Beyond Normative and Utilitarism

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Beyond the Normative and the UtilitarianThe Creativity of Action by Hans JoasReview by: Nicos MouzelisThe British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Sep., 1998), pp. 491-497Published by: Wiley on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science

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Nicos Mouzelis

REVIEW RTICLEBeyond the normative and the utilitarian

Parsons' early work, particularly his TheStructure f SocialAction 1937), hasset the foundations for all subsequent sociological attempts to construct ageneral theory of action. For Hans Joas however, these foundations arerather inadequate. They have directed the attention of social theorists tothe utilitarian-normative or rational-non-rational distinction, which leadsto a very restrictive conceptual framework. This conceptual frameworkrules out the idea that what is most distinctive about human action isneither rationality nor normativeness, but creativity, hich latter underlies

and goes beyond the notions of the rational and the normative.Parsons' critique of utilitarianism and his persistent attempt to show the

normative basis of social order (which is to say, his one-sided concern withthe rational-normative dialectic) prevented him from taking into con-sideration various philosophical theories of action that did try to grapplewith the issue of creativity. It also prevented him from seeing what the the-orists on whom he focused (Pareto, Marshall, Durkheim, Weber, and to alesser extent Tonnies and Simmel) had to say about the creative, inventiveaspects of action.

The Creativity f Action, in its attempt to restructure Parsons' theory ofaction, discusses both what the above-mentioned theorists said abouthuman creativity; as well as the more explicitly elaborated creativity theoriesto be found in the work of Herder (creativity of expressivity), of Marx (cre-ativity of production), and Castoriadis (creativity of revolution). If forHerder, Marx, and Castoriadis creativity was located in specific human insti-tutions or activities (artistic, economic, politico-revolutionary respectively),the so-called Lebensphilosophief Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Bergson sawit as underlying life in general and/or human life in particular. This broad-

ening of scope acquired a more social/sociological forln in the Americanpragmatist tradition (Peirce, Dewey, Mead), which conceptualized cre-ativity as a fundamental dimension of all social action, including that ofeveryday social conduct.

Focusing particularly on the American tradition, Joas points to threebasic but problematic presuppositions that underlie conventional action

Rrzt.Jrzl. f ociologytolume no. 49 Issue no. 3 September 1998 ISSX ( 0()7--1315 (C) ondon School of Economics 1998

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492 Nicos Mouzelis

theory. (These presuppositions are clearly present in the rational-choicemodel but, to a lesser degree, can also be found in the Parsonian,

normatively-oriented alternative.)

Teleologzcal n ten ion ality

The first problematic presupposition rests on the erroneous idea that anactor is always capable of purposive action. This notion results in theextremely rigid means-ends schemata, seen in both neo-classical econ-omics and in Parsons' early work. From this perspective, any action thatdoes not fit the means-ends straitjacket (i.e. routine action, expressive

action, silent contemplation etc.) is considered residual, a 'deviation' fromthe normal requiring explanation. According toJoas, what this rigid con-ceptualization ignores is that ends/goals (whether conceptualized in utili-tarian or Parsonian terms) are not static, not given 'in advance', so to speak.They are intrinsically linked in their constitution, reproduction, and trans-formation to the interactive ituation: f they do not always 'emerge', they areprofoundly affected and constantly reproduced or transformed by actors'interactive practices.

If this point, which has been extensively developed by symbolic inter-

actionism and ethnomethodology, is taken seriously into account, then itbecomes obvious that the situation s not, as Parsons has conceptualized it,a neutral and/or immobile terrain where actors choose means in order toachieve pre-given, stable goals. The interactive situation is constitutive ofgoals and actions. It does not merely set limits to what Inay occur, it con-stantly and directly influences what does occur. To use Parsonian termi-nology, neither general values (at the level of the cultural system) norinstitutionalized norms (at the social-system level), nor yet needs/disposi-tions (personality level) can account for social action if they are divorced

from the interactive situation. Values, norms, needs/dispositions are con-stantly, reflexively, creatively handled, negotiated, and reshaped as peopleinteract in specific contexts in time and space.

