Basic Jaina Epistemology

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Basic Jaina EpistemologyAuthor(s): Jayandra Soni

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 50, No. 3, The Philosophy of Jainism (Jul., 2000), pp.367-377Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1400179 .

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BASIC JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY

JayandraSoni

Department f Indology,University f Marburg

The Jaina contribution to philosophy in general, and to epistemology in particular, is

often underestimated, if not completely ignored. Jaina thinkers also drew from a

common pool of ideas (like the assumption of suffering as a characteristic feature of

human existence, and the knowledge of reality as crucial for liberation and the

possibility of liberation), and they couched these ideas in accordance with their own

ontology, metaphysics, theory of knowledge, and ethics. In each of these branches

of philosophy the Jainas have made significant contributions to the history and de-

velopment of Indian philosophy as a whole. Inthis essay Iam dealing with the basics

of Jainaepistemology,

notonly

to show that it has its ownhistory

and the differences

that go with it, in certain respects depending on the thinker concerned, but also to

demonstrate that the Jainas did not lag behind but kept up with the mainstream

concerns in Indian philosophy.The presentation of basic Jainaepistemology here is based on selected aspects of

the problem in the original words from the works of a selected number of thinkers:

Kundakunda's (second or third century) Pravacanasara, Umasvati's (perhaps fourth

or fifth century) Tattvarthasutra, nd Manikyanandin's (ninth-tenth century) Parfk-

samukha. These writers have been chosen for their systematic clarity and because

they are early thinkers who are generally regarded as authoritative by the Jaina tra-

dition. Other thinkers like Siddhasena Divakara (fifth century), Akalamka (eighthcentury), and Vidyanandin (ninth century) have also made significant contributions,

but their views will be referred to only in passing-to enter into a critique of the in-

teresting details of difference and to make comparisons would go far beyond the

scope of what can be done in an article like this one. Moreover, the later tradition,

represented by renowned thinkers like Hemacandra (eleventh century), Vadideva-

suri (twelfth century), and the erudite polyhistor Yasovijaya (seventeenth century), is

also not taken up for discussion. A few words regarding the beginnings of Indian

epistemology on the whole may not be out of place here at the outset in order to

show that the Jainatradition was not isolated in the Indiantradition and that its views

did not evolve in a vacuum.

On the Beginnings of Indian Epistemology

The desire for knowledge, which basically reflects a philosophical inclination, is

traceable in the Rgveda in a general way with what sound like inquisitive questions,for example about the origin of existence and about what can be known.1 By the

time of the composition of the Upanisads these questions became more direct and

systematic in the sense that, for instance, they show a specific desire for a knowledge

Philosophy East & West Volume 50, Number 3 July 2000 367-377 367

? 2000 by University of Hawai'i Press



aboutthe natureof the self (atman).Moreover,especially in the Upanisadsafter he

sixthcenturyB.C.E.and in the sutra iteratureromthe periodshortlybefore the be-

ginning of our common era, the direct or indirect mention of different views

becomes the usualpractice.Particularlyn the commentariesof the sutraworks the

explicitmention of Buddhistand Jainaviews becomes common, signifyingan inter-

estingand

livelydebate

amongthe different chools of

thought.The

historyof Indian

philosophygoes handin hand with the emergenceand historyof this kindof debate

amongall the representativesf different chools of thought,and with it there is the

necessityof dealingwith epistemologicalcategories.The contributionof the Jainas

here is perhapsalso uniquelybased on theirpredispositiono collect and copy all

kindsof literatureor the sake of knowingthe otherviews.2

The emergence of philosophicaldebate in India,not only in the commentaryliterature n the basic works of each school butalso in the formof organizedpubliccontests,contributedgreatlyto a sharpeningof the philosophicaltools and to the

settingdown of rulesof debate thathadto be adheredto strictly nthe courtswhere

the debates mostlytook place. That the theoryof knowledge has been a favoritetopic fromvery earlytimes is evident from a work on Indianmedicine (perhaps n

