Benazir Bhutto on Pakistan's Military Establishment and how the Generals undermine Democracy

44 The Herald Annual, January 2001

2000Annual exclusive

“The securityapparatus hasrun amok”

“The securityapparatus hasrun amok”

In her most candid interview since 1988, Benazir Bhutto, twice electedprime minister of Pakistan, reveals the extent to which successive civiliangovernments have been held hostage, and destabilised, by the ‘securityapparatus’ of the military. Bhutto, chairperson of the PPP — the singlelargest political party of the country — explains the helplessness ofcivilian governments in the face of Intelligence-inspired disinformation onthe one hand, and ideologically motivated illegal activities of ‘rogueelements’ of the army on the other. She argues that the securityapparatus of the country is out of control and that no government canhope to function smoothly unless these elements are brought under aformalised command structure that prevents them from taking on the roleof a state within a state. There is much evidence to support Bhutto’sclaims, including that of her adversaries — General Aslam Beg, GeneralHameed Gul and General Asad Durrani — all of whom conspired againstcivilian governments and have repeatedly gone on record to admit asmuch. “Blaming politicians alone for tarnishing democracy is actuallyless than half the story,” argues Bhutto. Here, she explains why.

— Benazir Bhutto

From Syed Ali Dayan Hasan in London

Q. What do you think is thebasic problem with civil-militaryrelations?

A. The inability of the military tobow before the people’s will.

Q. Why is that?A. The military’s view on security

and government is at variance withthe popular will. Pakistan is a

federation but the armed forcesdistrust provincial units. They arescared of giving up power.

Q. So, what is the solution tothis impasse in civil-militaryrelations?

A. Either we have democracy ordictatorship. The military seeks adictatorship or a controlleddemocracy to continue with theirsecurity agenda. They need the

centralised state and a diversion ofresources for that security agenda.For the first time, they are realisingthe difficulty of running the ship ofstate. I believe the solution lies indemocracy and devolution. Weshould return to the roots of theQuaid. He founded Pakistan on theprinciples of federalism, autonomy

and freedom. If we revert to thisdream, we might devolve morepower but we will be more secure.

Q. How has the army managedto present a discredited image ofpolitical figures, including you?

A. I dispute that they havesucceeded but I agree that theyhave tried. There are two factorsthat explain this. One, politicalinstitutions are weak and have poor

financial resources andorganisational ability. Also, they areunable to communicate freely withthe masses. This is becausegenuine political forces have beencontinually hunted by theestablishment, and when you areconstantly hunted, you have littletime to organise. Second, because

the army does give power to somepoliticians, it has divided the civilianpopular base by holding out to thosewho cannot win — the promise ofpower without legitimacy.

Q. You have presided twiceover a controlled democracy.What have you learnt from theexperience?

A. There is a tendency inPakistan, due to military


“How can a political party fight an organised military, severalintelligence outfits, the president and the judiciary? It is veryimportant to create this awareness and for the press to come

on board in exposing these manipulations.”

Fighting against the odds: PPP supporters at a rally

dictatorships and one-man rule, tothink that one person can make allthe difference. But in a democraticsystem, it is not just one person thatmakes a difference. A democraticruler, such as myself, functionswithin the confines of theconstitution. We need a civicconsensus on what a constitutionshould be and what constitutesfreedom and plurality. I had to workon the mandate I was given and thatis why I say that we did not achievemuch. I had to work with the 8thamendment and a president whocould sack the prime minister. Inother words, some elements in theintelligence agencies used thepresident when they felt I wasbecoming too powerful. They neverallowed us enough time to electmembers of the senate which wouldhave made my party — and thedemocratic forces — stronger. Thereal solution lies not with anyindividual. I can only give a clarioncall. Then it depends on the masseswhether they rally around that call tosay that they want a constitutionbased on the supremacy of the willof the people and that the primeminister and parliament mustdetermine national security and notthe military.

Q. But then, if you hadcommanded a two-thirds majorityand could have amended theconstitution, a coup would havetaken place against you insteadof Sharif...

A. I do not think so. I could be

wrong, of course, given that a coupdid take place against my father’sgovernment. However, when I cameto power in 1988, the world wasinterested in Pakistani democracyand, at that time, if I had been givenmy due constitutional majority, Ibelieve the PPP could haverestructured society without themilitary.

Q. You are accused by many of

The Herald Annual, January 2001 47

“When people are getting small salaries and they are told that one is rippingoff the nation and their utility bills are going up, not because the armed forcesare consuming a huge amount but because Asif Zardari has a polo team, it does

create resentment. Public opinion is manipulated into turning against one.”

having compromised the 11-year-old political struggle by agreeingto cohabit with an establishmentthat is innately hostile todemocratic governance. Thereby,you allowed yourself to be usedby the enemies of what you stoodfor. How can one be sure that youwill not allow that to happenagain?

A. That is only partially true. I hadtwo terms and two records. In myfirst term, I did dictate the securityagenda and I was overthrownbecause of that. But the liberalforces that should have stood by mefailed to do so. And therefore, in mysecond term, I went in for a historiccompromise. I accept my part of theresponsibility but others must ownup to theirs’. Secondly, I have neverbeen a believer in armed struggle.There are two ways to reform —either through constitutionalism orthrough revolution. If I am elected, Iam duty bound to function within theambit of the constitution.Consequently, I am unable to givethe guarantees I am asked for.Those guarantees can only beprovided by the voter by giving thePPP enough of a majority to changethe constitution. If you vote me inwith enough of a majority to changethe constitution, then, yes, I can dothings differently. But if you vote mein with a moth-eaten majority, then Ihave to live within the limitations ofthe mandate.

