Between consensus and confusion: Institutional changes and … · 2019. 3. 20. · between...

BETWEEN CONSENSUS AND CONFUSION

Marikki Stocchetti FIIA BRIEFING PAPER 93 • November 2011

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

93

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND POLICY CHALLENGES

IN THE EU'S DEVELOPMENT POLICY POST-LISBON

• TheLisbonTreatyanchored theEU developmentpolicyat the forefrontof theUnion’s externalrelations.Forthedevelopmentpolicy,thisprovidesanopportunityto improveitsownroleandfunctionsinrelationtoitsowntargets,aswellasinrelationtotheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicyandthetradepolicy.

• Totakethisopportunity,theEUdevelopmentpolicyactorsneedtofindameansandavisioninthecontextofthechanginginstitutionallandscapeandtheEUdevelopmentpolicyoverhaul.

• AstrongerEUdevelopmentpolicyasapartoftheexternalrelationsequationdependsontheEUdevelopmentactors’capabilitytoactjointlyintheareaofsharedcompetency,andtodefinethepolicy’sfocusandcontentvis-à-vistheotherbranchesoftheEU’sexternalrelations.

• This isofutmost importanceinthenewinstitutionalcontextthatwasformedto implementtheLisbon Treaty.Most notably, the European External Action Service (EEAS) risks inheriting thepreviousorganizationalchallengesoftheEUdevelopmentpolicyandcreatingnewones.

• TheEUCommissionproposal‘AgendaforChange’(October2011)stillpassesuptheopportunitytopresentastrongvisionforthedevelopmentpolicyintheEU’sexternalrelationsalongthelinesoftheLisbonTreaty.WhileenhancingthecommonagendafortheCFSPandthedevelopmentpolicyisconducivetodevelopmentpolicyobjectives,itisalarmingthatthepolicyproposalturnsablindeyetotheroleoftheEUtradepolicy.

BETWEEN CONSENSUS AND CONFUSION

FIIA Briefing Paper 93

November 2011

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND POLICY CHALLENGES

IN THE EU'S DEVELOPMENT POLICY POST-LISBON

The European Union research programme

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

Marikki Stocchetti

Researcher


U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 3

Amore effective European Union in the world, amore responsible and respected global actor thatwouldplaceglobalconcernsattheveryheartofitsexternal relationsagendaandact. In essence, thiswas theexternal imageof theEU as envisioned inthe Lisbon Treaty. To this end, the EU’s develop-ment policywas devised to foster the sustainableeconomic, social and environmental developmentof developing countries,with the primary aim oferadicating poverty in the world.This endeavourwouldbeapartof thebiggerpicture inwhichthethreebranchesoftheEU’sexternalrelations–theCommon Foreign and Security Policy, the TradePolicyandtheDevelopmentPolicy–wouldideallyformacoherentandconsistentexternalfrontwithacommonsetofobjectives(Art.21).

Formany,seeingthedevelopmentissuesanchoredatthecoreofexternalrelationswasthelongoverduesignthatthedevelopmentpolicywasnowofficiallyan area ofEU policy in its own right andof equalimportance to all the other EU policies. Andwhywouldthisnotbethecase?Itwasafterallanofficiallyacknowledged fact in the Union that sustainabledevelopmentwasa long-termnecessity forglobalstabilityandthereforealsointhelong-terminterestsofEurope.Furthermore,theincreasingawarenessofthegrowingmagnitudeofglobalchallengesshouldinitselfmakethedevelopmentpolicyanindispensa-bleelementintheexternalrelationsequation.

Infact,theEUoftenpresentsitself inaveryasser-tivemannerasthekeyglobalplayerininternational

development.ThisclaimisbasedonthepositionthattheEUholds, togetherwith itsmember states,byvirtueofbeingthelargestdonorofofficialdevelop-mentassistance(ODA)intheworld1andbyconstitut-ingthebiggesttradingblockandnegotiatingpartnerformanyof thedeveloping countries. In addition,politicalcooperationwithvariousdevelopingcoun-triesandregionalgroupingshasgrownincreasinglysincetheendoftheColdWar.ThankstotheLisbonTreaty,thereisnowatreatybasetosupporttheEU’sglobalactionalongtheselines.

However,theTreatyprovisionsareonlythestartingpoint for the longroadahead.What isneeded isastrategicvisionandadequateinstitutionstoturnthespiritofLisbonintoreality.ThemainpurposeofthisbriefingpaperistoexplorethepossibilitiesaswellasthepotentialproblemsbroughtaboutbytheLisbonTreatyfromtheparticularpointofviewofthedevel-opmentpolicy.Essentially,by‘developmentpolicy’thispaperreferstoapublicpolicysectoroftheEU’spoliticalsystemthatincludesdevelopmentcoopera-tionandassistance.Inaddition,thistraditionalcon-ceptionisextendedtocoverthepolicymeasuresofotherEUpoliciesthatareexpectedtocontributetothedevelopmentpolicyobjectivesbytheEUTreaties.AsapolicyareaofsharedcompetencebetweentheEUinstitutionsandmemberstates,thedevelopment

1 TheofficialdevelopmentassistancefromtheEUconstitut-

ed56percentoftheglobalflowofODAin2008.Theshareofthe

Communityaidconstitutesabout20percentofthetotalEUaid.

