Big Breaks for Big Polluters

8/4/2019 Big Breaks for Big Polluters

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Big Breaks for Big PollutersHouston Area Industries Escape Fines When Texas Fails to Follow Its Policies

When refineries and chemical plants break airpollution laws, they can rely on geing a light

penalty from the Texas Commission on Environ-mental Quality (TCEQ). We analyzed 26 enforcementcases handled by the TCEQ during the past fiveyears, and found that the TCEQ assessed just 14%of the fines it could have imposed in these cases.

The TCEQ was consistently lenient in the cases withthe largest potential fines. In cases where the TCEQcould have assessed fines exceeding $40,000, the TCEQnever collected more than 45% of the potential fine.

The vast majority of the TCEQ’s lenient penaltiescan be aributed to three causes:

• Lax prosecution of leak monitoring violations.Although leaking equipment is among the biggest causes of air pollution in our region, stateenforcement officials were particularly easy oncompanies that failed to properly monitor equip-ment for leaks. When state investigators foundthat companies didn’t have a functioning programto watch for leaks, state enforcement officialsreclassified the violations as “recordkeeping”violations. As a result, the state collected only$106,500 in fines for these types of violationswhen it could have collected about $1.7 million.

• Breaches of penalty calculation policy. Whendetermining penalties, the state routinely tookliberties with its own wrien policies for count-ing the number of events in a violation. Atypical abuse of the state’s policy involvedcounting an ongoing violation as one event,regardless of whether it had been occurring for

one month or for five years. By using this tech-nique, state enforcement officials let more than$800,000 in penalties slip through their fingersand created the impression that there is nogreater penalty to be incurred for long-termviolations of air pollution laws.

• Dropped enforcement cases. The TCEQdropped some cases without adequate docu-mentation, or based on policies that are neitherwrien down nor uniformly applied. If the

TCEQ had not dropped these cases, the statecould have collected more than $160,000. When

this happens, the offending companies don’t just escape current fines. If they commit similarviolations in the future, they also avoid the higherpenalties that usually apply to repeat offenders.

We also found that the TCEQ is taking an inordi-nately long time to sele some cases. Most of the 26cases we reviewed took more than a year and a halffrom the date of the initial investigation to the finalagreed order, and seven took more than two years.When this type of delay occurs, the offending com-

pany o�en ends up with a very large break on its fine.

We are calling for Texas environmental officials tofollow their own published procedures for seingpenalties. We are also asking the U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA) to review recently-seledcases and take independent enforcement action insituations where it agrees the state was too lenient.In addition, we are asking the Inspector General ofthe EPA to investigate our allegation that Texas isfailing to carry out enforcement in a timely andadequate manner.



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How We Conducted This Study

The state’s process for investigating and enforcingair pollution regulations is driven by three institu-tional policy decisions:

1. The state decides to initiate an investigation.Such a decision could be made based on a

citizen complaint, an internal strategic plan, orin response to a mandate from the EPA.

2. The state decides to initiate enforcement. Whenan investigator identifies a violation, the stateuses Enforcement Initiation Criteria to deter-mine if the violation should result in a penalty.

3. The state determines the appropriate fine (andother remedies).

Our study is exclusively limited to the final step;we have not determined whether the state is investi-

gating companies adequately or initiating enforce-ment adequately.

We reviewed 26 enforcement cases against chemicalplants, refineries and other petrochemical industryfacilities in the Houston region, as listed in the table(see page 3). These cases involved 13 companiesand encompassed 147 violations. The earliestinvestigation occurred in October 1998, and themost recent investigation was in October 2004.Most of the cases in our study were resolved

between mid-2003 and mid-2005.

We selected our cases by examining both electronicand paper files maintained by the TCEQ. First, wereviewed TCEQ enforcement referral documentsthat we had previously obtained for other researchprojects. Then we obtained a database of enforcementreferrals from the TCEQ and selected cases fromthat list to review. We tried to select cases represent-ing a variety of types and sizes of companies, and awide range of actual fines. Because of the labor

intensive nature of the file search, we aempted toinclude every recent case for any company that weincluded in the study. While most of the raw datafor the study came from the TCEQ’s paper files,some data were obtained from the TCEQ databaseor from notices in the Texas Register.

However, we did observe that the TCEQ databaseof enforcement referrals appears to be incomplete.For example, in one case the enforcement referralfrom our files did not appear in the official TCEQ

database, indicating that it had never been enteredor had been erased.

