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Between revolution and reform: Thefuture of Hizbut Tahrir IndonesiaMohammad Iqbal Ahnaf a ba School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington , NewZealandb Centre for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies , Gadjah MadaUniversity , IndonesiaPublished online: 04 Jul 2009.

To cite this article: Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf (2009) Between revolution and reform: The futureof Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism andgenocide, 2:2, 69-85, DOI: 10.1080/17467580902822163

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Between revolution and reform: The future of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia

Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf*

School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand and Centre for Religiousand Cross-Cultural Studies, Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia

(Received 16 November 2008; final version received 13 February 2009)

The rise of a self-proclaimed Islamic revolutionary movement, Hizbut TahrirIndonesia (HTI) is critical to the future of Islamist movements in Indonesia. TheIslamic state or shari’ah ideology has been advocated since the founding of thecountry but never gained majority support. Far from seeking an Islamic state,most Muslims in Indonesia are integrated in the opposed democratic system withits moderating consequences. In this context, the future of HTI will provide acritical test of the viability of Islamist ideology in democratic Indonesia. Thispaper discusses the challenge HTI faces in maintaining its revolutionary ideologyand suggests a non-revolutionary direction for HTI. Despite its constant anti-systemic discourse, evidence indicates that HTI is moving toward a path betweenrevolution and reform or what may be called ‘refolution.’

Keywords: radicalization; social movement; extremism; revolutionary movement;Islamism

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) has gained prominence as a major player in theadvocacy of an Islamic state in Indonesia. HTI has revived the ‘‘defeated’’ Islamicstate ideology, which has been advocated since the founding of the country but hasnever gained majority support. As a new contender, HTI has made an impressivemobilization of support in recent years. It has brought the once peripheral andutopian idea of an Islamic caliphate into the epicentre of Muslim discourse. HTI’sprogress is apparent from its widening presence across the nation. Even though it is asmall minority compared to moderate mainstream Muslims, it has been able toexpress its contention loudly, often louder than the mainstream. Its intense socialmobilization, public appearances, and media propaganda have rewarded it with astrong presence in Muslim society. As a result, HTI is attaining a growingsignificance in Indonesian politics.

HTI appeared in Indonesia in the 1980s. It began with semi-clandestine activismto survive Soeharto’s authoritarianism, officially beginning its public campaign in2000. Today, it appears in public as one of the most vocal Muslim groups inIndonesia. Supported by young intellectuals, with articulate rhetoric and simple,straightforward arguments, HTI’s fast growth is evident from its increasingmembership that reaches beyond its leadership base in urban communities. It isdifficult to determine the exact number of HTI’s members. The strength of this group

*Email: ahnafe7@yahoo.com

Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict

Vol. 2, No. 2, July 2009, 69–85

ISSN 1746-7586 print/ISSN 1746-7594 online

� 2009 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/17467580902822163

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can be measured by two indicators. First, there is HTI’s representation in mass ralliesand public discussions in major cities in Indonesia, normally drawing from severalhundred to several thousand people. Second, the international conference on thecaliphate hosted by HTI in 2007 drew an audience of about 80,000 in Jakarta’s nationalstadium. In short, the strength of HTI should not be judged merely by the size of itsmembership, but also by its ability to mobilize popular support for its agendas.

HTI is a part of the international Hizbut Tahrir (HT) founded in Palestine in1953 by a former Muslim Brotherhood activist, Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani (1909–1977).1 HT started with the revolutionary goal of restoring the past Islamiccaliphate, yet the movement claims the principle of non-violence. The raison d’etrefor HT was Nabhani’s disillusionment with political Islamic movements that failedbecause they embraced secular systems on the one hand, and adopted violentstrategies that caused state repression and Muslim antipathy on the other hand.Therefore, he rejected both the reformism of the Muslim Brotherhood and themilitarism of violent Islamists (Taji-Farouki, 1996, p. 9). He believed that throughthe development of strong vanguards that could mobilize support from the majoritypopulation and strategic elites, the conversion of a secular state into an Islamiccaliphate was possible.

In the long-term crisis of Islamist advocacy in Indonesia, HTI’s attempt to revivethe revolutionary ideology of an Islamic state is critical. Can HTI maintain thisrevolutionary character, or will it follow the fate of other radical Islamic groups thateither have tried the pathway of political change but have failed, or have tried toform religious movements to Islamisize Indonesian societies? This paper will discussthe direction of HTI by analyzing the recent statements of its leaders, and theorganization’s pronouncements and activities, as they are recorded on its websitewww.hizbut-tahrir.or.id and its derivative links.

I will start with a brief account of the characteristics of a revolutionarymovement, and then describe the revolutionary nature of HTI’s original ideology(Hizb ut-Tahrir) as taught by its founder Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani. I will then analyzethe advocacies of HTI on the basis of its recent discourse and activities. Finally, I willbuild my argument on matters that will determine the revolutionary or non-revolutionary direction of HTI.

