Barber (1971)-Meinong's Hume Studies (2)

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International Phenomenological Society

Meinong's Hume Studies: Part II. Meinong's Analysis of RelationsAuthor(s): Kenneth BarberSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Jun., 1971), pp. 564-584Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2105773Accessed: 02/02/2009 10:35

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MEINONG'SHUME STUDIES*PART II. MEINONG'SANALYSISOF RELATIONS

The problem of relations created insurmountabledifficultiesfor theempiricists.Theircauses are several; he proposedsolutionstortuousandin the main unconvincing.'Nor, clearly,is Meinong satisfiedwith theseproposals.To Hamilton'sclaim that "No part of philosophyhas beenmore fully andmoreaccuratelydeveloped,or ratherno partof philosophyis more determinately ertainthan the doctrineof relations" he replies,quite emphatically, that ". . . scarcely has an historical scholar supportedthe facts less correctlythan Hamilton in the sentence just quoted."With a view toward correcting the deficiencies of earlier analysesMeinongdevotes the entire, lengthysecond Hume Study to the subjectof relations.The structureof the second study is similar to that of the first. Thebulk of the detailed argumentis directed against his English prede-cessors. The restof his essay - and here, it must be admitted, he secondstudy excels the first - is devotedto his own analysis.Again, I shallmake sparinguse of the historicaland instead concentrateon the crucialfeaturesof Meinong'sown analysisof relations,discussing irst his basicontologicalanalysisof relationsand, second, his treatmentof similarityand equality.Of course, the analysisof similarityand equality is buta part,indeed,for our purposesthe most importantpart, of his generalanalysisof relations.This, though,is the conclusionwhichhe arrivesatratherthan his point of departure,which is why I shall first state asmuch as can be said aboutthe ontologicalanalysisof relationswithoutbecominginvolvedin the discussion of similarityand equality.Consider he followingthreesentences(and assumethem to be true):(1) The chair is to the left of the desk, (2) Red is darkerthan pink,* Part I appeared in Volume XXX, 4, June 1970.1 For a discussion of the causes of the difficulties see Bergmann, Gustav, "TheProblem of Relations in Classical Psychology," Philosophical Quarterly 7 (April,1952), 140-152.2 H.S.II., p. 573. Also, Hamilton, William, Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic,Vol. II, Edingburgh, 1859, p. 537.3 H.S.ll., p. 573.

564


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- PARTII. MEINoNG'S NALYSISOFRELATIONS 565(3) John is the brotherof Bill. Each containsa relationalexpression.The philosophical task, of course, is to give an analysis of the factsthese sentences are about. For a proposed analysis to be adequate, itmust account, among other things, for the fact that in each case thereare two entities which are actually related. In other words, not onlymust one give an analysis of the relata, but a complete analysis of thesituation must also yield an entity (or entities) which accounts for theconnectionbetweenthe relata.And it is the lattertaskwhichhas createdall the difficulties.Meinong, as we saw, in his analysisof thingshas only one categoryof simples,namely,propertieswhich are perfectparticulars. t is there-fore reasonable o assumethat his analysisof relations will in part bedeterminedby this prior commitment.If so, it may also be profitablefirst to establish a priori, as it were, the possibilitiesopen to him. Notonly will this produceclarityabout the problem of the analysisof rela-tilons tself, but it also may yield insight into why he makes the moveshe does.1. If the relationis a property, t may be either simple or complex.(Note that the issue is reallywhetherthere are any relationswhich aresimple. But we shallnot and need not concernourselveswith the exam-ination of every relationin order to determineits simplicityor com-plexity.) 2. If the relationis simple it may be eitherin 'thecategory ofnonrelationalpropertiesor in a uniquecategoryof its own, that of rela-tional properties. If it is complex, the entities composing it may be (a) allin the categoryof nonrelationalproperties, (b) all in the category ofrelationalproperties, or (c) some in both categories. 3. The relationmay be eitherinternalor externalto its relata,dependingon whether tis, respectively,n the category of nonrelationalor relationalproperties.If it is complex, some of its constituentsmay be internaland some ex-ternal to the relata. 4. If the relation, n case it iS simple,or some con-stituentof it, in case it is complex, is externalto the relata, it (or thisconstituent)may be "inthe mind"; hat is, it may eitherbe a constituentof an act or something"contributed" y an "activity"of the mind,or itmay be externalto the mindas well as to the relata.Such a classificationof possibilities s but an idle dialecticalexerciseunless one can show some structuraland historicalpatternsto be in-volved with the alternatives. In the case of relations the historicalpatternis quite clear. The inability to conceive nonlocalizedrelationalproperties ed to a denial of the categoryof relationalproperties. Asa result,relationstendedto be treatedas complexesthe constituentsof

4 See Bergmann, "The Problem of Relations in Classical Psychology."


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566 PHILOSOPHY ND PHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCHwhich were nonrelationalproperties nternalto the relata and, if therewere additionalconstituents,these were treated as nonrelationalprop-erties in, or somehow connected with, the mind. The views Meinongdiscussesare but variationson this basicpattern,which, as I shall show,is inadequateon two counts. (1) By reducing he relation o nonrelationalproperties nternalto the relata, one can no longer ground the fact thatthe relata are actuallyrelated.(2) The attempt o bridgethe gap betweenthe relata by introducingan entity which is a constituentof an act atbest could only account for our judgingthat the two are related butnot for the fact that the two actually are related. These comments,ofcourse, form but a diagram or guide to the following discussionofMeinong. The adequacyof the diagramcan only be supportedby adetailed consideration f his line of argument.So it will perhapsbe bestif we now turn for the first time to the text of the second Hume Study.Meinongfirst makesa distinctionof ultimate importancebetween therelation tself and its foundation.5Briefly,foundationsare the attributesin the relata which are compared; relations are, so far rather unin-formatively,somethingadditional,over and above the foundations.Letus for the time being assumethatthe notion of a foundations relativelyclear, or, at least, let us therefore temporarilypostpone discussingit,andinsteadfocus attentionon the additionalconstituent, he one he callsthe relation. The relation, or what passes for it in the ontology of theHumeStudies,clearlyis somethingwhichin a peculiarway is dependenton mind, i.e., on the conceivingsubject.Thus we are told:

