Benaim - A Conversation with Dr. Kenneth M. Pollack

8/12/2019 Benaim - A Conversation with Dr. Kenneth M. Pollack

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The Fletcher School Al Nakhlah Tufts University160 Packard Avenue Medford, MA 02155-7082 U.S.A Tel: +1.617.627.3700

The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Fall 2006

AConversationwithDr.KennethM.Pollack

DanielBenaim

KennethM.PollackisDirectorofResearchatthe

SabanCenterforMiddleEastPolicyandSeniorFellow

inForeign

Policy

Studies

at

The

Brookings

Institution.

HeservedasDirectorforNearEastandSouthAsian

AffairsandDirectorforPersianGulfAffairsonthe

U.S.NationalSecurityCouncilandasaCIAmilitary

analystonIranandIraq. HeistheauthorofArabsat

War,MilitaryEffectiveness:19481991,

ThreateningStorm:TheCaseforInvadingIraq,

andThePersianPuzzle:TheConflictBetween

IranandAmerica.

October 17, 2006

Iwas struckby something youwrote recently.

Yousaid thattheonly thingstandingbetween

Iraq and a descent into total Bosnialike

devastation is 135,000 U.S. troops and even

theyaremerelyslowingthefall. Howwillwe

knowifIraqisslidingintoalloutcivilwar?

Well, themost useful statistic in these kinds of

situations counterinsurgencies, stability

operations, civil war is civilian casualties.

Whether

the

number

of

Iraqis

is

50,000

dead

or

tentimesthat,thenumberislessrelevantthanthe

trendandthetrendlineisaverybadone.

Also,moreandmore Iraqishave lost confidence

thatnextyearwillbebetter.This is a keybellwether of

Iraqi hope for the future

andwillingness to cling to

reconstruction. Also,

Iraqis are increasingly

sayingthatthewarwasnot

worth it. They claim tobe

worse off than they were

under Saddam Hussein.

Andthat

is

saying

alot,

because we should never

lose sight of the fact that

Saddamdidnotneedtobedemonizedhewas

a demon. The state that he ran in Iraq was

absolutelyawful,soforIraqistosaytheircurrent

situationisworsespeaksvolumestotheirsenseof

where things are headed andjust howbad the

violenceisgetting.

They claim to be woroff than they were

under SaddamHussein. And that isaying a lot, becauswe should never lossight of the fact tha

Saddam did not nee

to be demonized hwas a demon

TowhatextentcanU.S.troopsactuallyserve to

staveoff

this

war?

Would

it

make

adifference

if

therewere60,000troops? 200,000troops?

Thetroopnumbersarecertainlynotunimportant,

but there ismore to it than that. TheU.S. troop

presence in Iraq is themost important retarding

factor. Militias cannot openly engage in ethnic

cleansingaslongastheU.S.isthere.

Daneil Benaim, Fletcher MALD 2006, has published

articles in The International Herald Tribune, The

BostonGlobe,TheNation,TheAmericanProspect

Online, and The New York Post. He is former

EditorinChief of alNakhlah and currently works as

speechwritertoUnitedStatesSenatorJohnKerry.


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Al Nakhlah2

Lookatwhathappened inBalad: Sunnigroups

attacked Shia, the Shia retaliated and started a

campaignofethniccleansing.Withinjustadayor

two,AmericanandIraqitroopsweredeployedto

Balad and shutdown all of those operations. In

theabsenceofU.S.troops,thoseoperationswould

have continued; they would have snowballed.

YouwouldhaveseenreprisalsfromtheSunnis,a

Bosnialikesituationofethniccleansingbreeding

ethniccleansing. As long as theU.S. troops are

there, theycanshutthisdown.

CantheU.S.reversethisdynamic?

Its unclear at this point. We have gone so far

down this path,we dont knowwhetherweve

crossedapoint

of

no

return.

That

said,

its

clear

thatwhereU.S. troopsarepresent,workingwith

Iraqisandusing the right tactics, theydohavea

very positive impact. Iraqi andAmerican units

pairedupcanbringrealsecuritytoareas. Ihave

seenthismyselfinMosul.WheregoodIraqiunits

arepresentwithAmericanforces,theycancreate

greater security, which can open up lowlevel

political and economic development that can

reallyturnthingsaround.

