FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

CREDIT OPINION9 April 2020

Update

RATINGS

Banco del Estado de ChileDomicile Chile

Long Term CRR A1

Type LT Counterparty RiskRating - Fgn Curr

Outlook Not Assigned

Long Term Debt A1

Type Senior Unsecured - FgnCurr

Outlook Negative

Long Term Deposit A1

Type LT Bank Deposits - FgnCurr

Outlook Negative

Please see the ratings section at the end of this reportfor more information. The ratings and outlook shownreflect information as of the publication date.

Contacts

Felipe Carvallo +52.55.1253.5738VP-Sr Credit Officerfelipe.carvallo@moodys.com

Anna Chabanenko +52.55.1555.5323Associate Analystanna.chabanenko@moodys.com

Ceres Lisboa +55.11.3043.7317Senior Vice Presidentceres.lisboa@moodys.com

» Contacts continued on last page

Banco del Estado de ChileUpdate following change in outlook to negative

SummaryOn 2 April 2020, we changed the outlook on Banco del Estado de Chile's (Banco Estado)long-term debt and deposit ratings to negative from stable.1 The rating action was drivenprimarily by the more challenging operating conditions, and our expectation that the bank'sasset-quality and profitability metrics will deteriorate over the next 12 to 18 months.

However, Banco Estado's A1 ratings benefit from our assessment of government support ifit were to face severe financial stress, which results in five notches of uplift from its baa3Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA). Banco Estado, 100% owned by the Government of Chile(A1 stable), benefits from full backing from the sovereign. The BCA captures the bank'ssuperior access to deposit funding and its low reliance on market funding, supported byits ample holdings of high-quality liquid assets. While we expect the bank's asset qualityto continue to benefit from ample government guarantees to its social mortgages andcommercial loans, its asset quality is likely to weaken as a result of the more difficultoperating conditions, which will also increase its credit costs. The BCA is constrained by alow capital ratio, which incorporates high holdings of deferred tax assets (DTAs), and modestprofitability relative to that of its peers in Chile.

Banco Estado is the country's largest deposit-taking institution and second-largest mortgagelender. The bank plays a significant public policy role with an explicit mandate to promotehomeownership and national savings among low-income individuals, finance small andmedium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and foster financial inclusion by servicing rural areas.

Exhibit 1

Rating Scorecard - Key financial ratiosAs of December 2019

3.7% 3.7%

0.4%

26.6% 32.6%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

Asset Risk:Problem Loans/

Gross Loans

Capital:Tangible Common

Equity/Risk-WeightedAssets

Profitability:Net Income/

Tangible Assets

Funding Structure:Market Funds/

Tangible BankingAssets

Liquid Resources:Liquid Banking

Assets/TangibleBanking Assets

Solvency Factors (LHS) Liquidity Factors (RHS)

Banco del Estado de Chile (BCA: baa3) Median baa3-rated banks

So

lve

ncy F

acto

rs

Liq

uid

ity F

acto

rs

Source: Moody's Investors Service

MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Credit strengths

» Superior funding access

» Asset quality will be supported by state guarantees and reserve coverage

» Higher-than-average stock of liquid assets

Credit challenges

» Asset risk will increase due to external factors

» Low capitalization, despite two capital injections

» Low profitability, which reflects the bank's social mission, business mix and higher tax rate

OutlookBanco Estado's ratings have a negative outlook, reflecting the challenges to its operating environment, asset quality and profitabilitystemming from weaker economic growth in Chile over the next 12-18 months.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade

» Given the negative outlook on Banco Estado's ratings, a rating upgrade is unlikely at the moment. However, a manageable increasein its nonperforming loans (NPLs) and an increase in its capitalization could lead us to change the outlook to stable.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade

» Banco Estado's baa3 BCA and its ratings could be downgraded if its asset quality deteriorates materially, while capitalizationremains low even after incorporating the recently announced capital injection.