Revolution, ‘refolution’ and reform

There are various views on the causes and the process of revolution. It is generallyaccepted that for a revolution to take place two components are required: thebreakdown of existing political institutions and the introduction of a fundamentalchange. These two components of revolution are inseparable. The overthrow of apolitical regime without a systemic change is not a revolution. This type of change iscalled a ‘‘coup d’etat’’ when it does not constitute a territorial shift, or a ‘‘rebellion’’when it involves only the specific territory of a state. Likewise, a fundamental changewithout the collapse of an existing political regime is deemed impossible because it isunimaginable that an existing ruler will voluntarily carry through a systemic changeat the expense of the loss of power. A revolution may be carried out in two ways:revolution from above, as advocated by Lenin and Trotsky, or revolution frombelow, as promoted by Gramsci. In both cases, systemic change has occurred at thesocial level before political power has been seized. However, a revolution in the endcan only be completed with the emergence of a new political regime with a new

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political system (Foran, 1997; Huntington, 1962; Johnson, 1982; Kamrava, 1999;Skocpol, 1994).

Revolution is different from reform in that the former is achieved throughirregular overthrow of the state followed by a fundamental change of polity. Thelatter refers to changes of legislation and those who govern within the framework ofthe existing system. The key difference between revolution and reform, according toKis (1998), lies in the legitimacy of the present system. He compares revolution andreform as follows:

a revolution is brought about when the legislative order breaks down as a result oflegitimacy crisis. Reforms, on the other hand, are completed – whether in the absence ofor as a response to legitimation crisis – in strict adherence to the rules of the legislativeorder. (Kis, 1998, pp. 316–317)

An alternative scenario of change, between reform and revolution, however, isnot impossible. In this scenario, ‘‘coordinated transition,’’ a large-scale transforma-tion of the political, social and economic system, including the amendment of theconstitution, takes place without the collapse of the present political power holder.This may happen in a situation where popular movements cause a crisis oflegitimation for the power holder and therefore, because of unbearable pressures,changes in favour of popular demand are made. In response to this situation, theruling power comes to the table with the opposition party to negotiate large-scaletransformations of the political, social and economic system, while maintaining thelegitimacy of the power holder. Examples of this model of change can be found inGarton Ash’s examination of the process of change in Poland and Hungary, inwhich a fundamental transformation of the state system, from totalitarian Marxismto democracy, was made while maintaining the legitimacy of the old power holders.Garton Ash called this alternative model of change ‘‘refolution’’ or a hybridcombination of reform and revolution (Garton Ash, 1990).

With regard to legitimacy, there are two components that need to be emphasized;namely, the legitimacy of the power holder and the legitimacy of the existing system.Reformist change maintains both forms of legitimacy; revolution seeks to overthrowboth legitimacies and replace them with a new political power and a new system; andrefolution or ‘coordinated transition’ entails the overthrow of the existing systemwithout overthrowing the existing power holder. The achievement of both revolutionand refolution thus requires the crisis of legitimation of both ruler and the rules thatwill put pressure on the ruler to face the unavoidable choice of revolution orrefolution.

The principal task of revolutionary movements is to force the process ofdelegitimation. It does this through creating a crisis that will challenge the existingpolity. Charles Tilly’s analysis of revolutionary situations illustrates how this taskcan be achieved. Tilly proposes three symptoms of revolutionary situations asnecessary, though not sufficient, conditions for revolution. These include theappearance of a contender or coalition of contenders advocating exclusivealternative claims to control the government, support from a significant segmentof the subject population, and the incapacity or unwillingness of the state apparatusto suppress the contenders (Tilly, 1978, p. 200).

Combining the essence of revolution and Tilly’s proposition of revolutionarysituation, three issues are essential in assessing the revolutionary or non-revolutionary nature of a social movement. They include the following stages.

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Deligitimation of the state

Deligitimation includes mobilization of widespread distrust of and anger toward thestate. Mobilization can be achieved in two levels: by attacking the hegemony of thestate system on an intellectual level, and by disabling the capacity of the state. Arevolutionary movement needs not only to exploit the state’s incapacity in order todestroy its legitimacy, but also to build its own legitimacy by filling the void left bythe state in the areas of social services.

The question of political participation is essential here. In the case of Indonesia,participation in an election is the day of judgement for the revolutionary principle.Alan Dawley argues that the ballot box is the ‘coffin’ of revolutionaries (1976, p. 70).The necessity of non-participation in elections is particularly significant for HTIbecause the very core of HTI ideology is the view that the introduction of democracywas instrumental in the destruction of the Ottoman caliphate in Turkey (Zallum,1994, pp. 30–76). This ideology differentiates HTI from pro-democratic revolu-tionary movements in Eastern Europe. The propagation of democracy was the coreof their opposition to totalitarian Marxism. Participation in democratic process istherefore a door of opportunity for pro-democratic revolutionary movement but a‘‘coffin’’ for the revolutionary Islamist.

Building a coalition of dissenters

Building a coalition is important because delegitimation of the state cannot comefrom a limited group of the population. Resentment and distrust of the existingpolity must be spread widely among the majority of the population so that theconsensual support and obedience that are the bases of state legitimacy can bedisrupted. For this purpose, the traditional bonds of societies, such as ethnicidentity, religious sectarianism, and political affiliation, must be superseded by thebond of resentment against the state.

Ideological mobilization

When ideology is mobilized, there is a conflict of values between the public and the state.A revolutionary movement needs to mobilize ideologically imbued supporters who aremoved by the revolutionary drive not only because of conflict of interest but alsobecause of conflict of values. This idea includes a belief that the state’s ideology hasinherently failed; therefore, replacement with a new ideology is inevitable. It is thisideologization that provides ‘‘glue’’ to different segments of societies so that a group ofchallengers will not be satisfied by partial fulfilment of its demands by the state. As notedby Tilly, a revolutionary situation requires a commitment by a significant segment of thepopulation to the claims made by the revolutionary movement.

