhealth

andtheenvironment

12.6

Encourage companies, especially large and transnational companies, to

adoptsustainablepracticesandtointegratesustainabilityinformationinto

theirreportingcycle

12.A

Support developing countries to strengthen their scientific and

technological capacity to move towards more sustainable patterns of

consumptionandproduction

12.C

Rationalize inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful

consumptionbyremovingmarketdistortions,inaccordancewithnational

circumstances, includingby restructuring taxation andphasingout those

harmful subsidies, where they exist, to reflect their environmental

impacts, taking fully into account the specific needs and conditions of


43

developingcountriesandminimizingthepossibleadverseimpactsontheir

development in a manner that protects the poor and the affected

communities

15LIFEONLANDProtect,restore

andpromote

sustainableuseof

terrestrial

ecosystems,

sustainably

manageforests,

combat

desertification,

andhaltand

reverseland

degradationand

haltbiodiversity

loss

15.1

By 2020, ensure the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of

terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems and their services, in

particular forests, wetlands, mountains and drylands, in line with

obligationsunderinternationalagreements

15.2

By2020, promote the implementationof sustainablemanagementof all

types of forests, halt deforestation, restore degraded forests and

substantiallyincreaseafforestationandreforestationglobally

15.3

By2030,combatdesertification,restoredegradedlandandsoil,including

landaffectedbydesertification,droughtandfloods,andstrivetoachievea

landdegradation-neutralworld

15.5

Take urgent and significant action to reduce the degradation of natural

habitats,haltthelossofbiodiversityand,by2020,protectandpreventthe

extinctionofthreatenedspecies

15.9

By 2020, integrate ecosystem and biodiversity values into national and

local planning, development processes, poverty reduction strategies and

accounts

15.A

Mobilizeandsignificantly increase financial resources fromall sources to

conserveandsustainablyusebiodiversityandecosystems

15.B

Mobilizesignificantresourcesfromallsourcesandatall levelstofinance

sustainable forest management and provide adequate incentives to

developing countries to advance such management, including for

conservationandreforestation

Source:UnitedNations,SustainableDevelopmentKnowledgePlatform,

https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs,Lastviewed:14March2017.

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