BACKGROUND - University of Maine...
Transcript of BACKGROUND - University of Maine...
STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND SS LOCATION PORTLAND
Docket No BCD~CV-16-19
SANDRA L NAPOLITANO Individually and on behalf of WINDHAM Q LLC
Plaintiff
v
ARTHUR NAPOLITANO SR and STEPHEN NA POLIT ANO
Defendants
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ) ) ) ) )
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano individually and on behalf of Windham Q
LLC (Windham Q) has filed a motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure
65 for an order granting preliminary injunctive relief against Defendants Arthur
and Stephen Napolitano Based on the following Plaintiffs motion for
preliminary injunctive relief is denied
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Defendant Arthur Napolitano are husband and wife (Sandra
Napolitano Aff -r 2) According to Plaintiffs affidavit Plaintiff and Arthur
Napolitano are each 50 members and the sole managers of Windham Q LLC
which operates a Dairy Queen franchise located in Windham Maine (Id)
Defendant Stephen Napolitano is Arthur Napolitanos son and the general
manager of the Dairy Queen store (Id -r 4)
According to Plaintiffs affidavit in the spring of 201 3 she became
concerned that Stephen Napolitano was using Windham Qs funds to pay his
personal expenses (Id ilif 3-4) Plaintiff requested that Arthur investigate the
matter (Id ~ 5) Arthur Napolitano assured her that Windham Q had not paid
any non-business expenses (Id) Plaintiff became concerned about Windham
Qs expenses again in May 2014 and requested that a forensic audit of Windham
Q be conducted (Id rr 6 8) Arthur opposed the audit (Id r 9)
Stephen Napolitano asserts that Windham Qs payment of certain
personal expenses was approved as part of his benefits package as the general
manager of the Dairy Queen (Stephen Napolitano Aff r 4) Stephen asserts
that in response to Plaintiffs complaints about the expenses Arthur Napolitano
increased his compensation and curtailed the practice of using Windham Qs
credit card to pay certain expenses (Id r 9) Plaintiff asserts that Arthur did
not discuss Windham Qs payment of Stephens personal expenses with her and
she did not approve the practice (Sandra Napolitano Aff rr 12 19)
According to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitano wrote a-letter to her -attorney
in October 201 4 admitting that certain personal expenses were paid for using
Windham Qs funds and stating that he was reimbursing Windham Q for those
expenses (Id r 14) Plaintiff does not believe that Stephen fully reimbursed
Windham Q for all of the personal expenses paid by the company (Id r 1 5)
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Plaintiff requested Arthur Napolitano remove Stephen as the general manager of
the Dairy Queen but Arthur refused to do so (Id r 1 6)
Plaintiff filed a civil complaint individually and on behalf of Windham Q
with the Superior Court on August 26 2015 Plaintiffs complaint asserts
claims for breach of fiduciary duty conversion to recover money owed unjust
enrichment and fraud against Arthur and claims for conversion to recover
money owed unjust enrichment fraud breach of duty of loyalty and breach of
contract against Stephen Plaintiffs complaint also seeks an order
reconstituting the governance of Windham Q and removing Arthur and Stephen
from any positions overseeing the operation of Windham Q
Arthur Napolitano filed an answer to the civil complalnt on September 18
201 5 Stephen Napolitano filed his answer on September 24 201 5 Stephen
Napolitano amended his answer on February 11 2016 and added a
counterclaim against Plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment that the parties
had agreed that Stephen would receive an ownership interest in Windham Q in
exchange for agreeing to work as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store
(Stephen Napmiddotolitano Am Ans amp Countercl rr 13-14)
Arthur Napolitano also filed a complaint for divorce with the District Court
on September 29 201 5 Plaintiff filed an answer and counterclaim for divorce
on October 6 201 5 On January 1 3 201 6 the District Court appointed a
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Referee to conduct an audit of Windham Q to produce an audit report 1 and to
monitor and report on the financial and operational performance during the
pendency of the divorce action (FM-1 6-02 Order of Appointment 1 )
Both the civil action and family action were accepted for transfer to the
Business and Consumer Court in June 201 6 Although not consolidated the
two cases are being coordinated before the Business and Consumer Court The
Referee filed his first report in the family action on August 5 2016 (the
Referees Report)
Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief on August 91 201 6
Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction ordering the following (1) that Stephen
Napolitano be removed as general manager (2) that the scope of the Referees
role be expanded to include (a) hiring a neutral third-party general manager to
oversee the day-to-day operations of the Dairy Queen store and (b) continued
oversight of Windham Qs finances (3) that a new accountant be hired by
Windham Q at the recommendation of the Referee ( 4) that the new accountant
conduct a complete review of the prior six tax years to determine if the parties
tax returns and Stephen Napolitanos W-Zs should be amended (5) that
Defendants pay the costs of the Referee and (6) any other relief the court
deems just (Pl Mot Prelim lnj 1 8-1 9)
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Defendants filed an oppositionmiddot to the motion for preliminary injunctive
relief on August 31 201 6 Plaintiff replied on September 8 201 6 Plaintiff
also filed an addendum to her reply on October 11 201 6 Oral argument on
all pending motions in this case was held on October 12 2016
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Ordinarily to obtain a preliminary injunction a plaintiff must produce
prim a facie evidence of the following ( 1 ) the plaintiff will suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction is not granted (2) the irreparable injury to the plaintiff
outweighs any harm to the defendant from granting the injunction (3) the
plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his or her claims and (4) the public
interest will not be adversely affected by granting the injunction Bangor
Historic Track Inc v Dept ofAgric Food amp Rural Res 2003 ME 140 iJ 9 837
A Zd 1 29 Failure to demonstrate that any one of the criteria is met requires
the motion for preliminary injunction be denied Id iJ 10 In determining
whether to issue a preliminary injunction the court may rely on evidence
presented in sworn depositions affidavits oral testimony or a verified
complaint 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333 (3d ed 2011 )
Because Plaintiffs motion seeks an injunction compelling Defendants to
take affirmative actions Plaintiffs motion is one for mandatory injunctive relief
See Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remediessect 5-2 at 1 00 (4th ed 2004) The
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purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final
judgment Dep 1t of Envtf Prat v Emerson 563 AZd 762 771 (Me 1989)
Because a mandatory injunction by its very nature will alter the status quo
courts do not readily enter mandatory preliminary injunctions Id However the
mere fact that a preliminary injunction sought by a plaintiff has mandatory
aspects does not ipso facto render the motion invalid Id Rather to obtain a
mandatory preliminary injunction the plaintiff must meet a higher burden
Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remediessect 5-2 n14 at 1 00 In addition to the
other criteria the plaintiff must show a clear likelihood of success on the
merits Emerson 563 AZd at 771 (emphasis supplied)
ANALYSIS
As discussed above Plaintiff seeks a mandatory preliminary injunction
removing Stephen Napolitano as general manager removing Windham Qs
accountant and expanding the role of the Referee (Pl Mot Prelim lnj 18-19)
Plaintiff argues that if the mandatory preliminary injunction is not granted
Stephen Napolitano will continue to mismanage Windham Q continue to use
Plaintiffs and Arthur Napolitanos money to pay his personal expenses and that
Windham Q will continue to file improper tax returns (Id at 1 6)
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A The Referees Report
The court first addresses the threshold matter of the Referees Report
Plaintiff largely relies on the Referees Report filed in the related divorce action
as evidentiary support for her motion (Id at 5-11 ) However because the
Referees Report is not sworn evidence it cannot be considered by the court in
deciding the motion for preliminary injunction 1 As previously discussed in
determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction the court may rely on
evidence presented in sworn depositions affidavits oral testimony or a verified
complaint 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333
The Referees Report has not been sworn to and no affidavit has been
filed by the Referee stating under oath that the contents of the Report to the
best of his personal knowledge are true and accurate Therefore because
Plaintiff largely relies on the unsworn Referees Report Plaintiff has not provided
sufficient proper evidence in order to obtain preliminary injunctive relief 2
1 In their opposition Defendants assert that the Referees Report is not admissible evidence in this case because it was filed in the separate divorce action (Defs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj 11-1 2) In her reply Plaintiff asserts at a trial management conference on June 7 2015 the parties verbally agreed that the Referees Report would apply to both proceedings (Pl Reply to Defs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj 2) Because the court finds that the Referees Report is not properly before the court on the motion for preliminary injunctive relief the court need not decide that this juncture whether the Referees Report is admissible in the civil action
2 Additionally attached to Plaintiffs reply and her addendum are a number of additional exhibits purported to show that Stephen Napolitano used Windham Qs credit card to pay for personal expenses See (Pl Reply to Oefs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj
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B The Merits of the Mot ion for Preliminary Injunction
Moreover even if the court were to consider the Referees Report
Plaintiff has still failed to produce prima facie evidence that she or Windham Q
will suffer an irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted An
irreparable injury is an injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law
Bangor Historic Track Inc 2003 ME 140 -r 10 83 7 A2d 1 29 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) Although there is no comprehensive rule
for measuring the adequacy of a legal remedy where a plaintiff is entitled to
money damages and the plaintiff has not demonstrated that damages would be
uncollectable from the defendant the legal remedy will be deemed adequate
Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remedies sect 5-3(a) at 101-02 Levesque v
Pelletier 144 Me 245 249 68 AZd 9 11 (1949)
In his Report the Referee identified numerous credit card charges to the
business from 201 2 to 2014 Hwhere the business purpose was not readily
apparent (Referee Report 1 3) These included gas charges drugstore
charges EZ Pass tolls groceries maintenance charges office supplies car
Exs D-G J Pl Addendum to Reply Exs L-0) Like the Referees Report no affidavit has been filed swearing to the authenticity of these documents Therefore like the Referees Report those exhibits cannot be considered by the court See 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333 Also like the Referees Report even if the court were to consider these documents there is no indication that Plaintiff would not be entitled to damages or that such damages would be uncollectable from Defendants See Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remediessect 5-3(a) at 101-02 Levesque 144 Me at 249 68 AZd at 11
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maintenance travel expenses medical charges Amazon and iTunes charges
meal charges department store charges and $1 67 77 500 of other
questionable charges (Id at 1 3-14) The Referee also noted numerous annual
expenses where the business purpose was not clearly determinable (Id at
11) These expenses included automobile repairs cable television internet
payments to multiple vendors tolls travel expenses and yard work (Id at 8shy
11 ) The Referee also noted a high rate of variance between the businesss
register tapes and daily deposits which demonstrated a significant system
failure made validating the daily deposit amounts difficult and revealed certain
commingling of personal and company funds (Id at 1 5-18)
Even if the Referees findings constitute prima facie evidence of an injury
to Plaintiff and Windham Q Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she is without
an adequate remedy at law Plaintiff has not cited and the court is not aware
of any legal authority that would prevent Plaintiff from recovering monetary
damages for the above injuries Plaintiff has also not put forth any evidence
that monetary damages would be uncollectable from Defendants Thus Plaintiff
has not demonstrated an injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law
Moreover additional findings in the Referees Report actually demonstrate
that Plaintiff is unlikely to suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is
not granted In his report the Referee noted that a number of questionable
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expenses had actually declined in 2015 and 2016 (Id at 11) The Referee
noted that there had been a complete stop in payments by Windham Q for auto
repairs gas tolls travel and yard work and a decline in payments for office
expenses supplies and telephone expenses (Id at 8-11 ) Thus based on the
findings in the Referees Report the alleged injuries to Plaintiff have ceased or
declined in the past two years Therefore contrary to Plaintiffs assertions the
Referees Report actually demonstrates it is unlikely that she will suffer a
continued irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted
Plaintiff argues that Stephen Napolitano has ceased his alleged tortious
behavior while under the scrutiny of the Referee and this court (Pl Mot Prelim
lnj 16) Plaintiff argues that if the Referees role is not expanded Stephen
Napolitano will likely resume his alleged tortious behavior (Id) Plaintiff has
cited no evidence to support this speculation (Id)
Therefore even if the court were to consider the Referees Report
Plaintiff has still failed to demonstrate an irreparable injury in order to obtain a
mandatory preliminary injunction Because failure to demonstrate that any one
of the criteria is met requires the motion be denied the court would not even
reach the other criteria for preliminary injunctive relief See Bangor Historic
Track Inc 2003 ME 140 ~ 10 837 A2d 129
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion
individually and on behalf of Windham Q LLC pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 for preliminary injunctive relief is DENIED
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Richard Mulhern Dated J2 t) G
Judge Business amp Consumer Court
Ent~rec on th~ Docket__~ Copies sent va Mail__ Elecronically__ ~
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STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND SS LOCATION PORTLAND Docket No BCD-CV-1 6-19
SANDRA L NAPOLITANO Individually and on behalf of WINDHAM Q LLC
Plaintiff
v
ARTHUR NAPOLITANO SR and STEPHEN NAPOLITANO
Defendants
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ) ) ) ) )
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano has moved for summary judgment pursuant
to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 5 6 on Defendant Stephen Napolitanos
counterclaim for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief For the following
reasons Plaintiffs motion is denied in part and granted in part
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Defendant Arthur Napolitano are husband and wife (Sandra
Napolitano Aff r 2) Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano are each 50 members
and the sole managers of Windham Q LLC (Windham Q) which operates a
Dairy Queen franchise located in Windham Maine (Id) Defendant Stephen
Napolitano is Arthur Napolitanos son and has worked as the general manager of
the Dairy Queen for more than sixteen years (Sandra Napolitano Aff r 4
Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF r 19)
Plaintiff filed a civil complaint individually and on behalf of Windham Q
with the Superior Court on August 26 201 5 Plaintiffs civil complaint generally
asserts that Stephen Napolitano has misused Windham Qs funds to pay his
personal expenses and that Arthur Napolitano has made improper distributions
and failed to act in the best interests of Windham Q (Campi ~I 20-46)
Arthur Napolitano filed an answer to the civil complaint on September 18
201 5 Stephen Napolitano filed his answer to the civil complaint on September
24 201 S Arthur Napolitano also filed a complaint for divorce with the District
Court on September 29 201 S Stephen Napolitano amended his answer to the
civil complaint on February 11 2016 to add a counterclaim against Plaintiff for
declaratory judgment that the parties had agreed that Stephen would receive an
ownership interest in Windham Q in exchange for agreeing to work as the
general manager of the Dairy Queen store (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp
Countercl ~~ 1 3-14) Plaintiff filed an answer to the counterclaim on March 7
2016 Both the civil action and family action were accepted for transfer to the
Business and Consumer Court in June 2016 Although not consolidated the
two cases are being coordinated before the Business and Consumer Court
Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim on August 11 201 6 Stephen filed an opposition to
summary judgment on September 1 201 6 Plaintiff filed a timely reply on
z
September 8 2016 Oral argument on all pending motions in this case was held
on October 1 2 2016
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if based on the parties statements of
material fact and the cited record there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law MR Civ P 56(c)
Dyer v Dept of Transp_ 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d 821 A fact is material
if it can affect the outcome of the case Dyer 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d
821 A genuine issue of material fact exists if the fact finder must choose
between competing versions of the truth Id When deciding a motion for
summary judgment the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party Id
If the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion
on a claim or defense then the moving party must establish the existence of
each element of the claim or defense without dispute as to any material fact in
the record in order to obtain summary judgment Cach LLC v Kulas 2011 ME
70 ~ 9 21 A3d 1015 The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to
respond with specific material facts indicating a genuine issue for trial in order
to avoid summary judgment MR Civ P 56(e) Even if one partys version of
the facts appears more credible and persuasive any genuine issue of material
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fact must be resolved by the fact finder regardless of the likelihood of success
Estate of Lewis v Concord Gen Mut Ins Co 2014 ME 34 ~ 10 87 A3d 732
ANALYSIS
Defendant Stephen Napolitanos counterclaim seeks a declaratory
judgment that he has an enforceable agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur
Napolitano that in exchange for agreeing to work full-time as the general
manager of the Dairy Queen store Stephen Napolitano was to receive (a) a
1 5 ownership share of Windham Q as soon as issues with his credit were
addressed and (b) Stephen would eventually receive a 50 ownership share of
Windham Q and associated real estate from Plaintiffs estate 1 (Stephen
Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl r~ 3-4 13) Stephen also seeks injunctive
relief ordering Plaintiff to transfer 75 of her ownership in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano to be increased to 50 from her estate in compliance with
the terms of the agreement (Id r~ 13-1 4)
Plaintiffs sole argument on summary judgment is that Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim is barred by the statute of frauds because there are
no writings evidencing the alleged agreement (Pl Mot Summ J 3-7 ) The
statute of frauds is an affirmative defense MR Civ P 8(c) Thus the statute
Stephen Napolitano asserts the remaining 50 ownership of Windham Q would be shared by his full siblings who are not parties to this litigation (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl ~ 3)
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of frauds must be affirmatively pleaded in an answer otherwise it is waived
Greenlaw v Rodick 158 Me 440 445 185 A2d 895 897-98 (1962) An
affirmative defense may be adequately pleaded even though the exact words
used in Rule 8(c) are absent See Graffam v Geronda 304 A2d 76 78 (Me
1973) Rule 8(c) is satisfied by any clear and unmistakable notice that the
defense is being raised 2 Harvey Maine Civil Practice sect 85 at 362 (3d ed
2011)
Here Plaintiff has not expressly pleaded the statute of frauds as an
affirmative defense (Pl Ans to Countercl amp Affirm Defenses ii 1-7)
Plaintiffs first affirmative defense however avers that Stephen has no
agreement relating to his ownership of the Windham Dairy Queen that is
enforceable under Maine law (Id 1l 1) This language is sufficient to put
Stephen Napolitano on clear and unmistakable notice that Plaintiff is raising the
statute of frauds defense
Maines statute of frauds provides that the actions based on the following
agreements may not be maintained unless the agreement is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto
lawfully authorized (a) any agreement that is not to be performed within one
year and (b) any agreement to give bequeath or devise by will to another any
real personal or mixed property 33 MRS sect 51 (5 ) (7)
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To determine whether an alleged agreement is one not to be performed
within one year the court does not look to when the performance actually
occurred or whether it was conceivable that performance would occur within or
beyond one year The court looks only to the parties intent Great Hill Fill amp
Gravel v Shapleigh 1997 ME 75 -r S 692 A2d 928 The court must look to
the circumstances of the case and whether the parties plainly manifested an middot
intent that the contract not be performed within one year Id
Regarding an agreement to devise by will Maines Probate Code further
provides
A contract to make a will or devise or not to revoke a will or devise can be established only by ( 1 ) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract or (3) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills
18-A MRS sect 2-701
If an agreement falls within the statute of frauds then it must be
evidenced in writing and signed by the party against whom the agreement is to
be enforced or another lawfully authorized person 33 MRS sect 51 Nearly any
form of writing will satisfy the statute of frauds McCare v Rocha 2014 ME 4
-r 11 86 A3d 22 A series of writings may collectively satisfy the statute of
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frauds even if none of the writings does so separately Wilson v DePapa 634
A2d 1252 1254 (Me 1993)
The part performance doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds
Sullivan v Porter 2004 ME 134 ~ 10 861 A2d 625 An oral contract within
the statute of frauds may still be enforced if the party seeking to enforce the
agreement can prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the parties entered
into a contract (2) the party seeking to enforce the contract partially
performed its obligation and (3) the performance was induced by the other
partys misrepresentation which may be evidenced by acquiescence or silence
Id at i 11 The part performance doctrine is grounded in the principle of
equitable estoppel which involves detrimental reliance induced by
misrepresentation and fraud Id I 17 Equitabl~ estoppel differs from
promissory estoppel which involves detrimental reliance on a mere promise Id
~ 1 7 n 7 The Law Court has expressly stated that for multi-year employment
agreements an employees detrimental reliance on an employers oral promise is
not enough to avoid the statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine
Stearns v Emery-Waterhouse Co 596 A2d 72 75 (Me 1991 ) To avoid the
statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine the employee must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their performance was induced by
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fraud on the part of the employer Id see also Suliivan 2004 ME 134 iI 17
861 A2d 625
A The 1 5 Ownership Interest in Windham Q
In support of her motion Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement
governing Stephen Napolitanos employment with Windham Q there was no
written agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership share of Windham Q to Stephen
Napolitano and that there was no agreement written or oral that Stephens
employment with Windham Q was contingent upon him receiving an ownership
interest (Pl Suppg SMF iiiI 8-9 14) Plaintiff asserts that even if there was
an oral agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership interest Stephen has testified
that any transfer would not happen immediately because the agreement was
contingent upon Stephen resolving certain issues with his credit (Id iI 11 )
Plaintiff further asserts that Stephen Napolitano admitted that it would be a
few years before his credit issues would be cleared up (Id r 1 2) Thus
according to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was agreement to
transfer a 1 5 ownership interest to him is barred by the statute of frauds as
an agreement not to be performed within one year (Pl Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano admits that there was no written
agreement governing his employment and no written agreement to transfer a
15 ownership interest in Windham Q to him (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF
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mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
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Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
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In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
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his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
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According to Plaintiffs affidavit in the spring of 201 3 she became
concerned that Stephen Napolitano was using Windham Qs funds to pay his
personal expenses (Id ilif 3-4) Plaintiff requested that Arthur investigate the
matter (Id ~ 5) Arthur Napolitano assured her that Windham Q had not paid
any non-business expenses (Id) Plaintiff became concerned about Windham
Qs expenses again in May 2014 and requested that a forensic audit of Windham
Q be conducted (Id rr 6 8) Arthur opposed the audit (Id r 9)
Stephen Napolitano asserts that Windham Qs payment of certain
personal expenses was approved as part of his benefits package as the general
manager of the Dairy Queen (Stephen Napolitano Aff r 4) Stephen asserts
that in response to Plaintiffs complaints about the expenses Arthur Napolitano
increased his compensation and curtailed the practice of using Windham Qs
credit card to pay certain expenses (Id r 9) Plaintiff asserts that Arthur did
not discuss Windham Qs payment of Stephens personal expenses with her and
she did not approve the practice (Sandra Napolitano Aff rr 12 19)
According to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitano wrote a-letter to her -attorney
in October 201 4 admitting that certain personal expenses were paid for using
Windham Qs funds and stating that he was reimbursing Windham Q for those
expenses (Id r 14) Plaintiff does not believe that Stephen fully reimbursed
Windham Q for all of the personal expenses paid by the company (Id r 1 5)
2
Plaintiff requested Arthur Napolitano remove Stephen as the general manager of
the Dairy Queen but Arthur refused to do so (Id r 1 6)
Plaintiff filed a civil complaint individually and on behalf of Windham Q
with the Superior Court on August 26 2015 Plaintiffs complaint asserts
claims for breach of fiduciary duty conversion to recover money owed unjust
enrichment and fraud against Arthur and claims for conversion to recover
money owed unjust enrichment fraud breach of duty of loyalty and breach of
contract against Stephen Plaintiffs complaint also seeks an order
reconstituting the governance of Windham Q and removing Arthur and Stephen
from any positions overseeing the operation of Windham Q
Arthur Napolitano filed an answer to the civil complalnt on September 18
201 5 Stephen Napolitano filed his answer on September 24 201 5 Stephen
Napolitano amended his answer on February 11 2016 and added a
counterclaim against Plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment that the parties
had agreed that Stephen would receive an ownership interest in Windham Q in
exchange for agreeing to work as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store
(Stephen Napmiddotolitano Am Ans amp Countercl rr 13-14)
Arthur Napolitano also filed a complaint for divorce with the District Court
on September 29 201 5 Plaintiff filed an answer and counterclaim for divorce
on October 6 201 5 On January 1 3 201 6 the District Court appointed a
3
Referee to conduct an audit of Windham Q to produce an audit report 1 and to
monitor and report on the financial and operational performance during the
pendency of the divorce action (FM-1 6-02 Order of Appointment 1 )
Both the civil action and family action were accepted for transfer to the
Business and Consumer Court in June 201 6 Although not consolidated the
two cases are being coordinated before the Business and Consumer Court The
Referee filed his first report in the family action on August 5 2016 (the
Referees Report)
Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief on August 91 201 6
Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction ordering the following (1) that Stephen
Napolitano be removed as general manager (2) that the scope of the Referees
role be expanded to include (a) hiring a neutral third-party general manager to
oversee the day-to-day operations of the Dairy Queen store and (b) continued
oversight of Windham Qs finances (3) that a new accountant be hired by
Windham Q at the recommendation of the Referee ( 4) that the new accountant
conduct a complete review of the prior six tax years to determine if the parties
tax returns and Stephen Napolitanos W-Zs should be amended (5) that
Defendants pay the costs of the Referee and (6) any other relief the court
deems just (Pl Mot Prelim lnj 1 8-1 9)
4
Defendants filed an oppositionmiddot to the motion for preliminary injunctive
relief on August 31 201 6 Plaintiff replied on September 8 201 6 Plaintiff
also filed an addendum to her reply on October 11 201 6 Oral argument on
all pending motions in this case was held on October 12 2016
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Ordinarily to obtain a preliminary injunction a plaintiff must produce
prim a facie evidence of the following ( 1 ) the plaintiff will suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction is not granted (2) the irreparable injury to the plaintiff
outweighs any harm to the defendant from granting the injunction (3) the
plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his or her claims and (4) the public
interest will not be adversely affected by granting the injunction Bangor
Historic Track Inc v Dept ofAgric Food amp Rural Res 2003 ME 140 iJ 9 837
A Zd 1 29 Failure to demonstrate that any one of the criteria is met requires
the motion for preliminary injunction be denied Id iJ 10 In determining
whether to issue a preliminary injunction the court may rely on evidence
presented in sworn depositions affidavits oral testimony or a verified
complaint 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333 (3d ed 2011 )
Because Plaintiffs motion seeks an injunction compelling Defendants to
take affirmative actions Plaintiffs motion is one for mandatory injunctive relief
See Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remediessect 5-2 at 1 00 (4th ed 2004) The
5
purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final
judgment Dep 1t of Envtf Prat v Emerson 563 AZd 762 771 (Me 1989)
Because a mandatory injunction by its very nature will alter the status quo
courts do not readily enter mandatory preliminary injunctions Id However the
