CASE DIGEST: Belgica v. Executive Secretary (G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 and 209251,2013)

I. SUBSTANTIVEISSUESA. Congressional Pork BarrelWON the 2013 PDAF Article and all otherCongressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on1.) separation of powers2.) non-delegability of legislative power3.) checks and balances4.) accountability5.) political dynasties6.) local autonomyB. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork BarrelWON the phrases:(a) and for such otherpurposes as may be hereafter directed by the President underSection 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and(b) to finance the priority infrastructure development projectsand to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilitiesdue to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by theOffice of the President of the Philippines under Section 12 ofPD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the PresidentialSocial Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constituteundue delegations of legislative power* HELD AND RATIO:A. Congressional Pork Barrel1.)YES.At its core, legislators have beenconsistently accordedpost-enactment authority (a) to identify the projects they desire to be fundedthrough various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations; (b) and in the areas of fund release and realignment. Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in thevarious operational aspects of budgeting,violatingthe separation of powers principle. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter itsunconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in theimplementation or enforcement of the law. Informal practices, through whichlegislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budgetexecution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amountingto lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the sameunconstitutional treatment.2.)YES.The 2013 PDAF Articleviolates the principle of non-delegability since legislatorsare effectively allowed to individually exercise the power ofappropriation, which,as settled inPhilconsa,is lodged in Congress.3.)YES.Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion onlyappears as a collective allocation limit. Legislators make intermediate appropriations of the PDAF only after the GAA ispassed and hence, outside of the law. Thus, actualitems of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the GeneralAppropriations Bill and are thus put into effectwithout veto consideration. Thiskind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgetingsystem fosters the creation of a budget within a budget which subverts theprescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs thePresidents power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between(a) accepting theentire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projectsof the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his nationalagenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all otherlegislators with legitimate projects.Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc).This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts andpurposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents power of item veto.4.)YES.To a certain extent, theconduct ofoversight would betainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority,would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselvesparticipate. Also, this very same concept of post-enactmentauthorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987Constitution which provides that: [A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives]shall not intervene in anymatter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefitor where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases ofproject implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.However, the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislators control of his PDAFper sewould allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This isa matterwhich must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-casebasis.Also, while it is possiblethat the close operational proximity between legislators and the Executive department, through the formers post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel Systems intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.5.)NO.Section 26, Article II ofthe 1987 Constitution isconsidered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase as may bedefined by law. Therefore, since thereappears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on politicaldynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue. In any event, the above-stated argument on this score is largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.6.)YES.The Court, however, finds aninherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention ofmaking equal the unequal. The gaugeof PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact ofoffice, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiaritiesof the district the legislator represents.As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanizedmetropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of afar-flung rural province which would be relatively underdevelopedcompared to the former.To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that evenSenators and Party-List Representatives and in some years, even the Vice-President who do not represent any locality, receive funding from theCongressional Pork Barrel as well.The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs),instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs. The programs, policies and resolutions of LDCs should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body.C.Presidential Pork BarrelYES.Regarding the Malampaya Fund:Thephrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by thePresident under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation oflegislative power as it does not lay down a sufficient standard toadequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect tothe purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, thesaid phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the MalampayaFunds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him tounilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.Regardingthe Presidential Social Fund:Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicatesthat the Presidential Social Fund may be used to finance the priorityinfrastructure development projects.Thisgives himcarte blancheauthority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a priority. The law does not supply a definition of priority infrastructure development projectsand hence,leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, thedelimitation of a project as one of infrastructure is too broad of aclassification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus,the phrase to finance the priority infrastructure development projectsmust be stricken down as unconstitutional since similar toSection 8 of PD 910 it lies independentlyunfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.