Benjafield. Revisiting Wittgenstein on Koehler & Gestalt Psychology (Article)

REVISITING WITTGENSTEIN ON KHLER AND GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY

JOHN G. BENJAFIELD

In an article in this journal, Nicholas Pastore rejected Ludwig Wittgensteins critique ofWolfgang Khler and Gestalt psychology. Pastore appears not to have appreciatedWittgensteins argument that Khler mistook conceptual questions for factual ones. A simi-lar confusion seems to underlie at least some aspects of contemporary neuroscience. Be thatas it may, Wittgenstein has had minimal influence on the research practices of psychologistswhile Khler remains influential. This outcome would not have surprised Wittgenstein, whopredicted that scientists would not see his work as relevant to theirs. 2008 WileyPeriodicals, Inc.

Nicholas Pastore (19161998) was a deeply knowledgeable student of the psychology ofperception (Winnick, 2001). His history of the nativism-empiricism controversy in perception(Pastore, 1971) has been cited continuously since its publication (e.g., Allik & Konstabel,2005). Pastore (1991) published an article in this journal considering some of LudwigWittgensteins (18891951) remarks on Wolfgang Khler (18871967) and Gestalt psychol-ogy. Pastores paper was an important illustration of the way in which Wittgensteins philoso-phy has tended to be assimilated by those psychologists who have taken an interest in it.

PASTORES CRITIQUE OF WITTGENSTEIN

Pastore focused on Wittgensteins treatment of reversible figures such as the famousduck-rabbit (Figure 1; Brugger, 1999; Kihlstrom, 2006), versions of the Necker cube (Figures 2and 3) and the double cross (Figure 4). Figures such as these were used by Wittgenstein toillustrate how seeing a figure in one way (e.g., as a duck) can change into another way of see-ing the same figure (e.g., as a rabbit). Pastore observed that Khler did not think that sensoryorganization was determined by learning in any essential way. By contrast, we haveWittgensteins (1958, p. 207) statement that you only see the duck rabbit aspects if you arealready conversant with the shape of those two animals. Pastore (1991, p. 349) concludedthat Wittgenstein did not fully appreciate Khlers rejection of empiricism, and thatWittgensteins objections to Khler . . . are . . . unfounded.

Pastore did not claim that Khler was a nativist, as indeed he should not. The Gestaltpsychologists were not nativists (Henle, 1977/1986). As Pastore (1971, p. 269) correctlyobserved, the Gestalt psychologists were opposed to both nativism and empiricism as theseterms are usually understood. For them, perceptual organization is governed by the same lawsthat regulate all phenomena and does not require an evolutionary explanation. Fromthe standpoint of physics one feels at once inclined to conceive of the processes underlyingperception as a dynamic pattern that comes into existence in some field of the brain (Khler,1930/1971a, p. 240).

Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 44(2), 99118 Spring 2008Published online in Wiley Interscience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/jhbs.20301 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

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JOHN G. BENJAFIELD is Professor Emeritus at Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario. His researchinterests have included aesthetics, the history of the English language, and personal cognition. Both hisHistory of Psychology (2nd ed., 2005) and Cognition (3rd ed., 2007) were published by Oxford UniversityPress. Send correspondence to John Benjafield, 83 Glenridge Avenue, St. Catharines, ON, L2R 4X2,Canada, (905) 6856039. E-mail: [email protected]

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As the preceding quotation shows, Khler believed that psychological facts have physio-logical correlates, a notion that Pastore says is supported by a considerable body of evidence(p. 343). Most neuropsychologists would surely agree, but Wittgenstein (1980a, p. 160) won-dered, Why should there not be a psychological regularity to which no physiological regular-ity corresponds? By asking such a question, said Pastore (1991, p. 343), Wittgenstein hadengaged in magical thinking.

Generally speaking, Pastore did not think much of Wittgensteins remarks, observingthat Wittgenstein does not formulate an explicit theory of seeing, and there is no appeal tothe empirical investigations by psychologists and physiologists (1991, p. 344). Moreover,the systematic exposition of an argument is absent and the justification or intended signifi-cance of some remark is not evident (1991, p. 343). Finally, Wittgensteins philosophy ofpsychology expresses a pronounced hostility toward psychology as a science. This is evidentin his unusual ideas about physiological explanation (1991, p. 343).

Pastores view of Wittgenstein was particularly striking because it came from someonesteeped in the tradition of experimental psychology and contrasted sharply with the views ofmany of those whose backgrounds were in philosophy. Indeed, Pastore (1991, p. 351) appearedto discount the objections of Wittgensteinian philosophers (e.g., Budd, 1989; Stromberg,1980) to Khlers psychology because they were philosophical.

One purpose of the present paper is to see if there might not be more to the philosophicalcritique of Khler than Pastore allowed. In particular, recent scholarship on both Wittgenstein andGestalt psychology allows us to better appreciate the breadth and complexity of Wittgensteinsanalysis. Pastore focused on the contrasting approaches to reversible figures taken byWittgenstein and Khler. We will also consider their contrasting approaches to memory (Bennett& Hacker, 2003, p. 161f; Hark, 1995; Schulte, 1992, p. 114f). These two topics are intertwined.Finally, we will consider the possibility that Wittgensteins famous remark about psychologysbarrenness may have been justified.

Wittgenstein was not hostile toward psychological science as such (e.g., Hark, 1990,1995). Indeed, while a student at Cambridge, Wittgenstein collaborated on an experiment onthe perception of rhythm that he presented to a meeting of the British Psychological Societyin 1912 (McGuinness, 1990, p. 128). However, he did not think that Gestalt psychology ingeneral and Khlers research program in particular were going in fruitful directions.Moreover, Wittgensteins attitude toward Gestalt psychology was colored by his profound pes-simism about the drift of modern times, particularly with respect to its scientism (Monk,1991, pp. 484486). Wittgenstein took scientism to be the smug and unexamined assurancethat what wants explanation is obvious, and that scientific tools are immediately applicable.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES DOI: 10.1002/jhbs

Figures 1 (the duck-rabbit), 2 and 3 (versions of the Necker cube), and 4 (the double cross). From N. Pastore.(1991). Wittgenstein on Khler and Gestalt psychology. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 27, 344.

