POLITICAL SCIENCE PROJECT WORK

CONCEPT OF BALANCE OF POWER

SUBMITTED TO- SUBMITTED BY-

Dr. S.P Singh AKSHAY MISHRA

Associate Professor (Political Science) ROLL NO -909

C.N.L.U 1ST YEAR

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Writing a project is one of the most significant academic challenges I have ever faced.

Though this project has been presented by me but there are many people who remained in

veil, who gave their all support and helped me to complete this project.

First of all I am very grateful to my subject teacher Dr. S.P Singh without the kind support of

whom and help the completion of the project was a herculean task for me. He donated his

valuable time from his busy time to help me to complete this project and suggested me from

where and how to collect data.

I am very thankful to the librarian who provided me several books on this topic which proved

beneficial in completing this project.

I acknowledge my friends who gave their valuable and meticulous advice which was very

useful and could not be ignored in writing the project. I want to convey most sincere thanks

to Sir Anuj Tiwari and Sir Animesh Jha for helping me throughout the project.

Akshay Mishra

Roll No. – 909

IInd Semester

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I – Concept of Balance of Power- Definition and Meaning

Realism and Balancing

Balance of Power (Federalism)

Balance of Power (Parliamentary)

CHAPTER II – Balance of Power – Various Aspects

Bandwagoning

Chainganging

Buck passing and Blood letting

Offensive and Defensive Realism

Balance of Threat

CHAPTER III – Balance of Power: It’s relevance in contemporary era

CHAPTER IV – Conclusion

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AIMS & OBJECTIVES

The aim of this project work is to –

1. Understand the Balance of Power in international relations

2. Study its various aspects such as realism and balancing, bandwagoning, chain ganging

etc.

3. Make an analysis as to how this concept is used by nations to maintain global

relations

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In this project Doctrinal Method as well as Non Doctrinal methods will be used. Doctrinal

Methods refer to Library research, research or processes done upon some texts writings or

Documents, legal propositions and Doctrines, Articles, Books as well as Online Research and

Journals relating to the subject. Non Doctrinal Method refers to non -conservative ways of

research i.e. field work, interviews, questionnaire, interacting with people and getting

answers etc. This project is an intensive one so both methods are needed to arrive at concrete

conclusions

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CHAPTER I

Concept of Balance of Power – Definition and Meaning

Balance of power theory is the idea that national security is enhanced when military

capabilities are distributed so that no one state is strong enough to dominate all others.1 If one

state gains inordinate power, the theory predicts that it will take advantage of its strength and

attack weaker neighbours thereby providing an incentive for those threatened to unite in a

defensive coalition. Some realists maintain that this would be more stable as aggression

would appear unattractive and would be averted if there was equilibrium of power between

the rival coalitions.2

When confronted by a significant external threat, states may balance or bandwagon balancing

is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat, whereas bandwagoning refers to

alignment with the source of danger.3 

States may also employ other alliance tactics, such as buck-passing and chain-ganging. There

is a longstanding debate among realists with regard to how the polarity of a system impacts

on which tactic states use 4 however, it is generally agreed that balancing is more efficient

in bipolar systems as each great power has no choice but to directly confront the other.5 

Along with inter-realist debates about the prevalence of balancing in alliance patterns, other

schools of international relations such as constructivists are also critical of the balance of

power theory, disputing core realist assumptions regarding the international system and the

behaviour of states.6

Balance of power, in international relations, the posture and policy of a nation or group of

nations protecting itself against another nation or group of nations by matching its power

1 Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House2 Kegley, Charles W.; Wittkopf, Eugene R. (2005), World Politics: Trends and Transformation (10th ed.), p. 5033 Mearsheimer, John (2010), "Structural Realism", in Dunne, Tim; Kurki, Milja; Smith, Steve, International Relations Theories, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 79–854 Mearsheimer, John (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: Norton, pp. 139–1615 Wendt, Alexander (1992), "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of international Politics", International Organization, p. 3976 Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979), Theory of International Politics, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, pp. 118, 121

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against the power of the other side. States can pursue a policy of balance of power in two

ways: by increasing their own power, as when engaging in an armaments race or in the

competitive acquisition of territory; or by adding to their own power that of other states, as

when embarking upon a policy of alliances

Realism and Balancing

The balance of power theory is a core tenet of both classical and neorealist theory and seeks

to explain alliance formation. Due to the neorealist idea of anarchism as a result of the

international system, states must ensure their survival through maintaining or increasing their

power in a self-help world. With no authority above the state to come to its rescue in the

event of an attack by a hegemon, states attempt to prevent a potential hegemon from arising

by balancing against it. According to Kenneth Waltz, founder of neorealism, "balance-of-

power politics prevail wherever two, and only two requirements are met: that the order be

anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive".7

They can do this either through internal balancing, where a state uses internal efforts such as

moving to increase economic capability, developing clever strategies and increasing military

strength,8 or through "external balancing", which occurs when states take external measures

to increase their security by forming enemies.