mere fact that a preliminary injunction sought by a plaintiff has mandatory
aspects does not ipso facto render the motion invalid Id Rather to obtain a
mandatory preliminary injunction the plaintiff must meet a higher burden
Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remediessect 5-2 n14 at 1 00 In addition to the
other criteria the plaintiff must show a clear likelihood of success on the
merits Emerson 563 AZd at 771 (emphasis supplied)
ANALYSIS
As discussed above Plaintiff seeks a mandatory preliminary injunction
removing Stephen Napolitano as general manager removing Windham Qs
accountant and expanding the role of the Referee (Pl Mot Prelim lnj 18-19)
Plaintiff argues that if the mandatory preliminary injunction is not granted
Stephen Napolitano will continue to mismanage Windham Q continue to use
Plaintiffs and Arthur Napolitanos money to pay his personal expenses and that
Windham Q will continue to file improper tax returns (Id at 1 6)
6
A The Referees Report
The court first addresses the threshold matter of the Referees Report
Plaintiff largely relies on the Referees Report filed in the related divorce action
as evidentiary support for her motion (Id at 5-11 ) However because the
Referees Report is not sworn evidence it cannot be considered by the court in
deciding the motion for preliminary injunction 1 As previously discussed in
determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction the court may rely on
evidence presented in sworn depositions affidavits oral testimony or a verified
complaint 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333
The Referees Report has not been sworn to and no affidavit has been
filed by the Referee stating under oath that the contents of the Report to the
best of his personal knowledge are true and accurate Therefore because
Plaintiff largely relies on the unsworn Referees Report Plaintiff has not provided
sufficient proper evidence in order to obtain preliminary injunctive relief 2
1 In their opposition Defendants assert that the Referees Report is not admissible evidence in this case because it was filed in the separate divorce action (Defs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj 11-1 2) In her reply Plaintiff asserts at a trial management conference on June 7 2015 the parties verbally agreed that the Referees Report would apply to both proceedings (Pl Reply to Defs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj 2) Because the court finds that the Referees Report is not properly before the court on the motion for preliminary injunctive relief the court need not decide that this juncture whether the Referees Report is admissible in the civil action
2 Additionally attached to Plaintiffs reply and her addendum are a number of additional exhibits purported to show that Stephen Napolitano used Windham Qs credit card to pay for personal expenses See (Pl Reply to Oefs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj
7
B The Merits of the Mot ion for Preliminary Injunction
Moreover even if the court were to consider the Referees Report
Plaintiff has still failed to produce prima facie evidence that she or Windham Q
will suffer an irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted An
irreparable injury is an injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law
Bangor Historic Track Inc 2003 ME 140 -r 10 83 7 A2d 1 29 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) Although there is no comprehensive rule
for measuring the adequacy of a legal remedy where a plaintiff is entitled to
money damages and the plaintiff has not demonstrated that damages would be
uncollectable from the defendant the legal remedy will be deemed adequate
Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remedies sect 5-3(a) at 101-02 Levesque v
Pelletier 144 Me 245 249 68 AZd 9 11 (1949)
In his Report the Referee identified numerous credit card charges to the
business from 201 2 to 2014 Hwhere the business purpose was not readily
apparent (Referee Report 1 3) These included gas charges drugstore
charges EZ Pass tolls groceries maintenance charges office supplies car
Exs D-G J Pl Addendum to Reply Exs L-0) Like the Referees Report no affidavit has been filed swearing to the authenticity of these documents Therefore like the Referees Report those exhibits cannot be considered by the court See 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333 Also like the Referees Report even if the court were to consider these documents there is no indication that Plaintiff would not be entitled to damages or that such damages would be uncollectable from Defendants See Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remediessect 5-3(a) at 101-02 Levesque 144 Me at 249 68 AZd at 11
8
maintenance travel expenses medical charges Amazon and iTunes charges
meal charges department store charges and $1 67 77 500 of other
questionable charges (Id at 1 3-14) The Referee also noted numerous annual
expenses where the business purpose was not clearly determinable (Id at
11) These expenses included automobile repairs cable television internet
payments to multiple vendors tolls travel expenses and yard work (Id at 8shy
11 ) The Referee also noted a high rate of variance between the businesss
register tapes and daily deposits which demonstrated a significant system
failure made validating the daily deposit amounts difficult and revealed certain
commingling of personal and company funds (Id at 1 5-18)
Even if the Referees findings constitute prima facie evidence of an injury
to Plaintiff and Windham Q Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she is without
an adequate remedy at law Plaintiff has not cited and the court is not aware
of any legal authority that would prevent Plaintiff from recovering monetary
damages for the above injuries Plaintiff has also not put forth any evidence
that monetary damages would be uncollectable from Defendants Thus Plaintiff
has not demonstrated an injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law
Moreover additional findings in the Referees Report actually demonstrate
that Plaintiff is unlikely to suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is
not granted In his report the Referee noted that a number of questionable
9
expenses had actually declined in 2015 and 2016 (Id at 11) The Referee
noted that there had been a complete stop in payments by Windham Q for auto
repairs gas tolls travel and yard work and a decline in payments for office
expenses supplies and telephone expenses (Id at 8-11 ) Thus based on the
findings in the Referees Report the alleged injuries to Plaintiff have ceased or
declined in the past two years Therefore contrary to Plaintiffs assertions the
Referees Report actually demonstrates it is unlikely that she will suffer a
continued irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted
Plaintiff argues that Stephen Napolitano has ceased his alleged tortious
behavior while under the scrutiny of the Referee and this court (Pl Mot Prelim
lnj 16) Plaintiff argues that if the Referees role is not expanded Stephen
Napolitano will likely resume his alleged tortious behavior (Id) Plaintiff has
cited no evidence to support this speculation (Id)
Therefore even if the court were to consider the Referees Report
Plaintiff has still failed to demonstrate an irreparable injury in order to obtain a
mandatory preliminary injunction Because failure to demonstrate that any one
of the criteria is met requires the motion be denied the court would not even
reach the other criteria for preliminary injunctive relief See Bangor Historic
Track Inc 2003 ME 140 ~ 10 837 A2d 129
10
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion
individually and on behalf of Windham Q LLC pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 for preliminary injunctive relief is DENIED
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Richard Mulhern Dated J2 t) G
Judge Business amp Consumer Court
Ent~rec on th~ Docket__~ Copies sent va Mail__ Elecronically__ ~
11
STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND SS LOCATION PORTLAND Docket No BCD-CV-1 6-19
SANDRA L NAPOLITANO Individually and on behalf of WINDHAM Q LLC
Plaintiff
v
ARTHUR NAPOLITANO SR and STEPHEN NAPOLITANO
Defendants
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ) ) ) ) )
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano has moved for summary judgment pursuant
to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 5 6 on Defendant Stephen Napolitanos
counterclaim for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief For the following
reasons Plaintiffs motion is denied in part and granted in part
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Defendant Arthur Napolitano are husband and wife (Sandra
Napolitano Aff r 2) Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano are each 50 members
and the sole managers of Windham Q LLC (Windham Q) which operates a
Dairy Queen franchise located in Windham Maine (Id) Defendant Stephen
Napolitano is Arthur Napolitanos son and has worked as the general manager of
the Dairy Queen for more than sixteen years (Sandra Napolitano Aff r 4
Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF r 19)
Plaintiff filed a civil complaint individually and on behalf of Windham Q
with the Superior Court on August 26 201 5 Plaintiffs civil complaint generally
asserts that Stephen Napolitano has misused Windham Qs funds to pay his
personal expenses and that Arthur Napolitano has made improper distributions
and failed to act in the best interests of Windham Q (Campi ~I 20-46)
Arthur Napolitano filed an answer to the civil complaint on September 18
201 5 Stephen Napolitano filed his answer to the civil complaint on September
24 201 S Arthur Napolitano also filed a complaint for divorce with the District
Court on September 29 201 S Stephen Napolitano amended his answer to the
civil complaint on February 11 2016 to add a counterclaim against Plaintiff for
declaratory judgment that the parties had agreed that Stephen would receive an
ownership interest in Windham Q in exchange for agreeing to work as the
general manager of the Dairy Queen store (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp
Countercl ~~ 1 3-14) Plaintiff filed an answer to the counterclaim on March 7
2016 Both the civil action and family action were accepted for transfer to the
Business and Consumer Court in June 2016 Although not consolidated the
two cases are being coordinated before the Business and Consumer Court
Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim on August 11 201 6 Stephen filed an opposition to
summary judgment on September 1 201 6 Plaintiff filed a timely reply on
z
September 8 2016 Oral argument on all pending motions in this case was held
on October 1 2 2016
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if based on the parties statements of
material fact and the cited record there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law MR Civ P 56(c)
Dyer v Dept of Transp_ 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d 821 A fact is material
if it can affect the outcome of the case Dyer 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d
821 A genuine issue of material fact exists if the fact finder must choose
between competing versions of the truth Id When deciding a motion for
summary judgment the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party Id
If the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion
on a claim or defense then the moving party must establish the existence of
each element of the claim or defense without dispute as to any material fact in
the record in order to obtain summary judgment Cach LLC v Kulas 2011 ME
70 ~ 9 21 A3d 1015 The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to
respond with specific material facts indicating a genuine issue for trial in order
to avoid summary judgment MR Civ P 56(e) Even if one partys version of
the facts appears more credible and persuasive any genuine issue of material
3
fact must be resolved by the fact finder regardless of the likelihood of success
Estate of Lewis v Concord Gen Mut Ins Co 2014 ME 34 ~ 10 87 A3d 732
ANALYSIS
Defendant Stephen Napolitanos counterclaim seeks a declaratory
judgment that he has an enforceable agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur
Napolitano that in exchange for agreeing to work full-time as the general
manager of the Dairy Queen store Stephen Napolitano was to receive (a) a
1 5 ownership share of Windham Q as soon as issues with his credit were
addressed and (b) Stephen would eventually receive a 50 ownership share of
Windham Q and associated real estate from Plaintiffs estate 1 (Stephen
Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl r~ 3-4 13) Stephen also seeks injunctive
relief ordering Plaintiff to transfer 75 of her ownership in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano to be increased to 50 from her estate in compliance with
the terms of the agreement (Id r~ 13-1 4)
Plaintiffs sole argument on summary judgment is that Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim is barred by the statute of frauds because there are
no writings evidencing the alleged agreement (Pl Mot Summ J 3-7 ) The
statute of frauds is an affirmative defense MR Civ P 8(c) Thus the statute
Stephen Napolitano asserts the remaining 50 ownership of Windham Q would be shared by his full siblings who are not parties to this litigation (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl ~ 3)
4
1
of frauds must be affirmatively pleaded in an answer otherwise it is waived
Greenlaw v Rodick 158 Me 440 445 185 A2d 895 897-98 (1962) An
affirmative defense may be adequately pleaded even though the exact words
used in Rule 8(c) are absent See Graffam v Geronda 304 A2d 76 78 (Me
1973) Rule 8(c) is satisfied by any clear and unmistakable notice that the
defense is being raised 2 Harvey Maine Civil Practice sect 85 at 362 (3d ed
2011)
Here Plaintiff has not expressly pleaded the statute of frauds as an
affirmative defense (Pl Ans to Countercl amp Affirm Defenses ii 1-7)
Plaintiffs first affirmative defense however avers that Stephen has no
agreement relating to his ownership of the Windham Dairy Queen that is
enforceable under Maine law (Id 1l 1) This language is sufficient to put
Stephen Napolitano on clear and unmistakable notice that Plaintiff is raising the
statute of frauds defense
Maines statute of frauds provides that the actions based on the following
agreements may not be maintained unless the agreement is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto
lawfully authorized (a) any agreement that is not to be performed within one
year and (b) any agreement to give bequeath or devise by will to another any
real personal or mixed property 33 MRS sect 51 (5 ) (7)
5
To determine whether an alleged agreement is one not to be performed
within one year the court does not look to when the performance actually
occurred or whether it was conceivable that performance would occur within or
beyond one year The court looks only to the parties intent Great Hill Fill amp
Gravel v Shapleigh 1997 ME 75 -r S 692 A2d 928 The court must look to
the circumstances of the case and whether the parties plainly manifested an middot
intent that the contract not be performed within one year Id
Regarding an agreement to devise by will Maines Probate Code further
provides
A contract to make a will or devise or not to revoke a will or devise can be established only by ( 1 ) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract or (3) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills
18-A MRS sect 2-701
If an agreement falls within the statute of frauds then it must be
evidenced in writing and signed by the party against whom the agreement is to
be enforced or another lawfully authorized person 33 MRS sect 51 Nearly any
form of writing will satisfy the statute of frauds McCare v Rocha 2014 ME 4
-r 11 86 A3d 22 A series of writings may collectively satisfy the statute of
6
frauds even if none of the writings does so separately Wilson v DePapa 634
A2d 1252 1254 (Me 1993)
The part performance doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds
Sullivan v Porter 2004 ME 134 ~ 10 861 A2d 625 An oral contract within
the statute of frauds may still be enforced if the party seeking to enforce the
agreement can prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the parties entered
into a contract (2) the party seeking to enforce the contract partially
performed its obligation and (3) the performance was induced by the other
partys misrepresentation which may be evidenced by acquiescence or silence
Id at i 11 The part performance doctrine is grounded in the principle of
equitable estoppel which involves detrimental reliance induced by
misrepresentation and fraud Id I 17 Equitabl~ estoppel differs from
promissory estoppel which involves detrimental reliance on a mere promise Id
~ 1 7 n 7 The Law Court has expressly stated that for multi-year employment
agreements an employees detrimental reliance on an employers oral promise is
not enough to avoid the statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine
Stearns v Emery-Waterhouse Co 596 A2d 72 75 (Me 1991 ) To avoid the
statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine the employee must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their performance was induced by
7
fraud on the part of the employer Id see also Suliivan 2004 ME 134 iI 17
861 A2d 625
A The 1 5 Ownership Interest in Windham Q
In support of her motion Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement
governing Stephen Napolitanos employment with Windham Q there was no
written agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership share of Windham Q to Stephen
Napolitano and that there was no agreement written or oral that Stephens
employment with Windham Q was contingent upon him receiving an ownership
interest (Pl Suppg SMF iiiI 8-9 14) Plaintiff asserts that even if there was
an oral agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership interest Stephen has testified
that any transfer would not happen immediately because the agreement was
contingent upon Stephen resolving certain issues with his credit (Id iI 11 )
Plaintiff further asserts that Stephen Napolitano admitted that it would be a
few years before his credit issues would be cleared up (Id r 1 2) Thus
according to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was agreement to
transfer a 1 5 ownership interest to him is barred by the statute of frauds as
an agreement not to be performed within one year (Pl Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano admits that there was no written
agreement governing his employment and no written agreement to transfer a
15 ownership interest in Windham Q to him (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF
8
mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
9
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
Plaintiff requested Arthur Napolitano remove Stephen as the general manager of
the Dairy Queen but Arthur refused to do so (Id r 1 6)
Plaintiff filed a civil complaint individually and on behalf of Windham Q
with the Superior Court on August 26 2015 Plaintiffs complaint asserts
claims for breach of fiduciary duty conversion to recover money owed unjust
enrichment and fraud against Arthur and claims for conversion to recover
money owed unjust enrichment fraud breach of duty of loyalty and breach of
contract against Stephen Plaintiffs complaint also seeks an order
reconstituting the governance of Windham Q and removing Arthur and Stephen
from any positions overseeing the operation of Windham Q
Arthur Napolitano filed an answer to the civil complalnt on September 18
201 5 Stephen Napolitano filed his answer on September 24 201 5 Stephen
Napolitano amended his answer on February 11 2016 and added a
counterclaim against Plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment that the parties
had agreed that Stephen would receive an ownership interest in Windham Q in
exchange for agreeing to work as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store
(Stephen Napmiddotolitano Am Ans amp Countercl rr 13-14)
Arthur Napolitano also filed a complaint for divorce with the District Court
on September 29 201 5 Plaintiff filed an answer and counterclaim for divorce
on October 6 201 5 On January 1 3 201 6 the District Court appointed a
3
Referee to conduct an audit of Windham Q to produce an audit report 1 and to
monitor and report on the financial and operational performance during the
pendency of the divorce action (FM-1 6-02 Order of Appointment 1 )
Both the civil action and family action were accepted for transfer to the
Business and Consumer Court in June 201 6 Although not consolidated the
two cases are being coordinated before the Business and Consumer Court The
Referee filed his first report in the family action on August 5 2016 (the
Referees Report)
Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief on August 91 201 6
Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction ordering the following (1) that Stephen
Napolitano be removed as general manager (2) that the scope of the Referees
role be expanded to include (a) hiring a neutral third-party general manager to
oversee the day-to-day operations of the Dairy Queen store and (b) continued
oversight of Windham Qs finances (3) that a new accountant be hired by
Windham Q at the recommendation of the Referee ( 4) that the new accountant
conduct a complete review of the prior six tax years to determine if the parties
tax returns and Stephen Napolitanos W-Zs should be amended (5) that
Defendants pay the costs of the Referee and (6) any other relief the court
deems just (Pl Mot Prelim lnj 1 8-1 9)
4
Defendants filed an oppositionmiddot to the motion for preliminary injunctive
relief on August 31 201 6 Plaintiff replied on September 8 201 6 Plaintiff
also filed an addendum to her reply on October 11 201 6 Oral argument on
all pending motions in this case was held on October 12 2016
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Ordinarily to obtain a preliminary injunction a plaintiff must produce
prim a facie evidence of the following ( 1 ) the plaintiff will suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction is not granted (2) the irreparable injury to the plaintiff
outweighs any harm to the defendant from granting the injunction (3) the
plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his or her claims and (4) the public
interest will not be adversely affected by granting the injunction Bangor
Historic Track Inc v Dept ofAgric Food amp Rural Res 2003 ME 140 iJ 9 837
A Zd 1 29 Failure to demonstrate that any one of the criteria is met requires
the motion for preliminary injunction be denied Id iJ 10 In determining
whether to issue a preliminary injunction the court may rely on evidence
presented in sworn depositions affidavits oral testimony or a verified
complaint 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333 (3d ed 2011 )
Because Plaintiffs motion seeks an injunction compelling Defendants to
take affirmative actions Plaintiffs motion is one for mandatory injunctive relief
See Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remediessect 5-2 at 1 00 (4th ed 2004) The
5
purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final
judgment Dep 1t of Envtf Prat v Emerson 563 AZd 762 771 (Me 1989)
Because a mandatory injunction by its very nature will alter the status quo
courts do not readily enter mandatory preliminary injunctions Id However the
mere fact that a preliminary injunction sought by a plaintiff has mandatory
aspects does not ipso facto render the motion invalid Id Rather to obtain a
mandatory preliminary injunction the plaintiff must meet a higher burden
Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remediessect 5-2 n14 at 1 00 In addition to the
other criteria the plaintiff must show a clear likelihood of success on the
merits Emerson 563 AZd at 771 (emphasis supplied)
ANALYSIS
As discussed above Plaintiff seeks a mandatory preliminary injunction
removing Stephen Napolitano as general manager removing Windham Qs
accountant and expanding the role of the Referee (Pl Mot Prelim lnj 18-19)
Plaintiff argues that if the mandatory preliminary injunction is not granted
Stephen Napolitano will continue to mismanage Windham Q continue to use
Plaintiffs and Arthur Napolitanos money to pay his personal expenses and that
Windham Q will continue to file improper tax returns (Id at 1 6)
6
A The Referees Report
The court first addresses the threshold matter of the Referees Report
Plaintiff largely relies on the Referees Report filed in the related divorce action
as evidentiary support for her motion (Id at 5-11 ) However because the
Referees Report is not sworn evidence it cannot be considered by the court in
deciding the motion for preliminary injunction 1 As previously discussed in
determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction the court may rely on
evidence presented in sworn depositions affidavits oral testimony or a verified
complaint 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333
The Referees Report has not been sworn to and no affidavit has been
filed by the Referee stating under oath that the contents of the Report to the
best of his personal knowledge are true and accurate Therefore because
Plaintiff largely relies on the unsworn Referees Report Plaintiff has not provided
sufficient proper evidence in order to obtain preliminary injunctive relief 2
1 In their opposition Defendants assert that the Referees Report is not admissible evidence in this case because it was filed in the separate divorce action (Defs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj 11-1 2) In her reply Plaintiff asserts at a trial management conference on June 7 2015 the parties verbally agreed that the Referees Report would apply to both proceedings (Pl Reply to Defs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj 2) Because the court finds that the Referees Report is not properly before the court on the motion for preliminary injunctive relief the court need not decide that this juncture whether the Referees Report is admissible in the civil action
2 Additionally attached to Plaintiffs reply and her addendum are a number of additional exhibits purported to show that Stephen Napolitano used Windham Qs credit card to pay for personal expenses See (Pl Reply to Oefs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj
7
B The Merits of the Mot ion for Preliminary Injunction
Moreover even if the court were to consider the Referees Report
Plaintiff has still failed to produce prima facie evidence that she or Windham Q
will suffer an irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted An
irreparable injury is an injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law
Bangor Historic Track Inc 2003 ME 140 -r 10 83 7 A2d 1 29 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) Although there is no comprehensive rule
for measuring the adequacy of a legal remedy where a plaintiff is entitled to
money damages and the plaintiff has not demonstrated that damages would be
uncollectable from the defendant the legal remedy will be deemed adequate
Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remedies sect 5-3(a) at 101-02 Levesque v
Pelletier 144 Me 245 249 68 AZd 9 11 (1949)
In his Report the Referee identified numerous credit card charges to the
business from 201 2 to 2014 Hwhere the business purpose was not readily
apparent (Referee Report 1 3) These included gas charges drugstore
charges EZ Pass tolls groceries maintenance charges office supplies car
Exs D-G J Pl Addendum to Reply Exs L-0) Like the Referees Report no affidavit has been filed swearing to the authenticity of these documents Therefore like the Referees Report those exhibits cannot be considered by the court See 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333 Also like the Referees Report even if the court were to consider these documents there is no indication that Plaintiff would not be entitled to damages or that such damages would be uncollectable from Defendants See Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remediessect 5-3(a) at 101-02 Levesque 144 Me at 249 68 AZd at 11
8
maintenance travel expenses medical charges Amazon and iTunes charges
meal charges department store charges and $1 67 77 500 of other
questionable charges (Id at 1 3-14) The Referee also noted numerous annual
expenses where the business purpose was not clearly determinable (Id at
11) These expenses included automobile repairs cable television internet
payments to multiple vendors tolls travel expenses and yard work (Id at 8shy
11 ) The Referee also noted a high rate of variance between the businesss
register tapes and daily deposits which demonstrated a significant system
failure made validating the daily deposit amounts difficult and revealed certain
commingling of personal and company funds (Id at 1 5-18)
Even if the Referees findings constitute prima facie evidence of an injury
to Plaintiff and Windham Q Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she is without
an adequate remedy at law Plaintiff has not cited and the court is not aware
of any legal authority that would prevent Plaintiff from recovering monetary
damages for the above injuries Plaintiff has also not put forth any evidence
that monetary damages would be uncollectable from Defendants Thus Plaintiff
has not demonstrated an injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law
Moreover additional findings in the Referees Report actually demonstrate
that Plaintiff is unlikely to suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is
not granted In his report the Referee noted that a number of questionable
9
expenses had actually declined in 2015 and 2016 (Id at 11) The Referee
noted that there had been a complete stop in payments by Windham Q for auto
repairs gas tolls travel and yard work and a decline in payments for office
expenses supplies and telephone expenses (Id at 8-11 ) Thus based on the
findings in the Referees Report the alleged injuries to Plaintiff have ceased or
declined in the past two years Therefore contrary to Plaintiffs assertions the
Referees Report actually demonstrates it is unlikely that she will suffer a
continued irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted
Plaintiff argues that Stephen Napolitano has ceased his alleged tortious
behavior while under the scrutiny of the Referee and this court (Pl Mot Prelim
lnj 16) Plaintiff argues that if the Referees role is not expanded Stephen
Napolitano will likely resume his alleged tortious behavior (Id) Plaintiff has
cited no evidence to support this speculation (Id)
Therefore even if the court were to consider the Referees Report
Plaintiff has still failed to demonstrate an irreparable injury in order to obtain a
mandatory preliminary injunction Because failure to demonstrate that any one
of the criteria is met requires the motion be denied the court would not even
reach the other criteria for preliminary injunctive relief See Bangor Historic
Track Inc 2003 ME 140 ~ 10 837 A2d 129
10
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion
individually and on behalf of Windham Q LLC pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 for preliminary injunctive relief is DENIED
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Richard Mulhern Dated J2 t) G
Judge Business amp Consumer Court
Ent~rec on th~ Docket__~ Copies sent va Mail__ Elecronically__ ~
11
STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND SS LOCATION PORTLAND Docket No BCD-CV-1 6-19
SANDRA L NAPOLITANO Individually and on behalf of WINDHAM Q LLC
Plaintiff
v
ARTHUR NAPOLITANO SR and STEPHEN NAPOLITANO
Defendants
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ) ) ) ) )
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano has moved for summary judgment pursuant
to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 5 6 on Defendant Stephen Napolitanos
counterclaim for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief For the following
reasons Plaintiffs motion is denied in part and granted in part
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Defendant Arthur Napolitano are husband and wife (Sandra
Napolitano Aff r 2) Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano are each 50 members
and the sole managers of Windham Q LLC (Windham Q) which operates a
Dairy Queen franchise located in Windham Maine (Id) Defendant Stephen
Napolitano is Arthur Napolitanos son and has worked as the general manager of
the Dairy Queen for more than sixteen years (Sandra Napolitano Aff r 4
Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF r 19)
Plaintiff filed a civil complaint individually and on behalf of Windham Q
with the Superior Court on August 26 201 5 Plaintiffs civil complaint generally
asserts that Stephen Napolitano has misused Windham Qs funds to pay his
personal expenses and that Arthur Napolitano has made improper distributions
and failed to act in the best interests of Windham Q (Campi ~I 20-46)
Arthur Napolitano filed an answer to the civil complaint on September 18
201 5 Stephen Napolitano filed his answer to the civil complaint on September
24 201 S Arthur Napolitano also filed a complaint for divorce with the District
Court on September 29 201 S Stephen Napolitano amended his answer to the
civil complaint on February 11 2016 to add a counterclaim against Plaintiff for