Thebest

example

of

this

was

H.R.

McMaster

in

TalAfar. Hewasabravecommander,hetrained

his troopsproperly,gotmany toabasic levelof

Arab proficiency, they spent a lot ofmoney on

reconstruction,andtheytriedrightfromthestart

tobringrealeconomicandpoliticaldevelopment

alongwithsecurity. Andwhile theywere there

theyenjoyedgreatsuccess.

In parts of Baghdad, were seeing something

similar. Thecurrentplandoesnothaveasmany

troops

as

it

needs

or

the

necessary

political

and

economicequipment. Butinsomeneighborhoods

ofBaghdad, theyare creatinggreater security to

wheretheeconomicandpoliticalcomponentscan

begintohaveagreaterimpact.

The problem is that we do not have nearly

enoughof that. Werejustnotconcentrating the

troopsproperlytodoitinbiggerswaths. Wejust

have 5 or 6 neighborhoods in Baghdad. And

Baghdad is gigantic, basically the size of Los

Angeleswedonthaveenoughtroopstocover

that much territory. Instead we have troops

spread out elsewhere in Iraq, where they are

simplystickingtheirfingerinthedike.

SoAmerican troops are helping to stave off the

inevitable,butiftheyhadtherightresourcesand

the right concentration of forces, maybe they

couldstillturnthingsaround. Butgiventhefact

thatwedonot,thegroundisstartingtoslipfrom

beneath their feet. Wemay stillget to civilwar

with theAmericanforcesthere; itjustwilltakea

lot longer than if the American troops were

withdrawn.

Whatother

potential

retarding

factors

do

you

see

wardingoffacivilwar?

Thereareafew. YoudohavealotofIraqipeople

whodonotwantacivilwar. Inmostcases,you

find that Iraqisunderstand thedangerandwant

to stickwith reconstruction. Whenever they see

American and Iraqi forcesdoing the right thing,

theydo theright thing. YoudostillhaveIraqis

joiningthesecurityservices,joiningthepolicefor

therightreasonsaswellasthewrongreasons. If

theAmericans

were

to

leave,

all

these

Iraqis

who

stillhavehopeandaretryingtodotherightthing

wouldhaveabsolutelynoincentivetodotheright

thing. It is very contingent on the U.S. troop

presence. In fact, they would have every

incentive tojoin one of themilitias as the only

way they could protect themselves. And then

theresalso the Iraqi leaderswhoare tryingvery

hard to do the right thing. It is an incredibly

formidable taskbutbecauseyoudohavepeople

like that who are willing to try, again it is

retarding

this

descent

towards

civil

war.

Itseemssomucheasiertopreventsectariancivil

war than it is to reverse itonce itsbegun. If

every flareup like the one you described in

Baladhasthepotentialtobecomethesparkfora

nationwide civil war, what is the bestcase

scenarioforIraq? Andhowdowegetthere?

The Fletcher School Al Nakhlah Tufts University


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Fall 2006 3

Ill give you an almostmiraculous scenario: the

U.S. agrees to concentrate its troops and really

deploysAmericantroopsalongwiththebestIraqi

troops in the places theyre most needed, fully

recognizingthatthismeansplaces likeAnbarare

going togo tohell. But thats theonlywayyou

candothis.

IftheUnitedStateswerewillingtoactuallyreach

outtotheUNandtheinternationalcommunityin

awayweneverhave,andcreateareasofsecurity

where thosecivilians canactuallyoperate freely,

thenyoucouldstarttomovethingsinadifferent

direction. Again, this is all in the realm of

possibility. Theseareallthingswhich,ifwehad

adopted them in the spring when they were

proposedbymy group andby Lt.Gen.Corelli,

groundforces

commander

in

Baghdad,

we

definitely could have turned the place around.

Eightmonthslater,itsgoingtobealotharderto

doso.

Whatweneed todo in Iraq is to start from the

ground up. All the solutions discussed on Iraq

focus on the top, on a national reconciliation

program, on aDaytonstylepeace conference

they allmiss thepoint. You arenever going to

have that happen until you start to change

conditionson

the

ground.