(1) (2)(4)(3)

FIGURES. 14

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For Wittgenstein, scientism is just as misguidedly metaphysical as traditional, more transpar-ently a prioristic, approaches (Goldfarb, 1989, p. 637).

It may seem odd for Gestalt psychology to be construed as scientistic, since many psy-chologists of the day did not even think it was scientific (e.g., Watson, 1930/1962, p. 1).However, the Gestalt psychologists attempts to extend the reach of science to cover everyconceivable aspect of human affairs including aesthetic and other values (e.g., Khler,1938/1959) allowed it to be seen as scientistic (Harrington, 1996, p. 123). Although some as-pects of Gestalt psychology may have been attractive to Wittgenstein (Hark, 1995), its scien-tistic aspects provided a natural target for him.

WITTGENSTEINS CONNECTIONS TO KHLER AND THE BERLIN SCHOOL OFGESTALT PSYCHOLOGY

Khler, Max Wertheimer (18801943), and Kurt Koffka (18861941) were the triumvi-rate most closely identified with what came to be called the Berlin school of Gestalt psy-chology. Khler was appointed director of the Psychological Institute there in 1922 (Ash,1995, p. 203). According to Hark (1995, p. 116), Wittgenstein was familiar with several ofKhlers works, including The Mentality of Apes (1927/1956), Gestalt Psychology (1947), ThePlace of Value in a World of Facts (1938/1959), and Dynamics in Psychology (1940/1960).Hallet (1977, p. 691) suggested that Wittgenstein may also have read Koffkas (1935)Principles of Gestalt Psychology. Whether Wittgenstein ever read anything by Wertheimer isunknown, but it would not be surprising if he had not, since Wertheimer did not publish agreat deal during his lifetime.

If we only consider Wittgensteins connections to Khler and Koffka, we can easily seethat they shared quite a bit of common ground. A complete investigation of their mutual ac-quaintances would go beyond the scope of this paper, but the following examples will suffice.Each example is already well known, but they have not heretofore been presented as a whole.

Moritz Schlick (18821936) and Khler were both students of the physicist Max Planck(18581947) at the University of Berlin. Schlick completed his dissertation under Planckssupervision in 1904. Although Khler considered taking a degree in physics (Ash, 1995, p. 113),he ended up completing his dissertation in psychoacoustics under Carl Stumpf (18481936) in1909. Schlick became professor of the philosophy of the inductive sciences at the Universityof Vienna in 1922 (Mulder & Velde-Schlick, 1979, p. xi). Schlick contributed to the Gestaltpsychologists journal, Psychologische Forschung (Ash, 1995, p. 217), and was supportive ofGestalt psychology, saying that as to the psychological concept formation, it seems to mebeyond doubt that a holistic mode of presentation, such as that championed by Gestaltpsychology is the only promising one (Schlick, 1935/1979, p. 398).

Koffka completed his degree with Stumpf in 1908 and was briefly one of Oswald Klpes(18621915) research assistants in Wrzburg in 1909 (Ash, 1995, p. 110). Karl Bhler(18791963), who came to Wrzburg in 1905 (Eschbach, 1990, p. xviii), was also one ofKlpes research assistants (Weimer, 1974, p. 250). Bhler and his wife Charlotte MalachowskiBhler (18931974) later became prominent members of the Viennese psychological scene,with Karl becoming the Director of the Psychological Institute there in 1922 (Ash, 1987;Brock, 1994).

In 1927, Schlick and Karl and Charlotte Bhler were invited to tea by Wittgensteins sis-ter Margarete Stonborough (18821958), in order to be introduced to Wittgenstein (Engelmann,1967, p. 188). For a picture of the sumptuous surroundings within which tea was taken, seeWijdeveld (2000, p. 69). Schlick, who would become widely known as the leader of the

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Vienna Circle group of philosophers of science, had long been desirous of such a meetingbecause of the impression that Wittgensteins (1922/1977a) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicushad made on him (McGuinness, 1967, pp. 146147). Wittgenstein subsequently agreed tomeet with Schlick and a few other members of the Circle on a regular basis (Carnap,1964/1967; Monk, 1991, p. 243).

Thus, Khler is connected to Wittgenstein through Planck and Schlick, and Koffka isconnected to Wittgenstein through Klpe and Bhler. Obviously, one does not have to playSix Degrees of Ludwig Wittgenstein (cf. Guare, 1990) for very long in order to connectKhler and Koffka to Wittgenstein. At most it requires two intermediaries to connect them.By comparison with many other social networks, Khler, Koffka, and Wittgenstein belongedto a very small world (Travers & Milgram, 1969; Watts, 2004; Watts & Strogatz, 1998) evenif they may not have known each other directly.

The Wrzburg Experiments and Wittgenstein

The connections among Klpe, Karl Bhler, and Wittgenstein are worth elaboratingfurther. Together with other members of the Wrzburg group, Klpe was responsible for con-ducting experiments in which participants were given tasks after which they reported theexperiences they had while carrying them out (e.g., K. Bhler, 1908/1951; Klpe, 1912/1964).Such experiments might require the participant to come up with the meaning of a word, forexample. The experiences that participants reported were far from being clear and distinct.Often they were accompanied by no imagery whatsoever, and the participant could say littleif anything about them. What the participants were able to report did not lend itself to astraightforward categorization of mental contents. Rather, the processes involved in thinkingare not amenable to any clear-cut classification, but actually consist of experience types merg-ing one into the other with no clear line of demarcation (Humphrey, 1951/1963, p. 42).Among other things, this made it difficult to see how any theory of linguistic meaning couldbe tied directly to some sort of inner process.

Bartley (1985) and Bloor (1983) concurred that Wittgenstein made use of the Wrzburgexperiments in his later philosophy. Bloor (1983, p. 16) observed that Wittgenstein (1969, pp. 155156) described a procedure very similar to a Wrzburg experiment in which a per-son is given words from a variety of categories (e.g., house, dynamo) and asked to indicate ineach case whether or not the word was understood. The person then tried to describe the ex-periences that accompanied the process of understanding or the lack of it. This descriptionfollowed closely that given by Klpe (1912/1964, pp. 209210) of the experimental procedurethat came to be called retrospection. In commenting on the results of such a procedure,Wittgenstein (1969, p. 156) noted that it will elicit a wide variety of experiences including alarge class of cases in which I remember experiences (sensations, thoughts) which, as I shouldsay, had nothing to do with the word at all. In another context, Wittgenstein (1974, p. 45) statedflatly that The psychological processes which are found by experience to accompany sentencesare of no interest to us.