States happy with their place in the system are known as "status quo" states, while those

seeking to alter the balance of power in their favour are generally referred to as "revisionist

states" and aspire for hegemony, thus repairing the balance.9

Balance of Power (Federalism)

In federations, the balance of power is occasionally used informally to designate the degree to

which power is centralized in the federal government or devolved to the subnational

governments. The term itself is largely a misnomer of its misapplication from geopolitics in

the twentieth century (for example, the Cold War) and European politics in the nineteenth

century involved, for example, in the assessment of the conditions of war following the

Napoleonic campaigns across Europe. In confederations (decentralised federations), it is

more likely that the balance of power will be in favour of the sub-national level of

7 Mearsheimer, John (2010), "Structural Realism", in Dunne, Tim; Kurki, Milja; Smith, Steve, International Relations Theories, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 79–858 Ibid9 Ibid

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government (that is, states or provinces). Canada is an example of such a federation. The

Commonwealth of Australia is an example of a federation in which the balance of power has

shifted in favour of the central (federal) government; although the states were constitutionally

intended to be preponderant, the federal government has become dominant through various

means of this power. The more refined use of the term usually defers to the designation of

power at the domestic level using such terms as the separation of powers, or the distribution

of powers among the states and institutions contained within a larger federal government.

Balance of Power (Parliamentary)

In parliamentary politics, the term balance of power sometimes informally describes the

pragmatic mechanism exercised by a minor political party or other grouping whose

guaranteed support may enable an otherwise minority government to obtain and hold office.10

The term itself is partially a misnomer of its misapplication from geopolitics in the twentieth

century and European politics in the nineteenth century involved, for example, in the

assessment of the conditions of war following the Napoleonic campaigns across Europe.

When used informally as a term describing voting majorities, this condition of 'balance' can

be achieved either by the formation of a coalition government or by an assurance that any

motion of no confidence in the government would be defeated.

A party or person may also hold a theoretical 'balance of power' in a chamber without any

commitment to government, in which case both the government and opposition groupings

may on occasion need to negotiate that party's legislative support.11

“Balance of power theory grew out of many centuries of multipolarity and a few decades of

bipolarity. Today the world is characterized by unprecedented unipolarity. Balance of power

theory, therefore, cannot provide guidance for the world we are in.”12

Balance of Power is equilibrium of power sufficient to discourage or prevent one nation or

party from imposing its will on or interfering with the interests of another.13

In international relations, an equilibrium of power sufficient to discourage or prevent one

nation or party from imposing its will on or interfering with the interests of another. The term

10 William Keylor, A World of Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003)11 Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory (London: Routledge, 2000)12 Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation, 1984.13 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/balance%20of%20power

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came into use at the end of the Napoleonic Wars to denote the power relationships in the

European state system. Until World War I, Britain played the role of balancer in a number of

shifting alliances. After World War II, a Northern Hemisphere balance of power pitted the

U.S. and its allies against the Soviet Union and its satellite in a bipolar balance of power

backed by the threat of nuclear war. China's defection from the Soviet camp to a nonaligned

but covertly anti-Soviet stance produced a third node of power. With the Soviet Union's

collapse (1991), the U.S. and its NATO allies were recognized universally as the world's

paramount military power.14

The term balance of power came into use to denote the power relationships in the European

state system from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War I. Within the European

balance of power, Great Britain played the role of the “balancer,” or “holder of the balance.”

It was not permanently identified with the policies of any European nation, and it would

throw its weight at one time on one side, at another time on another side, guided largely by

one consideration—the maintenance of the balance itself. Naval supremacy and its virtual

immunity from foreign invasion enabled Great Britain to perform this function, which made

the European balance of power both flexible and stable.