Schools, roads and bridges have been built in rural areas of Peru under the PRODAPP programme. Photo: Enrique Castro Mendívil / EuropeAid.


policyconsistsof twodimensions:whatwaspriortotheLisbonTreatylabelledastheEuropeanCom-munity(EC)developmentpolicyaswellasmemberstates’ national development policies.The LisbonTreatyrefers to the formerECdevelopmentpolicyastheEUdevelopmentpolicy.Thistermaddstotheconfusionas itmasks theparallel existenceof thetwo tracksof theEU andnationalpolicies thatdefactohasnotchanged.However,inordertoformamoreunifiedEuropeanpolicy,thesetwodimensionswerebroughttogetherbyajointdevelopmentpolicystatement known as the ‘European Consensus onDevelopment’in2005.

ThefactthatthefocusoftheEUdevelopmentpolicyhasnowbeenrenegotiatedinparallelwiththeinsti-tutionalreformincreasestheimportanceofanalysisandtheneedforfurtherdebate.Thereforeourfocuswill, on the one hand, centre on the institutionalchangesthathavetakenplacerecently,aswellasontheshiftsindevelopmentpolicycontentasproposedbytheEuropeanCommission(October2011)ontheother.Regardingtheformer,thenewinstitutionalset-upfortheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP), namely theEuropeanExternalAction Ser-vice (EEAS), has raised questions of whether thissetting could also improve the EU’s developmentpolicy influenceaswellasenhancecoherenceandconsistencybetweentheEU’sexternalarms.

At the same time, the role of trade appears to bediscussedlessinthistripartiteequation.RegardingtheEUpolicycontent,thedebateisessentiallyaboutthenewfocusoftheEUdevelopmentpolicy,whichshoulddirecttheEUinstitutionsinthepost-Lisbonsituation.However,asthedevelopmentpolicyisanareaof jointcompetenceandfinancing,theroleofmemberstatesisalsocrucialinthisrespect.

Consequently, thispaper suggests that inorder tobetterunderstandtheroleofthedevelopmentpolicyinthepost-Lisbonsituation,wehavetotakeacloserlookat thedivisionofroles insharedcompetence,the thematic issues that the development policyisenvisionedtocover,aswellas thedevelopmentpolicyinrelationtotheEU’sotherexternalpolicies.As a result, our analysis is underpinned by threeinterconnectedconcepts–competence,contentandcoherence–whichwillbeappliedtostructuretheanalysisandreflect thechanges introducedbytheLisbonTreaty.

Todeepenourunderstandingofthecurrentsituation,wewillfirsttakealookattheroleofthedevelopmentpolicyintheperiodprecedingtheLisbonTreaty.Inparticular,wewillrecalltheCommission’sandtheEUmemberstates’pastexperiencesofimprovingthedevelopmentpolicy,whichledtothefirstcommonpolicyframeworkentitled‘EuropeanConsensusonDevelopment’betweentheCouncil,theCommissionandtheEuropeanParliamentin2005.Againstthisbackdrop,wewillmoveon todiscuss the currenttransition period, starting with the institutionallandscape, and then finally, the respective policychallengesinthiscontext,whichagainwillinfluencethewayinwhichtheEUdevelopmentpolicywillbeshapedinthefuture.

The European consensus on development:

Past lessons yet to be learned

Somewhat paradoxically, the long-awaited pos-sibilityofadevelopmentpolicyprofileboostbytheLisbon Treaty has been accompanied by concernsrelatingtotheroleofthispolicyintheemergingEU’sexternalpolicylandscape.Infact,thepositionofthedevelopmentpolicyintheEU’spoliticalsystemhasalwaysbeenmarkedbyadegreeofuncertaintyandconfusion. In the following,weaddress this ambi-guitysurroundingtheEU’sdevelopmentpolicybylookingattheconceptsofcompetence,contentandcoherenceinamoreconcretemanner.

Development policy competenceFirst,theverynatureofthedevelopmentpolicyasanareaofsharedcompetencehasconstitutedasourceofconfusionattheUnionlevel,aswellasintheeyesof thedevelopmentpartnercountries. Ideally, theEUdevelopmentpolicyandthememberstates’poli-cies should form an internally coherent ensemble.Inreality,thememberstatesvaryintermsoftheirrespective commitment todevelopment, selectionofpartnercountries,interestsandpreferredsectorsof cooperation.2 Sometimes, this compounds theoverlapsandgapsinthedonorframework.MemberstatesalsotendtoseetheroleoftheEuropeanCom-missionaswellastheEUdevelopmentpolicyindif-ferentways.Therefore,theattemptsto‘Europeanize’thedevelopmentpolicyhavealwaysbeenachallenge.

2 SeealsoMaurizioCarbone(2007)TheEuropeanUnionand

InternationalDevelopment:ThePoliticsofForeignAid.


Inpractice,thedebatehasrevolvedaroundbalancingbetweentheEUdevelopmentpolicyandthememberstates’owndevelopmentpolicies,theconductandcontrolofthe jointpolicyareainthedevelopmentpolicy formulation,aidpractices,aswellas imple-mentationontheground.Furthermore,witheveryroundof EU enlargement, thegeographical scopeofthissharedareaofdevelopmentcooperationhasalso increased.Consequently,theEUdevelopmentcooperation has expanded in 50 years fromWestAfrica toaglobaldevelopmentpolicyof the2000scoveringpartnercountriesfromtheLeastDevelopedCountriesto(re-)emergingpowerslikeChina.