Q. Are you calling, in effect, fora new constitution?

A. I am calling for the removal ofthe Zia-dictated distortions in the1973 constitution. The ’73constitution was a federal,democratic, unanimous and Islamicconstitution and I stand by it. Underit, the concurrent list should havebeen abolished in 1983 (in areassuch as education, health,population, information — thesebelong in the domain of the

provinces). This has not happened.Under the ’73 constitution, only theparliament can decide which lawsare repugnant to Islam. But underthis distorted constitution, theShariat bench decides such issues.This creates fiscal crises such asthe one on riba. Thus, you see,there is a world of a differencebetween what the ’73 constitutionwas and what it has become.Crucially, the ’73 constitution did notgive the president the power to actas the mouthpiece of the military.The actions of an unelected dictatorwere indemnified in the constitution,

including laws in the name ofreligion such as the blasphemy lawwhich has less to do with blasphemyand more to do with the persecutionof minorities. What I am saying, inessence, is that we need to revisitthe Quaid’s dream whichconstitutionally manifested itself inthe 1973 constitution.

Q. Will you validate GeneralMusharraf’s amendments to the

constitution?A. It depends on what

the amendments are. Myparty is opposed tovalidating Musharraf’samendments but ifMusharraf announces therepeal of the separateelectorate (imposed byZia), I would validate it.Your question is general. Ifthere is a reformistagenda, in keeping withliberal aspirations, yes, Iwould validate it. But if anamendment creates aNational Security Councilthrough which the militarycan get rid of politicalgovernments that fail to toethe line, I would oppose it.When I use the term‘military’, I do not mean thearmed forces as such. Ithink the security

apparatus has run amok. I think adifferent kind of NSC is needed tobring the security apparatus underthe rule of law — not under the ruleof a prime minister but under the ruleof law. Let me give you an example.When I became prime minister, theycame to me and said they wanted toincrease the intelligence corps but Irejected the proposal. But when Iwas overthrown in 1990, the sameproposal was approved by Mr.Mustafa Jatoi. And now we haveseven different intelligence agenciesplaying politics right down to thetehsil level. This has led to the

destabilisation of politicalgovernments, the collapse of theeconomy and has undermined ourstanding in the internationalcommunity. Plurality of power meansthat the security apparatus has theright to an independent analysis ofthe situation but that independentanalysis must not be shoved downthe throats of everybody else.

Q. Did you attempt to rein in the


“Usually when a government is formed, the institutions ofgovernment respect the law. This was not the case in my

experience. And each time the power is abused, the centre from which it is being abused shifts.”

Aslam Beg: pioneer horse-trader?

intelligence agencies when youwere in power?

A. Yes, I did. For instance, inDecember 1988, within a week ofmy forming the government,Brigadier Imtiaz working at the ISIInternal began contacting politicalparties to overthrow mygovernment. My political adviser atthe time, General Babar, moved tohave him replaced. The armyrefused initially, though later,Brigadier Imtiaz was removed fromthe ISI Internal, not from the armyitself. So, I tried but they defied meand because of the 8th amendment,I could not remove any officermyself. We collected proof, in 1989,of ISI elements visiting MNAs for ano-confidence move. We madeaudio tapes. The head of the MIentered my office and saw thephotograph of the man who hadbeen approaching my MNAs. Hepanicked, took the photograph andthe tape and then sent me a reportsaying the man in question wasderanged. In 1990, when the ISIlaunched a similar effort, we made avideotape called Operation Jackal .A serving army officer, BrigadierImtiaz, technically not in the ISI butsubstantively still there, was tapedsaying: ‘the army does not want her,the president does not want her, theAmericans don’t want her’. He wasseeking the support ofparliamentarians to oust thegovernment. I gave that tape,substantive proof of treason, toGeneral Beg. He filibustered.

Eventually, under pressure, Beg justretired the man whereas he shouldhave been tried for treason. Then,when the no-confidence movefailed, I was approached by myMPAs in the NWFP who said thatGeneral Beg had called them to theGHQ and said, ‘We want to get ridof her starting with the NWFP andcould you please move a no-confidence vote against her.’ So, a

destabilising political role has beenplayed by a chief of army staff, bychiefs of intelligence, by the headsof the ISI and the president, atdifferent times.

On March 23, 1989, the armyjawans mobbed me in a show ofsupport when I went to the PakistanDay parade. General Beg panicked.I was used to being mobbed andpublic adulation. I told him it was allright. The support waned when theintelligence agencies — sometimesthe ISI, sometimes the MI, at othersthe FIT and the FIU and even thecorps command — intrigued.Poisonous stories were preparedand circulated to the corps

commanders and the jawans to putthe seeds of hatred in people’shearts. These included false storiesof corruption, of Indian agents, ofJewish agents, of American agents,Sikh lists. Thus, an impression wascreated that we are corrupt traitorsand even our supporters turnedagainst us. Beg was with me till theIntelligence worked on him andconvinced him that ‘she wants to

remove you and replace youwith General Imtiaz asCOAS’. It was a ridiculousstory but he believed it. Theytold Ghulam Ishaq Khan that,‘If she gets a senate majority,she’ll impeach you andreplace you with YahyaBakhtiar’. They concoctedthese stories. They went toone of my party leaders andsaid, ‘Get 10 MNAs and wewill make you prime minister’.A corps commander went tomy husband in 1989 and saidthat they could not salute awoman. ‘Let her make youprime minister as we have noproblems with the PPP’.

In 1993, they sent a MiddleEastern prince to tell me thesame thing — that Nawazwas going but I should bow

out because if I fought, things wouldbe different.

Q. Can you provide furtherexamples of how the militaryestablishment and theintelligence agencies operated todestabilise democracy duringyour first tenure?

A. I have two witnesses who tellme that they attended two similarmeetings arranged by a then-serving corps commander during myfirst term. In these meetings, thecorps commander, Nawaz Sharifand Osama Bin Laden werepresent. Osama Bin Laden was toldthat a woman in this position wasagainst Islam so he should give

them money to overthrow me. Andthen Nawaz said that he would bringIslam to Pakistan. Does the publicthink these things need to beinvestigated independently or not?No one had heard of Osama BinLaden then. I had not either. He isfamous now. In those days he wasunknown but he was sitting thereinterfering in my government. Hepaid 10 million dollars to finance the


“Concocted stories and lies. Murtaza shaved Asif’smoustache or vice versa. Did they think Asif and

Murtaza were feudal barbarians from a bygone age thatthey would behave like this?”