The combination of these three components is essential in the creation of Tilly’sthird indicator of revolutionary situation: the state’s inability or unwillingness tosuppress the coalition of challengers.

The revolutionary ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir

Nabhani founded HT partly as a criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood for engagingthe existing political process. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, which seeks to

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convert secular nation states into an Islamic state, Nabhani saw the nation-statesystem as a tool of Western neo-colonialism to create the decline of Muslim societies.The defining feature of Nabhani’s thought is the necessity to unite the Muslimummah worldwide into a single government that resembles the past system of Islamiccaliphate (khilafah Islamiyah) (an-Nabhani, 1990, p. 209; 2001).

Learning from the short life of violent Islamist groups that suffered either aregime’s repression or co-optation, Nabhani believed that any revolutionary changeshould be preceded by preparing a society that will support a peacefultransformation of a secular state into an Islamic caliphate. Nabhani emphasizedthe importance of undertaking non-violent struggle to avoid being co-opted by thesystem.

In this bid, Nabhani outlined the operational foundation of HT’s activism inthree stages. Stage 1 is building a party (tathqif), which involves creating a nucleusand personal mobilization. The purpose of this stage is to form core activists thathave sufficient understanding of and commitment to the ideology and strategy ofHT. These core activists are expected to be able to run HT’s organization andconduct public and personal mobilizations. Once the organization is formed, themain agenda is the mobilization of popular support for the caliphate ideal. Thissecond stage is called interaction (tafa’ul) with the Muslim public in order to makeIslam a central issue in the activities of the Muslim ummah. Here Islam is presentedas a supreme ideological alternative, replacing the existing non-Islamic system.HT’s activities on this stage are focused on two objectives; propagating thenecessity of the Islamic caliphate and challenging false ideologies. In this stage,Nabhani emphasized the importance of discipline in ideology and beinguncompromising in negating incompatible ideologies and opposing beliefs.Nabhani commanded:

Carrying the da’wah demands frankness, courage, strength, thought and to challenge allthat contradicts the fikrah and Tareeqah (idea and method) of Islam by facing it andexposing its falsehood, irrespective of the situation and its consequences . . . . Theda’wah carrier does not flatter the people. . . . Rather he must adhere to the ideologyalone and solely express it paying no regard to anything except the ideology . . . theda’wah carrier has to challenge everything. (quoted from Nabhanid’s book Nidaamal-Islam published by Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, 2007)

In the final stage, assuming support from a wide cross-section of society andassistance (nusroh) from political leaders as well as social and military leaders, HTbelieves the radical change of abolishing the secular constitution and replacing itwith an Islamic system can be carried out peacefully. It is assumed that the first statethat accepts the caliphate system will be the catalyst for further expansion of anIslamic caliphate worldwide, the beginning of a movement that resembles theexpansion from Medina in the time of the Prophet Muhammad (an-Nabhani, 2001,p. 33).

The revolutionary nature of this ideology lies in its objective of replacing thepresent system with the caliphate system. For this ideal, HT was not only cautiousabout the risk of violent methods that will make the organization vulnerable to staterepression, but also stressed the importance of advocacy outside the framework ofthe secular system. Therefore, HT has a policy of non-participation in normalpolitics and at the same time advocates a non-compromising approach to non-compatible ideologies, particularly democracy, secularism, capitalism and

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nationalism (Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain, 2000, pp. 63–69). HT believesthat the introduction of these Western ideas marked the decline of Muslim societies.HT is therefore required to challenge constantly the legitimacy of the secular systemand uncompromisingly propagate the caliphate as the only alternative.

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI): between revolution and reform

Since starting its public advocacy, HTI is now exercising the ‘‘politics of presence’’(Bayat, 2004, p. 200). As a new organization with a relatively new message ofcaliphate, HTI is far on the margin of mainstream Islam; nevertheless, it has beenable to express its contention loudly, often louder than the mainstream. HTI ismarginal, but by its presence it is at the epicentre of current issues being discussed byMuslims. It has not drawn large numbers of people to join its revolutionary vision;however, it manages to position itself on the ‘‘sphere of acceptance’’ in front of theMuslim communities. No less importantly, it has so far left the state with insufficientcause for repression.

In less than a decade in Indonesia, the new HTI enjoys broad media coverage ofits activities. HTI activists increasingly appear on local and national media. No lessthan a popular debate program on national TV (Metro TV) placed HTI on the scene(HTI, Haruskah Berharap pada Obama?). This not only boosts the popularity ofHTI, but also represents the growing recognition and influence of HTI in the publicarena. Within the objective of its second-stage struggle (interaction with ummah),HTI is working on mainstreaming its peripheral idea of caliphate, challenginggovernment policies, and highlighting the government’s fundamental (ideological)fallacy (Taji-Farouki, 1996, p. 96).

Beyond public activities, HTI strengthens its presence and mobilization withprograms that directly reach Muslim audiences. This is carried out through a rangeof activities such as developing cell groups, providing training for potential cadres,and visits to strategic leaders and institutions. HTI routinely knocks on the doors ofthese strategic institutions to propagate its ideology and offers space for dialogue anddebate. This program is recorded in the activity section of its website (hizbut-tahrir.or.id). Activists are well prepared with detailed answers to critical questions.