declaratory judgment that the parties had agreed that Stephen would receive an
ownership interest in Windham Q in exchange for agreeing to work as the
general manager of the Dairy Queen store (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp
Countercl ~~ 1 3-14) Plaintiff filed an answer to the counterclaim on March 7
2016 Both the civil action and family action were accepted for transfer to the
Business and Consumer Court in June 2016 Although not consolidated the
two cases are being coordinated before the Business and Consumer Court
Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim on August 11 201 6 Stephen filed an opposition to
summary judgment on September 1 201 6 Plaintiff filed a timely reply on
z
September 8 2016 Oral argument on all pending motions in this case was held
on October 1 2 2016
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if based on the parties statements of
material fact and the cited record there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law MR Civ P 56(c)
Dyer v Dept of Transp_ 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d 821 A fact is material
if it can affect the outcome of the case Dyer 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d
821 A genuine issue of material fact exists if the fact finder must choose
between competing versions of the truth Id When deciding a motion for
summary judgment the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party Id
If the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion
on a claim or defense then the moving party must establish the existence of
each element of the claim or defense without dispute as to any material fact in
the record in order to obtain summary judgment Cach LLC v Kulas 2011 ME
70 ~ 9 21 A3d 1015 The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to
respond with specific material facts indicating a genuine issue for trial in order
to avoid summary judgment MR Civ P 56(e) Even if one partys version of
the facts appears more credible and persuasive any genuine issue of material
3
fact must be resolved by the fact finder regardless of the likelihood of success
Estate of Lewis v Concord Gen Mut Ins Co 2014 ME 34 ~ 10 87 A3d 732
ANALYSIS
Defendant Stephen Napolitanos counterclaim seeks a declaratory
judgment that he has an enforceable agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur
Napolitano that in exchange for agreeing to work full-time as the general
manager of the Dairy Queen store Stephen Napolitano was to receive (a) a
1 5 ownership share of Windham Q as soon as issues with his credit were
addressed and (b) Stephen would eventually receive a 50 ownership share of
Windham Q and associated real estate from Plaintiffs estate 1 (Stephen
Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl r~ 3-4 13) Stephen also seeks injunctive
relief ordering Plaintiff to transfer 75 of her ownership in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano to be increased to 50 from her estate in compliance with
the terms of the agreement (Id r~ 13-1 4)
Plaintiffs sole argument on summary judgment is that Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim is barred by the statute of frauds because there are
no writings evidencing the alleged agreement (Pl Mot Summ J 3-7 ) The
statute of frauds is an affirmative defense MR Civ P 8(c) Thus the statute
Stephen Napolitano asserts the remaining 50 ownership of Windham Q would be shared by his full siblings who are not parties to this litigation (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl ~ 3)
4
1
of frauds must be affirmatively pleaded in an answer otherwise it is waived
Greenlaw v Rodick 158 Me 440 445 185 A2d 895 897-98 (1962) An
affirmative defense may be adequately pleaded even though the exact words
used in Rule 8(c) are absent See Graffam v Geronda 304 A2d 76 78 (Me
1973) Rule 8(c) is satisfied by any clear and unmistakable notice that the
defense is being raised 2 Harvey Maine Civil Practice sect 85 at 362 (3d ed
2011)
Here Plaintiff has not expressly pleaded the statute of frauds as an
affirmative defense (Pl Ans to Countercl amp Affirm Defenses ii 1-7)
Plaintiffs first affirmative defense however avers that Stephen has no
agreement relating to his ownership of the Windham Dairy Queen that is
enforceable under Maine law (Id 1l 1) This language is sufficient to put
Stephen Napolitano on clear and unmistakable notice that Plaintiff is raising the
statute of frauds defense
Maines statute of frauds provides that the actions based on the following
agreements may not be maintained unless the agreement is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto
lawfully authorized (a) any agreement that is not to be performed within one
year and (b) any agreement to give bequeath or devise by will to another any
real personal or mixed property 33 MRS sect 51 (5 ) (7)
5
To determine whether an alleged agreement is one not to be performed
within one year the court does not look to when the performance actually
occurred or whether it was conceivable that performance would occur within or
beyond one year The court looks only to the parties intent Great Hill Fill amp
Gravel v Shapleigh 1997 ME 75 -r S 692 A2d 928 The court must look to
the circumstances of the case and whether the parties plainly manifested an middot
intent that the contract not be performed within one year Id
Regarding an agreement to devise by will Maines Probate Code further
provides
A contract to make a will or devise or not to revoke a will or devise can be established only by ( 1 ) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract or (3) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills
18-A MRS sect 2-701
If an agreement falls within the statute of frauds then it must be
evidenced in writing and signed by the party against whom the agreement is to
be enforced or another lawfully authorized person 33 MRS sect 51 Nearly any
form of writing will satisfy the statute of frauds McCare v Rocha 2014 ME 4
-r 11 86 A3d 22 A series of writings may collectively satisfy the statute of
6
frauds even if none of the writings does so separately Wilson v DePapa 634
A2d 1252 1254 (Me 1993)
The part performance doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds
Sullivan v Porter 2004 ME 134 ~ 10 861 A2d 625 An oral contract within
the statute of frauds may still be enforced if the party seeking to enforce the
agreement can prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the parties entered
into a contract (2) the party seeking to enforce the contract partially
performed its obligation and (3) the performance was induced by the other
partys misrepresentation which may be evidenced by acquiescence or silence
Id at i 11 The part performance doctrine is grounded in the principle of
equitable estoppel which involves detrimental reliance induced by
misrepresentation and fraud Id I 17 Equitabl~ estoppel differs from
promissory estoppel which involves detrimental reliance on a mere promise Id
~ 1 7 n 7 The Law Court has expressly stated that for multi-year employment
agreements an employees detrimental reliance on an employers oral promise is
not enough to avoid the statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine
Stearns v Emery-Waterhouse Co 596 A2d 72 75 (Me 1991 ) To avoid the
statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine the employee must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their performance was induced by
7
fraud on the part of the employer Id see also Suliivan 2004 ME 134 iI 17
861 A2d 625
A The 1 5 Ownership Interest in Windham Q
In support of her motion Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement
governing Stephen Napolitanos employment with Windham Q there was no
written agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership share of Windham Q to Stephen
Napolitano and that there was no agreement written or oral that Stephens
employment with Windham Q was contingent upon him receiving an ownership
interest (Pl Suppg SMF iiiI 8-9 14) Plaintiff asserts that even if there was
an oral agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership interest Stephen has testified
that any transfer would not happen immediately because the agreement was
contingent upon Stephen resolving certain issues with his credit (Id iI 11 )
Plaintiff further asserts that Stephen Napolitano admitted that it would be a
few years before his credit issues would be cleared up (Id r 1 2) Thus
according to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was agreement to
transfer a 1 5 ownership interest to him is barred by the statute of frauds as
an agreement not to be performed within one year (Pl Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano admits that there was no written
agreement governing his employment and no written agreement to transfer a
15 ownership interest in Windham Q to him (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF
8
mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
9
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
Referee to conduct an audit of Windham Q to produce an audit report 1 and to
monitor and report on the financial and operational performance during the
pendency of the divorce action (FM-1 6-02 Order of Appointment 1 )
Both the civil action and family action were accepted for transfer to the
Business and Consumer Court in June 201 6 Although not consolidated the
two cases are being coordinated before the Business and Consumer Court The
Referee filed his first report in the family action on August 5 2016 (the
Referees Report)
Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief on August 91 201 6
Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction ordering the following (1) that Stephen
Napolitano be removed as general manager (2) that the scope of the Referees
role be expanded to include (a) hiring a neutral third-party general manager to
oversee the day-to-day operations of the Dairy Queen store and (b) continued
oversight of Windham Qs finances (3) that a new accountant be hired by
Windham Q at the recommendation of the Referee ( 4) that the new accountant
conduct a complete review of the prior six tax years to determine if the parties
tax returns and Stephen Napolitanos W-Zs should be amended (5) that
Defendants pay the costs of the Referee and (6) any other relief the court
deems just (Pl Mot Prelim lnj 1 8-1 9)
4
Defendants filed an oppositionmiddot to the motion for preliminary injunctive
relief on August 31 201 6 Plaintiff replied on September 8 201 6 Plaintiff
also filed an addendum to her reply on October 11 201 6 Oral argument on
all pending motions in this case was held on October 12 2016
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Ordinarily to obtain a preliminary injunction a plaintiff must produce
prim a facie evidence of the following ( 1 ) the plaintiff will suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction is not granted (2) the irreparable injury to the plaintiff
outweighs any harm to the defendant from granting the injunction (3) the
plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his or her claims and (4) the public
interest will not be adversely affected by granting the injunction Bangor
Historic Track Inc v Dept ofAgric Food amp Rural Res 2003 ME 140 iJ 9 837
A Zd 1 29 Failure to demonstrate that any one of the criteria is met requires
the motion for preliminary injunction be denied Id iJ 10 In determining
whether to issue a preliminary injunction the court may rely on evidence
presented in sworn depositions affidavits oral testimony or a verified
complaint 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333 (3d ed 2011 )
Because Plaintiffs motion seeks an injunction compelling Defendants to
take affirmative actions Plaintiffs motion is one for mandatory injunctive relief
See Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remediessect 5-2 at 1 00 (4th ed 2004) The
5
purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final
judgment Dep 1t of Envtf Prat v Emerson 563 AZd 762 771 (Me 1989)
Because a mandatory injunction by its very nature will alter the status quo
courts do not readily enter mandatory preliminary injunctions Id However the
mere fact that a preliminary injunction sought by a plaintiff has mandatory
aspects does not ipso facto render the motion invalid Id Rather to obtain a
mandatory preliminary injunction the plaintiff must meet a higher burden
Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remediessect 5-2 n14 at 1 00 In addition to the
other criteria the plaintiff must show a clear likelihood of success on the
merits Emerson 563 AZd at 771 (emphasis supplied)
ANALYSIS
As discussed above Plaintiff seeks a mandatory preliminary injunction
removing Stephen Napolitano as general manager removing Windham Qs
accountant and expanding the role of the Referee (Pl Mot Prelim lnj 18-19)
Plaintiff argues that if the mandatory preliminary injunction is not granted
Stephen Napolitano will continue to mismanage Windham Q continue to use
Plaintiffs and Arthur Napolitanos money to pay his personal expenses and that
Windham Q will continue to file improper tax returns (Id at 1 6)
6
A The Referees Report
The court first addresses the threshold matter of the Referees Report
Plaintiff largely relies on the Referees Report filed in the related divorce action
as evidentiary support for her motion (Id at 5-11 ) However because the
Referees Report is not sworn evidence it cannot be considered by the court in
deciding the motion for preliminary injunction 1 As previously discussed in
determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction the court may rely on
evidence presented in sworn depositions affidavits oral testimony or a verified
complaint 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333
The Referees Report has not been sworn to and no affidavit has been
filed by the Referee stating under oath that the contents of the Report to the
best of his personal knowledge are true and accurate Therefore because
Plaintiff largely relies on the unsworn Referees Report Plaintiff has not provided
sufficient proper evidence in order to obtain preliminary injunctive relief 2
1 In their opposition Defendants assert that the Referees Report is not admissible evidence in this case because it was filed in the separate divorce action (Defs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj 11-1 2) In her reply Plaintiff asserts at a trial management conference on June 7 2015 the parties verbally agreed that the Referees Report would apply to both proceedings (Pl Reply to Defs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj 2) Because the court finds that the Referees Report is not properly before the court on the motion for preliminary injunctive relief the court need not decide that this juncture whether the Referees Report is admissible in the civil action
2 Additionally attached to Plaintiffs reply and her addendum are a number of additional exhibits purported to show that Stephen Napolitano used Windham Qs credit card to pay for personal expenses See (Pl Reply to Oefs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj
7
B The Merits of the Mot ion for Preliminary Injunction
Moreover even if the court were to consider the Referees Report
Plaintiff has still failed to produce prima facie evidence that she or Windham Q
will suffer an irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted An
irreparable injury is an injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law
Bangor Historic Track Inc 2003 ME 140 -r 10 83 7 A2d 1 29 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) Although there is no comprehensive rule
for measuring the adequacy of a legal remedy where a plaintiff is entitled to
money damages and the plaintiff has not demonstrated that damages would be
uncollectable from the defendant the legal remedy will be deemed adequate
Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remedies sect 5-3(a) at 101-02 Levesque v
Pelletier 144 Me 245 249 68 AZd 9 11 (1949)
In his Report the Referee identified numerous credit card charges to the
business from 201 2 to 2014 Hwhere the business purpose was not readily
apparent (Referee Report 1 3) These included gas charges drugstore
charges EZ Pass tolls groceries maintenance charges office supplies car
Exs D-G J Pl Addendum to Reply Exs L-0) Like the Referees Report no affidavit has been filed swearing to the authenticity of these documents Therefore like the Referees Report those exhibits cannot be considered by the court See 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333 Also like the Referees Report even if the court were to consider these documents there is no indication that Plaintiff would not be entitled to damages or that such damages would be uncollectable from Defendants See Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remediessect 5-3(a) at 101-02 Levesque 144 Me at 249 68 AZd at 11
8
maintenance travel expenses medical charges Amazon and iTunes charges
meal charges department store charges and $1 67 77 500 of other
questionable charges (Id at 1 3-14) The Referee also noted numerous annual
expenses where the business purpose was not clearly determinable (Id at
11) These expenses included automobile repairs cable television internet
payments to multiple vendors tolls travel expenses and yard work (Id at 8shy
11 ) The Referee also noted a high rate of variance between the businesss
register tapes and daily deposits which demonstrated a significant system
failure made validating the daily deposit amounts difficult and revealed certain
commingling of personal and company funds (Id at 1 5-18)
Even if the Referees findings constitute prima facie evidence of an injury
to Plaintiff and Windham Q Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she is without
an adequate remedy at law Plaintiff has not cited and the court is not aware
of any legal authority that would prevent Plaintiff from recovering monetary
damages for the above injuries Plaintiff has also not put forth any evidence
that monetary damages would be uncollectable from Defendants Thus Plaintiff
has not demonstrated an injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law
Moreover additional findings in the Referees Report actually demonstrate
that Plaintiff is unlikely to suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is
not granted In his report the Referee noted that a number of questionable
9
expenses had actually declined in 2015 and 2016 (Id at 11) The Referee
noted that there had been a complete stop in payments by Windham Q for auto
repairs gas tolls travel and yard work and a decline in payments for office
expenses supplies and telephone expenses (Id at 8-11 ) Thus based on the
findings in the Referees Report the alleged injuries to Plaintiff have ceased or
declined in the past two years Therefore contrary to Plaintiffs assertions the
Referees Report actually demonstrates it is unlikely that she will suffer a
continued irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted
Plaintiff argues that Stephen Napolitano has ceased his alleged tortious
behavior while under the scrutiny of the Referee and this court (Pl Mot Prelim
lnj 16) Plaintiff argues that if the Referees role is not expanded Stephen
Napolitano will likely resume his alleged tortious behavior (Id) Plaintiff has
cited no evidence to support this speculation (Id)
Therefore even if the court were to consider the Referees Report
Plaintiff has still failed to demonstrate an irreparable injury in order to obtain a
mandatory preliminary injunction Because failure to demonstrate that any one
of the criteria is met requires the motion be denied the court would not even
reach the other criteria for preliminary injunctive relief See Bangor Historic
Track Inc 2003 ME 140 ~ 10 837 A2d 129
10
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion
individually and on behalf of Windham Q LLC pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 for preliminary injunctive relief is DENIED
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Richard Mulhern Dated J2 t) G
Judge Business amp Consumer Court
Ent~rec on th~ Docket__~ Copies sent va Mail__ Elecronically__ ~
11
STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND SS LOCATION PORTLAND Docket No BCD-CV-1 6-19
SANDRA L NAPOLITANO Individually and on behalf of WINDHAM Q LLC
Plaintiff
v
ARTHUR NAPOLITANO SR and STEPHEN NAPOLITANO
Defendants
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ) ) ) ) )
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano has moved for summary judgment pursuant
to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 5 6 on Defendant Stephen Napolitanos
counterclaim for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief For the following
reasons Plaintiffs motion is denied in part and granted in part
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Defendant Arthur Napolitano are husband and wife (Sandra
Napolitano Aff r 2) Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano are each 50 members
and the sole managers of Windham Q LLC (Windham Q) which operates a
Dairy Queen franchise located in Windham Maine (Id) Defendant Stephen
Napolitano is Arthur Napolitanos son and has worked as the general manager of
the Dairy Queen for more than sixteen years (Sandra Napolitano Aff r 4
Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF r 19)
Plaintiff filed a civil complaint individually and on behalf of Windham Q
with the Superior Court on August 26 201 5 Plaintiffs civil complaint generally
asserts that Stephen Napolitano has misused Windham Qs funds to pay his
personal expenses and that Arthur Napolitano has made improper distributions
and failed to act in the best interests of Windham Q (Campi ~I 20-46)
Arthur Napolitano filed an answer to the civil complaint on September 18
201 5 Stephen Napolitano filed his answer to the civil complaint on September
24 201 S Arthur Napolitano also filed a complaint for divorce with the District
Court on September 29 201 S Stephen Napolitano amended his answer to the
civil complaint on February 11 2016 to add a counterclaim against Plaintiff for
declaratory judgment that the parties had agreed that Stephen would receive an
ownership interest in Windham Q in exchange for agreeing to work as the
general manager of the Dairy Queen store (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp
Countercl ~~ 1 3-14) Plaintiff filed an answer to the counterclaim on March 7
2016 Both the civil action and family action were accepted for transfer to the
Business and Consumer Court in June 2016 Although not consolidated the
two cases are being coordinated before the Business and Consumer Court
Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim on August 11 201 6 Stephen filed an opposition to
summary judgment on September 1 201 6 Plaintiff filed a timely reply on
z
September 8 2016 Oral argument on all pending motions in this case was held
on October 1 2 2016
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if based on the parties statements of
material fact and the cited record there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law MR Civ P 56(c)
Dyer v Dept of Transp_ 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d 821 A fact is material
if it can affect the outcome of the case Dyer 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d
821 A genuine issue of material fact exists if the fact finder must choose
between competing versions of the truth Id When deciding a motion for
summary judgment the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party Id
If the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion
on a claim or defense then the moving party must establish the existence of
each element of the claim or defense without dispute as to any material fact in
the record in order to obtain summary judgment Cach LLC v Kulas 2011 ME
70 ~ 9 21 A3d 1015 The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to
respond with specific material facts indicating a genuine issue for trial in order
to avoid summary judgment MR Civ P 56(e) Even if one partys version of
the facts appears more credible and persuasive any genuine issue of material
3
fact must be resolved by the fact finder regardless of the likelihood of success
Estate of Lewis v Concord Gen Mut Ins Co 2014 ME 34 ~ 10 87 A3d 732
ANALYSIS
Defendant Stephen Napolitanos counterclaim seeks a declaratory
judgment that he has an enforceable agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur
Napolitano that in exchange for agreeing to work full-time as the general
manager of the Dairy Queen store Stephen Napolitano was to receive (a) a
1 5 ownership share of Windham Q as soon as issues with his credit were
addressed and (b) Stephen would eventually receive a 50 ownership share of
Windham Q and associated real estate from Plaintiffs estate 1 (Stephen
Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl r~ 3-4 13) Stephen also seeks injunctive
relief ordering Plaintiff to transfer 75 of her ownership in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano to be increased to 50 from her estate in compliance with
the terms of the agreement (Id r~ 13-1 4)
Plaintiffs sole argument on summary judgment is that Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim is barred by the statute of frauds because there are
no writings evidencing the alleged agreement (Pl Mot Summ J 3-7 ) The
statute of frauds is an affirmative defense MR Civ P 8(c) Thus the statute
Stephen Napolitano asserts the remaining 50 ownership of Windham Q would be shared by his full siblings who are not parties to this litigation (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl ~ 3)
4
1
of frauds must be affirmatively pleaded in an answer otherwise it is waived
Greenlaw v Rodick 158 Me 440 445 185 A2d 895 897-98 (1962) An
affirmative defense may be adequately pleaded even though the exact words
used in Rule 8(c) are absent See Graffam v Geronda 304 A2d 76 78 (Me
1973) Rule 8(c) is satisfied by any clear and unmistakable notice that the
defense is being raised 2 Harvey Maine Civil Practice sect 85 at 362 (3d ed
2011)
Here Plaintiff has not expressly pleaded the statute of frauds as an
affirmative defense (Pl Ans to Countercl amp Affirm Defenses ii 1-7)
Plaintiffs first affirmative defense however avers that Stephen has no
agreement relating to his ownership of the Windham Dairy Queen that is
enforceable under Maine law (Id 1l 1) This language is sufficient to put
Stephen Napolitano on clear and unmistakable notice that Plaintiff is raising the
statute of frauds defense
Maines statute of frauds provides that the actions based on the following
agreements may not be maintained unless the agreement is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto
lawfully authorized (a) any agreement that is not to be performed within one
year and (b) any agreement to give bequeath or devise by will to another any
real personal or mixed property 33 MRS sect 51 (5 ) (7)
5
To determine whether an alleged agreement is one not to be performed
within one year the court does not look to when the performance actually
occurred or whether it was conceivable that performance would occur within or
beyond one year The court looks only to the parties intent Great Hill Fill amp
Gravel v Shapleigh 1997 ME 75 -r S 692 A2d 928 The court must look to
the circumstances of the case and whether the parties plainly manifested an middot
intent that the contract not be performed within one year Id
Regarding an agreement to devise by will Maines Probate Code further
provides
A contract to make a will or devise or not to revoke a will or devise can be established only by ( 1 ) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract or (3) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills
18-A MRS sect 2-701
If an agreement falls within the statute of frauds then it must be
evidenced in writing and signed by the party against whom the agreement is to
be enforced or another lawfully authorized person 33 MRS sect 51 Nearly any
form of writing will satisfy the statute of frauds McCare v Rocha 2014 ME 4
-r 11 86 A3d 22 A series of writings may collectively satisfy the statute of
6
frauds even if none of the writings does so separately Wilson v DePapa 634
A2d 1252 1254 (Me 1993)
The part performance doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds
Sullivan v Porter 2004 ME 134 ~ 10 861 A2d 625 An oral contract within
the statute of frauds may still be enforced if the party seeking to enforce the
agreement can prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the parties entered
into a contract (2) the party seeking to enforce the contract partially
performed its obligation and (3) the performance was induced by the other
partys misrepresentation which may be evidenced by acquiescence or silence
Id at i 11 The part performance doctrine is grounded in the principle of
equitable estoppel which involves detrimental reliance induced by
misrepresentation and fraud Id I 17 Equitabl~ estoppel differs from
promissory estoppel which involves detrimental reliance on a mere promise Id
~ 1 7 n 7 The Law Court has expressly stated that for multi-year employment
agreements an employees detrimental reliance on an employers oral promise is
not enough to avoid the statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine
Stearns v Emery-Waterhouse Co 596 A2d 72 75 (Me 1991 ) To avoid the
statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine the employee must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their performance was induced by
7
fraud on the part of the employer Id see also Suliivan 2004 ME 134 iI 17
861 A2d 625
A The 1 5 Ownership Interest in Windham Q
In support of her motion Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement
governing Stephen Napolitanos employment with Windham Q there was no
written agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership share of Windham Q to Stephen
Napolitano and that there was no agreement written or oral that Stephens
employment with Windham Q was contingent upon him receiving an ownership
interest (Pl Suppg SMF iiiI 8-9 14) Plaintiff asserts that even if there was
an oral agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership interest Stephen has testified
that any transfer would not happen immediately because the agreement was
contingent upon Stephen resolving certain issues with his credit (Id iI 11 )
Plaintiff further asserts that Stephen Napolitano admitted that it would be a
few years before his credit issues would be cleared up (Id r 1 2) Thus
according to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was agreement to
transfer a 1 5 ownership interest to him is barred by the statute of frauds as
an agreement not to be performed within one year (Pl Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano admits that there was no written
agreement governing his employment and no written agreement to transfer a
15 ownership interest in Windham Q to him (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF
8
mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
9
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
Defendants filed an oppositionmiddot to the motion for preliminary injunctive
relief on August 31 201 6 Plaintiff replied on September 8 201 6 Plaintiff
also filed an addendum to her reply on October 11 201 6 Oral argument on
all pending motions in this case was held on October 12 2016
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Ordinarily to obtain a preliminary injunction a plaintiff must produce
prim a facie evidence of the following ( 1 ) the plaintiff will suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction is not granted (2) the irreparable injury to the plaintiff
outweighs any harm to the defendant from granting the injunction (3) the
plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his or her claims and (4) the public
interest will not be adversely affected by granting the injunction Bangor
Historic Track Inc v Dept ofAgric Food amp Rural Res 2003 ME 140 iJ 9 837
A Zd 1 29 Failure to demonstrate that any one of the criteria is met requires
the motion for preliminary injunction be denied Id iJ 10 In determining
whether to issue a preliminary injunction the court may rely on evidence
presented in sworn depositions affidavits oral testimony or a verified
complaint 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333 (3d ed 2011 )
Because Plaintiffs motion seeks an injunction compelling Defendants to
take affirmative actions Plaintiffs motion is one for mandatory injunctive relief
See Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remediessect 5-2 at 1 00 (4th ed 2004) The
5
purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final
judgment Dep 1t of Envtf Prat v Emerson 563 AZd 762 771 (Me 1989)
Because a mandatory injunction by its very nature will alter the status quo
courts do not readily enter mandatory preliminary injunctions Id However the
mere fact that a preliminary injunction sought by a plaintiff has mandatory
aspects does not ipso facto render the motion invalid Id Rather to obtain a
mandatory preliminary injunction the plaintiff must meet a higher burden
Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remediessect 5-2 n14 at 1 00 In addition to the
other criteria the plaintiff must show a clear likelihood of success on the
merits Emerson 563 AZd at 771 (emphasis supplied)
ANALYSIS