Murtaza: victim of the agencies?

no-confidence move against me. Atthat time, we heard that the moneycame from Saudi Arabia. I sent aminister to meet King Fahd. He hasbeen very kind to me and I reallylike him. He is an urbane, generousand kind man. I told my emissary toremind the king that he had said tome: ‘Ali Bhutto was my brother andmy friend. I opposed his murder. Ithought it was unjust then and Ithink it is unjust now. You are likemy daughter’. Then how come hewas sending money to overthrowmy government?

He sent back a message sayingthat the Saudi government was notinvolved and it was a private Saudicitizen. Later on, from these twoindividuals who were with the PMLthen but are with us now, I learntthat the meetings involved Sharif, athen-serving corps commander andOsama and they wheedled 10million dollars out of Osama tooverthrow the government.

Meanwhile, my parliamentariansinformed me that they were offereda million dollars each by Mr. GhulamMustafa Jatoi to get rid of me. I likeMr. Jatoi. He treats me like adaughter and personally I have noproblem with him. But I do think Mr.Jatoi and I both owe it to the nationthat the facts should come out.

I set up my own Trojan horse. Itold the MNAs to go ahead and takethe money. ‘Let them think you arewith them’. That is how they lost theno-confidence motion. My fourMNAs were counted against me but

they did not crossover and two morejoined me. Otherwise they had it allset. And then we had this very funnyincident when these four MNAscame to the prime minister’s housewith briefcases of money and said,‘You take it’, and I said, ‘No, Icannot’. In the end, of course, themoney was not taken but the factremains that these sorts of sumswere paid for no-confidence votes.

And they were not paid by thepolitical parties but by theintelligence agencies and rogueelements in the military as well asright-wing adventurists.

And at the SAF games, Beg satnext to me with a very satisfiedsmile on his face. When three PMLMNAs came and sat next to me, hisface fell. ‘What are they doinghere?’ he asked me in panic. Ismiled and said they had joined thegovernment. ‘Isn’t that wonderful?’Beg just looked like a ghost.

And then we were accused ofhorse-trading and corruption. Thusthe intelligence agencies try tocreate a ‘heads, I win, tails, youlose’ situation for the political class.This simply cannot continue.

Q. What happened during yoursecond tenure?

A. When General Javed Ashrafwas my DG ISI, everything was fine.But then one day an ISI official

heroically — and there are heroesamongst them as well — intercepteda coup attempt by BrigadierMuntasir. Muntasir’s group wasusing the army’s name to smugglearms into Pakistan. And the nextthing I knew, the officer whointercepted the coup (instead ofbeing given a medal) was shuntedout. A person called Shujaat wasinstalled and all our troubles began.Then Javed Ashraf went andGeneral Raana came in. Good man,but he must have been quite simple

because he brought me this absurdreport. It was absurd and it wasfalse, I knew that. The report saidthat Asif Zardari, along with JavedPasha, was going to mortgagePakistan’s airports. I was incensed,knowing the report to be untrue, andwanted it investigated. I expectedthe ISI report to pay accoladesacknowledging our efforts tostreamline the economy. I asked


“I would like General Mahmood to explain to the nation at whose behest he

destabilised the government.”

Lt. General Mahmood: Did he destabilise elected governments?

Raana for verification of this reportas, clearly, the source had playedmischief. But he asked me to let itbe and I did. Henceforth, the reportsbecame manufactured.

Anyway, General Shujaat tookover and started destabilising thegovernment. General NaseerullahBabar came to me, we spoke to thedefence secretary but he wasunable to remove him. We spoke tothe DG ISI, Raana, but he did notremove him. So here is this ISIInternal, running a politicalcampaign to overthrow yourgovernment and the constitutiondoes not allow you to hold himaccountable.

In January 1996, I was flying toinaugurate the Akora Dam when oneof the officials informed me thatGeneral Mahmood, then DG MI, hadasked him to resign citing ‘AsifZardari’s corruption’. The officialrefused and Mahmood told him that,‘She is going by March and we willsort you out’. I heard this and keptquiet. In March 1996, threejournalists were called by the DG MIto GHQ and asked to write variousstories. I would like GeneralMahmood to explain to the nation atwhose behest he did these things.Was it at the president’s behest?Was it at the army chief’s behest?Was it at the behest of a foreignpower? At whose behest? Let thepeople of Pakistan know howpolicies are made.

Then came the interesting Surreyscandal. How was it that the scandal

was in the possession of theparliamentary opposition a day priorto its publication in a Britishnewspaper? In July 1996, I heardthat the DG MI had said that theSurrey scandal is nothing comparedto what is to come. I took this upwith Jahangir Karamat. I said,‘Please ask the DG MI if this is partof his duties. Is he doing thisbecause of you? Is he doing this

because of something else?’Karamat wrote me a letter inresponse saying that raising thisissue meant that I did not trust himand, therefore, he would resign. Idid have the option of saying, ‘Fine,I accept your resignation’. But Ithought he was a good man,although a bit weak, so I said, ‘No,you must not resign. I took this upwith you because you are my COASand if your subordinate officer doessomething, I ought to take it up withyou’. Nothing happened to the DGMI.

Q. And then... A. I was in the NWFP when I got

a report from the COAS saying thatGeneral Hameed Gul came to seehim and told him that the Presidentwas ready to sack the primeminister. But the president,according to Hameed Gul, said thathe could not discuss this with thearmy chief because he felt that thearmy chief was very friendly with theprime minister and therefore thearmy chief should himself raise theissue with the president. I washorrified at this report. In the middleof August there was a dinner for theTurkish president and Leghari wasbeing very sweet to me, offering megulab jamuns and so on. Now, I wasin a state of confusion. Were theytrying to make me distrust thepresident whom I had known for solong? In the midst of all this, one ofthe president’s relatives came tosee me and said that the DG MI(General Mahmood) was telling the

president that he had to get rid ofBenazir and if he did not then thearmy would get rid of the presidentand the prime minister. The plotthickened to an unreal extent. Was itthe president? Was it the armychief? Was it the chief justice? Wasit the DG MI, the DG ISI, the DGInternal? Who was it? And thesequestions, I feel, ought to be in thepublic domain. Not for my sake.