GOETHE, WITTGENSTEIN, AND GESTALT THEORY

Scientific questions may interest me, but they never really grip me. Only conceptual &aesthetic questions have that effect on me. At bottom it leaves me cold whether scientificproblems are solved; but not those other questions. (Wittgenstein, 1998a, p. 91)

In addition to the connections discussed in the previous section, there were other influ-ences that helped Wittgenstein frame his exploration of Gestalt psychology. One of these was



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Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (17491832), who is best known in the history of psychologyfor his studies of color (Boring, 1942, pp. 112116; Goethe, 1840/1970). Goethes work oncolor was central to Wittgensteins (1977b) own investigations of that topic (Horner, 2000).Equally important was Goethes (1790/1995) Metamorphosis of Plants and other works onmorphology that shaped important aspects of Wittgensteins approach not only to Gestalt psy-chology but also to other topics (McGuinness, 2002; Schulte, 2003).

Goethes use of the word Gestalt is of particular interest. He noted that the word is oftenused to mean an interrelated whole that is identified, defined and fixed in character, but thatin reality, especially in organic Gestalten, nothing in them is permanent, nothing at rest ordefinedeverything is in a flux of continual motion (Goethe, 1817/1995, p. 63). This wayof seeing Gestalten seemed to the Berlin Gestalt psychologists entirely consistent with whatthey had in mind.

Khler . . . mentioned Goethe in his discussions of the mathematics of physical Gestalten.To underline what he took to be the ontological significance of the fact that similar seriesof differential equations can cover a wide variety of physical facts, he called them affin-ity series. . . . This was an allusion to Goethes novel . . . Elective Affinities, which tellsa story of human passion in the language of magnetism and chemical attraction. (Ash,1995, p. 185)

For Wittgenstein, however, this would have been at best an incomplete way of takingGoethes work. Goethe was not opposed to conventional science or mathematics but he wasopposed to scientism (Rowe, 1991, p. 285). Science had its place, but should not be allowedto exceed its proper sphere of influence. Science had a tendency to oversimplify. This ten-dency could be corrected by carefully considering the whole range of examples of variousphenomena. Seeing each instance in its various relations to all the others provided the intu-itive observer with an understanding of phenomena not obtainable otherwise. This is the ap-proach Goethe took to colors and plants, for example.

Physics quite legitimately searches for hidden mechanisms that explain phenomena.However, following Goethe, we could eschew the search for hidden mechanisms and insteadarrange the phenomena of interest in different ways (Rowe, 1991, p. 295), searching for a per-spicuous representation [that] produces just that understanding that consists in seeing con-nexions (Wittgenstein , 1958, p. 49). Dont look for anything beyond the phenomena. Theythemselves are the theory (Goethe) (Wittgenstein, 1980a, p. 157).

To the scientistic eye, both Goethe and Wittgenstein may seem to be making a distinc-tion without a difference. It might be argued that scientists routinely survey the phenomenaof interest precisely in order to be able to formulate an explanation of them. However, whilesuch explanations have their place, they can never substitute for the understanding that comesfrom the perspicuous representation itself. Goethe was lampooned for criticizing Newtonsexplanation of the nature of white. However, the point of Goethes discussion of white is thatNewtons theory has nothing to say about it as an experience. Goethe may have been seekingan alternative way of doing science, but Wittgenstein was not that nave (Vendler, 1995). WhatWittgenstein was doing was not prescientific. A perspicuous representation is not a prelimi-nary to science. Rather, Wittgenstein provided a description of the relations between colorsthat could stand on its own, illustrating the logic of colors.

We do not want to establish a theory of colour (neither a physiological one nor a psy-chological one), but rather the logic of colour concepts. And this accomplishes what peo-ple have often unjustly expected of a theory. (Wittgenstein, 1977b, p. 5) I am not saying



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here what the Gestalt psychologists say: that the impression of white comes about in suchand such a way. Rather the question is precisely: what is the impression of white, whatis the meaning of this expression, what is the logic of this concept white? (Wittgenstein,1977b, p. 7)

The Gestalt psychologist Adhmar Gelb (18871936; 1929/1967, pp. 207208) did anexperiment in which he projected light on a black disk in such a way that the disk appearedto be white. When a white piece of paper was placed in front of the disk, the disk suddenlyappeared black. Such an experiment was of considerable interest as a part of the explorationof color constancy. However, it would make no sense to do an experiment to determinewhether the statement White is lighter than black is true. That white is lighter than black ispart of the meaning of white and black (Lee, 1999, p. 218). We learn the meaning of colorwords in the course of our social development, from and with other people. Color words taketheir meaning from their use in a language. In this respect they are like any other words,including such important words for our purposes as remembering and seeing.

SPENGLER, WITTGENSTEIN, AND GESTALT THEORY

Wittgenstein was born into an immensely rich Viennese family that ensured that hewas exposed to high culture. Brahms occasionally performed at the Wittgenstein home,but Wittgensteins real affinity was for the music of Mozart and Beethoven (Monk, 1991,p. 13). Wittgensteins ideal world . . . the one to which he would have liked to belong wasnot that to which he actually belonged but one that had disappeared and had ended near themiddle of the nineteenth century (Bouveresse, 1991, p. 22).

During World War I, Wittgenstein served in the Austrian army for five years (McGuinness,1967, p. 141). His family felt that he had become a different person as a consequence of his warexperiences (e.g., H. Wittgenstein, 1973/1981, p. 4), and could not understand why he wantedto train to become a teacher in elementary schools. . . . On his arrival home from the war he wasone of the wealthiest men in Europe, . . . but within a month of returning, he had disposed ofhis entire estate (Monk, 1991, pp. 170171).

