November 19, 2013 [Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1(2013)]

G.R. No. 208566. GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, JOSE M. VILLEGAS, JR.,JOSE L. GONZALEZ, REUBEN M. ABANTE, and QUINTIN PAREDES

SAN DIEGO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVESECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SECRETARY OF BUDGET

AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONALTREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATEPRESIDENT, and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented byFELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF

THE HOUSE, respondents.

G.R. No. 208493. November 19, 2013.*SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S.

ALCANTARA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON,in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT, and HONORABLE

FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OFTHE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

G.R. No. 209251. November 19, 2013.*PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque,Former Provincial Board Member-Province of Marinduque,petitioner, vs. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III**and SECRETARY FLORENCIO “BUTCH” ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF

BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy; No questioninvolving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may beheard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legalrequisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case orcontroversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challengingthe act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act orissuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliestopportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of thecase.―The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involvingthe constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard anddecided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites forjudicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling forthe exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have thestanding to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question ofconstitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue ofconstitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Of these requisites, caselaw states that the first two are the most important and, therefore, shall bediscussed forthwith.

2. Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Jurisprudence provides that an actualcase or controversy is one which ― involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertionof opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from ahypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.―By constitutional fiat, judicialpower operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. This is embodiedin Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that“[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actualcontroversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceablex x x.” Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which“involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstractdifference or dispute.” In other words, “[t]here must be a contrariety of legal rightsthat can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law andjurisprudence.” Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is therequirement of “ripeness,” meaning that the questions raised for constitutionalscrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. “A question is ripe for adjudication whenthe act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individualchallenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished orperformed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and thepetitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itselfas a result of the challenged action.” “Withal, courts will decline to pass uponconstitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority toresolve hypothetical or moot questions.”

3. Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; The requirement of contrariety of legal rights isclearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionalityof the ― Pork Barrel System.―The requirement of contrariety of legal rights isclearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionalityof the “Pork Barrel System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated cases areripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing fortheir utilization — such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the MalampayaFunds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund — arecurrently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatenedinjury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

4. Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); Moot andAcademic; Neither will the President’s declaration that he had already ― abolishedthe Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) render the issues on PDAF mootprecisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutionalauthority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, theannulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through thepassage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration ofunconstitutionality.―As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that theissues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reformsundertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actualcontroversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passingupon the merits. Differing from this description, the Court observes thatrespondents’ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate thecontroversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform isgeared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a

distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will thePresident’s declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF” render the issueson PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has noconstitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutionaldesign, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress,through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration ofunconstitutionality.

5. Same; Same; Same; The “limitation on the power of judicial review to actual casesand controversies” carries the assurance that “the courts will not intrude intoareas committed to the other branches of government.”―The “limitation on thepower of judicial review to actual cases and controversies” carries the assurancethat “the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches ofgovernment.” Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the politicalquestion doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, 369 US 18682, S. Ct. 691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962], applies when there is found, among others, “atextually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinatepolitical department,” “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standardsfor resolving it” or “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policydetermination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.” Cast against this light,respondents submit that the “[t]he political branches are in the best position notonly to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to thespecific demands of their constituents” and, as such, “urge [the Court] not toimpose a solution at this stage.”

6. Same; Same; Same; The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” isnot an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of governmentbut rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court toact upon.―A political question refers to “those questions which, under theConstitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or inregard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislatureor executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependentupon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.” The intrinsicconstitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon thewisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which theConstitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contoursof the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches ofgovernment are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise ofjudicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested theJudiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty toproceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be anyclearer: “The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in suchlower courts as may be established by law. [It] includes the duty of the courts ofjustice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandableand enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch orinstrumentality of the Government.”

7. Same; Same; Same; When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional

boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; doesnot in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature [or the executive], butonly asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by theConstitution.―It must also be borne in mind that “when the judiciary mediates toallocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the otherdepartments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature [or theexecutive], but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by theConstitution.” To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reformsundertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by constitutionalforce that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court’savowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in anymanner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensurethat the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it isin the best interest of the people that each great branch of government, within itsown sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solutionto the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heedrespondents’ plea for judicial restraint.

8. Same; Same; Same; Taxpayer’s Suit; Taxpayers have been allowed to sue wherethere is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money isbeing deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted throughthe enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.―“The gist of the question ofstanding is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of thecontroversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens thepresentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficultconstitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of hisconstitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.”Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities ascitizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they “dutifully contribute to thecoffers of the National Treasury.” Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisitestanding to question the validity of the existing “Pork Barrel System” under whichthe taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable thatpetitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage ofpublic funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to suewhere there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public moneyis being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wastedthrough the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.

9. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Res Judicata; Res judicata (which means a “matteradjudged”) and stare decisis non quieta et movere ([or simply, stare decisis] whichmeans “follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled”) aregeneral procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous butfactually similar dispositions to subsequent cases.―Res judicata (which means a“matter adjudged”) and stare decisis non quieta et movere ([or simply, staredecisis] which means “follow past precedents and do not disturb what has beensettled”) are general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects ofprevious but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases atbar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its priorrulings in Philconsa and LAMP.

10.Constitutional Law; Pork Barrel System; Words and Phrases; The Court defines thePork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern themanner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for localprojects, are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative andExecutive branches of government, including its members.―Consideringpetitioners’ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, theCourt defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practicesthat govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarilyintended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of theLegislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. ThePork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: First,there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind oflump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectivelyorganized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of thefund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. Inparticular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, asCongressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure thatallows individual legislators to wield a collective power; and Second, there is thePresidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum,discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of itsutilization. For reasons earlier stated, the Court shall delimit the use of such termto refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

11.Same; Separation of Powers; The principle of separation of powers refers to theconstitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government; Tothe legislative branch of government, through Congress, belongs the power tomake laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President, belongsthe power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through theCourt, belongs the power to interpret laws.―The principle of separation of powersrefers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers ofgovernment. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. ElectoralCommission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), it means that the “Constitution has blocked outwith deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, thelegislative and the judicial departments of the government.” To the legislativebranch of government, through Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to theexecutive branch of government, through the President, belongs the power toenforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court, belongsthe power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, byconstitutional design, ordained in this respect, “[e]ach department of thegovernment has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and issupreme within its own sphere.” Thus, “the legislature has no authority to executeor construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law,and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law.” The principle ofseparation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem fromthe notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentrationof these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any singlebranch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. To achievethis purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of

government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising theirrespective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of onebranch of government to check the arbitrary or self interest assertions of anotheror others.

12.Same; Same; From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of lawthat empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in theimplementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation ofpowers and is thus unconstitutional; Any post-enactment-measure allowinglegislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis andhence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executivefunctions.―The Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members,should not cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, asearlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, inGuingona, Jr., the Court stated that “Congress enters the picture [when it]deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress,“in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation actprecisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifiesthat no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with anappropriation made by law.” Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress’law-making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive’s role ofimplementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutionalboundaries between them, Congress must “not concern itself with details forimplementation by the Executive.” The foregoing cardinal postulates weredefinitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that “[f]rom the momentthe law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any ofits members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the lawviolates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.” It mustbe clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to “any role in theimplementation or enforcement of the law,” Congress may still exercise itsoversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that theConstitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress’ role must beconfined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislatorparticipation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence,tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executivefunctions.

13.Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; Post-enactment measures which govern theareas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related tofunctions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to interveneand/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution;Towards this end, the Supreme Court must therefore abandon its ruling inPhilconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guisethat the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents’ reliance onthe same falters altogether.―Clearly, these post-enactment measures whichgovern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment arenot related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators tointervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budgetexecution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or

another, authorized to participate in — as Guingona, Jr. puts it — “the variousoperational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financialplans for individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds” in violationof the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categoricallyarticulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated — from the moment the lawbecomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of itsmembers to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violatesthe principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. That the saidauthority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter itsunconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in theimplementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court musttherefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislatoridentification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such,respondents’ reliance on the same falters altogether.

14.Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The SupremeCourt hereby declares the 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wieldany form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of thebudget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation ofpowers principle and thus unconstitutional.―The Court hereby declares the 2013PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators towield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcementof the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separationof powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices,through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases ofbudget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amountingto lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutionaltreatment. That such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantlyobserved throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here.