What happened to me, happened.But Pakistan deserves a betterfuture than to fall victim to repeatedpalace intrigues.

I called General Babar andSherpao and asked them to speak tothe president. The president toldthem that if they (the army) put a gunto his head, he would not dismiss thegovernment. ‘She is my sister andshe has made me president. I am aBaloch. I am ghairatmand. How canI think of turning against mybenefactress?’ I called the COAS todiscuss the report in light of thepresident’s response. The COASsaid he could mediate if there was agulf. Then he told me that someforeign bankers came to see himand said that the economy wasgoing to default. This of course, wasabsolutely untrue. (It may defaultnow but not then.) I wondered whatthese foreign bankers were doingbriefing the COAS. Looking for jobsat the behest of the president? Idon’t know. I informed the COASthat he was being given falseinformation. There was no danger ofdefault. I told him, ‘The presidentdenies wanting to sack thegovernment. You tell me he is goingto. Why don’t you talk to him. Askhim point blank— are you going todissolve the government? And thencome back and tell me’. The COASagreed. That night my brother waskilled.

Later on, I learnt that the COASasked the president if he would stilldissolve the government that very

day. And he responded, ‘Yes, I havegone too far to turn back’. That iswhy I think Murtaza’s murder waspart of the plan. One day he waskilled. The next day Leghari comesto condole. The following day hehas the Supreme Court opened on apublic holiday. He tries to create apresidential form of government,starts writing letters about corruptionand starts inviting Nawaz Sharif


“Hardly had I put the phone down that it rangand Hameed Gul was on the line

sneering: You want to know why he has gone? I’ll tell you... ha ha ha.”

over. There are a lot of intrigues thattook place.

I blamed the president for mybrother’s murder and planned to filean FIR against him. However, two ofmy ministers intervened.Consequently, I met with thepresident. After my brother’s firstThursday prayer, I asked him hisplans. ‘I am your brother. How couldI ever be involved. I’m trying to saveyou’ and other such rubbish was allhe had to say in response. Anyway,I said, ‘Farooq, our mutual friends inthe press, Irshad Haqqani, NajamSethi and others say that thepresident is going to dismiss thegovernment because of Zardari andcorruption and so on. Is this trueFarooq? Do you want this done?’He flatly denied it but he could only

seek refuge in social niceties. ‘Haveanother piece of cake. Have a gulabjamun. I had these brought for youbecause they are your favourite’. Iheard him and went back but by thistime I did not trust him.

Originally, my dilemma was thatKaramat was honourable but I didnot know him. It was difficult for meto choose between the presidentand the COAS. But I must say, in

retrospect, that I exonerate Karamatand the military as an institution. Itwas the president in collusion withrogue elements of the intelligenceand security apparatus thatoverthrew the government.

Karamat informed me that he hadasked the president to give theprime minister till December 31 tosort out differences. But thenFarooq got suspicious because hewas told that the COAS was intouch with the prime minister. Hetold the COAS, ‘I cannot wait tillDecember 31. I will move onNovember 14 when she returnsfrom Rome’. But then he decided tooverthrow the government on thenight of November 4. Meanwhile,they changed my military secretarytelling me it was a routine change.

And when the COAS tried to sendme a message, he could not getthrough. The COAS then got intouch with the defence secretary buthe, too, could not get through to me.

A totally wrong impression wasbuilt up of a collapsing, defaultingeconomy by the likes of ShahidJaved Burki and Shaukat Aziz. Onthe night of November 4, the IMFdirector was sitting with me. He

said, ‘I have been over the budgetwith a fine comb, Pakistan is overthe worst and now it will be smoothsailing’. My opponents simply didnot want this announcement made

nor did they want the IMF director tobrief the COAS and the armyaccordingly.

They sent a Colonel Asif to thePM House and as soon as the lightswent out, they moved. GeneralBabar reported that the army hadtaken over the airports. I rang up thepresident and said, ‘do you knowthis?’ He said, ‘Really?’ andpretended to be so shocked. I said,


“I can understand why Farooq Leghari was upset over the videotape. Perhaps they felt

he needed a little push to expedite the government’s dismissal.”

The aftermath: Nusrat andBenazir Bhutto grieving forMurtaza

Leghari with Bhutto: a case of self-interest over national interest

‘Cut it out. I want to know whetherthey are acting on your orders’. Hestarted mumbling and said, ‘I had todo it. I had no choice’. I told him thatthat was what Zia had said to myfather. That is why I started callinghim Farooqul Haq. I also told him,‘Khair, waqt batai ga kay ye sahi ya

ghalat faisla hai’.Usually when a government is

formed, the institutions ofgovernment respect the law. Thiswas not the case in my experience.And I would like to ask thesepeople: Why? Why was this done?Intelligence operatives openly saidthat the government was going. OnSeptember 6, Defence Day, I was inKarachi chairing a law and order

meeting. General Akram, the DGRangers, asked, ‘Prime Minister, wehear your government is going.What is the truth in this?’ Who toldAkram my government was goingwhen I enjoyed a majority inparliament and there were no streetprotests? What was happening? All

these generals were sitting aroundtelling journalists that thegovernment must go. One of myfriends in the Herald told me thatthey had started dropping brownmanila envelopes at the Heraldoffices.

In short, a political governmentwas destabilised by the securityapparatus. Precisely on whoseorders, I cannot say.