Right

now,

the

problem in Iraq is that you have a security

vacuum, people who live in fear, and no

functional economy or local leadership. Thats

what needs to change. Once that happens, you

canbreakthepowerofmilitiasbecause theywill

no longerhave the supportof thepeople. Once

thatshiftstothecentralgovernment,youcanstart

brokering these kinds of national reconciliation

deals. Butby focusingalloureffortson the top,

wehave allowed thebottom togo tohell. And

only

by

starting

to

rebuild

things

from

the

bottom

up arewe going tobe able to transform them.

The problem is that rebuilding from thebottom

takesalotlongerandrequiresalotmoreeffort.

Is there any way divide the country and split

mixedIraqicitieswithoutmassivebloodshed?

No,andthatstheproblem. Ihaveagreatdealof

respect forbothJoeBiden andLesGelb and for

their proposal, which is basically to help Iraq

divide itself and then simply preside over a

partitionwithinafederalstructure.

Theproblemisthat ifyoutrytodivideIraq,you

are going to get the civilwar that you seek to

prevent. However,ifyoucannotpreventtheslide

tocivilwar,perhapsin5,10,or15yearstherewill

be enough ethnic cleansing and enough

bloodshed thatyou canpresideover apartition.

ThatisessentiallywhathappenedinBosnia.

My colleague Michael OHanlon has been

proposing voluntary relocation. He is

proposing that we create financial and other

incentivesfor

Iraqis

to

leave

integrated

or

divided

communities andmove to communities that are

more homogenous. Its certainly somethingwe

ought to be looking hard at, but there are

obviouslysomeproblems.

Insomecases,youhavemixedfamiliesormixed

individuals. I cannot tell you howmany Iraqi

friendsofminedescribethemselvesassushis

halfSunni,halfShia. Wheredo theygo? What

becomesof them? Anddivided families? These

arebig

unanswered

questions,

aside

from

the

fact

thatmostIraqisdonotwant tomove. Manyare

saying theywouldrather fightanddie tostay in

theirhomes. Which,again,isexactlyhowyouget

a civil war. But there are Iraqis who are

increasinglybeing forcedoutof theirhomes. At

least for themaprogramofvoluntary relocation

mightgivethemanalternativetojoiningamilitia.

Youofferamicroloantostartasmallbusinessin

adifferentpartof thecountry. Maybe Iraqissee

this offer and,while it is not their first choice,

prefer

it

to

joining

the

Mahdi

Army

to

fight

for

theirhomes.

In caseof a civilwar,you recommend that the

U.S.notpicksides. Why?

Thismightseemcounterintuitive,butDanByman

andIdidsomehistoricalresearchanalyzingcivil

wars over the last 30 years. It emerged that



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Al Nakhlah4

picking sides is not actually helpful. Trying to

develop a proxy force to win the war for you

typicallydoesnotwork.

Whenyouget involvedcivilwarsbysupporting

proxies, everyone comes to grief. And thebest

exampleisthePakistanis. Ontheonehand,they

created a proxy thatwon theAfghan civilwar.

TheTalibanwon theAfghancivilwar,and look

what itdid toPakistan. Pakistan is an absolute

basketcase,tornapartbyIslamicfundamentalism

anddivisionswithinthesociety manyofwhich

were either caused or exacerbatedby the rise of

the Taliban. And so, even in case of victory,

supportingproxiesisnotagreatmodelforhowto

manageacivilwar.

Therehas

been

some

discussion

about

the

utility

of supporting an independent Kurdistan to

serveasafrontlineallyinthisregionakintoa

miniUlster solution theBritishhad inmind

forIsrael.Inyourestimate,isthissomethingthe

UnitedStatesshouldsupport?

Look,IamaKurdophile. I

have publicly and

repeatedly said that the

Kurds deserve their own

nation,and

Iabsolutely

believe that. But timing is

everything inpolitics. One

of the most interesting

phenomena in Iraq is that

many of the Iraqi leaders

still trying to do the right

thing areKurdsJalalTalabani,Barham Salih,

Hosheyar Zebari, and even Massoud Barzani.

Theyhavetakensomeofthemostimportantsteps

makingitpossibleforIraqtocontinuetostumble

along.