As discussed above Plaintiff seeks a mandatory preliminary injunction
removing Stephen Napolitano as general manager removing Windham Qs
accountant and expanding the role of the Referee (Pl Mot Prelim lnj 18-19)
Plaintiff argues that if the mandatory preliminary injunction is not granted
Stephen Napolitano will continue to mismanage Windham Q continue to use
Plaintiffs and Arthur Napolitanos money to pay his personal expenses and that
Windham Q will continue to file improper tax returns (Id at 1 6)
6
A The Referees Report
The court first addresses the threshold matter of the Referees Report
Plaintiff largely relies on the Referees Report filed in the related divorce action
as evidentiary support for her motion (Id at 5-11 ) However because the
Referees Report is not sworn evidence it cannot be considered by the court in
deciding the motion for preliminary injunction 1 As previously discussed in
determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction the court may rely on
evidence presented in sworn depositions affidavits oral testimony or a verified
complaint 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333
The Referees Report has not been sworn to and no affidavit has been
filed by the Referee stating under oath that the contents of the Report to the
best of his personal knowledge are true and accurate Therefore because
Plaintiff largely relies on the unsworn Referees Report Plaintiff has not provided
sufficient proper evidence in order to obtain preliminary injunctive relief 2
1 In their opposition Defendants assert that the Referees Report is not admissible evidence in this case because it was filed in the separate divorce action (Defs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj 11-1 2) In her reply Plaintiff asserts at a trial management conference on June 7 2015 the parties verbally agreed that the Referees Report would apply to both proceedings (Pl Reply to Defs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj 2) Because the court finds that the Referees Report is not properly before the court on the motion for preliminary injunctive relief the court need not decide that this juncture whether the Referees Report is admissible in the civil action
2 Additionally attached to Plaintiffs reply and her addendum are a number of additional exhibits purported to show that Stephen Napolitano used Windham Qs credit card to pay for personal expenses See (Pl Reply to Oefs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj
7
B The Merits of the Mot ion for Preliminary Injunction
Moreover even if the court were to consider the Referees Report
Plaintiff has still failed to produce prima facie evidence that she or Windham Q
will suffer an irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted An
irreparable injury is an injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law
Bangor Historic Track Inc 2003 ME 140 -r 10 83 7 A2d 1 29 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) Although there is no comprehensive rule
for measuring the adequacy of a legal remedy where a plaintiff is entitled to
money damages and the plaintiff has not demonstrated that damages would be
uncollectable from the defendant the legal remedy will be deemed adequate
Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remedies sect 5-3(a) at 101-02 Levesque v
Pelletier 144 Me 245 249 68 AZd 9 11 (1949)
In his Report the Referee identified numerous credit card charges to the
business from 201 2 to 2014 Hwhere the business purpose was not readily
apparent (Referee Report 1 3) These included gas charges drugstore
charges EZ Pass tolls groceries maintenance charges office supplies car
Exs D-G J Pl Addendum to Reply Exs L-0) Like the Referees Report no affidavit has been filed swearing to the authenticity of these documents Therefore like the Referees Report those exhibits cannot be considered by the court See 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333 Also like the Referees Report even if the court were to consider these documents there is no indication that Plaintiff would not be entitled to damages or that such damages would be uncollectable from Defendants See Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remediessect 5-3(a) at 101-02 Levesque 144 Me at 249 68 AZd at 11
8
maintenance travel expenses medical charges Amazon and iTunes charges
meal charges department store charges and $1 67 77 500 of other
questionable charges (Id at 1 3-14) The Referee also noted numerous annual
expenses where the business purpose was not clearly determinable (Id at
11) These expenses included automobile repairs cable television internet
payments to multiple vendors tolls travel expenses and yard work (Id at 8shy
11 ) The Referee also noted a high rate of variance between the businesss
register tapes and daily deposits which demonstrated a significant system
failure made validating the daily deposit amounts difficult and revealed certain
commingling of personal and company funds (Id at 1 5-18)
Even if the Referees findings constitute prima facie evidence of an injury
to Plaintiff and Windham Q Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she is without
an adequate remedy at law Plaintiff has not cited and the court is not aware
of any legal authority that would prevent Plaintiff from recovering monetary
damages for the above injuries Plaintiff has also not put forth any evidence
that monetary damages would be uncollectable from Defendants Thus Plaintiff
has not demonstrated an injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law
Moreover additional findings in the Referees Report actually demonstrate
that Plaintiff is unlikely to suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is
not granted In his report the Referee noted that a number of questionable
9
expenses had actually declined in 2015 and 2016 (Id at 11) The Referee
noted that there had been a complete stop in payments by Windham Q for auto
repairs gas tolls travel and yard work and a decline in payments for office
expenses supplies and telephone expenses (Id at 8-11 ) Thus based on the
findings in the Referees Report the alleged injuries to Plaintiff have ceased or
declined in the past two years Therefore contrary to Plaintiffs assertions the
Referees Report actually demonstrates it is unlikely that she will suffer a
continued irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted
Plaintiff argues that Stephen Napolitano has ceased his alleged tortious
behavior while under the scrutiny of the Referee and this court (Pl Mot Prelim
lnj 16) Plaintiff argues that if the Referees role is not expanded Stephen
Napolitano will likely resume his alleged tortious behavior (Id) Plaintiff has
cited no evidence to support this speculation (Id)
Therefore even if the court were to consider the Referees Report
Plaintiff has still failed to demonstrate an irreparable injury in order to obtain a
mandatory preliminary injunction Because failure to demonstrate that any one
of the criteria is met requires the motion be denied the court would not even
reach the other criteria for preliminary injunctive relief See Bangor Historic
Track Inc 2003 ME 140 ~ 10 837 A2d 129
10
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion
individually and on behalf of Windham Q LLC pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 for preliminary injunctive relief is DENIED
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Richard Mulhern Dated J2 t) G
Judge Business amp Consumer Court
Ent~rec on th~ Docket__~ Copies sent va Mail__ Elecronically__ ~
11
STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND SS LOCATION PORTLAND Docket No BCD-CV-1 6-19
SANDRA L NAPOLITANO Individually and on behalf of WINDHAM Q LLC
Plaintiff
v
ARTHUR NAPOLITANO SR and STEPHEN NAPOLITANO
Defendants
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ) ) ) ) )
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano has moved for summary judgment pursuant
to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 5 6 on Defendant Stephen Napolitanos
counterclaim for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief For the following
reasons Plaintiffs motion is denied in part and granted in part
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Defendant Arthur Napolitano are husband and wife (Sandra
Napolitano Aff r 2) Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano are each 50 members
and the sole managers of Windham Q LLC (Windham Q) which operates a
Dairy Queen franchise located in Windham Maine (Id) Defendant Stephen
Napolitano is Arthur Napolitanos son and has worked as the general manager of
the Dairy Queen for more than sixteen years (Sandra Napolitano Aff r 4
Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF r 19)
Plaintiff filed a civil complaint individually and on behalf of Windham Q
with the Superior Court on August 26 201 5 Plaintiffs civil complaint generally
asserts that Stephen Napolitano has misused Windham Qs funds to pay his
personal expenses and that Arthur Napolitano has made improper distributions
and failed to act in the best interests of Windham Q (Campi ~I 20-46)
Arthur Napolitano filed an answer to the civil complaint on September 18
201 5 Stephen Napolitano filed his answer to the civil complaint on September
24 201 S Arthur Napolitano also filed a complaint for divorce with the District
Court on September 29 201 S Stephen Napolitano amended his answer to the
civil complaint on February 11 2016 to add a counterclaim against Plaintiff for
declaratory judgment that the parties had agreed that Stephen would receive an
ownership interest in Windham Q in exchange for agreeing to work as the
general manager of the Dairy Queen store (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp
Countercl ~~ 1 3-14) Plaintiff filed an answer to the counterclaim on March 7
2016 Both the civil action and family action were accepted for transfer to the
Business and Consumer Court in June 2016 Although not consolidated the
two cases are being coordinated before the Business and Consumer Court
Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim on August 11 201 6 Stephen filed an opposition to
summary judgment on September 1 201 6 Plaintiff filed a timely reply on
z
September 8 2016 Oral argument on all pending motions in this case was held
on October 1 2 2016
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if based on the parties statements of
material fact and the cited record there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law MR Civ P 56(c)
Dyer v Dept of Transp_ 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d 821 A fact is material
if it can affect the outcome of the case Dyer 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d
821 A genuine issue of material fact exists if the fact finder must choose
between competing versions of the truth Id When deciding a motion for
summary judgment the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party Id
If the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion
on a claim or defense then the moving party must establish the existence of
each element of the claim or defense without dispute as to any material fact in
the record in order to obtain summary judgment Cach LLC v Kulas 2011 ME
70 ~ 9 21 A3d 1015 The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to
respond with specific material facts indicating a genuine issue for trial in order
to avoid summary judgment MR Civ P 56(e) Even if one partys version of
the facts appears more credible and persuasive any genuine issue of material
3
fact must be resolved by the fact finder regardless of the likelihood of success
Estate of Lewis v Concord Gen Mut Ins Co 2014 ME 34 ~ 10 87 A3d 732
ANALYSIS
Defendant Stephen Napolitanos counterclaim seeks a declaratory
judgment that he has an enforceable agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur
Napolitano that in exchange for agreeing to work full-time as the general
manager of the Dairy Queen store Stephen Napolitano was to receive (a) a
1 5 ownership share of Windham Q as soon as issues with his credit were
addressed and (b) Stephen would eventually receive a 50 ownership share of
Windham Q and associated real estate from Plaintiffs estate 1 (Stephen
Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl r~ 3-4 13) Stephen also seeks injunctive
relief ordering Plaintiff to transfer 75 of her ownership in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano to be increased to 50 from her estate in compliance with
the terms of the agreement (Id r~ 13-1 4)
Plaintiffs sole argument on summary judgment is that Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim is barred by the statute of frauds because there are
no writings evidencing the alleged agreement (Pl Mot Summ J 3-7 ) The
statute of frauds is an affirmative defense MR Civ P 8(c) Thus the statute
Stephen Napolitano asserts the remaining 50 ownership of Windham Q would be shared by his full siblings who are not parties to this litigation (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl ~ 3)
4
1
of frauds must be affirmatively pleaded in an answer otherwise it is waived
Greenlaw v Rodick 158 Me 440 445 185 A2d 895 897-98 (1962) An
affirmative defense may be adequately pleaded even though the exact words
used in Rule 8(c) are absent See Graffam v Geronda 304 A2d 76 78 (Me
1973) Rule 8(c) is satisfied by any clear and unmistakable notice that the
defense is being raised 2 Harvey Maine Civil Practice sect 85 at 362 (3d ed
2011)
Here Plaintiff has not expressly pleaded the statute of frauds as an
affirmative defense (Pl Ans to Countercl amp Affirm Defenses ii 1-7)
Plaintiffs first affirmative defense however avers that Stephen has no
agreement relating to his ownership of the Windham Dairy Queen that is
enforceable under Maine law (Id 1l 1) This language is sufficient to put
Stephen Napolitano on clear and unmistakable notice that Plaintiff is raising the
statute of frauds defense
Maines statute of frauds provides that the actions based on the following
agreements may not be maintained unless the agreement is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto
lawfully authorized (a) any agreement that is not to be performed within one
year and (b) any agreement to give bequeath or devise by will to another any
real personal or mixed property 33 MRS sect 51 (5 ) (7)
5
To determine whether an alleged agreement is one not to be performed
within one year the court does not look to when the performance actually
occurred or whether it was conceivable that performance would occur within or
beyond one year The court looks only to the parties intent Great Hill Fill amp
Gravel v Shapleigh 1997 ME 75 -r S 692 A2d 928 The court must look to
the circumstances of the case and whether the parties plainly manifested an middot
intent that the contract not be performed within one year Id
Regarding an agreement to devise by will Maines Probate Code further
provides
A contract to make a will or devise or not to revoke a will or devise can be established only by ( 1 ) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract or (3) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills
18-A MRS sect 2-701
If an agreement falls within the statute of frauds then it must be
evidenced in writing and signed by the party against whom the agreement is to
be enforced or another lawfully authorized person 33 MRS sect 51 Nearly any
form of writing will satisfy the statute of frauds McCare v Rocha 2014 ME 4
-r 11 86 A3d 22 A series of writings may collectively satisfy the statute of
6
frauds even if none of the writings does so separately Wilson v DePapa 634
A2d 1252 1254 (Me 1993)
The part performance doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds
Sullivan v Porter 2004 ME 134 ~ 10 861 A2d 625 An oral contract within
the statute of frauds may still be enforced if the party seeking to enforce the
agreement can prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the parties entered
into a contract (2) the party seeking to enforce the contract partially
performed its obligation and (3) the performance was induced by the other
partys misrepresentation which may be evidenced by acquiescence or silence
Id at i 11 The part performance doctrine is grounded in the principle of
equitable estoppel which involves detrimental reliance induced by
misrepresentation and fraud Id I 17 Equitabl~ estoppel differs from
promissory estoppel which involves detrimental reliance on a mere promise Id
~ 1 7 n 7 The Law Court has expressly stated that for multi-year employment
agreements an employees detrimental reliance on an employers oral promise is
not enough to avoid the statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine
Stearns v Emery-Waterhouse Co 596 A2d 72 75 (Me 1991 ) To avoid the
statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine the employee must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their performance was induced by
7
fraud on the part of the employer Id see also Suliivan 2004 ME 134 iI 17
861 A2d 625
A The 1 5 Ownership Interest in Windham Q
In support of her motion Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement
governing Stephen Napolitanos employment with Windham Q there was no
written agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership share of Windham Q to Stephen
Napolitano and that there was no agreement written or oral that Stephens
employment with Windham Q was contingent upon him receiving an ownership
interest (Pl Suppg SMF iiiI 8-9 14) Plaintiff asserts that even if there was
an oral agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership interest Stephen has testified
that any transfer would not happen immediately because the agreement was
contingent upon Stephen resolving certain issues with his credit (Id iI 11 )
Plaintiff further asserts that Stephen Napolitano admitted that it would be a
few years before his credit issues would be cleared up (Id r 1 2) Thus
according to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was agreement to
transfer a 1 5 ownership interest to him is barred by the statute of frauds as
an agreement not to be performed within one year (Pl Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano admits that there was no written
agreement governing his employment and no written agreement to transfer a
15 ownership interest in Windham Q to him (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF
8
mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
9
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final
judgment Dep 1t of Envtf Prat v Emerson 563 AZd 762 771 (Me 1989)
Because a mandatory injunction by its very nature will alter the status quo
courts do not readily enter mandatory preliminary injunctions Id However the
mere fact that a preliminary injunction sought by a plaintiff has mandatory
aspects does not ipso facto render the motion invalid Id Rather to obtain a
mandatory preliminary injunction the plaintiff must meet a higher burden
Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remediessect 5-2 n14 at 1 00 In addition to the
other criteria the plaintiff must show a clear likelihood of success on the
merits Emerson 563 AZd at 771 (emphasis supplied)
ANALYSIS
As discussed above Plaintiff seeks a mandatory preliminary injunction
removing Stephen Napolitano as general manager removing Windham Qs
accountant and expanding the role of the Referee (Pl Mot Prelim lnj 18-19)
Plaintiff argues that if the mandatory preliminary injunction is not granted
Stephen Napolitano will continue to mismanage Windham Q continue to use
Plaintiffs and Arthur Napolitanos money to pay his personal expenses and that
Windham Q will continue to file improper tax returns (Id at 1 6)
6
A The Referees Report
The court first addresses the threshold matter of the Referees Report
Plaintiff largely relies on the Referees Report filed in the related divorce action
as evidentiary support for her motion (Id at 5-11 ) However because the
Referees Report is not sworn evidence it cannot be considered by the court in
deciding the motion for preliminary injunction 1 As previously discussed in
determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction the court may rely on
evidence presented in sworn depositions affidavits oral testimony or a verified
complaint 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333
The Referees Report has not been sworn to and no affidavit has been
filed by the Referee stating under oath that the contents of the Report to the
best of his personal knowledge are true and accurate Therefore because
Plaintiff largely relies on the unsworn Referees Report Plaintiff has not provided
sufficient proper evidence in order to obtain preliminary injunctive relief 2
1 In their opposition Defendants assert that the Referees Report is not admissible evidence in this case because it was filed in the separate divorce action (Defs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj 11-1 2) In her reply Plaintiff asserts at a trial management conference on June 7 2015 the parties verbally agreed that the Referees Report would apply to both proceedings (Pl Reply to Defs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj 2) Because the court finds that the Referees Report is not properly before the court on the motion for preliminary injunctive relief the court need not decide that this juncture whether the Referees Report is admissible in the civil action
2 Additionally attached to Plaintiffs reply and her addendum are a number of additional exhibits purported to show that Stephen Napolitano used Windham Qs credit card to pay for personal expenses See (Pl Reply to Oefs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj
7
B The Merits of the Mot ion for Preliminary Injunction
Moreover even if the court were to consider the Referees Report
Plaintiff has still failed to produce prima facie evidence that she or Windham Q
will suffer an irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted An
irreparable injury is an injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law
Bangor Historic Track Inc 2003 ME 140 -r 10 83 7 A2d 1 29 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) Although there is no comprehensive rule
for measuring the adequacy of a legal remedy where a plaintiff is entitled to
money damages and the plaintiff has not demonstrated that damages would be
uncollectable from the defendant the legal remedy will be deemed adequate
Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remedies sect 5-3(a) at 101-02 Levesque v
Pelletier 144 Me 245 249 68 AZd 9 11 (1949)
In his Report the Referee identified numerous credit card charges to the
business from 201 2 to 2014 Hwhere the business purpose was not readily
apparent (Referee Report 1 3) These included gas charges drugstore
charges EZ Pass tolls groceries maintenance charges office supplies car
Exs D-G J Pl Addendum to Reply Exs L-0) Like the Referees Report no affidavit has been filed swearing to the authenticity of these documents Therefore like the Referees Report those exhibits cannot be considered by the court See 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333 Also like the Referees Report even if the court were to consider these documents there is no indication that Plaintiff would not be entitled to damages or that such damages would be uncollectable from Defendants See Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remediessect 5-3(a) at 101-02 Levesque 144 Me at 249 68 AZd at 11
8
maintenance travel expenses medical charges Amazon and iTunes charges
meal charges department store charges and $1 67 77 500 of other
questionable charges (Id at 1 3-14) The Referee also noted numerous annual
expenses where the business purpose was not clearly determinable (Id at
11) These expenses included automobile repairs cable television internet
payments to multiple vendors tolls travel expenses and yard work (Id at 8shy
11 ) The Referee also noted a high rate of variance between the businesss
register tapes and daily deposits which demonstrated a significant system
failure made validating the daily deposit amounts difficult and revealed certain
commingling of personal and company funds (Id at 1 5-18)
Even if the Referees findings constitute prima facie evidence of an injury
to Plaintiff and Windham Q Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she is without
an adequate remedy at law Plaintiff has not cited and the court is not aware
of any legal authority that would prevent Plaintiff from recovering monetary
damages for the above injuries Plaintiff has also not put forth any evidence
that monetary damages would be uncollectable from Defendants Thus Plaintiff
has not demonstrated an injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law
Moreover additional findings in the Referees Report actually demonstrate
that Plaintiff is unlikely to suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is
not granted In his report the Referee noted that a number of questionable
9
expenses had actually declined in 2015 and 2016 (Id at 11) The Referee
noted that there had been a complete stop in payments by Windham Q for auto
repairs gas tolls travel and yard work and a decline in payments for office
expenses supplies and telephone expenses (Id at 8-11 ) Thus based on the
findings in the Referees Report the alleged injuries to Plaintiff have ceased or
declined in the past two years Therefore contrary to Plaintiffs assertions the
Referees Report actually demonstrates it is unlikely that she will suffer a
continued irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted
Plaintiff argues that Stephen Napolitano has ceased his alleged tortious
behavior while under the scrutiny of the Referee and this court (Pl Mot Prelim
lnj 16) Plaintiff argues that if the Referees role is not expanded Stephen
Napolitano will likely resume his alleged tortious behavior (Id) Plaintiff has
cited no evidence to support this speculation (Id)
Therefore even if the court were to consider the Referees Report
Plaintiff has still failed to demonstrate an irreparable injury in order to obtain a
mandatory preliminary injunction Because failure to demonstrate that any one
of the criteria is met requires the motion be denied the court would not even
reach the other criteria for preliminary injunctive relief See Bangor Historic
Track Inc 2003 ME 140 ~ 10 837 A2d 129
10
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion
individually and on behalf of Windham Q LLC pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 for preliminary injunctive relief is DENIED
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Richard Mulhern Dated J2 t) G
Judge Business amp Consumer Court
Ent~rec on th~ Docket__~ Copies sent va Mail__ Elecronically__ ~
11
STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND SS LOCATION PORTLAND Docket No BCD-CV-1 6-19
SANDRA L NAPOLITANO Individually and on behalf of WINDHAM Q LLC
Plaintiff
v
ARTHUR NAPOLITANO SR and STEPHEN NAPOLITANO
Defendants
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ) ) ) ) )
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano has moved for summary judgment pursuant
to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 5 6 on Defendant Stephen Napolitanos
counterclaim for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief For the following
reasons Plaintiffs motion is denied in part and granted in part
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Defendant Arthur Napolitano are husband and wife (Sandra
Napolitano Aff r 2) Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano are each 50 members
and the sole managers of Windham Q LLC (Windham Q) which operates a
Dairy Queen franchise located in Windham Maine (Id) Defendant Stephen
Napolitano is Arthur Napolitanos son and has worked as the general manager of
the Dairy Queen for more than sixteen years (Sandra Napolitano Aff r 4
Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF r 19)
Plaintiff filed a civil complaint individually and on behalf of Windham Q
with the Superior Court on August 26 201 5 Plaintiffs civil complaint generally
asserts that Stephen Napolitano has misused Windham Qs funds to pay his
personal expenses and that Arthur Napolitano has made improper distributions
and failed to act in the best interests of Windham Q (Campi ~I 20-46)
Arthur Napolitano filed an answer to the civil complaint on September 18
201 5 Stephen Napolitano filed his answer to the civil complaint on September
24 201 S Arthur Napolitano also filed a complaint for divorce with the District
Court on September 29 201 S Stephen Napolitano amended his answer to the
civil complaint on February 11 2016 to add a counterclaim against Plaintiff for
declaratory judgment that the parties had agreed that Stephen would receive an
ownership interest in Windham Q in exchange for agreeing to work as the
general manager of the Dairy Queen store (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp
Countercl ~~ 1 3-14) Plaintiff filed an answer to the counterclaim on March 7
2016 Both the civil action and family action were accepted for transfer to the
Business and Consumer Court in June 2016 Although not consolidated the
two cases are being coordinated before the Business and Consumer Court
Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim on August 11 201 6 Stephen filed an opposition to
summary judgment on September 1 201 6 Plaintiff filed a timely reply on
z
September 8 2016 Oral argument on all pending motions in this case was held
on October 1 2 2016
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if based on the parties statements of
material fact and the cited record there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law MR Civ P 56(c)
Dyer v Dept of Transp_ 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d 821 A fact is material
if it can affect the outcome of the case Dyer 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d
821 A genuine issue of material fact exists if the fact finder must choose
between competing versions of the truth Id When deciding a motion for
summary judgment the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party Id
If the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion
on a claim or defense then the moving party must establish the existence of
each element of the claim or defense without dispute as to any material fact in
the record in order to obtain summary judgment Cach LLC v Kulas 2011 ME
70 ~ 9 21 A3d 1015 The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to
respond with specific material facts indicating a genuine issue for trial in order
to avoid summary judgment MR Civ P 56(e) Even if one partys version of
the facts appears more credible and persuasive any genuine issue of material
3
fact must be resolved by the fact finder regardless of the likelihood of success
Estate of Lewis v Concord Gen Mut Ins Co 2014 ME 34 ~ 10 87 A3d 732
ANALYSIS
Defendant Stephen Napolitanos counterclaim seeks a declaratory
judgment that he has an enforceable agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur
Napolitano that in exchange for agreeing to work full-time as the general
manager of the Dairy Queen store Stephen Napolitano was to receive (a) a
1 5 ownership share of Windham Q as soon as issues with his credit were
addressed and (b) Stephen would eventually receive a 50 ownership share of
Windham Q and associated real estate from Plaintiffs estate 1 (Stephen
Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl r~ 3-4 13) Stephen also seeks injunctive
relief ordering Plaintiff to transfer 75 of her ownership in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano to be increased to 50 from her estate in compliance with
the terms of the agreement (Id r~ 13-1 4)
Plaintiffs sole argument on summary judgment is that Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim is barred by the statute of frauds because there are
no writings evidencing the alleged agreement (Pl Mot Summ J 3-7 ) The
statute of frauds is an affirmative defense MR Civ P 8(c) Thus the statute
Stephen Napolitano asserts the remaining 50 ownership of Windham Q would be shared by his full siblings who are not parties to this litigation (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl ~ 3)
4
1
of frauds must be affirmatively pleaded in an answer otherwise it is waived
Greenlaw v Rodick 158 Me 440 445 185 A2d 895 897-98 (1962) An
affirmative defense may be adequately pleaded even though the exact words
used in Rule 8(c) are absent See Graffam v Geronda 304 A2d 76 78 (Me
1973) Rule 8(c) is satisfied by any clear and unmistakable notice that the
defense is being raised 2 Harvey Maine Civil Practice sect 85 at 362 (3d ed
2011)
Here Plaintiff has not expressly pleaded the statute of frauds as an
affirmative defense (Pl Ans to Countercl amp Affirm Defenses ii 1-7)
Plaintiffs first affirmative defense however avers that Stephen has no
agreement relating to his ownership of the Windham Dairy Queen that is
enforceable under Maine law (Id 1l 1) This language is sufficient to put
Stephen Napolitano on clear and unmistakable notice that Plaintiff is raising the
statute of frauds defense
Maines statute of frauds provides that the actions based on the following
agreements may not be maintained unless the agreement is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto
lawfully authorized (a) any agreement that is not to be performed within one
year and (b) any agreement to give bequeath or devise by will to another any
real personal or mixed property 33 MRS sect 51 (5 ) (7)