Q. What led to Murtaza Bhutto’sdeath? What was the role of theintelligence apparatus in hisdeath?

A. In July, I met my brother andwe had a good meeting. In August,the DG ISI came to see me andbrought an MI report claiming thatBenazir and Murtaza had made upand had decided to kill oppositionleaders including Nawaz andChaudhry Shujaat. In exchange, itsaid, I had agreed to release oneShaukat (who had killed theMasooma sisters in Karachi and islocked up in a Gujrat jail). The reportstated that Murtaza was going touse several people, including YarooBaloch, for the killings. I had a copysent to Murtaza. And I told the DGISI that, ‘This report is incorrect.Who is giving the COAS reports thatsay that the prime minister of thecountry is planning to murder?’ Hereplied that the DG MI received thereport and gave it to the chief whoasked that it be brought to the primeminister’s attention. I said the reportwas wrong. But there has been noinquiry on this report to date. Theperson who gave it to MI isunknown, as is his motive for falselyclaiming that the prime minister andher brother were planning murder.There are many such concoctedreports that reach the highest levelsof government due to lack of checkson, and the accountability of, thosewho send them. I believe thatbecause I gave a copy to mybrother, he was killed. If I had not,

maybe they would have killed one ofthe PML (N) leaders instead of himand Murtaza and I would both be injail on murder charges. Interestingly,when my brother was killed, all thepeople who were mentioned in theMI report were actually on site. Howdid the MI know that? And who gavethe MI this information? I am notblaming the MI because I don’tknow and I don’t like to cast


“I believe that because I gave a copy of the MI report to mybrother, he was killed. If I had not, maybe they would have

killed one of the PML (N) leaders instead of him and Murtazaand I would both be in jail on murder charges.”

aspersions but somebodywas intriguing and hadgiven all these names. Iwas very distressed.

When Murtaza waskilled, his widow, Ghinwa,was made a Pakistanicitizen overnight inviolation of rules andregulations. Murtaza didnot want her to be aPakistani citizen. She hadbeen married to him formany years and had neversought Pakistanicitizenship. But lo andbehold, she was aPakistani citizen,dispensing with iddat andher party afloat withmoney. The tri-colouredposters that her groupprinted could not beafforded by any of themajor political parties.Where did that moneycome from, for God’s sake?All these things happened and I’dlike answers.

Q. What you are describing is asituation where nobody seems tobe following the law andeverybody is destabilising thecivilian government for rathermurky ends...

A. General Waheed came to meand said Brigadier Muntasir plannedto kill the prime minister, thepresident, the COAS and all thecorps commanders. He said anexample should be made of

Muntasir. But after COAS Waheedwent, COAS Karamat came to meand said, ‘Don’t try him, slow itdown’. So who worked on who?

I remember, one day I rang up thedefence secretary and said, ‘I havecome to know that the president’ssecretary (Shamsher) is having asecret meeting with Abida Hussainand Fakhr Imam at the house ofFarooq Majeed in Islamabad. And

after that meeting, he is going tomeet the COAS. Could you pleasering up the COAS and find out why?’Hardly had I put the phone downwhen it rang and Hameed Gul wason the line sneering: ‘You want toknow why he has gone? I’ll tell you... ha ha ha.’ Even in October orNovember 1996, high level retiredofficers were personally listening into our conversations to the extentthat within 30 seconds a responseopenly ridiculing the sitting primeminister was made.

So, you see, something quiteextraordinary was taking place. Theprime minister’s telephones weretapped. One COAS wanted to hangBrigadier Muntasir while the otherwanted to show leniency. COASWaheed never asked to stop theinquiry into DG ISI Asad Durranisiphoning money from public sectorbanks. But COAS Karamat did. Howand why did these things happen?

How and why did these decisionschange? The nation needs to know.

These intrigues cannot go on. AndI am not talking about retribution. Iam talking about acknowledgement.When my brother was killed, the ISIInternal corps spread word in everyvillage that Benazir and herhusband had killed Murtaza.Naturally, when you hear somethingeverywhere, you do begin to believeit. People know better today. But theissue is what was done then.

Q. There were many other

rumours and scandals as well... A. Concocted stories. For

instance, there is this story thatMurtaza shaved Asif’s moustache orvice versa. This is simply a lie. Didthey think Asif and Murtaza werefeudal barbarians from a bygoneage that they would behave likethis? But it was believed. How dothese things get manufactured andfind their way into the press? I would


“Something quite extraordinary was taking place: the prime minister’s telephones were

tapped; one COAS wanted to hang Brigadier Muntasir but the other wanted to show leniency.”

Sharif with Leghari: was the president blackmailed by Sharif?

like to know who gave the MI reportof those very people who were withmy brother on the day he was killed.And it was a ditto copy of an attempton my mother in January 1994.

A prime minister could not haveasked for a more obedient colleaguethan Farooq Leghari. He got spoilt.Something happened. His cousincame to me after the overthrow andsaid that he asked Leghari why hehad dismissed the government.According to the cousin, Leghariresponded, ‘her husband made a

videotape of my child’s relationship(with a Lahore-based individual) andmy ghairat did not give mepermission.’ Well, I knew nothing ofhis family’s personal matters otherthan what he told me. I did not knowabout the tape. So, I ask: who madethe tape and gave it to the presidentwith the intention of provoking him?I am willing to go before a Truth andReconciliation Commission and say

I was told this by Hamid NasirChattha and Leghari’s relatives. Idid not do this. Neither did myhusband. So, you see, I have seena president, an army chief and aseries of people who were loyal andobedient but who turned against me.I can understand why he was upsetover the videotape. Perhaps theyfelt he needed a little push toexpedite the government’sdismissal.

It is said, and could beinvestigated, that Farooq was

blackmailed because there was acotton scandal in which he wasaccused of taking money. Accordingto this uninvestigated report, Farooqarranged huge sums of money froma Punjab-based banker to buy upthe cotton crop and export it. NawazSharif accused him of corruptionand Farooq instituted a defamationcase. Nawaz fought the case. It issaid that Farooq then asked Shahid

Hamid to negotiate with Sharif(because the case was goingagainst him). Shahid Hamid,apparently, contacted Nawaz tosettle out of court. It is argued thatLeghari was pressurised by NawazSharif through the defamation suit.The case was only withdrawn afterSharif came to power.