The balance of power from the early 20th century onward underwent drastic changes that for

all practical purposes destroyed the European power structure as it had existed since the end

of the Middle Ages. Prior to the 20th century, the political world was composed of a number

of separate and independent balance-of-power systems, such as the European, the American,

the Chinese, and the Indian. But World War I and its attendant political alignments triggered

a process that eventually culminated in the integration of most of the world’s nations into a

single balance-of-power system.15 This integration began with the World War I alliance of

Britain, France, Russia, and the United States against Germany and Austria-Hungary. The

integration continued in World War II, during which the fascist nations of Germany, Japan,

and Italy were opposed by a global alliance of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain,

and China.16 World War II ended with the major weights in the balance of power having

shifted from the traditional players in western and central Europe to just two non-European

ones: the United States and the Soviet Union. The result was a bipolar balance of power

14 http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/473296/balance-of-power15 Little,Richard, The Balance of Power in International Relations. Metaphors, Myths and Models (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200716 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace: Fourth Edition (New York: Knofp, 1967).

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across the northern half of the globe that pitted the free-market democracies of the West

against the communist one-party states of Eastern Europe. More specifically, the nations of

Western Europe sided with the United States in the NATO military alliance, while the Soviet

Union’s satellite-allies in central and Eastern Europe became unified under Soviet leadership

in the Warsaw Pact.17

Because the balance of power was now bipolar and because of the great disparity of power

between the two superpowers and all other nations, the European countries lost that freedom

of movement that previously had made for a flexible system. Instead of a series of shifting

and basically unpredictable alliances with and against each other, the nations of Europe now

clustered around the two superpowers and tended to transform themselves into two stable

blocs.18

There were other decisive differences between the post-war balance of power and its

predecessor. The fear of mutual destruction in a global nuclear holocaust injected into the

foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union a marked element of restraint19. A

direct military confrontation between the two superpowers and their allies on European soil

was an almost-certain gateway to nuclear war and was therefore to be avoided at almost any

cost. So instead, direct confrontation was largely replaced by -

(1) A massive arms race whose lethal products were never used and

(2) Political meddling or limited military interventions by the superpowers in various Third

World nations.

CHAPTER II17 Paul W. Schroeder, "The Nineteenth century system: balance of power or political equilibrium?", Review of International Studies, 15, (1989), pp. 135–153. Schroeder argues that the BOP system is inherently unstable and conflict-prone because particular nations tend to have differing conceptions of what constitutes a "balance"; he contends that the equilibrium achieved in Europe between 1815 and 1854 rested not upon a BOP but upon a generally recognized system of British and Russian hegemonies18 Abu-Lughod, Janet (2004) Before European Hegemony: The World System AD1250–1350. Oxford: Oxford University Press.19 Paul, T.V., James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (eds) (2004) Balance of PowerTheory and Practice in the 21st Century. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

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Balance of Power – Various Aspects

Bandwagoning

Bandwagoning in international relations occurs when a state aligns with a stronger,

adversarial power and concedes that the stronger adversary-turned-partner disproportionately

gains in the spoils they conquer together.20 Bandwagoning, therefore, is a strategy employed

by weak states. The logic stipulates that an outgunned, weaker state should align itself with a

stronger adversary because the latter can take what it wants by force anyway.21 Thucydides’

famous dictum, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must,” captures

the essence of bandwagoning.

Bandwagoning was coined by Quincy Wright in A Study of War (1942) and popularized

by Kenneth Waltz in Theory of International Politics (1979). Bandwagoning occurs when

weaker states decide that the cost of opposing a stronger power exceeds the benefits. The

stronger power may offer incentives, such as the possibility of territorial gain, trade

agreements, or protection, to induce weaker states to join with it.22

Realism predicts that states will bandwagon only when there is no possibility of building a

balancing coalition or their geography makes balancing difficult (i.e. surrounded by enemies).

