Balancing Privacy and Freedom of Expression An examination the European Court of Human Rights’...

Examination No: 1000366

The European Court of Human Rights has stated that media reports concerning matters of public importance are

different from publications that simply involve persons in whom the public has taken an interest. How has this

distinction manifested itself in the case law of the Court? Do you find the Court’s approach to this issue

convincing?

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The purpose of this paper is to examine the persuasive force of the Strasbourg Courts differing treatment of

media reporting concerning matters of public importance and publications involving persons in whom the public

have taken an interest. In this what will be examined are the principles expounded by the Court in drawing the

distinction and, in essence, the focus will be on the Courts balancing of rights under Article 8 and Article 10 of

the European Convention on Human Rights. The fundamental questions that need to be asked in this context are

what is the percieved role of the media and how does the Court draw the distinction in that respect, how does the

Court justify its decisions, what interpretative methodology does it employ and is this methodology persuasive?

The Role of the Media

From quite early in its jurisprudence the Strasbourg Court saw the role of the media in a democratic society to

be that of “purveyor of information and public watchdog”.1 The Court has held that whilst the press must not

overstep certain bounds – particularly in relation to the reputation and rights of others – it is incumbent upon it

“to impart information and ideas on political issues just as on those in other areas of public interest.”2 Beyond

this it is significant that not only do the media have a right to impart information and ideas of public interest but

“the public also has a right to receive them”.3

But how far do the bounds of this societal, democratic, role extend and how are they demarcated? The

Strasbourg Court have held the media’s value hangs on what it brings to the democratic process.4 The ability of

the media to catalyse and facilitate debate is clearly at the heart of the Strasbourg Court’s notion of the “public

interest”. On the other hand, the reality is that media interests may also tend toward gossip rather than debate

and their methods of investigation have been known to involve harassment rather than inquiry, so when the

freedom of expression becomes a vista into the private lives of citizens and the public interest is ultimately

usurped by commercial concerns how then is their democratic contribution to be valued?

The Distinction

The answer to these questions are rooted in a vital distinction forwarded by the Strasbourg Court in its seminal

judgement of Von Hannover v. Germany (No.1). The case involved Princess Caroline Von Hannover, daughter of

Prince Rainier III of Monaco, who had on several occasions applied to the German courts for an injunction to

prevent any further publication of photographs, taken without her consent, which showed her shopping and so

on. The Strasbourg Court agreed that Germany had not awarded a sufficient level of protection to the right of

privacy and, in reaching this conclusion, drew a clear distinction between matters of public importance and the

private lives of persons. This distinction in effect issued a limitation on the role of the media, one which is

defined to a large extent by the concept of the “public interest”:

[A] fundamental distinction needs to be made between reporting facts – even controversial ones –

capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society … and reporting details of the private life of

1 Barthold v. Germany [1985] 7 EHRR 383 at §58. See also: Financial Times v. UK [2010] 50 EHRR 46 at §59.2 Lingens v. Austria [1986] 8 EHRR 407 at §41. See also: Von Hannover v. Germany (No.2) [2012] 55 EHRR 15 at §102.3 Ibid. See also: Sunday Times v. UK at §65.4 Sunday Times v. UK (No.1) 2 EHRR 245 at §65 and Goodwin v. UK [1996] 22 EHRR 123 at §39. Harris et al at p. 465:

“The press and investigative journalism guarantee the healthy operation of democracy, exposing policy decisions and actions or omissions of government to close scrutiny of the public opinion, and facilitating the citizens’ participation in the decision making process”

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an individual who … does not exercise official functions. While in the former case the press exercises its

vital role of “watchdog” in a democracy by contributing to “impart[ing] information and ideas on matters

of public interest” it does not do so in the latter case.5

The Court continued to reason that where the sole purpose of publication is to “satisfy the curiosity of a

particular readership regarding the details of the applicant's private life” 6 such information “cannot be deemed

to contribute to any debate of general interest to society despite the applicant being known to the public”.7 An

additional factor considered by the Court was the arena in which the activities were taking place. The Court

reasoned that even where the activities were not taking place in seclusion this fact alone will not be sufficient to

circumvent the “value” requirement, particularly where the activities in question are of an exclusively private

nature,8 as the public simply does not have a “legitimate interest” in knowing all the intimate details of a

person’s private life.9 In conclusion, the Court found that as the photos in question dealt exclusively with the

private life of the Princess, who was at the time exercising no official function and should thus be considered, in

contradistinction to the German Courts characterisation, as private individual rather than a contemporary figure

