BAYANG VS. CAG.R. NO. 53564FEBRUARY 27, 1987

Facts:Petitioner Juan Bayang filed a complaint for quieting of title with damages against Benigno Biong in the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte, Branch 1, docketed as Civil Case No. 1892. While the case was pending, Biong succeeded in dispossessing the plaintiff of the land in question and remained there until January 25, 1978. On February 21, 1972, the case was decided in favor of Biong, but the Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court. This decision became final.

On February 6, 1978, Bayang filed a second case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2589, with the CFI of Surigao del Norte, Branch II, seeking to recover from Biong the incomes earned from the same land from 1970 up to the quarterly incomes from 1978 until the said land was delivered to the plaintiff. On August 16, 1978, Biong filed a motion for summary judgment, reiterating the affirmative defense of res judicata raised in his answer insofar as it related to the incidents concerning the case prior to January 25, 1978. An opposition to this motion was duly filed by Bayang.

The trial court, after considering the arguments of the parties, granted the motion and rendered a summary judgment on October 30, 1978. The said decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:Whether or not the judgment on the 1st case (civil case no. 1892) constitutes res judicata as to bar civil case 2589.

Rulings:Yes.

A long line of decisions has consistently held that for res judicata to apply: a) the former judgment must be final; b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and d) there must be between the first case and the second case identity of parties, identity of subject matter and Identity of cause of action.

The decision in Civil Case No. 1892 became final and executory on February 2, 1978. There is no dispute that the trial court which rendered that decision had jurisdiction over the subjectmatter and the parties to the proceeding. The case was tried on the merits. The parties to Civil Case No. 1892 and the subsequent Civil Case No. 2589 are the same petitioner and private respondent now before us.

The petitioner would draw a distinction between the land in dispute in Civil Case No. 1892 and the income from that land being claimed in Civil Case No. 2589. But that is in our view splitting hairs to split a cause of action. The subjectmatter is essentially the same in both cases as the income is only a consequence or accessory of the disputed property. We cannot agree that there are involved here two causes of action calling for two separate cases. The claim for the income from the land was incidental to, and should have been raised by Bayang in his earlier claim for, ownership of the land.

We are not unmindful of the argument that affirmance of the challenged decision of the respondent court will result in the unjust enrichment of Biong at the expense of Bayang. This assumes, of course, that the petitioner could have proved his right to the income he now claims belatedly. The point is that he did not make the proper claim at the proper time and in the proper proceedings, and he cannot do it now. Whatever right he might have had is now deemed waived because of his neglect.