Bandwagoning is considered to be dangerous because it allows a rival state to gain power.23

Bandwagoning is opposed to balancing, which calls for a state to prevent an aggressor from

upsetting the balance of power.24

States choose to balance for two reasons. First, they place their survival at risk if they fail to

curb a potential hegemon before it becomes too strong; to ally with the dominant power

means placing one’s trust in its continued benevolence. Secondly, joining the weaker side

increases the likelihood that the new member will be influential within the alliance.25 States

choose to bandwagon because it may be a form of appeasement as the band wagoner may

20 Mearsheimer, John (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. pp. 16221 Mearsheimer, John (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. pp. 16322 Walt, Stephen M. (Spring 1985). "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power". International Security 9 (4): 7. Retrieved 8 May 2013.23 Langer, William L. (1953). The Diplomacy of Imperialism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. pp. 434–435.24  Brown, Seyom (1968). The Faces of Power. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 21725 Mearsheimer, John (2010), "Structural Realism", in Dunne, Tim; Kurki, Milja; Smith, Steve, International Relations Theories, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 85

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hope to avoid an attack by diverting it elsewhere—a defensive reason—or because it may

align with the dominant side in wartime to share the spoils of victory—an offensive reason.

Realists claim that balancing is when states ally against the prevailing threat and results in a

more secure world whereas in a bandwagoning world security is scarce as rising hegemons

are not kept in check.26 With bandwagoning, the threatened state abandons hope of preventing

the aggressor from gaining power at its expense and instead joins forces with its dangerous

foe to get at least some small portion of the spoils of war.27

Chain ganging

Chain-ganging occurs when a state sees its own security tied to the security of its alliance

partner. 28It chains itself by deeming any attack on its ally the equivalent of an attack on itself.

This is another aspect of the balance of power theory, whereby the smaller states could drag

their chained states into wars that they have no desire to fight. A key example of this was the

chain-ganging between states prior to World War I, dragging the entire European continent to

war over a dispute between the relatively minor powers of Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Thus

states "may chain themselves unconditionally to reckless allies whose survival is seen to be

indispensable to the maintenance of the balance".29

Buck passing and Bloodletting

Balancing and buck passing are the main strategies for preserving the balance of power and

preventing a potential hegemon’s rise.30 Instead of balancing against an aggressor, some

states instead choose to "pass the buck" whereby instead of taking action to prevent a

potential hegemon's rise, it will pass the responsibility on to another state. John Mearsheimer,

a prominent offensive realist, claims that threatened states can take four measures to facilitate

buck passing, including: seeking good diplomatic relations with the aggressor in the hope that

it will divert its attention to the "buck-catcher"; maintaining cool relations with the buck-

catcher so as not to get dragged into the war with the buck-catcher and as a result possibly

increase positive relations with the aggressor; increasing military strength to deter the

26 Walt, Stephen M. (1987), The Origins of Alliances, New York: Cornell University Press, pp. 5, 2027 Mearsheimer, John (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: Norton, pp. 14728 Christensen, Thomas J.; Snyder, Jack (1990), "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity", International Organization 44: pp.13929 Ibid30 Mearsheimer, John (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: Norton, pp. 149

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aggressive state and help it focus on the buck-catcher; and facilitating the growth in power of

the intended buck-catcher.31

Bloodletting, a further variant whereby a state does what it can to increase the cost duration

of the conflict can further increase the buck-passer’s relative power. 32 Thus, threatened states

usually prefer buck-passing to balancing as the buck-passer avoids the costs of fighting the

aggressor in the event of war.33

Some realists believe there is a strong tendency to buck-pass or free-ride within balancing

coalitions themselves, usually leaving their alliance partners to assume the heavy burden of

wearing down the enemy, leaving the free-rider’s military fresh to win the final battles of the

war and thus be in a better position to dictate the peace, such as the UK’s light involvement

in the early stages of World War I.34 Likewise, buck-passers can enter wars late after both

sides have been worn down, allowing the buck-passer to dominate the post-war world.35

Offensive and Defensive Realism

Defensive realism

Defensive realists emphasize that if any state becomes too powerful; balancing will occur as

other powers would build up their militaries and form a balancing coalition. Because this

resulting security dilemma would leave the aspiring hegemon less secure, defensive realists

maintain that it is in a state’s interest to maintain the status quo rather than maximize its

power.36

Offensive Realism

31 Ibid32 Bull, Hedley and Adam Watson (1984) The Expansion of International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press33 Buzan, Barry and Richard Little (2000) International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press.34 Ibid35 Howard, Sir Esme (May 1925), "British Policy and the Balance of Power", The American Political Science Review 19 (2): 26136 Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton. Mearsheimer tries to mend BOP theory after it was unable to predict or explain the end of the Cold War. He describes himself as an "offensive realist" and believes that states do not simply balance, but because they want to survive in an anarchical system they get frequently aggressive. This is in contrast to Waltz, whom he describes as "defensive realist", who says that states primarily seek survival through balancing. 