5
To determine whether an alleged agreement is one not to be performed
within one year the court does not look to when the performance actually
occurred or whether it was conceivable that performance would occur within or
beyond one year The court looks only to the parties intent Great Hill Fill amp
Gravel v Shapleigh 1997 ME 75 -r S 692 A2d 928 The court must look to
the circumstances of the case and whether the parties plainly manifested an middot
intent that the contract not be performed within one year Id
Regarding an agreement to devise by will Maines Probate Code further
provides
A contract to make a will or devise or not to revoke a will or devise can be established only by ( 1 ) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract or (3) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills
18-A MRS sect 2-701
If an agreement falls within the statute of frauds then it must be
evidenced in writing and signed by the party against whom the agreement is to
be enforced or another lawfully authorized person 33 MRS sect 51 Nearly any
form of writing will satisfy the statute of frauds McCare v Rocha 2014 ME 4
-r 11 86 A3d 22 A series of writings may collectively satisfy the statute of
6
frauds even if none of the writings does so separately Wilson v DePapa 634
A2d 1252 1254 (Me 1993)
The part performance doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds
Sullivan v Porter 2004 ME 134 ~ 10 861 A2d 625 An oral contract within
the statute of frauds may still be enforced if the party seeking to enforce the
agreement can prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the parties entered
into a contract (2) the party seeking to enforce the contract partially
performed its obligation and (3) the performance was induced by the other
partys misrepresentation which may be evidenced by acquiescence or silence
Id at i 11 The part performance doctrine is grounded in the principle of
equitable estoppel which involves detrimental reliance induced by
misrepresentation and fraud Id I 17 Equitabl~ estoppel differs from
promissory estoppel which involves detrimental reliance on a mere promise Id
~ 1 7 n 7 The Law Court has expressly stated that for multi-year employment
agreements an employees detrimental reliance on an employers oral promise is
not enough to avoid the statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine
Stearns v Emery-Waterhouse Co 596 A2d 72 75 (Me 1991 ) To avoid the
statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine the employee must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their performance was induced by
7
fraud on the part of the employer Id see also Suliivan 2004 ME 134 iI 17
861 A2d 625
A The 1 5 Ownership Interest in Windham Q
In support of her motion Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement
governing Stephen Napolitanos employment with Windham Q there was no
written agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership share of Windham Q to Stephen
Napolitano and that there was no agreement written or oral that Stephens
employment with Windham Q was contingent upon him receiving an ownership
interest (Pl Suppg SMF iiiI 8-9 14) Plaintiff asserts that even if there was
an oral agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership interest Stephen has testified
that any transfer would not happen immediately because the agreement was
contingent upon Stephen resolving certain issues with his credit (Id iI 11 )
Plaintiff further asserts that Stephen Napolitano admitted that it would be a
few years before his credit issues would be cleared up (Id r 1 2) Thus
according to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was agreement to
transfer a 1 5 ownership interest to him is barred by the statute of frauds as
an agreement not to be performed within one year (Pl Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano admits that there was no written
agreement governing his employment and no written agreement to transfer a
15 ownership interest in Windham Q to him (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF
8
mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
9
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
A The Referees Report
The court first addresses the threshold matter of the Referees Report
Plaintiff largely relies on the Referees Report filed in the related divorce action
as evidentiary support for her motion (Id at 5-11 ) However because the
Referees Report is not sworn evidence it cannot be considered by the court in
deciding the motion for preliminary injunction 1 As previously discussed in
determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction the court may rely on
evidence presented in sworn depositions affidavits oral testimony or a verified
complaint 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333
The Referees Report has not been sworn to and no affidavit has been
filed by the Referee stating under oath that the contents of the Report to the
best of his personal knowledge are true and accurate Therefore because
Plaintiff largely relies on the unsworn Referees Report Plaintiff has not provided
sufficient proper evidence in order to obtain preliminary injunctive relief 2
1 In their opposition Defendants assert that the Referees Report is not admissible evidence in this case because it was filed in the separate divorce action (Defs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj 11-1 2) In her reply Plaintiff asserts at a trial management conference on June 7 2015 the parties verbally agreed that the Referees Report would apply to both proceedings (Pl Reply to Defs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj 2) Because the court finds that the Referees Report is not properly before the court on the motion for preliminary injunctive relief the court need not decide that this juncture whether the Referees Report is admissible in the civil action
2 Additionally attached to Plaintiffs reply and her addendum are a number of additional exhibits purported to show that Stephen Napolitano used Windham Qs credit card to pay for personal expenses See (Pl Reply to Oefs Oppn to Pl Mot Prelim lnj
7
B The Merits of the Mot ion for Preliminary Injunction
Moreover even if the court were to consider the Referees Report
Plaintiff has still failed to produce prima facie evidence that she or Windham Q
will suffer an irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted An
irreparable injury is an injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law
Bangor Historic Track Inc 2003 ME 140 -r 10 83 7 A2d 1 29 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) Although there is no comprehensive rule
for measuring the adequacy of a legal remedy where a plaintiff is entitled to
money damages and the plaintiff has not demonstrated that damages would be
uncollectable from the defendant the legal remedy will be deemed adequate
Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remedies sect 5-3(a) at 101-02 Levesque v
Pelletier 144 Me 245 249 68 AZd 9 11 (1949)
In his Report the Referee identified numerous credit card charges to the
business from 201 2 to 2014 Hwhere the business purpose was not readily
apparent (Referee Report 1 3) These included gas charges drugstore
charges EZ Pass tolls groceries maintenance charges office supplies car
Exs D-G J Pl Addendum to Reply Exs L-0) Like the Referees Report no affidavit has been filed swearing to the authenticity of these documents Therefore like the Referees Report those exhibits cannot be considered by the court See 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333 Also like the Referees Report even if the court were to consider these documents there is no indication that Plaintiff would not be entitled to damages or that such damages would be uncollectable from Defendants See Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remediessect 5-3(a) at 101-02 Levesque 144 Me at 249 68 AZd at 11
8
maintenance travel expenses medical charges Amazon and iTunes charges
meal charges department store charges and $1 67 77 500 of other
questionable charges (Id at 1 3-14) The Referee also noted numerous annual
expenses where the business purpose was not clearly determinable (Id at
11) These expenses included automobile repairs cable television internet
payments to multiple vendors tolls travel expenses and yard work (Id at 8shy
11 ) The Referee also noted a high rate of variance between the businesss
register tapes and daily deposits which demonstrated a significant system
failure made validating the daily deposit amounts difficult and revealed certain
commingling of personal and company funds (Id at 1 5-18)
Even if the Referees findings constitute prima facie evidence of an injury
to Plaintiff and Windham Q Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she is without
an adequate remedy at law Plaintiff has not cited and the court is not aware
of any legal authority that would prevent Plaintiff from recovering monetary
damages for the above injuries Plaintiff has also not put forth any evidence
that monetary damages would be uncollectable from Defendants Thus Plaintiff
has not demonstrated an injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law
Moreover additional findings in the Referees Report actually demonstrate
that Plaintiff is unlikely to suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is
not granted In his report the Referee noted that a number of questionable
9
expenses had actually declined in 2015 and 2016 (Id at 11) The Referee
noted that there had been a complete stop in payments by Windham Q for auto
repairs gas tolls travel and yard work and a decline in payments for office
expenses supplies and telephone expenses (Id at 8-11 ) Thus based on the
findings in the Referees Report the alleged injuries to Plaintiff have ceased or
declined in the past two years Therefore contrary to Plaintiffs assertions the
Referees Report actually demonstrates it is unlikely that she will suffer a
continued irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted
Plaintiff argues that Stephen Napolitano has ceased his alleged tortious
behavior while under the scrutiny of the Referee and this court (Pl Mot Prelim
lnj 16) Plaintiff argues that if the Referees role is not expanded Stephen
Napolitano will likely resume his alleged tortious behavior (Id) Plaintiff has
cited no evidence to support this speculation (Id)
Therefore even if the court were to consider the Referees Report
Plaintiff has still failed to demonstrate an irreparable injury in order to obtain a
mandatory preliminary injunction Because failure to demonstrate that any one
of the criteria is met requires the motion be denied the court would not even
reach the other criteria for preliminary injunctive relief See Bangor Historic
Track Inc 2003 ME 140 ~ 10 837 A2d 129
10
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion
individually and on behalf of Windham Q LLC pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 for preliminary injunctive relief is DENIED
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Richard Mulhern Dated J2 t) G
Judge Business amp Consumer Court
Ent~rec on th~ Docket__~ Copies sent va Mail__ Elecronically__ ~
11
STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND SS LOCATION PORTLAND Docket No BCD-CV-1 6-19
SANDRA L NAPOLITANO Individually and on behalf of WINDHAM Q LLC
Plaintiff
v
ARTHUR NAPOLITANO SR and STEPHEN NAPOLITANO
Defendants
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ) ) ) ) )
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano has moved for summary judgment pursuant
to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 5 6 on Defendant Stephen Napolitanos
counterclaim for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief For the following
reasons Plaintiffs motion is denied in part and granted in part
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Defendant Arthur Napolitano are husband and wife (Sandra
Napolitano Aff r 2) Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano are each 50 members
and the sole managers of Windham Q LLC (Windham Q) which operates a
Dairy Queen franchise located in Windham Maine (Id) Defendant Stephen
Napolitano is Arthur Napolitanos son and has worked as the general manager of
the Dairy Queen for more than sixteen years (Sandra Napolitano Aff r 4
Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF r 19)
Plaintiff filed a civil complaint individually and on behalf of Windham Q
with the Superior Court on August 26 201 5 Plaintiffs civil complaint generally
asserts that Stephen Napolitano has misused Windham Qs funds to pay his
personal expenses and that Arthur Napolitano has made improper distributions
and failed to act in the best interests of Windham Q (Campi ~I 20-46)
Arthur Napolitano filed an answer to the civil complaint on September 18
201 5 Stephen Napolitano filed his answer to the civil complaint on September
24 201 S Arthur Napolitano also filed a complaint for divorce with the District
Court on September 29 201 S Stephen Napolitano amended his answer to the
civil complaint on February 11 2016 to add a counterclaim against Plaintiff for
declaratory judgment that the parties had agreed that Stephen would receive an
ownership interest in Windham Q in exchange for agreeing to work as the
general manager of the Dairy Queen store (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp
Countercl ~~ 1 3-14) Plaintiff filed an answer to the counterclaim on March 7
2016 Both the civil action and family action were accepted for transfer to the
Business and Consumer Court in June 2016 Although not consolidated the
two cases are being coordinated before the Business and Consumer Court
Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim on August 11 201 6 Stephen filed an opposition to
summary judgment on September 1 201 6 Plaintiff filed a timely reply on
z
September 8 2016 Oral argument on all pending motions in this case was held
on October 1 2 2016
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if based on the parties statements of
material fact and the cited record there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law MR Civ P 56(c)
Dyer v Dept of Transp_ 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d 821 A fact is material
if it can affect the outcome of the case Dyer 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d
821 A genuine issue of material fact exists if the fact finder must choose
between competing versions of the truth Id When deciding a motion for
summary judgment the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party Id
If the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion
on a claim or defense then the moving party must establish the existence of
each element of the claim or defense without dispute as to any material fact in
the record in order to obtain summary judgment Cach LLC v Kulas 2011 ME
70 ~ 9 21 A3d 1015 The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to
respond with specific material facts indicating a genuine issue for trial in order
to avoid summary judgment MR Civ P 56(e) Even if one partys version of
the facts appears more credible and persuasive any genuine issue of material
3
fact must be resolved by the fact finder regardless of the likelihood of success
Estate of Lewis v Concord Gen Mut Ins Co 2014 ME 34 ~ 10 87 A3d 732
ANALYSIS
Defendant Stephen Napolitanos counterclaim seeks a declaratory
judgment that he has an enforceable agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur
Napolitano that in exchange for agreeing to work full-time as the general
manager of the Dairy Queen store Stephen Napolitano was to receive (a) a
1 5 ownership share of Windham Q as soon as issues with his credit were
addressed and (b) Stephen would eventually receive a 50 ownership share of
Windham Q and associated real estate from Plaintiffs estate 1 (Stephen
Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl r~ 3-4 13) Stephen also seeks injunctive
relief ordering Plaintiff to transfer 75 of her ownership in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano to be increased to 50 from her estate in compliance with
the terms of the agreement (Id r~ 13-1 4)
Plaintiffs sole argument on summary judgment is that Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim is barred by the statute of frauds because there are
no writings evidencing the alleged agreement (Pl Mot Summ J 3-7 ) The
statute of frauds is an affirmative defense MR Civ P 8(c) Thus the statute
Stephen Napolitano asserts the remaining 50 ownership of Windham Q would be shared by his full siblings who are not parties to this litigation (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl ~ 3)
4
1
of frauds must be affirmatively pleaded in an answer otherwise it is waived
Greenlaw v Rodick 158 Me 440 445 185 A2d 895 897-98 (1962) An
affirmative defense may be adequately pleaded even though the exact words
used in Rule 8(c) are absent See Graffam v Geronda 304 A2d 76 78 (Me
1973) Rule 8(c) is satisfied by any clear and unmistakable notice that the
defense is being raised 2 Harvey Maine Civil Practice sect 85 at 362 (3d ed
2011)
Here Plaintiff has not expressly pleaded the statute of frauds as an
affirmative defense (Pl Ans to Countercl amp Affirm Defenses ii 1-7)
Plaintiffs first affirmative defense however avers that Stephen has no
agreement relating to his ownership of the Windham Dairy Queen that is
enforceable under Maine law (Id 1l 1) This language is sufficient to put
Stephen Napolitano on clear and unmistakable notice that Plaintiff is raising the
statute of frauds defense
Maines statute of frauds provides that the actions based on the following
agreements may not be maintained unless the agreement is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto
lawfully authorized (a) any agreement that is not to be performed within one
year and (b) any agreement to give bequeath or devise by will to another any
real personal or mixed property 33 MRS sect 51 (5 ) (7)
5
To determine whether an alleged agreement is one not to be performed
within one year the court does not look to when the performance actually
occurred or whether it was conceivable that performance would occur within or
beyond one year The court looks only to the parties intent Great Hill Fill amp
Gravel v Shapleigh 1997 ME 75 -r S 692 A2d 928 The court must look to
the circumstances of the case and whether the parties plainly manifested an middot
intent that the contract not be performed within one year Id
Regarding an agreement to devise by will Maines Probate Code further
provides
A contract to make a will or devise or not to revoke a will or devise can be established only by ( 1 ) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract or (3) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills
18-A MRS sect 2-701
If an agreement falls within the statute of frauds then it must be
evidenced in writing and signed by the party against whom the agreement is to
be enforced or another lawfully authorized person 33 MRS sect 51 Nearly any
form of writing will satisfy the statute of frauds McCare v Rocha 2014 ME 4
-r 11 86 A3d 22 A series of writings may collectively satisfy the statute of
6
frauds even if none of the writings does so separately Wilson v DePapa 634
A2d 1252 1254 (Me 1993)
The part performance doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds
Sullivan v Porter 2004 ME 134 ~ 10 861 A2d 625 An oral contract within
the statute of frauds may still be enforced if the party seeking to enforce the
agreement can prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the parties entered
into a contract (2) the party seeking to enforce the contract partially
performed its obligation and (3) the performance was induced by the other
partys misrepresentation which may be evidenced by acquiescence or silence
Id at i 11 The part performance doctrine is grounded in the principle of
equitable estoppel which involves detrimental reliance induced by
misrepresentation and fraud Id I 17 Equitabl~ estoppel differs from
promissory estoppel which involves detrimental reliance on a mere promise Id
~ 1 7 n 7 The Law Court has expressly stated that for multi-year employment
agreements an employees detrimental reliance on an employers oral promise is
not enough to avoid the statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine
Stearns v Emery-Waterhouse Co 596 A2d 72 75 (Me 1991 ) To avoid the
statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine the employee must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their performance was induced by
7
fraud on the part of the employer Id see also Suliivan 2004 ME 134 iI 17
861 A2d 625
A The 1 5 Ownership Interest in Windham Q
In support of her motion Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement
governing Stephen Napolitanos employment with Windham Q there was no
written agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership share of Windham Q to Stephen
Napolitano and that there was no agreement written or oral that Stephens
employment with Windham Q was contingent upon him receiving an ownership
interest (Pl Suppg SMF iiiI 8-9 14) Plaintiff asserts that even if there was
an oral agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership interest Stephen has testified
that any transfer would not happen immediately because the agreement was
contingent upon Stephen resolving certain issues with his credit (Id iI 11 )
Plaintiff further asserts that Stephen Napolitano admitted that it would be a
few years before his credit issues would be cleared up (Id r 1 2) Thus
according to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was agreement to
transfer a 1 5 ownership interest to him is barred by the statute of frauds as
an agreement not to be performed within one year (Pl Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano admits that there was no written
agreement governing his employment and no written agreement to transfer a
15 ownership interest in Windham Q to him (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF
8
mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
9
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
B The Merits of the Mot ion for Preliminary Injunction
Moreover even if the court were to consider the Referees Report
Plaintiff has still failed to produce prima facie evidence that she or Windham Q
will suffer an irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted An
irreparable injury is an injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law
Bangor Historic Track Inc 2003 ME 140 -r 10 83 7 A2d 1 29 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) Although there is no comprehensive rule
for measuring the adequacy of a legal remedy where a plaintiff is entitled to
money damages and the plaintiff has not demonstrated that damages would be
uncollectable from the defendant the legal remedy will be deemed adequate
Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remedies sect 5-3(a) at 101-02 Levesque v
Pelletier 144 Me 245 249 68 AZd 9 11 (1949)
In his Report the Referee identified numerous credit card charges to the
business from 201 2 to 2014 Hwhere the business purpose was not readily
apparent (Referee Report 1 3) These included gas charges drugstore
charges EZ Pass tolls groceries maintenance charges office supplies car
Exs D-G J Pl Addendum to Reply Exs L-0) Like the Referees Report no affidavit has been filed swearing to the authenticity of these documents Therefore like the Referees Report those exhibits cannot be considered by the court See 3 Harvey Maine Civil Practicesect 654 at 333 Also like the Referees Report even if the court were to consider these documents there is no indication that Plaintiff would not be entitled to damages or that such damages would be uncollectable from Defendants See Horton amp McGehee Maine Civil Remediessect 5-3(a) at 101-02 Levesque 144 Me at 249 68 AZd at 11
8
maintenance travel expenses medical charges Amazon and iTunes charges
meal charges department store charges and $1 67 77 500 of other
questionable charges (Id at 1 3-14) The Referee also noted numerous annual
expenses where the business purpose was not clearly determinable (Id at
11) These expenses included automobile repairs cable television internet
payments to multiple vendors tolls travel expenses and yard work (Id at 8shy
11 ) The Referee also noted a high rate of variance between the businesss
register tapes and daily deposits which demonstrated a significant system
failure made validating the daily deposit amounts difficult and revealed certain
commingling of personal and company funds (Id at 1 5-18)
Even if the Referees findings constitute prima facie evidence of an injury
to Plaintiff and Windham Q Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she is without
an adequate remedy at law Plaintiff has not cited and the court is not aware
of any legal authority that would prevent Plaintiff from recovering monetary
damages for the above injuries Plaintiff has also not put forth any evidence
that monetary damages would be uncollectable from Defendants Thus Plaintiff
has not demonstrated an injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law
Moreover additional findings in the Referees Report actually demonstrate
that Plaintiff is unlikely to suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is
not granted In his report the Referee noted that a number of questionable
9
expenses had actually declined in 2015 and 2016 (Id at 11) The Referee
noted that there had been a complete stop in payments by Windham Q for auto
repairs gas tolls travel and yard work and a decline in payments for office
expenses supplies and telephone expenses (Id at 8-11 ) Thus based on the
findings in the Referees Report the alleged injuries to Plaintiff have ceased or
declined in the past two years Therefore contrary to Plaintiffs assertions the
Referees Report actually demonstrates it is unlikely that she will suffer a
continued irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted
Plaintiff argues that Stephen Napolitano has ceased his alleged tortious
behavior while under the scrutiny of the Referee and this court (Pl Mot Prelim
lnj 16) Plaintiff argues that if the Referees role is not expanded Stephen
Napolitano will likely resume his alleged tortious behavior (Id) Plaintiff has
cited no evidence to support this speculation (Id)
Therefore even if the court were to consider the Referees Report
Plaintiff has still failed to demonstrate an irreparable injury in order to obtain a
mandatory preliminary injunction Because failure to demonstrate that any one
of the criteria is met requires the motion be denied the court would not even
reach the other criteria for preliminary injunctive relief See Bangor Historic
Track Inc 2003 ME 140 ~ 10 837 A2d 129
10
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion
individually and on behalf of Windham Q LLC pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 for preliminary injunctive relief is DENIED
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Richard Mulhern Dated J2 t) G
Judge Business amp Consumer Court
Ent~rec on th~ Docket__~ Copies sent va Mail__ Elecronically__ ~
11
STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND SS LOCATION PORTLAND Docket No BCD-CV-1 6-19
SANDRA L NAPOLITANO Individually and on behalf of WINDHAM Q LLC
Plaintiff
v
ARTHUR NAPOLITANO SR and STEPHEN NAPOLITANO
Defendants
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ) ) ) ) )
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano has moved for summary judgment pursuant
to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 5 6 on Defendant Stephen Napolitanos
counterclaim for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief For the following
reasons Plaintiffs motion is denied in part and granted in part
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Defendant Arthur Napolitano are husband and wife (Sandra
Napolitano Aff r 2) Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano are each 50 members
and the sole managers of Windham Q LLC (Windham Q) which operates a
Dairy Queen franchise located in Windham Maine (Id) Defendant Stephen
Napolitano is Arthur Napolitanos son and has worked as the general manager of
the Dairy Queen for more than sixteen years (Sandra Napolitano Aff r 4
Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF r 19)
Plaintiff filed a civil complaint individually and on behalf of Windham Q
with the Superior Court on August 26 201 5 Plaintiffs civil complaint generally
asserts that Stephen Napolitano has misused Windham Qs funds to pay his
personal expenses and that Arthur Napolitano has made improper distributions
and failed to act in the best interests of Windham Q (Campi ~I 20-46)
Arthur Napolitano filed an answer to the civil complaint on September 18
201 5 Stephen Napolitano filed his answer to the civil complaint on September
24 201 S Arthur Napolitano also filed a complaint for divorce with the District
Court on September 29 201 S Stephen Napolitano amended his answer to the
civil complaint on February 11 2016 to add a counterclaim against Plaintiff for
declaratory judgment that the parties had agreed that Stephen would receive an
ownership interest in Windham Q in exchange for agreeing to work as the
general manager of the Dairy Queen store (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp
Countercl ~~ 1 3-14) Plaintiff filed an answer to the counterclaim on March 7
2016 Both the civil action and family action were accepted for transfer to the
Business and Consumer Court in June 2016 Although not consolidated the
two cases are being coordinated before the Business and Consumer Court
Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim on August 11 201 6 Stephen filed an opposition to
summary judgment on September 1 201 6 Plaintiff filed a timely reply on
z
September 8 2016 Oral argument on all pending motions in this case was held
on October 1 2 2016
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if based on the parties statements of
material fact and the cited record there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law MR Civ P 56(c)
Dyer v Dept of Transp_ 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d 821 A fact is material
if it can affect the outcome of the case Dyer 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d
821 A genuine issue of material fact exists if the fact finder must choose
between competing versions of the truth Id When deciding a motion for
summary judgment the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party Id
If the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion
on a claim or defense then the moving party must establish the existence of
each element of the claim or defense without dispute as to any material fact in
the record in order to obtain summary judgment Cach LLC v Kulas 2011 ME
70 ~ 9 21 A3d 1015 The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to
respond with specific material facts indicating a genuine issue for trial in order
to avoid summary judgment MR Civ P 56(e) Even if one partys version of
the facts appears more credible and persuasive any genuine issue of material
3
fact must be resolved by the fact finder regardless of the likelihood of success
Estate of Lewis v Concord Gen Mut Ins Co 2014 ME 34 ~ 10 87 A3d 732
ANALYSIS
Defendant Stephen Napolitanos counterclaim seeks a declaratory
judgment that he has an enforceable agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur
Napolitano that in exchange for agreeing to work full-time as the general
manager of the Dairy Queen store Stephen Napolitano was to receive (a) a
1 5 ownership share of Windham Q as soon as issues with his credit were
addressed and (b) Stephen would eventually receive a 50 ownership share of
Windham Q and associated real estate from Plaintiffs estate 1 (Stephen
Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl r~ 3-4 13) Stephen also seeks injunctive
relief ordering Plaintiff to transfer 75 of her ownership in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano to be increased to 50 from her estate in compliance with
the terms of the agreement (Id r~ 13-1 4)
Plaintiffs sole argument on summary judgment is that Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim is barred by the statute of frauds because there are
no writings evidencing the alleged agreement (Pl Mot Summ J 3-7 ) The
statute of frauds is an affirmative defense MR Civ P 8(c) Thus the statute
Stephen Napolitano asserts the remaining 50 ownership of Windham Q would be shared by his full siblings who are not parties to this litigation (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl ~ 3)
4
1
of frauds must be affirmatively pleaded in an answer otherwise it is waived
Greenlaw v Rodick 158 Me 440 445 185 A2d 895 897-98 (1962) An
affirmative defense may be adequately pleaded even though the exact words
used in Rule 8(c) are absent See Graffam v Geronda 304 A2d 76 78 (Me
1973) Rule 8(c) is satisfied by any clear and unmistakable notice that the
defense is being raised 2 Harvey Maine Civil Practice sect 85 at 362 (3d ed
2011)
Here Plaintiff has not expressly pleaded the statute of frauds as an
affirmative defense (Pl Ans to Countercl amp Affirm Defenses ii 1-7)
Plaintiffs first affirmative defense however avers that Stephen has no
agreement relating to his ownership of the Windham Dairy Queen that is
enforceable under Maine law (Id 1l 1) This language is sufficient to put
