Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

HCOC RESEARCH PAPERS

NO. 6

JANUARY 2020

Stéphane Delory

Ballistic missiles and conventional

strike weapons: Adapting the HCoC to address the dissemination of conventional ballistic missiles

The Hague Code of Conduct aims at curbing the

proliferation of missiles capable of carrying weapons of

mass destruction. Today, with an important increase in

ranges, these weapons are more and more used for a

conventional mission, by a variety of states. This

dissemination illustrates the fact that many stakeholders

master the technologies necessary to build and sustain

these weapons. But it also raises questions on the

possible destabilising effects of these arsenals, even

when they are not linked to WMDs.

This paper develops the factors that have led to a

reconsideration of the use of ballistic missiles for

conventional strikes, and evokes possible ways for the

HCoC to react to this evolution.

Specifically, it proposes three options for the HCoC.

First, it could continue to draw attention to the

proliferation of missiles, regardless of their vocation.

Second, an extension of the scope of the Code could be

considered, which could extend its field of action to

include regional security and stabilisation. Third, the

Code could focus less on the delivery vehicle itself and

more on the payload, enabling it to refer to all missiles

carrying WMDs. This final proposition is described as

more complex but potentially interesting as it would

provide for regulation of emerging technologies such

as hypersonic glide vehicles.

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

2

DISCLAIMER

This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The

contents of this document are the sole responsibility of the Fondation pour la Recherche

Stratégique and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the

European Union.

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

3

CONTENTS

Introduction 5

The main initiators of conventional ballistic strikes 7

The proliferation and dissemination of conventional ballistic missiles:

Technological aspects 9

The utility of conventional ballistic systems 11

Integrating conventional ballistic missiles into the HCoC 15

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

4

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

5

Introduction

The Hague Code of Conduct was designed

at a time when the proliferation of ballistic

missiles was closely associated with that of

weapons of mass destruction. However, the

HCoC is now faced with changes in ballistic

technology which fundamentally alter the

link between ballistic missiles and weapons

of mass destruction. Over short ranges,

ballistic missiles are increasingly used for

conventional strike missions. The same

development holds true, more gradually, for

longer-range missiles.1

The Code aims to prevent the proliferation

of ballistic weapons ‘capable of delivering

weapons of mass destruction’, and not

ballistic missiles per se. This phrasing

suggests a possible distinction based on the

purpose of the missiles and, therefore, that

no anti-proliferation mechanism exists for

missiles whose purpose is exclusively

conventional. In this regard, the Code could

be adapted to take into account

conventional ballistic missiles. But this

distinction is clearly specious: by definition,

any ballistic missile2 is capable of delivering

weapons of mass destruction.3 We must

attempt to define the parameters involved

in conventional applications of ballistic

missiles and decide how to take these into

account.

By making no reference to payload or

range, the Code differs from the initial

approach of the Missile Technology Control

Regime (MTCR). By defining minimal criteria

(a range of 300 km and a payload of 500

kg), the MTCR distinguished between

missiles subject to regulation and those

weapons or technologies that could be

freely exported. These criteria were heavily

inspired by the technical features of the SS-

1c Scud and first-generation nuclear

weapons. They applied to the main types of

missile proliferated by states in search of

delivery systems for weapons of mass

destruction, and were therefore probably

sufficient to halt the proliferation of such

systems in the 1980s and 1990s. However,

these criteria have turned out to be poorly

suited to subsequent technological

developments. They now apply to a majority

1. In this paper, very short-range missiles are defined

as those with a range of less than 300 km, short-

range missiles as those with a range of less than 800

km, and long-range missiles as those with a range of

over 1,000 km. In terms of conventional strikes, mis-

siles with ranges greater than 1,000 km are rare, and

the majority are not precise enough to generate a

predictable military effect on the target. Instead, they

are primarily used for “political” strikes—that is,

those aimed at civilian targets which are meant to

force the targeted political power to change its mili-

tary position in a conflict.

2. In speaking of ballistic missiles here, we include

those with manoeuvrable warheads and quasi-

ballistic missiles (which spend the majority of their

flight within the atmosphere). Guided heavy rockets

(missiles of 600 mm and above) are treated as ballis-

tic missiles, as the traditional distinction between

these systems and ballistic missiles (in terms of

range, trajectory, and type of guidance system) is

fading.

3. In fixing the payload limit for regulated missiles at

500 kg, the MTCR was guided by the minimum car-

rying capacity of a first-generation nuclear missile.

However, proliferating nuclear powers and those

who are not members of the Treaty on the Non-

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are now

capable of designing weapons whose mass is likely

lower. Furthermore, the Syrian conflict reminds us

that the use of chemical weapons remains a current

problem. The increasing precision of missiles makes

it possible to reduce the quantity of chemical agents

needed to produce a significant military effect. We

should take heed of cases in which low-payload

delivery systems are used to carry chemical weapons.