But insofar as relations are a product of psychic activity, it is clear that,strictly speaking, even for the realist, relations can only be subjective.6...Moreover, consideration shows at first glance that in some of the mostimportant cases of relations the conceiving subject, i.e., the subject to whomthe relation is presented, is active in a quite characteristic way, so that inthese cases the subjective factor comes even more to the fore than in con-ceiving the so-called absolute qualities. Indeed, asserting a relation appears inmany cases to be completely independent of asserting the existence of thethings it relates. Thinking of two different colors or shapes, I can call themsimilar or dissimilar even without knowing that there are such in reality or,even, knowing that there are not.7

Meinong here distinguishesbetween relational and nonrelationalqual-ities on the basisof whether he subject s, respectively,activeor passivein conceiving hem.A relationis a productof a psychicactivity;a non-relationalproperty uch as, say, blue, is, properlyspeaking,a qualityof

5 H.S.II., pp. 614-617.6 H.S.,., p. 614.7 H.S.II., p. 609.


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PART II. MEINONG'SANALYSISOF RELATIONS 567thing, not a product of conceiving it. The argumentsupportingthedistinctionurges us to considerthe fact that in manycases we can asserta relation ndependently f asserting he existenceof the relata,i.e., onecan call one shade of blue darker than anotherwithout knowing, orrequiring, hat these two shadesactually be exemplified.Notice, first ofall, that the contrast is betweenassertinga relation and assertingtheexistenceof a thing,not, as one might have thought,betweenassertingthe existence of a relation and assertingthe existenceof a thing. Theargument s fallacious. I can assert, in a sense, that unicornshave fourlegs without knowing whether or not there are unicorns, by merelyasserting that if there are any, then they do have four legs. But if thereare some, then the propertyof being four-leggedwhichthey have is inno way dependenton my conceivingor assertinganything.Similarly, fthe two shades of blue are perchanceexemplified,then the relation ofdarker-thanwhich they jointly exemplifydoes not depend on my con-ceivingor assertinganything.This is the properanalogybetweenrela-tional and nonrelationalproperties,and, evidently, it undercuts ratherthan supportsthe distinctionfor which Meinong argues.The most in-teresting hing about this argument s indeedsomethingelse. It appealsto what is commonlycalled an a prioritruth,e.g., in the example, thefact that a certain shade of blue is darkerthan a certainother.Sincewecannotconceivethe two colors standing n any otherrelation,the asser-tion that they standin this relationdoes not dependon experience,or,to unpackthis formula, it need not be based in anythingfurnishedtothe mind from without.Such a base would be "objective."Hence, the"subjective" f relations.The weaknessof this epistemologicalargumentis that it does not in the least precludethe ontologicalpossibilitywhichit purports o preclude,namely, that the relationis independentof theconceivingsubjectand, if anything,dependenton the relata.The chiefobjection o this account,however, s not that the objective-subjectivedistinction fails to support a distinctionbetween relationaland nonrelationalqualities,but, rather,that this analysisleaves nothingfor the relational udgment o be about. To say thata relational udgmentis the product of a psychicactivityis ontologicallyharmless.With thisharmlessclaim, however,Meinong is not content, insistinginsteadonthe muchstrongerone that the relation tself, and not just the judgment,is the productof such an activity.If so, then what is the latterabout?On the one hand,'itcannot be aboutthe relata,for the line of the argurment, if taken seriously, is that the relataas such or by themselvesdonot in effect stand in or have the relation.On the other hand, to saythatthejudgments aboutitself,as one would haveto since the judgment


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568 PHILOSOPHY ND PHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCHor the psychic activity produces or has the relation, is patentlyabsurd,since what is being comparedare the relata.Fortunately, hat is not all that Meinong has to say. He thinks he canavoid the objectionby appealing o the foundationof the relationwhich,as the word suggests,carries the burden of grounding he truth of rela-tional judgments,And, as we shall see, what he has to say about foun-dationsis quite interesting.Furthermore, e does recognizethat at leastone relation,namely, the one whichbindsqualitiestogetherso that theyform a complex, is "real"and not merely"ideal"and hence independentof any phychic activity.8In other words, the fact that qualities arepresentedbundled into complexes is not the result of any psychic ac-tivity. This, though is the exception.In general, the additionalconsti-tuentwhich he calls the relation, being "subjective,"s of little help inthe analysis of the "objective" tate of affairs.So I turn to the morefruitful discussion of the foundation.WhatMeinongmeanswhen sayingthat a relationhas a foundation sthat there is something n the relatawhich accountsfor or determinestheirbeing relatedin eacertainway. Furthermore,herecan be no rela-tion without two foundations,one in each relatum. Conversely, hesetwo foundations jointly determine the relation. To discover whatMeinong might consider to be a foundation, turn to the examples.(1), The clair is to the left of the desk, (2) Red is darker than pink,(3) John is the brotherof Bill. (3) offers the best indicationof what thefoundationof relation may be, and thereby of the claim that there issomething n the relata which grounds heirbeingrelated as they are. IfJohn is the brotherof Bill one might reasonablyarguethat this is so invirtue of the fact that both have the same father. In other words, theyhave the propertyof being brothers n virtue of their both having an-other property,namely, the propertyof having the same father. Hence,this other propertygrounds heir being brothers. Ignorefor the momentthe obvious fact that this other propertyis also relational.)"Brother-hood,"then, is definedin terms of "fatherhood";he relationfor whichit stands is a complex whose constituentsground the relation.The reasonablenessof this particularexplicationof "foundation" sobvious.What is not obviousis that the othertwo cases (and,of course,"fatherhood"tself) can be handledin the same way. The point is that"John"and "Bill" referto complexes.But again,it is not obvious that,for example,"red"and "pink" n (2) refer to complexes.Yet the rela-tion of darker-thanmust on his view be grounded n the two colors.