This publication does not announce a credit rating action. For any credit ratings referenced in this publication, please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page onwww.moodys.com for the most updated credit rating action information and rating history.

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Key indicators

Exhibit 2

Banco del Estado de Chile (Consolidated Financials) [1]

12-192 12-182 12-172 12-162 12-152 CAGR/Avg.3

Total Assets (CLP Billion) 43,355.0 40,221.5 37,890.2 34,560.6 32,549.6 7.44

Total Assets (USD Million) 57,656.7 57,956.1 61,612.1 51,599.6 45,935.1 5.84

Tangible Common Equity (CLP Billion) 980.6 851.1 802.6 913.8 604.9 12.84

Tangible Common Equity (USD Million) 1,304.0 1,226.4 1,305.1 1,364.4 853.7 11.24

Problem Loans / Gross Loans (%) 3.7 3.6 3.1 3.4 3.1 3.45

Tangible Common Equity / Risk Weighted Assets (%) 3.7 3.3 3.4 4.1 3.0 3.56

Problem Loans / (Tangible Common Equity + Loan Loss Reserve) (%) 53.5 56.3 46.9 46.3 51.5 50.95

Net Interest Margin (%) 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.75

PPI / Average RWA (%) 3.0 2.9 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.76

Net Income / Tangible Assets (%) 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.45

Cost / Income Ratio (%) 50.7 51.7 55.6 53.3 55.3 53.35

Market Funds / Tangible Banking Assets (%) 26.6 23.8 21.7 22.0 20.4 22.95

Liquid Banking Assets / Tangible Banking Assets (%) 32.6 34.8 35.6 36.0 36.8 35.25

Gross Loans / Due to Customers (%) 95.4 89.7 86.5 89.0 85.6 89.25

[1] All figures and ratios are adjusted using Moody's standard adjustments. [2] Basel I; IFRS. [3] May include rounding differences due to scale of reported amounts. [4] Compound AnnualGrowth Rate (%) based on time period presented for the latest accounting regime. [5] Simple average of periods presented for the latest accounting regime. [6] Simple average of Basel Iperiods presented.Sources: Moody's Investors Service and company filings

ProfileBanco del Estado de Chile (Banco Estado) was established in 1953 as a result of the merger of four state-owned credit institutions,namely Caja de Crédito Hipotecario, Caja Nacional de Ahorros, Caja de Crédito Agrario and Instituto de Crédito Industrial. The bankis wholly owned by the Chilean government. As of December 2019, the bank was the largest bank in Chile in terms of deposits, with amarket share of 19.4% (excluding deposits of subsidiaries abroad), and the third-largest lender, with a market share of 14.2%.

Banco Estado offers personal banking, credit and debit cards, consumer credit, insurance, mortgages, trade finance, liabilitymanagement, payment and treasury services to its various clients, including individuals, corporates and government entities.

As of December 2019, the bank reported total assets of $58 billion.

Detailed credit considerationsSuperior funding access and high-quality liquid assetsBeing the largest deposit-taking institution in Chile, Banco Estado's credit profile benefits from its superior access to deposit fundingand low reliance on market funding, and is also supported by its ample holdings of high-quality liquid assets, which are well abovethose of its local peers.

As of December 2019, deposits constituted 68% of the bank's funding, with customer deposits accounting for the majority, while therest came from institutional sources. Senior debt, issued both locally and abroad, constitutes another 17% of funding. Market funding,which was 27% of tangible banking assets, is well diversified and mainly comprises long-term, domestic debt issuances, reducing thebank's exposure to refinancing risks. Banco Estado would likely benefit from flight to quality in times of stress.

Banco Estado's market funding is largely in line with the bank's aim to match its large residential mortgage book through long-termmortgage bonds (letras hipotecarias) and issuances. The bank's $4.5 billion multicurrency global medium-term note (MTN) programhas allowed it to diversify its investor base by currency on advantageous terms, including USD, EUR, JPY, CHF, AUD, COP and HKDissuances.