the firstcenturyof ourera,but the ideas weresurely nvogue even earlier) ompiled

by one Carakaand called Carakasamhita. he author(in CS3.8) advises medical

practitionerso debatewith othersbecause discussion increases he zeal for knowl-

edge, clarifies knowledge, increases the power of speech, makes one famous,removesdoubt,and establishesthe knowledgealready gained. Moreover,one can

learnnew thingsin a discussion,especiallywhen carriedawaywith enthusiasm n a

discussionin which the otherpersondiscloses information hat would otherwise be

keptsecret. Inthisveryearlyperiodin the historyof Indiandebate it was also rec-

ognized thata discussion that formsthe basis of a debate can be of differentkinds,and Carakadistinguisheswo kinds,one that is friendly nd one that is hostile. 3

In view of their extremeemphasison nonviolence,the Jainaswere probablyexem-

plarydebaterswell-acquaintedwith theirsubjectmatter.

Carakaoffersa list of forty-fourtems over which the physicianshould have

a command before accepting an invitationto enter into a debate. Suffice it to

mentiona few terms from this listfor the point made here:4perception,inference,

comparison, he thesis,a statementof the prooffor the thesis,the reason,the exam-

ple, andthe doubt.The list becomes morecompactlater,especiallywhen the Nyaya

school, whose favorite opicwas epistemology, ncludesthe list as a startingpointfor

all the themesitdealswith in its basicwork. Sixteen ermsare listedat the beginningof the NyayasOtra,and they are interestingo note hereto show theirrelation o the

emergenceof philosophicaldebate in Indiaand for theirspecial emphasison epis-

temological issues:(1) the instruments r means of knowledge, (2) the objects of

knowledge,(3) doubt, (4) purpose,(5) example, (6) tenet, (7) membersof the argu-

ment, (8) deliberation, 9) conclusion, (10) disputation, 11) debate, (12) wrangling,(13) fallacious reasons, (14) quibble, (15) false objections, and (16) reasons for

defeat.

Eachschool accepteda fixednumberof instrumentsr meansof cognition,each

368 Philosophy East & West



of which yields a particularkindof knowledge,and forthe majorschools of Indian

philosophythe number ranges from one to six. So, for example, the materialist

accepts only perceptionas the most important nd reliable meansof knowledge,theBuddhistsand the Vaisesika school accept inference as well, the Samkhyaschool

accepts verbaltestimonyor scriptural uthority n additionto perceptionand infer-

ence,and so forth. There are certain

implicitconditionson the basis of which

thenumber of means of cognition were accepted by each school. At least four con-

ditions need to be fulfilled: a)the knowledgefurnishedby one means of cognitionmust be new and notattainableby anyothermeans;(b)one meansof cognitionmayaid another n makinga particular nowledge possible,but the means of cognitionin

questionshould not be reducibleto another-so, forexample,when perceptionaids

inference,as in inferringire by seeing the smoke in the distance, the knowledge

gained cannot be reduced to the knowledgeobtainedby perceptionalone; (c) the

cognitionobtainedthroughone particularmeans of knowledgeshould not be con-tradictedby anothermeans of knowledge;and (d)the accepted meansof cognition

should appeal to reason,and in the case of verbaltestimonyor scriptural uthority,forexample,knowledgeconcerningthe revealedtruthmustappearprobableand bemade intelligible n terms of humanexperience,or otherwise such a means of cog-nition will fail in itspurpose.5

Jainathinkersdid not lag behind in theirconcern with epistemologicalissues,and the relevantliterature romthe beginningof our era evinces this. What theirbasic theoryof knowledge is will be seen with special reference to Kundakunda,Umasvati,and Manikyanandin.