8 H.S.II., pp. 715-720.9 H.S.J1.,p. 615.


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PARTII. MEINONG'SNALYSIS F RELATIONS 569That leaves two alternatives. Either he must straightforwardly rantthat red and pink are complexes in the same sense in which John andBill are; or he must,while denying that, maintain hat they have natureswhich somehow ground the relation. Ignoring for the moment thephemonenologicalobjection to the first alternative and the dialecticaldifficulties nvolved in the doctrine of natures,it is clear that whetherthe foundationor ground be a propertyor a nature, it must be of apeculiar sort. For the property or nature which grounds the fact thatredis darker han pinkmustbe, on the one hand,the propertyor natureof being darker than pink, on the other hand, the property or nature ofbeing lighter than red. That is, each relatumcontains a peculiar entitywhich, as it were, reflects the relaton in which it stands.This peculiarentitywhich both groundsthe relation and is in the relatumI shall callan internal relation.l1 This designation is not arbitrary. The entity isboth internal to the relatumand is in some sense a reflectionof therelation. Hence, althoughsuch entities are in things, they are not to beconfused with ordinarypropertiessince, unlike the latter, they point toor indicate other things. Yet, since they are in things, they are not tobe confusedwith what he calls the relation, .e., the resultor productofan act of comparingwhich is not in the relatumbut insteadis dependenton the mind.The second example, then, is crucialfor isolating the kind of entitywhichmust be involvedin the claim that there are foundationsof rela-tions. Before,however, examining n detail the dialecticsof this claim,I wish to considerbriefly the first of the three examples, he chair beingto the left of the desk, for this case reveals a further peculiarity ofMeinong's ontology. Preliminary to this, though, it is necessary to dis-cuss the issue of relativeand absolute foundations,a distinctionwhich,as it happens,is at the heart of what Meinong says about spatial rela-tions.Although a relationpresupposes oundations, t may be the case, aswe have seen, that the foundation itself is a relation. But, Meinongargues,'"if the foundation s itself relationalthen this further relationmust also have foundations.At some point, then, one must arrive at a

10 Although I have used the property or nature of being darker than as anillustration of what it would mean to have an internal relation, I do not wish hereto saddle Meinong with a view as to the exact nature of this property. It is suffi-cient for my point to note that the talk of foundations requires that there be(internal) constituents grounding the relation. As we shall see, his own view of thenature of this internal constituent is a bit more sophisticated than the illustrativeexample here suggests.

11 H.S.11., p. 616.


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570 PHILOSOPHYNDPHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCHfoundationwhich is nonrelational,or absolute,as he uses the term. Todeny this would be absurd:"A relation without absolute foundationwould be a comparison n which nothingis compared.'2That is, if therelation is the result of an act of comparing,then at some point onemust start with somethingwhich exists independently f any act of com-paring. This is but the converse of stating that relationsare dependenton minds in a way in which absoluteor nonrelationalqualitiesare not,and thus but anotherway of depressing he status of relations. Yet theneed for absolute foundations s in no way surprising. ts consequences,however,are ontologically nteresting.To see that, turn to (1). The chair is to the left of the desk. Therelation involved clearly is spatial. The ontological issue concerningfacts of this kind, as Meinong sees,'3 is whether space is absoluteorrelative, .e., whether he simple or primary patialentities are relationalor nonrelational.ChargingLocke and Hume with holding the simplespatial entities to be relational,he then arguesthat this analysis is fun-damentallymistaken.14To show that it is, he asks what the expression"15 meters long" really means.'&Although the complex referredto by"15 meters long" involves relationsone could not begin to apply thisunit of measurement f which being 15 meters long is compounded.'6And concerning his absoluteunit of measurementMeinong claims thateven if one were to construeit relationally, t would involve two endpointswhichwere related:

It is true, however, that the idea of juxtaposition is relative and thereforeforces one to take one more step back to something which turns out to bereally the last one on which our determinationsrest. This is the something byvirtue of which a place in the continuum of a subjective space is distinguishedfrom every other place arat which therefore can only be called a subjectivespace determination.7Thus we see that Meinong arrives at a doctrine of absolute spacethrough his analysis of relations; there are simple entities which arespatial and nonrelational.That he needs, or thinks he needs, such enti-ties in orderto solve the problemof individuationbecameobviousear-lier. Now we see that he needs them also for anotherpurpose, inde-pendentlyof the problemof individuation.Even if one must ultimatelyrejecthis ontology,it may be said in its favor that its variousparts do12 Ibid.13 H.S.II., p. 618.14 Ibid.-5 H.S.II., pp. 618-619.16 Ibid.17 H.S.II., p. 619.


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PARTI. MEINONG'SNALYSISFRELATIONS 571supportone another.The introductionof spatialqualities,for instance,is by no means merely an ad hoc solution to the problem of indi-viduation.

Notice, however, that the example does not appear to lead to hisconclusion. For, it would seem that there is nothing about either thechairor the desk which determinesor groundsthe formerbeing to theleft of the latter. The chairmight just as well have been to the rightofthe desk. Meinong, however, reasons that while it is true that being achairor being a desk does not determineor precludeany spatial rela-tion, it is preciselybecauseof this fact that the chairand the desk mustcontainan elementwhichallows us to make spatialjudgments.That is,each is a complexcontaininga primaryspatialproperty.Nor is this all.The case of the spatialpropertiespresentsthe clearestpossibleevidencethat he is in fact arguing or what I have called the doctrineof internalrelations. In support of this claim, considerthe followingpassage:

If A and B are two place determinations, a their distance, then it is clearthat a is independent of A and B in the sense that the distance a can alsoobtain between infinitely many other place determinations. If, therefore,only a is given, neither A nor B need be involved. If, on the other hand,A and B are given, no other distance than a is possible and this distance canexpand or contract only if either a different Ai or Bi step in for eitherA or B.18

The examplehere is the relationof distance.This, though,is irrelevant.The analysishe argues for in the case of distancecan be extendedto allotherrelations.The natures of A and B in all cases determine he rela-tion a obtainingbetween them; there is somethingin the two whichgroundstheir being so related. Nor does Meinong just argue for whatI called internalrelations,but he does so by again appealing to thealleged a priori nature of relationaljudgments. Recall that above wesaw him establishthe mind-dependence f his relations,i.e., of certainentitiesin minds, not those in the objectswhich I called internal rela-tions, on the ground that we can know two relata to be related in acertain way independentlyof knowing whether they exist, and that,therefore, we know this fact a priori, or independentlyof perception.Here we see him appeal to the necessityof A and B being at a certaindistancefrom one another('If, on the other hand, A and B are given,no other distancethan a is possible... .") and hence to the alleged apriori characterof relationaljudgments n the case of space. The ar-gument for foundationsand hence for internalrelationsthen rests not