15.Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; Congress; As an adjunct to the separation ofpowers principle, legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body towhich the Constitution has conferred the same; It is clear that only Congress,acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative andreferendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other;Exceptions.―As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative powershall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferredthe same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states thatsuch power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist ofa Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to thepeople by the provision on initiative and referendum. Based on this provision, it isclear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through theprocess of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative powerand no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislativepower, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegatedlegislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowedto legislate on purely local matters; and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptionssuch as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and

proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other nationalemergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations andrestrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework ofthe national development program of the Government.

16.Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The SupremeCourt observes that the 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article,insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individuallegislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators areeffectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which ― assettled in Philconsa ― is lodged in Congress.―In the cases at bar, the Courtobserves that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactmentidentification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle ofnon-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individuallyexercise the power of appropriation, which — as settled in Philconsa — is lodged inCongress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only throughlegislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution whichstates that: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of anappropriation made by law.” To understand what constitutes an act ofappropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor(Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart bylaw of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose.Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personallump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fundwould go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves alsodetermine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power ofappropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Articleauthorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislatorshave been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislativepower, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other formsof Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identificationfeature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.

17.Same; Same; Checks and Balances; Veto Power; A prime example of aconstitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an itemwritten into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congressfor approval through a process known as “bill presentment.”―A prime example ofa constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an itemwritten into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congressfor approval through a process known as “bill presentment.” The President’sitem-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution whichreads as follows: Sec. 27. x x x. x x x x (2) The President shall have the power toveto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but theveto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. Thepresentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein hemay exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the “single, finely wrought andexhaustively considered, procedures” for law-passage as specified under the

Constitution. As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the“submission [of the bill] to the President for approval. Once approved, it takeseffect as law after the required publication.”

18.Same; Same; Same; Same; The justification for the President’s item-veto powerrests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation, imposefiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch’s rolein the budgetary process; It is meant to “increase the chances in favor of thecommunity against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, ordesign.”―The justification for the President’s item-veto power rests on a variety ofpolicy goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation, impose fiscal restrictions onthe legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch’s role in the budgetaryprocess. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US SupremeCourt characterized the President’s item-power as “a salutary check upon thelegislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of factions,precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen toinfluence a majority of that body”; phrased differently, it is meant to “increase thechances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste,inadvertence, or design.”

19.Same; Same; Same; What beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriationswhich merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source offunding for multiple purposes.―What beckons constitutional infirmity areappropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tappedas a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation typenecessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be expendedand the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from themultiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation lawalready indicates a “specific appropriation of money” and hence, without a properline-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President wouldthen be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if hefinds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entireappropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it maynot be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issuesconsidering that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again,both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of theappropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspectsof the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, beexercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.

20.Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The fact thatindividual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of thebudget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested “observers” whenscrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriationlaw; Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of projectimplementation ― a matter before another office of government ― renders themsusceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.―The Court agrees withpetitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional PorkBarrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional

oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in theimplementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested“observers” when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation ofthe appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would betainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would,in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, itmust be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorizationruns afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personallyappear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, orquasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly orindirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise orspecial privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, orinstrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlledcorporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene inany matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or wherehe may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly,allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation —a matter before another office of government — renders them susceptible totaking undue advantage of their own office.

21.Same; Same; Same; Same; The gauge of Priority Development Assistance Fund(PDAF) and Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) allocation/division is basedsolely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests andpeculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, theallocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality,wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken intoconsideration.―The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system whichactually belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal.” In particular,the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is basedsolely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests andpeculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, theallocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality,wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. Asa result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the sameamount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province whichwould be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rousesgraver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives — and insome years, even the Vice-President — who do not represent any locality, receivefunding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathemato the Congressional Pork Barrel’s original intent which is “to make equal theunequal.” Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under theeffective control of each legislator and given unto them on the sole account of theiroffice.

22.Same; “An appropriation made by law” under the contemplation of Section 29(1),Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart adeterminate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for aparticular public purpose.―“An appropriation made by law” under the

contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when aprovision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of moneyand (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. These two minimumdesignations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word“appropriation,” which means “to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particularuse or purpose,” and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that thelegislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution “does not provide orprescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which anauthorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be “madeby law,’” an appropriation law may — according to Philconsa — be “detailed and asbroad as Congress wants it to be” for as long as the intent to appropriate may begleaned from the same.

23.Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The 2013 PriorityDevelopment Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article cannot be properly deemed as a legalappropriation precisely because it contains post-enactment measures whicheffectively create a system of intermediate appropriations.―It is apropos to notethat the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriationunder the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, itcontains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system ofintermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actualappropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individuallegislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Courtobserves that the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not theP24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactmentdeterminations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat,occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does notconstitute an “appropriation made by law” since it, in its truest sense, onlyauthorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegabilityprinciple as afore-discussed.

24.Same; Delegation of Powers; Malampaya Funds; The Court agrees with petitionersthat the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by thePresident” under Section 8 of P.D. 910 constitutes an undue delegation oflegislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard toadequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to thepurpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.―The Court agrees withpetitioners that the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafterdirected by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an unduedelegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standardto adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to thepurpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrasegives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any otherpurpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate publicfunds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined onlyto “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of thegovernment” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the generalword or phrase is to be construed to include — or be restricted to — things akin to,resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied

by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development andexploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular andgeneral class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specificthings from which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited;second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energydevelopment programs of the government; and, third, the Executive departmenthas, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under thesubject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limitedonly to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects ofthe government.” Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed thecompleteness test since the policy of energy development is clearly deduciblefrom its text, the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directedby the President” under the same provision of law should nonetheless be strickendown as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficientstandard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored thatthe rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “tofinance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects ofthe government,” remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, thedeclared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance thatthe Malampaya Funds would be used — as it should be used — only in accordancewith the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.

25.Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); Special Allotment ReleaseOrder (SARO); Words and Phrases; A Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), asdefined by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) itself in its website,is “[a] specific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations notexceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. Itshall cover expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance with specificlaws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competentauthority.”―The Court agrees with petitioners’ posturing for the fundamentalreason that funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be “released” underlegal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website, is “[a]specific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding agiven amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall coverexpenditures the release of which is subject to compliance with specific laws orregulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competentauthority.” Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces theexistence of an obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, theSARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public fundsbeyond the control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even bewithdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent the actual release offunds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is brought about by theissuance of the NCA, which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may bedetermined from the statements of the DBM representative during the OralArguments.

26.Same; Same; Same; Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA); Unless a Notice of CashAllocation (NCA) has been issued, public funds should not be treated as fundswhich have been “released;” The disbursement of 2013 Priority Development

Assistance Fund (PDAF) funds which are only covered by obligated SpecialAllotment Release Order (SARO), and without any corresponding Notice of CashAllocation (NCA) issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, beenjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the generalfund.―Unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as fundswhich have been “released.” In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without anycorresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, beenjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the generalfund. Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article,the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though alreadyobligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from anunconstitutional source. This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a)the Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not released — meaning,those merely covered by a SARO — under the phrase “and for such other purposesas may be hereafter directed by the President” pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910;and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase “tofinance the priority infrastructure development projects” pursuant to Section 12 ofPD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court asunconstitutional. However, these funds should not be reverted to the general fundas afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds andthe Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposesnot otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

27.Same; Operative Fact Doctrine; The operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognitionthat until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certainlegislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitledto obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with.―Itmust be stressed that the Court’s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of(a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other CongressionalPork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) “and for such otherpurposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910,and (2) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” under Section12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective ineffect in view of the operative fact doctrine. To explain, the operative fact doctrineexhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares theinvalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumedconstitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properlyenforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner ofInternal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 707 SCRA 66 (2013), thedoctrine merely “reflect[s] awareness that precisely because the judiciary is thegovernmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative orexecutive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it canexercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. Itwould be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be norecognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.” “In the language ofan American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior tosuch a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may haveconsequences which cannot justly be ignored.’ ”

28.Same; Pork Barrel System; The Supreme Court must strike down the Pork BarrelSystem as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within whichit operates.―The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persistedin the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike down thePork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the ruleswithin which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, invarying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas ofbudget execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of powers;insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by givingthem personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specificprojects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle ofnon-delegability of legislative power; insofar as it has created a system ofbudgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it hasflouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied thePresident the power to veto items; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness ofcongressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budgetexecution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor andscrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability; insofar as it hasauthorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purelylocal nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewisesubverted genuine local autonomy; and again, insofar as it has conferred to thePresident the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-relatedpurposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public fundsunder the broad classification of “priority infrastructure development projects,” ithas once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.