There are many stories, sometrue and some not, based onintrigue and abuse of power. Andone is unable to identify where theabuse of power comes from? Does

it come from the president, the ISI,the MI, the chief justice or the armychief? Each time the power isabused the centre from which it isbeing abused shifts. Sometimes thechief justice is used, sometimes thepresident or somebody else. Wecannot have an army or intelligenceagencies that constantly destabilisegovernments. We cannot haverogue elements incessantly violating


“COAS Waheed never asked to stop the inquiry into DG ISIAsad Durrani siphoning money from public sector banks.

But COAS Karamat did. How and why did these things happen?How and why did these decisions change?”

Bhutto with General Waheed Kakar: a trouble-free relationship

their oath andplunging the nationinto crises.

Q. As apopularly electedleader, why didyou not see fit toshare thisinformation withthe people ofPakistan whileyou were inpower?

A. Maybe Ishould have donethat. But I thought Iwould be creatingmore polarisationand confrontationand a break downof theconstitutionalmachinery. Andunder the 8thamendment, thepresident had theright to dissolve agovernment if hefelt that the constitutional machinerywas breaking down. I wanted toavoid giving them a pretext.

In 1990, I was slammed fordisclosing that the ISI overthrew mygovernment and accused of trying todivide the country and the army.Subsequently, it was proved thatGeneral Asad Durrani took 10crores from one provincial bankalone to pay my political opponents.No inquiry has been conductedabout how much the other provincial

banks gave for that campaign.There is a list of politicians who tookpayments, including Nawaz Sharif. Iwould like to see him before a TRC.Who ran the media campaign withadvertisements on the back pagesof newspapers? A lot happened andblaming politicians alone fortarnishing democracy is actuallyless than half the story.

I believe I won four elections.

Twice the governments weredestabilised. And twice, partisanadministrations conducted electionsand ensured the defeat of the PPP.The DG ISI, Hameed Gul, admittedto influencing the 1988 elections.The DG ISI, Asad Durrani, admittedto influencing the 1990 elections. Inthe 1997 elections, 150 computerswere bought from a man — I knowhim — to rig the election. I wrote aletter to the president saying that theelection will be rigged. The

computers were installed in ModelTown. The returning officers (thepresiding officers) were given listswith 50 to 100 names missing oneach. After the elections, theelection commission computerswere hacked into and the additionalvotes in those polling stations wereadded to the tally.

I made mistakes and I amprepared to admit them but so must

others. Others also owe it: they oweit to their own armed forces, to thepeople of Pakistan and to theMuslim world. We call the lastdecade the decade of dirtydemocracy. I see it as one when wepretended democracy but principallyconspired against a democraticallyelected leader and her government.

Secondly, my agenda was not tofight with the military and the securityapparatus. My agenda was to changethe destiny of the people of Pakistan.

And I am proud of my efforts in thatrespect. I am proud of the fact that webrought electricity to villages that hadnever had it before. I am proud of thefact that people in urban areas whocould not get telephone lines for 20years, got them immediately, thanksto my government. There wasvirtually nothing by way of technologywhen the PPP took over. I broughtthe world of modern technology to


“Who told General Akram my government was going when I enjoyed a majority in

parliament and there were no street protests?”

Opposition politics again: Bhutto with allies in 1997

Pakistan and I have a legacy. Weeliminated polio, reduced infantmortality rates and there is so muchthat I did. And maybe, the way I seelife, this was a power battle. That yes,the establishment had to be resistedbut at the same time, thedispossessed and the downtroddenwho had put their faith in me neededmy time and my attention. The PPPincreased literacy rates by a third. Iwas given a gold medal by the WorldHealth Organisation (WHO) for ourefforts in the health sector. I built48,000 primary schools, recruited70,000 new teachers and changedthe dynamics of Pakistan. These aresolid achievements on the ground,acknowledged and honoured byindependent observers. The ISIpropaganda may obscure them in thepress but the beneficiaries are onlytoo aware of them.

Most importantly, I do believe thatthe changed dynamics have led tothe enlargement of the liberalconstituency and the resistance tomilitary dictatorship has alsoincreased, albeit in a differentfashion.

Q. How can this situationchange? How can Pakistanensure that civilian governmentsare not destabilised by theintelligence apparatus?

A. It is for us, as a nation, todecide what we want together. Thearmy can reveal its true intentionsby eliminating democracy andQuaid-e-Azam’s Pakistan throughrule by puppets — and there are a

lot of puppets in the market. Or else,the military has to learn toacquiesce to the people’s will. Weare all part of the problem and weare all part of the solution. I thinkthere is a need for a frank and opentalk between all the different playersbecause, in our own ways, we alllove Pakistan.

What are we going to have now?A revolution or a Truth and

Reconciliation Commission wherethese issues are exposed, less forretribution and more for a recordand acknowledgement of victims. Itbothers me that a man was hired toallege that my husband had tied abomb to his [the man’s] leg. Thiswas done in order to fabricate acase against [Zardari], and it wasprinted in the Washington Post andelsewhere. Political parties are

unable to combat intelligenceagencies with vast resources.

After the government’s overthrow,I received an alleged ISI messagethat I should boycott the electionsbecause otherwise theestablishment would give Sharif atwo-thirds majority. I declinedthrough the messenger. I felt that ifthe PPP boycotted the elections,there could be martial law and I

wanted to spare theparty the historicalblame for creating sucha situation. I understandthat the COAS andchief justice were readyto restore the 1993assembly in 1996,minus myself as primeminister. I was giventhis message by aconduit and it wasconfirmed to me by thechief justice through myformer attorney general.Farooq Leghari refusedto accept this andthreatened to resign.These decisions havelittle to do with law.There is a lack of stronginstitutions and weneed to build those.

During my secondgovernment, I heardthat certain officersasked Chief JusticeSajjad Ali Shah tocreate a crisis andpromised that he would

be made interim prime minister. Itook this issue up with the army. Iwas told that the army did not haveofficers with the names I hadprovided. The military alsocomplained that the prime ministercould not control the army eventhough the defence ministry wasunder the prime minister. Thecourts supported this view in mydismissal.