To put it finally in more philosophical terms: as both Simmel andHeidegger have pointed out, the rigid means-ends conceptualization ofaction ignores that human freedom may entail the opposite of purposive,strategic action. It may entail the capacity to get rid of the 'tyranny' of pur-posiveness; it may entail transcending the rather compulsive, never-endingsetting of goals the fulfilment of which only generates new goals, and so on

ad infinitum.

Instramental Control f the Body

A second problematic presupposition of conventional action theory is a tooactivistic conceptualization of the actor's body. The actor is supposed to bein full control of his/her body, this control entailing an instrumental self-body and body-world orientation. This activistic and, at the same time,



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Beyond he normative and the utilitarian 493

instrumental or rnanipulative orientation to the body is, as Foucault hasargued, a feature of the Western cultural tradition. As such it excludes the

consideration of action that is predominantly characterized by passivity,sensitivity, receptivity, imperturbability etc. It does not allow us, forinstance, to consider the kind of non-activistic intentionality which releasesthe body from cognitive and purposive controls (falling asleep or meditat-ing, for example); it does not, in other words, guide us to consider seriouslythe great variety of non-instrumental, non-controlling ways in which werelate to our bodies.

The Autonomous Individual

Conventional action theory's third problematic assumption has to do withthe conception of the social actor as based on an individualistic ontology-the Western tradition of possessive individualism. This tradition, if it doesnot see human beings as monads, certainly underemphasizes the extent towhich social and historical context shapes both our inner and outer selves,both inter- and intra-action. Parsons' focus on psychoanalysis and social-ization/internalization does not, of course, lead to the crude essentialistconstruction of pre-constituted, self-contained rational actors such as wefind in neo-classical economics. But just as his role players are shown asproducts rather than producers of the social world, so the self/personalityis shown in passive rather than active manner: in the sense that there is anunderemphasis of the complex, ongoing games that actors play not onlywith each other but also with themselves.

II

Joas' critique of conventional action theory's presuppositions makes him

take up an intermediate position between the rigidities of rational and nor-mative models on the one hand, and the extreme postmodernist reactionson the other. The latter, influenced by the Continental philosophy of liferather than by American pragmatism, emphasize creativity to the extentthat normative or rational considerations are thrown overboard. The Cre-ativity f Action by stressing the notions of reflexive rather than purposiveintentionality, non-instrumental rather than instrumental 'corporeality',primary sociality rather than pre-constituted individualism - thereforeargues, contra ostmodernism, that human creativity does not exclude the

rational or the normative, but rather combines these and other elements. . .n ever nove ., lnventlve ways.

In the last two chapters of his bookJoas shows the relevance of the aboveinsights for an assessment of ongoing sociological debates on the natureand causes of collective action (pp. 199-208), on the validity of functional-ist explanations (pp. 209-22), on how to bring systemically and action-oriented sociological theories closer together, and on the normativelinkages between the latter and democracy (pp. 223-58).



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With regard to collective-action theories, Joas contends that rational-

choice models (e.g. M. Olson's), or those based on Parsonian normative

functionalism (e.g. N. Smelser's), are less adequate than theorizations (e.g.Tourraine's approach) that explain macro phenomena in terms of real col-

lective actors and social movements operating within specific cultural tra-

ditions. On functionalism, he argues that it can be useful as an explanatory

theory only in a limited number of cases; as a heuristic device it can help

only if it avoids the conflation of function with cause, and if its rejection of

methodological individualism does not introduce holistic views of the social

world.For the action/system divide in the social sciences, Joas believes that a

rapprochement is possible between 'constitution theories' (i.e.theories

stressing the constitutive role played by action, both individual and collec-

tive, in the construction and transformation of social phenomena), and

system-oriented differentiation theories. ForJoas, the extreme ideal-typical

forms of the two approaches are mirror images of each other. He urgently

wants to see constitution theory applied to the differentiation processes of

modern societies in such a way as to avoid both an overrationalized, over-

integrated image of society on the one hand, and the portrayal of actors as

strictly constrained by systemic evolutionary imperatives on the other. This

is to say that constitution theories should sensitize one to thecontingent,

constructed character of all social patterns, and to the indeterminate

nature of all macro-social configurations.Finally, constitution theory forJoas entails, at least implicitly, the notion

