Barbarization and Roman Warfare in Late Antiquity
Transcript of Barbarization and Roman Warfare in Late Antiquity
Duke University
The Fall of Rome: Understanding “Barbarization” through the Shifting Strategic and Tactical
Requirements of Roman Warfare in Late Antiquity
Curtis Lee
CLST 551S: Roman Archaeology
Alicia Jiménez
20 November 2020
Introduction
In the 3rd century AD, the Roman Empire had begun to see the incursion of various
aggressive peoples along its borders on the Rhine, Danube, and in the East along the Euphrates.
Contemporaneous to these new threats, the Roman Army had begun to increasingly adapt to the
regional peculiarities present within its respective zones of operations and through its use of
auxilia and incorporation of “barbarizing” affects in the legions. In doing so, it has been said to
have become institutionally barbarized—adopting the same barbarian affects used by the “other”
who they so opposed—which has, in turn, led Classical scholarship to point towards this
“barbarization” as a diminution of the capabilities of the Roman army, and an overdetermined
cause of the collapse of the Roman Empire. However, this paper seeks to upset this traditionalist
narrative through an examination of the archaeological site as Dura-Europos.
Using this mid-3rd century site from the province of Syria Creole, this paper seeks to
understand the shifting strategic goals of the Roman army during the 3rd and 4th centuries AD in
response to the aggressive expansion of the Sassanid Persians, and how the material record
reflects both military cultural changes and tactical alterations—in terms of defenses, town layout,
deployments, etc.—incorporated as a means of adapting to newfound strategic necessities.
Furthermore, by examining the transformation occurring within the Roman army both
structurally and culturally during this period, and combining historical and archaeological means
of investigation, this paper answers how and why the Roman army became increasingly
provincial and why this was not a cause of the fall of Rome, but a sustaining force that defended
the empire during times of crisis.
The Development of Dura-Europos Prior to Roman Occupation
Dura-Europos was a settlement situated along the middle of the Euphrates on the borders
of the Seleucid and Parthian Empires, and subsequently the Roman and Sassanian Empires after
the conquests of the former by the latter in the second and third centuries AD. The city was
founded by Macedonian veterans in the 300s BCE who called the settlement Europos; albeit, the
largely Aramaic-speaking population labeled the city Dura, or “fortress,” giving the settlement
its hyphenated name and alluding to its existence as a crossroads on the liminality of multiple
imperial powers throughout antiquity (James 2019, 3). The Seleucids were the ones who invested
into the Hellenistic city: creating a Hippodamian street grid outlining a much larger city area
than was initially occupied by the veterans, constructing a circuit wall, and rebuilding what has
been labeled the Strategeion, or “Redoubt Palace,” on the plateau looking over the city (James
2019, 50). Following these constructions and renovations of the city’s structures, the city is
thought to have been absorbed by the Parthian Empire around 113-110 BC in which we see a
continued and gradual filling of the city area within the confines of the Hellenistic circuit wall
(James 2019, 50). The buildup of the city under Parthian sovereignty did not alter the cultural
dynamics of the city, as Miller notes it always maintained a Greek public character (Miller
2006), yet it’s transformation into a regional administrative center shows various cultural
markings that indicate the mixed cultural foundations of the city along with the structures of the
city, itself. For example, the Agora more closely resembles a Parthian bazaar than that of the
traditional Greco-Roman forms seen further West. Thus, certain structural characteristics
indicate both the likely chronology of the development of the city; but, more importantly, an
indication of some form of cultural interaction and co-existence between its two primary ethnic
groups—a Greek elite and a Semitic majority—in which the Semitic majority held greater
influence on the architectural forms seen in the material record—housing, sanctuaries, the agora,
etc. Another example of such cultural mixing, is the syncretization of Greek deities with those of
the Semitic population in concurrence with the presence of a synagogue (James 2019, 50), and
various other cult deities which are expanded based on “Babylonian forms” (James 2019, 51),
and which Leriche identifies as being central to immigrant communities in Dura of which the
largest was that of the Palymrenes (Leriche 2016, 181; Kaizer 2017). Thus, the cultural diversity
of Dura-Europos was already firmly established prior to the Roman conquest in which additional
cultural interactions would emerge with new syncretizations—the Mithraeum, the Temple of
Bel, the Temple of the Roman-Archers—but also Roman military standardizations in regard to
the defensive structures brought about through Sassanid Persian aggressions.