SERENO, C.J., Concurring Opinion:29.Constitutional Law; View that it has been held that the Supreme Court in

construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to beaccomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented orremedied.―The guiding principle for the Court should not be to “anticipate aquestion of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it,” but ratherto treat the function of judicial review as a most important and delicate matter;after all, we cannot replace the wisdom of the elected using our own, by addingqualifications under the guise of constitutional “interpretation.” While it is true thatthe Constitution must be interpreted both in its written word and underlying intent,the intent must be reflected in taking the Constitution itself as one cohesive,functional whole. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is theintention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held thatthe Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to beaccomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented orremedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of thetimes, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution wasframed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of theConstitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to beaccomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the wordsconsonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.

30.Same; Judicial Review; View that the Supreme Court’s power of judicial reviewmust be confined only to dispositions which are constitutionally supportable.―TheCourt’s power of judicial review must be confined only to dispositions which areconstitutionally supportable. Aside from the jurisdictional requirements for theexercise thereof, other guidelines are also mandated, i.e., that the question to beanswered must be in a form capable of judicial resolution; that as previouslydiscussed, the Court will not anticipate a question in advance of the necessity ofdeciding it; and, most relevant to the present case, that the Court “will notformulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise factson which it is to be applied.” Given a controversy that raises several issues, thetribunal must limit its constitutional construction to the precise facts which havebeen established. This rule is most applicable “in determining whether one, someor all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon.” Thus, the Courtis not authorized to take cognizance of an issue too far-removed from the other.

31.Same; Lump-Sum Appropriations; View that by its very words, the Constitutiondoes not prohibit lump-sum appropriations.―The questions surrounding lump-sumappropriations, in the context of how they arose during the interpellation, are notlegal questions. Unlike the first two reasons advanced by the ponencia in findingfor the unconstitutionality of the PDAF, the invalidity of lump-sum appropriationsfinds no textual support in the Constitution. By its very words, the Constitutiondoes not prohibit lump-sum appropriations. In fact, the history of legislativeappropriations suggests otherwise.

32.Same; General Appropriations Bill; View that the form, content, and manner ofpreparation of the budget must be prescribed by law, and no provision orenactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relatesspecifically to some particular appropriation therein, and such provision orenactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which itrelates.―The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget must beprescribed by law, and no provision or enactment shall be embraced in the generalappropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriationtherein, and such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to theappropriation to which it relates. Procedures involving appropriations must beuniform. A special appropriations bill must be specific in purpose and supported orsupportable by funds. Only the heads of the branches of government, as well asthe constitutional commissions and fiscally independent bodies may be authorizedto augment items in appropriations. Discretionary funds are regulated.Appropriations of the previous year are automatically revived if Congress fails topass a new law. Appropriations for fiscally autonomous agencies are releasedautomatically. Furthermore, in relation to all this, the Constitution gives to thePresident the duty to faithfully execute the law.

33.Same; Same; View that once the appropriations law is passed, the day-to-daymanagement of the national budget is left to the Department of BudgetManagement and Department of Finance, in accordance with the appropriate rulesand regulations. Simultaneously, the Commission on Audit is tasked to conductauditing and post-auditing throughout the fiscal year, with a final audit reportpresented to the President and Congress at the end of such year.―Once the

appropriations law is passed, the day-to-day management of the national budgetis left to the DBM and DOF, in accordance with the appropriate rules andregulations. Simultaneously, the COA is tasked to conduct auditing andpost-auditing throughout the fiscal year, with a final audit report presented to thePresident and Congress at the end of such year. In this whole process, anappropriation can be made and has been made at the lump-sum level. While notinitially broken down in the budget formulation aspect of the entire expenditureprocess, the individual expenditures sourced from these lump-sum appropriationsare broken down in journal entries after the fact, during the auditing process of theCOA, which has the power to issue notices of disallowance should it find aparticular expenditure to have been improper under law and accounting rules.Consequently, a lump-sum appropriation can still be audited and accounted forproperly. This recognizes the fact that lump-sum appropriating is a formal concernof the COA, and all other agencies and instrumentalities of the government thattake part in the appropriations process. In fact, the Administrative Code givesformal discretion to the President, in the following manner: Section 12. Form andContent of the Budget.—xxx The budget shall be presented to the Congress in suchform and content as may be approved by the President and may include thefollowing: xxx.

34.Same; Item-Veto Power; View that it behooves the Supreme Court to step back andnot needlessly create a controversy over the item-veto power when there isnone.―In the first place, all cases in which this Court ruled on the item-veto powerwere generated by an actual controversy. In stark contrast, the veto power hasnever been raised as an issue in this case until raised as a possible issue in the oralarguments. Neither the President (who should be invoking a direct injury if thepower were allegedly denied him) nor Congress (whose product would then betampered with by a presidential veto) is complaining. It behooves this Court to stepback and not needlessly create a controversy over the item-veto power when thereis none.

35.Same; Lump-Sum Appropriations; View that the use of lump-sum appropriationsinherently springs from the reality that the government cannot completely predictat the beginning of a fiscal year where funds will be needed in certaininstances.―The use of lump-sum appropriations inherently springs from the realitythat the government cannot completely predict at the beginning of a fiscal yearwhere funds will be needed in certain instances. Since Congress is the source ofthe appropriation law in accordance with the principle of separation of powers, itcan craft the law in such a way as to give the Executive enough fiscal tools to meetthe exigencies of the year. Lump-sum appropriations are one such tool. After all,the different agencies of government are in the best position to determine wherethe allocated money might best be spent for their needs: [A]n agency’s allocationof funds from a lump-sum appropriation requires “a complicated balancing of anumber of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise”: whether its “resourcesare best spent” on one program or another; whether it “is likely to succeed” infulfilling its statutory mandate; whether a particular program “best fits theagency’s overall policies”; and, “indeed, whether the agency has enoughresources” to fund a program “at all.”

36.Same; Same; Line-Item Budgeting; View that the evolution of the government’sbudgeting from a small amount in past decades, into what is now a massiveundertaking that contains complexities, and involves an exponentially larger sumthan before, suggests that a mixture of lump-sum and line-item budgeting withinthe same appropriation law could also be a feasible form of budgeting.―Theimportance of allowing lump-sum appropriations for budgetary flexibility and goodgovernance has been validated in other jurisdictions. The evolution of thegovernment’s budgeting from a small amount in past decades, into what is now amassive undertaking that contains complexities, and involves an exponentiallylarger sum than before, suggests that a mixture of lump-sum and line-itembudgeting within the same appropriation law could also be a feasible form ofbudgeting. At the very least, this Court owes it to Congress to ask it the questiondirectly, on whether an exclusively line-item budgeting system is indeed feasible.Simply put, there appears, even in the United States, a necessity for the inclusionof lump-sum appropriations in the budget: Congress has been makingappropriations since the beginning of the Republic. In earlier times when thefederal government was much smaller and federal programs were (or at leastseemed) much simpler, very specific line-item appropriations were more common.In recent decades, however, as the federal budget has grown in both size andcomplexity, a lump-sum approach has become a virtual necessity.

37.Same; Same; View that the Administrative Code provides that certain items maybe lump-sum funds, such as the budget for coordinating bodies, the budget for thepool of Foreign Service officers, and merit increases.―The Administrative Codeprovides that certain items may be lump-sum funds, such as the budget forcoordinating bodies, the budget for the pool of Foreign Service officers, and meritincreases. As a result, this Court should not read from the text of the Constitutionand the law, a mandate to craft the national budget in a purely line-item format. Todo so would be equivalent to judicial legislation, because the Court would read intothe law an additional requirement that is not supported by its text or spirit of thelaw, in accordance with its own perceived notion of how a government budgetshould be formulated. If we rule out lump-sum budgeting, what happens then tothe various provisions of the law, principally the Administrative Code, that governlump-sum funds? Is there such a thing as a collateral constitutional attack? Toomany questionable effects will result from a sledgehammer denunciation oflump-sum appropriations. This Court does not even know how many lump-sumappropriation laws will be affected by such a ruling. Thus, it is important toemphasize that the fallo only afflicts the 2013 GAA, Article XIV.