How do all these activities contribute to the revolutionary and non-revolutionarycharacteristics of HTI? Despite the calls by HTI leaders for revolutionary change torestore the caliphate system, do their current practices actually lead to the path ofrevolution? I seek to answer this question by using the three measurements ofrevolutionary movement that I raised earlier.

Challenging state legitimacy

The restoration of the caliphate system requires challenging the nation-state system.As argued earlier, state legitimacy stands on two foundations: public consensualsupport of the state system that is expressed in the rule-abiding attitudes of thepopulation, and the functioning of the state as the single source of coercion, bothlegal and violent.

The present behavior of HTI demonstrates that it is trying to challenge these twocomponents of state legitimacy. The predominant content of HTI messages is itsanalysis of the problems of democratic secular societies. HTI has concluded thatIndonesia as a state is failing because it is unable to fulfill its function of providing

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prosperity, security and the solution to disputes in societies (HTI, Negara SudahMati?). HTI’s criticism of the state is not limited to its policies, but extends to itsadherence to those secular functions. The only way out is the application of sharia(Islamic law) in its entirety.

The recent most apparent hostility of HTI to the Indonesian political system is itsdelegitimation of democracy by emphasizing the number of vote abstentions (golput;literally ‘white group’) in recent elections. HTI is trying to mobilize public distrust ofdemocracy by revealing the decreasing participation in elections and thus supportingits argument of the natural failure of democracy. Democracy is described as‘‘a disabled system since birth that only produces contradictions’’. HTI argues thatdemocracy is a high-cost political procedure and yet only produces incapable andcorrupt apparatuses. To strengthen the point and to develop public consent to theneed for sharia, HTI contrasts this development with the findings of several surveysthat reveal high support for sharia (HTI, Berharap pada Partai Islam?). A HTIpublication noted that, in contrast to the increasing number of golput in severaldistrict elections that range from 35 to 46 percent, decreasing trust of politicalparties, and the rising rate of public disappointment in the House of Representativesfrom 68.5 to 84 percent, the favorable attitude to sharia application rose to 67percent (HTI, Membaca Trend Politik Terkini).2

The issue of corruption, which is the centre of Indonesia’s problems today, isthe best example of HTI’s criticism of the state’s systemic problem. The root ofcorruption, in HTI analysis, is twofold: the immorality of the state apparatus,and the failure of state political and administration systems. The electedapparatus of the state does not possess Islamic morality, which condemnscorruption, and the present laws fail to end the corruption that gives advantagesto the rulers’ cronies, light punishment for convictions of corruption, andinconsistent law enforcement. The corrupt behavior of the state apparatus, HTIhighlights, is the result of the high cost of the political process in democracy.Politicians have to spend much money to win elections; therefore, when in office,they resort to corruption to recover their political expenses. Such an analysisleads to the conclusion that ‘‘the present political system actually strengthens theacceleration of corruption,’’ and therefore the only way to end corruption is theadoption of the Islamic system as practiced by past caliphs. HTI went on to offerpractical ways to end corruption that it claimed to be derived from the practiceof the Prophet’s companions, including applying the system of ‘‘reversed burdenproof’’ (pembuktian terbalik), labelling corruptors as the enemy of Islam, and thecaliph’s rule of counting the wealth of state officials before and after their serviceperiod and suspecting extraordinary wealth increase to be the result of corruption(HTI, Mengurangi Benang Kusut Korupsi). To strengthen the sense of a systemicproblem, HTI emphasizes that all the practical solutions it offers can only beimplemented under a caliphate system.

HTI is, however, very careful not to engage in frontal attacks on the state,especially on the crucial aspect of nationalism such as Pancasila (the five pillars ofthe Indonesian constitution) and the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). HTIhas probably learned from the failure of the past communist revolution attempt. Itwas opposition to Pancasila that led the military to crack down on the Indonesiancommunist party in 1965. Although these national symbols are substantially part ofthe nation state opposed by HTI, it never directly attacks them. With regard to theaccusation that HTI’s pan-Islamism threatens the NKRI, HTI builds an image of

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patriotism by arguing that the restoration of the caliphate is in defense of Indonesianintegrity and sovereignty:

The application of sharia will not destroy this nation, but strengthens it. Islamic shariaforbids separation from an Islamic state. History has demonstrated that Islam is theprimary factor of the unity of this nation like today. It has been generally known that itis foreign forces that played a key role in the separation of East Timor from Indonesia.Now they are playing the same role in Papua, Maluku, Poso and Aceh. The sign ofdisintegration is stronger when the government failed to realize justice and prosperityfor society, while foreign domination in economic and political sectors is widespread.(HTI, Bahaya Ideologi Transnasional)

This actually signals HTI’s ambiguity on the principle of non-participation.On the one hand, HTI constantly attacks democracy and warns Islamic politicalparties of the danger of democracy. HTI sends a clear message to Islamic partiesthat an Islamic political party needs to hold three principles; that is, basing apolitical ideology on Islam, focusing on political education to raise publicawareness of the need to apply sharia, and working toward the establishment ofan Islamic state. HTI warns that Islamic political parties that deviate from thisprinciple will ‘‘certainly fail and finally be trapped in the circle of the infidel’ssystem’’ (HTI, Konstruksi Parpol dalam Islam; see also HTI, Berharap padaParpol Islam?).