The Kurds recognize that the timing is not

propitious for them todeclare independence. If

we give them no other alternative, they will

declare independence. Butoneof the thingsour

study of civil wars revealed is that once one

subgroup declares independence, others follow

suit. Successionbreedssecessionism. Yousee it

everywhere:intheCaucasus,inYugoslaviaits

very common. And if the Kurds declare their

independenceinIraq,youcanexpecttoseeKurds

andothergroupsinIran,Turkey,andSyriadoing

thesame thing. Allofwhichwouldbeverybad

for the region and

ultimately bad for the

Kurds.

For the United States,

Kurdistan can be an

enclave in themidstofa

SunniShia civil war. I

think that thatwouldbe

helpful to all involved,

certainly to the Kurds.

The fewer Kurds being

slaughtered,the

better

for

allmankind. I think itwouldbe in Americas

interest tohelp theKurdsmaintain theirsecurity

inthemidstofacivilwar. Oneoftheonlyways

the U.S. can prevent the Kurds from declaring

independence and launching a chain reaction of

secessionismistogototheKurdsandessentially

say,hereisthedeal:Iraqisinacivilwar,weare

notgoing toaskyou toget involved, thatwould

beverycounterproductive. Butinreturnforhelp

with your security arms sales, financial

assistance,economic

aid,

perhaps

even

U.S.

troops in Kurdistan you are not going to

declare independence until we stabilize the

situation in Iraq so that you can secede in a

peacefulway.

I cannot tell you howmany Iraqi friends of

mine describethemselves as sushis

half Sunni, halfShia. Where do they

go? What becomes ofthem? And divided

families?

But one of the thingsour study of civil warsrevealed is that once

one subgroup declaresindependence, others

follow suit.Succession breeds

secessionismDoyouthinkthatisalreadythetacitagreement?

I hope so. The Kurdish leaders certainly

recognize that as theirbest course of action. I

think there are Americans who believe that as

well.

Whether

they

have

actually

had

these

conversations,KurdsandAmericans, Icouldnot

tellyouthat. Butbothsidesdoseemtorecognize

thatthatisthedeal.

Can you talk a bit about the experience of

revisingyouropinionsaboutIraq?



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Sure, its an ongoing process. Look, I think you

have to revise your opinions every day as the

situationdoesunfold. Letmestartwiththemost

obviousthingtherewasnotaweaponsofmass

destruction program in Iraq. Saddam was not

reconstituting his nuclearweapons program, so

thataspectofmybeliefsabouttheimportanceofa

warwithIraqclearlygoesoutthewindow.

Butitisnotsoeasytosaythatsincetherewasno

WMDthreat,wenevershouldhavegonetowar.

Therewereotherfactorsinvolved. First,Saddam

was a threat, a complication, and a force for

instability in the Middle East. In addition,

Saddamwasoneoftheworstdictatorsofthelast

60years.

Assomeone

who

believes

in

liberal

intervention,

who supported intervention in theBalkans,who

wantedus to findaway to intervene inRwanda

andwould still like to see us do something in

DarfurorCongo, I cannot simply lookatoneof

theworstdictatorsof the last60yearsandsay it

doesnotmatterbecauseremovinghimwouldbe

hard. Allthosethingsremainrationalesforawar.

Obviously,itwasneverarationaleforgoingtoa

war as quickly or as recklessly as we did. I

arguedin

my

book

and

throughout

the

run

up

to

the war that we did not need to go to war

immediately, that we had to go to war in as

responsibleamanneraswepossiblycould.

Having gone towar,unseatedSaddamHussein,

and recognized that theWMD argument is not

nearlyascompellingasIbelievedatthetime,the

onlyrationalesforwarthatremainarethoseother

ones: Saddamwasathreat,aforceforinstability

intheregion,andhumanitarianarguments.

Whether those rationales canactuallyjustify this

war depends entirely on the success of

reconstruction. Itisverysimple. Rightnow,Iraq

is sliding intoalloutcivilwar. If itdoes so,we

willhavecreatedgreater instability in theregion

thanSaddamevercausedus. Andwewillhave

lefttheIraqipeopleinaworsesituationthanthey

were under with Saddam which Iraqis

increasinglybelieveisthecase. Ifthatisthecase,

thiswarisabsolutelyunjustifiable.