“par excellence.”10 Ultimately, the commercial interest of the magazine in publishing the articles and the public

interest in Princess Caroline herself had to “yield to the applicant's right to the effective protection of her private

life”.11

The limits on the media’s function as “watchdog” and the corresponding value of its publications thus seem to

be drawn in relation to the content of its reporting, specifically, whether that content of public interest. So when

the Court balances freedom of expression under Article 10 and privacy under Article 8 of the European

Convention on Human Rights the key question is whether the published photos or articles have “value,” or, in

other words, can the publication contribute to a debate of general interest?12 When the publication relates to an

individual in whom the public has taken an interest the Court will assess the “value” of the article by asking,

firstly, is this person exercising an official function, are they known to the public or are they private individuals,

secondly, does the publication relate exclusively to the persons private life, thirdly, is the sole purpose to satisfy

the curiosity of a particular readership, fourthly, in what arena did the events occur and, finally, do the public

have a legitimate interest in knowing these details? The answers to these questions determine the “value” of the

publication, if it can contribute to a debate of general interest and thus whether it will be afforded the robust

protection of Article 10.

5Von Hannover v. Germany (No.1) [2005] 40 EHRR 1 at §63. See also: Mosley v. UK [2011] 53 EHRR 30 at §114 (emphasis added).6Von Hannover v. Germany (No.1) [2005] 40 EHRR 1 at §65. In Von Hannover v. Germany (No.2) [2012] 55 EHRR 15 at §103 the Court identified the kinds of publication in question and the disagreeable conditions under which their information is often gained. See also: Mosley v. UK [2011] 53 EHRR 30 at §114.7Von Hannover v. Germany (No.1) [2005] 40 EHRR 1 at §65 (emphasis added). See also: Mosley v. UK [2011] 53 EHRR 30 at §114.8 See also: The dissent of Vadjic J. in Hachette Filipacchi Associates v. France [2009] 49 EHRR 23 at §O-II12.9 Von Hannover v. Germany (No.1) [2005] 40 EHRR 1 at §77.10 Ibid at §72.11 Ibid at §77.12 Von Hannover v. Germany (No.1) [2005] 40 EHRR. 1 at §76. See also: Editions Plon v. France [2006] 42 EHRR 36 and

Leempoel v. Belgium (64772/01) November 9, 2006 at §78

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One of the outcomes of the Courts approach in Von Hannover (No.1) is that people known to the public are

clearly afforded a higher level of protection then those exercising an official function. This polarity between

officials on the one hand and celebrities and private individuals on the other establishes – at least on a narrow

reading of the case – a principle whereby the privacy of celebrities is given priority over the freedom of the

press and ultimately freedom of expression. Given the nature of the media’s watchdog function it is easy to see

why the Court has reasoned in this way, conversely however, given the centrality of the celebrity figure in

contemporary society it could be argued that such special treatment is simply unwarranted.

In Mosley v. UK – which involved allegations that a prominent motor-racing figure was involved in a “sick Nazi

orgy with 5 hookers” – the Strasbourg Court held that press reports concentrating on “sensational and, at times,

lurid news, intended to titillate and entertain” do not attract the robust protection of Article 10 normally afforded

to the press and consequentially, in such cases, freedom of expression called for a more narrow interpretation.13

Likewise, Harris et al proffer that those elements of the media whose goal is to satisfy the curiosity of a

particular readership “are primarily interested in increasing commercial gains by satisfying their readers

voyeuristic tendencies”.14 Moreover, the Court went on to clarify, at least to some degree, the distinction drawn

in Von Hannover (No.1) by stressing that in considering whether there was a public interest which justifies an

interference with the right to respect for private life, the Courts focus must be on whether “the publication is in

the interest of the public and not whether the public might be interested in reading it”.15 In other words,

irrespective of the public’s actual levels of interest, if the matter is not capable of contributing to a debate in

general society it will likely have to yield to the person’s right to privacy.