An attempt to rationalize the co-existence of EUand member states’ own bilateral policies at thetreaty level was first made in 1993 by establish-ing specific development policy principles for theUnionasawhole.Theseprinciples,oftenreferredtoasthe‘threeCs’ofComplementarity,Cooperation,andCoherence,were latercompletedbythesetofinternationalprinciplesonaidpracticesanddonorharmonizationasenshrinedintheParisDeclarationofAidEffectivenessin2005.Inthisrespect,ahistoriclandmarkwastheadoptionofa jointdevelopmentpolicystatemententitled‘TheEuropeanConsensusonDevelopment’attheendofthesameyear.3Thisbreakthroughwas largelybasedonactive interna-tional involvement intheearly2000sbytheEuro-peanCommission and themember states.4 In fact,the content of the European Consensus reflectedmuchofwhathadalreadybeenagreedintheinter-nationalarenabytheEuropeanactorsseparately.Yetthequestionofitsfinalformulationbecameaheated

3 HereafterreferredtoasEuropeanConsensus.

4 First,therewasthebigmomentumsetinmotionbytheUN

MillenniumDevelopmentDeclarationandMillenniumDevelop-

mentGoals(MDGs)in2000toreduceworldpoverty.Thenthe

firstWTOroundofinternationaltradenegotiationswasgiven

thepromisingepithetof‘theDohaDevelopmentRound’toat-

tractdevelopingcountriestoengagemoreactivelyinworldtrade

in2001,whiletheUNJohannesburgWorldSummitonSustain-

ableDevelopment(WSSD)calledformutuallysupportivetrade,

developmentandenvironmentalpoliciesin2002.Inaddition,

tosecuresufficientandadequateresourcesforthenewdevel-

opmentefforts,theUNConferenceonFinancingforDevelop-

mentinMonterreyin2003broughtworldleaderstogetherfor

thispurpose,withnewpledgesofincreaseddevelopmentaid.To

makethebestuseofthesecommitments,theUNParisDeclara-

tiononAidEffectivenesswaslaunchedin2005.

wranglebetweentheCommissionandtheCouncilPresidency,whichwasheldbytheUKatthattime.Infact,theUKandanumberofothermemberstateswereactuallyopposedtotheideaofhavingacom-monEuropeanframeworkofanykind.

In this case the compromisewas a fortunate one.Asanendresult,consensuswasreachedondevel-opment policy objectives, values and principlesthatwouldencompassallEU developmentefforts,includingallnationalandregionalagreementsthateither the Community or an individual memberstatehas.Thestatementhastwoparts:first,acom-monpartbothfortheEuropeanCommunityandthememberstatesalike,andasecondpartdirectedattheEuropeanCommunityalone.Twoyearslater,thejointvisionwascompletedwithaCodeofConductandDivisionofLabourbetweentheEuropeanCom-missionandthememberstates.

The lessontobe learnedhere is that,first,govern-ingdevelopmentpolicy in theUnion isacomplex,multi-levelandmulti-actorissueinwhichnationalpriorities and European agendas are in constantflux.Second, thequestionof leadership inanareaof sharedcompetencehasnotbeensettledperma-nently.Therefore,itcanbeassumedthattheseissueswillplayaroleinthepost-Lisboncontextwheretheneedforconsensusandcommondirectionismorepressingthanever.Thisisourfirstlesson.

Development policy contentAnother important trend impacting developmentpolicy is itsevolvingandexpandingscope. Indeed,theEU developmentpolicy contenthas expandedsignificantly during the past decades in terms ofnew development-related thematic areas. In thehistory of EC development cooperation, develop-mentaidandtradeaspectshaveformedanintegralpart of theEC development cooperation since theTreatyofRome(1957),andlater,inparticular,haveformedpartofthepartnershipagreementsbetweentheECandtheAfrican,Caribbean,andPacificACPcountriessince1975.Thisdevelopmentpolicycoop-eration frameworkwas also the first to include apoliticaldimension(sincethemid-1995s).Justastheendof theColdWar largely facilitated thischangeof cooperation paradigm, so have global concernsfurtherblurred thedivisionbetweennational andinternational development issues. Consequently,questionsofpeaceandsecurity,humanrightsandgovernance, environment and climate change,


health, migration and various other aspects ofglobalizationhavefoundtheirwaytothecoreoftheEuropeanConsensusonDevelopmentpolicyagenda.In this respect, theConsensus stated that throughthedevelopmentpolicy,theUnioncanplayitspartinaddressingglobalchallenges.However,whatwasleft unspecified was the specific role of develop-mentcooperationvis-à-visallthesenewthematicfields.Inotherwords,wherewoulditsmandateendandotherpolicysectors’responsibilitybegin?Thisisparticularly importantfromthepointofviewofeffective and ethical development financing.Thisdebatehasyettotakeplacebeforewecanleaptoanewlevelindevelopmentpolicyinthepost-Lisboncontext.Thisisoursecondlesson.

Policy coherence for developmentClosely related to thedevelopment policy contentisthequestionoftheinterrelationshipbetweenthedevelopmentpolicyandotherEUpoliciesthatcanworkeitherinfavouroforagainstthedevelopmentpolicy objectives. In the European Consensus onDevelopment,itwasemphasizedthatdevelopmentaid and cooperationwill need support fromotherpolicysectorsinordertoachieveitsownobjectives.Tothisend,theEuropeanConsensusre-statedthatallEU policies should take intoaccount theobjec-tivesofdevelopmentcooperationwhicharelikelytoaffectdevelopingcountries.5Toputitmorebluntly,it called for the understanding that unsustainabledevelopment andworldpoverty require an activeandintegratedcontributionacrossthepolicylines.Attheveryleast,thiswouldentailtheEUrefrainingfromconductingpoliciesthatwouldriskincreasingpovertyandunsustainabilityinitspartnercountries.