The Roman Garrison at Dura-Europos
The Romans gained sovereignty over Dura-Europos in the middle of the second century
AD with the earliest datable textual evidence leaving it within the hands of a garrison of
Palmyrene archers in 168 BC as attested by an inscription in the Mithraeum (PR 7/8, 84-85). The
Roman military presence in Dura-Europos was tenuous during this period, and it is likely the
Palmyrene archers were acting as symmachiarii, or as “allies and proxies for Roman authorities”
(James 2019, 244). From this early dating up until the reforms of Severus, there are only minor
additions to the Roman garrison; however, the arrival of Cohors II Ulpia in Dura, which an
inscription on an altar at the Palmyrene Gate attests to 193 AD (PR 1, 42-44), is one notable
addition as it shows a distinguishable and definitive Roman military presence in the city—and is
a precursor to the shift in significance that the city would truly enjoy under Severus, Caracalla,
and in the Crisis of the Third Century. The Cohors II Ulpia is no longer found in the material
record of Dura-Europos after approximately 210 AD, which coincides with the renovations
under Septimius Severus, after which it is replaced by Cohors XX Palmyrenorum.
Cohors XX Palmyrenorum is first attested in 208 AD from two separate letters; however,
it is not until 225 AD that men from the unit are explicitly mentioned at Dura-Europos (James
2019, 307). Nevertheless, based on several letters concerning the placement of detachments
within surrounding settlements, it can be reasonably confirmed that the Cohors XX
Palmyrenorum was present in Dura following the Severan renovations circa 210 AD. Another
interesting distinction concerning the Cohors XX Palmyrenorum is its unique organizational
structure and leadership. The Cohors XX was led by a tribune rather than a prefect which would
seem to mark it as a milliary as opposed to the expected quingenary, yet there is a lack of textual
or epigraphic evidence to support such a designation and the structure of the Cohors—the
number of centuries and turmae—is radically different from what would be expected of a
milliary (James 2019, 247). James reconciles the various issues with defining the size and
designation of the Cohors XX by assuming the centuries and turmae were double strength similar
to the organization of the first cohorts of post-Flavian legions, and that this was a change that
happened later in the presence of the garrison within the city (James 2019, 247). It can further be
inferred that such a doubling is in response to the rise of the Sassanid Persians and their raids
across the border. For example, Cohors XX Palmyrenorum had a dromadarii attachment (P.
Dura 82 in Campbell 1994), and was itself a unit with roughly equal distribution of centuries and
turmae suggesting a need to remain mobile, and adapting to Persian horse archers. Additionally,
the doubling of the size of each cohort and turmae would allow for larger detachments to
settlements along the Euphrates, and for significantly more populated defenses in the case of a
siege at Dura-Europos, itself.
While the Cohors arrived at Dura-Europos at an early stage in its development as a
Roman settlement, and continually played a significant role in the operations within and
surrounding the city, they were not the only troops tasked with garrisoning the city and region.
Dura-Europos, as a city within the province of Syria Creole, was afforded vexillations from the
provinces two legions—IV Scythica and VXI Flavia Firma—as attested by inscriptions within
the Mithraeum dating to its renovation circa 210 AD (PR 7-8, 85). The presence of the
vexillation from IV Scythica is continuous after its arrival circa 210 AD, and it is noteworthy that
the vexillation becomes connected with the city such that a papyri fragment from 254 AD
denotes it as “the local vexillation;” albeit, as James notes, the chronology of occupation drawn
from the papyri record is open to interpretation (P. Dura 32; James 2019, 248). The significance
of the presence of vexillations at Dura-Europos, the duration and formalization of the garrison,
and the implications concerning manpower and unit strength are all relevant to discussions
concerning the state of the empire during the Crisis of the Third Century; but, also the shifting
strategic goals of the Roman Empire as it entered into Late Antiquity.
Firstly, the significance of the consistent presence of two vexillations based out of Dura-
Europos signifies its heightened importance as an intermediary city on the liminality of the
Roman and Persian empires. The increased garrison at Dura-Europos combined with its
increased fortifications signal a concern of late-Parthian and early-Sassanid aggression aimed at
the heart of Rome’s territorial possessions in the East—its possessions in the newly created
province of Mesopotamia and the city of Antioch in Syria Creole. The capital of the Sassanian
Empire was located at Ctesiphon on the Tigris south-east of Dura-Europos, and as such, any
Sassanid army marching on Roman territory would be forced to march in the vicinity of the
Tigris or Euphrates for access to water. While Rome controlled Hatra and Nisibis, the Persians
were at a great strategic disadvantage as Roman fortifications controlled access to the majority of
Mesopotamia. However, following the campaigns of Shapur I in 241 AD, and Roman concession
of Nisibis and Hatra, Dura-Europos would have undoubtedly became one of the most significant
border cities controlling access into the Roman East. Accordingly, such changes to the walls and
military district, and the doubling of Cohors XX, all occurring in the later period of Dura’s
occupation would match this increased defensive importance placed upon Dura-Europos as a
border city and within a model of defense-in-depth as proposed by Luttwak with the later Limes.