The Courts clear distaste for voyeurism and sensationalism, in addition to its concern that the media is merely

attempting to satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership, seem to imply that the distinction is subject to the

surreptitious influence of two further factors: firstly, the aim of the publication – is its purpose to contribute to or

generate debate – and, secondly, its corresponding newsworthiness – is the publisher pandering to gossip and

voyeurism in order to satisfy a commercial interest?

The Lives of Others

Thusfar the distinction between matters of public importance and people in whom the public have taken an

interest is clearly not a clean one. While the Strasbourg Court holds that public personalities must be able to

enjoy a “legitimate expectation” 16 of protection of and respect for their private lives, it has also found that there

are “certain special circumstances” where the public’s right to be informed can even extend to aspects of the

private lives of public figures.17 But what are these “special circumstances”? As Harris et al point out: “the

13 See: Societe Prisma Presse v. France (66910/01 and 71612/01) July 1, 2003; Von Hannover v. Germany (No.1) [2005] 40 EHRR. 1 at §66; Leempoel v Belgium (64772/01) November 9, 2006 at §77; Hachette Filipacchi Associates v. France [2009] 49 EHRR 23 at §40; and MGN Ltd v. UK [2011] 53 EHRR.5 at §143.

14 Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick at p.512. In Von Hannover v. Germany (No.2) [2012] 55 EHRR 15 at §103 the Court actually singled out the “sensationalist” press or “romance” magazines in this context.

15 Mosley v. UK [2011] 53 EHRR 30 at §114.16 Ibid at §69.17 Ibid at §64. See also: Von Hannover v. Germany (No.2) [2012] 55 EHRR 15 at §110 and Karhuvaara v. Finland [2004]

41 EHRR 1154 at §45.

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conditions under which private aspects of public figures can be considered sufficiently related to their public

function to justify their disclosure is debateable”.18

The first thing to note in this regard is that Strasbourg Court affords differing levels of protection to individuals

in accordance with their societal role, the more prominent and public an individual’s role the more media

scrutiny that person will be expected to endure. In Lingens v. Austria the Court made it quite clear that the levels

of scrutiny which may be legitimately visited upon public as opposed to private individuals differ greatly, in

particular, where the individual “knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by

both journalists and the public at large … he must consequently display a greater degree of tolerance.”19

Similarly, in Oberschlick v. Austria the Court found that where a politician expresses himself in terms which are

likely to shock many people he “exposes himself to a strong reaction on the part of journalists and the public.”20

The levels of scrutiny public figures are expected to endure, however, are not unlimited and the media in their

role as “watchdog” must be cognisant of the reputation and rights of others. But how far is too far? The case of

Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France involved French politician Jean-Marie Le Pen, a man who had

opened himself up to particularly high levels of scrutiny on account of “his extremist views“.21 In this case the

Court found that the publication of a fictitious depiction of Mr Le Pen which referred to him as the “chief of a

gang of killers” and a “vampire who thrives on the bitterness of his electorate, but sometimes also on their

blood” had overstepped the permissible limits of tolerance, adding that “the reputation of a politician, even a

controversial one, must benefit from the protection afforded by the Convention”.22

Indeed, these principles have been held to apply to all those who voluntarily enter the public forum and include,

for instance, prominent business people and those persons or associations who participate in public debate. For

example, in Jerusalem v. Austria the Court found that where associations are active in a field of public concern –

in that case, drugs policy – they ought to have shown a higher degree of tolerance to criticism23 and in Nilsen v.

Norway the Court reasoned that “a prominent participant in many controversial discussions … could not be

regarded as a private person in the debate on police brutality”.24

On the other hand in Tammer v. Estonia the Court found that a journalist’s conviction for insulting the lover of

the former Estonian Prime Minister in comments he had made in a newspaper interview was in accordance with

Article 10 of the Convention. At the time of the interview the woman had resigned from her governmental post

and was thus seen by the Court as a private person whose right to privacy under Article 8 had to be specially

protected. In applying the principles of proportionality the Court reasoned that it had not been established that

18 Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick at p.480.19 Lingens v. Austria [1986] 8 EHRR 407 at §41. See also: Dichand v. Austria (App. 29271/95) at §39 and Oberschlick v