18 H.S.Il., p. 620.


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572 PHILOSOPHY ND PHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCHjust on the fact that Meinong cannot otherwiseunderstandhow twoobjects come to exemplify a spatial relation,but rather,or at least justas much, on the fact that he cannot otherwiseunderstand heir neces-sarily being so related. To deny foundationsat this point would makethe relation "arbitrary" and not necessary.I do not wish to enter here into the difficult issue of the synthetica priori.I merely argue that its appealis a structuralmotive behind thetwo claims whichMeinongdid in fact make, namely, first, that relationsare mind-dependent, nd second, that they have foundations, .e., thatthereare in the relata the entities I call internal relations,which deter-mine the relations involved. Since I thus ignore the issue of the syn-thetica priori it will be only fair not to use his appeal to it as an argu-ment against the adequacyof his analysis of relations, but merely, asI just did, by way of a brief diagnosticsuggestion.The central issue, towhichI now turn, is his doctrineof what I call internalrelations.The doctrineis most fully articulated n the discussionof the rela-tions of comparison n general and in that of similarityand equalityinparticular.About the doctrine itself little is said. Yet the detailedandmost explicit treatmentof similarity and equality reveals the role thedoctrine plays in this ontology. We shall thereforefirst examine hisanalysisof similarityand equality. Then we shall be in a position tooffer a critiqueof his more or less implicitdoctrine of internalrelationswith at least some assurance hat we have accuratelygrasped ts role.Meinong'sthesis is that all relationsof comparisoncan be dividedinto two mutuallyexclusive classes on the basis of the result of thecomparison.The comparisonof two attributes,we are told, can onlyresult in (a judgmentof) eitherequality or inequality(difference,diver-sity).'9 That is, two attributesare eitherequalor unequal. If the latter,they may be either similar or dissimilar,both similarity and dissimil-arity being but special cases of difference.Similarity, n other words, isnot, as some philosophershave argued,20a distinctrelation on par withequalityand inequality.Furthermore, quality and similaritystand as follows. If two attri-butes are equal,no more can be said about them. There are no degreesof equality.There are, however, degrees of similarity; wo colors canbe more or less similar to one anotherthan two others. Furthermore,two objects, or complexes,are equal only if all of theirconstituentsareequal; again,two complexescannot be more or less equal.2'Whilethese

'19 H.S.ll., pp. 647, 652.20 H.S.ll., p. 647. See, for example, Mill, System of Logic, B.I., Ch. III, Sect. II.21 H.S.II., P. 648.


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PART II. MEINONG'S ANALYSIS OF RELATIONS 573considerations how equality and similarityto be distinct,they do notshow how they are connected.Meinong'snegativeclaim in this respectis that equalitycannot be defined in terms of similarity.Positively,heclaims that similarity s to be definedin terms of equalityor difference.That is, if two complexesare similar,they are so in virtue of agreeingin some constituent; hey have constituentswhich are equal. Given thisfact, one mightsupposethat equalitycould be defined as completesimi-larity;by placing more and more constituentsequal one moves fromlesser to greatersimilarityand finally to equality. The difficultywiththis line of reasoning,Meinongargues,is that while it is true that simi-larity implies agreementof some constituents, t is also true that simi-larity impliesthat some are differentor unequal.Hence, this accountofequalitywould sanction our calling somethingboth equal and (exactly)similar, which is objectionablesince equality implies there being nodiversity while similarity mplies that there is diversity.22Part of thisargument s merely a verbal quibbleconcerning the use of "equality"and "similarity."Yet it has a nonverbalcore that reveals a certainpeculiaritywhich presentsMeinongwith an insoluble difficulty.The difficultyarises from the acceptance of Meinong'sdefinitionof"equality"and "similarity":Equality of two attributesobtains only ifthe attributes(and their constituents, f any) are perfect particularsofthe same kind. Similarityof two attributes,on the other hand, onlyobtains if each attributecontains at least one perfect particularwhichis of the same kind as one perfect particularof the other as well as atleast one different n kind from at least one in the other. One sees im-mediately that these definitions require the relata to be complex inevery case where they are in fact similar, although the definitionofequality s neutralwith respectto whether he relataare simpleor com-plex. This is obvious since the similarrelatamust be equal in at leastone respectandunaqual n at least one otherrespect.Hence, at a mini-mum, objects servingas relata between which similarityobtains mustcontain two constituents.At first glance the complexity requirementappearsharmless;one can say that the chair is similar to the table (theyeach have four legs) or that the pencil is similar to the ball (they bothhave the same shadeof yellow). Hence, at least some cases of similaritycan quite unproblematically e handled in this way. The question,asMeinongsees, is whetherall cases of similaritycan be so treated.The question,I repeat,is simplywhether n everycase of comparisonone can say that the two relatainvolvedare in fact complex, each con-

22 Ibid.


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574 PHILOSOPHYNDPHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCHtrainingat least one constituent equal to some constituent in the other.Meinong himself explains the difficulty which arises in the case of colors:

