B. Ebersole

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Religion and Politics

Luke Ebersole

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 332, Religion in AmericanSociety. (Nov., 1960), pp. 101-111.

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ABSTRACT:The controversy over mixing religion and poli-tics has not ke pt religion ap ar t from governmen t. Religiousgroups par ticipa te in a wide va riety of political activities. Bu treligious groups in the U nited St ate s are no t organized a s politi-cal pa rties or political machines. T her e is a relation betweenreligious affiliation an d part y affiliation. T h e corre lation , how-ever, does no t usually indicate a "religious" vote. I n par t, therelation reflects socio-economic sta tus . For Catholics an d Jewsit is ve ry much a resu lt of awareness of minority status . Asminority awareness declines, trends in voting change. T he re isno pat te rn of voting for or against candidates because of theirreligion. T h e importance of religion in a pres iden tial electioncannot be assessed on the basis of oth er elections. T h e electionof a Catho lic president would no t change the na tu re of ourgovernment, but it would have an effect on American politics.

L uk e Ebersole, Ph.D ., Kn oxv ille, Tennessee, is Professor of Sociology at the Univ ersityof Tennessee. He previously taught at the Univ ersity of Ma rylan d. He is the authorof Church Lobbying in the Nation's Capital (1951), American Society (1955), and hehas contributed to various books and periodicals.


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IN the controversy over mixing reli-gion and politics, a distinction fre-quently is not made between religiouspolitical action and the joining ofchurch and state. Without regard forits historical meaning, the principleof separa tion of church an d sta te isoften used as the chief basis for criti-cism of political activity by religiousgroups.The legal basis for separation ofchurch and state in the United Statesis contained in the provision of the F irs tAmendment that "Congress shall makeno law respecting an establishment ofreligion, or prohibiting the free exercisethereof." I n the years since its ratifi-cation there has been considerable con-tention over its specific application, butthere is rather general agreement thatits authors meant to prohibit the federalgovernment from regulating and sup-porting re1igion.l On the whole, the"wall of separation" has been well main-tained.T h e framers of the Constitution wereequally concerned about the control thatreligion might exercise over government.T h e coin of d isestablishm ent had twosides. .4t the same time that it grante dfreedom to religion from regulation bythe state, it foreclosed a major meansfor religious dom ination of the s tate .There could be no state church orchurches.Bu t separation of church a nd sta teas set forth in the First Amendmentdoes not cover the w hole range of rela-tions between religion and government.Other than to disestablish the churchor churches, it does not define the legalplace of religion in government. Reli-gious political movements, religious po-litical parties, organized religious pres-sure groups, and church lobbying are

outside the purview of any C onstitu-tional provision.'

In practice, religion has not held itselfaloof from government. Organized ef-forts to sway government in the nameof religion have long been pa rt of thepolit ical process. A surv ey of a fewpast movements and organizations showshow varied the political interests of reli-gious groups have been. Since 1844 theChristian Amendment Movement hasbeen attempting to have religious lan-guage written into th e pream ble of theConstitution . One of the purp oses ofthe Know-Nothing P ar ty was to preventthe election of an y bu t staun ch Protes-tant s to public office. Churchmen playedprominent roles on both sides of thepolitical struggle over slavery. Imm e-diately following its appearance in 1874the Woman's Christian TemperanceUnion launched a prohibition campaign.Th e Knights of Columbus has attem ptedto use the machinery of government toachieve its ends. T he Lord's D a y Alli-ance was formed in 1888 to representProtestant denominations in their ef-fort s to secure the enactment of legis-lation to preserve Sunday rest a nd wor-ship. I n the present century the mostconspicuous political activ ity of thechurches was the drive for national pro-hibition under the direction of thepowerful Anti-Saloon League. T h eMethodist Board of Temperance movedto Washington in 1916 in time to aidin the prohibition campaign. T h e N a-tional Council for Prevention of War,working closely with church groups,started its campaign in Washington in1921. Between the First and Second