Generally we aempted to obtain three types ofdocuments for each case:

• Investigation reports, including the initial list ofviolations cited by the regional field staff and

the initial enforcement referral to headquartersenforcement staff;

• Enforcement deliberations, including communi-cations with the offender and proposed sele-ment documentation; and

• Final enforcement documents, including thefinal agreed order and the penalty calculationworksheet used to determine the administrativepenalty or fine.

Typically the documentation was woefully incom-plete; we were able to fully document the state’senforcement process in only six of 26 cases.

Several cases, in fact, were dropped from our study because we could not locate sufficient docu-mentation. In the rest of the cases, we were able toestablish with reasonable certainty (a) the initialviolations cited by the TCEQ and (b) the finalpenalty amount and the basis on which that penalty

was calculated.

To calculate the potential fine for each case review,we followed the TCEQ penalty policy in a strictmanner, assessing the documentary evidence fromthe case files. We classified each violation into oneof several issue areas, and aributed portions ofeach fine to different steps in the TCEQ penaltycalculation process. We then considered the manypotential factors that may affect the size of a fine. Athe end of this process, we were able to identify the

three main areas where the TCEQ has been espe-cially lenient over the past several years.

Although it may be reasonable at times for theTCEQ to compromise with the offending companyin order to obtain a selement, TCEQ fines werefrequently lower than policy indicated. We believethe evidence supports the conclusion that the TCEQroutinely sets penalties for refineries and chemicalplants at a much lower level than it would if itclosely followed its own policy.



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Case-by-Case Comparison of Actual Fines vs. Potential FinesComplete Listing of Enforcement Cases Reviewed by GHASP

TCEQ Total Amount of Potential Assessed Fine Potential Fine Fine Assessed

$ 1,000 $ 1,000 100 %

3,175 3,175 100 %

3,550 3,550 100 %

3,160 4,875 65 %

2,000 5,000 40 %

4,400 11,000 40 %

0 13,000 0 %

4,800 14,000 34 %

9,610 17,360 55 %

20,400 20,400 100 %

12,880 24,150 53 %

0 25,000 0 %

15,600 26,000 60 %

0 32,500 0 %

17,500 35,000 50 %

1,710 86,645 2 %

0 93,600 0 %

14,800 97,300 15 %

25,000 97,500 26 %

22,560 120,000 19 %

49,290* 148,665 33 %

30,000 168,000 18 %

87,856 196,656 45 %

40,464 500,240 8 %

12,535 706,675 2 %

87,775 808,635 11 %

$ 470,065 $ 3,259,926 14 %

Company Name andCase Reference

Vintage Petroleum BaytownDocket 2004-0440-AIR-E

Total Petrochemicals BayportDocket 2004-1080-AIR-E

Total Petrochemicals LaPorteDocket 2005-0171-AIR-E

Chevron Phillips PasadenaDocket 2005-0054-AIR-E

Equistar LaPorteDocket 2002-0863-AIR-E


Rohm & Haas Deer ParkEnforcement referral from 2003


Equistar LaPorteDocket 2003-0630-AIR-E

Magellan Terminals Galena ParkDocket 2004-0487-AIR-E


Equistar LaPorteCase 19741 (2003)

Rohm & Haas Deer ParkDocket 2005-0152-AIR-E

Texas Petrochemicals HoustonEnforcement referrals from 2002

Allwaste / Fitzgerald Railcar Services AngletonDocket 1999-0613-AIR-E


Texas Petrochemicals HoustonEnforcement referrals from 2004

Gulf Chemical and Metallurgical FreeportDocket 1999-0943-IHW-E

Texas Petrochemicals HoustonDocket 2002-0609-AIR-E


Solutia Chocolate BayouDocket 2003-0471-MLM-E

Solutia Chocolate BayouDocket 2002-0174-AIR-E

Dow Hampshire Deer ParkDocket 2003-0469-AIR-E

Rohm & Haas Deer ParkDocket 2002-0871-MLM-E

Dow Chemical LaPorteDocket 2003-1507-AIR-E

Rohm & Haas Deer ParkDocket 2003-0610-MLM-E

TOTALS

CaseReview #

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

* This case is still pending; we are assuming that the most recent proposed agreed order will be finalized.