Ontheotherhand,ifwecansomehowturnthings

around,evenifittakes5or10years,ifwegettoa

place where Iraq avoids nightmarish ethnic

cleansing,if wesomehowdokeeptheviolenceto

itscurrentlevels,ifwegettoapointwhereIraqis

stable and prosperous, then yes you can say

reluctantly that thewar had ajustification, that

we leftIraqisbetteroffthantheywerebeforewe

invaded. . . Itallcomesback tohowbadlywe

mishandled the reconstruction,which Ijust find

inexcusable.

Was themainproblem thatweunderestimated

thedifficultyofthemissionorthatweexecuted

itpoorly?

At some level, this issomething forhistorians to

debate. I tend to be of the latter opinion.

Everything that I have seen in Iraq leadsme to

believethatthiswaspossible. Again,thefactthat

threeandahalfyearsafterthe invasion,afterwe

havemadeeverysinglemistakeitwaspossibleto

make, leaving the Iraqis in theworst situations

imaginable,youstillhaveabout40%of the Iraqi

population saying the situation is going to be

betternext

year.

That

is

stunning.

Last

year

it

was still up at around 60%. Public opinion is

absolutelyessential,and thatyouhad enormous

numbers of Iraqis who truly believed in this

reconstruction project and who were incredibly

patientintermsofallowingittotrytosucceed. In

mybook, Ipredictedahoneymoonperiodwhen

Iraqis were very grateful to be rid of Saddam

Hussein. Butweshouldntassumemore than6

12months toshow Iraqis thatreconstructioncan

work. In fact,wewould upwith nearly three

years

of

a

honeymoon

period.

LookatallthebookswrittenaboutthisIraqWar:

everyonewho participated in the reconstruction

or has done work as an independent outside

observer believes that it was possible for

reconstructiontosucceed. Itwasalwaysgoingto

beveryhard,andtheIraqthatwecreatedwasnot

goingtobeSwitzerlandforavery,verylongtime,



6/9

Al Nakhlah6

if ever. However, there does seem to be a

consensusamongboththepeoplewhowereover

thereandtheoutsideexperts. Theyallsaiditwas

possible to havemade this thingwork in some

fashion, and it was mostly our mistakes that

doomedus.

You describe Americas policy dilemma

regarding Iran in terms of the two clocks

thelongtermefforttoreformandreconcilewith

the Iranian regime and the shortterm effort to

stave off their nuclear program. It seems like

the disjunction between these two clocks has

grown. Is thatstill thepolicydilemmaweface

inIran?

The two clocks is still out there, and it is still

usefulfor

acertain

segment

of

American

policy.

Butotherthingsweseecroppinguparebecoming

more important. Its still

importantbecauseIdostill

believe that there will be

regimechangeinIransome

day. It seems like regime

change is still pretty far

away. There are people

whosay,withgoodreason,

that Iran may face an

internaleconomic

crisis

in

35years. And if thatkind

of crisis comes to fruition,

that could cause or speed

regimechangeinIran.

The twoclocksarestillausefulanalogybecause

theymake clear that regime change is probably

notgoing tohappenbefore Iranacquiresnuclear

capability. Andtherefore,itisnotuseful,itisnot

realistic, it is not responsible to suggest that

regime

change

as

a

policy

of

the

United

States

governmentisagoodwaytosolveourproblems

withIranspursuitofnuclearweaponscapability.

OneoftenneglectedaspectIranianpoliticsisits

ethnic diversity the Arabs, the Kurds, the

Azeris,andvariousotherpeoples. ShouldU.S.

policyexploitthesepotentialdivisions?

Iran is a multiethnic, almost polyglot, nation.

There are frictions and tensions among the

different ethnic groups. And there certainly are

things that theUnited States couldbe doing to

exacerbatethosetensions. Butthebigquestionis,

towhatextentdowewanttodoso?