CARPIO, J., Concurring Opinion:38.Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Locus Standi; View that as taxpayers and ordinary

citizens, petitioners possess locus standi to bring these suits which indisputablyinvolve the disbursement of public funds.―As taxpayers and ordinary citizens,petitioners possess locus standi to bring these suits which indisputably involve thedisbursement of public funds. As we held in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,110 Phil. 331 (1960), taxpayers, such as petitioners in the present petitions, have“sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised bytaxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiringexpenditure of public moneys.” Likewise, in Lawyers Against Monopoly and

Poverty (LAMP) v. Secretary of Budget and Management, 670 SCRA 373 (2012), wedeclared that “taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim thatpublic funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to anyimproper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of aninvalid or unconstitutional law.”

39.Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; View that well-entrenched in ourjurisdiction is the principle of separation of powers, which ordains that each of thethree great branches of government is supreme in the exercise of its functionswithin its own constitutionally allocated sphere; Any encroachment on thefunctions of a co-equal branch by the other branches violates the principle ofseparation of powers, and is thus unconstitutional.―Under our Constitution,government power is divided among the three co-equal branches: Executive,Legislature, and Judiciary. Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the principle ofseparation of powers, which ordains that each of the three great branches ofgovernment is supreme in the exercise of its functions within its ownconstitutionally allocated sphere. Lawmaking belongs to Congress, implementingthe laws to the Executive, and settling legal disputes to the Judiciary. Anyencroachment on the functions of a co-equal branch by the other branchesviolates the principle of separation of powers, and is thus unconstitutional.

40.Same; Separation of Powers; Legislative Power; View that the power to appropriateis the exclusive legislative power to direct by law the payment of governmentfunds under specified conditions or specified purposes.―The Administrative Codeof 1987 defines “appropriation” as “an authorization made by law or otherlegislative enactment directing payment out of government funds under specifiedconditions or for specified purposes.” Thus, the power to appropriate is theexclusive legislative power to direct by law the payment of government fundsunder specified conditions or specified purposes. The appropriation must state thespecific purpose of the payment of government funds. The appropriation must alsonecessarily state the specific amount since it is a directive to pay out governmentfunds.

41.Same; Same; General Appropriations Act; View that the implementation of theGeneral Appropriations Act belongs exclusively to the President, and cannot beexercised by Congress. The President cannot share with the Legislature, itscommittees or members the power to implement the General Appropriations Act(GAA). The Legislature, its committees or members cannot exercise functionsvested in the President by the Constitution; otherwise, there will be a violation ofthe separation of powers.―The GAA is a law. The implementation of the GAAbelongs exclusively to the President, and cannot be exercised by Congress. ThePresident cannot share with the Legislature, its committees or members the powerto implement the GAA. The Legislature, its committees or members cannotexercise functions vested in the President by the Constitution; otherwise, there willbe a violation of the separation of powers. The Legislature, its committees ormembers cannot also exercise any veto power over actions or decisions ofexecutive departments, bureaus or offices because this will divest the President ofcontrol over the executive agencies. Control means the power to affirm, modify orreverse, and even to pre-empt, the actions or decisions of executive agencies or

their officials. Any provision of law requiring the concurrence of the Legislature, itscommittees or members before an executive agency can exercise its functionsviolates the President’s control over executive agencies, and is thusunconstitutional.

42.Same; Countrywide Development Fund (CDF); View that it is clear from theCountrywide Development Fund (CDF) provisions of the 1994 GeneralAppropriations Act (GAA) that the authority vested in legislators was limited to themere identification of projects; The President could change the projects identifiedby legislators without the favorable endorsement of any congressional committee,and even without the concurrence of the legislators who identified the projects.―Itis clear from the CDF provisions of the 1994 GAA that the authority vested inlegislators was limited to the mere identification of projects. There was nothing inthe 1994 GAA that made identification of projects by legislators mandatory on thePresident. The President could change the projects identified by legislators withoutthe favorable endorsement of any congressional committee, and even without theconcurrence of the legislators who identified the projects. The Court ruled inPHILCONSA: The authority given to the members of Congress is only to proposeand identify projects to be implemented by the President. Under Article XLI of theGAA of 1994, the President must perforce examine whether the proposalssubmitted by members of Congress fall within the specific items of expendituresfor which the Fund was set up, and if qualified, he next determines whether theyare in line with other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposedprojects qualify for funding under the Fund, it is the President who shall implementthem. In short, the proposals and identifications made by members of Congressare merely recommendatory.

43.Same; Funds; Words and Phrases; View that the term “funds” means appropriatedfunds, whether savings or not. The term “savings” is much narrower, and muststrictly qualify as such under Section 53 of the General Provisions of the 2013General Appropriations Act, which is a verbatim reproduction of the definition of“savings” in previous General Appropriations Act (GAA).―The Constitutionexpressly states that what can be realigned are “savings” from an item in the GAA,and such savings can only be used to augment another existing “item” in the“respective appropriations” of the Executive, Legislature, Judiciary, and theConstitutional Commissions in the same GAA. The term “funds” in SpecialProvision No. 4 is not the same as “savings.” The term “funds” means appropriatedfunds, whether savings or not. The term “savings” is much narrower, and muststrictly qualify as such under Section 53 of the General Provisions of the 2013 GAA,which is a verbatim reproduction of the definition of “savings” in previous GAAs.Section 53 of the 2013 GAA defines “savings” as follows: Sec. 53. Meaning ofSavings and Augmentation. Savings refer to portions or balances of anyprogrammed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrancewhich are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance orabandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation isauthorized; (ii) from appropriation balances arising from unpaid compensation andrelated costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay;and (iii) from appropriation balances realized from the implementation ofmeasures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled

agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets, programs andservices approved in this Act at a lesser cost.

44.Same; Same; View that the transfer of funds or appropriations is absolutelyprohibited, unless the funds qualify as “savings,” in which case the savings can berealigned to an existing item of appropriation but only within the same branch orConstitutional Commission.―Funds, or “appropriations” as used in the first clauseof Section 25(5) of Article VI, cannot be transferred from one branch to anotherbranch or to a Constitutional Commission, or even within the same branch orConstitutional Commission. Thus, funds or appropriations for the Office of thePresident cannot be transferred to the Commission on Elections. Likewise, funds orappropriations for one department of the Executive branch cannot be transferredto another department of the Executive branch. The transfer of funds orappropriations is absolutely prohibited, unless the funds qualify as “savings,” inwhich case the savings can be realigned to an existing item of appropriation butonly within the same branch or Constitutional Commission.

45.Same; Presidency; Delegation of Powers; View that the President’s constitutionalpower to realign savings cannot be delegated to the Department Secretaries butmust be exercised by the President himself.―The President’s constitutional powerto realign savings cannot be delegated to the Department Secretaries but must beexercised by the President himself. Under Special Provision No. 4, the President’spower to realign is delegated to Department Secretaries, which violates theConstitutional provision that it is the President who can realign savings. InPHILCONSA, we ruled that the power to realign cannot be delegated to the Chief ofStaff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines because this power “can be exercisedonly by the President pursuant to a specific law.” In Sanchez, we rejected thetransfer of funds because it was exercised by the Deputy Executive Secretary. Weruled in Sanchez that “[e]ven if the DILG Secretary had corroborated the initiativeof the Deputy Executive Secretary, it does not even appear that the matter wasauthorized by the President.” Clearly, the power to realign savings must beexercised by the President himself.

46.Same; Same; View that the power to release public funds authorized to be paidunder the General Appropriation Act is an Executive function.―The power torelease public funds authorized to be paid under the GAA is an Executive function.However, under Special Provision No. 5, prior approval of either of theCongressional Committees is required for the release of funds. Thus, theCongressional Committees effectively control the release of funds to implementprojects identified by legislators. Unless the funds are released, the projectscannot be implemented. Without doubt, the Congressional Committees andlegislators are exercising Executive functions in violation of the separation ofpowers. The Congressional Committees and the legislators are also divesting thePresident of control over the implementing agencies with respect to the PDAF. Alaw that invests Executive functions on the Legislature, its committees ormembers is unconstitutional for violation of the separation of powers.