JainaEpistemology

TheJaina radition estson one fundamentalact, namelythathumanbeingsare in a

positionto be omniscientand that this view is based on the teachingof omniscient

beingswho have taughtthe basic ideas afterhavingbecome enlightenedthroughastrict ascetic discipline.These beings are called Jinas r victors,who have con-

queredthe passionsthatbind humanbeingsto worldlylife.Since such beingshaveseen throughrealityas such, theirteachingis regardedas authoritativeby the tradi-

tion, and Jainathinkersthroughout he ages have strivento reiterate heirviews inthe hope of arrivingat the same insightas the Jinas.TheJinasare regardedas TTr-thamkaras r ford-makers ecause theirviews are a bridgebetween the worldly

and non-worldlybanksof the streamof life.Thetraditionmentionstwenty-four uchteachers of humanity,the last two of whom were Parsvaand, 250 years later,MahavTra, ho was a contemporaryof the Buddha.The teachingsof the Jinas are

regardedas reliableand authoritative, nd every basic idea concerning ontology,epistemology,and ethics is tracedbackto a tradition tartedby such beings.6

It must be noted that epistemologicalissues are in fact inalienablyconnectedwith the metaphysicsandontologyof a particularchool. Whatis the intrinsicnatureof the thingsof the worldthatare open to humanknowledge?How can one definethe subject,the knower?What is the natureof the instrumentsf knowledge,such as

Jayandraoni 369



sightand hearing?All these questionsare basic to the concern withepistemology.It

is also a well-knownfactthat,apart rom he materialists,he Carvakas,he teachingof each school is aimed at liberation moksaor nirvana), nd each has its own view

of the world,a knowledgeof which formspartof the disciplinethat leads to the goal.Jainismmade its own uniquecontribution o this mainstreamdevelopment by also

occupyingitself with the basic issues

concerningthe nature of

knowledge,how

knowledgeis derived,and inwhatway knowledgecan be said to be reliable.For he

Jainasthe concern with epistemologicalissues also served two main functions:it

providedthe basis for an intelligiblediscourse on mattersof common, everyday

experience, and, secondly, even if indirectly,it demarcatedthis area from what

constitutes he knowledgeof ultimatereality.Explaining ow errorsoccur in human

cognitionwas includedin the epistemologicaltheories,and it is not often noticed

thatepistemologydealtwiththeoriesof erroras well. Indeed he success of a theoryof validcognitionis commensuratewith the success in which error n ourcognitionis also explained.In otherwords,granted hatwe can errin ourcognition,a theory

of cognitionshould also be able to explainthe sourceof thisoccurrence,or at leastbe in a positionto accountfor it.Thispointis implicitwhen, at the verybeginningof

his ParTksamukhaPM),Manikyanandinays theproperascertainment f an objectarisesout of a valid means of knowledge (pramana);he contraryof this happenswhen it is erroneous PM1).7 In his Pramana-mTmarmsa1.1.7), Hemacandra aysthaterror isa cognitionthatdefinitely akesa thingto be what it is not.

One superficialrelationbetweenJainaontologyand Jainaepistemologyis that

justas there are only two fundamentalontologicalcategories,the principlesof sen-

tience and non-sentience(jTvand ajTva, sually ranslated s soul andmatter),here

areonly two basic meansthroughwhich we can knowthings: n a directway (pra-

tyaksa)or in an indirectway (paroksa).For the Jainassentience intrinsicallypos-sesses unlimitedqualitiesof bliss and energyand, withoutthe detrimentalnfluence

of matter, s omniscient.The associationof the soul with the insentientprincipleshinders its capabilities,and thereforehuman beings possess limited knowledge.

Uniqueto Jainism s the idea that directknowledgein fact takes place through he

soul.8 On the basis of the twofold classificationof a direct and indirectmeans of

knowledge,an intricateheoryof knowledgeis builtup concerning he fundamental

principlesor categories(tattva)suppliedbelow).Thefirstsystematicpresentation f

it inthe classicalsutrastylewas givenby Umasvati n his TattvarthasutraTS1.6-31),

and his presentations regardedas authoritative y all Jainas.Kundakunda'siews,

expressedin the Prakritlanguage,are also looked upon with greatrespectfor hispioneeringattempts.