Of course, Wittgenstein was far from being the only person transformed by the disasterthat was the Great War. The 1920s produced a range of responses to what was experienced asa crisis in German culture. One of these responses came from

self-styled philosopher of history Oswald Spengler [18801936]. The first volume ofThe Decline of the West has a subtitle, Gestalt and reality. This referred to a contrastbetween the exact, deadening procedure of modern physics, which subjects its objectsto mechanical, numerical order, and a morphological or formative method, whichtakes the creations of a culture as signs of its soul or life. (Ash, 1991, p. 398)

Although Wittgenstein did not put much faith in Spenglers reliability as a historian, hedid think that Spengler could teach us something about the age we were now living in (Drury,1981). Wittgenstein (1998a, p. 16) listed Spengler (1918/1986) as someone who had influ-enced his thinking. Useful analyses of Spenglers relation to Wittgenstein may be found inBloor (1983, pp.162165), Haller (1988, pp. 7489), Klagge (2005), and Wright (1982,pp. 212 215). Spengler famously argued that all cultures have a distinct character and gothrough periods similar to those of an individual life-cycle. Western culture has been in declinesince the nineteenth century. Indeed, Western culture was no longer even worthy of being calleda culture, but had become merely a civilization. This meant that it was disintegrating rather thandeveloping as a coherent whole. Such a message resonated strongly with Wittgenstein, who felt



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that he properly belonged to an earlier time when there really was a Western culture. The spiritof this civilization the expression of which is the industry, architecture, music, of present dayfascism & socialism, is a spirit that is alien & uncongenial to the author (Wittgenstein, 1998a,p. 8). Because he did not think of himself as being of his time, Wittgenstein thought that oth-ers were unlikely to understand him.

By contrast with Spenglers pessimistic outlook, the Berlin Gestalt psychologists be-lieved that their approach could contribute to a positive resolution of the postwar crisis. BothAsh (1995, pp. 294297) and Harrington (1996, pp. 119121) pointed to a paper byWertheimer (1924/1967) in which he argued that the Gestalt approach could contribute toovercoming the schisms of the time. This was possible by seeing that all phenomena, whethernatural or cultural, were expressions of the same Gestalt laws. Even values were objectivelypresent in Gestalten. This is a theme that Khler (1938/1959) developed further in The Placeof Value in a World of Facts. A science of values was not only a desirable but also a real pos-sibility (Harrington, 1996, pp. 130132). The pessimism of Wittgenstein contrasted with theoptimism of the Gestalt psychologists, who were confident that their scientific work couldcontribute to a resolution of the important problems of the day.

WITTGENSTEINS STYLE

Wittgensteins later writings are the most relevant for us because it is there that he beganto remark on Khler and Gestalt psychology. In the Collected Works (Wittgenstein, 1998b),Khler and/or Gestalt psychology are referred to in seventeen separate remarks. One of theseis in the Philosophical Investigations (1958), fourteen in the Remarks on the Philosophy ofPsychology (1980a,b), one in Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology (1990) and onein Remarks on Colour (1977b). These remarks were all composed between 1946 and 1951.Of course, these are not all the remarks that are relevant to Khler and Gestalt psychology,but only those in which they are explicitly mentioned in the Collected Works (1998b).

The distinctive style of Wittgensteins later writings has been extensively discussed(e.g., Baker, 1999; Cavell, 1966; Peters, 2001; Stern, 1996). In part, Wittgenstein may haveacquired his style as a result of his experience as an elementary school teacher in rural Austriafrom 1920 until 1926 (Wright, 1967, p. 20). Wittgensteins friend Paul Engelmann(18911965; 1967, p. 114115) suggested that being a teacher compelled Wittgenstein toseek to translate the questions he had to ask as a teacher into a language that he could assumeto come close to the childrens language. He would never have been forced to learn how todo this otherwise. He thus acquired the art of asking questions with consummate skill, andthe crucial simplicity with which he accomplished this in his profoundest mental probing con-stitutes his great new philosophical achievement (p. 115).

While it would be wrong to exaggerate the question-asking aspect of Wittgensteinsstyle, no one disputes its presence. Here is an example (Wittgenstein, 1980b, p. 63).

Am I doing child psychology?I am making a connexion between the concept of teach-ing and the concept of meaning.

Wittgenstein posed a question, but did not provide a direct answer. The reader may beprompted to ask, Is the connexion between the concept of teaching and the concept of mean-ing a matter of child psychology? In ruminating about possible answers, the reader may con-clude that while what Wittgenstein is doing may not actually be child psychology, his worknonetheless has suggestive implications for child psychology. Indeed, one very influentialresearch program in cognitive and developmental psychology was instigated by just such a



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reading of Wittgenstein. The example is Eleanor Roschs (1978) empirical investigations ofconceptual development. However, doing child psychology was not Wittgensteins goal.Rather, it was to present a perspicuous representation of a series of phenomena pertaining tothe connexion between the concept of teaching and the concept of meaning.

Rosch (1987, p. 164) argued that psychology could begin where philosophy ended. Forempirical issues, perhaps this means rather that the problems are brought completely intoview. And that is the beginning of investigation. Roschs opinion of the relation between phi-losophy and psychology is, of course, her own. She may not be reflecting Wittgensteins opin-ion. Wittgenstein is at his most provocative when his view of psychology seems to be that itis unnecessary, there being no reason to engage in it once a Goethean, perspicuous represen-tation of the phenomena has been achieved. This is an aspect of Wittgensteins thought we willconsider further below.

WITTGENSTEINS REMARKS ON KHLER AND GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY

According to Joachim Schulte (1992, p. 76), Khler was the most important influenceon Wittgenstein during the late 1940s. The famous statement at the end of PhilosophicalInvestigations that The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained bycalling it a young science (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 232), was probably directed at Khlers(1947, p. 420) argument that psychology was a young science that needed to imitate the phys-ical sciences in their youth, when their state of development was comparable to our own atthe present time. Wittgensteins statement had an earlier version in which Wittgenstein(1980a, p. 180; Anscombe & Wright, 1980, p. iv) omitted and barrenness. This suggests thatWittgenstein regarded the confusion of psychology and its barrenness as somewhat separateissues, and in what follows they will be treated as such. What Wittgenstein might have meantby the confusion of psychology has been extensively discussed over many years (e.g.,Drury, 1973, p. 30; Gustafson, 1964, p. xiv; Harr & Tissaw, 2005; Schulte, 1992, p. 76f).However, what he might have meant by its barrenness has received less explicit attention.

The Hffding Function and the Problem of Similarity

Wittgensteinians have not made as much of the Hffding function, sometimes called theHffding step, as they could have. Named after the Danish psychologist Harald Hffding(18431931), it purported to state a necessary relationship between perception and memory.Hffding (1891/1919) brought out what he took to be the central role of similarity in makingrecognition possible. He observed that the law of similarity was seen by associationists such asJames Mill (17731836) as a special case of more fundamental laws such as contiguity.However, Hffding reversed this relationship, and argued that similarity was more fundamental.