Stephen Napolitano on clear and unmistakable notice that Plaintiff is raising the
statute of frauds defense
Maines statute of frauds provides that the actions based on the following
agreements may not be maintained unless the agreement is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto
lawfully authorized (a) any agreement that is not to be performed within one
year and (b) any agreement to give bequeath or devise by will to another any
real personal or mixed property 33 MRS sect 51 (5 ) (7)
5
To determine whether an alleged agreement is one not to be performed
within one year the court does not look to when the performance actually
occurred or whether it was conceivable that performance would occur within or
beyond one year The court looks only to the parties intent Great Hill Fill amp
Gravel v Shapleigh 1997 ME 75 -r S 692 A2d 928 The court must look to
the circumstances of the case and whether the parties plainly manifested an middot
intent that the contract not be performed within one year Id
Regarding an agreement to devise by will Maines Probate Code further
provides
A contract to make a will or devise or not to revoke a will or devise can be established only by ( 1 ) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract or (3) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills
18-A MRS sect 2-701
If an agreement falls within the statute of frauds then it must be
evidenced in writing and signed by the party against whom the agreement is to
be enforced or another lawfully authorized person 33 MRS sect 51 Nearly any
form of writing will satisfy the statute of frauds McCare v Rocha 2014 ME 4
-r 11 86 A3d 22 A series of writings may collectively satisfy the statute of
6
frauds even if none of the writings does so separately Wilson v DePapa 634
A2d 1252 1254 (Me 1993)
The part performance doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds
Sullivan v Porter 2004 ME 134 ~ 10 861 A2d 625 An oral contract within
the statute of frauds may still be enforced if the party seeking to enforce the
agreement can prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the parties entered
into a contract (2) the party seeking to enforce the contract partially
performed its obligation and (3) the performance was induced by the other
partys misrepresentation which may be evidenced by acquiescence or silence
Id at i 11 The part performance doctrine is grounded in the principle of
equitable estoppel which involves detrimental reliance induced by
misrepresentation and fraud Id I 17 Equitabl~ estoppel differs from
promissory estoppel which involves detrimental reliance on a mere promise Id
~ 1 7 n 7 The Law Court has expressly stated that for multi-year employment
agreements an employees detrimental reliance on an employers oral promise is
not enough to avoid the statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine
Stearns v Emery-Waterhouse Co 596 A2d 72 75 (Me 1991 ) To avoid the
statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine the employee must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their performance was induced by
7
fraud on the part of the employer Id see also Suliivan 2004 ME 134 iI 17
861 A2d 625
A The 1 5 Ownership Interest in Windham Q
In support of her motion Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement
governing Stephen Napolitanos employment with Windham Q there was no
written agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership share of Windham Q to Stephen
Napolitano and that there was no agreement written or oral that Stephens
employment with Windham Q was contingent upon him receiving an ownership
interest (Pl Suppg SMF iiiI 8-9 14) Plaintiff asserts that even if there was
an oral agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership interest Stephen has testified
that any transfer would not happen immediately because the agreement was
contingent upon Stephen resolving certain issues with his credit (Id iI 11 )
Plaintiff further asserts that Stephen Napolitano admitted that it would be a
few years before his credit issues would be cleared up (Id r 1 2) Thus
according to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was agreement to
transfer a 1 5 ownership interest to him is barred by the statute of frauds as
an agreement not to be performed within one year (Pl Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano admits that there was no written
agreement governing his employment and no written agreement to transfer a
15 ownership interest in Windham Q to him (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF
8
mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
9
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
maintenance travel expenses medical charges Amazon and iTunes charges
meal charges department store charges and $1 67 77 500 of other
questionable charges (Id at 1 3-14) The Referee also noted numerous annual
expenses where the business purpose was not clearly determinable (Id at
11) These expenses included automobile repairs cable television internet
payments to multiple vendors tolls travel expenses and yard work (Id at 8shy
11 ) The Referee also noted a high rate of variance between the businesss
register tapes and daily deposits which demonstrated a significant system
failure made validating the daily deposit amounts difficult and revealed certain
commingling of personal and company funds (Id at 1 5-18)
Even if the Referees findings constitute prima facie evidence of an injury
to Plaintiff and Windham Q Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she is without
an adequate remedy at law Plaintiff has not cited and the court is not aware
of any legal authority that would prevent Plaintiff from recovering monetary
damages for the above injuries Plaintiff has also not put forth any evidence
that monetary damages would be uncollectable from Defendants Thus Plaintiff
has not demonstrated an injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law
Moreover additional findings in the Referees Report actually demonstrate
that Plaintiff is unlikely to suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is
not granted In his report the Referee noted that a number of questionable
9
expenses had actually declined in 2015 and 2016 (Id at 11) The Referee
noted that there had been a complete stop in payments by Windham Q for auto
repairs gas tolls travel and yard work and a decline in payments for office
expenses supplies and telephone expenses (Id at 8-11 ) Thus based on the
findings in the Referees Report the alleged injuries to Plaintiff have ceased or
declined in the past two years Therefore contrary to Plaintiffs assertions the
Referees Report actually demonstrates it is unlikely that she will suffer a
continued irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted
Plaintiff argues that Stephen Napolitano has ceased his alleged tortious
behavior while under the scrutiny of the Referee and this court (Pl Mot Prelim
lnj 16) Plaintiff argues that if the Referees role is not expanded Stephen
Napolitano will likely resume his alleged tortious behavior (Id) Plaintiff has
cited no evidence to support this speculation (Id)
Therefore even if the court were to consider the Referees Report
Plaintiff has still failed to demonstrate an irreparable injury in order to obtain a
mandatory preliminary injunction Because failure to demonstrate that any one
of the criteria is met requires the motion be denied the court would not even
reach the other criteria for preliminary injunctive relief See Bangor Historic
Track Inc 2003 ME 140 ~ 10 837 A2d 129
10
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion
individually and on behalf of Windham Q LLC pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 for preliminary injunctive relief is DENIED
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Richard Mulhern Dated J2 t) G
Judge Business amp Consumer Court
Ent~rec on th~ Docket__~ Copies sent va Mail__ Elecronically__ ~
11
STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND SS LOCATION PORTLAND Docket No BCD-CV-1 6-19
SANDRA L NAPOLITANO Individually and on behalf of WINDHAM Q LLC
Plaintiff
v
ARTHUR NAPOLITANO SR and STEPHEN NAPOLITANO
Defendants
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ) ) ) ) )
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano has moved for summary judgment pursuant
to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 5 6 on Defendant Stephen Napolitanos
counterclaim for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief For the following
reasons Plaintiffs motion is denied in part and granted in part
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Defendant Arthur Napolitano are husband and wife (Sandra
Napolitano Aff r 2) Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano are each 50 members
and the sole managers of Windham Q LLC (Windham Q) which operates a
Dairy Queen franchise located in Windham Maine (Id) Defendant Stephen
Napolitano is Arthur Napolitanos son and has worked as the general manager of
the Dairy Queen for more than sixteen years (Sandra Napolitano Aff r 4
Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF r 19)
Plaintiff filed a civil complaint individually and on behalf of Windham Q
with the Superior Court on August 26 201 5 Plaintiffs civil complaint generally
asserts that Stephen Napolitano has misused Windham Qs funds to pay his
personal expenses and that Arthur Napolitano has made improper distributions
and failed to act in the best interests of Windham Q (Campi ~I 20-46)
Arthur Napolitano filed an answer to the civil complaint on September 18
201 5 Stephen Napolitano filed his answer to the civil complaint on September
24 201 S Arthur Napolitano also filed a complaint for divorce with the District
Court on September 29 201 S Stephen Napolitano amended his answer to the
civil complaint on February 11 2016 to add a counterclaim against Plaintiff for
declaratory judgment that the parties had agreed that Stephen would receive an
ownership interest in Windham Q in exchange for agreeing to work as the
general manager of the Dairy Queen store (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp
Countercl ~~ 1 3-14) Plaintiff filed an answer to the counterclaim on March 7
2016 Both the civil action and family action were accepted for transfer to the
Business and Consumer Court in June 2016 Although not consolidated the
two cases are being coordinated before the Business and Consumer Court
Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim on August 11 201 6 Stephen filed an opposition to
summary judgment on September 1 201 6 Plaintiff filed a timely reply on
z
September 8 2016 Oral argument on all pending motions in this case was held
on October 1 2 2016
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if based on the parties statements of
material fact and the cited record there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law MR Civ P 56(c)
Dyer v Dept of Transp_ 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d 821 A fact is material
if it can affect the outcome of the case Dyer 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d
821 A genuine issue of material fact exists if the fact finder must choose
between competing versions of the truth Id When deciding a motion for
summary judgment the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party Id
If the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion
on a claim or defense then the moving party must establish the existence of
each element of the claim or defense without dispute as to any material fact in
the record in order to obtain summary judgment Cach LLC v Kulas 2011 ME
70 ~ 9 21 A3d 1015 The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to
respond with specific material facts indicating a genuine issue for trial in order
to avoid summary judgment MR Civ P 56(e) Even if one partys version of
the facts appears more credible and persuasive any genuine issue of material
3
fact must be resolved by the fact finder regardless of the likelihood of success
Estate of Lewis v Concord Gen Mut Ins Co 2014 ME 34 ~ 10 87 A3d 732
ANALYSIS
Defendant Stephen Napolitanos counterclaim seeks a declaratory
judgment that he has an enforceable agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur
Napolitano that in exchange for agreeing to work full-time as the general
manager of the Dairy Queen store Stephen Napolitano was to receive (a) a
1 5 ownership share of Windham Q as soon as issues with his credit were
addressed and (b) Stephen would eventually receive a 50 ownership share of
Windham Q and associated real estate from Plaintiffs estate 1 (Stephen
Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl r~ 3-4 13) Stephen also seeks injunctive
relief ordering Plaintiff to transfer 75 of her ownership in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano to be increased to 50 from her estate in compliance with
the terms of the agreement (Id r~ 13-1 4)
Plaintiffs sole argument on summary judgment is that Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim is barred by the statute of frauds because there are
no writings evidencing the alleged agreement (Pl Mot Summ J 3-7 ) The
statute of frauds is an affirmative defense MR Civ P 8(c) Thus the statute
Stephen Napolitano asserts the remaining 50 ownership of Windham Q would be shared by his full siblings who are not parties to this litigation (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl ~ 3)
4
1
of frauds must be affirmatively pleaded in an answer otherwise it is waived
Greenlaw v Rodick 158 Me 440 445 185 A2d 895 897-98 (1962) An
affirmative defense may be adequately pleaded even though the exact words
used in Rule 8(c) are absent See Graffam v Geronda 304 A2d 76 78 (Me
1973) Rule 8(c) is satisfied by any clear and unmistakable notice that the
defense is being raised 2 Harvey Maine Civil Practice sect 85 at 362 (3d ed
2011)
Here Plaintiff has not expressly pleaded the statute of frauds as an
affirmative defense (Pl Ans to Countercl amp Affirm Defenses ii 1-7)
Plaintiffs first affirmative defense however avers that Stephen has no
agreement relating to his ownership of the Windham Dairy Queen that is
enforceable under Maine law (Id 1l 1) This language is sufficient to put
Stephen Napolitano on clear and unmistakable notice that Plaintiff is raising the
statute of frauds defense
Maines statute of frauds provides that the actions based on the following
agreements may not be maintained unless the agreement is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto
lawfully authorized (a) any agreement that is not to be performed within one
year and (b) any agreement to give bequeath or devise by will to another any
real personal or mixed property 33 MRS sect 51 (5 ) (7)
5
To determine whether an alleged agreement is one not to be performed
within one year the court does not look to when the performance actually
occurred or whether it was conceivable that performance would occur within or
beyond one year The court looks only to the parties intent Great Hill Fill amp
Gravel v Shapleigh 1997 ME 75 -r S 692 A2d 928 The court must look to
the circumstances of the case and whether the parties plainly manifested an middot
intent that the contract not be performed within one year Id
Regarding an agreement to devise by will Maines Probate Code further
provides
A contract to make a will or devise or not to revoke a will or devise can be established only by ( 1 ) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract or (3) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills
18-A MRS sect 2-701
If an agreement falls within the statute of frauds then it must be
evidenced in writing and signed by the party against whom the agreement is to
be enforced or another lawfully authorized person 33 MRS sect 51 Nearly any
form of writing will satisfy the statute of frauds McCare v Rocha 2014 ME 4
-r 11 86 A3d 22 A series of writings may collectively satisfy the statute of
6
frauds even if none of the writings does so separately Wilson v DePapa 634
A2d 1252 1254 (Me 1993)
The part performance doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds
Sullivan v Porter 2004 ME 134 ~ 10 861 A2d 625 An oral contract within
the statute of frauds may still be enforced if the party seeking to enforce the
agreement can prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the parties entered
into a contract (2) the party seeking to enforce the contract partially
performed its obligation and (3) the performance was induced by the other
partys misrepresentation which may be evidenced by acquiescence or silence
Id at i 11 The part performance doctrine is grounded in the principle of
equitable estoppel which involves detrimental reliance induced by
misrepresentation and fraud Id I 17 Equitabl~ estoppel differs from
promissory estoppel which involves detrimental reliance on a mere promise Id
~ 1 7 n 7 The Law Court has expressly stated that for multi-year employment
agreements an employees detrimental reliance on an employers oral promise is
not enough to avoid the statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine
Stearns v Emery-Waterhouse Co 596 A2d 72 75 (Me 1991 ) To avoid the
statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine the employee must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their performance was induced by
7
fraud on the part of the employer Id see also Suliivan 2004 ME 134 iI 17
861 A2d 625
A The 1 5 Ownership Interest in Windham Q
In support of her motion Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement
governing Stephen Napolitanos employment with Windham Q there was no
written agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership share of Windham Q to Stephen
Napolitano and that there was no agreement written or oral that Stephens
employment with Windham Q was contingent upon him receiving an ownership
interest (Pl Suppg SMF iiiI 8-9 14) Plaintiff asserts that even if there was
an oral agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership interest Stephen has testified
that any transfer would not happen immediately because the agreement was
contingent upon Stephen resolving certain issues with his credit (Id iI 11 )
Plaintiff further asserts that Stephen Napolitano admitted that it would be a
few years before his credit issues would be cleared up (Id r 1 2) Thus
according to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was agreement to
transfer a 1 5 ownership interest to him is barred by the statute of frauds as
an agreement not to be performed within one year (Pl Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano admits that there was no written
agreement governing his employment and no written agreement to transfer a
15 ownership interest in Windham Q to him (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF
8
mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
9
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
expenses had actually declined in 2015 and 2016 (Id at 11) The Referee
noted that there had been a complete stop in payments by Windham Q for auto
repairs gas tolls travel and yard work and a decline in payments for office
expenses supplies and telephone expenses (Id at 8-11 ) Thus based on the
findings in the Referees Report the alleged injuries to Plaintiff have ceased or
declined in the past two years Therefore contrary to Plaintiffs assertions the
Referees Report actually demonstrates it is unlikely that she will suffer a
continued irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted
Plaintiff argues that Stephen Napolitano has ceased his alleged tortious
behavior while under the scrutiny of the Referee and this court (Pl Mot Prelim
lnj 16) Plaintiff argues that if the Referees role is not expanded Stephen
Napolitano will likely resume his alleged tortious behavior (Id) Plaintiff has
cited no evidence to support this speculation (Id)
Therefore even if the court were to consider the Referees Report
Plaintiff has still failed to demonstrate an irreparable injury in order to obtain a
mandatory preliminary injunction Because failure to demonstrate that any one
of the criteria is met requires the motion be denied the court would not even
reach the other criteria for preliminary injunctive relief See Bangor Historic
Track Inc 2003 ME 140 ~ 10 837 A2d 129
10
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion
individually and on behalf of Windham Q LLC pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 for preliminary injunctive relief is DENIED
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Richard Mulhern Dated J2 t) G
Judge Business amp Consumer Court
Ent~rec on th~ Docket__~ Copies sent va Mail__ Elecronically__ ~
11
STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND SS LOCATION PORTLAND Docket No BCD-CV-1 6-19
SANDRA L NAPOLITANO Individually and on behalf of WINDHAM Q LLC
Plaintiff
v
ARTHUR NAPOLITANO SR and STEPHEN NAPOLITANO
Defendants
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ) ) ) ) )
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano has moved for summary judgment pursuant
to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 5 6 on Defendant Stephen Napolitanos
counterclaim for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief For the following
reasons Plaintiffs motion is denied in part and granted in part
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Defendant Arthur Napolitano are husband and wife (Sandra
Napolitano Aff r 2) Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano are each 50 members
and the sole managers of Windham Q LLC (Windham Q) which operates a
Dairy Queen franchise located in Windham Maine (Id) Defendant Stephen
Napolitano is Arthur Napolitanos son and has worked as the general manager of
the Dairy Queen for more than sixteen years (Sandra Napolitano Aff r 4
Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF r 19)
Plaintiff filed a civil complaint individually and on behalf of Windham Q
with the Superior Court on August 26 201 5 Plaintiffs civil complaint generally
asserts that Stephen Napolitano has misused Windham Qs funds to pay his
personal expenses and that Arthur Napolitano has made improper distributions
and failed to act in the best interests of Windham Q (Campi ~I 20-46)
Arthur Napolitano filed an answer to the civil complaint on September 18
201 5 Stephen Napolitano filed his answer to the civil complaint on September
24 201 S Arthur Napolitano also filed a complaint for divorce with the District
Court on September 29 201 S Stephen Napolitano amended his answer to the
civil complaint on February 11 2016 to add a counterclaim against Plaintiff for
declaratory judgment that the parties had agreed that Stephen would receive an
ownership interest in Windham Q in exchange for agreeing to work as the
general manager of the Dairy Queen store (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp
Countercl ~~ 1 3-14) Plaintiff filed an answer to the counterclaim on March 7
2016 Both the civil action and family action were accepted for transfer to the
Business and Consumer Court in June 2016 Although not consolidated the
two cases are being coordinated before the Business and Consumer Court
Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim on August 11 201 6 Stephen filed an opposition to
summary judgment on September 1 201 6 Plaintiff filed a timely reply on
z
September 8 2016 Oral argument on all pending motions in this case was held
on October 1 2 2016
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if based on the parties statements of
material fact and the cited record there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law MR Civ P 56(c)
Dyer v Dept of Transp_ 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d 821 A fact is material
if it can affect the outcome of the case Dyer 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d
821 A genuine issue of material fact exists if the fact finder must choose
between competing versions of the truth Id When deciding a motion for
summary judgment the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party Id
If the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion
on a claim or defense then the moving party must establish the existence of
each element of the claim or defense without dispute as to any material fact in
the record in order to obtain summary judgment Cach LLC v Kulas 2011 ME
70 ~ 9 21 A3d 1015 The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to
respond with specific material facts indicating a genuine issue for trial in order
to avoid summary judgment MR Civ P 56(e) Even if one partys version of
the facts appears more credible and persuasive any genuine issue of material
3
fact must be resolved by the fact finder regardless of the likelihood of success
Estate of Lewis v Concord Gen Mut Ins Co 2014 ME 34 ~ 10 87 A3d 732
ANALYSIS
Defendant Stephen Napolitanos counterclaim seeks a declaratory
judgment that he has an enforceable agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur
Napolitano that in exchange for agreeing to work full-time as the general
manager of the Dairy Queen store Stephen Napolitano was to receive (a) a
1 5 ownership share of Windham Q as soon as issues with his credit were
addressed and (b) Stephen would eventually receive a 50 ownership share of
Windham Q and associated real estate from Plaintiffs estate 1 (Stephen
Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl r~ 3-4 13) Stephen also seeks injunctive
relief ordering Plaintiff to transfer 75 of her ownership in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano to be increased to 50 from her estate in compliance with
the terms of the agreement (Id r~ 13-1 4)
Plaintiffs sole argument on summary judgment is that Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim is barred by the statute of frauds because there are
no writings evidencing the alleged agreement (Pl Mot Summ J 3-7 ) The
statute of frauds is an affirmative defense MR Civ P 8(c) Thus the statute
Stephen Napolitano asserts the remaining 50 ownership of Windham Q would be shared by his full siblings who are not parties to this litigation (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl ~ 3)
4
1
of frauds must be affirmatively pleaded in an answer otherwise it is waived
Greenlaw v Rodick 158 Me 440 445 185 A2d 895 897-98 (1962) An
affirmative defense may be adequately pleaded even though the exact words
used in Rule 8(c) are absent See Graffam v Geronda 304 A2d 76 78 (Me
1973) Rule 8(c) is satisfied by any clear and unmistakable notice that the
defense is being raised 2 Harvey Maine Civil Practice sect 85 at 362 (3d ed
2011)
Here Plaintiff has not expressly pleaded the statute of frauds as an
affirmative defense (Pl Ans to Countercl amp Affirm Defenses ii 1-7)
Plaintiffs first affirmative defense however avers that Stephen has no
agreement relating to his ownership of the Windham Dairy Queen that is
enforceable under Maine law (Id 1l 1) This language is sufficient to put
Stephen Napolitano on clear and unmistakable notice that Plaintiff is raising the
statute of frauds defense
Maines statute of frauds provides that the actions based on the following
agreements may not be maintained unless the agreement is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto
lawfully authorized (a) any agreement that is not to be performed within one
year and (b) any agreement to give bequeath or devise by will to another any
real personal or mixed property 33 MRS sect 51 (5 ) (7)
5
To determine whether an alleged agreement is one not to be performed
within one year the court does not look to when the performance actually
occurred or whether it was conceivable that performance would occur within or
beyond one year The court looks only to the parties intent Great Hill Fill amp
Gravel v Shapleigh 1997 ME 75 -r S 692 A2d 928 The court must look to
the circumstances of the case and whether the parties plainly manifested an middot
intent that the contract not be performed within one year Id
Regarding an agreement to devise by will Maines Probate Code further
provides
A contract to make a will or devise or not to revoke a will or devise can be established only by ( 1 ) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract or (3) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills
18-A MRS sect 2-701
If an agreement falls within the statute of frauds then it must be
evidenced in writing and signed by the party against whom the agreement is to
be enforced or another lawfully authorized person 33 MRS sect 51 Nearly any
form of writing will satisfy the statute of frauds McCare v Rocha 2014 ME 4
-r 11 86 A3d 22 A series of writings may collectively satisfy the statute of
6
frauds even if none of the writings does so separately Wilson v DePapa 634
A2d 1252 1254 (Me 1993)
The part performance doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds
Sullivan v Porter 2004 ME 134 ~ 10 861 A2d 625 An oral contract within
the statute of frauds may still be enforced if the party seeking to enforce the
agreement can prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the parties entered
into a contract (2) the party seeking to enforce the contract partially
performed its obligation and (3) the performance was induced by the other
partys misrepresentation which may be evidenced by acquiescence or silence
Id at i 11 The part performance doctrine is grounded in the principle of
equitable estoppel which involves detrimental reliance induced by
misrepresentation and fraud Id I 17 Equitabl~ estoppel differs from
promissory estoppel which involves detrimental reliance on a mere promise Id
~ 1 7 n 7 The Law Court has expressly stated that for multi-year employment
agreements an employees detrimental reliance on an employers oral promise is
not enough to avoid the statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine
Stearns v Emery-Waterhouse Co 596 A2d 72 75 (Me 1991 ) To avoid the
statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine the employee must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their performance was induced by
7
fraud on the part of the employer Id see also Suliivan 2004 ME 134 iI 17
861 A2d 625
A The 1 5 Ownership Interest in Windham Q
In support of her motion Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement
governing Stephen Napolitanos employment with Windham Q there was no
written agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership share of Windham Q to Stephen
Napolitano and that there was no agreement written or oral that Stephens
employment with Windham Q was contingent upon him receiving an ownership
interest (Pl Suppg SMF iiiI 8-9 14) Plaintiff asserts that even if there was
an oral agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership interest Stephen has testified
that any transfer would not happen immediately because the agreement was
contingent upon Stephen resolving certain issues with his credit (Id iI 11 )
Plaintiff further asserts that Stephen Napolitano admitted that it would be a
few years before his credit issues would be cleared up (Id r 1 2) Thus
according to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was agreement to
transfer a 1 5 ownership interest to him is barred by the statute of frauds as
an agreement not to be performed within one year (Pl Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano admits that there was no written
agreement governing his employment and no written agreement to transfer a
15 ownership interest in Windham Q to him (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF
8
mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
9
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion
individually and on behalf of Windham Q LLC pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 for preliminary injunctive relief is DENIED
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Richard Mulhern Dated J2 t) G
Judge Business amp Consumer Court
Ent~rec on th~ Docket__~ Copies sent va Mail__ Elecronically__ ~
11
STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND SS LOCATION PORTLAND Docket No BCD-CV-1 6-19
SANDRA L NAPOLITANO Individually and on behalf of WINDHAM Q LLC
Plaintiff
v
ARTHUR NAPOLITANO SR and STEPHEN NAPOLITANO
Defendants
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ) ) ) ) )
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano has moved for summary judgment pursuant
to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 5 6 on Defendant Stephen Napolitanos
counterclaim for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief For the following
reasons Plaintiffs motion is denied in part and granted in part
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Defendant Arthur Napolitano are husband and wife (Sandra
Napolitano Aff r 2) Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano are each 50 members
and the sole managers of Windham Q LLC (Windham Q) which operates a
Dairy Queen franchise located in Windham Maine (Id) Defendant Stephen
Napolitano is Arthur Napolitanos son and has worked as the general manager of
the Dairy Queen for more than sixteen years (Sandra Napolitano Aff r 4
Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF r 19)
Plaintiff filed a civil complaint individually and on behalf of Windham Q
with the Superior Court on August 26 201 5 Plaintiffs civil complaint generally
asserts that Stephen Napolitano has misused Windham Qs funds to pay his
personal expenses and that Arthur Napolitano has made improper distributions