2 The only other specific reference to reli-


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World Wars many religious groups wereactive in the peace movement and op-posed governmental action that mightlead toward war.Some of these older g roups still con-tinue their efforts to influence govern-ment in Washington. I n addition, neworganizations have appeared. A num-ber of religious groups have formedagencies which have the assigned func-tion of providing their constituents withinformation about government and alsoof representing their respective denomi-national or interdenominational churchbodies before the federal government.The Catholic Church has had offices inWashington for more than four decades.Most of the Protestant agencies havemaintained offices in Washington sincethe end of the Second World W ar.Among the groups with Washington of-fices are the Friends Committee onNational Legislation, the LegislativeCommittee of the Congregational Chris-tian Council for Social Action, the Coun-cil for Chr istian Social Progress of theh-orthern Baptist Convention, severalMethodist organizations, the NationalLutheran Council, the National Councilof the Chu rches of Christ in Am erica,the American Zionist Committee forPublic Affairs, the National Catholic\TTelfare Conference, th e Na tion al Con-ference of Catholic Charities, the C hris-tian Science Com mittee on Publications,and Protestants and Other AmericansVnited for Separation of C hurch an dState. Th is list might be expanded toinclude other national organizations andalso groups that operate on the stateand local levels.T h e activities of such organiza tionsvary greatly in the degree to which theyare political. Some church agencies in\Vashington function only to channelinformation concerning legislation and

take their place among the lobbyists ininforming, advising, and persuading leg-islators an d administrators. T h e effortsof many national and local groups con-sist chiefly of sporadic campaign s ofpropaganda an d pressure. By passingresolutions, appointing delegations, call-ing mass meetings, and sending lettersand telegrams, religious groups acrossthe country pressure and protest, ap-prove and disapprove governmentalaction.The re are many critics of the partici-pation by religious groups in the affairsof government. Church pol itical actio nagencies are often charged with takingpositions that are not representative oftheir constituents. I n man y cases thecharge is true , as it is true of otherorganizations that attempt to speak forlarge and heterogeneous groups. I ntheir stu dy of the Protestant EpiscopalChurch to find the relationship be-tween parishioners' a ttitu de s an d officialchurch policy on social issues, Glock an dRinger reported that on all but oneissue on which the church has a com-mitted policy the parishioners are di-vergent. T he single area in which thereis agreement is the United Nations.They also found that on most socialissues the policy of the church is moreliberal than the attitudes of parishion-e r ~ . ~n a le tter prefacing the f inalreport of the National La y Comm itteeof the Natio na l Council of Churches ,the chairman wrote: Clergy and laityactive in organized Protestantismseemed to have lost the capacity tounderstand each other. We, as lay peo-p!e, were alarmed and unhappy as theNational Council assumed the right tospeak increasingly on subjects in which

3 Charles Glock and B. B. Ringer, "ChurchPolicy and the Att i tudes of Ministers andParishioners on Social Issues," American So-


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it was difficult to see ethical or spiritualcontent for that inarticulate and voice-less body called "34 million Protes-tants."Some of the opp ositio n, of course,follows from the premise that, no mat-ter what the issues, organized religionhas no place in government. Indeed,there are some critics who seem to be-lieve that all pressure groups shouldbe removed from governm ent. Th eywould prefer to have the National Asso-ciation of M anufa cturers, the Am ericanFederation of Labor and Congress ofIndustrial Organizations, the Farm Bu-reau, and other interest groups, alongwith religious groups, cease politicalactivity and leave government to func-tion in a pressureless vacuum.K Om att er how religious group s resolvethe issue of their proper p lace in gov-ernment, it appears that their presentorganized pressure and lobbying effortsare not contra ry to the intent of theConstitution. N o church organizationis in a position to dominate governmentin the United States. Th e politicalforces of religion are dispersed, not cen-tralized. Th ey often display disagree-me nt, not consensus. Moreover, theat tem pt s of religious group s to influencegovernment are usually based on utili-tarian and broadly ethical considera-tions, rather than on strictly sectarianand theological grounds. T h e churchesin this country are not political rivalsof th e sta te . Religious groups are doingnothing more than participating in thedem ocratic process of discussion, pres-sure, and consent by which governmentpolicy is formed.