47.Same; Same; Pork-Barrel System; View that the President’s line-item veto inappropriation laws is intended to eliminate “wasteful parochial spending,”primarily the pork-barrel.―The President’s line-item veto in appropriation laws is

intended to eliminate “wasteful parochial spending,” primarily the pork-barrel.Historically, the pork-barrel meant “appropriation yielding rich patronagebenefits.” In the Philippines, the pork-barrel has degenerated further as shown inthe COA Audit Report on the 2007-2009 PDAF. The pork-barrel is mischievouslyincluded in lump-sum appropriations that fund much needed projects. ThePresident is faced with the difficult decision of either vetoing the lump-sumappropriation that includes beneficial programs or approving the sameappropriation that includes the wasteful pork-barrel. To banish the evil of thepork-barrel, the Constitution vests the President with the line-item veto power,which for its necessary and proper exercise requires the President to propose, andCongress to enact, only line-item appropriations.

48.Same; Funds; View that the Constitution allows the creation of discretionary andspecial funds but with certain specified conditions. The Constitution requires thatthese funds must have specific purposes and can be used only for such specificpurposes.―The Constitution allows the creation of discretionary and special fundsbut with certain specified conditions. The Constitution requires that these fundsmust have specific purposes and can be used only for such specific purposes. Asstated in the Constitution: (6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particularofficials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriatevouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law. x x x x (3) Allmoney collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as aspecial fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a specialfund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall betransferred to the general funds of the Government. (Boldfacing and italicizationsupplied) The “discretionary funds” and “special funds” mentioned in theConstitution are sui generis items of appropriation because they are regulated byspecial provisions of the Constitution.

49.Same; Same; Discretionary Funds; View that “discretionary funds” areappropriated for particular officials who must use the funds only for publicpurposes in relation to the functions of their public office.―“Discretionary funds”are appropriated for particular officials who must use the funds only for publicpurposes in relation to the functions of their public office. The particular publicofficials must support the use of discretionary funds with appropriate vouchersunder guidelines prescribed by law. “Discretionary funds” already existed in GAAsunder the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. They are items, and not lump-sums, withspecified conditions and guidelines. A valid appropriation includes the payment offunds “under specified conditions.” The framers of the 1987 Constitution decidedto regulate in the Constitution itself the disbursement of discretionary funds “toavoid abuse of discretion in the use of discretionary funds” in the light of theexperience during the Martial Law regime when discretionary funds “were spentfor the personal aggrandizement of the First Family and some of their cronies.”

50.Same; Same; Same; View that there is nothing that prevents President Benigno S.Aquino III from submitting an emergency supplemental appropriation bill thatcould be approved on the same day by the Congress of the Philippines.―Thebalance of the 2013 PDAF, having reverted to the unappropriated surplus orbalances of the General Fund, can be the subject of an emergency supplemental

appropriation to aid the victims of Typhoon Yolanda as well as to fund the repairand reconstruction of facilities damaged by the typhoon. When the Gulf Coast ofthe United States was severely damaged by Hurricane Katrina on 29 August 2005,the U.S. President submitted to the U.S. Congress a request for an emergencysupplemental budget on 1 September 2005. The Senate passed the request on 1September 2005 while the House approved the bill on 2 September 2005, and theU.S. President signed it into law on the same day. It took only two days for theemergency supplemental appropriations to be approved and passed into law.There is nothing that prevents President Benigno S. Aquino III from submitting anemergency supplemental appropriation bill that could be approved on the sameday by the Congress of the Philippines. The President can certify such bill forimmediate enactment to meet the public calamity caused by Typhoon Yolanda.

51.Same; Same; Malampaya Fund; There is only a single subject to be financed by theMalampaya Fund ― that is, the development and exploitation of energy resources.No other government program would be funded by PD No. 910, except theexploration, exploitation and development of indigenous energy resources asenvisioned in the law’s Whereas clauses.―There is only a single subject to befinanced by the Malampaya Fund — that is, the development and exploitation ofenergy resources. No other government program would be funded by PD No. 910,except the exploration, exploitation and development of indigenous energyresources as envisioned in the law’s Whereas clauses, to wit: WHEREAS, there isneed to intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to theexploration, exploitation and development of indigenous energy resources vital toeconomic growth; WHEREAS, it is imperative that government accelerate the paceof, and focus special attention on, energy exploration, exploitation anddevelopment in the light of encouraging results in recent oil exploration and ofworld-wide developments affecting our continued industrial progress andwell-being; x x x The rule of ejusdem generis will apply if there is an enumerationof specific energy sources, such as gas, oil, geothermal, hydroelectric, and nuclear,and then followed by a general phrase “and such other energy sources,” in whichcase tidal, solar and wind power will fall under the phrase “other energy sources.”In PD No. 910, no such or similar enumeration can be found. Instead, what we findis the sole purpose for which the Malampaya Fund shall be used — that is, tofinance “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects ofthe government.”

52.Same; Same; Same; Congress; View that Congress has the exclusive power toappropriate public funds, and vesting the President with the power to determinethe uses of the Malampaya Fund violates the exclusive constitutional power ofCongress to appropriate public funds.―Under the 1987 Constitution, determiningthe purpose of the expenditure of government funds is an exclusive legislativepower. The Executive can only propose, but cannot determine the purpose of anappropriation. An appropriation cannot validly direct the payment of governmentfunds “for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President,”absent the proper application of the ejusdem generis rule. Section 8 of PD No. 910authorizes the use of the Malampaya Fund for other projects approved only by thePresident. To repeat, Congress has the exclusive power to appropriate public funds,and vesting the President with the power to determine the uses of the Malampaya

Fund violates the exclusive constitutional power of Congress to appropriate publicfunds.

53.Same; Same; Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Funds;Delegation of Powers; View that the phrase that the government’s share in thegross earnings of Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) shallbe used “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects as may bedirected and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines,” is anundue delegation of the legislative power to appropriate.―Similar to PD No. 910,PD No. 1869 was issued when then President Marcos exercised both executive andlegislative powers. Under the 1987 Constitution, the President no longer wieldslegislative powers. The phrase that the government’s share in the gross earningsof PAGCOR shall be used “to finance the priority infrastructure developmentprojects x x x as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President ofthe Philippines,” is an undue delegation of the legislative power to appropriate.

54.Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; View that the supreme duty of the SupremeCourt is to restore the constitutional check-and-balance that was preciselyintended to banish lump-sum appropriations and the pork-barrel system. Thepeaceful and constitutional solution to banish all forms of the pork-barrel systemfrom our national life is for this Court to declare all lump-sum appropriations,whether proposed by the Executive or enacted by the Legislature, asunconstitutional.―We have seen the outrage of the Filipino people to the revulsivepork-barrel system spawned by this forbidden Executive-Legislative arrangement.The Filipino people now realize that there are billions of pesos in the annual budgetthat could lift a large number of Filipinos out of abject poverty but that money islost to corruption annually. The Filipino people are now desperately in search of asolution to end this blighted pork-barrel system. The solution lies with this Court,which must rise to this historic challenge. The supreme duty of this Court is torestore the constitutional check-and-balance that was precisely intended to banishlump-sum appropriations and the pork-barrel system. The peaceful andconstitutional solution to banish all forms of the pork-barrel system from ournational life is for this Court to declare all lump-sum appropriations, whetherproposed by the Executive or enacted by the Legislature, as unconstitutional.Henceforth, as originally intended in the Constitution, the President shall submit toCongress only a line-item NEP, and Congress shall enact only a line-item GAA. TheFilipino people can then see in the GAA for what specific purposes and in whatspecific amounts their tax money will be spent. This will allow the Filipino people tomonitor whether their tax money is actually being spent as stated in the GAA.

BRION, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:55.Constitutional Law; Delegation of Powers; View that no branch of government may

delegate its constitutionally-assigned powers and thereby disrupt theConstitution’s carefully laid out plan of governance.―A necessary corollary to thisarrangement is that no branch of government may delegate itsconstitutionally-assigned powers and thereby disrupt the Constitution’s carefullylaid out plan of governance. Neither may one branch or any combination ofbranches deny the other or others their constitutionally mandated prerogatives —either through the exercise of sheer political dominance or through collusive

practices — without committing a breach that must be addressed through ourconstitutional processes. To be sure, political dominance, whether the brazen orthe benign kind, should be abhorred by our people for we should have learned ourlessons by now. Thus, Congress — the government’s policy making body — maynot delegate its constitutionally-assigned power to make laws and to alter andrepeal them, in the same manner that the President — who enforces andimplements the laws passed by Congress — cannot pass on to the Congress or tothe Judiciary, its enforcement or implementation powers.