Nevertheless, HTI has never launched a direct attack on the Islamic parties suchas the Prosperity Justice Party (PKS), the Unity and Development Party (PPP), andthe Moon and Star Party (PBB); pro-sharia groups integrated within the democraticsystem are not its target. While constantly attacking democracy, HTI’s leaders havebeen making ambiguous statements on the possibility of HTI participating inelections. When asked about this question, there was no definite answer from HTI’sspokesman, Ismail Yusanto; instead, he emphasized the focus of HTI on the task ofpolitical education in creating public awareness on the need for a comprehensiveapplication of sharia and eventually the caliphate. This may be understood as apart of HTI’s aim to appease groups it believes it could unite with. However, thedoor to participation in elections seemed more visible when recently Ismail Yusantostated:

For Hizbut Tahrir, what is more important is mobilizing changes in that direction(sharia and caliphate). . . . Until today, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia has not decidedwhether it will participate in elections or not. As a principle (uslub), participation inelections may be taken or not. If change can be done without election, why is itnecessary? For HTI, election is an uslub and will never be a tariqah or fixed method inmaking a true change. (HTI, Kapan HTI Ikut Pemilu?)

On another occasion, when HTI held a discussion forum to advocate coalitionbetween Islamic political parties, Ismail Yusanto did not prohibit its members fromvoting in the election (HTI, HTI Tidak Paksa Kadernya Pilih Parpol). It appearsthat, in contrast to its opposition to democracy, HTI – as well as international HT –does not rule out the option of participation in elections. HT in Jordan, for example,allowed some of its members to run for parliamentary seats and, when successful, tosit in the parliament (Baran, 2004, p. 34).

Ambiguity between anti-systemic policy and reformist strategy is also indicatedin the increasing use of the term ‘sharia’ in addition to, and sometimes as an

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alternative to, ‘khilafah.’ This started in recent years when HTI adopted the slogan,‘‘Save Indonesia with sharia and khilafah.’’ Later, an issue of HTI’s journal,Al-Islam, advocated a fatwa for the application of sharia, instead of the establish-ment of khilafah, in response to a discourse on vote abstention in elections (HTI,Fatwakan Wajibnya Menerapkan Syari’ah Islam!). Sharia application implies anacknowledgement of the capability of the present political system to accommodatesharia. In contrast, the establishment of khilafah requires a total replacement of thecurrent order.

HTI’s anti-democratic discourse can be understood as its effort to undermine oneof the components of state legitimacy; consensual support. HTI is masterful inexploiting state incapacities in delivering social services. HTI raises issues whereby itcan portray itself on the side of the population against the government. However, thelimit of HTI’s delegitimation effort is its inability to fill the void of social services leftby the state. In this area, HTI is not comparable to, for example, the EgyptianMuslim Brotherhood, which runs various institutions to provide people’s basicneeds, such as healthcare, housing, education, and employment help through itsmultisector associations (Berman, 2003, p. 260).

Additionally, HTI sometimes conducts actions that actually or unexpectedlyempower the legitimacy of the state. For example, by joining Muslim rallies todemand that the state act on specific issues such as banning Ahmadiyah, a ‘deviant’Islamic sect, it implicitly recognized the state’s capacity to do so. Instead of flowingwith the crowd on this reformist demand, HTI, ideally, by the standard ofrevolution, should have devoted its energy to molding public opinion on the state’sinability to stop the anti-Islamic blasphemy of Ahmadiyah teaching.

HTI is challenging the state’s legitimacy on the level of consensual support to thestate system, but, in practice, no significant effort is made to delegitimize the state’scapacity. It does not actually try to disrupt the state homeostasis. Furthermore, thefact that HTI fails to fill the void of social services left by the state shows its inabilityto develop its own legitimacy in the eyes of the population.

Building a cross-group coalition of dissenters

Integrating diverse Muslim societies in Indonesia is probably the most challengingtask of HTI. Muslims, who constitute a large majority of the country’s population,can be a significant force for mobilization if they can come together with a singledemand for the application of sharia. However, religion is not a strategic factor inIndonesian politics. The division on the ground of religious orientation is deep.Long-standing Muslim social organizations have a strong hold in civil societies withdifferent religious orientations and political affiliations. HTI faces the tremendoustask of not only making its caliphate message resonate with the general Muslimpublic, but also finding a common ground that bridges the long-standing divisionfrom other Islamist groups.

Despite this, cross-group coalition building is central in HTI’s discourse andactivities. This can be seen from the intensity of its call for Muslim unity and itsavoidance of criticism of other Muslim groups, even though they are notideologically compatible. By framing its argument to confront anti-Islamic threats,it tries to appeal to the Islamic emotional sentiment. Those who oppose its ideas arelabeled as supporters of secularism, liberalism, or capitalism, thus picturing them notonly as opposed to HTI, but also as the enemies of Islam.

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In practice, cross-group coalition building is attempted by HTI in several ways,including the following:

(1) Joining the Indonesian Council of the Ulama (MUI). The presence of formerleader of HTI, Muhammad Al-Khattah, in the structure of MUI enabledHTI to gain public recognition. On the one hand, HTI’s effort to find afoothold in MUI is strategic since MUI is a multigroup organization thatrepresents various Muslim groups in Indonesia. Even though it does notpossess religious authority in the eyes of all Indonesian Muslims, thegovernment often consults MUI as a legal basis. So far, HTI seems to gaintwo advantages from its presence in MUI. First, it places itself at theepicenter of Islamic discourse (thus reducing its marginal status); second, itgains a vehicle to advance its intergroup activities in favor of its interest.