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Offensive realists accept that threatened states usually balance against dangerous foes,

however, they maintain that balancing is often inefficient and that this inefficiency provides

opportunities for a clever aggressor to take advantage of its adversaries.37 Buck passing,

rather than joining a balancing coalition, is another tactic offensive realists point to when

disputing the balance of power theory.

Offensive realists believe that internal balancing measures such as increasing defence

spending, implementing conscription, are only effective to a certain extent as there are

usually significant limits on how many additional resources a threatened state can muster

against an aggressor. However, since offensive realists theorize that states are always seeking

to maximize their power, states are "effectively engaged in internal balancing all the time".38

Balance of Threat

The balance of threat theory is an offshoot of the balancing, coined in 1985 by Stephen M.

Walt in an attempt to explain why balancing against rising hegemons has not always been

consistent in history. In contrast to traditional balance of power theorists, Walt suggests that

states balance against threats, rather than against power alone.39 The theory acknowledges that

power is an extremely important factor in the level of threat posed by a state, but also

includes geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions.

CHAPTER III

37 Ibid38 Wolfforth, William C. (1999) ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’, International Security 21(1): pp. 12.39 Walt, Stephen M. (1987), The Origins of Alliances, New York: Cornell University Press, pp. 19

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Balance of Power: It’s Relevance in Contemporary Era

The concept of balance of power is considered as one of the oldest and fundamental concept

in the field of international relations.40 International relations theorists had been defining

balance of power differently to highlight its significance and relevance in international

politics, as David Hume declared balance of power as scientific law due to its significance in

international politics.

Glenn Snyder highlighted balance of power as a core theoretical concept in international

relations. Hans Morgenthau called balance of power as “iron law of politics” and Henry

Kissinger, regarded balance of power as more an art than a science.41 Significance and

relevance of balance of power even in contemporary times cannot be ignored, though it was a

fashionable trend among states in historical times.

Power is unevenly distributed among states in international system of states. Therefore, some

of the states are powerful and others are comparatively weak. There is no instrument to

measure power of states, though power is always measured in relative terms. States,

especially small and weaker states, often cannot achieve security on their own. So they have

to depend upon other states for enhancing their security. This way smaller state, by

concluding alliances with other powerful (friendly) states try to attain balance of power

against a powerful adversary or a threatening state. The term ‘Balance of Power’ refers to the

general concept of one or more states’ power being used to balance that of another state or

group of states.42

Strategies to maintain Balance of power

The concept of balance of power ideally ensures that power is distributed in such a way that

no single state or entity is able to dominate the remaining states or entities. Objective

characteristics such as relative military power and economic resources determine the

distribution of capabilities and hence play a central role in establishing which states occupy

the positions of major powers. Major Powers keep strategy of balancing as topmost priority

40 M J Williams, The coming revolution in foreign affairs,(2008), International Affairs,Vol84,No4,p.111041 Ibid.p2942 Goldstein S.Joshua,(2005),International Relations(6th Edition). Peking University Press,Peking,p77

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in security realm because a successful balancing strategy ensures peace and it is a

precondition of the preservation of the state system.43

Cold war presented precise example of balance of power between United States and Soviet

Union. Both the states had developed WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction) and made

alliances with other states to extend their influence across globe. United States formed NATO

(North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and Soviet Union concluded WARSA Pact.44 There was

a condition of Quasi balancing between them that shunned them from engaging into any

direct clash that could escalate into nuclear catastrophe. Scholars pinpoint the reason of about

balance between both powers as a chief reason of de-escalation.

States adopt multiple strategies to strengthen their power comparative to other competitive

actors. The study of international relations is diverse in nature that’s why states can’t rely or

depend permanently on others to secure their national interest. Most reliable strategy to

balance against any threat is internal balancing. The reason is, every state watches her interest

and can sacrifice others’ interest whether they are friends or enemies.

There is a famous proverb to highlight diverse nature of international relations study. “There

is no permanent friend or permanent enemy in international politics but permanent

interests, a friend of today may be the enemy of tomorrow and enemy of today may be

the friend of tomorrow”

The above cited quote explains Pakistan-United States relationship nicely. The nascent state

of Pakistan was looking for its security against India and decided to join United States’ bloc.