56.Constitutional Law; Congress; General Appropriations Law; View that Congresscarries out the power of the purse through the appropriation of funds under ageneral appropriations law (titled as the General Appropriations Act or the GAA)that can easily be characterized as one of the most important pieces of legislationthat Congress enacts each year.―Under our system of government, part of thelegislative powers of Congress is the power of the purse which, broadly described,is the power to determine the areas of national life where government shall devoteits funds; to define the amount of these funds and authorize their expenditure; andto provide measures to raise revenues to defray the amounts to be spent. Thispower is regarded as the “the most complete and effectual weapon with which anyconstitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people.” By grantingCongress this power, the Constitution allows the Filipino people, through theirrepresentatives, to effectively shape the nation’s future through the control of thefunds that render the implementation of national plans possible. Consistent withthe separation of powers and the check and balance doctrines, the power of thepurse also allows Congress to control executive spending as the Executive actuallydisburses the money that Congress sets aside and determines to be available forspending. Congress carries out the power of the purse through the appropriation offunds under a general appropriations law (titled as the General Appropriations Actor the GAA) that can easily be characterized as one of the most important pieces oflegislation that Congress enacts each year. For this reason, the 1987 Constitution(and previous Constitutions) has laid down the general framework by whichCongress and the Executive make important decisions on how public funds areraised and spent — from the policy-making phase to the actual spending phase,including the raising of revenues as source of government funds.

57.Same; Funds; Malampaya Funds; General Appropriations Bill; View that Section 22,Article VII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to the general appropriations bill sothat there may be no need to report all sources of government revenue,particularly those emanating from funds like the Malampaya Fund.―Arguably,Section 22, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to the generalappropriations bill so that there may be no need to report all sources ofgovernment revenue, particularly those emanating from funds like the MalampayaFund. The power of Congress, however, will be less than plenary if this omissionwill happen as Congress would then be denied a complete picture of governmentrevenues and would consequently be denied its rightful place in setting nationalpolicies on matters of national importance, among them energy matters. TheConstitution would similarly be violated if Congress cannot also demand that therevenues of special funds (like the Malampaya Fund) be reported together with alisting of their items of expenditures. Since the denial would be by the Office of the

President, the incapacity of Congress would be because of intrusive action by theExecutive into what is otherwise a congressional preserve.

58.Same; Lump-Sum Appropriations; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF);View that a lump sum appropriation like the Priority Development Assistance Fundcannot and should not pass Congress unless the Executive and the Legislativebranches collude, in which case, the turn of the Supreme Court to be an activeconstitutional player in the budget process comes into play.―A lump sumappropriation like the PDAF cannot and should not pass Congress unless theExecutive and the Legislative branches collude, in which case, the turn of thisCourt to be an active constitutional player in the budget process comes into play.The PDAF, as explained in the Opinions of Justice Carpio and Bernabe, is a primeexample of a lump sum appropriation that, over the years, for reasons beneficial toboth branches of government, have successfully negotiated the congressionallegislative process, to the detriment of the general public.

59.Same; Oversight Power; View that oversight concerns post-enactment measuresundertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with programobjectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) toeliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation oflegislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressionalperception of public interest.―The last phase of the budgetary process is thebudget accountability phase that Congress is empowered to enforce in order tocheck on compliance with its basic intents in allocating measured funds under theappropriation act. At the budget hearings during the legislation phase, Congressalready checks on the need for the recommended appropriations (as Congressmay delete a recommended appropriation that it perceives to be unneeded), andon the propriety, efficiency and effectiveness of budget implementation, both pastand impending. Technically, this portion of the budgetary exercise involveslegislative scrutiny that is part of the overall oversight powers of Congress over thebudget. Another part of the oversight authority is legislative investigation. FormerChief Justice Puno expounded on this aspect of the budgetary process in hisSeparate Opinion in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, 405 SCRA 614 (2003),and he best sums up the breadth and scope of this power, as follows: Broadlydefined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress toenhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislationit has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertakenby Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b)to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminateexecutive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislativeauthority, and (e) to assess executive conformity with the congressionalperception of public interest. The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsicin the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balancesinherent in a democratic system of government.

60.Same; Funds; Malampaya Funds; Lump-Sum Appropriations; Separation of Powers;View that the Section 8, P.D. No. 910 funds or the Malampaya Fund consist of twocomponents: the funds “to be used to finance energy resource development andexploitation programs and projects,” and the funds “for such other purposes as

may be...directed by the President.” I join Justice Carpio in the view that thesecond “for such other purposes” component is a complete nullity as it is an unduedelegation of legislative power. I submit that this is additionally objectionable forbeing a part of a constitutionally objectionable lump sum payment that violatesthe separation of powers doctrine.―The Section 8, P.D. No. 910 funds or theMalampaya Fund consist of two components: the funds “to be used to financeenergy resource development and exploitation programs and projects,” and thefunds “for such other purposes as may be…directed by the President.” I join JusticeCarpio in the view that the second “for such other purposes” component is acomplete nullity as it is an undue delegation of legislative power. I submit that thisis additionally objectionable for being a part of a constitutionally objectionablelump sum payment that violates the separation of powers doctrine. I will discussthis view under the first component of Section 8. I vote to strike down the “energy”component of Section 8, P.D. No. 910 as it is a discretionary lump sum fund that isnot saved at all by its energy development and exploitation purpose. It is a pureand simple pork barrel granted to the President under a martial law regime decreethat could have escaped invalidity then under the 1973 Constitution and theprevailing unusual times, but should be struck down now for being out of step withthe requirements of the 1987 Constitution. As a fund, it is a prohibited lump sumbecause it consists of a fund of indefinite size that has now grown to giganticproportions, whose accounts and accounting are far from the usual in government,and which is made available to the President for his disposition, from year to year,with very vague controls, and free from the legal constraints of the budget processnow in place under the 1987 Constitution. Admittedly, it is a fund raised andintended for special purposes but the characterization “special purpose” is notreason enough and is not a magical abracadabra phrase that could whisk a fundout of the constitutional budget process, defying even common reason in theprocess.

61.Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the legitimacy of the present status ofthe fund is questionable, particularly its purpose and lack of specificity; its lumpsum nature and its disbursement solely at the discretion of one man, uncheckedby any other; how and why a multi-project and multi-activity fund covering manyprojects and activities, now and in the future, should be held at the discretion ofone man; and the legal situation where the power of Congress and its participationin national policymaking through the budget process is disregarded.―I questionthe legitimacy of the present status of the fund, particularly its purpose and lack ofspecificity; its lump sum nature and its disbursement solely at the discretion of oneman, unchecked by any other; how and why a multi-project and multi-activity fundcovering many projects and activities, now and in the future, should be held at thediscretion of one man; and the legal situation where the power of Congress and itsparticipation in national policymaking through the budget process is disregarded.All these can be encapsulated as violations of the doctrines of separation ofpowers and checks and balances which can be addressed and remedied if only thefund can be subjected to the usual budget pro­cesses, with adjustments thatcircumstances of the fund and its use would require. Lest this conclusion bemisunderstood, I do not per se take the position that all lump sum appropriationsshould be disallowed as this would be an extreme position that disregards therealities of national life. But the use of lump sums, to be allowed, should be within

reason acceptable under the processes of the Constitution, respectful of theconstitutional safeguards that are now in place, and understandable to the peoplebased on their secular understanding of what is happening in government.

62.Same; Same; Same; Indirect Contempt; Department of Budget and Management(DBM) Circular Letter No. 2013-8; View that the issuance of the Department ofBudget and Management (DBM) Circular Letter No. 2013-8 is prima facie anindirect contempt for which the DBM Secretary himself should be liable unless hecan show why he should not be punished.―Under the Rules of Court, contempt isclassified into direct and indirect or constructive contempt. Direct contempt ismisbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct orinterrupt the proceedings before the same. Where the act of contumacy is notcommitted in facie curiae, or “in the presence of or so near a court or judge, i.e.,perpetrated outside the sitting of the court, it is considered indirect or constructivecontempt, and may include “disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,order judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge,”or “(a)ny abuse of or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings ofa court not constituting direct contempt,” or “any improper conduct tending,directly, or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.”Based on this definition and classification, the issuance of the DBM Circular Letteris prima facie an indirect contempt for which the DBM Secretary himself should beliable unless he can show why he should not be punished. As an element of dueprocess, he must now be directed by resolution to explain why he should not bepenalized for issuing and enforcing Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated September 27,2013 despite the Court’s TRO.

LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:63.Constitutional Law; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); Presidential

Social Fund; View that Title XLIV known as the Priority Development AssistanceFund (PDAF) in the 2013 General Appropriations Act (Republic Act No. 10352) isunconstitutional; The purpose of the Presidential Social Fund in Title IV, Section 12of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended, “to finance the priorityinfrastructure development projects” is also unconstitutional.―Title XLIV known asthe Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) in the 2013 GeneralAppropriations Act (Republic Act No. 10352) is unconstitutional. We, thus, overturnthe holdings of various cases starting with Philippine Constitution Association v.Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994), and Sarmiento v. The Treasurer of the Philippines.Presidential Decree No. 910 does not sanction the unmitigated and unaccountableuse of income derived from energy resources. The purpose of the PresidentialSocial Fund in Title IV, Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended, “tofinance the priority infrastructure development projects” is also unconstitutional.

64.Same; Presidency; Immunity from Suit; View that the doctrine of the non-suabilityof the President is well settled. This includes any civil or criminal cases; This doesnot mean, however, that the President cannot be made accountable. He may beimpeached and removed. Likewise, he can be made criminally and civilly liable inthe proper case after his tenure as President.―The doctrine of the non-suability ofthe President is well settled. This includes any civil or criminal cases. It is part ofthe Constitution by implication. Any suit will degrade the dignity necessary for the

operations of the Office of the President. It will additionally provide either ahindrance or distraction from the performance of his official duties and functions.Also, any contrary doctrine will allow harassment and petty suits which can impairjudgment. This does not mean, however, that the President cannot be madeaccountable. He may be impeached and removed. Likewise, he can be madecriminally and civilly liable in the proper case after his tenure as President.

65.Same; Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy; Advisory Opinions; View thatbasic in litigation raising constitutional issues is the requirement that there mustbe an actual case or controversy. The Supreme Court cannot render an advisoryopinion.―Basic in litigation raising constitutional issues is the requirement thatthere must be an actual case or controversy. This Court cannot render an advisoryopinion. We assume that the Constitution binds all other constitutionaldepartments, instrumentalities, and organs. We are aware that in the exercise oftheir various powers, they do interpret the text of the Constitution in the light ofcontemporary needs that they should address. A policy that reduces this Court toan adviser for official acts by the other departments that have not yet been donewould unnecessarily tax our resources. It is inconsistent with our role as finalarbiter and adjudicator and weakens the entire system of the Rule of Law. Ourpower of judicial review is a duty to make a final and binding construction of law.This power should generally be reserved when the departments have exhaustedany and all acts that would remedy any perceived violation of right. The rationalethat defines the extent of our doctrines laying down exceptions to our rules onjusticiability are clear: Not only should the pleadings show a convincing violation ofa right, but the impact should be shown to be so grave, imminent, and irreparablethat any delayed exercise of judicial review or deference would underminefundamental principles that should be enjoyed by the party complaining or theconstituents that they legitimately represent.

66.Same; Same; Same; View that the requirement of an “actual case,” thus, meansthat the case before this Court “involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion ofopposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be mootor academic based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable bya court of justice.”―The requirement of an “actual case,” thus, means that thecase before this Court “involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of oppositelegal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot oracademic based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by acourt of justice.” Furthermore, “the controversy needs to be definite and concrete,bearing upon the legal relations of parties who are pitted against each other due totheir adverse legal interests.” Thus, the adverse position of the parties must besufficient enough for the case to be pleaded and for this Court to be able to providethe parties the proper relief/s prayed for.

67.Same; Same; Judicial Department; View that in cases of conflict, the judicialdepartment is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determinethe proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among theintegral or constituent units thereof.―The political question doctrine emerged as acorollary to the nature of judicial review. In the landmark case of Angara v.Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), the essence of the duty of judicial

review was explained, thus: But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out withdeft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislativeand the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacingof functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimesmakes it hard to say just where one leaves off and the other begins. In times ofsocial disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitutionare apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, thejudicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon todetermine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments andamong the integral or constituent units thereof.

68.Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; Words and Phrases; View that the SupremeCourt, through Chief Justice Davide, defined grave abuse of discretion as “suchcapricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack ofjurisdiction; or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrarymanner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and grossas to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform theduly enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.”―This Court, through ChiefJustice Davide, defined grave abuse of discretion as “x x x such capricious andwhimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, in otherwords, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion orpersonal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion ofpositive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duly enjoined or to act at all incontemplation of law.” After a review of the facts established in the case andapplication of the relevant provisions of law, it then held that the House ofRepresentatives did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

69.Same; Judicial Review; Moot and Academic; View that in SANLAKAS v. ExecutiveSecretary Reyes, 421 SCRA 656 (2004), the Supreme Court ruled that while thecase has become moot, “[n]evertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwisemoot, if it is “capable of repetition yet evading review.”―In SANLAKAS v. ExecutiveSecretary Reyes, 421 SCRA 656 (2004), this Court ruled that while the case hasbecome moot, “[n]evertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if itis “capable of repetition yet evading review.”

70.Same; Same; Same; View that in SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 421SCRA 656 (2004), Petitions were filed to assail the issuance of Proclamation No.427 declaring a state of rebellion during the so-called Oakwood occupation in 2003.While the Supreme Court conceded that the case was mooted by the issuance ofProclamation No. 435, which declared that the state of rebellion ceased to exist, itstill decided the case.―In SANLAKAS, Petitions were filed to assail the issuance ofProclamation No. 427 declaring a state of rebellion during the so-called Oakwoodoccupation in 2003. While this Court conceded that the case was mooted by theissuance of Proclamation No. 435, which declared that the state of rebellion ceasedto exist, it still decided the case. This Court pointed out that the issue has yet to bedecided definitively, as evidenced by the dismissal of this Court of previous casesinvolving the same issue due to mootness: Once before, the President on May 1,2001 declared a state of rebellion and called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppressthe rebellion through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1. On that

occasion, “ ‘an angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladedweapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons’ assaulted and attempted tobreak into Malacañang.” Petitions were filed before this Court assailing the validityof the President’s declaration. Five days after such declaration, however, thePresident lifted the same. The mootness of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez andaccompanying cases precluded this Court from addressing the constitutionality ofthe declaration. To prevent similar questions from reemerging, we seize thisopportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of rebellionin the exercise of the President’s calling out power, the mootness of the petitionsnotwithstanding.

71.Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Priority Development Assistance Fund(PDAF); View that the concepts of accountability and separation of powers arefundamental values in our constitutional democracy. The effect of the use of thePriority Development Assistance Fund can have repercussions on these principles.Yet, it is difficult to discover anomalies if any.―The concepts of accountability andseparation of powers are fundamental values in our constitutional democracy. Theeffect of the use of the Priority Development Assistance Fund can haverepercussions on these principles. Yet, it is difficult to discover anomalies if any. Ittook the Commission on Audit some time to make its special report for a periodending in 2009. It is difficult to expect such detail from ordinary citizens who wishto avail their rights as taxpayers. Clearly, had it not been for reports in bothmainstream and social media, the public would not have been made aware of themagnitude.

72.Remedial Law; Judgments; Stare Decisis; View that stare decisis is a functionaldoctrine necessary for courts committed to the rule of law. It is not, however, anencrusted and inflexible canon. Slavishly adhering to precedent potentiallyundermines the value of a Judiciary.―Respondents also argued that we shouldcontinue to respect our precedents. They invoke the doctrine of stare decisis. Staredecisis is a functional doctrine necessary for courts committed to the rule of law. Itis not, however, an encrusted and inflexible canon. Slavishly adhering toprecedent potentially undermines the value of a Judiciary.

73.Constitutional Law; General Appropriations Bill; View that the GeneralAppropriations Bill is considered by Congress in three readings like other pieces oflegislation.―The President first submits to Congress a “budget of expenditures andsources of financing” in compliance with Article VII, Section 22 which provides thus:The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening ofevery regular session as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget ofexpenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing andproposed revenue measures. This budget of expenditures and sources of financing(also called the National Expenditure Plan) is first filed with the House ofRepresentatives and can only originate from there. Thus, in Article VI, Section 24:All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House ofRepresentatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.Thereafter, the General Appropriations Bill is considered by Congress in threereadings like other pieces of legislation. Should it become necessary, a bicameral

committee is convened to harmonize the differences in the Third Reading copies ofeach Legislative chamber. This is later on submitted to both the House and theSenate for ratification. The bill as approved by Congress shall then be presented tothe President for approval. The President, in addition to a full approval or veto, isgranted the power of an item veto. Article VI, Section 27 (2) provides: ThePresident shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in anappropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or itemsto which he does not object. We have had, in several cases, interpreted the powerof item veto of the President.