Unlike religious groups in several Eu-ropean countries, religious groups in theUnited States have not formed political

Native American Party, which becamethe Sup reme Order of the Star-SpangledBanner or Know-Nothing Party, wascommitted to the election of Protestants.T he program of the movement derivednot from wha t it was for but from wh atit was against. In a predominantlyProtestant country, the erection ofCatholic churches, schools, an d conventsgave rise to a deeply roo ted s et of sus-picions. fears, and hates. T he Know-Kothing Pa rty was the political embodi-ment of religious hostility. I t fough taga inst every form of C atho lic influencein the United States. A few years afterthe peak of its streng th in the middleof the last centu ry, the Kno w-S othingPar ty was dead. But Know-Sothing-ism has been felt many times in Ameri-can politics in th e small waves of Anti-Catholic and Anti-Jewish fedinp; thathave moved across the nation.Not only are there no religious politi-cal parties in America today: there areno politico-ecclesiastical machines com-parable to the Anti-Saloon League in itsday. Founded in 1895, the League grewinto an organization supported by asmany as 60,000 agencies and spendingas much as $2,500,000 a year. Althoughtemperance societies in and outside ofthe churches co-operated, it was thechurches that gave the organization itsstrength. Th e League had a simple andunchanging platform. I t would settlefor nothing less than de struction of theentire traffic in liquor. I t was gearedfor quick and effective action towardthis end. Control was centralized. Fun dswere bountifully supplied. Leaguehenchmen were located throughout theland. Mo st importa nt, the League couldemploy the one sure method of exertingpolitical pressure; it could control votes.At the height of its strength the A nti-Saloon League achieved unprecedented


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It cannot be alleged that there nowexists a political machine prepared todeliver a bloc of Pr ot es tan t votes, northat there is a political machine ableto deliver the Jewish vote. B u t thecharge is made tha t the Catholic Churchhas a political apparatus that can con-trol the Catholic vote throughout theUnited States. T h e case against thisbelief is stated by Elmo Roper?I think I can . . . dispel . . . the mythof a captive, precommitted Catholic vote.. . . Catholic voters are just as free, justas unfettered, just as intelligent, and justas divided in their voting preferences asany other group. . . .One can only hope that both our poli-ticians and our people will one day ac-knowledge what seems an obvious truth:that Catholics are many things. For ex-ample, they are not only Irish-they areItalians, they are Germans, they areFrenchmen, and they are Poles. Catholicsare liberals-and they are conservatives.Catholics belong to labor unions-andCatholics are unhappy about labor un-ions. Catholics are Republican-and theyare Democratic.

Most students of political behaviorconcur in the judgment that the Catho-lic Church does not constitute a politi-cal organization capable of deliveringthe vote of its members. Cath olic lay-men, like other laymen, are responsiveto many political cues other than thosethat might be provided by church offi-cials. Moreover, Ca tho lic officials hav edemonstrated little inclination to pre-sent a united fron t in supp ort of par -ticular candidates for public office. Likethe leaders of other churches, Catholicleaders are politically divided.

De spi te the absence of religious politi-

machines ready to deliver blocs of votes,is there a relation between religion andvoting? Is there an y indication th atreligion enters into the choice that theAmerican registers a t the polls? Th isis a complex matter involving manyoften contradictory factors. We shallconsider only a few.It is necessary to make a distinctionbetween voting when local measures area t stake a nd voting in national elections.T h e greatest evidence of religious blocvoting or of occasional ecclesiasticallyencouraged voting is to be found belowthe level of national politics. It is ap-parent that at times local actions pro-duce a religious vote. I n 1948 inMassachusetts, Catholics voted in vastnumbers because of a referendum meas-ure to allow state health officials todisseminate birth-control information.I n California in 1958, there was an out-pouring of Catholics because of a ref-erendum issue which would have madeparochial schools subject to taxat i~n.~In local liquor referendums, organiza-tions led by Protestant ministers some-times arouse the "church vote.'' But inview of the difference in drinkin g ha bi tsamong Protestants and within each de-nomination, such voting can hardly becalIed Protestant, or even Baptist orMethodist.Turning to the broader question ofthe religious composition of politicalparties, there is some indication of arelation between religious affiliation andpa rty affiliation. I t is an elementarypolitical assumption that although Prot-estants, Jews, and Catholics are bothRepublicans and Democrats, Protestan tstend to be more R epublican tha n Demo-cratic, and Catholics and Jews tend tobe more Democratic than Republican.The evidence, however, is not unmixed,