Secondly, and expanding on the concept of Dura-Europos as a border city, the long-
standing billeting of the vexillation from IV Scythica reveals general trends in how Rome made
use of its legions as a function of dwindling manpower and expansive borders with various
enemies just outside of Roman imperium. The designation in P. Dura 32 of the attached
vexillation as “the local vexillation” potentially reveals a source of much discord in the Roman
military usage in Late Antiquity as it alludes to a provincialization of the vexillation and the
legion more widely. While the Syrian legions are recalled multiple times during this period to
combat the Sassanids on various campaigns (Baird 2012), the local connection drawn between
the vexillation and the city populace represents the emergence of the trend of later limitanei and
even later foederati units in which regionalizations are further pronounced as a symptom of the
increasing usage of foreigners and foreign material goods in the defense of the borders of the
empire.
In his study of Dura-Europos, James proposed a new model for examining the
development of the garrison which, if true, would suggest greater ethnic diversity in the garrison,
as he claims Cohors XX Palmyrenorum was “created in situ at Dura directly from the previously
attested body of Palmyrene archers” (James 2019, 249). If this hypothesis is true, then it could
lead to further discussions surrounding the dual tribunals found in the principia, and the separate
headquarters for Cohors XX and the two vexillations—the former in the Temple of
Azzanathkona and the latter in the principia which was most likely constructed explicitly for the
vexillations (James 2019, 76). These spatial divisions within the town could be said to mirror the
social divisions between more “provincial” auxilia and more “Romanized” vexillations; albeit,
this is difference is likely found only in differences with specialty units and perhaps some pieces
of equipment which the Roman legionary would not have employed directly. Furthermore, the
question of “provincial” and “Roman” identities is highly obscured at the site as soldiers and
their camp followers likely interacted with the civilian population outside the military district
and were likely of questionable “Roman” origin anyways, as we see in the case of Cohors Ulpia
II which received Roman citizenship for its service prior to arriving at Dura-Europos.
Additionally, shared experience in mystery cults and shared use of barbarizing affects such as the
wearing of trousers by the
vexillations serve to illustrate
that neither group is easily
characterizable (James, 2019).
Fortifications at Dura-Europos
Having discussed the
increasing geopolitical
significance of Dura-Europos to both the Roman and Sassanian Empires, and a Roman strategic
shift towards a more defensive posture, it seems relevant to discuss the alterations made to the
cities structures to better fortify it against potential Sassanid invasion. The Roman garrison
seems to accompany two distinct phases of construction at Dura-Europos—one with the arrival
of the two vexillations circa 210 AD and another following its reconquest after a Sassanid
invasion in 252 AD saw the city quietly fall to Shapur I following the defeat of a Roman Army
60,000 strong at Barbalissos in the same year (Edwell 2008, 89-90). This defeat revealed some of
the most significant weaknesses in Roman strategical planning; namely, that Rome lacked the
resources to be able to risk its army in offensive, large-scale action. For example, the Battle of
Barbalissos in 252 AD likely required nearly the entirety of the garrison of Dura-Europos to be
recalled and consolidated into the field army which would have faced the Persians at Barbalissos.
The issue with such a strategic choice is that should the primary field army be routed, then the
garrisoned cities which are depleted of troops will quickly be taken if they choose not to
surrender outright. Thus, in Shapur I’s campaigns in 252-253 AD, the defeat of the Roman army
saw Dura-Europos fall into Sassanid sovereignty without signs of siege nor urban combat as it is
likely there were too few troops to withstand any form of siege. Furthermore, following the
recapture of the city by Romans in the following year, there is no longer any reference to the
Cohors XX Palmyrenorum which had likely made up approximately half of the garrison prior to
the Battle of Barbalissos (See Fig. 9.1 from James 2019, 251). Thus, defeat for the Romans in
Late Antiquity was far more damaging than it had ever been before, as manpower and monetary
reserves did not allow for the same level of recovery following a defeat as it did in the Republic
or early Principate. Furthermore, the now weakened defenses in the East required Rome to adapt
new strategies and structures to enact those strategies—transforming Dura from a forward
operating base to that of an advanced stronghold on the Roman frontier.
