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Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhideveloping an alternative framework for peace and security in the region

MARCH 2011

NO 165

Alternative Strategies for India towards Tibet Between Assertion and Measured Silence

While many significant issues have been examinedby Chinese and Indian leaders in their foregoingdialogues to normalize relations, the Tibetanquestion continues to lurk in the dark. The Indian

government for its part has been intermittent on itsapproach to the status of Tibetans in India. While the2005 visit of Premier Wen J iabao had elicited hopesof reflection on the Tibet issue between the twocountries, the December 2010 visit reflected totalred carpeting. The growing disinclination of the twosides to discuss the matter is contextualised best inthe burgeoning economic relationship between thetwo Asian powers.

 The reservation from mentioning the ‘One Chinapolicy’ in the joint communiqué signed between

India and China at the end of the latest Chinese visitalso perhaps reflects a rethinking from theperspective of Indian foreign policy agendas. Themaintenance of the status quo not only preventsthe ‘internationalization’ of the Tibet issue but alsofits in the larger policy goal of attaining apermanent seat in the UN Security Council by India.Given India’s geopolitical circumstances, there areonly limited options that are available to its leaders.

 This paper explores a prac ticable solution to India’s Tibet conundrum through the prism of core interestsand political and economic bargaining amongstthe three concerned parties.

I

CHINA’S CORE CONCERNS: ‘MIGHT IS RIGHT’

 The Chinese attitude to Tibetan Autonomous region(TAR) has been and continues to be governed byan intense fervour of nationalism evident in itsterritorial c laims and its attempts to include TAR intothe mainstream through economic development.

 The Chinese White Paper on Tibet states thatregional ethnic autonomy was established in Tibetafter ‘peaceful liberation’ of Tibet from the ‘clutches

of the feudal lords’ in 1965. Since then China hasmaintained Tibet as a core concern along with

 Taiwan. Within the ambit of its minority policies,China has endeavoured hard to modernize and

change the mindsets of the Tibetan people through apolicy of ‘patriotic education’.

 Two major concerns explain the current trust deficitbetween the Chinese government and the Tibetanpeople: first, the dispute over the Dalai Lama’ssuccessor, which posits a choice between a successorappointed by the Chinese government ho will work inthe interests of the mainland and a leader appointedby the Dalai Lama himself representing the interests of the Tibetan community and second, the economicgrievances resulting from amassing of severaldevelopment benefits by the Han migrantsmarginalising resources for the local Tibetans. Thediscrepancy between action and rhetoric on part of the Chinese government in delivering the promise of 

regional and cultural autonomy (laid out in the WhitePapers of the Chinese government) becomestransposed in terms of c ontinuous rebellion against theState by either violent or peaceful means from time totime.

Moreover, the issue of the Dalai Lama being providedasylum by the Indian state is a constant irritant topolitical dialogues between the mainland Chineseauthorities and the Tibetan leadership. The C hinesegovernment perceives any show of discontent asantithetical to State interests and often blames DalaiLama for instigating separatism. The Chinesegovernment also believes that there is a consistentattempt by the separatist groups to mislead theinternational community, pretending to speak onbehalf of the “Tibetan people”, and denigrating theimplementation of the democratic reform to promotesocial progress as “destruction of culture and religion”and “infringement of human rights.” The prospect of loss of territory if TAR is given autonomy isunimaginable for the Chinese, whose growingeconomic might among other reasons, is encouragingan assertive stanc e in this matter.

China also maintains that Tibet is strictly a domesticissue and no other country has the right to interfere inthis regard, hence the international community

Bhavna Singh

 Research Officer, IPCS 

IPCS ISSUE BRIEF

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restrains from commenting on Tibet’s sovereigntystatus while criticising the human rights situation andthe lack of cultural and religious freedom in thisregion.

With regards to India, the Chinese governmentclaims the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh,

labelling it as “Southern Tibet” and the Aksai Chin,which the Government of India strongly refutes. TheDecember visit of the Chinese Premier Wen J iabao issignificant in terms of the two sides vowing tostrengthen confidence-building measures and avoidtensions along a vast disputed border in India’snortheast. The Chinese leadership has on its owninitiative brought out sensitive matters on the tablewhich reflects that they are willing to acknowledgeIndian concerns but are not willing to take anysubstantial measures to address those conc erns.