In fact, the early 2000s not only saw a new kindof enthusiasm for development policy opportuni-ties among development practitioners, but alsoincreasinginterestintheEU’sexternalrelationsasawhole.Crucially,pastexperiencesremindusthatthere-discoveryof‘development’intheEU’sotherexternalpolicyagendas,mostnotablythoseoftheCFSP6andtheEU’smultilateralandbilateralexternaltradepolicies,haveentailedbothopportunitiesandrisksfortheattainmentofdevelopmentobjectives.Onthepositiveside, theopportunitiesofferscopefora‘developmentcheck’integratedintothepolicy

5 TheEuropeanConsensusonDevelopment2005:paragraph35.

6 SeeEUSecurityStrategy2003.

agendasandachancetoincreasedevelopmentpolicyimpactinasynergicway.Onagloomiernote,riskshave included a loss of clear sightedness and thecapacitytocontroldevelopmentpolicydirections.

As a matter of fact, the European Consensus onDevelopment statement also encompassed theneighbouringsectorsoftheCFSPandtradepolicies’roleindevelopment.Thereasonforthiswas,how-ever,more reactive than proactive.The post-9/11situationhadledtodiscussionsonthe‘securitization’ofdevelopmentcooperationandfearsofstretchingdevelopment funding beyond its officially defined(ODA)purposes.Justa fewmonths later, ‘develop-ment’waschosenas themainslogan toboost thewholeroundofmultilateraltradetalks,alongwithadistinctlypromisingdevelopment-orientedagendaforaction.Increasingly,andespeciallysincethefirstsetbacks in theEU position in theDohaRound in2003,theEUhaslaunchedanumberofbilateralfreetradeinitiativeswithdevelopingcountriescoveringthemajorityoftheWTOmembers.

TheEuropeanConsensusonDevelopmentwasalsoa response to these trends. In the name of policycoherencefordevelopment,securityandtradeissueswere transferred to thecoreof theEuropeanCon-sensusonDevelopment. In fact, thecross-cuttingissuesforthepost-Lisbonerawerealreadyincludedthere:goodgovernance,democracy,humanrights,and conflict resolution, together with the tradepolicyobjectivesofdismantlingprotectionismunderthetradeliberalizationethos.However,asabroadpolicystatement,theEuropeanConsensusfailedtoset thedevelopmentpolicycriteria todirect thesepolicies. Inasense,thiswasnotevenintendedashighhopeswerepinnedontheexpectedoutcomesofthemultilateralandbilateraltradetalks.DuetotheCommunity competence in trade, these processeswereledbyDGTrade.Yet,thisdebateshouldtakeplace, especially in the current situation inwhichdevelopment results risk remaining undelivered.Thisisourthirdandfinallesson.

Inmoregeneral terms, the fact that thestatementwassignedbytheleadersofthethreeInstitutions–thePresidentsoftheCouncilandtheCommissionaswellastheEuropeanParliament–indicatedanewtypeofacknowledgementoftheimportanceofthedevelopmentpolicy.Developmentpolicyissueshad–atleastmomentarily–becomeissuesfortheUnionasawhole,andtheundertakingwasalsobroadened


toencompasstheimmediateexternalpolicies,whileimprovingthetraditional‘developmentaidpolitics’alongthelinesof internationalcommitments.ThisstatementshowedthattheEUdevelopmentpolicywasnolongermerelyaboutthepoliticsofaid.Itwasalsoacallfortheneighbouringbranchestorespond.WiththechangesbroughtaboutbytheLisbonTreaty,thetaskofclarifyingtheinterrelationsbetweenthethreeexternalbranchesisnowmorepressingthanever.

The new institutional landscape:

At the service of the development policy?

AccordingtotheLisbonTreaty,theUniondevelop-ment policy shall be conductedwithin the frame-workoftheprinciplesandobjectivesoftheUnion’sexternalaction.Atthesametime,theEUdevelop-mentcooperationpolicyandmemberstates’devel-opmentpoliciesshould‘complementandreinforceeachother’.7

Inthisrespect,theLisbonTreatydidnotchangethisbasicdivisionofcompetences,but itdoesprovideawelcomeincentivetocontinuealongthe linesofa joint European development vision as discussedabove.8 However, the relationship between the

7 TheLisbonTreaty,Article208.

8 ParisDeclarationonAidEffectiveness(2005)andthe

EuropeanConsensusonDevelopment(2005).

former ‘Community Development Policy’ and, inLisbon Treaty parlance, the ‘Union DevelopmentPolicy’andmemberstateactorsandpoliciesremainsa highly political question, as discussed above. Inaddition, the Lisbon Treaty reinforces the Unioncommitment to policy coherence for develop-ment,statingthat‘theUnionshalltakeaccountofthedevelopmentcooperationinthepoliciesthatitimplements which are likely to affect developingcountries’(Art.208).Inthissection,wewillanalysethecurrentinstitutionalstructureattheserviceofthesecommitments.Inparticular,wewilllookattheinstitutionsthatexercisethepowerto initiateandimplement thedevelopment policy.These includetheEuropeanCommissionandtheCouncilaswellastheroleofthenewactor,theEuropeanExternalAction Service. The paper also acknowledges thestrengthenedroleoftheEuropeanParliament,par-ticularlyintheconclusionof internationaltreatieswithdevelopmentimpact.9

Asalways,themainchallengeslieintheprocessoftransformingtheintentionsenshrinedintheTreatyprovisions into everyday politics. In this regard,theroleofadequateinstitutionsandthedivisionoflabourbetweentheactorsisevermorecrucial.Fromthedevelopmentpolicypointofview,thenewinsti-tutionalstructureandrespectivechangesagainpose

9 OnthenewfunctionsoftheEuropeanParliament,including

tradeandagriculturalpolicies,seeTiilikainen,Teija:FIIABrief-

ingPaper91,November2011.

