Basic Principles of Patient Safety-Overview-Self-Study Module-2013.pdf
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Transcript of Basic Principles of Patient Safety-Overview-Self-Study Module-2013.pdf
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1Principles of Patient SafetyAn Overview
Richard T. Griffey, MD, MPHAssistant Professor, Emergency Medicine
Mary Z. Taylor, JDDirector of Patient Safety
Washington University School of Medicine
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2Learning Objectives
What is the case for patient safety? Adverse Events/Medical errors System Design and Human Factors Adverse Event Reporting Culture of Safety Disclosure of Adverse Events What you can use these principles in your work
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3Definitions
Patient Safety
- Absence of preventable harm: avoidance of errors in clinical care resulting in injury to our patients
Quality Care
- Best possible care: optimizing the likelihood of health outcomes desired by patients, families and clinicians
PresenterPresentation Notes
What is quality care?
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4Incidence of adverse events and negligence in hospitalized patients
Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I (1991)TA Brennan, LL Leape, NM Laird, L Hebert, AR Localio, AG Lawthers,
JP Newhouse, PC Weiler, and HH Hiatt
30,121 patients; 51 acute care hospitals in New YorkRates of Adverse Events (AE) by age, sex and specialty.
Conclusion: There is a substantial amount of injury to patients from medical management, and many injuries are the result of substandard care.
Adverse events in 3.7% of hospitalizations 27% resulting from negligence 58% preventable (errors) 13.6% resulted in death
The Harvard Study was the first major attempt to quantify medical harm. It was limited to professional liability claims and was the first to create a sense of the magnitude of the problem.
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5HarmScope of the Problem
More than 1 million preventable adverse events occur in the US each year
An estimated 44,000-98,000 people die in hospitals each year from preventable medical errors
Institute of Medicine. 1999. To Err is Human: Building a safer health system.
Many mark the release of To Err is Human by the Institute of Medicine as the first major study in patient safety and an attempt to offer ideas on what can be done in prevention. The IOM took the Harvard study and extrapolated its findings to create the often quoted 44,000 98,000 statistic.
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6Scope of the Problemwhat if they all happened at once?
Extrapolated to annual hospital admissions (33.6M)between 44,000 and 98,000 deaths/year or 1 jumbo jets per day falling from the sky
Leape LL. Error in medicine. JAMA. 1994 Dec 21;272(23):1851-7
Total national costs estimated between $17 and $29 billion for preventable adverse events
Brennan TA, Leape LL, Laird NM, Hebert L, Localio AR, Lawthers AG, Newhouse JP, Weiler PC, Hiatt HH. Incidence of adverse events and negligence in hospitalized patients. Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I. N Engl J Med. 1991 Feb 7;324(6):370-6.
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7Yearly Attributable Deaths
05,000
10,00015,00020,00025,00030,00035,00040,00045,000
MVA Breast Cancer AIDS Medical Errors
AHRQ 2001Even using the lower number from the IOM study, Medical Errors killed more Americans than car accidents and breast cancer. There is no indication that the annual rate of deaths from errors decreased since 1999.
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8The rate of adverse events was higher than previously reported
adverse events occurred in 33.2 percent of hospital admissions (range: 2936 percent) or 91 events per 1,000 patient days (range: 89106).
Some patients experienced more than one adverse event; the overall rate was 49 events per 100 admissions (range: 4356).
Older patients, longer LOS, higher case mix, experienced most adverse events
2011 Study Shows IHI Global Trigger Tool Reveals Highest Harm Rate
Classen DC, et al. Health Affairs. 30:4 (2011): 581589
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9High Profile Deaths from Medical Errors
Sebastien Ferrero, 3U. Florida
Josie King, 18 monthsJohns Hopkins
Jesica Santillan, 17Duke
Betsy Lehman, 39Dana Farber
Chemotherapy overdose
Dehydration and oversedation
ABO compatibilitychecking error-- transplant Growth hormone
overdose
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Weve been talking about the numbers of people who die from errors. But its important to maintain the focus on individual patients.
Betsy Lehman was the health reporter for the Boston Globe. She received a 10-fold overdose of chemo at Dana Farber and died.
Josie King was recovering from burns when she died of dehydration and a failure to monitor her pain medications at Johns Hopkins.
Jesica Santillan died of ABO incompatibility when the surgeons and staff at Duke failed to check her blood type prior to transplant.
Sebastian Ferrero received an overdose of growth hormone at his outpatient pediatric clinic and died.
All have foundations in their names and their families work with the schools and hospitals on patient safety efforts. Do we really need to wait for a tragic case in order for us to improve safety for our patients?
High Profile Deaths from Medical Errors
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Traditional Approach to Error
Error is a character flaw Focus on the incident and the individual Punishment and Remediation
Personal responsibility and theory of bad apples"
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Patient Safety Approach to Error Humans will err despite their best efforts, knowledge and motivation.