and failed to act in the best interests of Windham Q (Campi ~I 20-46)
Arthur Napolitano filed an answer to the civil complaint on September 18
201 5 Stephen Napolitano filed his answer to the civil complaint on September
24 201 S Arthur Napolitano also filed a complaint for divorce with the District
Court on September 29 201 S Stephen Napolitano amended his answer to the
civil complaint on February 11 2016 to add a counterclaim against Plaintiff for
declaratory judgment that the parties had agreed that Stephen would receive an
ownership interest in Windham Q in exchange for agreeing to work as the
general manager of the Dairy Queen store (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp
Countercl ~~ 1 3-14) Plaintiff filed an answer to the counterclaim on March 7
2016 Both the civil action and family action were accepted for transfer to the
Business and Consumer Court in June 2016 Although not consolidated the
two cases are being coordinated before the Business and Consumer Court
Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim on August 11 201 6 Stephen filed an opposition to
summary judgment on September 1 201 6 Plaintiff filed a timely reply on
z
September 8 2016 Oral argument on all pending motions in this case was held
on October 1 2 2016
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if based on the parties statements of
material fact and the cited record there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law MR Civ P 56(c)
Dyer v Dept of Transp_ 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d 821 A fact is material
if it can affect the outcome of the case Dyer 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d
821 A genuine issue of material fact exists if the fact finder must choose
between competing versions of the truth Id When deciding a motion for
summary judgment the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party Id
If the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion
on a claim or defense then the moving party must establish the existence of
each element of the claim or defense without dispute as to any material fact in
the record in order to obtain summary judgment Cach LLC v Kulas 2011 ME
70 ~ 9 21 A3d 1015 The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to
respond with specific material facts indicating a genuine issue for trial in order
to avoid summary judgment MR Civ P 56(e) Even if one partys version of
the facts appears more credible and persuasive any genuine issue of material
3
fact must be resolved by the fact finder regardless of the likelihood of success
Estate of Lewis v Concord Gen Mut Ins Co 2014 ME 34 ~ 10 87 A3d 732
ANALYSIS
Defendant Stephen Napolitanos counterclaim seeks a declaratory
judgment that he has an enforceable agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur
Napolitano that in exchange for agreeing to work full-time as the general
manager of the Dairy Queen store Stephen Napolitano was to receive (a) a
1 5 ownership share of Windham Q as soon as issues with his credit were
addressed and (b) Stephen would eventually receive a 50 ownership share of
Windham Q and associated real estate from Plaintiffs estate 1 (Stephen
Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl r~ 3-4 13) Stephen also seeks injunctive
relief ordering Plaintiff to transfer 75 of her ownership in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano to be increased to 50 from her estate in compliance with
the terms of the agreement (Id r~ 13-1 4)
Plaintiffs sole argument on summary judgment is that Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim is barred by the statute of frauds because there are
no writings evidencing the alleged agreement (Pl Mot Summ J 3-7 ) The
statute of frauds is an affirmative defense MR Civ P 8(c) Thus the statute
Stephen Napolitano asserts the remaining 50 ownership of Windham Q would be shared by his full siblings who are not parties to this litigation (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl ~ 3)
4
1
of frauds must be affirmatively pleaded in an answer otherwise it is waived
Greenlaw v Rodick 158 Me 440 445 185 A2d 895 897-98 (1962) An
affirmative defense may be adequately pleaded even though the exact words
used in Rule 8(c) are absent See Graffam v Geronda 304 A2d 76 78 (Me
1973) Rule 8(c) is satisfied by any clear and unmistakable notice that the
defense is being raised 2 Harvey Maine Civil Practice sect 85 at 362 (3d ed
2011)
Here Plaintiff has not expressly pleaded the statute of frauds as an
affirmative defense (Pl Ans to Countercl amp Affirm Defenses ii 1-7)
Plaintiffs first affirmative defense however avers that Stephen has no
agreement relating to his ownership of the Windham Dairy Queen that is
enforceable under Maine law (Id 1l 1) This language is sufficient to put
Stephen Napolitano on clear and unmistakable notice that Plaintiff is raising the
statute of frauds defense
Maines statute of frauds provides that the actions based on the following
agreements may not be maintained unless the agreement is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto
lawfully authorized (a) any agreement that is not to be performed within one
year and (b) any agreement to give bequeath or devise by will to another any
real personal or mixed property 33 MRS sect 51 (5 ) (7)
5
To determine whether an alleged agreement is one not to be performed
within one year the court does not look to when the performance actually
occurred or whether it was conceivable that performance would occur within or
beyond one year The court looks only to the parties intent Great Hill Fill amp
Gravel v Shapleigh 1997 ME 75 -r S 692 A2d 928 The court must look to
the circumstances of the case and whether the parties plainly manifested an middot
intent that the contract not be performed within one year Id
Regarding an agreement to devise by will Maines Probate Code further
provides
A contract to make a will or devise or not to revoke a will or devise can be established only by ( 1 ) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract or (3) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills
18-A MRS sect 2-701
If an agreement falls within the statute of frauds then it must be
evidenced in writing and signed by the party against whom the agreement is to
be enforced or another lawfully authorized person 33 MRS sect 51 Nearly any
form of writing will satisfy the statute of frauds McCare v Rocha 2014 ME 4
-r 11 86 A3d 22 A series of writings may collectively satisfy the statute of
6
frauds even if none of the writings does so separately Wilson v DePapa 634
A2d 1252 1254 (Me 1993)
The part performance doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds
Sullivan v Porter 2004 ME 134 ~ 10 861 A2d 625 An oral contract within
the statute of frauds may still be enforced if the party seeking to enforce the
agreement can prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the parties entered
into a contract (2) the party seeking to enforce the contract partially
performed its obligation and (3) the performance was induced by the other
partys misrepresentation which may be evidenced by acquiescence or silence
Id at i 11 The part performance doctrine is grounded in the principle of
equitable estoppel which involves detrimental reliance induced by
misrepresentation and fraud Id I 17 Equitabl~ estoppel differs from
promissory estoppel which involves detrimental reliance on a mere promise Id
~ 1 7 n 7 The Law Court has expressly stated that for multi-year employment
agreements an employees detrimental reliance on an employers oral promise is
not enough to avoid the statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine
Stearns v Emery-Waterhouse Co 596 A2d 72 75 (Me 1991 ) To avoid the
statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine the employee must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their performance was induced by
7
fraud on the part of the employer Id see also Suliivan 2004 ME 134 iI 17
861 A2d 625
A The 1 5 Ownership Interest in Windham Q
In support of her motion Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement
governing Stephen Napolitanos employment with Windham Q there was no
written agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership share of Windham Q to Stephen
Napolitano and that there was no agreement written or oral that Stephens
employment with Windham Q was contingent upon him receiving an ownership
interest (Pl Suppg SMF iiiI 8-9 14) Plaintiff asserts that even if there was
an oral agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership interest Stephen has testified
that any transfer would not happen immediately because the agreement was
contingent upon Stephen resolving certain issues with his credit (Id iI 11 )
Plaintiff further asserts that Stephen Napolitano admitted that it would be a
few years before his credit issues would be cleared up (Id r 1 2) Thus
according to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was agreement to
transfer a 1 5 ownership interest to him is barred by the statute of frauds as
an agreement not to be performed within one year (Pl Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano admits that there was no written
agreement governing his employment and no written agreement to transfer a
15 ownership interest in Windham Q to him (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF
8
mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
9
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND SS LOCATION PORTLAND Docket No BCD-CV-1 6-19
SANDRA L NAPOLITANO Individually and on behalf of WINDHAM Q LLC
Plaintiff
v
ARTHUR NAPOLITANO SR and STEPHEN NAPOLITANO
Defendants
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ) ) ) ) )
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano has moved for summary judgment pursuant
to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 5 6 on Defendant Stephen Napolitanos
counterclaim for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief For the following
reasons Plaintiffs motion is denied in part and granted in part
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Defendant Arthur Napolitano are husband and wife (Sandra
Napolitano Aff r 2) Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano are each 50 members
and the sole managers of Windham Q LLC (Windham Q) which operates a
Dairy Queen franchise located in Windham Maine (Id) Defendant Stephen
Napolitano is Arthur Napolitanos son and has worked as the general manager of
the Dairy Queen for more than sixteen years (Sandra Napolitano Aff r 4
Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF r 19)
Plaintiff filed a civil complaint individually and on behalf of Windham Q
with the Superior Court on August 26 201 5 Plaintiffs civil complaint generally
asserts that Stephen Napolitano has misused Windham Qs funds to pay his
personal expenses and that Arthur Napolitano has made improper distributions
and failed to act in the best interests of Windham Q (Campi ~I 20-46)
Arthur Napolitano filed an answer to the civil complaint on September 18
201 5 Stephen Napolitano filed his answer to the civil complaint on September
24 201 S Arthur Napolitano also filed a complaint for divorce with the District
Court on September 29 201 S Stephen Napolitano amended his answer to the
civil complaint on February 11 2016 to add a counterclaim against Plaintiff for
declaratory judgment that the parties had agreed that Stephen would receive an
ownership interest in Windham Q in exchange for agreeing to work as the
general manager of the Dairy Queen store (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp
Countercl ~~ 1 3-14) Plaintiff filed an answer to the counterclaim on March 7
2016 Both the civil action and family action were accepted for transfer to the
Business and Consumer Court in June 2016 Although not consolidated the
two cases are being coordinated before the Business and Consumer Court
Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim on August 11 201 6 Stephen filed an opposition to
summary judgment on September 1 201 6 Plaintiff filed a timely reply on
z
September 8 2016 Oral argument on all pending motions in this case was held
on October 1 2 2016
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if based on the parties statements of
material fact and the cited record there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law MR Civ P 56(c)
Dyer v Dept of Transp_ 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d 821 A fact is material
if it can affect the outcome of the case Dyer 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d
821 A genuine issue of material fact exists if the fact finder must choose
between competing versions of the truth Id When deciding a motion for
summary judgment the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party Id
If the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion
on a claim or defense then the moving party must establish the existence of
each element of the claim or defense without dispute as to any material fact in
the record in order to obtain summary judgment Cach LLC v Kulas 2011 ME
70 ~ 9 21 A3d 1015 The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to
respond with specific material facts indicating a genuine issue for trial in order
to avoid summary judgment MR Civ P 56(e) Even if one partys version of
the facts appears more credible and persuasive any genuine issue of material
3
fact must be resolved by the fact finder regardless of the likelihood of success
Estate of Lewis v Concord Gen Mut Ins Co 2014 ME 34 ~ 10 87 A3d 732
ANALYSIS
Defendant Stephen Napolitanos counterclaim seeks a declaratory
judgment that he has an enforceable agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur
Napolitano that in exchange for agreeing to work full-time as the general
manager of the Dairy Queen store Stephen Napolitano was to receive (a) a
1 5 ownership share of Windham Q as soon as issues with his credit were
addressed and (b) Stephen would eventually receive a 50 ownership share of
Windham Q and associated real estate from Plaintiffs estate 1 (Stephen
Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl r~ 3-4 13) Stephen also seeks injunctive
relief ordering Plaintiff to transfer 75 of her ownership in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano to be increased to 50 from her estate in compliance with
the terms of the agreement (Id r~ 13-1 4)
Plaintiffs sole argument on summary judgment is that Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim is barred by the statute of frauds because there are
no writings evidencing the alleged agreement (Pl Mot Summ J 3-7 ) The
statute of frauds is an affirmative defense MR Civ P 8(c) Thus the statute
Stephen Napolitano asserts the remaining 50 ownership of Windham Q would be shared by his full siblings who are not parties to this litigation (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl ~ 3)
4
1
of frauds must be affirmatively pleaded in an answer otherwise it is waived
Greenlaw v Rodick 158 Me 440 445 185 A2d 895 897-98 (1962) An
affirmative defense may be adequately pleaded even though the exact words
used in Rule 8(c) are absent See Graffam v Geronda 304 A2d 76 78 (Me
1973) Rule 8(c) is satisfied by any clear and unmistakable notice that the
defense is being raised 2 Harvey Maine Civil Practice sect 85 at 362 (3d ed
2011)
Here Plaintiff has not expressly pleaded the statute of frauds as an
affirmative defense (Pl Ans to Countercl amp Affirm Defenses ii 1-7)
Plaintiffs first affirmative defense however avers that Stephen has no
agreement relating to his ownership of the Windham Dairy Queen that is
enforceable under Maine law (Id 1l 1) This language is sufficient to put
Stephen Napolitano on clear and unmistakable notice that Plaintiff is raising the
statute of frauds defense
Maines statute of frauds provides that the actions based on the following
agreements may not be maintained unless the agreement is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto
lawfully authorized (a) any agreement that is not to be performed within one
year and (b) any agreement to give bequeath or devise by will to another any
real personal or mixed property 33 MRS sect 51 (5 ) (7)
5
To determine whether an alleged agreement is one not to be performed
within one year the court does not look to when the performance actually
occurred or whether it was conceivable that performance would occur within or
beyond one year The court looks only to the parties intent Great Hill Fill amp
Gravel v Shapleigh 1997 ME 75 -r S 692 A2d 928 The court must look to
the circumstances of the case and whether the parties plainly manifested an middot
intent that the contract not be performed within one year Id
Regarding an agreement to devise by will Maines Probate Code further
provides
A contract to make a will or devise or not to revoke a will or devise can be established only by ( 1 ) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract or (3) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills
18-A MRS sect 2-701
If an agreement falls within the statute of frauds then it must be
evidenced in writing and signed by the party against whom the agreement is to
be enforced or another lawfully authorized person 33 MRS sect 51 Nearly any
form of writing will satisfy the statute of frauds McCare v Rocha 2014 ME 4
-r 11 86 A3d 22 A series of writings may collectively satisfy the statute of
6
frauds even if none of the writings does so separately Wilson v DePapa 634
A2d 1252 1254 (Me 1993)
The part performance doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds
Sullivan v Porter 2004 ME 134 ~ 10 861 A2d 625 An oral contract within
the statute of frauds may still be enforced if the party seeking to enforce the
agreement can prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the parties entered
into a contract (2) the party seeking to enforce the contract partially
performed its obligation and (3) the performance was induced by the other
partys misrepresentation which may be evidenced by acquiescence or silence
Id at i 11 The part performance doctrine is grounded in the principle of
equitable estoppel which involves detrimental reliance induced by
misrepresentation and fraud Id I 17 Equitabl~ estoppel differs from
promissory estoppel which involves detrimental reliance on a mere promise Id
~ 1 7 n 7 The Law Court has expressly stated that for multi-year employment
agreements an employees detrimental reliance on an employers oral promise is
not enough to avoid the statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine
Stearns v Emery-Waterhouse Co 596 A2d 72 75 (Me 1991 ) To avoid the
statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine the employee must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their performance was induced by
7
fraud on the part of the employer Id see also Suliivan 2004 ME 134 iI 17
861 A2d 625
A The 1 5 Ownership Interest in Windham Q
In support of her motion Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement
governing Stephen Napolitanos employment with Windham Q there was no
written agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership share of Windham Q to Stephen
Napolitano and that there was no agreement written or oral that Stephens
employment with Windham Q was contingent upon him receiving an ownership
interest (Pl Suppg SMF iiiI 8-9 14) Plaintiff asserts that even if there was
an oral agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership interest Stephen has testified
that any transfer would not happen immediately because the agreement was
contingent upon Stephen resolving certain issues with his credit (Id iI 11 )
Plaintiff further asserts that Stephen Napolitano admitted that it would be a
few years before his credit issues would be cleared up (Id r 1 2) Thus
according to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was agreement to
transfer a 1 5 ownership interest to him is barred by the statute of frauds as
an agreement not to be performed within one year (Pl Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano admits that there was no written
agreement governing his employment and no written agreement to transfer a
15 ownership interest in Windham Q to him (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF
8
mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
9
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
Plaintiff filed a civil complaint individually and on behalf of Windham Q
with the Superior Court on August 26 201 5 Plaintiffs civil complaint generally
asserts that Stephen Napolitano has misused Windham Qs funds to pay his
personal expenses and that Arthur Napolitano has made improper distributions
and failed to act in the best interests of Windham Q (Campi ~I 20-46)
Arthur Napolitano filed an answer to the civil complaint on September 18
201 5 Stephen Napolitano filed his answer to the civil complaint on September
24 201 S Arthur Napolitano also filed a complaint for divorce with the District
Court on September 29 201 S Stephen Napolitano amended his answer to the
civil complaint on February 11 2016 to add a counterclaim against Plaintiff for
declaratory judgment that the parties had agreed that Stephen would receive an
ownership interest in Windham Q in exchange for agreeing to work as the
general manager of the Dairy Queen store (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp
Countercl ~~ 1 3-14) Plaintiff filed an answer to the counterclaim on March 7
2016 Both the civil action and family action were accepted for transfer to the
Business and Consumer Court in June 2016 Although not consolidated the
two cases are being coordinated before the Business and Consumer Court
Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim on August 11 201 6 Stephen filed an opposition to
summary judgment on September 1 201 6 Plaintiff filed a timely reply on
z
September 8 2016 Oral argument on all pending motions in this case was held
on October 1 2 2016
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if based on the parties statements of
material fact and the cited record there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law MR Civ P 56(c)
Dyer v Dept of Transp_ 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d 821 A fact is material
if it can affect the outcome of the case Dyer 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d
821 A genuine issue of material fact exists if the fact finder must choose
between competing versions of the truth Id When deciding a motion for
summary judgment the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party Id
If the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion
on a claim or defense then the moving party must establish the existence of
each element of the claim or defense without dispute as to any material fact in
the record in order to obtain summary judgment Cach LLC v Kulas 2011 ME
70 ~ 9 21 A3d 1015 The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to
respond with specific material facts indicating a genuine issue for trial in order
to avoid summary judgment MR Civ P 56(e) Even if one partys version of
the facts appears more credible and persuasive any genuine issue of material
3
fact must be resolved by the fact finder regardless of the likelihood of success
Estate of Lewis v Concord Gen Mut Ins Co 2014 ME 34 ~ 10 87 A3d 732
ANALYSIS
Defendant Stephen Napolitanos counterclaim seeks a declaratory
judgment that he has an enforceable agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur
Napolitano that in exchange for agreeing to work full-time as the general
manager of the Dairy Queen store Stephen Napolitano was to receive (a) a
1 5 ownership share of Windham Q as soon as issues with his credit were
addressed and (b) Stephen would eventually receive a 50 ownership share of
Windham Q and associated real estate from Plaintiffs estate 1 (Stephen
Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl r~ 3-4 13) Stephen also seeks injunctive
relief ordering Plaintiff to transfer 75 of her ownership in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano to be increased to 50 from her estate in compliance with
the terms of the agreement (Id r~ 13-1 4)
Plaintiffs sole argument on summary judgment is that Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim is barred by the statute of frauds because there are
no writings evidencing the alleged agreement (Pl Mot Summ J 3-7 ) The
statute of frauds is an affirmative defense MR Civ P 8(c) Thus the statute
Stephen Napolitano asserts the remaining 50 ownership of Windham Q would be shared by his full siblings who are not parties to this litigation (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl ~ 3)
4
1
of frauds must be affirmatively pleaded in an answer otherwise it is waived
Greenlaw v Rodick 158 Me 440 445 185 A2d 895 897-98 (1962) An
affirmative defense may be adequately pleaded even though the exact words
used in Rule 8(c) are absent See Graffam v Geronda 304 A2d 76 78 (Me
1973) Rule 8(c) is satisfied by any clear and unmistakable notice that the
defense is being raised 2 Harvey Maine Civil Practice sect 85 at 362 (3d ed
2011)
Here Plaintiff has not expressly pleaded the statute of frauds as an
affirmative defense (Pl Ans to Countercl amp Affirm Defenses ii 1-7)
Plaintiffs first affirmative defense however avers that Stephen has no
agreement relating to his ownership of the Windham Dairy Queen that is
enforceable under Maine law (Id 1l 1) This language is sufficient to put
Stephen Napolitano on clear and unmistakable notice that Plaintiff is raising the
statute of frauds defense
Maines statute of frauds provides that the actions based on the following
agreements may not be maintained unless the agreement is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto
lawfully authorized (a) any agreement that is not to be performed within one
year and (b) any agreement to give bequeath or devise by will to another any
real personal or mixed property 33 MRS sect 51 (5 ) (7)
5
To determine whether an alleged agreement is one not to be performed
within one year the court does not look to when the performance actually
occurred or whether it was conceivable that performance would occur within or
beyond one year The court looks only to the parties intent Great Hill Fill amp
Gravel v Shapleigh 1997 ME 75 -r S 692 A2d 928 The court must look to
the circumstances of the case and whether the parties plainly manifested an middot
intent that the contract not be performed within one year Id
Regarding an agreement to devise by will Maines Probate Code further
provides
A contract to make a will or devise or not to revoke a will or devise can be established only by ( 1 ) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract or (3) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills
18-A MRS sect 2-701
If an agreement falls within the statute of frauds then it must be
evidenced in writing and signed by the party against whom the agreement is to
be enforced or another lawfully authorized person 33 MRS sect 51 Nearly any
form of writing will satisfy the statute of frauds McCare v Rocha 2014 ME 4
-r 11 86 A3d 22 A series of writings may collectively satisfy the statute of
6
frauds even if none of the writings does so separately Wilson v DePapa 634
A2d 1252 1254 (Me 1993)
The part performance doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds
Sullivan v Porter 2004 ME 134 ~ 10 861 A2d 625 An oral contract within
the statute of frauds may still be enforced if the party seeking to enforce the
agreement can prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the parties entered
into a contract (2) the party seeking to enforce the contract partially
performed its obligation and (3) the performance was induced by the other
partys misrepresentation which may be evidenced by acquiescence or silence
Id at i 11 The part performance doctrine is grounded in the principle of
equitable estoppel which involves detrimental reliance induced by
misrepresentation and fraud Id I 17 Equitabl~ estoppel differs from
promissory estoppel which involves detrimental reliance on a mere promise Id
~ 1 7 n 7 The Law Court has expressly stated that for multi-year employment
agreements an employees detrimental reliance on an employers oral promise is
not enough to avoid the statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine
Stearns v Emery-Waterhouse Co 596 A2d 72 75 (Me 1991 ) To avoid the
statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine the employee must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their performance was induced by
7
fraud on the part of the employer Id see also Suliivan 2004 ME 134 iI 17
861 A2d 625
A The 1 5 Ownership Interest in Windham Q
In support of her motion Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement
governing Stephen Napolitanos employment with Windham Q there was no
written agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership share of Windham Q to Stephen
Napolitano and that there was no agreement written or oral that Stephens
employment with Windham Q was contingent upon him receiving an ownership
interest (Pl Suppg SMF iiiI 8-9 14) Plaintiff asserts that even if there was
an oral agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership interest Stephen has testified
that any transfer would not happen immediately because the agreement was
contingent upon Stephen resolving certain issues with his credit (Id iI 11 )
Plaintiff further asserts that Stephen Napolitano admitted that it would be a
few years before his credit issues would be cleared up (Id r 1 2) Thus
according to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was agreement to
transfer a 1 5 ownership interest to him is barred by the statute of frauds as
an agreement not to be performed within one year (Pl Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano admits that there was no written
agreement governing his employment and no written agreement to transfer a
15 ownership interest in Windham Q to him (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF
8
mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
9
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
September 8 2016 Oral argument on all pending motions in this case was held
on October 1 2 2016
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if based on the parties statements of
material fact and the cited record there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law MR Civ P 56(c)
Dyer v Dept of Transp_ 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d 821 A fact is material
if it can affect the outcome of the case Dyer 2008 ME 106 ~ 14 951 A2d
821 A genuine issue of material fact exists if the fact finder must choose
between competing versions of the truth Id When deciding a motion for
summary judgment the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party Id
If the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion
on a claim or defense then the moving party must establish the existence of
each element of the claim or defense without dispute as to any material fact in
the record in order to obtain summary judgment Cach LLC v Kulas 2011 ME
70 ~ 9 21 A3d 1015 The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to
respond with specific material facts indicating a genuine issue for trial in order
to avoid summary judgment MR Civ P 56(e) Even if one partys version of
the facts appears more credible and persuasive any genuine issue of material
3
fact must be resolved by the fact finder regardless of the likelihood of success
Estate of Lewis v Concord Gen Mut Ins Co 2014 ME 34 ~ 10 87 A3d 732
ANALYSIS
Defendant Stephen Napolitanos counterclaim seeks a declaratory
judgment that he has an enforceable agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur
Napolitano that in exchange for agreeing to work full-time as the general
manager of the Dairy Queen store Stephen Napolitano was to receive (a) a
1 5 ownership share of Windham Q as soon as issues with his credit were
addressed and (b) Stephen would eventually receive a 50 ownership share of
Windham Q and associated real estate from Plaintiffs estate 1 (Stephen
Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl r~ 3-4 13) Stephen also seeks injunctive
relief ordering Plaintiff to transfer 75 of her ownership in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano to be increased to 50 from her estate in compliance with
the terms of the agreement (Id r~ 13-1 4)
Plaintiffs sole argument on summary judgment is that Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim is barred by the statute of frauds because there are
no writings evidencing the alleged agreement (Pl Mot Summ J 3-7 ) The
statute of frauds is an affirmative defense MR Civ P 8(c) Thus the statute
Stephen Napolitano asserts the remaining 50 ownership of Windham Q would be shared by his full siblings who are not parties to this litigation (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl ~ 3)
4
1
of frauds must be affirmatively pleaded in an answer otherwise it is waived
Greenlaw v Rodick 158 Me 440 445 185 A2d 895 897-98 (1962) An
affirmative defense may be adequately pleaded even though the exact words
used in Rule 8(c) are absent See Graffam v Geronda 304 A2d 76 78 (Me
1973) Rule 8(c) is satisfied by any clear and unmistakable notice that the
defense is being raised 2 Harvey Maine Civil Practice sect 85 at 362 (3d ed
2011)
Here Plaintiff has not expressly pleaded the statute of frauds as an