The sentientprincipleis responsible orthe fact thatknowledgetakes place at

all. Hence, for the Jainas,knowledgetakesplace in the soul;when the soul is freed

or isolated fromthe influenceof matter, t has kevalajinna(omniscientknowledge,which beings like the Jinashave attained).In the case of the concern with epis-

temology in the context of humanknowledge, it is necessaryin Jainism o under-

standclearlythe contextinwhich the followingtermsareused: lnna, pramana,and

naya. Further,he theoryof manifoldness(anekantavada,with its twofold aspects

370 PhilosophyEast& West



of nayavada and syadvada) also has to be seen in an epistemological context

because it is concerned with how we know things. The theory of manifoldness,

however, applies in a different context: it is concerned with particular standpoints

(naya), like the common, the general, or the practical standpoint from which an ob-

ject may be perceived, and the seven kinds of statements or predications that maybe made about an

objectwhere it is said

that, dependingon the

perspective (syat),an object can be said to exist, not exist, and so forth.9 What the theory of mani-

foldness does not do is discuss the means or instruments of knowledge in the Jaina

tradition.

The word jnana, which is usually translated as knowledge, is used in Jainism

primarily in the context of absolute knowledge, which can be had only by beingsliberated from the detrimental effects of matter in the form of karma clinging to the

soul. In other contexts it could be used in the sense of valid cognition, in contrast to

erroneous cognition. Inthis case jna,na is synonymous with the prama (also meaning

knowledge ) of the thing to be known (prameya), obtained through a particular

means or instrument of cognition (pramana). A theory of knowledge (pramanya-vada), therefore, deals with all three of these aspects, and the Jainassay that there are

two general instruments of knowledge (the direct and the indirect ones), that the

objects to be known are the seven basic categories of Jaina metaphysics (supplied

below), and that knowledge takes place in the soul. In Jainism the basic twofold

classification of knowledge derived through direct and indirect means is as uniqueas the classification of the different kinds of instruments of knowledge that come

under the rubricof these two.

It seems that Kundakunda is the first independent thinker of the post-canonical

period who dealt with epistemological issues. In this context his Pravacanasara

( Essence of the Scripture )(PrS) s an insightful work, regarded as one of his philo-sophical masterpieces. The three sections of the work clearly show the issues he

deals with: knowledge, the objects of knowledge, and conduct. It is interestingto see

how he deals with some aspects of epistemology that have become part of the tra-

dition, so that it can also be evident how the problem was thematized differently in

the later period:10

He who hasmanifestedpureconsciousness and is freefrom .. karmicdust,has become

self-sufficient; ndfullycomprehends he objectsof knowledge.(PrS1.15)

The soul is co-extensive withknowledge;knowledge

is said to be co-extensivewith the

object of knowledge; he object of knowledge comprises he physicaland non-physicalworld; hereforeknowledgeis omnipresent. PrS1.23)

The knowerwho is beyondsense-perception,necessarilyknows and sees the worldnei-

therentering nto norentered into by the objectsof knowledge, justas the eye sees the

objectsof sight.(PrS1.29)

He who knows is knowledge; he self does not become a knowerwith knowledge(asan

extraneousinstrument).The very self develops knowledge, and all the objects stand

(reflected)n the knowledge.(PrS1.35)

Jayandra Soni 371



Perceptionf things hrough foreignagencyis calledparoksa,ndirect r mediate;whateversperceived ythesoulalone spratyaksa,irect r immediate.PrS .58)

Theobjectofknowledges madeupofsubstances,hicharesaid o becharacterisedyqualities, ndwithwhich,moreover,re(associated)hemodifications;hosewho aredeludedbymodifications,re alsebelievers.PrS .1)11

Thats calleda substancewhich s endowedwithqualities ndaccompanied y modi-fications nd which is coupledwithorigination,estructionndpermanence ithout

leavingtsnature.PrS .3)