(2) Mobilizing cross-group Muslim organizations. A notable group in thiscategory is the Muslim Ummah Forum (FUI). FUI was founded after thefall of Soeharto, and HTI’s Al-Khattah serves as its general secretary.Members of FUI consist of individual leaders from various Muslimorganizations, including those with backgrounds in the mainstream Muslimorganizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. FUI has beenat the forefront of various demonstrations that criticize the government’s un-Islamic policies and call for adoption of sharia. It is under the guise of FUIthat HTI, together with other Muslim groups and leaders, mobilizes cross-group activities to advocate sharia. Among groups in this category are thePro-Sharia Academics Forum (in Bogor), communication (silaturrahmi)forums of ulama and social leaders in many cities, Muslimah Leaders StudyForum (ForumKita), the Society and Social Study Forum (FKSK), Ulamaand Habaib Forum, and Ulama serial workshops.3

(3) Approaching strategic groups. Among the strategic groups that HTI seeks toconciliate are NU and Muhammadiyah as well as the military. Althoughthese groups have been strong defenders of Pancasila as the basic ideology ofIndonesia, criticism of them is absent in HTI discourse. HTI developsarguments on the need for sharia by selectively citing statements or evidencethat suggests that the founders of NU and Muhammadiyah were actuallysupporters of sharia. A frequently mentioned case is NU’s founder,K. H. Wahab Hasbullah, who, according to HTI was the founder of KomiteKhilafah Indonesia but later gave up the demand for the caliphate because ofthe pressure from nationalist forces (Hizbut Tahrir, Ancaman bagi NU,Benarkah? See also HTI, Jejak Syari’ah dan Khilafah di Nusantara). HTI’sattitude to the military and the police suggests their importance as HTI’starget in securing elite support. Despite many criticisms of the military, nonegative voice comes from HTI. Instead, HTI invites military and policerepresentatives to speak in many of its public forums.

By these various activities, HTI not only mobilizes public awareness of thenecessity of sharia, but also tries to break the traditional bonds of Muslimcommunities to establish a new bond based on Islamic ideology and brotherhood.The increasing number of Muslim cross-group coalitions favoring Islamist goals andthe growing popularity of HTI are indicators of HTI’s achievements. Given HTI’sradical idea of subverting Indonesia into an Islamic caliphate, the tolerant attitude of

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general Muslim society to HTI and the government’s inaction against it are greatadvantages.

However, there are some limits that prevent HTI from taking the path ofrevolution. Far from establishing a cross-group coalition of challengers, many ofthose who are in HTI’s cross-group coalition circles (such as MUI and FUI) are partof the present polity. Many of these people join the movement because they findcommunality in preserving normative values of Islam against moral laxity, anti-Islamic blasphemy, and Christian missionaries. These people are on the fault linebetween maintaining the present polity, concern for Islamic conservative values, anda reluctant attitude to the radical idea of an Islamic state. Their primary interest isthe Islamization of society rather than the Islamization of the state. The state’sadoption of social Islamization that gives a sense of spiritual security would satisfythis group of people. In contrast, the state’s inability to respond to the fear of thedegradation of Islamic normative values would help HTI justify the necessity of anIslamic revolution.

The way the Indonesian government has responded to the controversy ofAhmadiyah is a good example of the limited strength of HTI in exploiting acommon issue for the mobilization of its radical advocacy. HTI was successful inbringing together various groups to put strong pressure on the government to banAhmadiyah. The government responded with an ambiguous policy that neitherbans nor legalizes Ahmadiyah. Instead of banning Ahmadiyah, the governmentissued an interministry letter that prohibits Ahmadiyah from public propagation ofteachings that contradict mainstream Islam. The interministry letter, however, doesnot have legal power and is therefore ineffective in outlawing Ahmadiyah activities.This partial accommodation calmed Muslim emotion and prevented furtherexploitation of the issues.

The aggressive style of HTI in propagating the caliphate ideology can also becounterproductive. Despite the relative acceptance of the public at present, concernabout HTI’s aggressiveness has started to rise, especially by established mainstreamMuslim institutions such as NU. Many leaders of NU have expressed their concernabout the possible threat to Pancasila. For example, NU’s chairman, HasyimMuzadi,raised his concern of the threat to Pancasila andNKRI from trans-national ideologiesby referring to groups such as HTI, Al-Qaedah and the Muslim Brotherhood (NUOnline, PBNU: Ideologi Transnasional Harus Di-Indonesia-kan Dulu!).

A crucial issue in HTI’s effort to build a cross-group coalition, therefore, is itsability to exploit sensitive issues that touch Muslim emotions – such as blasphemy,moral laxity and the victimization of Muslims – and endow them with ideologicalimpetus. In other words, HTI’s success depends on its ability to advocate thenecessity of systemic change so that Muslim anti-governmental rallies do not ceaseafter partial accommodation by the state. HTI’s major task is to sustain Muslimresentment of the government, especially when the government adopts conciliatorypolicies that satisfy the aspiration of ‘‘Islamic conservatism.’’

Ideological mobilization

A strong revolutionary movement needs ideologically imbued supporters whobelieve that the necessity of fundamental change is a matter not only of interest,but also of value or ideology. Because not every problem of society is a matter ofideology – Islam versus anti-Islam, or secular versus Islamic – by the standard of

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revolutionary movement, the task of HTI is the ideologization of conflict betweenthe population and the existing polity.