affirmative defense (Pl Ans to Countercl amp Affirm Defenses ii 1-7)
Plaintiffs first affirmative defense however avers that Stephen has no
agreement relating to his ownership of the Windham Dairy Queen that is
enforceable under Maine law (Id 1l 1) This language is sufficient to put
Stephen Napolitano on clear and unmistakable notice that Plaintiff is raising the
statute of frauds defense
Maines statute of frauds provides that the actions based on the following
agreements may not be maintained unless the agreement is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto
lawfully authorized (a) any agreement that is not to be performed within one
year and (b) any agreement to give bequeath or devise by will to another any
real personal or mixed property 33 MRS sect 51 (5 ) (7)
5
To determine whether an alleged agreement is one not to be performed
within one year the court does not look to when the performance actually
occurred or whether it was conceivable that performance would occur within or
beyond one year The court looks only to the parties intent Great Hill Fill amp
Gravel v Shapleigh 1997 ME 75 -r S 692 A2d 928 The court must look to
the circumstances of the case and whether the parties plainly manifested an middot
intent that the contract not be performed within one year Id
Regarding an agreement to devise by will Maines Probate Code further
provides
A contract to make a will or devise or not to revoke a will or devise can be established only by ( 1 ) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract or (3) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills
18-A MRS sect 2-701
If an agreement falls within the statute of frauds then it must be
evidenced in writing and signed by the party against whom the agreement is to
be enforced or another lawfully authorized person 33 MRS sect 51 Nearly any
form of writing will satisfy the statute of frauds McCare v Rocha 2014 ME 4
-r 11 86 A3d 22 A series of writings may collectively satisfy the statute of
6
frauds even if none of the writings does so separately Wilson v DePapa 634
A2d 1252 1254 (Me 1993)
The part performance doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds
Sullivan v Porter 2004 ME 134 ~ 10 861 A2d 625 An oral contract within
the statute of frauds may still be enforced if the party seeking to enforce the
agreement can prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the parties entered
into a contract (2) the party seeking to enforce the contract partially
performed its obligation and (3) the performance was induced by the other
partys misrepresentation which may be evidenced by acquiescence or silence
Id at i 11 The part performance doctrine is grounded in the principle of
equitable estoppel which involves detrimental reliance induced by
misrepresentation and fraud Id I 17 Equitabl~ estoppel differs from
promissory estoppel which involves detrimental reliance on a mere promise Id
~ 1 7 n 7 The Law Court has expressly stated that for multi-year employment
agreements an employees detrimental reliance on an employers oral promise is
not enough to avoid the statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine
Stearns v Emery-Waterhouse Co 596 A2d 72 75 (Me 1991 ) To avoid the
statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine the employee must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their performance was induced by
7
fraud on the part of the employer Id see also Suliivan 2004 ME 134 iI 17
861 A2d 625
A The 1 5 Ownership Interest in Windham Q
In support of her motion Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement
governing Stephen Napolitanos employment with Windham Q there was no
written agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership share of Windham Q to Stephen
Napolitano and that there was no agreement written or oral that Stephens
employment with Windham Q was contingent upon him receiving an ownership
interest (Pl Suppg SMF iiiI 8-9 14) Plaintiff asserts that even if there was
an oral agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership interest Stephen has testified
that any transfer would not happen immediately because the agreement was
contingent upon Stephen resolving certain issues with his credit (Id iI 11 )
Plaintiff further asserts that Stephen Napolitano admitted that it would be a
few years before his credit issues would be cleared up (Id r 1 2) Thus
according to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was agreement to
transfer a 1 5 ownership interest to him is barred by the statute of frauds as
an agreement not to be performed within one year (Pl Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano admits that there was no written
agreement governing his employment and no written agreement to transfer a
15 ownership interest in Windham Q to him (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF
8
mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
9
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
fact must be resolved by the fact finder regardless of the likelihood of success
Estate of Lewis v Concord Gen Mut Ins Co 2014 ME 34 ~ 10 87 A3d 732
ANALYSIS
Defendant Stephen Napolitanos counterclaim seeks a declaratory
judgment that he has an enforceable agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur
Napolitano that in exchange for agreeing to work full-time as the general
manager of the Dairy Queen store Stephen Napolitano was to receive (a) a
1 5 ownership share of Windham Q as soon as issues with his credit were
addressed and (b) Stephen would eventually receive a 50 ownership share of
Windham Q and associated real estate from Plaintiffs estate 1 (Stephen
Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl r~ 3-4 13) Stephen also seeks injunctive
relief ordering Plaintiff to transfer 75 of her ownership in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano to be increased to 50 from her estate in compliance with
the terms of the agreement (Id r~ 13-1 4)
Plaintiffs sole argument on summary judgment is that Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim is barred by the statute of frauds because there are
no writings evidencing the alleged agreement (Pl Mot Summ J 3-7 ) The
statute of frauds is an affirmative defense MR Civ P 8(c) Thus the statute
Stephen Napolitano asserts the remaining 50 ownership of Windham Q would be shared by his full siblings who are not parties to this litigation (Stephen Napolitano Am Ans amp Countercl ~ 3)
4
1
of frauds must be affirmatively pleaded in an answer otherwise it is waived
Greenlaw v Rodick 158 Me 440 445 185 A2d 895 897-98 (1962) An
affirmative defense may be adequately pleaded even though the exact words
used in Rule 8(c) are absent See Graffam v Geronda 304 A2d 76 78 (Me
1973) Rule 8(c) is satisfied by any clear and unmistakable notice that the
defense is being raised 2 Harvey Maine Civil Practice sect 85 at 362 (3d ed
2011)
Here Plaintiff has not expressly pleaded the statute of frauds as an
affirmative defense (Pl Ans to Countercl amp Affirm Defenses ii 1-7)
Plaintiffs first affirmative defense however avers that Stephen has no
agreement relating to his ownership of the Windham Dairy Queen that is
enforceable under Maine law (Id 1l 1) This language is sufficient to put
Stephen Napolitano on clear and unmistakable notice that Plaintiff is raising the
statute of frauds defense
Maines statute of frauds provides that the actions based on the following
agreements may not be maintained unless the agreement is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto
lawfully authorized (a) any agreement that is not to be performed within one
year and (b) any agreement to give bequeath or devise by will to another any
real personal or mixed property 33 MRS sect 51 (5 ) (7)
5
To determine whether an alleged agreement is one not to be performed
within one year the court does not look to when the performance actually
occurred or whether it was conceivable that performance would occur within or
beyond one year The court looks only to the parties intent Great Hill Fill amp
Gravel v Shapleigh 1997 ME 75 -r S 692 A2d 928 The court must look to
the circumstances of the case and whether the parties plainly manifested an middot
intent that the contract not be performed within one year Id
Regarding an agreement to devise by will Maines Probate Code further
provides
A contract to make a will or devise or not to revoke a will or devise can be established only by ( 1 ) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract or (3) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills
18-A MRS sect 2-701
If an agreement falls within the statute of frauds then it must be
evidenced in writing and signed by the party against whom the agreement is to
be enforced or another lawfully authorized person 33 MRS sect 51 Nearly any
form of writing will satisfy the statute of frauds McCare v Rocha 2014 ME 4
-r 11 86 A3d 22 A series of writings may collectively satisfy the statute of
6
frauds even if none of the writings does so separately Wilson v DePapa 634
A2d 1252 1254 (Me 1993)
The part performance doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds
Sullivan v Porter 2004 ME 134 ~ 10 861 A2d 625 An oral contract within
the statute of frauds may still be enforced if the party seeking to enforce the
agreement can prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the parties entered
into a contract (2) the party seeking to enforce the contract partially
performed its obligation and (3) the performance was induced by the other
partys misrepresentation which may be evidenced by acquiescence or silence
Id at i 11 The part performance doctrine is grounded in the principle of
equitable estoppel which involves detrimental reliance induced by
misrepresentation and fraud Id I 17 Equitabl~ estoppel differs from
promissory estoppel which involves detrimental reliance on a mere promise Id
~ 1 7 n 7 The Law Court has expressly stated that for multi-year employment
agreements an employees detrimental reliance on an employers oral promise is
not enough to avoid the statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine
Stearns v Emery-Waterhouse Co 596 A2d 72 75 (Me 1991 ) To avoid the
statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine the employee must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their performance was induced by
7
fraud on the part of the employer Id see also Suliivan 2004 ME 134 iI 17
861 A2d 625
A The 1 5 Ownership Interest in Windham Q
In support of her motion Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement
governing Stephen Napolitanos employment with Windham Q there was no
written agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership share of Windham Q to Stephen
Napolitano and that there was no agreement written or oral that Stephens
employment with Windham Q was contingent upon him receiving an ownership
interest (Pl Suppg SMF iiiI 8-9 14) Plaintiff asserts that even if there was
an oral agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership interest Stephen has testified
that any transfer would not happen immediately because the agreement was
contingent upon Stephen resolving certain issues with his credit (Id iI 11 )
Plaintiff further asserts that Stephen Napolitano admitted that it would be a
few years before his credit issues would be cleared up (Id r 1 2) Thus
according to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was agreement to
transfer a 1 5 ownership interest to him is barred by the statute of frauds as
an agreement not to be performed within one year (Pl Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano admits that there was no written
agreement governing his employment and no written agreement to transfer a
15 ownership interest in Windham Q to him (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF
8
mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
9
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
of frauds must be affirmatively pleaded in an answer otherwise it is waived
Greenlaw v Rodick 158 Me 440 445 185 A2d 895 897-98 (1962) An
affirmative defense may be adequately pleaded even though the exact words
used in Rule 8(c) are absent See Graffam v Geronda 304 A2d 76 78 (Me
1973) Rule 8(c) is satisfied by any clear and unmistakable notice that the
defense is being raised 2 Harvey Maine Civil Practice sect 85 at 362 (3d ed
2011)
Here Plaintiff has not expressly pleaded the statute of frauds as an
affirmative defense (Pl Ans to Countercl amp Affirm Defenses ii 1-7)
Plaintiffs first affirmative defense however avers that Stephen has no
agreement relating to his ownership of the Windham Dairy Queen that is
enforceable under Maine law (Id 1l 1) This language is sufficient to put
Stephen Napolitano on clear and unmistakable notice that Plaintiff is raising the
statute of frauds defense
Maines statute of frauds provides that the actions based on the following
agreements may not be maintained unless the agreement is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto
lawfully authorized (a) any agreement that is not to be performed within one
year and (b) any agreement to give bequeath or devise by will to another any
real personal or mixed property 33 MRS sect 51 (5 ) (7)
5
To determine whether an alleged agreement is one not to be performed
within one year the court does not look to when the performance actually
occurred or whether it was conceivable that performance would occur within or
beyond one year The court looks only to the parties intent Great Hill Fill amp
Gravel v Shapleigh 1997 ME 75 -r S 692 A2d 928 The court must look to
the circumstances of the case and whether the parties plainly manifested an middot
intent that the contract not be performed within one year Id
Regarding an agreement to devise by will Maines Probate Code further
provides
A contract to make a will or devise or not to revoke a will or devise can be established only by ( 1 ) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract or (3) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills
18-A MRS sect 2-701
If an agreement falls within the statute of frauds then it must be
evidenced in writing and signed by the party against whom the agreement is to
be enforced or another lawfully authorized person 33 MRS sect 51 Nearly any
form of writing will satisfy the statute of frauds McCare v Rocha 2014 ME 4
-r 11 86 A3d 22 A series of writings may collectively satisfy the statute of
6
frauds even if none of the writings does so separately Wilson v DePapa 634
A2d 1252 1254 (Me 1993)
The part performance doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds
Sullivan v Porter 2004 ME 134 ~ 10 861 A2d 625 An oral contract within
the statute of frauds may still be enforced if the party seeking to enforce the
agreement can prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the parties entered
into a contract (2) the party seeking to enforce the contract partially
performed its obligation and (3) the performance was induced by the other
partys misrepresentation which may be evidenced by acquiescence or silence
Id at i 11 The part performance doctrine is grounded in the principle of
equitable estoppel which involves detrimental reliance induced by
misrepresentation and fraud Id I 17 Equitabl~ estoppel differs from
promissory estoppel which involves detrimental reliance on a mere promise Id
~ 1 7 n 7 The Law Court has expressly stated that for multi-year employment
agreements an employees detrimental reliance on an employers oral promise is
not enough to avoid the statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine
Stearns v Emery-Waterhouse Co 596 A2d 72 75 (Me 1991 ) To avoid the
statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine the employee must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their performance was induced by
7
fraud on the part of the employer Id see also Suliivan 2004 ME 134 iI 17
861 A2d 625
A The 1 5 Ownership Interest in Windham Q
In support of her motion Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement
governing Stephen Napolitanos employment with Windham Q there was no
written agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership share of Windham Q to Stephen
Napolitano and that there was no agreement written or oral that Stephens
employment with Windham Q was contingent upon him receiving an ownership
interest (Pl Suppg SMF iiiI 8-9 14) Plaintiff asserts that even if there was
an oral agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership interest Stephen has testified
that any transfer would not happen immediately because the agreement was
contingent upon Stephen resolving certain issues with his credit (Id iI 11 )
Plaintiff further asserts that Stephen Napolitano admitted that it would be a
few years before his credit issues would be cleared up (Id r 1 2) Thus
according to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was agreement to
transfer a 1 5 ownership interest to him is barred by the statute of frauds as
an agreement not to be performed within one year (Pl Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano admits that there was no written
agreement governing his employment and no written agreement to transfer a
15 ownership interest in Windham Q to him (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF
8
mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
9
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
To determine whether an alleged agreement is one not to be performed
within one year the court does not look to when the performance actually
occurred or whether it was conceivable that performance would occur within or
beyond one year The court looks only to the parties intent Great Hill Fill amp
Gravel v Shapleigh 1997 ME 75 -r S 692 A2d 928 The court must look to
the circumstances of the case and whether the parties plainly manifested an middot
intent that the contract not be performed within one year Id
Regarding an agreement to devise by will Maines Probate Code further
provides
A contract to make a will or devise or not to revoke a will or devise can be established only by ( 1 ) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract or (3) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills
18-A MRS sect 2-701
If an agreement falls within the statute of frauds then it must be
evidenced in writing and signed by the party against whom the agreement is to
be enforced or another lawfully authorized person 33 MRS sect 51 Nearly any
form of writing will satisfy the statute of frauds McCare v Rocha 2014 ME 4
-r 11 86 A3d 22 A series of writings may collectively satisfy the statute of
6
frauds even if none of the writings does so separately Wilson v DePapa 634
A2d 1252 1254 (Me 1993)
The part performance doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds
Sullivan v Porter 2004 ME 134 ~ 10 861 A2d 625 An oral contract within
the statute of frauds may still be enforced if the party seeking to enforce the
agreement can prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the parties entered
into a contract (2) the party seeking to enforce the contract partially
performed its obligation and (3) the performance was induced by the other
partys misrepresentation which may be evidenced by acquiescence or silence
Id at i 11 The part performance doctrine is grounded in the principle of
equitable estoppel which involves detrimental reliance induced by
misrepresentation and fraud Id I 17 Equitabl~ estoppel differs from
promissory estoppel which involves detrimental reliance on a mere promise Id
~ 1 7 n 7 The Law Court has expressly stated that for multi-year employment
agreements an employees detrimental reliance on an employers oral promise is
not enough to avoid the statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine
Stearns v Emery-Waterhouse Co 596 A2d 72 75 (Me 1991 ) To avoid the
statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine the employee must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their performance was induced by
7
fraud on the part of the employer Id see also Suliivan 2004 ME 134 iI 17
861 A2d 625
A The 1 5 Ownership Interest in Windham Q
In support of her motion Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement
governing Stephen Napolitanos employment with Windham Q there was no
written agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership share of Windham Q to Stephen
Napolitano and that there was no agreement written or oral that Stephens
employment with Windham Q was contingent upon him receiving an ownership
interest (Pl Suppg SMF iiiI 8-9 14) Plaintiff asserts that even if there was
an oral agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership interest Stephen has testified
that any transfer would not happen immediately because the agreement was
contingent upon Stephen resolving certain issues with his credit (Id iI 11 )
Plaintiff further asserts that Stephen Napolitano admitted that it would be a
few years before his credit issues would be cleared up (Id r 1 2) Thus
according to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was agreement to
transfer a 1 5 ownership interest to him is barred by the statute of frauds as
an agreement not to be performed within one year (Pl Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano admits that there was no written
agreement governing his employment and no written agreement to transfer a
15 ownership interest in Windham Q to him (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF
8
mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
9
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
frauds even if none of the writings does so separately Wilson v DePapa 634
A2d 1252 1254 (Me 1993)
The part performance doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds
Sullivan v Porter 2004 ME 134 ~ 10 861 A2d 625 An oral contract within
the statute of frauds may still be enforced if the party seeking to enforce the
agreement can prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the parties entered
into a contract (2) the party seeking to enforce the contract partially
performed its obligation and (3) the performance was induced by the other
partys misrepresentation which may be evidenced by acquiescence or silence
Id at i 11 The part performance doctrine is grounded in the principle of
equitable estoppel which involves detrimental reliance induced by
misrepresentation and fraud Id I 17 Equitabl~ estoppel differs from
promissory estoppel which involves detrimental reliance on a mere promise Id
~ 1 7 n 7 The Law Court has expressly stated that for multi-year employment
agreements an employees detrimental reliance on an employers oral promise is
not enough to avoid the statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine
Stearns v Emery-Waterhouse Co 596 A2d 72 75 (Me 1991 ) To avoid the
statute of frauds under the part performance doctrine the employee must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their performance was induced by
7
fraud on the part of the employer Id see also Suliivan 2004 ME 134 iI 17
861 A2d 625
A The 1 5 Ownership Interest in Windham Q
In support of her motion Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement
governing Stephen Napolitanos employment with Windham Q there was no
written agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership share of Windham Q to Stephen
Napolitano and that there was no agreement written or oral that Stephens
employment with Windham Q was contingent upon him receiving an ownership
interest (Pl Suppg SMF iiiI 8-9 14) Plaintiff asserts that even if there was
an oral agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership interest Stephen has testified
that any transfer would not happen immediately because the agreement was
contingent upon Stephen resolving certain issues with his credit (Id iI 11 )
Plaintiff further asserts that Stephen Napolitano admitted that it would be a
few years before his credit issues would be cleared up (Id r 1 2) Thus
according to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was agreement to
transfer a 1 5 ownership interest to him is barred by the statute of frauds as
an agreement not to be performed within one year (Pl Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano admits that there was no written
agreement governing his employment and no written agreement to transfer a
15 ownership interest in Windham Q to him (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF
8
mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
9
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
fraud on the part of the employer Id see also Suliivan 2004 ME 134 iI 17
861 A2d 625
A The 1 5 Ownership Interest in Windham Q
In support of her motion Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement
governing Stephen Napolitanos employment with Windham Q there was no
written agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership share of Windham Q to Stephen
Napolitano and that there was no agreement written or oral that Stephens
employment with Windham Q was contingent upon him receiving an ownership
interest (Pl Suppg SMF iiiI 8-9 14) Plaintiff asserts that even if there was
an oral agreement to transfer a 1 5 ownership interest Stephen has testified
that any transfer would not happen immediately because the agreement was
contingent upon Stephen resolving certain issues with his credit (Id iI 11 )
Plaintiff further asserts that Stephen Napolitano admitted that it would be a
few years before his credit issues would be cleared up (Id r 1 2) Thus
according to Plaintiff Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was agreement to
transfer a 1 5 ownership interest to him is barred by the statute of frauds as
an agreement not to be performed within one year (Pl Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano admits that there was no written
agreement governing his employment and no written agreement to transfer a
15 ownership interest in Windham Q to him (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF
8
mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
9
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
mT 8-9) Stephen asserts however that Plaintiff has misstated his deposition
testimony Stephen did not testify that it would be a few years before his
credit issues would be cleared up (Stephen Napolitano Opp SMF iT 1 2)
Stephens actual testimony was that it ultimately was a few years specifically
two to three years before his credit issues were cleared up (Id) Stephen
asserts the parties had no understanding at the time the alleged oral agreement
was made that it would take Stephen more than a year to clear up his credit
issues (Id) Stephen asserts ~hat at that time he was anxious to resolve his
credit issues as soon as possible (Stephen Napolitano AddI SMF iT 9)
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Stephen Napolitano as
the non-moving party there are genuine issues of material fact whether the
parties plainly manifested an intent that the Stephens credit issues would not
be resolved in within one year Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether the alleged agreement to transfer 1 5 ownership interest in Windham
Q to Stephen as soon as his credit issues were resolved is within the statute of
frauds Therefore summary judgment must be denied as to that issue
B The 50 OwnershiR Share of Windham Q from Plaintiffs Estate
Plaintiff asserts there was no written agreement to provide Stephen
Napolitano with any additional ownership interest in Windham Q from Plaintiffs
estate (Pl Suppg SMF i7 8) Thus according to Plaintiff Stephen
9
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
Napolitanos counterclaim that there was agreement to transfer a 50
ownership share of Windham Q and associated real estate to him Plaintiffs
estate is barred by the statute of frauds as any agreement to devise by will any
real personal or mixed property or as a contract to make a will or devise (Pl
Mot Summ J 4-5)
In opposition Stephen Napolitano asserts that the parties agreement is
evidenced in writing by Plaintiffs estate documents (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF i 11) A copy of Plaintiffs will executed on July 1 5 2010 is attached
to an affidavit by Arthur Napolitano (A Napolitano Aff Ex A) Plaintiffs will
devises most of her property including her interest in Windham Q to Arthur as
trustee of her separate Trust (A Napolitano Aff Ex A at 2) Plaintiffs will
references Stephens option to purchase 50 of her Trusts interest in
Windham Q (Id) A copy of Plaintiffs revocable trust agreement also
executed on July 1 5 2010 is also attached to Arthurs affidavit (Id Ex B)
Plaintiffs Trust agreement permits Arthur as trustee to authorize the sale of
the Trusts interest in Windham Q and associated real estate to Stephen
Napolitano at a discount (Id Ex B at 10) Plaintiffs Trust authorizes upon
the deaths of both Plaintiff and Arthur the distribution of 50 of the Trusts
interest in Windham Q to Stephen upon Stephens purchase of the remaining
50 of the Trusts interest (Id Ex B at 1 0-11 )
10
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
In her reply Plaintiff asserts the estate documents cited by Stephen
Napolitano have been superseded by more recent estate documents which do
not provide a purchase option or provide for Stephen to receive any interest in
Windham Qfrom Plaintiffs estate (Pl Reply SMF rr 11-1 5)
Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to him Stephen
Napolitano has failed to put forth any facts evidencing the existence of a
written agreement to devise a 50 share of Windham Q to him in exchange for
his service as the general manager of the Dairy Queen store The estate
documents cited by Stephen do evidence that there was an option for Stephen
to purchase Plaintiffs interest from her Trust and that 50 of Plaintiffs
interest would be devised to Stephen upon her and Arthurs death and his
purchase of the remaining interest However the estate documents do not
evidence that these provisions were drafted as part of an agreement related to
Stephens employment The estate documents do not state the material
provisions of a contract to make a devise by will in exchange for Stephens
employment the estate documents do not reference any extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of a contract to make the devise in exchange for Stephens
employment and the estate documents do not constitute a writing signed by a
decedent evidencing any sort of contract regarding Stephens employment
Thus Stephen Napolitano has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding
11
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
his assertion that there was an agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of
Windham Qand associated real estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
Moreover Stephen Napolitano cannot rely on the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds Stephen asserts that as part of the
agreement he immediately assumed the position as general manager of the
Dairy Queen store at a salary below market-rate (Stephen Napolitano AddI
SMF -r 1 6) Stephen asserts he worked long and hard managing the Dairy
Queen for relatively little pay for more than sixteen years in reliance on the
alleged agreement with Plaintiff and Arthur Napolitano (Id rr 18-19)
Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Stephen as the nonshy
moving party Stephen has middotset forth facts only demonstrating at most
detrimental reliance on a promise Stephen has set forth no facts
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his performance was
induced by misrepresentations on the part of Plaintiff As discussed above
detrimental reliance on a mere promise is not enough to avoid the statute of
frauds Stearns 596 A2d at 75 The plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their performance was induced by fraud on the part of
the adverse party Id see also Sullivan 2004 ME 134 r 17 861 A2d 625
Because Stephen has set forth no evidence of fraud on the part of Plaintiff
1 2
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
Stephen Napolitanos claim does not fall within the part performance exception
to the statute of frauds
Therefore based on the foregoing Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment must be granted as to Stephen Napolitanos claim that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Qand associated real
estate to him from Plaintiffs estate
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos motion pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART Summary judgment is DENIED as to Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there exists an
enforceable agreement to transfer a 15 ownership interest in Windham Q to
Stephen Napolitano as soon as his credit issues were resolved Summary
judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitano on Stephen
Napolitanos counterclaim for declaratory judgment that there was an
agreement to transfer a 50 ownership share of Windham Q and associated real
estate to him from Plaintiff Sandra L Napolitanos estate
1 3
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14
The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order on the docket for this case
incorporating it by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
Dated Richard Mulhern Judge Business amp Consumer Court
- oicnw on the Dockct_j_O)S flsect Copies sent via Mail___Jlectronicnlly_
14