Despite being the member of US sponsored security pacts in Asia US could not provide any

security against India during 1965, 1971 wars. The war of 1971 proved catastrophic for

Pakistan and resulted in dismemberment of East Pakistan (Bangladesh today).Similarly

United States and China were enemies during cold war and fought Korean War against each

other but later on with Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing in July 1971 both the states

improved their ties to end rivalry and set in new era of relationship.

43 Liselotte Odgaard,(2007), The Balance of Power in Asia Pacific Security: US-China Policies on Regional Order, Taylor and Francis, New York,p2544 NATO was formed by United States and its West European Allies to combat threat of Communism and tocounter United States military might with her Western allies Soviet Union concluded Warsaw pact to maintain apower balance between them.

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As there is no permanent friend in international politics, therefore states prefer to adopt a

policy of internal balancing to consolidate their defense, which sounds more reliable for a

state than any other ally.

Internal Balancing

States carve out various strategies to keep a check on external threats. Threatened states could

also adopt the internal balancing strategy of building up weapons, that is, to obtain

countervailing capabilities and thereby attempt to balance the rising power’s military strength

which can pose serious threats to its security in future. The key means of internal balancing

by which states balance one another are, building up arms through internal production. This

trend was more in fashion during 18th century. States had been quite busy in making stronger

armies, well equipped with latest weapons to cope with enemies in the battlefield. But this

trend of balancing was not efficacious in enhancing security of the state. Whatever the quality

of weapons one could produce and strengthen its military power but when enemy was in a

position to attack from various sides with the help of their allied states then it was hard to

defend against two or more states. However states realized that internal balancing is crucial

but not sufficient to avert external aggression.

Pakistan and India two rival states in South Asia also adopted internal balancing as a first

strategy to secure national integrity, but limited resources on both sides compelled them to

see other substitutes. Both the rival states in South Asia could not rely heavily upon internal

resources due to limited internal resources and depended on external factor to enhance and

strengthen their security against each other. Additionally, cold war provided golden

opportunity to find friends with great powers. United States and Soviet Union were also

looking for allies to extend their areas of influence.

South Asian region is crucial due to its geopolitics in international system. But before

drawing attention to South Asian region and its geopolitics we should bear in mind that

during cold war era there were only two super powers who divided the world into two rival

camps, Communist and capitalist. Both the superpowers engaged in intense competition to

rule the world. They had the capability to destroy their enemies and even each other, they had

nuclear arsenals that’s the reason cold war remain cold war and could not turn into hot war,

South Asia is significant in its geopolitics that there are two nuclear powers in South Asia.

South Asia is geopolitically and geo strategically important due to unique location. Starting

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from Russia to downward China, India and Pakistan are four nuclear powers, whereas North

Korea and Iran are suspected of possessing nuclear capability if not, then sooner they will be

having nuclear bomb. One shares border with the other nuclear actor.45 Security factor is very

crucial in this nuclear armed belt where states with inimical track record are dealing with

each other.

India had been engaged with Pakistan in two full-fledged wars (1965, 1971) and several

armed clashes (1948, 1984 and 1999) which despite huge human and capital costs remained

unsuccessful in resolving disputes. Now the nuclear weapons have enhanced risk of

catastrophic war in subcontinent. Any event of war can escalate into a nuclear war between

India-Pakistan. If such an undesirable mishap occurs then neighbouring states won’t be in a

position to save them from effects of nuclear war. But the balance of power theorists see

nuclearization of the region ripe for maintenance of peace between nuclear armed states. If

the ‘Balance of Power’ is maintained in the region it may create an environment of mutual

deterrence. As cold war between United States and Soviet Union remained a cold war due to

Quasi Balance of Power between nuclear powers. Both the superpowers had realized that if

war erupts will be collective death of both the nations. In case of India and Pakistan its quite

obvious that whenever the balance of power in the region got disturbed there happened a war

between Pakistan and India. China as a biggest stake holder in Asia, after the demise of

USSR, plays a vital role in the maintenance of Balance of power in the region.

Theories explain events; analyse their happenings, present causes and effects of international

events (war and peace).Theories help to make predictions about possible outcome of

circumstances. No theory in the field of international relations is universal to explain all the

events in a precise manner but some are more applicable in some specific case and others

less.