Andthefirstquestionbeforethatis,whatisitthat

we are trying to accomplish? If we truly are

tryingtoaccomplishisregimechange,thenthatis

agoodwaytogo. Weoughttotrytoexacerbate

those tensionsasmuchaswepossiblycan. But,

again, ifyou startwith themetaphorof the two

clocks,thenyouassumethisisnotgoingtosolve

our nuclear problem, then you have got to first

startwithwhat arepolicies that could solveour

nuclearproblem.

If it isaboutnegotiatingwithIran,atsomepoint

youaregoing toneed tobeable togive thatup

becausethereisnoquestionthatoneofthethings

thatIraniansaregoingtodemandaspartofthose

negotiationsisthatwegiveupoursupportforthe

variousminorities.

And therefore, it is no tuseful, it is not

realistic, it is notresponsible to suggestthat regime change asa policy of the United

States government is a

good way to solve ourproblems with Irans

pursuit of nuclearweapons capability

This is very similar to what the Nixon

administration faced with the Kurds. Are you

willing tosell thesepeopledown theriver? The

Nixonadministration

helped

the

Shah

support

the

IraqiKurds to fight the Iraqicentralgovernment

in the early 1970s. Wedid it knowing fullwell

that at some point the Shahwas going to cut a

dealwith Saddam. When he did that, hewas

goingtobesellingtheKurdsdowntheriver,and

wewouldbecomplicit in it. And that isexactly

whathappened,andtheKurdspaidtheprice. Do

we want to stir up Iranian Kurds and Iranian

Azerbaijanis and Iranian Arabs against their

government only to sell them down the river

when

we

decide

to

cut

a

deal

with

Tehran

for

theirnuclearprogram?Thesearethedilemmasof

thesekindofcovertactioncampaigns.

WhatwouldittaketodeterIranfrompursuinga

bomb? NewleadershipinAmerica? InIran?

Allthosethingsprobablywouldbehelpful. ButI

am always skittish about the term grand



7/9

Fall 2006 7

bargain,because I think it isunlikely tounfold

thatway ifwe negotiatewith Iran. It ismore

likely tobea farmore informal setofdeals that

willamounttothesamething.

Right now, the biggest problem is that Irans

hardliners are in a pretty dominant position.

Theydontcontrolthegovernment,buttheyhave

theadvantage. Thatneeds tochange. Youhave

to reach a point where the advantage is with

Irans pragmatists. Dont

getmewrong, pragmatists

should not be taken as a

euphemism for nice

guys. These are not nice

guys. But Irans

pragmatists typically

prioritizeIrans

economic

health and its domestic

politics.Theylookforgood

governanceandprosperity,

and theyhavebeenwilling

tomake deals on all these

issues in return for the

western investment and

trade they recognize as

criticaltoIranseconomy.

Sowhat

needs

to

happen

is

a change in the balance

within Iran. And that can

happen through external

events. SoiftheUNagreed

toimposesanctionsonIran,

thatwouldbeveryhelpful.

The more the Iranians recognize that the

internationalcommunitytrulyisresolvedtomake

thempayapriceforinsistingonthispath,thatis

stepone. SteptwoisthatIranseconomyisgoing

to

have

to

worsen.

It

can

worsen

on

its

own.

It

hasallkindsofdeepseated structuralproblems,

and Ahmadinejads policies are not helping

theyre actuallymaking itworse. Thats one of

the reasonswhy people talk about the potential

forrealcrisesinsideIranin35years. Thatisone

way. Anotherwaywouldbetogetrealsanctions

imposedonthem.

Yes, but what are the chances of that? Will

Russia andChina ever agree to sanction Irans

oilindustry?

Theyarewithintherealmofpossibility. Illputit

thisway. IpublishedPersianPuzzlein2004,and

I laidoutexactly thispolicy.Ihadpeoplesaying

tome,noneofitwilleverhappen,theRussians,

Chinese and Europeans will never agree to it,

youllnevergettheIAEAtosanctionthem,youll

never get itvoted out of the IAEA, youllnever

get it into theUnitedNations, theUNwillnever

passaChapter7Resolution. Allofthosethings

have happened, all of those things that people

said would absolutely never happen, have

happened. So, it suggests that it actually is

entirely possible to imagine a series of new

resolutionswhich

impose

greater

and

greater

sanctionsonIran. Itsnotasurethingitnever

wasa sure thing As forpetroleum,wemaynot

evenneed to get there. These financial controls

the Bush Administration has talked about are

actuallyveryclever. Again,youneed tocreatea

climatewhereIranisisolated. Iransstockmarket

has collapsed, its getting very little foreign

investment, and insurance companies are not

willing to insure Iranian projects and goods

because theyre anticipating sanctions. That in

andof

itself

is

imposing

avery

serious

burden

on

Iranwithoutanysanctionsactuallybeingpassed.