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

6

of weapons and technologies whose

purposes are primarily conventional. By

leaving the MTCR’s range and payload

criteria unchanged, the Code has diverged

fundamentally from the MTCR, whose

implicit objective is to regulate the

proliferation of missiles in their own right,

and not just delivery systems for weapons

of mass destruction.

The Code and the MTCR may reflect

different methodological approaches, but

they face the same problem: How can

prevention and anti-proliferation measures

take account of weapons and technologies

whose applications are primarily

conventional? And how can these be

distinguished from delivery systems for

weapons of mass destruction?

The question is far from merely rhetorical.

By focusing solely on ‘ballistic missiles

capable of delivering weapons of mass

destruction’, the Code emphasises a

fundamental principle: that states are

permitted the equipment of their choice in

order to defend themselves, as long as this

is not prohibited or restricted by

international treaties. The MTCR does not

go against this principle, nor do the United

Nations Security Council resolutions passed

during proliferation crises. The member

states of the MTCR voluntarily undertake to

regulate certain types of exports, with no

normat ive consequences under

international law. Security Council

resolutions, which ban particular states from

acquiring ballistic missiles, establish a direct

link between such missiles and illegal

programmes to acquire weapons of mass

destruction. Resolution 1540, whose scope

is more general, requires states to establish

measures to control the proliferation of

both weapons of mass destruction and their

delivery systems. Like the Code and

previous resolutions, it makes a distinction

between delivery systems in their own right

and delivery systems associated with

weapons of mass destruction. Since there is

no international treaty prohibiting the

design, development, acquisition, and

export of ballistic weapons, all of these

actions are legal as long as they are carried

out in conformity with the respective

commitments of states to non-proliferation

agreements and international standards.

Until the 1990s, the acquisition of ballistic

missiles for conventional strike purposes

was merely a theoretical issue, since such

weapons were extremely imprecise. But

many examples of conventional ballistic

strikes have been recorded since 1973 (the

date of the first use of an SS-1c, during the

Yom Kippur War). In particular, these strikes

occurred during the War of the Cities

between Iran and Iraq, by the Afghan forces

of the Najibullah government to break the

siege of Jalalabad in 1989, during US

operations in Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and,

more recently, in Yemen. These examples

showed the partial political and, in some

situations, military utility of ballistic missiles,

even if they were imprecise and poorly

suited to a role as conventional strike

weapons.4 Nonetheless, conventional

ballistic strikes were still primarily seen as a

4. The political utility is only partial because the use

of specifically conventional delivery systems only

rarely requires targeted states to radically modify

their declaratory stances. However, the strategic

effects are real: most of the states concerned are

required to adapt their military strategies, both

during and after the conflict..

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

7

costly and militarily ineffective substitute for

airstrikes. Therefore, analysts generally view

North Korea’s success in exporting Scud Bs

and Cs5 and No Dong missiles after the Gulf

War in 1991 as an attempt by purchasing

states to acquire delivery systems for

weapons of mass destruction (Pakistan, Iraq,

Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Iran), or as the result

of a politics of prestige.

Iraqi Al-Hussein missiles, derived from the SS-1c

(1989)

Remarkably, the value of ballistic weapons

as an anti-access system—clearly

recognized in the United States since

1991—has been heavily underestimated.

But this is an important factor in

proliferation: many states see the

acquisition of such systems as part of a

protection and deterrence strategy and not

necessarily as a strategy of aggression.

The main initiators of

conventional ballistic strikes

Until the end of the 2000s, ballistic missiles

were primarily thought of as delivery

systems for nuclear weapons (for powers

that possessed them) or for weapons of

mass destruction (for proliferating

countries). Since the late 1980s, however,

cases emerged of such weapons being

developed for conventional purposes. Thus,

the Soviet SS-21 was designed to be used

for nuclear operations, but also for

conventional deep strikes in the theatre.

The US ATACMS, a heavy guided rocket,

was developed exclusively for conventional

strikes. The operations against Iraq in 1991

and 2003 highlighted the utility of these

systems for US forces, in spite of the

absolute air superiority they enjoyed. The

reactivity and precision of the ATACMS

allowed US ground forces to attack high-

value tactical targets, but also to produce

massive effects against the targets engaged,

particularly using cluster munitions.6

From the mid-1980s, China began to

convert some of its nuclear delivery systems

into conventional delivery systems. It

attempted to increase their precision by

modernising the traditional inertial

5. Recall that the Scud B is derived from the Soviet

Scud 1c, with a roughly identical range and payload

(300 km, 980 kg), but with lower precision: the CEP of

the Scud 1c is 300 m, compared to 500 m or more

for the Scud B. The long-range version (500 km for

750 kg of payload) has an even higher CEP, generally

estimated at over 700 m or even 1 km.