IITIBETANS: ‘SANDWICHED’

 The Tibetan community most often finds its positioncompromised in the face of its domineeringclaimant. The ‘middle way approach’ of the DalaiLama has so far not provided any considerableadvantage for Tibetans. The Tibetan sensitivities canbe observed more vividly through the variousfactions working under the auspices of the TibetanGovernment in Exile and youth organisations whichincessantly spread awareness about the Tibetancause.

 The December 2010 visit was yet again seen by the Tibetan youth as an opportunity to bring to fore theirgrievances. The Tibetans were aware that this wasthe first visit of a high-profile Chinese leader since theprotests of 2008 in Tibet and thus wanted the Chinesegovernment to take into account the fact that theconditions of Tibetans in Tibet and the situation of political prisoners had become extremely critical. The

 Tibetan Youth Congress organized a protest rallyafter obtaining official permission from the Indianpolice. The demonstrators exhibited a radical

approach demanding “Free Tibet Now” and “Tibet’sindependence is India’s security” and even burnedan effigy of Wen J iabao.

Citing several consecutive events, the Tibetan YouthCongress issued a memorandum to the Government

of India giving opinion to its discomfort with the stateof Sino-Indian bilateral developments, especially onthe issue of Tibet. Moreover, Tibetans garneredsupport from several non-governmental agenciesand youth associations amongst the Tibetanexpatriates. Their efforts are not only a part of thelarger struggle for re-acceptance of Dalai Lama in

China but also recognition of the rights of other Tibetan émigrés in case of their return to the TAR. The Tibetans are embittered by China’s successiveattempts at discouraging international support to the

 Tibetan cause.

 The following opinions from the Tibetan youth help inclarifying their position and bringing the issues of concern to the fore. Dhondup Dorjee, the ex Vice-president of the Tibetan Youth Congress stated that“it is high time that India takes a stand on Tibet… if India is aspiring for a UNSC permanent membership,it should also take greater responsibility on the issues

of human rights and not shy away from confrontingthese concerns... We are especially concerned as noother country besides India provides for a permanentrefugee status, and in fact under the Indianconstitution several of the Tibetans living in India aretoday eligible for Indian c itizenship. Tibet shares amore spiritual relationship with India and we expectthe Indian government to put forward our cause infront of the Chinese premier, which has nothappened so far.”

 Tibetan ac tivist and writer Tenzin Tsundue in his

writings and interviews emphasizes the state of affairsin Tibet, a militarized zone today instigating constantfear, and criticizes the ‘settlement of nomadsprojects’ which has led to destruction of livelihood forthe local inhabitants in the TAR. He expressed hisdisappointment with the rejection of ‘genuineautonomy of Tibet within the People’s Republic of China’ proposed by the Dalai Lama and the lack of political dialogue between the two sides.

At the same time, the de facto prime minister of TGIEor Kalon Tripa, Samdhong Rinpoche outlined theissue of Tibet as being “intertwined with theboundary problem between these two countries.

 There needs to be a political will in both India andChina to resolve the boundary dispute... Until thequestion of Tibet remains unsolved it is wishful thinkingto hope for a lasting peace in the region.”

While there is unanimity on the need for greaterIndian role on the Tibet issue, internal dissensions inthe Tibetan community in exile are becomingincreasingly visible. There is increasing bifurcationamongst the youth and the older generation of leaders in terms of the approach to be used to

advocate the Tibetan cause. While so far the Tibetancommunity has managed to garner internationalsupport due to its non-violent nature, if the Tibetanyouth began to resort to violence it is likely to

The Chinese leadership has on its own initiative

brought out sensitive matters on the table which

reflects that they are willing to acknowledge

Indian concerns but are not willing to take any

substantial measures to address those concerns.

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undermine the support that their cause receives.Moreover, the urgency for settlement of the Tibetanissue during the lifetime of the c urrent Dalai Lamaseems no longer feasible because of the Chinesestrategy of waiting him out.