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TCEQ Fails to Prosecute FlagrantLeak Monitoring Violations

In our study, the TCEQ could have fined chemicalplants and refineries in excess of $1.8 million forfailing to properly operate programs to detect andrepair leaks at their facilities. Instead, the stateassessed only $106,500; in some cases, the offenders

paid less than 2% of the potential fine.

Leaks are a major source of unreported emissions,and faulty leak detection programs are a key part ofthat problem. According to self-reported data submit-ted by industry and analyzed by the state, about 97tons of organic chemical air pollution are releasedfrom leaks each day. Furthermore, the state estimatesthat an additional 168 tons per day of such air pollu-tion goes unreported by industry. The hundreds oftons of pollution are released from literally thousands

and thousands of tiny leaks at the many chemicalplants, refineries and other facilities in the region.

Thus, while each leak contributes a relatively smallamount of air pollution to the region’s skies, findingand repairing the leaks quickly is necessary if ourair is to become safe to breathe. The day-to-dayeffectiveness of leak detection and repair programsdepends on the careful aention to detail by plantmanagement; in this regard, the lax aitude ofTCEQ enforcement officials can encourage a simi-

larly lax aitude by plant managers.

For example, Texas Petrochemicals routinely reportsthat less than 1% of its plant components are leakingat any time. Yet in four investigations, city and stateinvestigators auditing the plant’s actual performancefound much higher leak rates: 10%, 3%, 5% and 2%.This demonstrates that the actual pollution beingleaked into the air from Texas Petrochemicals is manytimes higher than its self-reported data indicates.Unfortunately, this is not a unique situation; the

TCEQ has found serious shortcomings in leakdetection programs at a number of chemical plants.

Among the cases we reviewed, state investigatorscaught six plants with inadequate programs forleak monitoring. (Note: The fine amounts belowrefer only to fines for leak monitoring violations.Cases o�en involve several types of violations.)

• Dow Chemical LaPorte paid a fine of $3,335 forhaving “failed to maintain fugitive emission

records,” though the company could have beenassessed a fine of $690,000. The investigatorconcluded, “Dow failed to maintain a fugitiveemission monitoring program for the two-yearperiod of 2001 and 2002. . . . there are examplesof questionable data, falsified records and/orinconsistent reporting for every quarter of 2001and 2002.” While Dow agreed that its contractor

was not performing the required duties, the casefile does not give any reason for such a dramaticreduction in the severity of the regulatoryviolation. (Case Review #25)

• Rohm & Haas Deer Park was fined about$66,000 for failing to monitor a variety of equip-ment over a four-year period, when it couldhave been assessed penalties of $611,000. Duringthe enforcement process, for reasons that are notdocumented, the number of events was adjusted

downward to “make the penalty commensuratewith the situation.” (Case Review #26)

• Dow Hampshire Deer Park was fined about$12,500 when the TCEQ discovered that its leakdetection contractor was fabricating data.Although this represents the full fine that couldhave been collected under state policy, theinvestigation hinted at a much larger and moresystematic violation. However, the investigatorwas not assigned to pursue the case further.

(Case Review #23)

• A field investigator cited Chevron PhillipsPasadena for failing to monitor a number ofvalves and other components over the course ofseveral years. However, the enforcement officeagreed to “assess the monitoring violations asone recordkeeping violation, rather than asemissions events.” Had the violations beenassessed as emissions events, the penalty couldhave been $153,900. Although the TCEQ had

previously proposed a fine of $75,150, the finalfine was just $570. No reason for the penaltyreduction is given other than to cite a meetingof TCEQ Enforcement Division staff with Chev-ron Phillips’ representative and aorney. (CaseReview #16).

• Solutia Chocolate Bayou admied operating aunit for six months without a leak detectionprogram. The TCEQ collected about $40,000from Solutia for this infraction, about one-third



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of what could have been collected under statepolicy. Much of this shortfall occurred becausethe TCEQ, without documentation, dropped oneof the monitoring violations. (Case Review #21)

• Texas Petrochemicals Houston could have beenfined over $63,000 for inadequate leak monitor-ing, but the case was dismissed during its

corporate bankruptcy proceedings (discussed below). Due to case dismissals and otherwiseinadequate enforcement, the official compliancehistory for Texas Petrochemicals does not reflectthe severity of its actual history of noncompli-ance. (Case Review #17)

In these six cases, as well as two other smaller casesinvolving the same companies, the state’s responsenot only appears inadequate, it also seems to devi-ate from its official policy.