Austria (No. 2) [1998] 25 EHRR 357 at §41.20 Oberschlick v Austria (No. 2) [1998] 25 EHRR 357 at §4421 Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [2008] 46 EHRR 35 at §56.22 Ibid at §57. In addition, the Court have also found that the rumoured marital difficulties of a president of the Republic or

the financial difficulties of a famous singer could not be deemed to be matters of general interest; see: Axel Springer AG v. Germany [2012] 55 EHRR 6 at §90. See also: Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria (No.2) (App. No. 21277/05) June 4, 2009 at §52 and Hachette Filipacchi v. France [2009] 49 EHRR 23 at §43

23 Jerusalem v. Austria [2003] 37 EHRR 25 at §39.24 Nilsen v. Norway [2000] 30 EHRR 878 at §52.. See also: Fayed v. UK [1994] 18 EHRR 393

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“her private life was among the issues that affected the public” and her remarks could therefore “scarcely be

regarded as serving the public interest”. 25

In Armonienė v. Lithuania the applicant was the widow of a man who was not in any sense a public figure but

was nonetheless named in an article which dealt with an AIDS threat in a remote part of Lithuania. The article

appeared on the front page of Lithuania's biggest daily newspaper giving the applicant’s husbands address and

accusing him of being HIV positive, of having illegitimate children and of engaging in extra marital affairs. The

Court, using particularly strong invective, classified the incident as “an outrageous abuse of press freedom”26

and found that where the damages awarded by the national courts were too low that of itself could amount to a

breach of Article 8. The Strasbourg Court reasoned that if the damages awarded were too low they were

consequently insufficient to deter the recurrence of such abuses.27

The Strasbourg Court assess the applicable levels of scrutiny in direct proportionality to societal role or status.28

As such, the limits of permissible criticism are widest in relation to Government29 and narrowest for individuals

who are not public figures of any kind and who do not knowingly attempt to attain such a status. It is clear that,

in addition to the manifold factors already outlined, an individual’s status – be they politician, celebrity or

private individual – is also a key factor in the Courts deliberation on the circumstance in which a publication

that deals with a person in whom the public has taken an interest will be protected by Article 10. In order to

square this reasoning with the distinction found in Von Hannover (No.1) which appears to place celebrity figures

in the same category as private individuals it is necessary to examine how the notion of “public interest” has

evolved since Von Hannover (No.1).

The Evolving Concept of “Public Interest”

The concept of the “public interest” has been considered in the context of something that adds “value” to a

publication. The added “value” broadens the level of protection available under Article 10 of the Convention

and has been defined as emanating from a publications ability to contribute to the debate in a democratic society.

But why classify a publication as something the public might be interested in reading and another as something

that is in the public interest to read? Indeed, the Courts uncharacteristic lack of clarity on this very point has led

to some dubious decisions.

One such decision, Hachette Filipacchi, concerns the political assassination of a public figure and the

subsequent publication of the photos in Paris-Match. The Strasbourg Court found that as the punishment given

by the domestic courts against the publication of the photos would not have a dissuasive or ‘chilling effect’ on

the exercise of freedom of the press there had been no violation of Article 10. However, in a strongly worded

dissent Vadjic J closely examined the concept of the “public interest” and held, contrary to the majority of the

Court, that the assassination of a public figure “affected an evident and undeniable public interest,”30 and the

25 Tammer v. Estonia [2003] 37 EHRR 857 at §68.26 Armonienė v. Lithuania [2009] 48 EHRR 53 at §47.27 Ibid at §47.28 Ovey and White at p.433.29 Castells v. Spain [1992] 14 EHRR 445 at §42.30 Hachette Filipacchi Associates v. France [2009] 49 EHRR 23 at §O-II17.