6. ATACMS missiles currently use unitary munitions.

Versions that use guided cluster munitions have

been developed but are not deployed. The versions

that use unguided cluster munitions are no longer

operational. Each rocket can launch 300–950 submu-

nitions.

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

8

guidance systems and by developing new

technologies for manoeuvrability and

terminal guidance. China was exempt from

the restrictions of the INF (Intermediate-

Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty, but faced the

extreme air superiority of the United States

and its allies. It settled on ballistic systems

as its preferred means of ensuring that it

could carry out strikes early in conflict. Its

aim was to neutralise enemy defences and

air and port infrastructures, to destroy

enemy command and control (C2) facilities,

and to ensure air dominance. In the absence

of restrictions from the INF Treaty, and with

its mastery of precision technologies, China

was able to gradually develop strike

systems of increasing ranges (from 300 km

originally to more than 3,000 km currently

for the DF-26).

Other states quickly recognised the

advantages ballistic weapons could offer for

conventional strikes. In 1998, Iran carried

out its first conventional deep strikes

against opposition forces in Iraq. Tehran

was already deploying its missiles alongside

drones, which were used to evaluate the

effects of the strikes. During the 2000s, Iran

developed short-range solid-propellant

systems (Fateh-110), which were exclusively

designed for conventional deep-strike

operations. A series of modernisation

programmes enabled Iran to deploy

systems with a range of over 600 km.

For a long time, analysis of Iranian ballistics

programmes has conflated them with Iraqi

and North Korean programmes—that is,

with the search for strategic capacities that

can deliver weapons of mass destruction.

While Iran has worked intensively to

develop long-range missiles that are closely

associated with its nuclear programme,

developing conventional strike systems was

also a priority. This allowed the country to

pass a number of important milestones. The

single-stage Fateh-110 missile did not allow

for precision strikes beyond 800 km.7 Iran

therefore attempted to develop

manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles for longer-

range Shahab-3/Ghadr-type systems (from

1,500 to 2,000 km) and for Qiam missiles

(from 800 to 1,000 km). The system, which is

known as Emad for Shahab-3/Ghadr

missiles, is undoubtedly still too imprecise

to enable very deep conventional strikes

with high precision. It nonetheless

demonstrated a clear desire to master the

technologies involved in such operations.

Yet, at shorter ranges, Iran has operationally

demonstrated its ability to conduct highly-

precise strikes on military assets. The

January 2020 strike in Iraq reportedly

employed Fateh-313 and Qiam.

Iranian Emad/Shahab-3/Ghadr,

Credits: Tasnim News Agency,

The Iranian approach is different from that

of North Korea. Pyongyang is also very

interested in such technologies, but still

7. Beyond a range of 800 km, the speed of a single-

stage missile is typically too high to allow for stable

re-entry.

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

9

sees the development of its ballistic

weapons as closely associated with nuclear

weapons. However, the launches it

performed in August 2019 may mark an

important turning point, as the systems

tested seem to be designed for

conventional strikes on the battlefield and

the theatre.8

Other countries have also driven the

dissemination of conventional ballistic

weapons. Turkey and South Korea are

developing their own short-range systems

based on a single-stage missile with

terminal guidance. Like China, South Korea

sees ballistic systems as an excellent way to

carry out strikes against hardened targets,

one that is more reactive and that

guarantees a greater effect than airpower.

Turkey is reproducing the American model

by developing short-range systems to

directly support ground forces.

The United States is now free from the INF

Treaty and has relaunched successor

programmes to the ATACMS. Their aim is to

combine metre-scale precision with a range

of 500 km or more. Meanwhile, Russia has

an excellent conventional strike system in

the SS-26. Its range can be increased by

adapting it to an aerial platform, as the

Kinzhal system can be connected to a

fighter jet or a heavy bomber. This version

also enables a greater number of axes of

penetration with complex flight trajectories,

limiting the effectiveness of defences.

Qatar’s acquisition of very short-range SY-

400 systems also shows the growing

interest that even the smallest military

powers have in these weapons systems.

The proliferation and

dissemination of conventional

ballistic missiles: Technological

aspects

Proliferation during the 1980s was based on

the spread of a particular type of missile

(the SS-1c Scud and its derivatives)9 from,

effectively, a single source (the USSR, then

later North Korea), and on the acquisition of

the technologies specific to this type of

missile. The spread of conventional ballistic

missiles is now taking place in a different

context. Most of the countries developing

them today already have the technological

and industrial resources to produce ballistic

weapons. For instance, many have mastered

the production of the solid composite

propellants required for medium-diameter

rockets and missiles (300–600 mm), which

make up the majority of short-range

systems currently exported and deployed.10

Many have access to (or themselves

produce) the chemical components

(particularly binders), special steels, and

composite materials necessary for solid-

propellant rockets. Another distinctive

aspect of the current phenomenon is that

emerging ballistic powers can rely on

existing technological flows to modernise

both their systems and their industrial

8. The images available show missiles whose charac-

teristics resemble the SS-26 and the ATACMS.