Therefore goal of Patient Safety is not to eliminate human error, but to create safe systems to prevent them from reaching the patient.
Context of error is more important than the participant. Ask How did it happen not Who did it?
Assumes good intentions, ability, motivation and knowledge
Systems or processes that depend on perfect human performance are fatally flawed.
Most adverse events result from a cascade of failures in a flawed system
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Why Are We Quick to Blame?
Clinicians value personal judgment and responsibility We like to have attribution/causality We maintain an illusion of autonomy If we can blame someone we can move on and dont
have to look a the entire processIts just human error or It happens, its a known complication.
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We cant change the human condition, but we can change the conditions under which humans work.
Pioneers in Patient Safety
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James Reasons Swiss cheese Model Some holes dueto active failures
Successive layers of defenses, barriers, & safeguards
Hazards
Other holes due tolatent system factors
Harm
No single individual error (active error) is sufficient to cause an accident The majority of medical errors are caused by faulty systems, processes and conditions that lead people to make mistakes or fail to prevent them Latent conditions = system faults that increase the probability of individuals making
errors
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Pioneers in Patient Safety
Incompetent people are, at most, 1% of the problem. The other 99% are good people trying to do a good job who make very simple mistakes and it's the processes that set them up to make these mistakes.
DonBerwickformer CEOofIHI,nowheadofCMS
LucianLeapeHarvardSchoolofPublicHealth
Every system is perfectly designed to achieve the results it gets.
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Why has it taken so long to make things safer?
We fail to treat the delivery of healthcare as a science Most errors dont harm patients/failure to capture and learn
-no harm, no foul usually brings a sigh of relief, not action
Need to overcome the culture of medicine which expects perfection instead of expecting error and planning for it
-get away from the idea that your own effort drives everything -healthcare is a team sport: overwhelming evidence that diverse input improves outcomes
Some of us still believe smart people, working hard, will not make mistakes
We map the human genome and transplant hearts and lungs, but we dont wash our hands
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Medical Errors
Bad news Errors are inevitable
Good news Errors fall into predictable patterns
Communication
Planning
Execution
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Strong But Wrong
Once a decision is made, natural tendency is to defend it Contradictory data is often
discounted or ignored
Problem often detected at shift change fresh eyes, or when a new person enters a room
This tendency is prevalent among experienced clinicians who have developed effective routines. It can also be common among newer clinicians who don t have a history of experiences to draw from, a mature frame of reference. .
PresenterPresentation NotesThis tendency is prevalent among experienced, senior clinicians, who have developed effective routines. It is also common among newer clinicians who don t have a history of experiences to draw from.
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Human Factors
Examines activity by way of component tasks and considers it in terms of:
Physical demands: fatigue, illness, substance abuse, stressSkill requirements: inexperience, fear, procedural shortcutsMental workload: boredom, cognitive shortcuts, reliance on memoryTeam dynamics: stress, shift workDevice design: equipment/programsEnvironment:
fixed: lighting, heat, unnatural workflow spacecontrollable: noise, interruptions, motion, clutter
We know errors result when these factors are violated
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Human Factors Principles
Avoid reliance on memoryseven digits is our max Decrease reliance on vigilance Increase verbal feedback/structured communication Standardize what you can, and only that; use
protocols & checklists wisely
Use constraints and forcing functions to create a safety net to save you from yourself
Reduce handoffs and standardize content
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When the posted speed limit is 65mph, how fast do you drive? What impacts your speed?Time of day?Whether its a speed trap?Are you late picking up kids from daycare?Is the weather bad?Even the best intentioned are pressed to step over known safety precautions in medicine, resulting in practice creep.
PresenterPresentation Notes
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Reliability and SafetyExpectations of Healthcare
Is it sufficient to achieve thrombolysis/PCI in MI within 60 minutes 60% of the time?
Is it OK to eliminate 90% of the NICU BSIs? What if we do the correct operation 99% of the time? ATM example: Change in design reduced defect
rate 1,000 foldincreased reliability/reduced costHard Stop: Most banks changed their design to release your card first, then your money, so the card isnt retained. You cant leave it behind.