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photos in particular made an “essential contribution”31 to a debate on a matter of general interest. Vadjic J

offered several reasons for this dissent. Firstly, the event had “major political repercussions” 32 and could be

considered “a national tragedy;”33 secondly, the subject was “at the very heart of the news, extending beyond

the realm of private life;”34 and finally, “the offending publication was essentially a political comment.”35

Therefore, according to Vadjic J, the political and historical circumstances in addition to the newsworthiness and

form of the publication are capable of weighing against the private interests of the family.36 Ultimately, Vadjic J

found that “the public interest rarely comes across as clearly as it does in the present case” and the majority

decision of the Court, if taken as a legal principle, would be “detrimental to the interests of our democratic

societies”.37 Vadjic J referred in particular to the numerous photographs of politicians or public figures – the

assassination of President Kennedy, for example – that would not have been published, and thus might not be

published in future, if this ruling were to be established as a principle.

Two more recent judgements of the Strasbourg Court may assist in understanding the concept of the “public

interest”. The first, Axel Springer v. Germany, concerned the publication of articles relating to drug possession

and use by a famous television actor. The actor sued the publisher in the German Courts and was successful in

obtaining an injunction to prohibit publication. The Strasbourg Court however found that there had been a

violation of the publisher’s freedom of expression. In coming to its decision the Court considered that the

definition of what constitutes a subject of public interest “will depend on the circumstances of the case” but

pointed out nonetheless “that it has recognised the existence of such an interest not only where the publication

concerned political issues or crimes, but also where it concerned sporting issues or performing artists.”38 In

addition, the Court broadened the scope of the distinction from Von Hannover (No.1) to include “persons acting

in a public context, as political figures or public figures”.39 Once public figures are included the Court must then

ask how well known must a person be in order to be considered a public figure? This, the Court considered, was

in principle best left to the domestic court’s margin of appreciation “especially where that person is mainly

known at national level”.40

In Von Hannover (No.2) the Court found that the applicants right to private life had not been violated by the

refusal of the German courts to grant an injunction. In this case, unlike Von Hannover (No.1), the photo’s in

question accompanied an article reporting on the then poor health of Prince Rainier III, the father of Princess

Caroline. The Strasbourg Court held that it was not unreasonable to characterise Prince Rainier’s illness as “an

event of contemporary society”41 and considered that the photos, when taken in the light of the accompanying

31 Ibid at §O-II17.32 Ibid at §O-II8.33 Ibid.34 Ibid.35 Ibid at §O-II10.36 Ibid at §O-II12.37 Ibid at §O-II15.38 Axel Springer AG v. Germany [2012] 55 EHRR 6 at §90. See also: Nikowitz and Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v Austria

(App. No.5266/03) February 22, 2007 at §25; Colaço Mestre v. Portugal (App. No.11182/03 and 11319/03) April 26, 2007 at §28; and Sapan v. Turkey (App. No.44102/04) June 8, 2010 at §34.

39 Axel Springer AG v. Germany [2012] 55 EHRR 6 at §91.40 Ibid at §98.41 Von Hannover v. Germany (No.2) [2012] 55 EHRR 15 at §118.

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articles, did contribute, at least to some degree, to a debate of general interest.42 Furthermore, departing from the

bounds of the distinction as characterised in Von Hannover (No.1), the Court found that regardless of whether

Princess Caroline assumes any official public function “it cannot be claimed that the applicants, who are

undeniably very well known, are ordinary private individuals. They must, on the contrary, be regarded as public

figures”.43

One of the key consequences of the Axel Springer and Von Hannover (No.2) judgements is thus a manifest

widening of the concept of a “public figure” to include anyone sufficiently well known to the public. This means

that, in addition to officials or those exercising an official function, celebrities are now potential public figures

and thus may be afforded a lower level of protection in respect of their private lives than private individuals. The

result of this re-characterisation is that those who court the media’s attention by knowingly, and voluntarily,

laying themselves open could become a legitimate target for media scrutiny. Furtghermore, there may be a

lingering weakness in Von Hannover (No.2) in that the publication of photos that deal exclusively with the

private life of an individual may warrant the full protection of Article 10 if they accompany an article of

contemporary significance, but how far this weakness could be manipulated is questionable.