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and the relation between religion andparty is probably not as consistent asis widely believed.On the basis of a small-scale stud yof the 1948 election and a nationwidestudy of the 1952 election, the Univer-sity of Michigan Survey Research Cen-ter provides some evidence concerningthe voting behavior of Cath olics andP ro te ~ ta n t s .~ n 1948 the C atholic scontacted during this survey expresseda strong Democratic preference. F o ~ t y -nine per cent voted D em ocra tic; 15 percent of the nonvote rs had a De mocraticpreference. Th is produced a totalDem ocratic preference of 64 pe r cent.Twenty-five pe r cent of the Catholicssurveyed voted Republican; 2 per centof the nonvoters had a Repub lican pref-erence. Th is produced a total Repub-lican preference of 27 per cent. I n 1952the total Democratic preference among

Catholics was 53 per cent, of which 43per cent were voters and 10 per centwere nonvoters. T he total Republicanpreference was 47 per cent, of which41 per cent were voters and 5 per centwere nonvoters.Protestants questioned by the 1948study seem to have had a Democraticpreference which did not show up intheir vote. T he total Democratic pref-erence among Protestants was 53 percen t, of which 25 per cen t were votersand 28 per cent were nonvoters. Th irty -four per cent of t he Pro testan ts had aRepublican preference, of which 28 percent were voters and 6 per cent werenonvoters. I n 1952 the total Demo-cratic preference among Protestants was39 per cent-26 per cent voters an d 13per cent nonvoters. T he total Republi-can preference among Protestants was57 per cent--45 per cent voters and 12per cent nonvoters.

the assumed relationship between reli-gion and party, but they show that therelationship is varied and sometimestenuous. In a Democratic year, Catho-lics voted Democratic two to one. I n aRepublican year, Catholics divided theirvote almost evenly, giving the Demo-cra ts a slight edge. Prote stants , in aDemocratic year, had a Democraticpreference which they did not vote. I na Republican year they voted Republi-can not quite two to one.In several studies of particular com-munities, Catholic-Protestant differencesstand out more definitely. In ErieCounty, Ohio, in 1940, 60 per cent ofthe Protestants said they intended tovote Republican, whereas only 23 percent of the Catho lics indicated a R epub-lican p r e f e r e n ~ e . ~n Elm ira, New York,in 1948, Catholics voted Republicanonly half as much as Protestants.l0

I n the case of Am erican Jews, therelation between religion and partyaffiliation has been ma rked . For manyyears Jewish immigrants gave their po-litical loyalty to the Republican Party.But since the 1930's the Jewish vote hasshifted to the Democrats. I n 1936,Ward 24 in Chicago, which probablyhad a higher proportion of Jews thanany ward in the nation, voted 96 percent for Roosevelt. Na tiona l surveysshow that in 1940 and 1944 more than90 out of 100 Jews voted De mocratic.Since 1948 the Jewish Democratic votehas diminished but the decline has notbeen great.ll

9 Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, andHazel Gaudet, Th e People's Choice (NewYork: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944), pp.21, 2 2 .

10 Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld,and William N. McPhee, Vot ing (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 64.

11 Jewish voting trends have been analyzedby Lawrence H. Fuchs in The Political B e-


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Does the correlation between religionand party, whether great or small, con-sistent or fluctuating, actually representa religious vote? So far as Protestantsare concerned the answer is in the nega-tive. Protestan ts are much too diversein their political attitudes and behaviorto be treated as one group. After ananalysis of politico-economic attitudesin eight major religious groups, Wesleyand Beverly Allensmith concluded asfollows: l2Differences can be shown between majorProtestant denominational groups whichare as great as differences between suchgroups and non-Protestan t groups. Thusdifferences between Congregationalists(taken as a group) and Catholics (as agroup) are in general no greater than dif-ferences between Congregationalists andBaptists.T he source of Pro testa nt political differ-entiation is not religious but economic.Among Protestants there is a close cor-relation between socio-economic statusand political behavior.With considerable justification, manypolitical observers have also applied asocio-economic interpretation to theparty identification of American Catho-lics. In The Fu ture of American Poli-tics, Samuel Lubell wrote: l3Because they came to this country late,these immigrants and their children wereconcentrated in the lower economic rungs.. . . Catholicism . . . coincided largely withdiscrimination and sweated labor, with im-migrant minorities who were looked uponas inferior beings-in short, the lower class.