 The Indian government’s support can go only as far

as allowing peaceful demonstration of grievances aswas done in December 2010. The visit of the C hinesePremier was paralleled by the Dalai Lama spreadinghis spiritual messages around various parts of thecountry (Himachal and Sikkim). However, this doesnot really mean empathy with the Tibetan cause.Rather the Indian government is aware that ascompared to the 2008 scenario, Tibetan oppositionto this visit does not elicit grave concern from theChinese authorities. Moreover, geopoliticalexigencies have forced India to consider thegrowing economic might of its neighbour which itcannot afford to disregard any more.

IIIEXPLORING INDIA’S OPTIONS: ‘SILENCE IS GOLDEN?’ 

 The TAR has provided a geographical safeguard forIndia as a buffer region, but in terms of supporting arefugee population India has depended on andbuttressed the international outcry for upholdingdemocracy and safeguarding human rights in theregion. Meanwhile, India’s concerns on Tibet and the

 Tibetan community in India are driven by a host of political, economic and cultural factors.

Politically, India grapples with the question of how farto link the Tibetan issue with Indian parallels of Kashmir or whether to link them at all. Since thePanchsheel Agreement, 1954 and the 1993 and the1996 agreements related to the boundary issue Indiaand China have sought to resolve the border buthave not succeeded so far. The second concernderives from framing a future policy for the Tibetancommunity in context of the rising discontentamongst the Tibetan youth. It is possible that in apost-Dalai Lama scenario the Tibetan youth might

become unmanageable for the Indian government.

Economically, the Tibetan community, with itspopulation of 1, 20,000 people, is being provided forby the Indian state which requires continuousmobilization of resources. The illegal trade occurringin the border areas with the neighbouring Indianstates causes alarm to the Indian government. Thusthe larger worry then is how far and till when is Indiawilling to sustain this population on its territory. And if 

 Tibet is to be used ‘as a card’ against China, then tillwhen is India willing to bide its time?

Culturally, India endeavours to preserve the TibetanBuddhist tradition with which it has strong linkages.

 There is also a constant effort to manage and

strengthen people-to-people contacts between the Tibetan community and border areas in India, interms of education and employment opportunities.India has also justified its asylum to the Dalai Lama asa spiritual leader and not as a leader of the TGIE.

 There are myriad opinions amongst the Indiancommunity on how to seek solutions to the above-

mentioned political, economic and culturalconcerns which can be broadly categorized in twobinaries:

Option I: Wait and Watch

Srikanth Kondapalli, Professor, Centre for East AsianStudies, J NU, believes that the fact that the Indianforeign ministry has identified Kashmir at anequivalent position of core concern to that of Tibetand Taiwan for China is in itself a new trend. “ThoughClause Number One of the joint communiqué

mentions that China and India would abide by theprevious agreements, however there was no explicitmention of their position. It points towards twopossibilities: either diplomatic negotiations havebroken down between the two sides on the issue orChina is contemplating a quiet step back on itsvarious assertive stances especially the stapled visaissue.”

At the same time, the situation is much morefavourable to the Tibetan community as first, theyhave been allowed to demonstrate freely unlike

during the earlier visits of Chinese officials. Second,the reluctance to use the word Tibet in thedocument gives them a certain leeway. The groundrealities on both sides also affect their perceptionsand are a reflection of the power reality. It is also atestament to the fact that there is much moreconfidence in the Indian side to address the Tibetissue as compared to previous overtures. However,he warns against jumping to a conclusion that Indiahas jettisoned the “one China policy”.

Alka Acharya, Associate Professor, Centre for EastAsian Studies, J NU, also believes that one should notequate Tibet and Kashmir at the same level. Thoughshe differs on the outcome of how to construe theverbal signals between the two countries, she doespropound a more careful treading of the Chinese

PAGE 3NO 165

There are myriad opinions amongst the Indian

community on how to seek solutions to the above- 

mentioned political, economic and cultural

concerns which can be broadly categorized in two

binaries: wait and watch; and the need to assert.

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suddenly become more opaque.”