If in the case of blue and red we accept one (or several) common elementscorrespondingo the word color, then one can do the same with the differ-ent shadesof blue, all of whichhave in commonthat they are blue. Simi-larly, one establishes several gradations within the different shades, thengradations within these gradations, and so on, ad infinitum; all these beingdivisions neither more nor less arbitrary than the distinctions of traditionalclasses of red, blue, green, and so on, the transitions between which areequally continuous. Each of these divisions would entail the supposition ofcommondetermining lements.That shows that an eventually nfinitecom-plication could not be avoided. If one accepts it, then we can to all casesin which it is possible to speak of continua of qualities apply the principlethat similarity is partial agreement.23If red and blue are similar, then they must share a common constituent,namely, that constituent in virtue of which they are colors. If, howeverwe say, as we often do, that two shades of blue are similar, then thisrequires that the two shades also contain equal constituents groundingtheir similarity. Furthermore, this common constituent of the shadescannot be the same constituent (color) as in the case of red and blue forthe two shades are more similar than are red and blue. Hence, the prob-lem is not in accounting for similarity but for degrees of similarity. Andonce the problem is raised with respect to shades of blue the difficultymultiplies; since the shades can be ordered in a continuum, every timetwo of the shades are more similar than two others, then additional con-stituents are required. The number of constituents eventually needed islimited only by the number of possible similarities. The precise diffi-culty Meinong facuses on is the possibility that there may be an infinitenumber of shades; if this were the case then every shade would have tocontain an infinite number of constituents.Before turning to Meinong's discussion of this impasse it will beprofitable to delineate sharply the difficulties raised by this analysis sothat we may see clearly that there are two difficulties, not merely theone he chooses to emphasize. (1) A shade of blue is phenomenologicallysimple. Whereas one can argue that a colored spot is complex becauseof the fact that one can distinguish at least a shape and a color, one canmake no such distinction with respect to a shade of blue. To think onecould do so is only a deception; one would have in mind, for example,the mixing of several other colors to form this shade. But the causalprocess of producing the color does not affect the phenomenologicalsimplicity of the shade of blue resulting from it. Furthermore, the causal23 H.SII.., p. 649.


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PARTI. MEINONG'sNALYSISFRELATIONS 575factors involved in producingthis shade of blue are clearly irrelevantfor knowing hat it is similarto another; or we can know this fact with-out knowinghow either has been produced.Meinong'sdesireto providea groundor foundationfor the similarityrelation,therefore, eads himto arguefor complexes where there are only simples. This is an inter-esting dialecticaltwist. Against Hume, he argued at length, and cor-rectly, for the complexity of what Hume insisted was simple.24Butreadinessto make the simple-complexdistinction,however admirablein one case, is disastrouswhen carriedbeyondthe pointwhereit can bephenomenologically ecured. Or so at least I am preparedto argueagainstMeinong.

(2) The seconddifficultyarisesfromthe possibilitythat, for example,the color continuummay containan infinite numberof distinguishableshades.Although Meinongmakes no commitmentwith respect to thispossibility,25he does worryabout the fact that primafacie simple ob-jects could contain an infinite number of constituents.He does not,however,makeclearthe exactnatureof his worry.For he appears o bemerely concernedwith the possibilitythat what appearssimple is in-finitelycomplex.Yet the numberof constituentsor, if you will, the issueof how complexa simple object is, is secondary.The difficulty,as justseen, arises when any simple object is claimed to be complex. But itmay well be that he worriedabout the logical difficultyof any objecthaving an infinite numberof constituents.In other words, it may bethat certain difficult questionsabout "infinity"are at the root of hisperplexityhere.Lastly, and most importantly,what goes for colors goes for placesand moments and for any other "simple"element of this world. Phe-nomenologically,therefore,we are upon this analysis not acquaintedwith a single simple.This comes dangerouslyclose, to say the least, togivingup any possible good reason for the simple-complexdistinction.Yet this distinctionis at the very heart of the ontological enterprise.Without it one could not even begin ontology. Just rememberhowardently Meinonghimself strugglesto maintainit throughout he firstHumeStudy.Meinong'sdiscussionwas, I said, peculiar.What I meant was thatwhile he sees preciselywhat is involved,he does not give up this anal-ysis of similarity.Yet his agony becomes evident when he faces thealternativeshe has. (1) He may try to undercutthe force of the objec-tions resultingfrom the claim that, say, a (phenomenologicallyimple)

24 H.S.I., pp. 220-247.25 H.S.II., p. 649.


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576 PHILOSOPHY NDPHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCHshade of blue is complex, perhapsinfinitely so, or, (2) he may arguethat in some cases, at least, a similarityrelation can obtain withouthavinga groundor foundation n the senseexplained.

Concerning he second possibility he mentions that one might give"similar" wo rather differentmeanings.The first is the one alreadydiscussed.The second he does not really explore. He merely suggeststhat if one chooses it... one will have to recognize still another principle by virtue of which thecontents closer to one another in the continuum are more similar than thosemore distant, even though, as mentioned above (p. 623), this principlecannot be adequately defied as proximity in the continuum.26

What this "otherprinciple"might be he does not say. Nor could he.The suggestion nvolvesgiving up the notion of a foundationand takingthe relation of similarity tself to be primitive.In other words, insteadof having different constituentsaccountingfor degrees of similarity,one would have differentdegreesof similarity,each of which would beprimitive.That in turnleaves only two alternatives.1) The relationhasno "foundation."This is againstthe grain.Just rememberhow strenu-ously he argues that, given their relata, all relations are necessarilywhat they are. (2) He must breakout of the historicalpatternin whichthe objectivegroundof a relationmust be a property or, rather,twoproperties,one in each relatum,and propose a more radical doctrine.Upon this doctrinethe objectivegroundof the relational act is in addi-tion to the two relataas such, this pairhavingbeen given a very specialobjectiveontologicalstatus as an "objectof higherorder."This step hewill eventuallytake in the famous essay on such objects, in 1899. Inthe HumeStudies,of 1877 and 1882, he was not yet readyfor it. Hencethe agony, or, if you please, the inconclusivenessof it all.Be this as it may, Meinongdoes try to minimizethe objectionstothe claim that a shadeof blue is complex upon the analysis of similaritywe have at this time attributed o him. Nor, of course, would he havetried so hard to defendthis analysisif he were then prepared o rejectit. He in fact offers two defenses.The first is an epistemological laim.One usually makes judgmentsof similarityat first glance without in-quiring (beingawareof) into what the similarityconsists.28Hence, theobject's being complex (or even infinitely complex) does not hinderour makingjudgmentsof similarity.Againstthis defensetwo comments

26 H.S.II., p. 651.27 "Vber Gegenstainde h6herer Ordnung und deren Verhaltnis zur innerenWahrnehmung,"1899, reprinted in Gesammelte Abhandlungen, Leipzig 1913-1914.28 H.S.II., p. 652.


