People v. Barros [GR 90640, 29 March 1994]

Third Division, Feliciano (J): 3 concur

Facts: On 6 September 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both members of the P.C. Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing Plate ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan, Mountain Province. Upon reaching Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at the back, saw Bonifacio Barros carrying a carton, board the bus and seated himself on seat 18 after putting the carton under his seat. Thereafter, the bus continued and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it being their station, called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat 18. After C2C Bongyao inspected the carton, he found out that it contained marijuana and he asked the passengers who the owner of the carton was but nobody answered. Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao invited Barros to the detachment for questioning as the latter was the suspected owner of the carton containing marijuana. Upon entering the detachment the carton was opened in the presence of Barros. When Barros denied ownership of the carton of marijuana, the P.C. officers called for the bus conductor who pinpointed to Barros as the owner of the carton of marijuana. Barros was charged with violating Section 4 of RA 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). After trial, the trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation of Section 4 of RA 6425 as amended and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. Barros appealed.

Issue: Whether the failure of the carton bearer to object to the search made in the moving vehicle, resulting to his warrantless arrest, constitutes a waiver.

Held: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The evidence secured thereby i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure will be inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any proceeding." The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are certain exceptions recognized in our law, one of which relates to the search of moving vehicles. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles automobiles, trucks, etc. without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the examination of the vehicles being limited to visual inspection. When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense. The Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was conducted; (3) Narcom agents were informed or "tipped off" by an undercover "deep penetration" agent that prohibited drugs would be brought into the country on a particular airline flight on a given date; (4) Narcom agents had received information thata Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do so; and (5) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana. Herein, there is nothing in the record that any circumstance which constituted or could have reasonably constituted probable cause for the peace officers to search the carton box allegedly owned by Barros. The testimony of the law enforcement officers who had apprehended the accused (M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan), and who had searched the box in his possession, (C2C Fernando Bongyao), simply did not suggest or indicate the presence of any such probable cause. Further, The accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest "simply because he failed to object." To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein. As the constitutional quaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. Accordingly, the search and seizure of the carton box was equally non-permissible and invalid. The "fruits" of the invalid search and seizure i.e., the 4) kilos of marijuana should therefore not have been admitted in evidence against Barros.

People vs. Correa [GR 119246, 30 January 1998]

En Banc, Martinez (J): 12 concur

Facts: A week before 18 June 1994, Leonardo Dulay was placed under surveillance by the Police Operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District Command (DEU-WPDC) on account of confidential and intelligence reports received in said Unit about his drug trafficking around Bambang Street, Tondo, Manila. The police surveillance brought forth positive results and confirmed Dulay's illegal drug trade. On 17 June 1994, operatives were alerted that Dulay would transport and deliver a certain quantity of drugs that night on board a owner-type jeep (FMR948). Thereafter, the operatives, together with the informer proceeded to A. Bonifacio Street on board 3 vehicles, and inconspicuously parked along the side of North Cemetery and waited for the suspect. The police informant spotted Dulays vehicle at 3:00 am. The operatives tailed the subject jeepney until they reached Bambang extension and Jose Abad Santos Avenue, where they accosted the passengers of said jeepney. The team inspected a cylindrical tin can of El Cielo Vegetable Cooking Lard, about two feet high, loaded in the vehicle of the appellants. The can contained 8 bundles of suspected dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in pieces of paper and plastic tapes. The team seized the suspected contrabands and marked each bundle consecutively. The 3 suspects were brought to the police headquarters at DEU-WPDC for investigation. The packages of suspected marijuana were submitted to the NBI for laboratory analysis to determine their chemical composition. The tests confirmed that the confiscated stuff were positive for marijuana and weighed 16.1789 kilograms. The defense, however, contends that the 3 accused were arrested without warrant in Camarin D, Caloocan City, enroute to Dulays house to get the things of his child allegedly rushed previously to the Metropolitan Hospital, for an alleged charge of trafficking on 'shabu,' and were brought to the WPDC headquarters at U.N. Avenue, where they were detained. On 12 July 1994, an Information was filed with the RTC Manila (Branch 35) indicting Antonio Correa y Cayton @ "Boyet," Rito Gunida y Sesante @ "Dodong," and Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ "Boy Kuba" for having violated Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, as amended. When arraigned, the 3 accused pleaded not guilty. After trial and on 3 March 1995, the lower court found the appellants guilty as charged and were sentenced to death and a fine of P10 million.

Issue: Whether the accused are precluded from assailing the warrantless search and seizure, due to waiver on their part.

Held: Antonio Correa y Cayton @ "Boyet," Rito Gunida y Sesante @ "Dodong," and Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ "Boy Kuba" are precluded from assailing the warrantless search and seizure when they voluntarily submitted to it as shown by their actuation during the search and seizure. They never protested when the police officer opened the tin can loaded in their vehicle, nor when he opened one of the bundles, nor when they, together with their cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were brought to the police station for investigation and subsequent prosecution. When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly." Further, they effectively waived their constitutional right against the search and seizure by their voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, when they entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and by participating in the trial.

Caballes vs. Court of Appeals [GR 136292, 15 January 2002]

Facts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y Taio. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he appeared pale and nervous. With Caballes' consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NAOCOR). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the wires came from and Caballes answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail. Caballes was charged with the crime of theft in an information dated 16 October 1989. During the arraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued. On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft. In a resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial court denied Caballes' motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision on 15 September 1998. Caballes appealed the decision by certiorari.

Issue: Whether Caballes passive submission to the statement of Sgt. Noceja that the latter "will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive" be considered as waiver on Caballes part on warrantless search and seizure.

Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right. The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search;(6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers was not authorized by a search warrant. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Herein, the police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of Caballes' vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine check. Also, Caballes' vehicle was flagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in the present case. Further, the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When Caballes' vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached Caballes and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." By uttering those words, it cannot be said the police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon Caballes that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof. Neither can Caballes' passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain Caballes' conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.