9. I.e., the Scud B, Scud C, and Scud D, as well as the

No Dong, which adopts the Scud propulsion system.

10. Short-range systems are primarily used for deep

strikes on the battlefield, and are generally deve-

loped around solid propellants, which offer greater

reactivity and safety than liquid propellant systems.

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

10

resources. As well as intangible trade

between states (or industries), which

encourages cooperation and the transfer of

expertise, current calculation methods

facilitate the modelling and simulation of

prototypes. High-technology components

produced by civil industry can be used to

improve navigation and guidance systems.

Industrial precision tools allow for higher-

quality assembly, and special materials

(steels and composites) and the dual nature

of certain civil industries (chemistry,

ceramics, composites) provide easier access

to materials that can substantially improve

missile performance. Furthermore, additive

printing is likely to accelerate the process of

dematerialising trade.11

The proliferation model of the 1980s, which

was based on the physical transfer of

components of missiles and/or the

production line, is largely a thing of the past.

Industrial and technological developments

make the engineering involved considerably

easier, in terms of weapon propulsion,

steering, and guidance. The case of Iran is

particularly striking. Since the late 2000s,

Tehran has demonstrated its capacity to

develop large-diameter solid-propellant

launchers (Sejjil),12 to guide quasi-ballistic

missiles,13 to install terminal sensors on

relatively fast missiles (Khalij Fars), and,

more recently, to develop manoeuvrable

warheads. Similarly, North Korea offers an

example of the particularly rapid

development of solid-propellant missiles

without any previous expertise.

Industrialised states like South Korea are

capable of developing their existing

capacities relatively quickly and, by using

earlier imports of foreign expertise, of

developing highly competitive national

industries. We should emphasise that, for a

large number of states, greater weapons

precision is highly dependent on the use of

GPS-like systems, as they lack the industrial

and technological capacities to design and

build high-precision navigation systems

(inertial measurement units, stellar tracking

systems). The increasing vulnerability of GPS

systems to signal jamming or disruption

limits their long-term value for missile

navigation and guidance systems, which

operate in increasingly hostile

electromagnetic conditions. For this reason,

despite the fact that emergent ballistic

powers are increasingly able to produce

relatively precise missiles, such development

is still only partial and must be made more

concrete through the acquisition of more

robust industrial capacities for producing

navigation systems.

However, the role of technology is not

restricted to the modernisation of delivery

systems; it also involves the transformation

11. On these issues, see Mark Bromley and Giovan-

na Maletta, “The Challenge of Software and Tech-

nology Transfers to Non-Proliferation Efforts,” SI-

PRI, April 2018; Arnaud Idiart, “The Role of Intan-

gible Transfer of Technology in the Area of Ballistic

Missiles: Reinforcing the Hague Code of Conduct

and the MTCR,” Food-for-Thought Paper, FRS,

December 2017; and Kolja Brockmann and Sibylle

Bauer, “3D Printing and Missile Technology Con-

trols,” SIPRI Background Paper, SIPRI, November

2017.

12. The manufacture and casting of large-diameter

rocket motors (approximately one metre or more in

diameter) presents a number of technical difficul-

ties that most proliferating countries have not been

entirely able to overcome. Iran’s ability to produce

such missiles is yet to be fully explained.

13. Quasi-ballistic flight within the atmosphere

requires permanent guidance of the missile during

its flight, and therefore real-time calculation of the

vehicle’s aerodynamic behaviour.

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

11

of C4ISR (Computerized Command, Control,

Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance,

Reconnaissance) resources, which make it

possible to make full use of the precision

and reactivity of missiles by identifying

targets precisely. Only a decade ago,

surveillance and targeting capacities were

highly dependent on national satellite

resources and heavy airborne platforms.

The spread of modern ISR methods

expands the range of targets, particularly

against military objectives (troop

concentrations, mobile targets, vulnerable

military infrastructure, etc.). The

combination of strike methods and

targeting does not only expand the range

of potential missions that may employ

ballistic weapons, but also clearly reinforces

the conventional deterrence capacity of the

states that possess them.

The utility of conventional

ballistic systems

The actual utility of ballistic systems for

conventional strikes depends on a number

of factors. Traditionally, ballistic weapons

enable a combination of speed, range, and

payload, distinguishing them from cruise

missiles, whose speed and payload are far

lower, and which are typically used for

different missions.