Nicaraguan primary school pupils waving EU flags.

Nicaragua is a major recipient of EU development

funding in Latin America. Photo: EuropeAid.


bothchallengesandopportunities.Tosecurethebestoutcome,itismorethanjustifiabletousethelever-agesthatalreadyexist,whiledevelopingthoseinthemaking.Inthisregard,itmightbeusefultoconsulttheEuropeanConsensusonDevelopmentstatementwhich,asitisstillinforce,hasrepresentedahistoricinter-institutionalcommitmenttowardsthedevel-opmentpolicyanditsobjectivestogaintheappro-priatepoliticalwillinatimeoftransition.Itisequallyimportanttoensurethattheprinciplesrelatedtothedevelopmentpolicy (namelyAidEffectivenessandtheAccraAgendaofAction),aswellastheprinciplesconcerningtheinterrelationshipbetweentheexter-nalpolicies(PolicyCoherenceforDevelopment)areadoptedacrosstheinstitutionalboard.ItiscrucialtohavetheappropriatenormsinplacetosafeguardthevaluesthattheEUissupposedtopromote.

The European External Action Service: Cutting across competences and policy coherenceAstheestablishmentoftheEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS)hasinitselfbecometheinstitutioninwhichthespiritoftheLisbonTreatyiscrystallized,itsfunctionsarethereforeofutmostimportanceforthe development policy at theUnion level. By itsveryrationale,itshouldbeanaturalcandidateforaleadingroleinthisrenewedandenlargedConsensus.TheEEAS shouldnotbeseensolelyasa fruitofEUforeignpolicy reform, but as a reformof externalrelations by and large. Starting from the highestsphere–theHighRepresentativeforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicywithherinstitutionalfunctionsastheVicePresidentoftheCommissionandChairoftheForeignAffairsCouncil–highhopeshavebeenpinnedontheabilityofthesefunctionstobreathenewlifeintotheconsistency(Art.22)andcoherenceofexternalaction,particularlywhenitcomestotheobjectivesofthedevelopmentpolicy(Art208).

Ideally, by virtue of its leadership, the EEAS issituatedatthecoreofthe institutionalpatchwork.However,theEEASis,inessence,anadministrativestructureattheserviceofpolicy-makers.Butwherethe European development policy is concerned,policy-makingseemstobeparticularlycomplexasthestruggleoverdevelopmentpolicyleadershipandshared competencehasnot yet beenpermanentlyresolvedamongtheEUinstitutionsandbetweentheEUandnational levels.Inaddition,muchdependson howwell the institution itselfwill perform inachievingthedevelopmentobjectives.

Inthisrespect,theEEAS’sroleiscrucial.Itsimpactextends from Brussels to the EU delegations onthe ground. In addition, theEEAS builds linkagesbetweentheEUinstitutions.Regardingtheformer,thedevelopmentexpertisewithin theEEASbuildson the former Commission’s External RelationsServices(DGRELEX)andthosepartsofDGDevelop-mentthatweretransferredandintegratedintotheEEAS.Albeitovershadowedbyadegreeofambiguityin the final division of labour and responsibilities,theEEAS,togetherwithitsextendedarmoftheEUdelegations in developing partner countries, is inchargeofconductingtheEU’sexternalrelationsontheground.ThisfactisparticularlyinterestingfromtheEUdevelopmentpolicypointofview,asduringrecentyearsmorepowerhasbeendelegated fromBrusselstothedelegationslevelsoastoimprovetheefficiency and impact of theCommissiondevelop-mentpolicyinthecountrycontext.NowinchargeoftheEUdelegationsinthirdcountries,theEEASisnot only leadingdiplomacy andpolitical dialogue,butalsothestrategicplanningandprogrammingofdevelopmentassistanceacrosstheglobe.

Although the original purpose of theEEASwas tounify the EU’s external presentation and policies,what iscurrentlyworthnoting is the fact that theEU delegations under theEEAS includeEEAS andCommissiondelegatesaswellasnationaldiplomatsalike.However, from thedevelopmentpolicyper-spective, the uncertainty of specific developmentexpertiseandreadinesstoalignwiththeEU’sownaswellasinternationaldonorpracticessuchastheParisDeclarationanditsPrinciplesonAidEffective-ness,hasbecomeamajorconcernfordevelopmentpractitionersinEurope.Thisiscrucialbecausesincethe Lisbon Treaty, the EEAS also largelymanagesthefinancialinstrumentsfordevelopmentfunding.These include substantial geographically dividedenvelopesfortheEuropeanDevelopmentFund(EDF)for79African,CaribbeanandPacificcountries,theDevelopmentCooperation Instrument (DCI) for47countries, togetherwith theEuropeanNeighbour-hoodandPartnershipInstrument(ENPI)withEast-ernEuropeanandSouthernMediterraneancountries.

However,theEEAS’scounterpartintheCommission,theDGDEVCO,whichaftertheestablishmentoftheEEAS isbasedon the formerDGDevelopmentandEuropeAid,isstillinchargeoftheimplementationofEC development cooperation, and theplanningand programming of thematic development aid.