It is for this reason that HTI has devoted effort to counter a statement onnational television by a politician from an Islamic party who considers that the issueof ideology has ended. HTI challenges the view that Muslims should end debate onthe necessity of the Islamic state or the sharia to focus on finding solutions tonational problems. HTI argues that ideology is the foundation of the state thatshapes its constitutions and policies in all aspects of life. The question of ideologywill end only when the state throws the secular system away and replaces it withIslam as a state ideology (HTI, Persoalan Ideologi Belum Selesai).

To emphasize the necessity of adopting Islam as an ideology, HTI presents Islamin stark opposition to other competing ideologies, the so-called secular capitalismand communist-socialism. HTI argues that Indonesia’s ideology is unclear because itclaims to hold religious principles but in practice adopts a secular system. Therefore,HTI calls for the state to take a definite position in adopting Islam as an ideology. Itis this definition of state ideology that will lead to a true awakening of the state (HTI,Indonesian Bangkit Hanya dengan Islam).

Underlying the centrality of ideology, HTI describes its role as mobilizingideological awareness to counter the proliferation of foreign and infidel ideologiesof secular capitalism and communist-socialism. This goal is carried out bypropagating a way of thinking (fikroh) that acknowledges the existence of God andthe obligation to implement His authority in all aspects of life. It believes that oncethe majority segments of the Muslim community possess this ideologicalawareness, a true awakening of Islam is imminent (HTI, Indonesian BangkitHanya dengan Islam).

Ideologization is probably the most consistent policy of HTI. The message ofthe necessity of ideological change is always explicit in any publication of HTI. Inthis task, HTI is blessed by a rich literature from its founder and later activists,and from abundant anti-globalization sources, to support its argument of the needfor a systemic change. HTI borrows many antiglobalist arguments againstliberalization in its economic analysis. What differentiates HTI from other anti-globalization critics is its conclusion that the issues can only be solved by theadoption of sharia. For example, when discussing the issue of the energy crisis,HTI uses the example of the privatization of the state electric company (PLN). Itborrows anti-privatization analyses regardless of the different orientation (non-Islamic) of the analysts. It uses lengthy and detailed arguments from anti-privatization analyses, including a quotation from David Hall, associated with thePublic Service International Research Unit in London, who claims that the PLN’scrisis started when it issued its ‘unbuilding policy,’ which diversifies PLN units onfunctional and geographical bases. This led to the weakening of PLN’s operationalcapacity and the dominance of the private electric company. Ideologization of theissues came in the last part:

Therefore, the unbuilding idea must be challenged because it will destroy PLN and willcertainly affect people and the state. It must also be understood that PLN is only oneexample of how global capitalism works . . . until all national resources are looted. Withthis awareness, we must consistently refuse any form of liberalism, capitalism, andsecularism. Here is the actual relevance of the call ‘‘Save Indonesia with sharia . . .’’According to sharia, all energies (electricity, gas, coal, and others) belong to people.(HTI, Awas, PLN Dalam Bahaya!!!)

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These publications arm HTI with detailed and practical cures for all the problemsof society, including the rise of fuel prices, the energy crisis, the food crisis,corruption, drug abuse, natural disasters, and HIV/AIDS. Browsing through HTI’swebsite, one finds daily analyses and comments on actual issues.

The strength of HTI’s propaganda is that it does not present simplified analyseseven though it may be actually simplifying. The academic background of its activistsenables HTI to present analyses with academic arguments. It not only advocatessystemic change with dogmatic slogans and emotional symbols but also combinesintellectual analysis with ideological slogans. The sense of intellectualism attracts theeducated and professional segments of society; strong ideological slogans thatpromise welfare and the protection of faith are especially attractive.

The target of HTI’s ideologization is not only issues with political and moralnuances but also those with the least relevance to ideology such as natural disasters.In a press release, HTI expressed its condolences to the victims; however, hostility tothe secular system was not left out:

This disaster teaches a lesson of how weak human beings are in front of Allah.Therefore, we must ask ourselves whether it is proper for us to maintain ourdisobedience to the laws of Allah. These repeated disasters must increase our obedienceto Allah by throwing away secular-capitalist systems that have been driving us awayfrom sharia. (HTI, Pernyataan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia tentang Bencana Alam diBerbagai tempat di Indonesia).

HTI’s ideologization rhetoric characterizes its unique identity and develops animage of a genuine struggle, clarity, and intellectualism. It presents a clear platformand strategy of political Islamism. However, it can also develop an image ofoveremphasizing the ideological aspect, especially on issues such as natural disastersthat have the least ideological impetus. HTI’s overemphasis on its ideologicalmessage is also at the expense of spiritual content. Religious events such as Iedal-Fitr, Isra’ Mi’raj, Ramadhan, and Muharram are used by HTI to justify thenecessity of the caliphate. In the recent rise of religiosity among all segments ofMuslims, HTI has lost an opportunity to mobilize its social base, especially inmeeting the spiritual thirst of Muslims. Spiritual services are offered by non-politicalIslamic groups such as the televangelist Aa Gym’s Menejemen Qolbu, Sufi orders,Jemaah Tabligh and Salafi movements. HTI is no match for these groups in fillingthis public spiritual need. As long as the government provides security for thisspiritual activity, it is unlikely that these Muslim spiritual devotees will be attractedby HTI’s anti-systemic message.