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PART I. MEINONG'SNALYSISF RELATIONS 577merit consideration.First, the questionof what we may or may not beaware of is not an ontological ssue. Irrespectiveof how we make judg-ments of similarity, t should (also on Meinong'sview) at least be pos-sible to become aware of the constituentsof a shade of blue. Yet thisvery possibilityis excluded by the phenomenological implicityof theshade. Second, if what he says about making judgmentsof similarity strue, then it weakens ratherthan supportshis analysisof similarity; or,if we do make such judgmentswithout being aware of the equal con-stituents, hen how can one be sure that there must be these equal con-stituents n order to accountfor similarity?One need not presseitherofthese commentsto make it obvious that this first defense is ratherin-conclusive.The second occurs in the context of replying to an argumentofHume's.Hume, contrary o Meinong,arguesthat there can be similaritywithout agreeingconstituents.29The paradigmhe appealsto is the caseof two simple ideas being similar in virtue of their being simple. Sincethey are similar,they could not possiblycontainan agreeingconstituent,namely, simplicity. Hence, Hume concludes, similaritycan obtain be-tween simples and thus needs no foundation (in Meinong's sense). Ig-noringthe peculiarityof treating simplicityon a par with other prop-erties, it is clear that this exampledoes pose a treat to Meinong'sanal-ysis. The latter charges Hume with failing to distinguish between asimple idea and an idea of a simple. An idea may thus be called "simple"because it is of a simple, even thoughit is not itself simple.30WhetherHumeis in fact guiltyof this confusion s here irrelevant.Distinguishingbetween object and idea does not help one to answer the question ofwhether and how a similarityrelationcan obtain between two simpleobjects n virtueof theirbeing simple.If they are simple, then they haveno constituents.Thus, howeverone treats this logical propertyof havingno constituents, t cannot itself be a constituentof the object. Hence,Meinong'sargumentdoes not throwany light on what is at issue, name-ly, whethera relation can obtain between simple objects.I concludethatMeinong analyzessimilarityalways in terms of agree-ment and disagreement f constituentseven thoughon his own groundsthis analysis encountersobjectionsthat are difficult to answer. So wemust now turn to what he has to say about equality. First, though, Iwant to call attentionto the extensiveuse he makes of the similarityrelation.

29 Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford, 1958, Appendix,p. 627.30 H.S.II., p. 650.


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578 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCHEquality and similarityare distinctive n their generality; heir appli-cation is not limitedby the different kinds of foundationsas, say, thespatial relation of to the left of is limitedin applicationto those cases

where the relata are place determinations.31 n the case of spatialrelations,he argues,accordingly, hat althoughwe do not ordinarilysospeak, one could speak of similaritybetween place determinations.Thereason we do not is that the otherrelationaldesignations, uch as to theleft of, are more advantageousn virtueof their being more precise.32Hence, even though the special natureof certainkinds of foundationsfavors use of relationsother than similarity, t does not preventus fromanalyzingthe relations among them in terms of similarity.Thus hestrengthenshis centralidea that the divisionof relations of comparisoninto equalitiesand inequalities,and of the latter into similaritiesanddissimilarities,s exhaustive.33Finally, then, we are in a positionto discuss the internal relationofequality. Its importance,as we saw, is very greatin Meinong'sontology;for it purportsto account (a) for two perfect particularsof the samekind beingof the same kind and (b), for similarity, ncludingdegreesofsimilarity.The adequacyof this ontologythus dependson whether ornot an internalrelationof equalitycan in fact do all that. There is alsoa connection between (a) and (b). If his analysis does not yield anadequatesolution to (a), then it cannotpossiblydo so for (b). I do be-lieve him to fail with respect to (a). Yet, the importanceof the issuewarrantsa separatediscussionof (a) and (b).(a) Considertwo spots which are both the same shade of red. Uponhis view each spot contains an entity which accountsfor its being red.Furthermore, he red (entity) in the one spot is numerically distinctfrom the red (entity) in the other spot. To express this, let us refer tothe two entities as red, and red2 respectively.The claim is that whilered, and red2 are numericallydistinct,they are yet equal.Nor are theyjust equal to each other, but also to all other entities which are, orground,in other objects this particularshade of red. This latter fact,however,can be ignoredsince if the proposedsolutionfails, as it does,for red,, and red2,is also fails with respectto all other instances.Red, and red2 are simple. (We may surely ignore the dubiousness,due to what he says aboutsimilarity,of the simple-complexdistinction,since he does claim that simple propertiesare equal.)And not only arethey simple, but they are the only entities grounding the fact that red,

31 H.S.II., p. 652.32 H.S.I., pp. 622-625, 653-654.33 H.S.II., p. 654.


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PARTII. MEINONG'SNALYSISOF RELATIONS 579and red2 are equal. Equality,in other words, is neither a constituentofred, and re42 nor is it an entity jointly exemplifiedby red, and red2.Nor of course is that surprising.It merely restates what we learnedearlier about Meinong'sgeneralanalysis of relations.The one thing leftto be done is to find out what, if anything,can be made of this claim.First of all, it is obvious that if red, and red2 are simpleand are theonly entities in the fact of red, and red2 being equal, then red1 andred2 are not related. The relationdependenton the mind will not do.This latter relationis somehow about the fact that red, and red2 areequal,but it is not a constituentof this fact. Nor will it do to say thatthe relationis containedin the respective "natures"of red1 and red2,red, and red2 somehow "pointing"at or to one another.For red1 andred2 are simple. Thus they cannot have internal ingredientsperformingthis function. Nor, even if this difficultycould be overcome,would thenotion of an ingredientwhich "points" o anotherentitybe intelligible.There are no such ingredients.Hence, red, and red2 are in fact notrelated upon this analysis.Furthermore, ven if one ignoresthis difficulty, t is hardto see howthe relation of equalitycould accountfor the samenessof the two redspots. In otherwords, the difficulty s not merelythat Meinongfails togive equality the objective status of an externalrelation,since, even ifhe somehowsucceeded n doingthis, therewould still be a puzzle.Howwould he explain that just red, and red2 are equal, but not, say, red,and blue1? This could only be accomplishedby introducingdifferentequality relations (which is directly contraryto his claim concerningthe "generality" f equality),34 o that red1 and redi would exemplifyequality, blue, and blue2, equality2,and so on. While this will for-mallyworkin the sense that the differentequalityrelationscan be usedto pick out the various classes of objets which are the same in a certainrespect, one still remains uncomfortableabout the ground of each ofthese severalequalityrelations.The source of the discomfort lies in the fact that we are asked toaccept as ultimate and ontologicallyadequatethe notion or, rather, theprinciple, that two simple entities may be the same in kind yet differentin number. There are supposed to be two simple perfect particularswhich are equal,or of the same kind. One may plausiblysay that theirbeing numericallydistinct is grounded simply in their being two, i.e.,that their difference s primitive.In other words, one need not worryabout individuatinghe two perfect particulars ince in effect they areindividuatorsThe troubleis, rather,that if one takes theirdifference o

34H.S.II., p. 652.