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Aviation Safety as a ModelHigh Reliability
Aviation industry admitted they were going to be tired, make mistakes, do the wrong thing
As large commercial planes crashed the publics attention was focused
Became pre-occupied with failureo Standardized communication between team memberso Flattened hierarchy but recognized leadershipo Created safe environments, free from distraction during critical steps
Developed reporting and investigation infrastructure
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How Do We Respond to Errors? Report them WUSM Employees use the WUSM Event Reporting System
http://ers.wusm.wustl.edu
BJC Employees use the BJC System (icon on desktops) SAFEline Call 7-SAFE (7233) and leave a message Submit cases to Departmental QI or M&M process
Transparency with each other safely telling lessons learned Ask What happened not Who did it? Give a full explanation to patients/families of adverse events Ask Who else can learn from this?generalize lessons Involve patients and families in safety efforts
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Traditional Voluntary Reporting in Hospitals Lost Opportunities to Learn
Key Findings:9 Hospital staff did not report 86% of events to incident reporting systems9 Physician accounted for less than 2% of reports
Hospital Incident Reporting Systems Do Not Capture Most Patient Harm. January 2012 OEI-06-09-00091
Low physician reporting is problematic. It hinders the ability to identify and mitigate risks. Physicians view health care through a unique lens, which allows them to identify certain types of hazards and certain contributing factors better than others.
Noble, DJ, Pronovost, Underreporting of Patient Safety Incidents Reduces Health Cares Ability to Quantify and Accurately Measure Harm Reduction P. J Patient Saf 2010; 6:24
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Culture
Definition of culture: the way we do business Behaviors define culturewhat you do, not say Culture is a manifestation of internalized assumptions,
shared beliefs and practices
Culture is made up of understandings we share as to how to actusually unspoken but passed down
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Culture of Safety
Focuses on creating a safe system in which to work Strikes a balance between flattening hierarchy and effective
teamwork with a recognized leader
Strives for high reliability with members preoccupied with failure
Creates an environment where both patients, physicians, staff are treated with dignity and respect Right thing to do Keeps patients safer
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Just CulturePersonal Responsibility
A fair and just culture establishes the mechanisms to appropriately apportion responsibility Human error, At-risk behavior, Reckless Behavior
A just culture is one in which individuals are held accountable for their actions, but not for system flaws
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The algorithm helps you walk through an event to determine what actions need be taken: system change, counseling, discipline. It recognizes that personal responsibility must be paired with system change.
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Communication of Adverse Events to Patients
When harm occurs: Consult with all those
involved to establish facts
Give family a prompt explanation of what occurred
Express regret and compassion for what they are experiencingsay sorry
Discuss the medical needs going forwardshort and long term effects of injury
If error contributed to harm: Give a compassionate &
truthful explanation and say you are sorry
Tell them what you are doing to prevent it from happening again
Identify who will be their contact for future discussions
Document the error and the discussions in the record
For more information on Disclosure, go http://patientsafety.wusm.wustl.edu
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Patient Safety in ActionWhat Can You Do?
Recognize your role on the team: Solicit wide and independent input/Solicit discordant views Develop a shared mental model that is verbalized and identify when the
plan needs to shift
Be approachable Be preoccupied with failureobserve the systems Communicate using best practices: SBAR, Closed loop
communication, Standard handoff language, Stop the Line
When things go wrong, learn: What happened? Why? What did you do to reduce risk of it happening again? How do you know it worked?
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Thetypeofthinkingthatgotusintotheseproblemswillnotbethetypeofthinkingthatwillgetusout.
AlbertEinstein
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Conclusions
We want patient care to be safe, effective, and centered on the patients needs and wants
We come to work, as do our colleagues, to do the best job possible. We acknowledge that our systems of care are often unreliable
We know that it almost always takes many failures to create patient harm
Patient Safety is not a belief, it is something you dolearn basic patient safety skills and techniques to prevent harm to patients
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Institute for Healthcare Improvement Patient Safety Executive Curriculum
University of Michigan Medical Center Harvard Medical School Risk Management Foundation Washington University School of Medicine Patient Safety
Curriculum authors: Chris Carpenter, MD James Duncan, MD Richard Griffey, MD Nikoleta Kolovos, MD Brian Nussenbaum, MD;
Acknowledgements
Slide Number 1Learning ObjectivesDefinitionsSlide Number 4HarmScope of the Problem Scope of the Problemwhat if they all happened at once?Slide Number 7Slide Number 8High Profile Deaths from Medical ErrorsHigh Profile Deaths from Medical ErrorsTraditional Approach to ErrorPatient Safety Approach to Error Why Are We Quick to Blame? Slide Number 14James Reasons Swiss cheese Model Pioneers in Patient SafetyWhy has it taken so long to make things safer?Medical ErrorsStrong But WrongHuman FactorsHuman Factors PrinciplesSlide Number 22Reliability and SafetyExpectations of HealthcareAviation Safety as a ModelHigh Reliability How Do We Respond to Errors? Traditional Voluntary Reporting in Hospitals Lost Opportunities to Learn Culture Culture of SafetyJust CulturePersonal ResponsibilitySlide Number 30Communication of Adverse Events to PatientsPatient Safety in ActionWhat Can You Do?Slide Number 33ConclusionsSlide Number 35