Furthermore, the bank holds ample liquidity buffers, at 33% of tangible banking assets as of December 2019. The bank's liquid assetsare of good quality and include cash, deposits at highly rated local banks, and A1-rated Chilean sovereign or central bank securities or

3 9 April 2020 Banco del Estado de Chile: Update following change in outlook to negative

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obligations issued by local financial institutions. The bank's investment portfolio generally has a short duration, protecting its balancesheet against wide moves in interest rates.

Asset risk will further increase, although supported by state guarantees and reserve coverageWe expect asset risks to increase in 2020 because of a countercyclical lending mandate, a contraction in GDP as a consequence ofthe ongoing social unrest, the coronavirus outbreak and lower global growth. However, asset-quality deterioration will be limited bysubstantial government guarantees that the bank has on its most vulnerable portfolios of SME financing and residential mortgages. Asof December 2019, commercial loans represented about 51% of the total loan book of Banco Estado, followed by residential mortgages(39%) and consumer loans (9%). Loans to SMEs (included in corporate loans) stood at about 14% of gross loans.

The bank's NPL2 ratio remains largely stable at 3.7% as of February 2020 largely in line with the figure as of year-end 2018 of 3.6%, inspite of the slowdown in activity and difficulties in collecting loans as a result of the social unrest in Chile at year-end 2019.

In addition, the government has once again asked Banco Estado to increase its SME lending as part of its stimulus program, a risk thatwill again be balanced by the partial government guarantees tied to these types of loans. The bank is also focused on easing the termsof SMEs that have been affected by the coronavirus.

Asset risks are magnified by the bank’s high concentrations in terms of top-20 borrower exposures as a percentage of shareholders'equity. These risks are mitigated by the bank's ample reserve coverage, at 5.1% of gross loans (almost 140% NPLs) as of December2019, consisting of voluntary and regulatory provisions.

Low capitalization, despite two capital injectionsAlthough Banco Estado's total regulatory capital ratio of 11.3% as of December 2019 remains comfortably above the current regulatoryminima, it is among the lowest in the Chilean banking system, in part because of its inherently low profitability and internal capitalgeneration. The bank's tangible core capital is just 7% of its reported risk-weighted assets (RWA) and would be even lower if its DTAs,which represent about 55% of its common equity, were capped at 10% of capital as is done under Basel III norms and under ourmethodology. Our tangible common equity (TCE)/RWA, adjusted to weigh government securities at 20%, in line with Basel guidelinesfor A-rated sovereign debt, stood at a low 3.7% as of year-end 2019.

In fact, the proposed regulatory changes in Chile include the establishment of new capitalization requirements for banks, includingnew buffers, and a change in the definition of capital for banks, including the deduction of DTA, in line with Basel III norms. Undernew norms, the overall Common Equity Tier 1 capital requirement for Banco Estado will range between 8.00% and 8.25% of RWA (aminimum of 4.5% + a conservation buffer of 2.5% + a domestic systemically important requirement of 1.00%-1.25%).

Accordingly, in October 2019 and in March 2020, the government announced two capital injections totaling $1 billion. The bankreceived the first half of the capitalization announced October 2019, in December 2019 and the second half in January 2020. TheJanuary 2020 capitalization, combined with the recently announced $500 million, without including an estimation of earnings or RWAgrowth during 2020, will add a little over 200 basis points to Banco Estado’s TCE/RWAs of 3.7% as of December 2019. However, basedon its countercyclical role, we expect Banco Estado to expand its loan book, which may result in continued low capitalization ratioseven if the capital injections enhance its loss-absorption capacity.

In addition, the Comisión para el Mercado Financiero (CMF), the country’s bank regulator, suggested that the government providea conditional guarantee on most of Banco Estado's DTA.3 Under Basel III norms, DTAs with a government guarantee need not bededucted. Both moves are credit positive because they would enhance the loss absorption of Banco Estado’s capital and bring itsregulatory capitalization ratios closer to meeting the new Basel III-like requirements, which are currently being established in Chile.

