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Banning Ballistic Missiles? Missile Control for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World

Jürgen ScheffranProgram in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security

University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignInternational Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

The Article VI ForumDublin Castle, Ireland, March 26-28, 2008

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Delivery systems in NPT and Model NWC

NPT Preamble: “the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”

Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (1997/2007)I. General Obligations

1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances:

e. To develop, test, produce, otherwise acquire, deploy, stockpile, maintain, retain, or transfer nuclear weapons delivery vehicles;

2. Each State Party undertakes:

f. To destroy or convert for purposes not prohibited under this Convention all nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and nuclear weapon components

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Weapon delivery methods

Rocket-propelled vehicles•Land-based ballistic missiles •Submarine-based ballistic missiles•Surface ship-based ballistic missiles•Space-based ballistic missiles•Short range rockets (no guidance)

Air-breathing vehicles•Aircrafts•Cruise missiles•Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

Other delivery•Artillery/howitzers•Land mines•Torpedoes•Man-portable air-defense systems •Cars, trucks, ships, containers, suitcases

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The German V2 missile program

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Germany

Iraq

South Africa UK

Taiwan

USAIsrael

Brazil

North Korea

Afghanistan

Soviet Union/Russia

Egypt

South Korea

SyriaFrance Argentina

Saudi-Arabia

Libya

Iran

Vietnam

Bulgaria

Pakistan

China

Yemen

India

Proliferation network of ballistic missiles

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Dual use: Titan ballistic missiles and space launchers

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Dual use: Evolution of China’s Long March space launcher

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Soviet Scud missiles and derivatives

Soviet Scud-B Missile(based on German V2)

Range: 300 km

Iraqi Al-Hussein SRBMRange: 600–650 km

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Scud missiles and derivatives

Pakistan’s Ghauri MRBM and transporter (range 1,300 km). It is almost identical to North Korea’s No Dong MRBM, which is based on Scud technology that North Korea got from Egypt in the 1970s.

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Three classes of the missile threat

Scud barrier

INFbarrier

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Ballistic Missile Ranges

Cirrincione, Deadly Arsenals, 2002.

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Critical missile components

Accurate accelerometers and gyroscopes

Advanced composite technology for rocket nozzles

Reentry vehicles

Solid rocket fuel

Thrust vector controls

Advanced testing and manufacturing technologies

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Recent missile test programs

United States: 11 ICBM tests from June 2004 to September 2006 and one SLBM test

Russia: seven tests of ICBMs and 11 tests of SLBMs

China: three tests of ICBMs and two of SLBMs

India: about a dozen tests of short (less than 1,000 kilometers) and medium (1,000 – 3,000 km) range missiles

Pakistan: nine tests of short- and medium-range missiles

DPRK: seven ballistic missile tests in July 2006

Iran: several tests of a medium-range missile

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Characteristics of ballistic missiles

across wide range of distances

with high speed

little warning

high accuracy

probability of penetration

power and prestige

weapons of terror

limited effectiveness (V2, Iran–Iraq, 1991 Iraq war)

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Security impacts of ballistic missiles

Regional vs. global missile threat

Non-state actors (Hezbollah)

Connects regional and global conflicts (Iran)

Link between horizontal and vertical proliferation

Deterrence, counterproliferation and preemptive strikes

New arms races and instabilities

Disruption of regional balances

Obscure threshold between conventional + WMD

Military escalation and increased probability of war

Risk of nuclear war by accident, hair-trigger alert

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Links to space warfare

Missile defense

Ballistic Missiles Space launchers

ASAT

Satellites

Nuclear

Laser

Collision

Expl

osiv

e ElectronicImpacts

Overlapping control regimesSpace

Missiles•INF-Treaty•START 1+2•Moscow Treaty•Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

Nuclear

Missile DefenseABM-Treaty

•Outer Space Treaty•Moon Treaty •Rescue agreement•Liability/Registration Conv.

•NPT•CTBT•NWFZ

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Recent initiatives for missile control

US-Russian Joint Data Exchange Centre (JDEC): Notification of Missile Launches, early warning

Russian Global Control System (GCS) and Global Monitoring System (GMS) to improve multilateral transparency and risk reduction

Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: "responsible missile behaviour“ (MTCR)

UN Panel of Governmental Experts (UNPGE) on missiles (UNGA resolution 55/33A): missile report: "comprehensive approach towards missiles, in a balanced and non- discriminatory manner“

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): Preemptive interdiction of transport of weapons of mass destruction and missiles (land, sea, air)

Global INF Treaty: US-Russian talks

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Options for missile control

Confidence building measures

Code of Conduct

Unilateral reductions

Partial limitations

Missile test restraints, freeze

Missile free zones

Comprehensive disarmament (Zero Ballistic Missiles)

New ABM Treaty

Integration into a regime for space security

Instruments for monitoring and verification

On-site inspections

UVLidarRadar

InfraredElectro-optical

Societal verificationWhistle blowing

Organisational verification

Aerial overflights

Ground/ship-based sensors

Reconnaissance satellite

On-board sensorsSpace

weapon

Spacetracking

Non-intrusive detectors (gamma, x-ray, neutron)

Inspections

Missile track

Data exchange

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Activities vs. monitoring capabilities

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Dual-use of ballistic missiles & space launchers

Similarity of civilian and military rockets

Functional differences and operational characteristics to distinguish missiles and space launchers (deployment mode, test procedures, payload, flight path, guidance, reentry)

Risk reduction: Prevent transformation of space technologies for ballistic use

Safeguards of space systems: critical items unter international control

International space cooperation

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Space launch sites

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The US Space Surveillance Network

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Can we get rid of the missile threat?