By virtue of this re-organization under the EEAS,theEUscopeappearstrulyglobal,yetgeographicallystructuredwithinoneinstitutionalstructure.Ontheflip-side,itseemsthatthedevelopmentpolicycycle,includingplanning,programming,implementationand evaluation, risks being divided between twoinstitutionalentitiesasinthepast,namelythefor-merDGsofRELEXandDevelopment.

Inaddition, the internaldivisionofregionaldirec-torates revealshistorical andpolitical dissemblingwhenitcomestotheAfrican,CaribbeanandPacific(ACP) group. While rational from the EU as wellas from the regionalizationpointofview, theACPcountriesmayinterpretthisasafurtherdeteriora-tionof theirpositionas thesecountrieshavenow,afterfourdecadesofinstitutionalizedACP-EUcoop-eration,beendividedbetweentheSub-Saharan(yetalso in chargeof thehorizontalACP issues), LatinAmerican and the Caribbean and Asian, CentralAsianandPacificStates.

Intriguingly, the inter-institutional ACP-EU rela-tionship has constituted a contested but concretebackbone to the historically specific constellationof thepastLoméConventions (1975-2000)aswellas currently under the Cotonou ACP-EU partner-ship 2000-2020. In the post-Lisbon landscape,theCommissionhasclearlyopted foraglobal andregionalapproach in thedevelopmentpolicywithlessemphasisontheACPgroupasapoliticalgroupand as a potential counterforce. The EuropeanParliament, however, hasmaintained theACP-EUinter-institutional featureswhile supervising andinfluencingEU development policy – increasinglyalsoonpolicycoherencefordevelopment–throughtheCommitteeonDevelopment(DEVE).

Tosummarize,whilethemergerofDGdevelopmentandEuropeAidandtheglobalextensionofthescopewas good news for the development community,there are still a number of issues to be resolved.The remaining ambiguity resides in twoplaces: inthe interrelationship between the EEAS and theDGDEVCO,andbetweentheEEASandthememberstates’roles.Regardingtheformer,itisasyetunclearwhetheritshouldbethedevelopmentCommissionerthathas theoverall responsibility for thisexerciseof strategic planning of EC development coopera-tion,andhowthememberstatesaregoingtoalignthemselvestothesenewstructures.Inthisrespect,theinformalInter-ServiceQualitySupportGroupof

theCommission,whichusedtoharmonizethepoli-ciesandpracticesbetweentheCommissionexternalservices’DGs,couldalsoplayaroleinthischangedsettingasawatchdogfortheimplementationoftheprinciplesandpracticesattheBrusselslevel.

YetanotherfeatureoftheEEASandDGDEVCOhastodowiththeEU’sincreasingemphasisonbudgetsupport as a development assistance instrument,which highlights the importance of developmentexpertiseatthedelegations’end.Thisisduetothenecessaryassessmentprocedureswhichdeterminewhether budget support is applicable in a givencountrycontext.AccordingtotheCommission,thestaffresourcesatthedelegationshavetobereviewed.Therefore,theCommissionproposessettingupsen-iorregionalteamsatHeadquartersandDelegationsthatwouldconsistofrelevantCommissionDGsandtheEEAS.Theseteamswouldthenconsultandcoop-eratewiththememberstates.10

Regarding theEEAS andmember states’ roles, theEuropeanConsensusonDevelopmentshowedthatapolicyofsharedcompetencewouldbenefit fromajointvision.Inthecurrentinstitutionalsituation,although the European Consensus is still formallyvalid,theEuropeanCommissioninparticularfearsthat the buried bones of contention will surfaceagain.Theriseofnationalandmoreforeignpolicy-dominated interestswithin theEEASmay lead topost-Lisbon confusion, rather than to a renewedconsensus.Inthisrespect,thenewactorinthefieldmaycomplicatetheissueofsharedcompetence.

Onamorepositivenote,thechangesonthegroundat the delegations’ level provide the opportunityforclosercoordinationandEUdevelopmentpolicythroughtheEEAS axis. In turn, thiswillcreateanopeningforimprovingtheacknowledgedsynergiesbetweentheforeignandsecuritypolicyanddevel-opment.Thismightcomeinhandy,especiallyinthecontextoffragilestates.Tothisend,theCommissionhasintroducedajoined-upapproachtosecurityandpoverty.11Thesuccessfulimplementationofsuchanapproachwouldbehighlywelcomedfromthepolicycoherenceperspective.Alsoinmoregeneralterms,thetimeisindeedripetopromotegovernanceand

10 EuropeanCommissionCOM(2011)684final.‘TheFuture

ApproachtoEUBudgetSupporttoThirdCountries’.

11 Ibid.11-12.


democracyaswellasconflictresolutionintheafter-mathoftheArabSpring,whichaugurswellforthisagendaandtheEUinstitutionspromotingit.

WhiletheCFSPandthedevelopmentpolicywillnowbemore closely interconnected by the new struc-tureasdevelopmentandtheCFSParenowhousedtogether,theEEAS-DGDEVCOlinkageisessentialforthe incorporationof theCommissionandexternaltradeaspectsintothisequation.Thisisparticularlythe case as the international context seems evenmore demanding of the development and tradeaspects because the global processes – especiallywithregardto the tenyearsof international tradenegotiations–havebeenmarkedbymajordifficul-ties.