I would like to talk about theseexperiences with the service chiefs(with whom, for the most part, I hadgood relations) and see whatsolutions emerge and howintelligence reports can be madesubject to accountability andauthenticity checks. Otherwise,jawans and generals hearing aboutthe prime minister’s husband’salleged bid to mortgage the airports,


“A destabilising political role has been played by a chief of army staff, by chiefs of

intelligence, by the heads of the ISI and the president, at different times.”

Jahangir Karamat: well-meaning but weak

will be justifiably upset. This is onething, in addition to the use oftorture in fabricating cases, that aTruth and ReconciliationCommission could investigate. Howcould the ISI chief, General Raana,give the prime minister a report thatwas so totally contrary to facts? Andif such information is circulated inthe armed forces, then we are beingset up for a perpetual state ofconfrontation between the militaryand the civil rulers.

Perhaps, the service chiefs cancome up with a system that

examines intelligence reports of thelast decade to assess theircredibility and suggests steps thatcan be taken to ensure that this kindof disinformation at the highestlevels is not perpetuated.

It is wrong to believe that theproblem always lies with armychiefs. I got on well with Beg till hewas alienated through false reports.COAS Kakar, in fact, tried to save

democracy, as did COAS Karamat.The problem is with the intelligenceagencies — the security apparatus.

Q. Will the generals be requiredto testify before the Truth andReconciliation Commission youare proposing?

A. We need a figure like Mandelaor Bishop Tutu, someone with greatmoral authority, to preside over it.Then, we need the victims to startcoming first. Not the servinggenerals but the victims must becalled first. Once we start with thetortured and the coerced, we will get

a paper trail back to thoseresponsible. I understand that mostof them are retired Ziaist officerswho fought the Afghan jihad andhave infiltrated the securityapparatus to dictate their securityagenda.

My husband was interrogated byan army officer in the murderinquiry of my brother and that waswrong. It was simply beyond the

army’s purview. Let’sstart. I am not here toprejudge. Maybe somegenerals will be calledand maybe some willnot. Some wereinvolved and some werenot. Second, I’d like toinvite the UN rapporteuron judges and thejudiciary to investigatecases of judicial abuseand responsibility. Notjust on my case but onHubco, for example.Was it right for theLahore High Court,through JusticeQayyum, to rewrite thetariff? How did thathappen? On the Saimacase: did the judgeconduct himselfproperly? It is time toreform our institutions.And rather than look for

a messiah, it is time for us to back apolitical party with an agenda, evenif we disagree with some aspects ofthat political party.

These games have to end. Andthey are played by elements withinthe military and the rest of us haveto play along just to survive and stayafloat. I think the retired Ziaistelement choreographs these events.It is very powerful. They used theirpower to back Musharraf when hewas in the air. When they did notwant to back Karamat, he could nottake power even though he was on

the ground. Q. What about the problems

associated with Asif Zardari?A. My husband has spent seven of

the last 10 years behind bars. OK.He is not an angel. Maybe he didthings that were wrong. He is manenough to say, ‘I did it’, in a fair andimpartial inquiry. But what about allthose others who are asked topervert the course of justice? What


“We cannot have an army or intelligence agencies that constantly destabilise governments. We cannot

have rogue elements incessantly violating their oath andplunging the nation into crises.”

Soldiering on: Bhutto campaigns after her dismissal in 1996

about the police officers who weretortured to say that Asif Zardari hadMurtaza murdered? Two SDMs wereremoved, Four IOs were changedand I don’t know how manymagistrates were changed becausethey refused to pervert justice.Which were the army officersinvolved in the perversion of legalityand justice? Why did they do it?

Both times I formed thegovernment, I found that thegenerals respected me — and theyhad good reason. I continued withthe Bhuttoist dream of a strong,impregnable Pakistan and besides,whatever they wanted in thedefence arena, they got. Ultimately,they turned against me, affected bythe smear campaign labelling me aJewish agent, an Indian agent, anAmerican agent and accusing myhusband of being corrupt. Whenpeople are getting small salariesand they are told that one is rippingoff the nation and their utility billsare going up, not because thearmed forces are consuming a hugeamount but because Asif Zardarihas a polo team, it does createresentment. Public opinion ismanipulated into turning againstyou. I do have a political structureand solid base that has stood byme. But how can a political partyfight an organised military, severalintelligence outfits, the presidentand the judiciary ? It is veryimportant to create this awareness.It is very important for the press tocome on board to expose these

manipulations.Corruption and efficiency are

strangers to each other. Both thegovernments I led have been farmore efficient than anything inbetween, including the presentregime. The economic indicators forthe periods in question back myassertions. Therefore, the onlylogical conclusion that can be drawnis that the quantum of corruption

during both my tenures was farlower than all the other periods ofmilitary and quasi-military (underNawaz) rule.

Q. What you have described isan arbitrary system ofgovernance run by individualwhim. Even if a TRC brings thesethings out in the open, they maynot come to an end. How can weput an end to this situation?

A. The situation can be endedthrough constitutional restructuring. Iremember how very hawkish theWestern world was during the ColdWar. Once women entered politics,things started to change. Theparticipation of women is veryimportant. A TRC can only be onepart of the solution. A UN rapporteuron the judiciary is another. The thirdaspect is a consensus between thearmed forces and the political partieson an NSC, not as Musharraf wantsit but as an umbrella where the roleof the security apparatus can bemonitored. A constitutionalmechanism which defines the role ofintelligence agencies, lays downprocedures for them and ensuresthat they work within the ambit of thelaw and constitution. This ties in withthe disbursal of unauthorised fundsto these intelligence agencies andthe practice of these agencies toextract money from banks, stateinstitutions and state-runorganisations

Q. Do you think you will beprime minister again?

A. Well, yes, I do. The people

support me and I can be primeminister again. However, I do notparticularly want to be primeminister again, having been theretwice already. But Pakistan is facinga bleak future. My party, our allies,and increasingly, independentobservers, feel that I owe it to mycountry to give of my experience ofmy leadership of the PPP, to pull thecountry out of bankruptcy and put it

once again on a pluralistic,democratic path.

Q. What would you dodifferently this time?

A. In this question there is animplicit assumption. Some of thethings I did were very good andsome ought to be done differently.