The military effect of the payload depends

on the precision of its delivery system, even

in cases where the payload is a weapon of

mass destruction. The search for greater

precision therefore goes hand in hand with

the development of ballistic weapons. It

does not mean that the missile is meant for

conventional use, but it is crucial if the

missile is to be used in conventional

missions and if a predictable military effect

is expected.14

For systems derived from Scud technology,

the near-impossibility of significantly

increasing the precision of missiles

originating from North Korea (Scud B, Scud

C, and No Dong) has prevented the states

that possess them from using them in

conventional strike scenarios beyond terror

or harassment strikes (for example, by Iraqi

forces against the United States in 2003, or

by the Houthis), with unpredictable results.

Until the deployment of the Iranian Qiam

missile in the 2010s, most Scud-type

systems proliferated had a CEP greater than

500 m. As a result, they could not provide a

guaranteed military effect except when

coupled with weapons of mass destruction

or used en masse (as with the strikes to

defend Jalalabad). Understandably, in

developing Scud-type systems, proliferating

states have privileged range over precision,

to the detriment of payload, and in most

cases have tried to couple them with

weapons of mass destruction.

The dissemination of ballistic technologies

14. Similarly, it is important to emphasise that range

is not an indicator that a missile has a conventional

purpose. The archetype of the deterrent role of a

short and very short-range arsenal coupled with

weapons of mass destruction is given by North Ko-

rea: by keeping Seoul under the threat of chemical

strikes, it has been able to block any possible South

Korean or US action for nearly thirty years. Some of

the systems used for this are artillery systems. The

North Korean case shows that deterrence capacity

does not depend on the range of the delivery system

but solely on its capacity to target a very high-value

objective using weapons of mass destruction. There-

fore, a short-range delivery system whose technical

characteristics fall below the limits established by the

MTCR may perfectly well deliver weapons of mass

destruction.

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

12

has profoundly changed this approach.

Except for North Korea, which is still

primarily focused on the development of

long-range missiles and has only recently

begun developing conventional strike

systems, most states with ballistic weapons

now possess systems whose precision is

under 100 m over short ranges. More

advanced states possess missiles that are

precise almost to the metre, even over long

distances.

The reduction of CEPs to below 100 m, and

even to below 50 m for a growing number

of short-range systems, has important

military implications. The combination of

the ballistic missile’s terminal velocity and

its payload, which can easily be over 500 kg,

can cause devastating blast and

overpressure effects on insufficiently

hardened infrastructure. Improving

precision to below 50 m makes it possible

to engage hardened targets and to make

targeted use of cluster or area-effects

munitions (thermobaric explosives). The

improvement in the precision of short-

range ballistic missiles poses a complex

problem, as it considerably increases the

vulnerability of the infrastructure required

for military operations (air bases, troop

stationing zones, logistics centres, etc.).

When used alongside a powerful C4ISR

architecture, the range of potential targets

expands to include military units and mobile

systems, making it possible to target high-

value military objectives (C2, radar systems,

vehicles, units being assembled, etc.).

Depending on the quality of C4ISR, short-

range ballistic systems encourage

systematic interdiction missions far beyond

the battlefield, deep within the theatre. By

generating deep vulnerabilities in the

systems deployed, they create an

interdiction bubble that can prove a major

obstacle to force projection.

With the exception of China, which is

developing ballistic missiles with

conventional payloads for ranges between

500 and 3,000 km, most ballistic powers

only use shorter-range systems. The United

States, which currently only has a system

with a range of 300 km (the ATACMS), is

likely to move towards developing one with

a range of 500–600 km. With the SS-26,

Russia should be able to reach targets up to

600–700 km away. Following changes to the

Fateh-110, Iran now possesses systems with

ranges of between 300 and 700 km,

although the Emad (manoeuvrable-warhead

Shahab-3) is probably still insufficiently

precise for conventional strikes. The

difference in approach between China and

the other ballistic powers is largely

explained by geography and the kind of

targets involved. The aero-naval dimension

of the Pacific theatre requires China to plan

for strikes over long distances (above 1,500

km) against hardened or naval targets

(Japan, Guam, carrier battle groups).15

Furthermore, China’s decision to develop

long-range capacities is fairly recent, and

has more to do with a conventional

deterrence approach than a purely

operational one. By contrast, the

development of ballistic systems against

Taiwan, far closer to Chinese shores, meets

a strictly operational objective.

Conventional ballistic strikes are intended to

have a decapitation effect on Taiwanese

15. In particular, carrier battle groups may be tar-

geted by ASBMs (Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles), inclu-

ding DF-21D and possibly DF-26 missiles, which are

meant to prevent the access of US carrier battle

groups to the South China Sea or close to the Ja-

panese coast.

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

13

military infrastructures, and so to facilitate

either a political resolution to the conflict or

an invasion.