Conclusions

The persuasiveness of the Strasbourg Court's jurisprudence lies in its utilising a logical and coherent

interpretative methodology in addition to its willingness to give reasons for its interpretative strategy.44 Indeed

one of the Court’s most laudable qualities is the continuous application of its interpretative principles throughout

its case law in addition to the fact that these criteria are tied so closely to the media’s perceived role in the

democratic process. On the other hand, however, the Court should certainly clarify the circumstances in which

protection under Article 8 can be overridden in favour of the public interest, and in addition, offer a reasoned

argument that determines what this interest amounts to. Indeed Harris et al hold that this approach or lack

thereof, “entails a haze of vagueness”45 as without this reasoning to back it up it can prove difficult to

understand the Court’s application of its principles.46 Of particular concern are the more subversive aspects of

the Court’s reasoning, in particular, the factoring of aim and newsworthiness, for if these criteria are to be used

as deliberative principles it should be so stated and the concepts rigorously developed, otherwise, the Court

could be seen to be engaging in “arbitrariness or elitism”.47

42 Ibid at §118.43 Von Hannover v. Germany (No.2) [2012] 55 EHRR 15 at §120.44A view supported by Tom Daly in his article “Strengthening Irish Democracy: A Proposal to Restore Free Speech to Article 40.6.1°(I) of the Constitution” (2009) Dublin University Law Journal.45 See: Harris et al at p.512.46 In addition to the statements of Harris et al above this sentiment is echoed by Barent in ‘Balancing Freedom of

Expression and Privacy: The Jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court” (2009) Journal of Media Law at p.72.47 Harris et al at p.512.

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Bibliography:

Cases:-

Armonienė v. Lithuania [2009] 48 EHRR 53

Axel Springer AG v. Germany [2012] 55 EHRR 6

Barthold v. Germany [1985] 7 EHRR 383

Colaço Mestre v. Portugal (App. No.11182/03 and 11319/03) April 26, 2007

Castells v. Spain [1992] 14 EHRR 445

Dichand v. Austria (App. No.29271/95)

Editions Plon v. France [2006] 42 EHRR 36

Fayed v. UK [1994] 18 EHRR 393

Financial Times v. UK [2010] 50 EHRR 46

Goodwin v. UK [1996] 22 EHRR 123

Hachette Filipacchi Associates v. France [2009] 49 EHRR 23

Jerusalem v. Austria [2003] 37 EHRR 25

Karhuvaara v. Finland [2004] 41 EHRR 1154

Leempoel v Belgium (64772/01) November 9, 2006

Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [2008] 46 EHRR 35

Lingens v. Austria [1986] 8 EHRR 407

Mosley v. UK [2011] 53 EHRR 30

MGN Ltd v. UK [2011] 53 EHRR 5

Nikowitz and Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v Austria (App. No.5266/03) February 22, 2007

Nilsen v. Norway [2000] 30 EHRR 878

Oberschlick v Austria (No. 2) [1998] 25 EHRR 357

Palko v. Connecticut [1937] 302 US 319

Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria [1996] 21 EHRR 1

R v. Sharpe [2001] 1 SCR 45

Sapan v. Turkey (App. No.44102/04) June 8, 2010

Societe Prisma Presse v. France (App. No.66910/01 and 71612/01) July 1, 2003

Standard Verlags v. Austria (No.2) (App. No. 21277/05) June 4, 2009

Sunday Times v. UK (No.1) 2 EHRR 245

Tammer v. Estonia [2003] 37 EHRR 857

Von Hannover v. Germany (No.1) [2005] 40 EHRR 1

Von Hannover v. Germany (No.2) [2012] 55 EHRR 15

Books:-

Barendt, E; Freedom of Speech (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 2005)

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Harris, O’ Boyle and Warbrick; Law of European Convention on Human Rights (2nd ed, Oxford University Press

2009).

Peter Hogg; Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed, Thomson Carswell, Release, 2007)

White and Ovey; Jacobs, White and Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (5th ed, Oxford

University Press, 2010).

Articles:-

Barendt, E; “Balancing Freedom of Expression and Privacy: The Jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court” (2009)

Journal of Media Law.

Daly, T; “Strengthening Irish Democracy: A Proposal to Restore Free Speech to Article 40.6.1°(I) of the

Constitution” (2009) Dublin University Law Journal.

Lehnhardt, E; “Privacy Law and the German Experience” (2012) 30 Irish Law Times 1; p.34-37.

Moynihan, Y; “The Defence of Fair and Reasonable Publication on a Matter of Public Interest” (2012) 30 Irish

Law Times 1; p.281-284

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