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580 PHILOSOPHYNDPHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCHbe primitive, then one cannot also take their sameness to be primitive.Yet this is precisely what we are asked to do.To repeat, one cannot say in ontology that both sameness and dif-ference of two simple entities are primitive. Even more strongly, onlythe claim that difference is primitive is acceptable. With respect tosameness, one must always ask in what way, or in what respect, twoentities are the same or equal. And this question can only be answeredby pointing out an entity shared by or common to both of the entitieswhich are said to be the "same" in some way or respect. Hence,Meinong, by taking equality to be primitive, fails to provide an accept-able ground for the sameness of the two red spots.

(b) Let us for the time being ignore the fact that Meinong's solutionto the problem of sameness is at best verbal and ask ourselves whetherit could, at least verbally, account for similarity and its degrees, as hehas analyzed them. The reason this question is important is this. Onemay account for his failure to provide an adequate ground for samenessby his inability to push the analysis of equality to greater explicit depththan he did. But about the reduction of similarity to equality and dif-ference), he is, for better or worse, most explicit. Thus failure at thishe has set himself, even though, structurally, the root of the weaknessis his inability, implicit in his approach, to grasp and solve the problemof grounding equality.Similarity, we recall, is held to be a relation between complexescontaining some equal perfect particulars. That raises two problems.First, it must be shown that equality does in fact account for similarity,i.e., for the fact of two objects in a continuum being more similar thantwo others farther apart in it. About the first problem, I shall not worry,since I agree that similarity of complexes is to be handled in terms ofagreeing constituents. That he nevertheless incorrectly analyzes what itis for constituents to agree, we have already examined.The second problem is the interesting one since, prima facie, it wouldseem that equality cannot account for degrees of similarity. Indeed,some have argued that Meinong in fact fails at this point.35 To see whyhis analysis appears to fail and, furthermore, why upon a closer exam-ination it nevertheless provides an ingenious way of at least formallysolving the problem, it is perhaps best to use a simple example. Con-sider a restricted continuum consisting of five pitches, c, d, e, f and g.

35 See Grossmann, Reinhardt, The Structure of Mind, Madison andMilwaukee, 1965, p. 176, where he aplies an argument against Meinong's useof spatial determinations to ground degrees of similarity in terms of agreeingconstituents.


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PART II. MEINONG'SANALYSIS OF RELATIONS 581Pitchesbeingordered n the familiarcontinuum, he similarityrelationsin which they standare readily ascertained.For example,the membersof the pairs(c, e), (d, f), (e, g) all exemplify he same similarityrelation,hg3 (higher-by-a-third),he membersof the pairs (c, f), (d, g), hg4, andso on.36 Consider next how one might plausibly explicate Meinong'sanalysis of this case. One might argue that, for example, the membersof (c, e) exemplifyhg3 becausethey containequal constituents.That is,there are two constituents,a, in c, a2 in e, such that a, and a2 areequal. The class of pairs, each memberof whichcontainssome aj, thenpicks out the class of pairs the membersof which exemplifythe simi-larity relation hg3.37 Similarity,the membersof the pairs (c, f) and(d, g) each exemplifyhg4 in virtueof their containing,respectively,bl,b2, b3 and b4.This suggestion,then, amounts to defining quality order within acontinuum n terms of equal constituents.In other words, the specialcase of the orderingrelation,hg3, is analyzedexactly the same way inwhich, say, similarity-with-respect-to-reds analyzed.But this, as I willshow, does not workin the case of an orderingrelation,although t will(formally)work in the case of a nonordering imilarityrelation. To seewhatis wrongwith this attemptconsiderfirst the pairs (c, e) and (e, g),and then the pairs (c, f) and (d, g). In the first case a,, a2, a3 and a4accountfor hg3 being exemplifiedrespectivelyby the membersof thepairs (c, e) and (e, g). But notice that since c containsa3 and g con-tains a4, the membersof the pair (c, g) should exemplifyhg3, whichthey of course do not. In the secondcase, bl, b2, b3 and b4 account forhg4 being exemplifiedrespectivelyby the membersof (c, f) and (d, g).Again, since c containsb, and g containsb4, the membersof the pair(c, g) should exemplifyhg4. Moreover,extendingthis reasoning, t caneasily be show that the membersof the pair (c, g) will exemplify all ofthe relationspeculiarto the continuum.The mistake,I submit,lies in analyzingthe orderingrelationssolelyin terms of equal constituents.If this were the only possibility,thenMeinong'sontologicaledifice would indeedcrumble.There is, however,

36 See H.S.1l., pp. 622-625, 653-654, for evidenec that hg3 is to be treatedas a similarity relation.17 Ignore, if you will, the problem of how the equality of ai and a2 canaccount for a relation such as hg3, even though the paradigm seems to showthat it cannot be treated like similarity, and assume that there is somethingabout the natures of at and a2 which not only makes them equal, but equalin a certain way. Ignore also the worry about what at and a2 might be,whether they themselves be pitches within the pitches, c and e, or some otherquality, either auditory or non-auditory.