While the Roman Army had faced large-scale defeats in the Persia before Barbalissos,
these defeats were followed by treaties that generally maintained the sovereignty of Rome on the
western bank of the Euphrates; however, after Barbalissos, Shapur I did not settle with the
Romans, but instead pushed his advantage sacking several cities including the provincial capital
at Antioch. Henceforth, we see renovations of the Hellenistic wall along with the bolstering of
existing defenses for urban combat as the civilian population had been likely evacuated (Baird
2012, 312-317), or deported by the Persians during their short-lived occupation of the site (James
2019, 36-37). Of the changes which occurred after the first Persian occupation—the addition of
artillery to the tops of buildings at E4 and along the Camp Wall, the alteration to buildings and
doorways for quicker access,
the blocking of streets to
effectively channel the enemy
into “kill zones” during urban
combat (See Figure XXIV
from James 2019 for an
approximation of how the
processional routes would
have mirrored artillery
placements and subsequent
kill zones leading into the
military district)—the most significant and explicit modification signaling the change to the
aforementioned defensive posturing at Dura is the largely expanded West Wall which would
have been the only section of wall on which the enemy could lay siege. During this period, the
wall was greatly expanded with an anti-siege glacis, expanded towers and glacial shields for the
towers, a reinforced wall making use of rubble fills from housing that had been attached to the
Hellenistic wall, and expanded ramparts and ramps to make accessing these ramparts easier in
the event of a siege (See Fig. 3 from James 2011, 73). The ease of moving around and accessing
the ramparts can also be seen as an alteration maximizing the efficiency of movement of the
smaller garrison in responding to targeted attacks on certain sections of the wall.
Looking at the original Hellenistic wall in comparison with the alterations made in
response to the invasion of Shapur I, it is quite clear that the devastation wrought by that
invasion in 252 AD had a profound impact on Roman strategic and tactical planning. The
Romans had seen the siege
abilities of the Persians at Hatra
and Nisibis; and, accordingly
fortified their walls to such an
extent that the Persians would
have difficulties sieging them
down. Evidence from the final
siege in 256 AD suggests that
Persian attempts to undermine
the wall were successful in
collapsing the inner tower floors
of Tower 19, but the anti-siege
glacis supported the tower only
causing it to sag (James 2011,
77). Thus, the siege of 256 AD
seems to have been prolonged as
the Persians attempted to
undermine the walls while the Romans continually countermined the Persian mines. While it is
unknown precisely how the city fell, it seems clear that Dura-Europos delayed the Persian
invasion force in 256 AD even with a smaller than optimal garrison. Had Rome not been in the
middle of the Crisis of the Third Century when this siege occurred, it is likely that such a delay
would have allowed for a Roman field army to mobilize to meet the Persians prior to any
significant intrusion into Roman territory—hence why Luttwak argues that such an strategic
arrangement constitutes a “defense in depth” (Luttwak 2016), or an elastic defense as it is more
commonly known; albeit, his argument is outside the scope of this case study as he applies the
term following the reforms of Diocletian and Constantine. However, Dura-Europos through its
altered significance as a heavily fortified, yet undermanned, stronghold on the Roman frontier
appears to represent this new strategy of defense with its limited resources being used as a
method of slowing enemy movement so Roman field armies have a chance to respond before
significant loses have been accrued (See Treadgold 1995 and Wheeler 2007 for a more detailed
examination of how these reforms altered Roman military structures and strategy).
Conclusion
The site at Dura-Europos thus reveals an early transformation in how the army was used
on a provincial scale and in provincial command structures. While the Roman army would not be
divided into the comitatenses and limitanei until the reforms of Diocletian and Constantine in the
late-3rd and early-4th centuries (Nischer 1923), the evidence from Dura-Europos seems to
confirm what is known from the historical record—that manpower shortages and internal
political concerns had already led to an informal division of the Roman army into both
praesental armies and a mix of vexillations and auxilia along the border (Elton 1996, 205). The
epigraphic data and material finds combined with the historical record showcase Dura-Europos
as a site in the middle of a transition between the Imperial armies of the Principate and the field
armies of the Dominate, as new threats could not be overcome with old solutions. In 252 AD, the
settlement was left unguarded in order to offensively attack an enemy outside the empire, while
in 256 AD, the defensive structures were improved and the garrisons remained so to occupy and
slow the forces of Shapur I in his continued raids against the Roman Empire. Thus, Dura-
Europos can serve as a type site of the Roman adoption of a “defense in depth” military strategy
which preceded the formalization of such strategy through the reforms of Diocletian and
Constantine, and one which can emphasize the accompanying alterations in military culture,
structures, and identity as observed through its rapid alterations from 210-256 AD.
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