Accordingo somemodificationr the other tisstated hata substancexists,doesnot

exist, s indescribable,s bothor otherwise.PrS .23)

Thisrandom election of the basic aspectsof the problem n Kundakunda'swn

words has been supplied so as to demonstratehow the treatmentof the theme

changes with Umasvati. One of the basic differences is that Umasvatiexplicitly

enumerates he differentmeans of knowledgethat are groupedunderthe rubricsofthe direct (pratyaksa)nd the indirect(paroksa).When the Jainasspeak about a

knowledgeof objects they mean specificallya knowledgeof the seven categoriesthatcomprisethe metaphysicsof the school. The seven categoriesare,as Umasvati

mentions heminhis Tattvarthasutra:he sentientand insentient ategories, he inflow

(of matter ntothe soul; matter urns nto karmaparticles,which obstruct he innate

energy of the soul), bondage (caused by this inflow),stoppage (of further nflow),

burningaway (of the remainingparticlesof karma, hroughasceticism),and libera-

tion (asa resultof being isolatedfromthe influenceof matter) TS1.4).

In TS 1.6, Umasvatisays that knowledge can be obtained throughpramana

and naya,and he goes on to say (in TS1.9-12) thatknowledgeis obtainedthroughfive kindsof pramana,and of these the first wo-sensory knowledgeand scriptural

knowledge-are indirect paroksa)meansof knowledge,and the rest-clairvoyance,

telepathy,and omniscience-are direct (pratyaksa)means of knowledge.Not onlyis this list much more differentiatedand explicit than Kundakunda's, ut it also

presents he characteristicallyainaview since then:sensoryperception s definedas

being indirect,whereas all other schools regardit as the only direct means of

knowledge;whattheJainasregardas directmeansof knowledgedo not at all feature

as valid meansof knowledgein the otherschools.12

Inelaborating he Jainaview, Umasvaticontinuesto say thatsynonymsforsen-

soryknowledgeareremembrance, ecognition, induction, nd deduction, ll ofwhich are caused by the senses and the mind (TS1.13-14). Scriptural nowledge,which is based on sensory knowledge, is of two, several,or twelve kinds(TS1.20),

dependingon which scripturalexts are regardedas authoritative.The rangeof sen-

sory and scripturalknowledgeextends to all the six substances(soul and the five

insentientsubstances),but not in all their modes (TS 1.20). Divine and infernal

beings possess clairvoyance;if the karmathat hindersthis kind of knowledge is

obliterated,or if its influence is neutralized, hen animalsand humanbeings, too,

can have it (TS1.21-22), andthrough t all entitiesthathave formcan be known(TS

372 Philosophy East & West



1.27). Telepathy s of two kinds,distinguishedon the basis of purityand infallibility

(TS1.23-24), and its rangeis infinitelygreater han that of clairvoyance(TS1.28).

The scope of omniscience, on the other hand,extendsto all substances in all their

modes simultaneously(TS 1.29). Sensory knowledge, scripturalknowledge, and

clairvoyanceare explicitlyreferred o as instruments f knowledgethat can also be

erroneous(TS

1.31).

Manikyanandin egins his treatmentof epistemologyin his ParTksamukhaPM)

by sayingthat pramanais validknowledgeof itselfand of thingsnotprovedbefore

(PM 1.1),13 and goes on to say that the validityof pramana risesfrom itself or

throughanother(Pramana) (PM1.13). Afterreferringo the basic kinds of knowl-

edge as directand indirect, n keepingwith the tradition PM2.2), he saysthat direct

knowledge is knowledge which is clear (PM2.3), with clearness meaning an

illuminationwithoutany other intermediateknowledgeor illumination n details

(PM2.4). Directknowledge is then divided into two kinds: one that is current n

everyday life and which is partiallyclear (PM2.5), and the other, which is su-

preme, notdependenton any sense organ,and is devoid of any kind of obstruction(PM2.11). The indirectmeansof knowledgeconsists of memory,recognition, ogic,inference,and scriptural estimony(PM3.2). These are then defined,and the final

threechaptersof the work deal with universalsand particulars,he resultsof infer-

ence, and, finally,the fallacies of inference.