The more the Iraniansrecognize that the

internationalcommunity truly is

resolved to make them

pay a price for insist ingon this path; that is

step one. Step two isthat Irans economy is

going to have toworsen. It can worsenon its own. It has allkinds of deep-seatedstructural problems,

and Ahmadinejadspolicies are not helping theyre actuallymaking it worse One of thegreat challenges is that,with Irans

complex system of mixed clerical and

parliamentaryrule,itfeelsasifIranianpolicyis

madeinsideablackbox.

Yeah, unfortunately it is very difficult for us to

knowwhat isgoingon insideof Iran. Decisions

are made by a very small group of extremely

tight

knit,

closed

mouthed

people.

When

I

talk

about the hardliners, I am referring to

Ahmadinejadandaconstellationofotherpeople

behind him, you know peoplewith names like

Janati, andYazdi, and avariety of other figures

including Safavi, the head of the Revolutionary

Guards.



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Al Nakhlah8

We tend toconcentrateonAhmadinejadbecause

he iscolorfulandsaysa lotofobnoxious things,

buthedoesnotrunthegovernmentofIran. Hes

onlyoneplayer. Hehashisownpower,andhis

stature within the Iranian

regime has clearly grown

over the last year because

hehasbeenable touse the

nuclear issue and a lot of

oldfashioned porkbarrel

politics to make himself

more popular with the

Iranianpeople.

And we have seen that

degree of popularity does

translate into greater

influencewithin

the

Iranian

government. But itdoesnt

meanheisevenfirstamong

equals. Khomeini remains

first among equals. It is

still an open question

whether Ahmadinejad is

first among the hardliners

themselves.

If you could somehow get

tothe

hardliners

and

ask

them, Who is your most

importantfigure? Whoisthepersonwhodecides

todosomethingandhaseveryoneelsefallintoin

line? I am not certain they would name

Ahmadinejad. Butagain,Ahmadinejadistheone

whocapturestheheadlines,whohascapturedthe

worlds attention. And in some ways that is

unfortunate because, he is not the one who is

callingtheshotsinTehran.

At

this

point

it

seems

like

a

clich

for

our

politicians to praise Irans culture and

civilizationwhilecriticizingtheirpolitics. What

is itthatAmericansshouldknowaboutPersian

culture?

Oneof themost important things forAmericans

tounderstandisIranianpride,justhowproudthe

Iraniansareoftheirculture,oftheirachievements

and a belief deriving from that pride that Iran

oughttobeoneoftheworldsgreatpowers. This

is one of the reasonswe have all these clashes

with the Iranians. Because Iraniansbelieve they

oughttobecallingtheshotsinapartoftheworld

wherewebelieve thatweought tobecalling the

shots, and psychologically because the Iranians

have such an enormous chip on their shoulder

about theUnited States. Thatwe are a greater

power then themand,quitehonestly, thatpisses

themoff. Andasaresult,almostanythingwedo,

theytakethewrongwayandtheyseeasasignof

disrespect.

We tend to concent rate

on Ahmadinejadbecause he is colorful

and says a lot ofobnoxious things, but

he does not run thegovernment of Iran.

Hes only one player.He has his own power,and his stature within

the Iranian regime hasclearly grown over thelast year because hehas been able to use

the nuclear issue and alot of old-fashioned

pork-barrel politics tomake himself more

popular with the Iranianpeople

That said, letmejust finishbymaking thepoint

that while it is certainly useful to understand

Iranian culture,and themore thatAmericansdo

understandit

the

better,

Ido

not

think

that

we

should fall into the trap of thinking that the

problems between the two of us are merely

civilizational and causedbymiscommunication.

We have some real and difficult problemswith

the Iranians. They are trying to acquire

capabilities thatwe do notwant them to have.