Caesar, Alexander, and Napoleon, are indeed often presented together in our thought; butthis is so just because they have so often been compared with one another. . . . So farfrom association by similarity being resolvable into association by contiguity, every as-sociation by contiguity on the contrary presupposes association by similarity, or at leastan immediate recognition. In order that A may excite the ideas of B, C, D, with which itusually arises simultaneously in consciousness, it must first, so to speak establish itsidentity. (p. 157)

One way of putting the Hffding function is to say that recognition precedes recall (Asch,1969, pp. 9899; Rock, 1962). Hffdings argument is that, for example, I must recognize youbefore I can recall your name. If I do not recognize you, then your name will not occur to me.



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The Hffding function received little attention in psychology until Khler took it upagain in a paper read before the International Congress in Copenhagen in 1932 (Koffka,1935, p. 561). Khler (1940/1960, pp. 126130) subsequently made the Hffding function anessential part of his theory of memory traces. In order for experienced events to be remem-bered, they must leave behind traces of themselves (Khler, 1947, pp. 251252). Thus, afterbeing introduced to me, you will have a memory trace of me (a) associated with a memorytrace of my name (b). The theoretically important part occurs the next time you see me (A).A has never occurred in conjunction with a, and so there is no association between A and a.In order for recognition to occur, A must somehow make contact with the memory trace a, andthen b can be recalled. Following Hffding, Khler (1940/1960, p. 129) said that the connec-tion between A and a takes place on the basis of similarity. However, Khler (1940/1960)never said exactly what similarity means, although he did use nontechnical words such askinship (p. 127) as synonyms.

The argument that recognition takes place on the basis of similarity should be an easytarget for Wittgensteinians. The word similarity figures in some of Wittgensteins most influ-ential arguments. For example, consider his rejection of the common assumption that whatis needed to justify characterizing a number of processes or objects by a general concept-word issomething common to them all (Wittgenstein, 1974, p. 75). Wittgensteins famous counter-example was that games do not have something that is common to all, but similarities,relationships, and a whole series of them at that. . . . I can think of no better expression tocharacterize these similarities than family resemblances (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 31, italicsadded). Here is another remark, this time bearing on so-called mental processes.

Understanding is not the name of a single process but of more or less interrelatedprocesses against a background of the actual use of a learnt language.We think that ifI use the word understanding in all these cases there must be some one thing that hap-pens in all of them. Well, the concept-word certainly does show a kinship but this neednot be the sharing of a common property or constituent.The concept-word game.By knowledge we mean these processes, and these, and similar ones. (Wittgenstein,1974, p. 11; italics added)

Notice that the word similar is used to indicate that there may be other members of a se-ries that are as yet unspecified. It is impossible in practice to predict what will be sufficientlydissimilar so as not to be an example of a concept-word.

Then it might be objected that a transition can be made from anything to anything, andso the concept isnt bounded. To this I have to say that for the most part it isnt in factbounded and the way to specify it is perhaps: by knowledge we mean these processes,and these, and similar ones. And instead of and similar ones I might have said andothers akin to these in many ways. (Wittgenstein, 1974, p. 76, italics added)

Because similarity is such a flexible and accommodating concept, it does not in practiceadd anything to say that We recognize things on the basis of similarity. We might as wellsay that we recognize things because we recognize them. It is instructive to imagine two peo-ple having the following dialogue.

Theyre brother and sister, but they dont look alike at all.I can see a similarity be-tween them. (Wittgenstein, 1990, p. 24)

The foregoing is not intended to imply that similarity is not a useful word. On the con-trary, it is a very useful word, precisely because of the innumerable contexts in which it canhelp to express what one wants to say. It is just that it is not a very scientific concept-word.



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However, psychologists of a Gestalt persuasion wanted it to become a scientific concept,although precisely how this was supposed to happen was unclear. We know almost nothingabout the mechanism of similarity or about the character of memory trace arousal was theway that Solomon Asch (19071996; 1969, p. 99) put the problem. The belief that the mean-ing of a concept-word can be clarified by scientific investigation was (and is) by no meanspeculiar to Gestalt psychology, and is a theme to which we will return throughout theremainder of the paper.

Scholars of a Wittgensteinian persuasion generally agree that Khlers psychology wasconceptually confused (e.g., Bennett & Hacker, 2003, p. 161f; Budd, 1989; Hark, 1995;Schulte, 1992). One way in which conceptual confusion manifests itself is through the beliefthat the ordinary language meanings of words are unscientific and need to be given moreprecise definitions. The psychologist often behaves like Humpty Dumpty, saying that WhenI use a word, . . . it means just what I choose it to meanneither more nor less (Carroll,1971, p. 190; Pitcher, 1965/1967, p. 328). However, as we have seen in the case of similarity,any such cavalier approach would of necessity yield an artificial definition that would coveronly some of the cases in which we say of things that they are similar. It must be said that, tothe Gestalt psychologists credit, they never arbitrarily defined similarity, but, like Asch(1969), had the integrity to remain puzzled by the problem.

Conceptual Confusion and Khlers Theory of Memory Traces

Khler believed that perception leaves behind a trace of itself. For Khler (1938/1959,p. 249), memory traces are physiological entities, distributed throughout the brain. Wittgenstein(1980a, p. 45) commented on this hypothesis as follows.

An event leaves a trace in the memory: one sometimes imagines this as if it consisted inthe events having left a trace, an impression, a consequence, in the nervous system. Asif one could say: even the nerves have a memory. But then when someone rememberedan event, he would have to infer it from this impression, this trace. Whatever the eventdoes leave behind in the organism, it isnt the memory.

The organism compared with a dictaphone spool; the impression, the trace, is the al-teration in the spool that the voice leaves behind. Can one say that the dictaphone (or thespool) is remembering what was spoken all over again, when it reproduces what it took?

The problem with any theory that equates memory with physiological traces is that itmakes no sense to say that the brain remembers, any more than it makes sense to say that a dic-taphone spool remembers (Overgard, 2004). A brain is a part of a person, and it is the personwho remembers (Bennett & Hacker, 2003, p. 154). Traces can be part of an account of remem-bering, but not the whole story. To say that memory traces are essential to memory disguises theways in which memory blends into imagination and thinking (cf. Schulte, 1992, p. 118).