We find this operational approach among

the Russians as well as the Americans,

although each implements it differently. The

United States typically uses ballistic missiles

or heavy guided rockets as deep-strike

artillery, targeting high-value military

targets, anti-air defence systems, or the

command forces accompanying land

manoeuvres. Since 1991, the United States

has fired more than 500 ATACMS missiles

during operations, with long-range strikes

primarily being provided by cruise missiles

and aviation. During the Chechen and

Georgian conflicts, Russia tested different

ballistic strike methods, both to support

ground forces and to eliminate high-value

targets. These operational experiments have

become part of a body of doctrine that sees

deep strikes as the core of Russian capacity

development. The suspension of the INF

treaty will likely push Russia and the United

States to develop ballistic, quasi-ballistic,

and hypersonic strike systems capable of

operating very deep within the theatre—an

approach relatively close to that currently

taken by China towards its own ballistic

systems.

Very deep ballistic strikes raise questions

about the cost and durability of the desired

military effects. While certain types of

objectives need only be targeted once,

many can only be neutralised by multiple

strikes. The unit cost of long-range ballistic

missiles and, in general, the limits of

available stockpiles mean that missions

must be highly specialised, relative both to

the desired military effects and political

considerations. Depending on the objective,

very deep strikes may indicate a state’s

desire to intensify a conflict and widen the

range of targets engaged, moving from the

strictly military to the economic, political, or

social domains.

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System,

US Army, 2006

Very deep strikes on strategic objectives

have a considerable political dimension.

Often, the presence of strategic strike

means within a nation’s arsenal contributes

to conventional deterrence by increasing an

adversary’s political, economic, and societal

costs of entering into conflict. It helps to

protect their territory from potential

adversaries, irrespective of the real military

effect these weapons may produce. The

Iranian case appears to demonstrate the

importance of this deterrence approach. But

we should not overestimate the political

effect. Many examples show that, once

conflict has begun, conventional strategic

strikes with a political goal do not have a

significant impact on states’ determination

to pursue military operations.

Conversely, when they are or may

potentially be coupled with weapons of

mass destruction, these missiles continue to

have a major deterrent effect. The decision

by a state to develop long-range

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

14

conventional ballistic weapons remains an

important signal, one that may suggest a

shift towards using them as delivery

systems for weapons of mass destruction—

even if these missiles are designed to carry

out precision strikes. In this particular case,

increasing their range is generally done in

order to make it possible to target the

major actors protecting hostile regional

powers.

However, it would be overly restrictive to

only view the development of the use of

conventional ballistic systems in terms of

increasing range or political deterrence of

hostile powers. Most of the states currently

acquiring or developing conventional

ballistic missiles are above all seeking short-

range capacities in order to increase their

ability to carry out deep strikes on the

battlefield. The limits imposed by the MTCR

are not, in most cases, particularly

restrictive. An operational range limited to

300 km is sufficient in most cases for strikes

on the battlefield and the theatre, and the

500 kg payload limit allows for significant

military effects as long as the missile is

precise enough. For smaller military powers,

short-range ballistic systems are an

important force multiplier, particularly

because the availability of simple but

relatively high-performance C4ISR

architectures makes it possible to optimise

effects. The deployment of such capacities

also figures in zone denial strategies: the

existence of strike systems makes it more

risky for adversaries to deploy troops,

limiting their military options.

On the other hand, the development of the

Fateh systems by Iran demonstrates the

ability of states to adapt their industrial

capacities to their specific strategies, which

may initially be restricted to the battlefield

but may develop towards more ambitious

strategies.

Tehran initially developed these systems for

carrying out battlefield strikes, before

making them more advanced in order to

provide a deep-strike capacity which could

pose a credible threat to enemy military

infrastructures. The development of Zulfiqar

systems, which are derived from the Fateh

systems but have a range of 600–800 km

(compared to 300–500 km for the different

Fateh variants), allows Iran to use strike

strategies that are specifically adapted to its

conventional needs. These missiles also

reinforce its deterrence capacities. Two

strikes against militias close to the so-called

Islamic State in Syria, in 2016 and 2017,

using modernised versions of the Fateh-

110, show these increasing capacities. The

strikes conducted by Iran in January 2020

against military infrastructures in Iraq

provide further evidence that Iranian

ballistic capabilities are now battlefield

weapons. Similarly, the development of the

ASBM Khalij Fars, also derived from the

Fateh-110, allows Tehran to threaten

maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. In

South Korea, we can observe an identical

trend to develop national strike concepts

associated with very specific programmes,

in order to respond to different aspects of

North Korean military threats.

Technological developments, the

modernisation of military arsenals, and the

transformation of strike concepts all

increase the speed at which ballistic missiles

are spreading. Other more contingent

factors have also contributed to this spread.