Banco Estado’s DTAs were a substantial $1.3 billion as of December 2019. The state guarantee is intended to cover net DTAs, deductingdeferred tax liabilities arising from temporary differences and mainly generated from the provisions on its mortgage loan bookin light of the additional 40% tax rate that Banco Estado pays as a state-owned entity. The CMF estimates that because of thisguarantee, Banco Estado would have to deduct only about $300 million in DTAs, which would narrow its capitalization needs fromthe government for regulatory purposes. However, creditors' ability to benefit in full from the conversion of DTAs may be less certainbecause the CMF proposes that they be reimbursed only upon the liquidation of Banco Estado.

4 9 April 2020 Banco del Estado de Chile: Update following change in outlook to negative

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Low profitability reflects the bank's social mission, business mix and higher tax rateAs a government-owned bank with an important social mission, Banco Estado reports profitability levels that are well below those ofits private-sector peers in Chile. The bank's low profitability results from high operating expenses related to the large branch networkneeded to fulfill its mandate; a loan mix geared toward low-yielding commercial and mortgage financing; its high liquidity; and a highertax burden.

Banco Estado's net interest margin (NIM) of just below 3% in 2019 was lower than that of the banking system, as a result of the bank'sasset mix. The bank has a strong focus on low-yielding residential mortgages and corporate loans, as well as a higher proportion ofliquid assets, which tend to be lower yielding than loans. Banco Estado's earnings benefit from a healthy fee income, stemming fromelectronic payments, account management and card services, as well as insurance and mutual funds services. As of December 2019, netfees contributed 21% of the bank's net revenue (net interest income plus non interest income).

Banco Estado's higher operating costs are in part related to its nationwide distribution network that is designed to serve customersthroughout Chile. Banco Estado's cost-to-income ratio was about 51% as of December 2019, below the 55% average registered in2015-17, because of the bank's focus on cost controls and a higher margin.

In 2019, Banco Estado’s return on tangible assets decreased slightly to 0.42% from 0.45% in 2018, as a result of a 38% increase incredit costs, primarily driven by a deterioration in asset quality amid the social unrest at year-end 2019, which offset the 13% increasein net interest income, ahead of the 8% loan book expansion over the same period. Owing to its state-owned nature, Banco Estadofaces an additional 40% tax burden above the corporate tax rate paid by other banks in Chile.

Banco Estado's rating reflects Chile's Strong Macro ProfileCredible and predictable macroeconomic and fiscal policies reflect the continued strength of Chile's institutions.

Although the economic effects of the coronavirus may be short-lived, they will be acute. Moreover, the social protests that eruptedlast year, the process to draft a new constitution and the presidential elections in 2021 will weigh on investor confidence beyond thecoronavirus outbreak. In addition, Chile's economic diversification and GDP per capita lag those of its peers. We expect GDP growth inChile to contract 2.4% in 2020 and rebound to 2.5% in 2021, and remain below Chile's 2.9% average growth rate since 2009 over thenext two to three years.

Although Chile has a high credit-to-GDP ratio, loan expansion has slowed in recent years. Over the next 12-18 months, we expect afurther deceleration in credit growth, in line with lower economic activity. Chilean banks benefit from a stable and diversified mix ofdomestic funding sources, although the share of institutional and market funding is significant and above the Latin American averagelevels. The banking system is fairly concentrated and Chilean banks tend to have significant pricing power.

Environmental, social and governance (ESG) considerationsBanco Estado’s exposure to environmental risks is low, consistent with our general assessment for the global banking sector. See ourenvironmental risk heat map for further information.