Seeing-as

Seeing the figure as . . . has something occult, something ungraspable about it. One wouldlike to say: Something has altered, and nothing has altered. (Wittgenstein, 1980a, p. 170)

This was a phenomenon in which Wittgenstein was particularly interested, and was at theheart of Pastores (1991) discussion. Following the method of creating a series of examples,a perspicuous representation, Wittgenstein not only used figures from Khler, either repro-ducing them or using analogs, but also some examples that Khler did not use.

We can arrange some of Khlers and Wittgensteins examples in a series. For now, wewill only consider three. At one end of the series are figures such as the double cross (Figure 4).



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Then there is the duck-rabbit (Figure 1), which is a more complicated case. Which aspect ofthe double cross is seen could be indicated nonverbally, by pointing, for example. One couldquite well imagine this as a primitive reaction in a child even before it could talk(Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 207). However, which aspect of the duck-rabbit was seen could not beindicated simply by pointing. You only see the duck and rabbit aspects if you are alreadyconversant with the shapes of those two animals (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 207). Now considerthe triangle in Figure 5. Wittgenstein (1958, p. 201) asked us to see it as something that hasfallen over. The fallen-over triangle is complicated in different way. It is possible to take theduck-rabbit simply for the picture of a rabbit, the double cross simply for the picture of ablack cross, but not to take the bare triangular figure for the picture of an object that has fallenover. To see this aspect of the triangle demands imagination (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 207).

The series illustrates different ways in which the word see can be used when one seessomething as something. Pastore wanted to see Wittgensteins examples as part of an argu-ment in favour of an empiricist theory of seeing-as. However, Wittgenstein was not arguingfor or against Khlers emphasis on perceptual organization as the determinant of what a fig-ure is seen as. Wittgenstein was not psychologizing, but pointing out that there are many waysof seeing seeing-as (Hark, 1990, p. 186). Certainly experience and education enter into atleast some forms of seeing-as. Seeing as . . . is not part of perception. And for that reasonit is like seeing and again not like (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 197).

The visual examples with which we have illustrated seeing-as are by no means the only, orperhaps even the most interesting, illustrations. Consider the following examples (Wittgenstein,1974, p. 42).

The different experiences I have when I see a picture first one way and then another arecomparable to the experience I have when I read a sentence with understanding and with-out understanding.

(Recall what it is like when someone reads a sentence with a mistaken intonationwhich prevents him from understanding itand then realizes how it is to be read.)

(To see a watch as a watch, i.e. as a dial with hands, is like seeing Orion as a man strid-ing across the sky.)

One of the goals of education must be to enable people to see things they might not oth-erwise. This may have nothing to do with psychology in particular or science in general, buthave everything to do with being fortunate enough to have had the right kinds (and amount)of training and experience (Hamlyn, 1989).



FIGURE 5.A triangle that has fallen over. From L. Wittgenstein. (1958). Philosophical

investigations (p. 200). Oxford: Blackwell.

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I could say of one of Picassos pictures that I dont see it as human. Or of many anotherpicture that for a long time I wasnt able to see what it was representing, but now I do.Isnt this similar to: for a long time I couldnt hear this as of a piece, but now I hear itthat way. Before, it sounded like so many little bits, which were always stopping shortnow I hear it as an organic whole. (Bruckner) (Wittgenstein, 1990, p. 86)

Someone of a scientistic bent might seek a simple explanation for all these phenomena.However, first one would need to understand and appreciate the phenomena him- or herself.Theacquisition of such an understanding might be sufficient in itself. Wittgensteins philosophy

betokens a trenchant attempt to protect and conserve a domain of knowledge and form ofunderstanding from erosion and distortion by the scientific spirit of the age. For one maysee Wittgensteins philosophical endeavours as a defence of humanistic understandingagainst the illegitimate encroachment of the natural sciences. (Hacker, 2001, p. 42)

Isomorphism

Isomorphism was, of course, not Khlers invention (Madden, 1957). The term is used inchemistry, mineralogy, mathematics, and biology, as well as psychology. It means somethingdifferent in each case. For example, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, in mathe-matics it means an exact correspondence as regards the number of constituent elements andthe relations between them. Khlers version of isomorphism was that there was a corre-spondence between the organization of experience and the organization of cortical processes.The correspondence was not point-for-point. Rather the correspondence was structural, sothat any change in the organization of experience would have a corresponding change in theorganization of cortical activity.

Wittgenstein (1977b, p. 48), by contrast, did not attempt to tie experiences directly tobrain events. Psychology connects something experienced with something physical, but weconnect something experienced with what is experienced. Wittgenstein also wondered whatKhler meant by the word organization. The organization of the visual image changes hasnot the same kind of application as: The organization of this company is changing. Here Ican describe how it is, if the organization of our company changes (Wittgenstein, 1980a,p. 100). In the case of a change of aspect, can one describe the change in organization?

Khlers answer to this question relied on a process he called satiation. In the case of areversible figure such as the double cross, Khler (1940/1960, p. 70) claimed that over timereversals occur more frequently. This meant that while a figure is inspected, the brain tissuesupporting the perception of a particular aspect becomes fatigued, or satiated. The result isthat a new aspect emerges, until it, too, is satiated, and so on. Satiation was assumed to be aprocess that builds up over time and does not disappear immediately upon a change of aspect.Consequently, when the aspect changes back to its previously satiated form, there is less timeto the next reversal.

[P]rolonged occurrence of the percept process in a given area changes the medium inwhich the process is located, and . . . it does so gradually and continuously. . . . [W]henthe change has reached a certain critical degree, the reversible pattern is suddenly trans-formed. (Khler, 1940/1960, pp. 8283)

Michel ter Hark (1995) believed that Wittgenstein had been right to doubt the isomor-phism hypothesis not only on philosophical grounds but also on empirical grounds. He saidthat Wittgensteins rejection of Khlers theory has been proven correct empirically (p. 125)and that Khlers theory is no longer taken seriously by neuroscientists (p. 134). Hark doesnot cite anyone in support of this conclusion, but it is certainly true that neuroscientists no



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longer work with Khlers specific formulation. However, versions of Khlers satiation hy-pothesis are still influential.