TCEQ Breaches Its Own Policy andLets Polluters Escape Major Penalties

In 10 of the 26 enforcement cases we reviewed, thestate breached its own policies for calculating its“violation base penalty.” The state calculates thispenalty by multiplying the base penalty for anoffense by the number of events. The base penaltyof an offense may range from $100 to $10,000, butrefineries and chemical plants almost always receive

a base penalty of either $1,000 or $2,500 per offense.More important, however, is how the number ofevents is calculated; the state can make large reduc-tions in fines by manipulating this number.

In some instances, the number of events is clear cut,as in the case of “discrete” events, which are distinctoccurrences and are not continuous. The state’s policyregarding these events is clear, and we found fewinstances when it was not followed. In those fewinstances, failure to follow the policy appeared to be

simple error and had a modest impact on the fine.

The state’s policy for continuous violations worksdifferently: in selecting a number to represent the“number of events,” the TCEQ is supposed toconsider both the duration of the event and itsseverity. By design, state enforcement officials arele� with some flexibility to interpret the policymore or less strictly depending on the type andseverity of the violation. In practice, though,

enforcement division staff frequently makes deci-sions that bear lile relation to the actual policy andresult in penalties that are heavily discounted.

In ten of the cases we reviewed, the TCEQ chose thenumber of events without clearly following itspolicies (see box below). For example, TCEQ staffo�en assessed continuous violations as beginning

with the date of the investigation, even when theinvestigation documented noncompliance as datingfrom the issuance of a permit or the effective date oa regulation. O�en, TCEQ staff wrote that thenumber of events was chosen to make the “penaltycommensurate with the situation” in the opinion ofTCEQ Enforcement Division staff. Since the differ-ence between one event and ten events is typicallyas much as $22,500, this can result in a large reduc-tion in the violation base penalty.

In every case where the number of events was set ina manner inconsistent with established state policy,the staff recommendation resulted in a substantialreduction of fines (never an increase). Ten of thecases we examined involved incorrect counting ofevents, and in those cases the state assessed

Excerpt from the TCEQ Policyon Continuous Violations

For continuing violations, the number of events willbe linked to the level of impact of the violation byconsidering the violation as if it recurred with the frequency shown in the chart below.*

The duration of events concerning continuousviolations, for the purposes of preparing an enforce-ment action, may begin with the initial date of noncompliance with a requirement, rule, or permitand extend up to the time that the enforcementdocuments are prepared.

In practice, continuous violations will be assessedbeginning with the documented date of noncompliance(i.e., sample results, record review) or the date thatthe respondent “should have known,” whichever isappropriate, as the beginning point. The respondent isalways considered knowledgeable of permit conditions.

*This chart can be viewed in the original TCEQ document,“Penalty Policy of the Texas Commission on EnvironmentalQuality,” Enforcement Division RG-253, Sept. 2002.



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approximately $394,000. If the state had followedits own policies, it could have collected at least$800,000 in additional penalties.

For example, the penalty for two four-year viola-tions by Rohm and Haas Deer Park was calculatedon the basis of “one single event.” For anotherviolation, the enforcement division staff noted thatthe company had been out of compliance for 27months when estimating economic benefit, but based the penalty on “three monthly events.” Theseadjustments resulted in as much as $190,000 inreduced fines. (Case Review #24)

The state counted three long-term self-reportingviolations by Total Petrochemicals LaPorte assingle events, and it also lumped together severaldiscrete failures to repair leaks as quarterly viola-tions. On one of the self-reporting violations, thestate initially recommended “Thirteen semiannual

events . . . for the thirteen semiannual reports thatwere not submied.” However, the state changed itsassessment to “one single event” a�er the companycomplained. These adjustments resulted in as muchas $120,000 in reduced fines. (Case Review #20)

One of the most dramatic relaxations of the state’spolicy was for Solutia Chocolate Bayou. Thecompany failed to “have an adequate monitoringplan that will reliably detect a leak from the heatexchangers to the water of [three] cooling towers”

and to “have an adequate monitoring plan for [two]absorbers.” The state’s penalty policy allows up todaily violations for each of the three towers andtwo absorbers, and the plant was out of compliancefor at least three years. Yet the TCEQ assessed just“one single event” for each violation. A conservativeinterpretation of state policy could have increasedSolutia’s fine by $145,000. Under the strictest policyinterpretation, penalties could have been calculatedon a daily basis, and the fine would have been inthe millions of dollars. (Case Review #22)

TCEQ Drops Enforcement Cases Without Adequate Reasons

Four of the 26 enforcement cases we reviewed weredropped without adequate documentation, or based on policies that are not wrien down and arenot uniformly applied. One enforcement case wasmisplaced; another was dismissed due to a compa-ny’s bankruptcy. When cases are dropped withoutadequate reason, these companies not only avoidthe current fines; they also dodge the stiffer finesand penalties o�en associated with future viola-tions.