Overall, we consider banks to face moderate social risks. The most relevant social risks for banks arise from the way they interact withtheir customers. Social risks are particularly high in the area of data security and customer privacy, which are mitigated by sizabletechnology investments and banks’ long track record of handling sensitive client data. Fines and reputational damage because ofproduct mis-selling or other types of misconduct are a further social risk. Social trends are also relevant in a number of areas, such asshifting customer preferences toward digital banking services increasing information technology costs, aging population concerns inseveral countries affecting demand for financial services or socially driven policy agendas translating into regulations that affect banks’revenue base. See our social risk heat map for further information.

We lowered our expectations for Chile's economic growth partly because of the uncertainties related to the ongoing social unrest sincelate 2019. In addition, we regard the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under our ESG framework, given the substantial implicationsfor public health and safety. Our 2020 real GDP growth forecast, at negative 2.4%, reflects a severe, but relatively short-lived,economic downturn following the coronavirus outbreak because of the combined supply and demand shocks that weigh particularlyheavily on very open and commodity exporting countries like Chile.

5 9 April 2020 Banco del Estado de Chile: Update following change in outlook to negative

MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Governance is highly relevant for Banco Estado, as it is to all participants in the banking industry. Corporate governance weaknessescan lead to a deterioration in a bank’s credit quality, while governance strengths can benefit a bank’s credit profile. Governance risksare largely internal rather than externally driven, and for Banco Estado, we do not have any particular governance concerns. BancoEstado has already been asked to ease the terms of SMEs affected by the unrest, which has happened in the past. Overall, corporategovernance remains a key credit consideration and requires ongoing monitoring.

Support and structural considerationsGovernment supportWe assume that Banco Estado's debt and deposit ratings are government backed, and as such benefit from five nothces of uplift. Ourassumption is based on its full ownership by the Chilean government; its significant policy roles; and its importance to the bankingsystem, as indicated by its large deposit and loan market shares. Banco Estado caters to low-income individuals, with the key objectivesof fostering homeownership, and financing and promoting national savings. Banco Estado does not benefit from an explicit governmentguarantee.

Furthermore, Banco Estado acts as a primary dealer of government securities and provides payroll and other transaction services toboth government and private-sector enterprises. The bank is an important source of liquidity in the banking system and has played acountercyclical lending role from time to time, such as during the 2008 global financial crisis and for Chile's 2014 economic stimulusprogram.

Senior unsecured MTN program ratingWe rate Banco Estado's foreign-currency senior unsecured MTN program issued out of Chile and through its New York branch, BancoEstado, New York Branch (deposits A1 negative), at (P)A1, first rated on 24 January 2012.4 Banco Estado expects to increase its MTNprogram to $5 billion during April 2020.

Counterparty Risk (CR) AssessmentCR Assessments are opinions of how counterparty obligations are likely to be treated if a bank fails and are distinct from debt anddeposit ratings in that they (1) consider only the risk of default rather than both the likelihood of default and the expected financial losssuffered in the event of default, and (2) apply to counterparty obligations and contractual commitments rather than debt or depositinstruments. The CR Assessment is an opinion if the counterparty risk related to a bank’s covered bonds, contractual performanceobligations (servicing), derivatives (for example, swaps), letters of credit, guarantees and liquidity facilities.

Banco Estado's CR Assessment is positioned at A1(cr)/Prime-1(cr)The CR Assessment is placed at the level of the bank's deposit rating, reflecting our view that the willingness of the Chilean governmentto support any of the bank's obligations is limited by its own capacity.

Counterparty Risk Ratings (CRRs)Our Counterparty Risk Ratings are opinions of the ability of entities to honor the uncollateralized portion of non-debt counterpartyfinancial liabilities (CRR liabilities) and also reflect the expected financial losses in the event such liabilities are not honored. CRRliabilities typically relate to transactions with unrelated parties. Examples of CRR liabilities include the uncollateralized portion ofpayables arising from derivatives transactions and the uncollateralized portion of liabilities under sale and repurchase agreements. CRRsare not applicable to funding commitments or other obligations associated with covered bonds, letters of credit, guarantees, servicerand trustee obligations, and other similar obligations that arise from a bank performing its essential operating functions.