Hence, future policy formulation will have to beextremely sensitive to the complexities involved.While any irresponsible remarks from the Indiancommunity can destabilize the engagement processbetween China and India, it is equally necessary for

India to voice its core concerns. As put forward byNirupama Rao, the Indian Foreign Secretary- “Thechallenge is to find the right balance and maintain akind of steady equilibrium in taking the relationshipwith China forward”. With the increasing gamut of economic relationship between the two giants, the

 Tibetan community will have to evaluate andreconsider several of its stands and present itsagendas accordingly.

Measured/calculated silence would be in fact thebest strategy given the current dynamics. Neither

does India have any incentive nor the resources torake up the Tibetan issue again and again in thebilateral talks. It is also significant that the issue itself does not get red-carpeted and the momentum of deliberations needs to be kept up. With the final goalof the Tibetan community being a return back to itsmainland the transfer process would have to be withminimal conflict and endangerment of lives. Thishowever has to c ome at a significant equivalence of India amassing gains in Arunachal Pradesh andKashmir.

For this purpose it is time that India learnt the ways of 

the Chinese and use them to its own advantage thatis mould Deng Xiaoping’s slogan of ‘hiding ourcapabilities and bidding for time’ for the purpose of developing Indian capabilities and bidding time. Apracticable solution on the Tibetan issue and the

 Tibetan community in India will be worked out only ina scenario where India becomes indispensable toChina and gains certain leverage in military andeconomic terms and is in a position to exert onbehalf of the Tibetans. Since, this is unlikely tohappen anywhere in the near future ‘measuredsilence’ will be golden.

Select Interviews:

Dhondup Dorjee, ex Vice-president, Tibetan YouthCongress; Lobsang, Tibetan Youth Congress, GeneralSecretary; Srikanth Kondapalli, Professor at Centre forEast Asian Studies, J NU; Alka Acharya, AssociateProfessor at Centre for East Asian Studies, J NU; Brig.Gurmeet Kanwal, Director Centre for Land and WarfareStudies; Amb. Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, DistinguishedFellow at TERI

attitude. “If the Chinese give consent to upholdingthe earlier agreements signed in 2003, 2005-06, thenit should be taken as a reiteration of their position.

 There has been no reversal of the policy and oneshould not stretch the preference of not mentioning

 Tibet to any other significance. The visit had mixedoutcomes as certain fundamentals governing the

bilateral relationship were upheld providingcomplete satisfaction while there was reluctanceand concern. The current developments on Tibetcan be fraught with dangerous consequences forthe Tibetan community if minutely observed.” Oneshould further await gestures from the politicalleaderships of the two countries to reach aconclusion on the issue.

According to C Raja Mohan, a leading Indianstrategic analyst, the Chinese authorities havereluctantly taken into account Indian sensitivitieswhich has led to an understanding on show of 

“mutual respect and sensitivity for each other’sconcerns and aspirations.” In his words “China andIndia remain deeply divided over the critical issues of territorial sovereignty, regional security and globalgovernance. Nonetheless, the evolution of India’spolicy on Tibet and its position vis-à-vis China reflectsa balanced and cautious approach devised toaccommodate the interests of both entities.”

Option II: India needs to Assert

 This view is mostly endorsed by the defence

community which believes that India needs toadequately assert its stand in the internationalforums. Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, who heads the Armythink-tank the C entre of Land Warfare Studies, is of the opinion that “the unstable security relationshipand lack of progress on the resolution of the territorialdispute have the potential to act as a spoiler and willultimately determine whether these Asian giants willclash or cooperate for mutual gains. China’spolitical, diplomatic and military aggressiveness atthe tactical level is hampering further normalisationof relations.” Thus, the Sino-Indian relations wouldshape up depending on how far India is able toassert its independent agendas.

IVTHE WAY AHEAD 

Most strategic analysts, however, agree that India’sposition is much constrained by its inability to matchChina in military and ec onomic terms.Chandrasekhar Dasgupta, former ambassadoropines that the joint communiqué’s dispensing withthe standard reference to India’s “one China” policyand its recognition that the Tibet Autonomous Regionis an indication of India’s position remainingunchanged. He states that it would have hardlybeen appropriate to reflect these sentiments at atime when the “Chinese position on Kashmir had

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