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582 PHILOSOPHYNDPHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCHan alternativewhich effectively avoids the formal objections to theabove suggestion.WhetherMeinong actually had this alternative inmindwhen arguing or the reductionof similarity o equalityI shall nottry to decide.The suggestion s this. Insteadof analyzingthe orderingrelationsinterms of equal constituents,analyze them in terms of equal numbersofequal constituents.To see how this works, consideran arbitrarilyargerange of pitches. By calling it a range ratherthan a continuumI in-dicate that it consists of a finite, though arbitrarilyarge, numberofpitcheseach of which contains in turn only a finite number of constit-uents; for the introductionof a continuumand, thereby,infinity,wouldintroduceunwantedmathematical omplications.Assume, for example,that there are 99 pitches in the range;call them t1, t2. . . t99, respec-tively. What are the constituentsof these pitches? The trick, as onemight suspect, lies in the selection and arrangementof these constit-uents. As it turns out, to producethe desiredorder there must be aminimumof 199 differentconstituentsand each pitch must contain aminimumof 100 differentconstituents.38Designate the 199 differentconstituents in the following way: 99 of them are a,, a2 .. . af9; 99more are bl, b2 ... b9g. The remainingconstituent is p, standingforthe propertyof being a pitch. As such, it will be the only constituentcontained in all of the pitches. The other constituentswill vary from1 to 99 in the number of pitches in which they are contained.Havingidentifiedthe elements, I shall now exhibitthe list of pitcheswith theirconstituents.

t1 consists of: pa4,a2 .. a96,a97,a98,a99.t2 consists of: p,a4,a2..a.6,aa98,ba.t3 consists of: pa4,a2 .. a96,a97,b2,bl.t4 consists of: p,a4,a2.. a96,b3,b2,bl...........***.****..*****..*..*...........***.*.***..*****......

t96 consists of: p,al,a2,a3,b96.... b3,b2,bl.t97 consists of: paa2,b97,b6 ..... b3,b2,bi.t98 consists of: p,a1,b98,b97,b96 .... b3,b2,bl.t99 consists of: p,bg9,b98,b97,b96.... b3,b2,bl.38 As it turns out, they may contain more constituents. But if this is the caseeach of the additional constituents would have to appear as a constituent of onlyone pitch in order not to interfere with the principle of ordering in terms ofequal numbers of equal constituents. Since these additional constituents wouldthen play no role in ordering, let us ignore them.


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PARTHI.MEINONG'SNALYSISFRELATIONS 583Now the members of the pairs (t1,t2), (t2,t3, (t3,t4) . . . (t96,t97) (t97,t98), (t089t99) all exemplify hg2. The members or the pairs t1,t3),t2,t4) ... (t96,t98), t97,t99) all exemplifyhg3. From the above list ofpitches and theirconstituents t is obviousthat all and only those pairsof pitches whose membersexemplify hg2 agree in exactly 99 of theirconstituents.All and only those pairs whose membersexemplify hg3agree in exactly 98 of their constituents. And so on, until the pair(tltgg), whose membersexemplify hg99 and agree in only one con-stituent,p.The class of pairs which exemplify hg2, then, is defined in terms ofall of the pairs of pitches whose memberscontain an equal number ofequal constituents,namely, 99. While no two pairs have memberscon-taining the same equal constituents,he numberof equalconstituents nall of these pairs is constant. The order of the relationshg2 to hg99 isdefined in terms of the numericalorder of pitches containingequalconstituents.Hence, the pitchescan be arranged n the continuumandeach pitch will stand in all and only those similarityrelations in whichit in fact stands to all of the otherpitches.39The formal adequacyof this interpretations obvious. With it Mei-nong could account for degrees of similaritywithin his system.But theformal ease must not be allowed to blind us to the objectionswhichcan be raised.One such objection s minor,the othermajor. The minorobjectionrecalls the fact that in the analysisof similarityMeinong em-ploys the notion of equal constituents,which notion we have foundabove to be defective.The reason I call this objection minor is that ifhe were to amendhis account of equalityto meet the criticismwe hayebrought o bear against t, he could indeed in this manneranalyzesimi-larity in terms of equality. The major objection is to the claim thateach pitch contains 100 constituents.Only two entitiescould plausiblybe claimedto be presented,namely,the pitch itself and perhaps,p, thepropertyof being a pitch.As for a, ... a99, b3 . . . b9g, one must simplysay that one is not acquaintedwith any such entities.The objection is

39 At this point it can be seen why the number of pitches and their constituentsmust be finite. An infinite number of pitches would be absurd in the sense thatit could not possibly be groundedin acquaintance.And, if one had a finite numberof pitches each of which contained an infinite number of constituents, one wouldthen face the problem of a non-Archimedeanseries, for while the first and secondpitch would differ with respect to only one constituent, the first and last pitchwould differ with respect to an infinite number of constituents.Thus, there wouldbe no progression by which one could move from disagreementwith respect to one(or any finite number of) constituents to disagreement with respect to an infinitenumber of constituents in a finite number of steps.


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584 PHILOSOPHY ND PHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCHmajor because there is no way in which Meinong could even makeplausible acquaintancewith such entities.Meinong thus fails in both tasks, though for different reasons. Hecannot account for the fact that two perfect particularsof the same kindare of the same kind and he cannot account for degrees of similarity.The failure is due to his nominalismand hisdenialof externalrelations.Because he analyzes properties n terms of perfectparticulars, e cannotaccountfor samenessin kind. He mistakenlythinkshe can becausehecovertly appeals to his analysis of relations,by thinkingof sameness nterms of equality and of the latter as a relation which is in some senseprimitive, unanalyzable,and somehow without need of an ontologicalground. With respect to similarity,since he cannot accept it as an ex-ternal relation, he is at this stage forced to accept transcendentalorunpresentedentities as constituentsof phenomenologicallyimpleones.This examinationof Meinong's early ontology has revealed its basicdeficiencies.But althoughI have argued that Meinongfails to do whathe sets out to do and, hence, that his early ontology must be rejected,it does not follow that the Hume Studies are merely a failure and haveno meritwhatsoever.Their shortcomingsare but those of the nomina-listic empiricists, whose importance in the tradition has managed tosurvive the inadequacyof their solutions to the fundamental ntologicalproblems. The Hume Studies' merit lies in having carried the empiri-cist line of argumentwith respect to equality and similarity urther handid Meinong'sEnglish predecessors.

KENNETHBARBER.STATE UNIVERSITYOF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO.

Barber (1971)-Meinong's Hume Studies (2)

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Transcript of Barber (1971)-Meinong's Hume Studies (2)