Jack Donnelly describes ‘Theory’ as an artful abstraction which averts our attention from

goofing up with ambiguous details. Theory precisely directs our attention at the case study,

which is of great significance in academia. Theoretical mechanism makes explanations

crystal clear and complements understanding about the case study at hand.46

45 Russia a nuclear armed state and a former superpower shares border with China, China shares border with India, Pakistan and North Korea, While Iran shares border with Pakistan. Historically India-China had fought war on territorial dispute. The same between Pakistan and India, China and USSR also did not have amicable relations and Pakistan and Russia were also unfriendly and engaged in Afghan war. Now the nuclear belt makes it unique in the world on one hand but on the other side it’s the most dangerous region of the world where four nuclear powers of the world are living in proximity.46 Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui True,(2005), Theories of International Relations(3rd edition),Palgrave Macmillan, New York,p30

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Idealists employ one size fits all approach to justify their standpoint which is frail and

impractical approach in a world with diverse cultures, religions, norms and values.

Liberalists rule out relevance of realism in age of globalization. They declare balance of

power a theory of past among bellicose states. 47 Answering to the skeptics of realist school of

thought, proponents of this theory argue that balance of power dynamics is still actively

operating in world politics with its varying degrees. Realists maintain that balance of power

hangs in despite operational liberal forces. They are of the view as relative power capabilities

keep on changing and U.S. hegemony will invite power balancing when it becomes too

threatening for other major states’ interests and it’s only a matter of time because hegemony

can never stay permanent.48

But one thing should bear in mind that even today, state is a core actor in international

relations, borders still matter, sovereignty is exercised by state internally and externally, war

and armed conflicts still persist and most importantly ‘National Interest’ is still supreme for

nation-states and they don’t compromise on their national interests which reflects that the

above mentioned axioms have their relevance in contemporary international politics.

Morgenthau one of the pioneer realists, highlights significance of realist approach in

international relations to him “The concept of interest can be defined in terms of power” and

“to define interest in terms of power is universally applicable, Interests are dynamics”.

International morality does not occupy elated position in hierarchic structure of international

society that’s why “universal moral principles cannot be applied to state policies. An

individual can claim that justice be done even the world perish, but states cannot say that.49

International relations scholars had been trying hard to figure out the basic reason of war.

Their extensive studies had been dealing with human nature and declared it a major reason of

war.

Men wherever they live, cannot live in an absolute peace, so conflict amongst them is

inevitable.

47 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2002),Understanding International Conflicts: An introduction to Theory and History, Longman, New York,p4748 T.V Paul,(2004),Balance of Power Theory and Practice in 21st Century(Edited), Stanford UniversityPress,California,p249 Renowned six principles of Power Politics by Hans J Morgenthau, Three of them are explaining more relevancies to the topic. Hans J Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations(Revised by Kenneth W Thompson)(1992),Peking University Press Beijing,p5

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Kenneth Waltz augmented Morgenthau’s argument about causes of war. He says that the

reasons that often times cause war are found in human nature. War is the outcome of selfish

behaviour, misguided and aggressive impulse, and foolish actions and policies. He describes

the other causes of war as ‘secondary’ and need to be understand in the context of these basic

causes of war,50 another notion that made an attempt to make it clear that why states cannot

live in an absolute peace is due to anarchy.

This World is anarchic and almost all the states are sovereign actors and there is no central

authority in international society of states which could regulate relations among them. All the

states operate in international system of states as autonomous actors. They are independent in

their decision making, formulation of policies and implementation of laws. They enjoy the

legality of using force against those elements that could endanger it security and integrity.

Every state does have her respective national interest and each state struggles to maximize its

power in the anarchical global system to protect and promote their national interest. States

don’t compromise their national interest rather promote it through various means. If some

states do not acquire sufficient power, they can be more prone to become subservient to other

powerful states and their will, ultimately, lose their sovereignty, security and prosperity.