of selfdetermination, nd on the normative level this unavoidably links themwith the notion of democratization. While Parsons argues that growing dif-

ferentiation, in modern conditions, relates positively to democracy, Joas

reverses the problem. For him, given that growing differentiation may or

may not lead to democratization, the degree and type of differentiation

becomes an issue in democratic debate. Looking at thework of Luhmann,

Munch, Offe and others, he asks whether growing differentiation is stop-

pable; and if it is, whether we should try to slow it down or reverse it, or pay

less attention to the degree of differentiation and more to the way the dif-

ferentiated parts have to be integrated if democracy is to be enhanced.

III

Given the density and richness of The CreativityfAction, t is difficult to

convey here the great number of insights it offers in a variety of fields,

among others in philosophy, the history of ideas, classical social theory, ana-

lytically oriented sociological theory, and the theory of collective move-

ments. In all the above areas Joas shows an impressive command of the

literature, as well as a capacity for establishing new connections between

seemingly unrelated spheres of study. Moreover, his overall argument, i.e.

the idea that we should break out of the rational-normative straitjacket by



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seriously considering the creative dimensions of all human action, is verypersuasive. I find equally persuasive his attempt to partially establish this

proposition by looking, from the creativity perspective, at the work ofDurkheim, Weber, Tonnies, and Simmel, as well as at the more philo-sophical theories that were ignored by Parsons.

For all that, the above strategies, although relevant and convincing, areby themselves not enough to provide an adequate alternative to Parsons'theory of action. Because if Parsons is weak on philosophy, he is very strongon sociological theory proper, on the construction, that is, of an interre-lated set of conceptual tools (what Althusser called Generalities II) thatenable the sociologist to link in theoretically and logically coherent manner

social action with such other fundamental dimensions of social organiz-ation as roles, institutions, social structures, culture, personality etc. IfParsons' oeurre s still relevant today, if (as inJoas' case) it is still used as thebasic frame of reference in debates dealing with the fundamental dimen-sions of social life, if it is still used by sociologists as a conceptual guide thathelps to raise interesting questions and to produce substantive theories(Generalities III) in numerous empirical fields, this is because it offers usnot simply philosophical disquisitions about the nature of human action,but specific, heoretically orked ut concepts hat an empirically-oriented social

scientist can use in his/her research. It is precisely on this fundamental level(on the level of heuristic tools, of Generalities II) thatJoas' book is wanting.

Restructuring arsons Theory f Action

Let me make this central point more specific. Parsons, in his attempt toovercome the difficulties of the utilitarian theory of action, did not limithimself to mere criticisms and/or the formulation of general methodo-logical directives. In a more positive and constructive manner he presented

us with an alternative model of action, which he called voluntaristic. This isbased on the interrelated concepts of unit act, values/ends, means ofaction, conditions of action, situation. And if one looks at his entire theor-etical edifice, the above five interrelated concepts were systematicallylinked, however nadequately, with the notions of institutionalization andinternalization (as one moves from the cultural to the social, and from thesocial to the personality system); with the four functional requirements thatevery system has to cope with if it is to survive as such (the famous AGILscheme); to the idea of structural/functional differentiation; to that of

sociological and evolutionary universals, etc.This being so, an effective restructuring of the Parsonian theory of actionrequires more than a simple critique of its fundamental presuppositionsand the tentative formulation of more convincing ones. It has to go a stepfurther by translating these insights into speciflc onceptual ools hat make itpossible to see, for instance, how precisely the 'rational' and the 'norma-tive' relate to the 'creative'. If actors do not operate on the basis of rigidlyset means-ends schemata, if interactive situations constitute and constantly



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reformulate both means and ends, what sort of conceptual tools can makethis obvious, and how are such tools linked to each other and to broader

macro-sociological conceptualizations? Joas does not give us any answershere.

Rapprochement etween Constitution nd Differentiation Theoraes

The same difficulty applies to Joas' attempt, on the basis of his theory ofcreative action, to bring action-based constitution closer together withsystem-based differentiation theories of stability and change. To simplyargue that it is only in their ideal-typical form that the two approaches are

incompatible, and that a rapprochement is both possible and necessary, isneither sufficient nor original. Neither is it enough to provide general andequally non-original suggestions concerning the limitations of teleologi-cally-oriented functionalist explanations, the capacity of action theory forsuccessfully linking micro with macro levels of analysis, etc.