Wedonotwantthemtohavethembecausethey

support terroristgroups,because theyhavebeen

veryaggressiveagainstus inthe last2627years,

andbecause they continue to define us as their

enemy,and

they

act

accordingly.

Youknow,whethertheywerePersians,Russians,

or misguidedMethodists, it wouldnt really

matterthoseproblemswouldstillremain. And

to some extent, trying to dealwith them at this

culturalpsychological level actually takes away

fromsomeofourstrengths.Weneedtorecognize

the Iranians as important players in the Persian

Gulf,we need to stop pretending that they are

not,andstop insisting thatwewillnotdealwith

them

but

we

need

to

deal

with

them

in

hard

politicalterms.

The more time we spend wondering what

Persians actuallywantbased on their culture, I

thinkitactuallytakesusawayfromdealingwith

therealproblemsweface. Attheendoftheday,

we were able to find very good, constructive

solutions toourproblemswith theRussiansnot



9/9

Fall 2006 9

by understanding Russian civilization but by

sitting down and working out a series of

compromisesthatwereacceptabletousandtothe

Russians. Toacertainextent,theIranianscannot

do thatbecause they cannot get over their own

culturalbaggage. Quite honestly,we canthelp

themgetoverthatculturalbaggage.Wejustneed

tobereadysothatwhentheyareableto,weare

therewithareal,constructivesetofcompromises.

Which is something theBushadministrationhas

beenlessthanwillingtodo.

In Iraq, it seems that we took advice from

expatriateswholivedinadifferentIraqthanthe

onethatweinvaded. Isthereanydangerofthat

happeninginIranwiththesubsetofantiregime

Iranians accessible toAmericans asopposed to

themajority

that

elected

Ahmadinejad?

Sure,Icertainlythinkthereisadangerofthat. It

goesbacktothesamepointaboutregimechange.

There are Americans out there who believe

ferventlyinregimechange,anditseemstobethe

casethatthesepeoplearetalkingtoIranianswho

are trying to convince them that regime change

wouldbequick and easy in Iran. They say the

Iranianpeoplearejustwaitingtooverthrowtheir

government, thatall itsgoing to take isa strong

rhetoricalcommitment

on

the

part

of

the

United

States for the Iranians to rise up against their

government. That isexactly thesameSirensong

we heard on Iraq. I think itwouldbe a tragic

mistake ifwe followed itonceagain in Iranand

dashedourselvesonthoserocks. Especiallygiven

thefactthatwejustmadethismistakeinIraq.

Five years into the Cold War, we already had

foundational documents like the writings of

George Kennan that would guide us over the

next

several

decades.

Do

you

think

we

have

seenanythinglikethatinthelastfiveyearsthat

willendureasastrategic

road map for where we

areheadingoverthenext

severaldecades?

I hope not because the

only document out there

is the Bush

Administrations

National Security

Strategy,which I think is

horriblymisguided. Not

becauseoftheiremphasis

on preemption, which

mostpeoplehavefocused

on, but because of the

problems they have

diagnosed.One

of

my

greatest concerns with

U.S.MiddleEastpolicyis

that the Bush

Administration has

tended to see it through

the lens of terrorism. I

think thats been a

tremendous mistake. Terrorism is not the

problem in the Middle East. Terrorism is a

symptom of the problems of the Middle East.

Andby

focusing

on

the

symptom

and

not

the

underlying problems, we have exacerbated the

underlyingproblems.

The views and opinions expressed in articles are

strictly the authors own, and do not necessarily

represent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory and

EditorialBoards, or theProgramfor SouthwestAsia

and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The Fletcher

School.

One of my greatestconcerns with U.S.

Middle East policy isthat the Bush

Administ rat ion hastended to see itthrough the lens of

terrorism. I think thatsbeen a tremendous

mistake. Terrorism isnot the problem in the

Middle East. Terrorismis a symptom of the

problems of the Middle

East. And by focusingon the symptom andnot the underlyingproblems, we have

exacerbated theunderlying problems


Benaim - A Conversation with Dr. Kenneth M. Pollack

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Transcript of Benaim - A Conversation with Dr. Kenneth M. Pollack