For the sake of historical accuracy, it is important to review the process whereby Khlerstheory was discredited. The usual narrative is that neuroscientific heavyweights such as KarlLashley (18901958; Lashley, Chow, & Semmes, 1951) and future Nobel prizewinner RogerSperry (19131994; Sperry, Miner, & Myers, 1955; Sperry & Miner, 1955) did experimentsthat finished Khler off. Lashley placed strips of gold foil or gold pins in the cortices of twomonkeys in order to disrupt electric fields, but observed no consequences of this manipulation.Sperry cut and inserted wires and nonconductive material into the visual cortex of cats in orderto disrupt the organization of visual perception, but he also observed no effects. Perhaps notsurprisingly, Khler (1958; 1965/1971b) never accepted these results, partly because theyrelied on what he regarded as crude methodologies. However, logical argument proved to beno match for experiments, however crude they might have been, and in the absence of anyexperimental reply on Khlers part, Lashley and Sperry appeared to carry the day.

However, over time, Khlers ideas have crept back in (Scheerer, 1994). For example,Steven Lehar (2003, p. 404) presented an elaborate model of perception that incorporatesmany of the concepts and principles introduced by the original Gestalt movement. Leharsmodel includes a version of isomorphism that explicitly owes much to Khler. Of course, oneswallow does not a summer make, but Lehar is far from being the only example of Khlerscontinuing influence. There are several approaches to reversible figures that pay homage toKhlers satiation theory. For example, Burton (2002, p. 292) stated that one of the predom-inant contemporary approaches to ambiguous figure reversals . . . is the satiation theory,which dates back to Wolfgang Khler. Satiation, regarded as a form of neural fatigue, is stillconsidered to be a possible explanation for figural reversals (e.g., Long & Toppino, 2004;Toppino, 2003). Some experimenters explicitly say that their work is designed to assess theconventional theory of neural satiation, which they identify as Khlers (1940/1960) theoryof neural fatigue (Aks & Sprott, 2003, p. 167).

According to Scholars Portal, there are 137 articles published since 1950 in peer-reviewed journals that mention satiation and reference Khler. Twenty-four of these articleshave been published since 1995. Scholars Portal includes PsycInfo as well as several otherdatabases in the sciences and social sciences. While Hark (1995) is correct in saying that noone adheres to a precisely Khlerian theory any longer, many contemporary researchersacknowledge their indebtedness to Khler and his concept of satiation.

Wittgenstein, by contrast, appears to have had minimal influence on the psychology ofreversible figures. It was a hope of some Wittgensteinians that their attempts to clear up con-ceptual confusion in psychology would result in psychologists behaving differently. Yet it isnow over 50 years since the publication of Part II of the Philosophical Investigations, oftencalled the foundations of psychology, and its effect on the behavior of psychologists is diffi-cult to discern. For example, the scientific literature on reversible figures is not at all divisi-ble into pre- and post-Wittgensteinian phases. Indeed a Scholars Portal search for either thephrase reversible figures or ambiguous figures in articles citing Wittgenstein returned onlythree results. A striking example of Wittgensteins lack of influence in psychology is a recentstudy of the development of childrens understanding of reversible figures that used a versionof the duck-rabbit as a stimulus but did not cite Wittgenstein (Doherty & Wimmer, 2005).

As Dale Jacquette (2007) and Michael Maraun (1998) observed, there are few documentedcases in which psychologists have taken Wittgenstein to heart and changed their researchpractices as a consequence. Ivan Leudar (2006) suggested that the possibility of Wittgensteinhaving an influence on psychology was masked by the simultaneous occurrence of the cognitive



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revolution. Gestalt psychology was a precursor of that revolution (Murray, 1995; Neisser, 1967,pp. 5051; 8991; 245247). Had Wittgenstein been more salient for psychologists at that time,perhaps we could have moved toward a discipline that understands people not in isolation, butas living in the world with culture and history (Leudar, 2006, p. 852).

Wittgensteins style did not make it easy for psychologists to consider the possibility thatthey should change their ways. In any case, Wittgenstein was not particularly interested inwriting a guide for psychologists. He was more interested in exposing the weaknesses of psy-chology to the few sympathetic readers who might then be inclined to do something morefruitful than psychology.

THE BARRENNESS OF PSYCHOLOGY

The word barrenness occurs only once in Wittgensteins (1998b) Collected Works inEnglish, and that is in reference to psychology. According to the Oxford English Dictionary,barren has among its figurative senses bare of intellectual wealth, destitute of attraction orinterest, poor, meager, jejune, arid, dry. Has Wittgensteins harsh judgment of psychologybeen borne out? In order to at least partially answer that question, we need look no furtherthan research on the prototypical reversible figure, the Necker cube.

What Hath Necker Wrought?

Consider Figure 6, which is taken from Louis Albert Neckers (17861861; 1832/1964)paper presenting the phenomenon that bears his name. Necker observed that drawings ofcrystalline forms . . . will undergo sudden and involuntary change, such that sometimesthe angle at A will appear nearer than the angle at X, and sometimes the reverse. Thus, theface ABCD will recede behind the face XDC, which will come forward; which effect givesthe whole solid a quite contrary apparent inclination (p. 78). Necker observed that he couldreverse the figure by focusing on either angle A or angle X, thus being able by my will tosee the solid in which position I chose (p. 79).

Notice that Figure 6 should properly be called Neckers rhomboid rather than Neckerscube (Boring, 1942, p. 268). However, Neckers figure has typically been presented as a cube,of which Figure 3 is an example taken from Wittgensteins Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus(1922/1977, p. 54). E. G. Boring (1942, p. 268) said that Neckers original rhomboid is re-versed more easily than the cube, for the rhomboid stands upon an edge and is prejudiced forneither perspective, whereas the cube is seen more easily flat upon the ground (as near)than in the alternative peculiar uptilted position (bs near).

If that were all there was to it, then we could treat Neckers cube as an interesting diver-sion in the history of psychology. However, according to Scholars Portal, since Borings



A

B D

X

C

FIGURE 6.Neckers rhomboid. From L. A. Necker, (1832). An apparent change of position

in a drawing or engraved figure of a crystal. Philosophical Magazine, 1, 329.