Anarchical structure, therefore, pushes states to increase their power, because security and

survival cannot be dissociate from power maximization. Consequently, the competition for

power enhancement becomes a natural state of affair in world politics.51

States remain engaged in a constant struggle to achieve a satisfied level of security against

internal and external threats. As Pakistan and India both, had been trying to achieve a

satisfied level of struggle against each other and any external threat. Kenneth Waltz writes

that the state conducts its affairs in an uncertain situation and remains in a constant fear of

being attacked by other rival states. Due to uncertainty, some states may use force any-time

to endanger the survival of others, so all the states must be prepared to face such a surprise

attack or live at the mercy of their militarily more powerful neighbours. As Pakistan’s

integrity was threatened by India immediately after independence and consequently weaker

(economically and militarily) Pakistan depended on United States and cultivated friendly ties

with China to seek economic, military and diplomatic aid from allied states. Waltz maintains 50 Kenneth Waltz, Man the State and War; A theoretical Analysis,(2001), Columbia University Press, New York,P1651 Paul.op.cit.p4

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that among states, the state of nature is a state of war. This does not mean that war occurs all

the times but in the sense that such an uncertain situation can lead states to war and war may

break out anytime. Conflict (minor, major) among individuals and states is inevitable.52

The notion of security has been at the heart of international affairs for centuries. If historical

wars are taken into account (the Peloponnesian war, Thirty years war, and the First and

Second World Wars), it helps us to frame that how the world politics is conceptualized.

Security indeed doesn’t have any structure, but it depends upon the actors how do they view

and define it. The way one secures oneself may not have the same effects for others. One fact

is indisputable that every state in the world desires to be secure from internal and external

threats, for that reason they pursue the objective by enhancing their military power. 53

CONCLUSION

Balance of power, in international relations, the posture and policy of a nation or group of

nations protecting itself against another nation or group of nations by matching its power

against the power of the other side. States can pursue a policy of balance of power in two 52 Kenneth N Waltz,(1979), Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley Publishing company, California, p102 53 M J Williams, The coming revolution in foreign affairs,(2008), International Affairs,Vol84,No4,p.1110

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ways: by increasing their own power, as when engaging in an armaments race or in the

competitive acquisition of territory; or by adding to their own power that of other states, as

when embarking upon a policy of alliances

The balance of power theory is a core tenet of both classical and neorealist theory and seeks

to explain alliance formation. Due to the neorealist idea of anarchism as a result of the

international system, states must ensure their survival through maintaining or increasing their

power in a self-help world. With no authority above the state to come to its rescue in the

event of an attack by a hegemon, states attempt to prevent a potential hegemon from arising

by balancing against it. According to Kenneth Waltz, founder of neorealism, "balance-of-

power politics prevail wherever two, and only two requirements are met: that the order be

anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive".

The notion of security has been at the heart of international affairs for centuries. States

remain engaged in a constant struggle to achieve a satisfied level of security against

internal and external threats. Waltz maintains that among states, the state of nature is a state

of war. This does not mean that war occurs all the times but in the sense that such an

uncertain situation can lead states to war and war may break out anytime. Conflict (minor,

major) among individuals and states is inevitable. Kenneth Waltz writes that the state

conducts its affairs in an uncertain situation and remains in a constant fear of being attacked

by other rival states. Due to uncertainty, some states may use force any-time to endanger the

survival of others, so all the states must be prepared to face such a surprise attack or live at

the mercy of their militarily more powerful neighbours.

Every state does have her respective national interest and each state struggles to maximize its

power in the anarchical global system to protect and promote their national interest. States

don’t compromise their national interest rather promote it through various means. If some

states do not acquire sufficient power, they can be more prone to become subservient to other

powerful states and their will, ultimately, lose their sovereignty, security and prosperity.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS REFERRED

James W. Huston, Balance of Power, 2nd Edition, Harper Publications, 2009

Richard North Patterson, Balance of Power, 1st Edition, Ballantine Books, 2004

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Richard Little, The Balance of Power in International Relations, 1st Edition,

Cambridge University Press, 2007

T.V Paul, Balance of Power: Theory and practice in 21st century, 1st Edition, Stanford

University Press, 2004

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: An introduction to Theory

and History, Longman, 2002

Kenneth Waltz, Man the State and War; A theoretical Analysis, Columbia University Press,

2004

Liselotte Odgaard, The Balance of Power in Asia Pacific Security: US-China Policies

on Regional Order, Taylor and Francis, 2001

Goldstein S.Joshua, International Relations, 6th Edition, Peking University Press, 2005

Little,Richard, The Balance of Power in International Relations. Metaphors, Myths

and Models, Cambridge University Press, 2007

Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace, 4th

Edition 1967.

ONLINE SOURCES

www.brittanica.com

www.foreignaffairs.com

www.merriam-webster.com

www.dictionary.reference.com

www.goodreads.com

www.infoplease.com

www.foreignpolicy.com

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