To the disappointment ofmany, the Doha Roundhas verymuch lost its ‘development’ course overthe years. Even more alarmingly, the EU’s ownbilateraltradenegotiations,especiallyregardingtheSubSaharanAfricaninterimEconomicPartnershipAgreements (EPAs), have largely failed to delivermutually satisfactory results. This is particularlyalarming in terms of the common objectives forexternalrelationsthattheLisbonTreatyaimstopro-mote, namely themultilateral abolition of restric-tions in international trade and the integrationof its developing country partners into theworldeconomy(Art.21)throughbalancedtraderulesandarrangements.Atthesametime,increaseddevelop-ment fundinghas been allocatedprecisely for theimprovementofthetradingcapacityindevelopingcountriesundertheAidforTradedevelopmentfunds(€10.4billionin2008).Eventhoughsupportforthetrade sector is crucial in itself, without enablinglocal,national,regionalandglobaltradingenviron-ments,theimpactoftheaidwillinevitablyremainmorelimited.

Thejuryisstilloutonthedegreetowhichtheobjec-tivesoftheseotherEUpolicieswereactuallyrecon-ciledwiththedevelopmentgoalsasmoreanalysisand understanding is needed to grasp the biggerpicture.Atthesametime,thechallengealsoresideswithintheCommission,as inthisnewsettingtheneedtosafeguardtheinternalcohesionoftheCom-missionmaybe evengreater thanbefore.Despitethejointexternalobjectives,inpolicynegotiationsthe devil is often in the detail.This is importantbecause the Commission unity de facto requirescompromises thatmaynotbe thefirstchoices for

the development policy. This will be the litmustestforthesingleinterlocutorfortheEEASandallCommissionDGs,especiallyforthosewithexternaldevelopment impact. As the Commission view isnegotiated through the process of inter-serviceconsultation, one possible yet controversial waywouldbeto increasethetransparencyof thispro-cess.AnotherimportantentrypointhereisalreadyprovidedbytheLisbonTreaty,namelythenewroleoftheEuropeanParliamentasaco-legislatorinthetradepolicy.

The Council and the Foreign Affairs CommitteeAtthesametimeasthedebatehaslargelycentredontheEEAS,theorganizationoftheCouncilstructureshasreceivedlessattention.Here,themostrelevantcouncil fortheinternationaldevelopmentissuesistheForeignAffairsCouncil(FAC).ConsistingoftheCFSP,tradeanddevelopmentpolicyandchairedbythe High Representative, it would offer a naturalnicheforcross-sectoralcoordinationanddirection.Inaddition,developmentministersalsomeeteverysixmonths in the informal Development Council.However, a lot hinges on how the understandingofconsistencyandcoherencewillbebuiltintothepreparationoftheFACagendas.Forthispurpose,the‘issuewithdevelopmentimpact’thatcharacterizedthepracticeofthepreviousCouncilagendashouldbemaintained.

It is equally important to look at the organizationof the Council work at the Working Group level.InordertoconsolidatetheroleoftheEEAS inthiscontext,adevelopmentcooperationandcoordina-tionunitwasestablished for theEEAS asapartofthe Multilateral Relations and Global Governanceorganizationalline.Withthisentitynowinplace,itishopedthatthepreviouslyverylimitedexchangebetweenthethematicCouncilworkinggroupswillimprove.

Another interesting changewhichmerits a closerlook and future analysis is the role that remainsfor therotatingEUpresidency in thisnewsetting.Before the Lisbon Treaty, itwas of utmost impor-tancefordevelopmentcooperationwhichmemberstatewasinthedriver’sseatandleadingtheagenda.WiththeadventoftheLisbonTreaty,thisfunctionis set to diminish. Intriguingly, the only externalrelationsworkinggroupsthatarestillchairedbytheCouncilPresidencyarethoseofdevelopmentcoop-eration(CODEV)andtheACPgroup.


Development policy focus post-Lisbon:

A new policy agenda for change?

AnadditionalchallengeforthedevelopmentpolicyliesinthefactthattheEUdevelopmentpolicycon-tentisundergoingchangesinlinewiththeinstitu-tionaltransformations.Inthispost-Lisbonsituation,it is particularly important to get it right so as todemonstratethatthedevelopmentpolicyhasboththepracticalwisdomandtheintellectualrigourtofitinwiththeEU’sexternalfront.Tothisend,theCommission launched itsGreenPaperentitled ‘EUDevelopmentPolicyinSupportofInclusiveGrowthandSustainableDevelopment:IncreasingtheImpactofEUDevelopmentPolicy’andinitiatedaconsulta-tionprocessforallinterestedstakeholders(Novem-ber2010- January2011).Thiskindof consultationpractice was already applied when the EuropeanConsensusonDevelopmentdebatewaslaunchedin2005.However,thistimetheCommissioninitiativeandtheGreenPaperweregreetedwithmixedemo-tionsthatclearlyreflectthecomplexitiesembeddedin theEU developmentpolicy.At theheartof thematterwas again the rather undefined identity ofthedevelopmentpolicyasacollectiveundertakingoftheUnion,aswellasitsplaceinitsexternalpolicypuzzle.

Somewhatparadoxically, theCommission’sGreenPaperseemedtoargueinfavouroftheefficiencyofdevelopmentaid in timesoffinancial crisis,whileat the same time downplaying the importance ofdevelopmentaidperse.Certainly,itisofparamountimportancetocontinueimprovingtheEU’sforeignaidpractices,aswellas toassess thedevelopmentpolicy in thewider context.What is stillmissing,however,isacommonunderstandingofwhetherthedevelopmentpolicyisapolicysectorinitsownrightand,ifso,whatelementsitneedstoincludeinaddi-tion to the traditional development aid.Whereasthe idea that the developmentpolicy shouldhavea facilitating and enabling function in the partnercountrieswaswelcomed,theunclearpolicyimageinrelationtotheotherEUpolicieswasregardedasarisk.Thus,perhapsthebiggestquestionwaswhethertheEUisreadytothinkoutsidetheboxofsectoraldivisionandacceptthatconsistencyandcoherencewould also be defined from the point of view ofdevelopmentobjectives.