Banco Estado's long- and short-term CRRs are positioned at A1/Prime-1The CRRs are placed at the level of the bank's deposit rating, reflecting our view that the willingness of the Chilean government tosupport any of the bank's obligations is limited by its own capacity to provide support.

Methodology and scorecardAbout Moody's Bank ScorecardOur scorecard is designed to capture, express and explain in summary form our Rating Committee's judgment. When read inconjunction with our research, a fulsome presentation of our judgment is expressed. As a result, the output of our scorecardmay materially differ from that suggested by raw data alone (though it has been calibrated to avoid the frequent need for strong

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MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

divergence). The scorecard output and the individual scores are discussed in rating committees and may be adjusted up or down toreflect conditions specific to each rated entity.

Rating methodology and scorecard factors

Exhibit 3

Banco del Estado de Chile

Macro FactorsWeighted Macro Profile Strong 100%

Factor HistoricRatio

InitialScore

ExpectedTrend

Assigned Score Key driver #1 Key driver #2

SolvencyAsset RiskProblem Loans / Gross Loans 3.7% baa1 ←→ baa3 Single name

concentrationExpected trend

CapitalTangible Common Equity / Risk Weighted Assets(Basel I)

3.7% caa3 ↑ caa1 Access to capital Expected trend

ProfitabilityNet Income / Tangible Assets 0.4% ba1 ←→ ba1 Return on assets

Combined Solvency Score ba3 ba3LiquidityFunding StructureMarket Funds / Tangible Banking Assets 26.6% baa3 ↑ a3 Deposit quality Term structure

Liquid ResourcesLiquid Banking Assets / Tangible Banking Assets 32.6% a3 ←→ a2 Stock of liquid assets Quality of liquid assets

Combined Liquidity Score baa2 a3Financial Profile ba1Qualitative Adjustments Adjustment

Business Diversification 0Opacity and Complexity 0Corporate Behavior 0

Total Qualitative Adjustments 0Sovereign or Affiliate constraint A1BCA Scorecard-indicated Outcome - Range baa3 - ba2Assigned BCA baa3Affiliate Support notching 0Adjusted BCA baa3

Instrument Class Loss GivenFailure notching

Additionalnotching

Preliminary RatingAssessment

GovernmentSupport notching

Local CurrencyRating

ForeignCurrency

RatingCounterparty Risk Rating 1 0 baa2 4 A1 A1Counterparty Risk Assessment 1 0 baa2 (cr) 4 A1(cr)Deposits 0 0 baa3 5 A1 A1Senior unsecured bank debt 0 0 baa3 5 A1[1] Where dashes are shown for a particular factor (or sub-factor), the score is based on non-public information.Source: Moody’s Investors Service

7 9 April 2020 Banco del Estado de Chile: Update following change in outlook to negative

MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Ratings

Exhibit 4

Category Moody's RatingBANCO DEL ESTADO DE CHILE

Outlook NegativeCounterparty Risk Rating A1/P-1Bank Deposits A1/P-1Baseline Credit Assessment baa3Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment baa3Counterparty Risk Assessment A1(cr)/P-1(cr)Senior Unsecured A1Commercial Paper P-1

BANCO ESTADO, NEW YORK BRANCH

Outlook NegativeCounterparty Risk Rating A1/P-1Bank Deposits A1/P-1Counterparty Risk Assessment A1(cr)/P-1(cr)Senior Unsecured MTN (P)A1Commercial Paper P-1

Source: Moody's Investors Service

Endnotes1 Please see our press release Moody's changes to negative outlook on four Chilean banks' ratings; downgrades two banks' BCAs.

2 NPLs equal the Comisión del Mercado de Financiero's definition of cartera morosa a 90 días, or 90+ days past due loans, as can be found in the ReportesMensuales. NPLs include consolidated loans past due by more than 90 days even when only one or some debt payments (capital or interest) are past due,as defined by the commission.