Recent improvements to air defences, which

place increasing constraints on the use of

aviation for interdiction missions, offer a

reason to acquire strike systems capable of

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

15

neutralising and/or penetrating defences. In

parallel, on a more global scale, the spread

of anti-missile defences and their constant

improvements provide strong incentives for

states to modernise their weapons (quasi-

ballistic missiles over short ranges, and

hypersonic missiles over longer ranges). The

modernisation of anti-missile defences, both

at the terminal stage and in terms of exo-

atmospheric interception, may have other

consequences. In the long term, it could

counteract the current trend of developing

ground-to-ground ballistic systems,

favouring air-to-ground systems with

greater manoeuvring capacity, range, and

terminal velocity.16 It may also provide the

conditions for the systematic development

of hypersonic weapons, initially using glide

vehicles and, in the longer term, scramjets.

The transfer of hypersonic glide vehicle

technology should be treated as a serious

issue in the dissemination of conventional

strike systems.

Integrating conventional

ballistic missiles into the HCoC

Since there is no difference between a

conventional ballistic missile and one

capable of delivering a weapon of mass

destruction, how should the Code deal with

the likely spread of ballistic missiles used for

conventional purposes, and take future

developments into account?

There are a number of elements to consider.

First, the emergence of industrial actors

operating outside the MTCR, violations of

the MTCR by certain exporters belonging to

the regime, technological exchanges

between member states of the regime, and

the spread of civilian technology which,

even if not considered dual-purpose,

facilitates the design and production of

ballistic missiles: all of these mark a shift

from proliferation to dissemination. Ballistic

weapons and their related technologies are

no longer rare, and their acquisition or

development is sustained by a growing

number of technological and industrial

sources, and by states. We are witnessing

the democratisation or even the

normalisation of the ownership and use of

short-range systems, which may extend to

longer-range systems. The increased range

and improved precision of heavy rockets,

whose characteristics increasingly resemble

very short-range and short-range SRBMs

(from 150 km to over 300 km), are also

making the use of ballistic weapons more

normalised.

More generally, the dissemination of

ballistic weapons reflects a technological

and doctrinal transformation of military

operations. These are characterised by a

substantial increase in combat distances,

from the tactical level to the theatre, and

even the strategic level. Operative

engagement distances within the theatre

have also become far longer. From this

point of view, the popularisation of the

concept of A2/AD (anti-access/area-denial)

reflects the increasing spread of weapons

systems capable of operating over several

hundred kilometres. In parallel, current

operational concepts based on speed give

ballistic systems and their derivatives an

important place in military funding.

16. The Russian Kinzhal system, a ground-to-air

version of the SS-26, is a typical example of this

likely development. The concept has already been

adopted by China, Israel, and the United States.

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

16

Finally, the development of hypersonic

technologies using glide vehicles, which will

likely represent the main development in

ballistic weapons in the decades to come,

forces us to reconsider the definition of

what counts as a ballistic system. Over long

ranges (3,000 km and over), such weapons

are deployed using a space launcher or a

ballistic missile. But the glider performs

much of its flight within the atmosphere or

at its limits. It is therefore tempting for

states developing these technologies to

distinguish hypersonic weapons systems

from ballistic weapons systems, since the

majority of the flight of a hypersonic missile

is non-ballistic. However, drawing a

distinction within the weapon system

between the launcher (ballistic propeller)

and the hypersonic weapon itself (glide

vehicle) would undermine the credibility of

the Code. Possessing a hypersonic weapons

system is effectively equivalent to

possessing a ballistic weapons system.

Conversely, including hypersonic missiles in

the Code without modifying its goal is hard

to accept, as the Code could only refer to

vehicles coupled with launchers or ballistic

missiles. This would exclude hypersonic

systems propelled by scramjets. In the

medium term, however, such systems will

approach or surpass the speed of SRBMs,

even while using an entirely non-ballistic

trajectory.

Given these different elements, the options

available to states who subscribe to the

Code are relatively simple. Firstly, they can

maintain the stance adopted in recent years

and continue to make member states more

aware of the question of ballistic missiles in

their own right, without drawing a

distinction between systems effectively

coupled with weapons of mass destruction

and those which, currently, are not.

Prototype of a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle

(HTV-2), DARPA, U.S.

While the Code covers all ballistic systems,

most of the issues under discussion have to

do with the arsenals of states whose ballistic

missile programmes involve weapons of

mass destruction (or programmes for such

weapons), in violation of their international

commitments and UN restrictions. But while

this question remains a crucial one, it

neglects the growing impact of the spread

of conventional ballistic weapons on the

security of states. On the other hand, this

stance makes it more difficult to

accommodate new technologies involving

ballistic systems, particularly for hypersonic

programmes which, with the exception of

the Russian strategic programme, remain

associated with conventional strikes.