One of the notable differencesregardinghe specific means of knowledgethat

are directis given by Akalamkawhen dealingwith sensoryperception.Itwas seen

above thatforUmasvatidirectperception(pratyaksa), hich takesplace in the soul,occurs throughclairvoyance, telepathy,and omniscience and that sensoryknowl-

edge and scripturalknowledge are indirect (paroksa).Accordingto Akalamka's

classification,direct knowledge is basicallyof the two kinds that Manikyanandintakes over from him, namely the direct knowledge that takes place throughthe

senses and that which takes place through memory,which is regardedas synony-mous with remembrance,recognition, induction, and deduction. In another

classificationAkalamka dentifiesmemory(andthe otherthings regardedas syno-

nymsof it)with sensoryperceptionas directknowledgeand another kind of direct

knowledge not derived throughthe senses, namely clairvoyance,telepathy, and

omniscience. The differencesare not merelya matterof classification. nview of the

high regardand impacthis views have in the Jaina radition(inspiringmasters uch

as Vidyanandinand Manikyanandin), detailed study and furtherresearch of his

worksare still needed to assess theirepistemologicalimplications n the context ofthe Jainaview as a whole.14

Inconclusion,the relationbetween epistemologyand logic needs special men-

tion here. These two areas areclosely linked in the Indian raditionbecause logic in

Indiaprimarily nvolved an investigation nto the validityof inference,which, in

turn,is regardedas a means of knowledge.The preoccupationwith abstract, ogicalideas related to inference was a favoritetopic of the Nyaya school, and Jainathinkersadopted its languageand method,usingnaturallanguage,not symbols,to

presenttheir abstract ideas.15SiddhasenaDivakara(fifthcentury)deals with the

Jayandraoni 373



issuesregardinghe major,minor,and middleterms of an argumentwithin a Jainacontext in his Nyiayvatara.Here, too, the Jainashave kept up withthe major ssues

within the Indian radition.

Thefollowingpointshavehopefullyemergedout of this shortpresentation f the

basics of Jainaepistemology: 1)the Jaina radition vinces insightful iews thatcan

beregarded

as their contribution o thedevelopment

of Indianphilosophy

as a

whole, forexampletheir own definitionof what constitutesa valid meansof cogni-tion and their classificationof the meansor instruments f knowledge;(2) it is pos-sible to speakof a historyof epistemological deas withinJainism tself,forexamplewhen one comparesthe views of the thinkersreferred o above;and (3)a greatdeal

of researchis still requiredbecause not all significantworks on epistemologyare

easily available,as in the case of Akalamka'sworks.

Notes

1 - See, forexample, Rgveda1.164(especially4 and 37) and X.129 (especially6

and 7). Eventhoughdoubtshave been raisedaboutthe authenticityof certain

philosophicalideas in this work,the interpolations re certainly very earlyand depictan intrinsically hilosophicalattitudeeven inthe earliestrecordsof

Indianthought.

2 - Jaina monasterieswere and are centersof learning,and fromearlytimes the

copying of manuscripts f all disciplineshas been seen as an act thatbrings

religiousmerit.Hence, Jaina libraries till contain a wealth of material hat

is only graduallycoming to light,with obvious implications or the whole ofIndianphilosophy.

3 - For a detailed description,also concerningthe differentkinds of assemblies

that decide the outcome of a debate, see Dasgupta1952, pp. 378-388, and

Frauwallner 984, p. 66. Useful in this context also is G. Obherhammer, Ein

Beitrag u den Vada-Traditionenndiens, n WienerZeitschrifturdie Kunde

Sud-und Ostasiens Leiden:E.J. Brill)7 (1963):63-103.

4 - For he complete list see Frauwallner 984 again,pp. 69-70.