The demanding task is to 'concretize' the action/system rapprochementby working out new concepts for overcoming some of the theoretical diffi-culties that Parsons' theory generates. For instance, as far as intra-societalmechanisms of change are concerned, Parsons explains the overall move-

ment towards greater social complexity and differentiation in terms ofincompatibilities or strains between the four institutional subsystems: adap-tations (A), goal achievement (G), integration (I), and latency (L). AsDavid Lockwood (1964) noted long ago, Parsons has failed to show how sys-temic incompatibilities between the norms and values of the institutionalsubsystem are linked (on the level of social integration and disintegration)with the strategies and struggles of collective actors. Do incompatibilitiesbetween economic and political or cultural norms automatically generatechange? Obviously not. As Marx and others have pointed out, it depends

on whether and how actors see these incompatibilities and contradictions,and what they do about them. Parsons, because of his overemphasis ofsystem and his underemphasis of social integration/disintegration, fails tosystematically link subsystem incompatibilities with social co-operation andconflict.

My point here is that the above Parsonian weakness cannot be remediedby injecting in ad hoc manner the idea of social or class struggles (Smelser1985), or the idea of economic, political, social, and cultural elites (Eisen-stadt 1990) into the Parsonian conceptual construct. In addition, we will

have to show what specific theoretical onsequences he introduction of con-cepts borrowed from 'constitution theories' will have on such fundamentalParsonian concepts as the AGIL scheme, the pattern variables, and thenotion of evolutionary universals (Mouzelis 1995: 81-9). When this is notdone, theoretical rapprochement or convergence is reduced to the eclec-tic exercise of picking and choosing whatever one fancies from constitutionand differentiation theories, without showing whether or how the newamalgam holds together.



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IV

To conclude: it is onlyJoas moving - as is to be hoped, in a subsequentvolume - from philosophical analysis to sociological theory (in the narrowsense of the term) that an effective reconstruction of Parsons' action theorywill become possible. Giddens (1984), and to a lesser extent Habermas(1984), have already tried this with varying degrees of success. Joas couldstart with a more serious and systematic reassessment of these authors' workas a convenient way of constructing new conceptual tools reflecting hisinsights on the creativity of social action.

The above criticism certainly does not imply thatJoas' book has failed.

The Creativity f Action succeeds, among other things, in showing the rele-vance of the type of project Parsons set himself. Despite the fact that HansJoas did not manage to bring his own ambitious undertaking to a conclu-sive end, he has convincingly shown that the concept of creativity shouldhave a much more central place in sociological theorizing. The Creativity fAction s an important book. It should be indispensable reading not only forthose interested in post-Parsonian sociological theory, but also for empiri-cally-oriented sociologists concerned with the sociology of social move-ments, the social structure of modern societies, and the linkages between

differentiation and democratization.

(Date accepted: February 1998) Nicos MouzelisDepartment f Sociology

London School ofEconomics ndPolitical Science

336pp, 45.00 (hardback))

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Eisenstadt S.N. et al. 1990 'Modes of struc-tural differentiation, elite culture and cul-tural visions'. in J.C. Alexander and P.Colomy (eds) IDifferentiation heory and.Social Change, New York: Columbia Uni-versity Press.

Giddens A. 1984 The Constitution f Society,Cambridge: Polity Press.Habermas J. 1984/87 The Theory of Com-municativeAction, oston: Beacon Press.Lockwood D. 1964 'Social integration andsystem integration', in G.K. Zollschan and

W. Hirsch (eds) Explorations in SocialChange, London: Routledge.Mouzelis N. 1995 Sociological heory: WhatWent Wrong? ondon: Routledge.Parsons T. 1937 The Structure of SocialAction, New York: McGraw Hill.

Smelser N. 1985 'Evaluating he model ofstructural differentiation in relation toeducational change in the nineteenthcentury', in J.C. Alexander (ed. ) Neo-Func-tionalism, London: Sage.

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