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(1942) discussion there have been 424 studies in peer-reviewed journals in which the phraseNecker cube or Neckers cube occurs, a rate of over 6 studies a year. The word voluntary oc-curs in 49 of these articles, all published since 1985. The question of whether or not the re-versal could be voluntary was what originally intrigued Necker. We are still trying to answerNeckers question by means of experiments.

How would one determine if Necker cube reversals were voluntary? It is the person whoacts voluntarily. Naturally, one can ask someone to do something voluntarily such as sign upto be a participant in an experiment. However, it is confused to believe that there is an innerprocess, whether mental or physiological, that causes a voluntary act (Bennett & Hacker,2003, pp. 223228). Nevertheless, experimental investigations of the Necker cube typicallybind what is called voluntary control to an inner process with a neural basis (e.g., Ee, Dam, &Brouwer, 2005, p. 52).

Obviously, an experiment that purports to compare voluntary and involuntary rever-sals of the Necker cube must have at least one condition in which the participants reversethe cube voluntarily and another condition in which the cube reverses involuntarily. Theparticipants need to be told when to act voluntarily and when not. There have been a widevariety of ways in which participants have been told how to act voluntarily. For example,participants may be instructed to use concentration and mental effort in order tocontrol reversal (Mathes, Strber, Stadler, & Basar-Eroglu, 2006, p. 146), or to reverse ormaintain the cube when given the appropriate cue (Slotnick & Yantis, 2005, p. 99), or tospeed up the alternation as much as they could (Brascamp, Ee, Pestman, & Berg, 2005,p. 291), or to attempt to perceive the cube from the [top or bottom] view for as long aspossible (Meng & Tong, 2004, p. 541). Concentration, mental effort, reverse, maintain,speed up, and attempt are all perfectly good English words and phrases, but how exactlyare they related to voluntary? In the corresponding involuntary conditions, participantsobviously cannot be instructed to act involuntarily. Rather they are told to gaze at thefigure in a passive manner (Mathes et al., 2006, p. 146), or to to view a stimulus in anatural way without attempting to control the alternation rate (Brascamp et al., 2005,p. 291), or to just look at the cube passively (Meng & Tong, 2004, p. 541). Sometimesan involuntary reversal was simply defined as one that occurred in the absence of a cue tomaintain or reverse the cube (Slotnick & Yantis, 2005, p. 99). Here again, how exactly dogazing passively, or viewing in a natural way relate to involuntary? Indeed, is it not per-fectly good English to say that someone is voluntarily gazing passively or voluntarilyviewing the cube in a natural way? Cant rest be just as voluntary as motion?(Wittgenstein, 1980a, p. 150).

But there is not one common difference between so-called voluntary acts and involuntaryones, viz, the presence or absence of one element, the act of volition. (Wittgenstein,1969, pp. 151152)

Thus also, acting voluntarily (or involuntarily) is, in many cases, characterized assuch by a multitude of circumstances under which the action takes place rather than byan experience which we should call characteristic of voluntary action. (Wittgenstein,1969, p. 157)

Einhauser, Martin, & Knig (2004, p. 2817) noted that the question of the voluntarynature of Necker cube reversals engaged some of the best minds of the nineteenth century, in-cluding Charles Wheatstone (1838), Hermann von Helmholtz (1867/1962), and WilhelmWundt (1897/1969). Yet here we are 175 years after Neckers publication still unable to giveanything even remotely like a conclusive answer to the question Necker originally posed.



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Rather, we continue to modify our experimental methods in the hope that someday all will be-come clear. In the end, perhaps all we have been doing for 175 years is making up new andimproved ways of using voluntary. If that is not barrenness, what is?

Psychologists tend to approach such questions as whether or not something is voluntaryby pursuing a research program of systematic observation and experiment. . . . [However,we cannot] discover the nature of our psychological concepts by experimental investiga-tions (Baker & Hacker, 1982, pp. 229230). Psychologists persist in using words such asvoluntary in a metaphysical way. The essential thing about metaphysics is that the differ-ence between factual and conceptual investigations is not clear to it. A metaphysical ques-tion is always in appearance a factual one, although the problem is a conceptual one(Wittgenstein, 1980a, p. 167). Without realizing it, psychologists often do metaphysicsrather than science. This leads to some psychological studies resembling the sort of meta-physical inquiries described by Wittgensteins friend and colleague at Cambridge, JohnWisdom (19041993).

In the labyrinth of metaphysics are the same whispers that one hears when climbingKafkas staircases to the tribunal which is always one floor further up. (Wisdom, 1957,p. 282)

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

We saw that Khler and Wittgenstein were connected through common acquaintances.These acquaintances were themselves important figures in early twentieth century thoughtand illustrate the extent to which Khler and Wittgenstein shared common ground. This com-mon ground made it relatively straightforward for Wittgenstein to use Khler as a vehicle forphilosophizing about psychology just as he used Goethe to inspire him to philosophize aboutcolor (Lee, 1999, p. 216f; Monk, 1991, p. 561).

Although there is no evidence that Khler ever read Wittgenstein, it is not difficult toimagine how Khler might have responded. To a very large extent, Pastore has already donethis job for us. His argument that Wittgenstein did not offer any coherent alternatives and washostile toward psychological science would surely have found echoes in any reply Khlermight have made. Khler (1938/1959, p. 185) might also have been prepared to discountWittgensteins attitudes toward physiological psychology because many philosophers disliketo hear much about the brain when philosophical problems are discussed. Khler (1938/1959,p. 193) unabashedly tried to upgrade physiological events so that they would be equivalentto and exactly as good as are mental facts. Of course, Wittgenstein regarded such a moveas confused.

Wittgensteins trenchant analysis of Khlers neuropsychology did not have an apprecia-ble impact on the behavior of psychologists. Indeed, an examination of some current researchon reversible figures suggests that, while his specific theories are no longer central, Khlersgeneral approach is still influential. Wittgensteins criticisms of Khler and, by extension,contemporary neuroscience may be as valid now as they ever were. However, there is noevidence that Wittgensteins arguments have any more traction now than they had in the past.

Nothing seems to me more unlikely than that a scientist or mathematician, who reads me,should be seriously influenced thereby in the way he works. (In that respect my warningsare like the posters on the ticket offices at English railway stations [during World War II]Is your journey really necessary? As if anyone reading that would say to himself Onsecond thoughts, no .) (Wittgenstein, 1998a, pp. 7071)



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