5 - Accordingto ErichFrauwallnert was Vrsagana orVarsaganya,perhaps300

C.E.),he renowned Samkhyateacher, who was the firstto investigateepis-

temologicalquestionsat the beginningof his work,the Sasttitantraavailable

only in fragments), nd therebybegan a tradition ollowed by others. See his

Die Erkenntnislehrees klassischenSamkhya-Systems, n ErichFrauwallner

Kleine Schriften Wiesbaden:FranzSteinerVerlag,1982), pp. 223-278. See

also D. SeyfortRuegg, Note on Varsaganyaand the Yogacarabhomi, ndo-

IranianJournal(Hague:Mouton)6 (1962): 137-140, and G. Oberhammer,TheAuthorshipof the Sastitantram, Wiener Zeitschrift urdie KundeSud-

und Ostasiens4 (1960): 71-91. I thankmy friend and colleague Dr. Roland

374 PhilosophyEast&West



Steiner orsuggesting hat I includethese referenceshere,and for otherusefulcomments.

6 - The issue concerns the notion of apta, one who can be regardedas anauthoritativeerson ; f. Soni 1996.

7- I amusing

the edition mentioned inManikyanandin

1940. The text is alsoembodied inthe two maincommentaries o the work:(1)the Prameya-kamala-marttan.daby Prabhacandra,ed. with introduction, indexes, etc. by Pt.MahendraKumarShastri,2d edition (Bombay:NirnayaSagar Press, 1941),and (2) the ParTksamukka-laghuvrttialso called ParTksamukha-panjikand

Prameya-ratna-mala)y AnantavTryaeleventh century), ed. Satis Chandra

Vidyabhusana(Calcutta:Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1909). To this second

commentary here is a commentarycalled Prameya-ratnalahkaray AbhinavaCarukTrtiPanditacarya,d. Panditaratnam . Shantiraja astri(Mysore:OrientalResearchInstitute,1948).

8 - Anystandardwork on Jainismdealswith the basics of Jainaontologyand doesnot have to be explained here. The point of direct knowledge taking placethrough he soul can be compared,e.g., with the functionof cic-chakti n SaivaSiddhanta.For he similarities nd differences ee Soni 1996, pp. 9-13.

9 - Any standardworkon Jainismsuppliesthe details. Forthe philosophicalsig-nificanceof the Jainatheoryof manifoldness,which is omittedhere, see Soni1997.

10 -The translationsare taken from Kundakunda'swork given in Kundakunda1984.

11 - The reference here is to a fundamental ssue in Jainaphilosophyconcerningsubstance,quality,and mode. For he philosophicalcontextof thisfar-reachingproblemsee Soni 1991.

12 - Umasvatisays thatknowledgecan also be obtainedthroughother means:bydescription,ownership,cause, restingplace (or substratum), nd division (TS1.7);and by existence, number,place of abode, etc. (TS1.8). These listsonlybroadenthe scope of epistemology. I have chosen to deal only with those

aspectsthatareclearlycomparablewithepistemologyin the otherschools.

13 -Thetranslations refromManikyanandin's orkgiven inManikyanandin940.

14 - The firstclassification s contained in his Pravacanapravesaa workthatforms

partof a trilogycalled Laghfyastraya;he othertwo contained in this are Pra-

manapravesa nd Nayapravesa).The second classification s contained in his

Nyayaviniscaya.All these works have been published in a single volume:

Akalamka-grantha-trayam,d. MahendraKumarSastri,SimghTainaGrantha-mala, no. 12 (Ahamadabad-Kalkatta,931). The reference to these classi-ficationsis takenfrom K.K.Dixit,JainaOntology(Ahmedabad:L.D. Instituteof Indology,1971), p. 146.

JayandraSoni 375



15 - For hispointand a surveyof the issuesinJainaphilosophyas a whole see Soni

1998.

References

Bhattacharya,HariMohan.1994. JainaLogicand Epistemology.Calcuttaand New

Delhi:K.P. Bagchiand Co.

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