Equistar LaPorte could have been fined $25,000 fora major upset on June 27, 2003 when it releasedover 1,300 pounds of pollution in one minute.According to the investigation, the release was“caused by poor maintenance and operation prac-tices.” According to a TCEQ database, the case wasreferred for enforcement and then the case wasclosed. The case file contains no documentedreason for closing the case. (Case Review #12)

Rohm & Haas Deer Park could have been fined$13,000 for failing to monitor cooling towers forpollution leaks and for failing to repair leakingequipment in a timely manner. Although the com-pany was sent a notice of enforcement, the casedoes not appear in any TCEQ database, nor is thereany documented reason for dropping the enforce-ment case. (Case Review #7)

Texas Petrochemicals Houston could have beenfined more than $125,000 for violations in twoseparate cases. In the first case, which occurred in2002, Texas Petrochemicals was sent a notice ofenforcement for several upsets that were “part of arecurring paern indicative of inadequate design,operation or maintenance.” This case was referred

by the City of Houston, and its staff discussed thestatus of the case with the TCEQ. However, the casedoes not appear in any TCEQ database, nor is thereany documented reason for dropping the enforce-ment case. (Case Review #14)

Then in 2004, the TCEQ discharged another caseagainst Texas Petrochemicals without adequatereason. According to the TCEQ memo:

. . . due to Texas Petrochemicals’ legal status duringits bankruptcy proceedings, we are unable to pursue

In every case where the number of events was set in a manner inconsistent with established state policy, the staff

recommendation resulted in asubstantial reduction of fines.



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enforcement action for these violations. The inspec-tions occurred a�er Texas Petrochemicals had filed for bankruptcy but before its reorganization date,which is May 6, 2004. Texas Petrochemicals isdischarged from penalties or obligations for viola-tions documented during this time period. (CaseReview #17)

That explanation is inconsistent with its actions in

other bankruptcy cases, and the TCEQ should nothave discharged these violations.

Although bankruptcy is not addressed in anygeneral policy statement available from the TCEQ,two memos in other enforcement cases make itclear that bankruptcy is not a legal shield fromenforcement action. In a leer to Solutia ChocolateBayou , a TCEQ Enforcement Division coordinatorwrote:

Please be aware that the Automatic Stay imposed by

the Federal Bankruptcy Code does not apply to thecommencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power, byvirtue of the exception set out at 11 U.S.C. §362(b)(4). Accordingly, TCEQ, as a governmentalunit . . . is expressly excepted from the automaticstay in pursing enforcement of the State’s Environ-mental Protection Laws including but not limited toliquidating its damages for such violations. (Source:Leer from Tel Croston to Solutia, April 23, 2004.)

Four years prior to the Solutia case, Allwaste / Fitzgerald Railcar Services Angleton was informedthat the TCEQ planned to pursue litigation againstthe company because “we have been unable toreach agreement due to your facility filling (sic) for

bankruptcy.” These two cases, one of whichoccurred almost at the same time as the TexasPetrochemicals case, indicate that despite bank-ruptcy status, the TCEQ has pursued enforcementagainst companies that violate air pollution regula-tions. (Case Review #15)

However, not only did the TCEQ discharge the Texas

Petrochemicals violations referred to in the memo,at the same time it also discharged violations thatoccurred prior to the company’s bankruptcy filingof July 20, 2003. According to TCEQ staff, violationsthat were found during investigations on November19, 2002 and on May 12, 2003, were dismissed alongwith the later violations. This further demonstratesthat the Texas Petrochemicals case was handled in amanner inconsistent with TCEQ policy.