74.Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); View that nowhere in theConstitution does it allow specific members of the House of Representatives or theSenate to implement projects and programs. Their role is clear. Rather, it is thelocal government units that are given the prerogative to execute projects andprograms.―The Executive is given the task of preparing the budget and theprerogative to spend from an authorized budget. The Legislature, on the otherhand, is given the power to authorize a budget for the coming fiscal year. Thispower to authorize is given to the Legislature collectively. Nowhere in theConstitution does it allow specific members of the House of Representatives or theSenate to implement projects and programs. Their role is clear. Rather, it is thelocal government units that are given the prerogative to execute projects andprograms.

75.Same; Congress; View that the members of the Legislature do not do the formalaudit of expenditures. This is the principal prerogative of the Commission onAudit.―The members of the Legislature do not do the formal audit of expenditures.This is the principal prerogative of the Commission on Audit. Rather, they benefitfrom such formal audits. These formal audits assist the members of the House ofRepresentatives and the Senators to do their constitutional roles. The formal auditsalso make public and transparent the purposes, methods used, and achievementsand failures of each and every expenditure made on behalf of the government sothat their constituencies can judge them as they go on to authorize another budgetfor another fiscal year.

76.Same; Same; View that interference in any government project other than that ofcongressional activities is a direct violation of Article VI, Section 14 of the 1987Constitution in so far as Title XLIV of the 2013 General Appropriations Act allowsparticipation by Congress.―Any system where members of Congress participate inthe execution of projects in any way compromises them. It encroaches on theirability to do their constitutional duties. The violation is apparent in two ways: theirability to efficiently make judgments to authorize a budget and the interference inthe constitutional mandate of the President to be the Executive. Besides,interference in any government project other than that of congressional activitiesis a direct violation of Article VI, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution in so far asTitle XLIV of the 2013 General Appropriations Act allows participation by Congress.

77.Same; Special Allotment Release Order (SARO); View that under National BudgetCircular No. 545, the appropriations shall be made available to the agency of thegovernment upon the issuance by the Department of Budget and Management of

either an Agency Budget Matrix or a Special Allotment Release Order.―Generally,the first step to budget execution is the issuance by the Department of Budget andManagement of Guidelines on the Release of Funds. For the year 2013, theDepartment of Budget and Management issued National Budget Circular No. 545entitled “Guidelines for the Release of Funds for FY 2013.” Under National BudgetCircular No. 545, the appropriations shall be made available to the agency of thegovernment upon the issuance by the Department of Budget and Management ofeither an Agency Budget Matrix or a Special Allotment Release Order. The AgencyBudget Matrix will act as a comprehensive release of allotment coveringagency-specific budgets that do not need prior clearance. The Special AllotmentRelease Order is required for those allotments needing clearance, among others.

78.Same; Separation of Powers; View that from the moment the law becomeseffective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members toplay any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates theprinciple of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.―This Court hasimplied that the participation of Congress is limited to the exercise of its power ofoversight. Any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should belimited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must beconfined to the following: 1. scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power ofappropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its powerto ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houseson any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and 2.investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the powerof Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. x x x As such, it is only uponits effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive branch acquires theduties and powers to execute the said law. Before that point, the role of theexecutive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving or vetoingthe law. From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law thatempowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementationor enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thusunconstitutional.

79.Same; Same; View that the participation of members of Congress — even if only torecommend — amounts to an unconstitutional post-enactment interference in therole of the Executive. It also defeats the purpose of the powers granted by theConstitution to Congress to authorize a budget.―[T]o forestall the danger ofcongressional encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the Constitutionimposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, anyof its committees or its members with either Executive or Judicial power. WhenCongress exercises its legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely wroughtand exhaustively considered, procedures” specified under the Constitution,including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.” The participationof members of Congress — even if only to recommend — amounts to anunconstitutional post-enactment interference in the role of the Executive. It alsodefeats the purpose of the powers granted by the Constitution to Congress toauthorize a budget.

80.Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); View that the Priority

Development Assistance Fund is an appropriation for each Member of the House ofRepresentative and each Senator. This is why this item in the GeneralAppropriations Act of 2013 is an invalid appropriation. It is allocated for use whichis not inherent in the role of a member of Congress. The power to spend is anExecutive constitutional discretion — not a Legislative one.―The equal allocationamong members of the House of Representatives and more so among Senatorsshows the true color of the Priority Development Assistance Fund. It is to give alump sum for each member of the House of Representatives and the Senate forthem to spend on projects of their own choosing. This is usually for any purposewhether among their constituents and whether for the present or future. In short,the Priority Development Assistance Fund is an appropriation for each Member ofthe House of Representative and each Senator. This is why this item in the GeneralAppropriations Act of 2013 is an invalid appropriation. It is allocated for use whichis not inherent in the role of a member of Congress. The power to spend is anExecutive constitutional discretion — not a Legislative one.

81.Same; Same; Same; View that instead of Congress acting collectively with itselected representatives deciding on the magnitude of the amounts for spending, itwill be the officer who either recommends or spends who decides what the budgetwill be. This is not what is meant when the Constitution provides that “no moneyshall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made bylaw.” When no discernible purpose is defined in the law, money is paid out for apublic official and not in pursuance of an appropriation.―An item becomes invalidwhen it is just an amount allocated to an official absent a purpose. In such a case,the item facilitates an unconstitutional delegation of the power to authorize abudget. Instead of Congress acting collectively with its elected representativesdeciding on the magnitude of the amounts for spending, it will be the officer whoeither recommends or spends who decides what the budget will be. This is notwhat is meant when the Constitution provides that “no money shall be paid out ofthe Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” When nodiscernible purpose is defined in the law, money is paid out for a public official andnot in pursuance of an appropriation.

82.Same; Same; Same; View that I cannot join Justice Brion in his view that even thephrase “to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitationprograms and projects of the government” in Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.910 is too broad; The kinds of projects relating to energy resource developmentand exploitation are determinable.―I regret, however, that I cannot join JusticeBrion in his view that even the phrase “to be used to finance energy resourcedevelopment and exploitation programs and projects of the government” inSection 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 is too broad. This is even granting that thisphrase is likewise qualified with “as may be hereafter determined by thePresident.” The kinds of projects relating to energy resource development andexploitation are determinable. There are obvious activities that do not square withthis intent, for instance, expenditures solely for agriculture. The extent of latitudethat the President is given is also commensurate with the importance of the energysector itself. Energy is fundamental for the functioning of government as well asthe private sector. It is essential to power all projects whether commercial or forthe public interest. The formulation, thus, reasonably communicates discretion but

puts it within reasonable bounds. In my view, and with due respect to the opinionof Justice Brion, the challenge of this phrase’s unconstitutionality lacks the claritythat should compel us to strike it down.

83.Same; Same; Same; View that a member of the House of Representatives or aSenator is not an automated teller machine or ATM from which the public couldwithdraw funds for sundry private purposes; Their role is to use their experienceand their understanding of their constituents to craft policy articulated in laws.―Amember of the House of Representatives or a Senator is not an automated tellermachine or ATM from which the public could withdraw funds for sundry privatepurposes. They should be honorable elected officials tasked with having a longerand broader view. Their role is to use their experience and their understanding oftheir constituents to craft policy articulated in laws. Congress is entrusted to workwith political foresight. Congress, as a whole, checks the spending of the Presidentas it goes through the annual exercise of deciding what to authorize in the budget.A level of independence and maturity is required in relation to the passage of lawsrequested by the Executive. Poverty and inefficiencies in government are theresult of lack of accountability. Accountability should no longer be compromised.

84.Same; Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; View that pork barrel funds historicallyencourage dole-outs.―Pork barrel funds historically encourage dole-outs. Itinculcates a perverse understanding of representative democracy. It encourages aculture that misunderstands the important function of public representation inCongress. It does not truly empower those who are impoverished or found in themargins of our society. There are better, more lasting and systematic ways to helpour people survive. A better kind of democracy should not be the ideal. It should bethe norm. We listen to our people as we read the Constitution. We watch as othersdo their part and are willing to do more. We note the public’s message: Politicsshould not be as it was. Eradicate greed. Exact accountability. Build a governmentthat has a collective passion for real social justice.