Conclusion

The critical question is how HTI will develop in the future. Will it maintain itsmandated peaceful revolution for the installation of a caliphate or will it follow otherIslamists working within the secular system to enforce incremental reforms?

An effective revolutionary movement if carried out in a non-violent mannerneeds to undermine two components of the legitimacy of the present system,including consensual support for and the functioning of the present polity. In thiseffort, a revolutionary movement is required to build a cross-group coalition ofdissenters to the present polity that is ideologically mobilized by a common desire forthe implementation of shared values. Only after such massive support for an

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alternative system occurs, can a revolutionary change be expected. HTI’s stagedmovement methodology reflects a desire to implement this process.

But in contrast to this ideal, some evidence suggests that HTI is moving awayfrom a revolutionary direction. First, in its effort to gain resonance in a widerMuslim public, there is a lack of criticism of Islamic political parties and groups thatattempt incremental reforms by working through the secular system. HTI has alsoplayed a key role in reformist Islamic rallies that demand the state’s intervention inenforcing conservative Islamic values such as banning Ahmadiyah and pornography.This is an implicit recognition of the capacity of the present system. Moreover, theincreasing use of the term ‘sharia’ beside, and sometimes as an alternative to,‘khilafah’ indicates the ambiguity of HTI in dealing with the competing ways ofreplacing and reforming the system. The tolerance of ‘reformist Islamists’ betrays thecommand of the founder of its original organization, Hizb ut-Tahrir, on the need forthe movement to challenge uncompromisingly all incompatible ideologies.Practically, this development reduces the ability of HTI to challenge the legitimacyof the existing system at the level of popular support.

Second, HTI declares its exclusive struggle in an extra-parliamentary politicalactivity and rejects social programs. This makes it impossible for HTI to undermineanother component of the state’s legitimacy; that is, the functioning of the politicalsystem. A revolutionary movement ideally provides alternative social services andmobilizes disobedience in a way that undermines public trust in the politicalideology.

Third, although HTI promotes non-voting in elections as a part of its anti-systemic campaign, the recent statement of its spokesperson Ismail Yusanto on thepossibility of HTI participating in the elections shows the ambiguity of themovement’s stance. The failure to gain a foothold in society as a result of its focus onpolitical struggle may bring the HTI leadership to see participation in elections as theonly practical way to gain power. If this takes place, it is most likely that Indonesiandemocracy will transform HTI into a reformist movement.

The question is how far HTI can move in a reformist direction. The constantanti-systemic discourse of HTI suggests that the belief in the inherent failure of thepresent system is still prevalent. An attempt to collaborate with other groups thatadvocate partial application of sharia has created internal tension in the leadership ofthe organization. This can be seen from the discussion on the matter of joiningMuslim associations such as FUI and the rumor that Muhammad Al-Khattah hasbeen expelled from HTI because of his association with the reformist FUI.

The fundamental anti-systemic principle may lead the organization’s leadershipto seek an alternative way between revolution and reform. Such a choice mayresemble Garton Ash’s notion of ‘refolution,’ a hybrid combination of reform andrevolution, in which a large-scale transformation of the system takes place withoutoverthrowing the ruler. Assuming widespread support from society and powerfulelites, refolutionary leaders initiate coordinated peaceful transformation of theconstitution. Such a direction is reflected in the fact that, at present, HTI’s anti-systemic ideological mobilization is its most consistent revolutionary element. Thisdirection may be translated into a participating anti-systemic political party.The democratic context of Indonesia requires compromise for any social movement.The extent of willingness to compromise from HTI’s leadership will determine themore or less reformist direction of HTI. The pendulum does not move betweenrevolution and reform, but between refolution and reform. HTI development is

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likely to follow the following path: register as a political party, contest in elections,have a voice in parliament, and work from within to undermine the political systemuntil it has control of the structure and its leadership. By doing this, HTI maintainsthe hope that in the long-term future it can make a shift from reformist politics torefolutionary politics sustained by a combination of anti-systemic campaign andreformist practice. As Farideh Farhi (2003) has pointed out, ‘‘The goal is nothing;the movement is everything.’’

Notes

1. There is a debate over whether or not Nabhani even became a member of the MuslimBrotherhood (Commins, 1991, p. 194; Taji-Farouki, 1996, p. 2). I follow Al-Awaisi (1998),who claims that Nabhani was a leader of Jamiya I’tisam in Haifa. He joined anotherleader of the group in a meeting with a delegation of Muslim Brotherhood (MB) fromEgypt, in which an agreement to found MB’s branch in Palestine was reached.

2. There are several surveys assessing the numbers supporting application of sharia. Theygenerally agree on the overwhelming support of sharia. The latest survey by the Australia-based Roy Morgan Survey Company found that 52 percent of respondents answered‘‘yes’’ to the question, ‘‘Do you support the implementation of sharia in your area?’’(Shari’ah at National Law, 2008). This figure, however, does not necessarily mean supportof sharia, as understood by Islamist groups, as comprehensive law that rules all aspects oflife.

3. The association of HTI with FUI has recently created an internal issue in HTI’sleadership. There is a rumor that al-Khattath was expelled from HTI because of hisactivity at FUI. A former member of HTI said that HTI has issued an instruction to itsmembers to separate from FUI on the argument that HTI should not cooperate with otherorganizations unless HTI is predominant (O Solihin, 2008a, 2008b).

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