But let me state clearly that I amnot a messiah. I can only workwithin the limitations placed uponme by the people (in terms of myability to effect constitutionalchange) and the institutionalrealities of Pakistan. For example, ifI come in, I’m going to have to workwith judges who have beenappointed by people of a verydifferent ideological thinking. Whathappened in the judges’ case? Letus examine that. Every single judgewas appointed in writing, in thesame way in which judges hadbeen appointed in the past. Justbefore my first term, because theydid not want liberal judges, theypacked the courts with 50 judgeswithout the advice of the primeminister, which wasunconstitutional. When I becameprime minister, my attorney generaldenotified them. Today, they areamongst those trying me: JusticesQayyum, Rehman and Abbasi. Thesacked judges came back to gettheir revenge. Anyway, the judgesthen decided that even if they wereillegally appointed, the illegallyappointed ones would belegitimised. Then came my secondtenure, where in accordance with

the legal prescription, I appointedmore judges.

One of my appointees, Justice ArifIqbal Bhatti acquitted a manaccused of blasphemy and all hellbroke loose. So, those illegallyappointed by Ghulam Ishaq Khanwere legitimised and thoseappointed legally by me were kickedout. The establishment obviously feltthat if these judges came in, they


“These games have to end. And they are played by elements within the military and the rest of us have to play along just to survive and stay afloat.”

would be affirmative on minorities,on women’s rights and other arenasand their power base would bethreatened. And when I made aspeech in the parliament about it,they could not find a word wrongwith it so they filled the press withcomments such as, ‘Her tone waswrong’. Nawaz Sharif could stormthe court and it was fine.

Q. What errors of judgementdid you make — all mitigatingcircumstances notwithstanding?And how would you tackle themdifferently now?

A. There are several areas whereI would do things differently. First,perceptions of corruption were nottackled by an independentinvestigative system. We brushedthem aside and that was a mistake.Second, the security agenda thatwe adopted led to increasedtension within the region. I wish wehad taken the opportunity to carryon with the task begun when RajivGandhi was prime minister of India.I am very committed to the Kashmirissue but there is little to be gainedfrom repeating patterns of the pastthat lead to repeated conflict andnear-conflict while placing the issueitself in cold storage. I think weneed to acknowledge that this is adispute that needs managementand resolution. Also, I do believethat while we did hold hearings intoso-called extra-judicial killings,those hearings were not publicisedenough and instead of holdingthose hearings through sessions

judges, we should have had morewell known and established humanrights agencies such as AmnestyInternational, Asia Watch, HumanRights Watch and other NGOs.

But I insist that in terms of socialdevelopment and the economy, bothmy tenures, particularly the latterone, were periods of tremendousgrowth.

One other area that I failed to

tackle was defence expenditure. Ihad revenues pouring in through oursuccessful policies and I thought,‘Let us share this largesse with themilitary’. But I think the time hascome when we need a new postCold War identity for the military.The Cold War is over. The idea thatPakistan, without US aid amountingto 4.5 billion dollars, can maintainparity with India, is wrong. I think thetime has come for Pakistan to delinkitself from what India does. The timehas come to involve our armedforces, as my father did, in nationalreconstruction without taking awaythe civil bureaucracy’s rights.

Q. Why have you chosen to

speak about these issues now? A. In one way or another I have

constantly been speaking aboutthem. Perhaps some people whowere not listening earlier arebeginning to listen now.

Tomorrow they may decide to killme because I know too much. But Iwant this on record so that one day,10 years from now, 20 years fromnow, somebody goes back and

says, ‘What was happening inQuaid-e-Azam’s Pakistan?’ Withoutputting an end to destabilisation,democracy will fail again, even if wehave another election and anothergovernment. We need the rule oflaw and we need a defined role foreverybody.

Even now, there are reports ofintelligence lists of 642 clearednames for the so-called local bodieselection for the Larkana divisionalone. I do not want to malign thearmy or the ISI and I do not want tomalign the politicians. There arepoliticians willing to be Juliets to themilitary’s Romeo but they jilt thepeople in the process. It is time the

people counted. The DG ISI turned against me.

Why? Because I was his boss and Iwas cross with him when he gaveme a report that was wrong and Iwanted him to substantiate it and hecouldn’t. Should intelligence reportsnot be substantiated whenquestioned by executive authority?

As a nation, we need to come toterms with the past and then let go


“The important thing is that what happened to me as the popularly elected leader of the people should not

happen to other popularly elected leaders.”

Refusing to back down: a resurgent Bhutto meets party leaders in exile

of it. I see life as a journey whereevery single soul is tested by Allah.What sustains me is my faith. I amnot a fanatic though my enemiesportray me as a fundamentalist witha dupatta on the head and a tasbihin hand. I am devout. I am like manymodern Pakistanis who do believein equal opportunities, freedom andfree markets but who also needspiritual sustenance in a world thatis increasingly materialistic. I havebeen given much, including theopportunity to serve the people ofPakistan twice as their primeminister. Maybe I will serve a thirdtime. Maybe I will not. The importantthing is that what happened to meas the popularly elected leader ofthe people should not happen toother popularly elected leaders.

Q. But what happens if thereare new elections, you win thembut not with an absolute majorityand the new King’s Party startsplaying games? Will it not happenall over again?

A. Either the democratic forceswin or the establishment wins. If theestablishment wins, the past will berepeated and that is what hashappened for 50 years. If thedemocratic forces win, maybe the21st century will be different forPakistan. It is a fight and we areunable to say who will be thewinner. But then, democracy is alsoabout evolution. And democracy isalso about fighting for what youbelieve is right and not giving up. n


“Tomorrow they may decide to kill me because I know toomuch. But I want this on record so that one day, 10 yearsfrom now, 20 years from now, somebody goes back and says: What was happening in Quaid-e-Azam’s Pakistan?”

Benazir Bhutto on Pakistan's Military Establishment and how the Generals undermine Democracy

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Transcript of Benazir Bhutto on Pakistan's Military Establishment and how the Generals undermine Democracy