A slightly different approach could include

the problem of conventional arms systems

more systematically within discussions and

debates. Currently centred on non-

proliferation, the Code could extend its field

of action to include regional security and

stabilisation. The aim would not be to

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

17

change the focus of the Code, and the issue

of delivery systems for weapons of mass

destruction would remain central. Rather,

this extension would make states more

aware of the destabilising impact of the

spread of conventional strike systems,

which can encourage pre-emptive

approaches and even decapitation strikes.

Therefore, member states could pay closer

attention to the spread of heavy rockets

and SRBMs. States should also be made

aware of the need to report their launches

and to demonstrate transparency about this

type of arsenal. By specifically including

conventional delivery vehicles, the Code

could better address hypersonic systems,

whether aerobic or not, because of their

potentially destabilising nature.

There is a potential link between this

second approach and a third one, less

widely agreed upon and more complex to

implement, which focuses more closely on

the payload rather than the ballistic missile

alone. A number of missiles currently

produced and exported were designed

exclusively as conventional systems, not

dual ones. While they retain a dual capacity

by definition, they can only be adapted to

carry weapons of mass destruction under

the following double condition: the state

that possesses the delivery system must

have a weapons of mass destruction

programme, and the ballistic missile itself

must be adapted, a potentially complex

process. For instance, the sale of an SS-26

to Armenia or Algeria may represent a

military risk for neighbouring countries, but

does not for the moment represent a

proliferation issue. By contrast, the export of

Fateh-110s from Iran to Syria is far more

problematic. The Fateh-110 is documented

as exclusively conventional, but Syria is

technically capable of adapting it to deliver

chemical weapons.

This final approach would be complex to

negotiate among the members of the Code,

but it would likely offer a number of long-

term advantages by providing a more

precise definition of ‘proliferating’ delivery

systems, without thereby giving carte

blanche for the acquisition of all

conventional systems. In the absence of a

distinction between conventional and non-

conventional missions, the Code risks losing

all relevance. The connection between

ballistic delivery systems and weapons of

mass destruction was natural when the

Code was created, but it can no longer be

maintained except if ballistic carriers remain

an exceptional weapon, rather than an

ordinary part of military arsenals.

Categorising missiles more precisely may

also allow us to evaluate and potentially

integrate technological developments,

particularly for hypersonic systems, which,

in terms of their mission, are only

marginally distinct from ballistic systems,

whether conventional or coupled with

weapons of mass destruction.

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

18

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

19

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Stéphane Delory is a Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Straté-

gique. He conducts research on missile defence, balistic proliferation and security policy in

the Black sea.

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

20

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

21

Previously published

Opening HCoC to cruise missiles: A proposal to overcome political hurdles, HCoC Research

Paper, Issue 5, by Stéphane Delory, Emmanuelle Maitre and Jean Masson, Fondation pour la

Recherche Stratégique, February 2019.

The role of intangible transfer of technology in the area of ballistic missiles – reinforcing the

Hague Code of Conduct and the MTCR, HCoC Research Paper, Issue 4, by Arnaud Idiart,

Group French Export Compliance advisor, Airbus, July 2017.

The use of the existing WMD free zones as an exemple and a potential Framework for

further initiatives banning ballistic missiles, HCoC Research Paper, Issue 3, by Benjamin

Hautecouverture, Senior Research Fellow, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, June

2017.

Limiting the proliferation of WMD means of delivery: a low-profile approach to bypass di-

plomatic deadlocks, HCoC Research Paper, Issue 2, by Renaud Chatelus, collaborator and

PhD candidate at the University of Liège, May 2017.

The HCoC: current challenges and future possibilities, HCoC Research Paper, Issue 1, By Dr

Mark Smith, Defence & Security Programme, Wilton Park, 2014.

Papers can be downloaded on the https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/ website.

HCOC RESEARCH PAPERS

Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons

22

Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique

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www.frstrategie.org

Service européen pour l’action extérieure (SEAE)

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https://eeas.europa.eu

USEFUL LINKS

www.hcoc.at

www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc

This project is financed by the

European Union

This project is implemented by the Fondation pour la

Recherche Stratégique

CONTACTS

THE HAGUE CODE OF CONDUCT

The objective of the HCoC is to prevent and curb the prolifera-

tion of ballistic missiles systems capable of delivering weapons

of mass destruction and related technologies. Although non-

binding, the Code is the only universal instrument addressing this issue today. Multilateral instrument of

political nature, it proposes a set of transparency and confidence-building measures. Subscribing

States are committed not to proliferate ballistic missiles and to exercise the maximum degree of re-

straint possible regarding the development, the testing and the deployment of these systems.

The Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, with the support of the Council of the European Union,

has been implementing activities which aim at promoting the implementation of the Code, contrib-

uting to its universal subscription, and offering a platform for conducting discussions on how to further

enhance multilateral efforts against missile proliferation.