Even if the TCEQ believes it cannot recover mon-

etary damages from a violator, there are other goodreasons to follow through with an enforcementcase. In addition to a fine, an enforcement orderfrom the TCEQ usually includes provisions requir-ing corrective action and ordering the company tocease the violations in the future. This means that ifthe violations occur again, the company is subjectto substantially enhanced fines and that additionalpollution control requirements may be imposed.

When enforcement cases are dropped, on the other

hand, the offending companies escape fines andany enforceable obligations to correct the practicesrelated to these violations. In addition, futureviolations of the same nature may not be penalizedat higher levels if the TCEQ has dropped the previ-ous violations.

One issue that has been raised with regard to the

fines assessed by the TCEQ is economic benefit.In theory, the size of the fine being levied should be greater than the economic benefit that thecompany gains by not implementing practicesthat would prevent pollution.

In the 26 cases we reviewed, we found that thefine assessed by the TCEQ was usually largerthan the estimated economic benefit gained as aresult of the violation.

Because our study is targeted, our conclusion

should not be generalized to other media, to smallcompanies, or to other parts of the state where airpollution issues are o�en quite different. Further-more, we have questions about the method bywhich the TCEQ calculates the economic benefit.Although we did not systematically review thecalculations, it appears that TCEQ economic benefit estimates may be too low – particularly incases where companies have failed to monitor forleaks or have allowed major upsets to occur.

TCEQ Method for Determining Economic Benefit Needs Further Review



GHASP’s Recommendations

As a result of this study, we concluded that theTCEQ is inadequately enforcing air pollutionregulations by assessing fines that are dramaticallylower than warranted and by dismissing enforce-ment cases without adequate justification. Further-more, we believe that the TCEQ is failing to carry

out enforcement in a timely manner.

TCEQ should follow its enforcement policies.We recommend that the TCEQ adhere to its currentwrien policies regarding the calculation of finesinstead of assessing fines that are clearly lower thanintended. Over the past several years, fines assessedfor violations of air pollution regulations in theHouston region appear to reflect the personalpreferences of TCEQ Enforcement Division man-agement rather than clear implementation of the

commission’s official policies. Where necessary, theTCEQ should amend its policies to clarify theminimum penalties for certain classes of violations.We believe this stricter application of current poli-cies would result in more appropriate fines.

TCEQ should fully document case dismissals.We also recommend that the TCEQ adopt a policyregarding the dismissal of cases that have beenreferred for enforcement. Presently, there does notseem to be a procedure or requirement that theTCEQ document the reason for the dismissal of acase. In addition, if the TCEQ deviates from itsusual dismissal policy, as it did in the case of theTexas Petrochemicals bankruptcy, the TCEQ shouldclearly document the reasons for such actions.

The Galveston-Houston Association for Smog Prevention (GHASP) works to persuade government and corporate officials to prevent smog. GHASP seeks to accomplish itsmission by being the most credible advocate for clean air in the Houston region; by supporting efforts to educate the public; and by directly engaging government officials,

community leaders, the media and industry on regional air pollution issues.

3100 Richmond, Ste. 309 www.ghasp.org (713) 528-3779Houston, TX 77098 [email protected]

Printed on recycled paper. © 2005 GHASP. Permission granted to reproduce entire document

EPA should investigate TCEQ’s failure toimplement timely and adequate enforcement.We are asking the U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA) to address the state’s failure to meetfederal expectations for timely and adequateenforcement. Much of the authority for enforcingair pollution regulations is delegated to Texas bythe EPA.

We suggest that the Inspector General of the EPAfurther investigate our allegation that Texas isfailing to carry out enforcement in a timely andadequate manner. The EPA expects that enforcementaction will be completed for high priority violationswithin 9 to 11 months of an investigation. Yet mostof the cases in our study exceeded that guideline,and seven cases took more than two years.

The EPA also expects state enforcement actions to

assess a penalty sufficient to achieve effectivedeterrence, both for the offending company and forall regulated companies. This penalty should reflect both the economic benefit of noncompliance and anamount reflecting the seriousness of the violation.We do not believe the TCEQ is meeting this stan-dard, because it assesses fines that are dramaticallylower than warranted, and because it dismissesenforcement cases without adequate justification.

We also suggest that the EPA regional enforcementoffice review recently-seled cases and take inde-pendent enforcement action in situations where itagrees that the state was too lenient. If the EPA acts,this could result in additional fines being collectedfrom serious offenders of air pollution regulations.

Big Breaks for Big Polluters

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