Inthisrespect,theoverallaimoftheGreenPaperwasnotclearfromtheoutset.Althoughitsstatedpurpose

was to teaseout thedebateandtherebyshapetheplannedCommissionproposal, itwasuncertain towhatextenttheGreenPaperwasdesignedtoreformthedevelopmentpolicystartingfromthepremisesofthedevelopmentpolicyfield,orwhetherithadalargermandatetoadjustthedevelopmentpolicytothefunctionsoftheUnionatlarge.ThesimilarityintheapproachsuggeststhelatterasreferencestotheEU-2020strategywerequiteevident.However,thelinkagestotheEuropeanConsensusonDevelopmentstatementwerestrategicallylesslucidandrecogniz-able,whichwasratheralarmingfromthedevelop-mentpolicyreformperspective.Also,thequestionofthefutureoftheconsensuswasleftopenatthatinitialstageoftheconsultation.

Interestingly, the resulting Commission proposalentitled‘IncreasingtheImpactofEUDevelopmentPolicy:anAgendaforChange’(October2011),takesasitsstartingpointthat‘theLisbonTreatyhasfirmlyanchored development policywithin EU externalaction’.ThestatedpurposeoftheCommissionpro-posalwasnottochallengetheEuropeanConsensusonDevelopmentbuttoadjusttheEUdevelopmentpolicytothepost-Lisbonrealitieswith‘arightpolicymix’ to correspondwithpartner countries’needs.At the same time, theproposal argues that theEUdevelopmentpolicyhastofocusonpartnercountrieswhereitcanhavethegreatestimpact,andconcen-tratedevelopmentcooperationinsupportofthekeyareasthatformanexuswiththeotherbranchesoftheexternalrelations.Mostevidently,thepriority-setting reflects this in terms of ‘good governance’(includinghumanrights,democracy,theruleoflawandotheraspects)aswellas ‘inclusivegrowth forhuman development’.12When comparedwith theGreenPaper,thefocusongovernancehasincreasedinrelativeimportance.Atthisstage,onecanassumethattheArabSpringaswellastheincreasinginflu-enceoftheEEASmaywellexplainthis.Inaddition,theCommissionunderlinesthatthepursuitoftheseobjectives should be supported by differentiateddevelopmentpartnerships, coordinatedEU action

12 TheproposedEUfocusoninclusivegrowthisdefinedasbe-

ingbasedonlong-termpovertyreduction,andgrowthpatterns

andratesbasedonpeople’sparticipationwealthandjobcreation.

Thekeyareasinclude,firstly,socialprotection,health,educa-

tionandjobs;secondly,businessenvironment,regionalintegra-

tionandworldmarkets;and,thirdly,sustainableagricultureand

energy.COM(2011)637final.


betweenBrusselsandthememberstates,aswellasimprovedcoherenceamongEUpolicies.

In this respect, thecentral rolegiven to the largergovernance agenda in development is welcomebecause of its fundamental importance, its clearbasis in the EuropeanConsensus onDevelopmentstatement, aswell as evident synergic linkages tothe CFSP. The prerequisite is, however, that thedevelopmentactorsandtheircounterpartsarereadytocooperateacross thesectorsandhavesufficientresourcestomakeaninformedanalysis,andthewilltosupporttheseviewsfromthedevelopmentpart-nershipperspective.

WhenitcomestotheEU tradepolicyinthisequa-tion,however,theoppositeisunfortunatelythecase.In fact, the trade dimension of the Commission’sAgenda for Change is alarmingly weak. Whereasin theEuropeanConsensusonDevelopment tradewasseenasthemostimportantsectorfordevelop-ment,inthisCommission’sproposal,thisaspecthasbeenalmostcompletelyignored.Thisisparticularlysurprisingasthedevelopmentpolicy’stradevisionis crucial to the proposed ‘inclusive growth para-digm’,aswellastothedevelopmentpolicyobjectiveof‘fosteringsustainableeconomicdevelopment’atlarge. In lightof this, theEU’sstatedemphasisonpolicycoherencefordevelopmentislackingoneoftheexternalrelationsdimensions.Whatisneededisanintegratedanalysisofpolicycoherencefordevel-opmentand theEU developmentpolicyon ‘inclu-sivegrowth’soastopointoutwhatkindofpolicychangesandadditionalmeasuresarerequiredfromtheEUtradepolicyinordertosupportdevelopment.

The global context in which the EU operates isbecomingincreasinglydemanding.Thispapercon-cludesthat it iscrucialthattheinstitutionalstruc-turesfacilitateboththedevelopmentpolicyperse,aswellasthewideragendaofexternalrelationsinthisrespect.Although the closer relationshipbetweendevelopmentandforeignaffairsmaybeaflourishingone,turningablindeyetotraderisksparalyzingtheexternal relations provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.What isneeded is anEU developmentpolicywiththevisionandthewill toencompassbothaspects,soastotrulycontributetoacoherentEUactionintheworld and, eventually, to development policyobjectives.ThatwouldreallyconstituteanAgendaforChange.


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