3 For further details, please see our comment Banco del Estado de Chile: Chile’s capitalization and state guarantee of Banco Estado's deferred tax assetswould be credit positive, 21 November 2019.

4 See our press release Moody's assigns (P)Aa3 to Banco del Estado de Chile's proposed global medium term note program, 24 January 2012.

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Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., a wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary of Moody’s Corporation (“MCO”), hereby discloses that most issuers of debt securities (includingcorporate and municipal bonds, debentures, notes and commercial paper) and preferred stock rated by Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. have, prior to assignment of any credit rating,agreed to pay to Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. for credit ratings opinions and services rendered by it fees ranging from $1,000 to approximately $2,700,000. MCO and Moody’sinvestors Service also maintain policies and procedures to address the independence of Moody’s Investors Service credit ratings and credit rating processes. Information regardingcertain affiliations that may exist between directors of MCO and rated entities, and between entities who hold credit ratings from Moody’s Investors Service and have also publiclyreported to the SEC an ownership interest in MCO of more than 5%, is posted annually at www.moodys.com under the heading “Investor Relations — Corporate Governance —Director and Shareholder Affiliation Policy.”

Additional terms for Australia only: Any publication into Australia of this document is pursuant to the Australian Financial Services License of MOODY’S affiliate, Moody’s InvestorsService Pty Limited ABN 61 003 399 657AFSL 336969 and/or Moody’s Analytics Australia Pty Ltd ABN 94 105 136 972 AFSL 383569 (as applicable). This document is intendedto be provided only to “wholesale clients” within the meaning of section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001. By continuing to access this document from within Australia, yourepresent to MOODY’S that you are, or are accessing the document as a representative of, a “wholesale client” and that neither you nor the entity you represent will directly orindirectly disseminate this document or its contents to “retail clients” within the meaning of section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001. MOODY’S credit rating is an opinion as tothe creditworthiness of a debt obligation of the issuer, not on the equity securities of the issuer or any form of security that is available to retail investors.

Additional terms for Japan only: Moody's Japan K.K. (“MJKK”) is a wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary of Moody's Group Japan G.K., which is wholly-owned by Moody’sOverseas Holdings Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of MCO. Moody’s SF Japan K.K. (“MSFJ”) is a wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary of MJKK. MSFJ is not a NationallyRecognized Statistical Rating Organization (“NRSRO”). Therefore, credit ratings assigned by MSFJ are Non-NRSRO Credit Ratings. Non-NRSRO Credit Ratings are assigned by anentity that is not a NRSRO and, consequently, the rated obligation will not qualify for certain types of treatment under U.S. laws. MJKK and MSFJ are credit rating agencies registeredwith the Japan Financial Services Agency and their registration numbers are FSA Commissioner (Ratings) No. 2 and 3 respectively.

MJKK or MSFJ (as applicable) hereby disclose that most issuers of debt securities (including corporate and municipal bonds, debentures, notes and commercial paper) and preferredstock rated by MJKK or MSFJ (as applicable) have, prior to assignment of any credit rating, agreed to pay to MJKK or MSFJ (as applicable) for credit ratings opinions and servicesrendered by it fees ranging from JPY125,000 to approximately JPY250,000,000.

MJKK and MSFJ also maintain policies and procedures to address Japanese regulatory requirements.

REPORT NUMBER 1220122

9 9 April 2020 Banco del Estado de Chile: Update following change in outlook to negative

MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Contacts

Felipe Carvallo +52.55.1253.5738VP-Sr Credit Officerfelipe.carvallo@moodys.com

Anna Chabanenko +52.55.1555.5323Associate Analystanna.chabanenko@moodys.com

Ceres Lisboa +55.11.3043.7317Senior Vice Presidentceres.lisboa@moodys.com

M. Celina Vansetti +1.212.553.4845MD-Bankingcelina.vansetti-hutchins@moodys.com

10 9 April 2020 Banco del Estado de Chile: Update following change in outlook to negative