On the other hand, the Erie Countyand Elmira studies showed that when

1 2 Wesley and Beverly Allensmith, L'ReligiousAffiliation and Politico-Economic Attitude: AStudy of Eight Major U. S. Religious Groups,"

Catholics and Protestants on varioussocio-economic levels were compared,Catholics voted more Democratic thanPro tes tan ts on all levels.14 Catholics ofhigh economic status voted more Demo-cratic than Protestants of low economicstat us. I n addition , liberalism or con-servatism on economic issues was no t thedetermining influence in party alliance.Catholics who agreed with the Repub-lican position on economic issues wereno more Republican than liberal Protes-tan ts. On each level of liberalismor conservatism, Catholics were moreDemocratic than Protestants.15 I n Phil-adelphia, Glantz found no differencebetween Catholics and Protestants atthe top level of stratification, but inthe middle and lower classes there wastwice as much Republicanism amongProtestants as among Catholics.16 ~ h u swhile the economic st at us of Catho licshas an important bearing on their pa rtyaffiliation, it does not offer a full ex-planation.For the Jewish group taken as awhole, the economic class theory of poli-tics is no t relevant. T h e economicposition of American Jews has beenimproving rapidly. Ye t while this im-provement was taking place, the Jewishvote shifted from Republican to stronglyDemocratic. With in the group, eco-nomic differences have had little effecton voting in national elections. Politi-cal attitudes, too, appear to be unrelatedto economic status. Only a relativelysmall proportion of Jews are manualworkers, but they tend to share certainof the at titud es held by groups havinga large proportion of workers.17

1 4 Lazarsfeld et al., p. 22, and Berelson etal., p. 65.

15 Berelson et al., p. 6 6 . 1 6 Oscar Glantz, "Protestant and Catholic


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MINORITY TATUS WARENESSWhat we see in the party affiliations

of Catholics and Jews is not in a truesense "voting the ir religion." Religiousissues are rarely involved. Wh ateverpolitical consensus exists, and it is some-times small, is not so much a result ofreligious cohesion as it is a result ofawareness of mino rity sta tus. Berelson,in Elmira, found the following: l8The more closely the members ident$edwith their minority group, the strongertheir Dem ocratic vote . Regardless of theparticular measure, those minority mem-bers who feel close to their own group(or who feel hostile to the out-group) aremore likely to express the group's politicalpreference (i.e., vote Democratic) thantheir fellows.

Religious intolerance, ethnic discrimi-nation, low economic position, urbanconcentration, and residential segrega-tion have all contributed in varyingdegrees to Catholic and Jewish minorityfeelings. I n cities with large Catholicpopulations the Democratic party earlybecame a n agency of Catholic socialparticipation, protest, an d power. Onceestablished, party allegiance tended tobe transmitted within the group andfrom generation to generation.

One of the rea sons why Jews firstassociated themselves with the Republi-cans was th at Catholics were D emocrats.Bu t in the campaign of 1928 an d duringthe 1930's) the Democratic Party cameto be defined as the party of the city,of social protes t, and of hope for minori-ties. Increasingly Jews found identifi-cation with the Democratic Party to bemore compatible with their own status.When in the late 1930's and early 1940'sFranklin D. Roosevelt became the svm-bol of opposition to Hitlerism and jew-

intensified. For a period the Jewishtransfer to the Democratic Partv wasalmost complete.The need for Catholics and Jews tohold to a minority-group political iden-tification has greatly decreased in thelast generation. Occupational an d eco-nomic mobility, political and educa-tional achievement, cultural assimila-tion, and increased religious tolerancehave removed much of the reason forminority protest. Indeed, when theMichigan Survey Research Center at-tempted to measure the degree to whichthe relationship between religion andparty is psychologically meaningful, itwas discovered that most voters, in-cluding minority group m embers, do notthin k of their religious group a s pre-ferring a particular party. lQBut even though the stimulus forminority political sentiment has weak-ened, minority-group patterns of votingpersist. With out consciously voting asCatholics or Jews, people tend to votelike others who have had similar experi-ences and like the people with whomthey associate most intimately. Forurban Catholics and Jews these peoplear e often members of their own religiousgroup.There is evidence, however, that the

changing sta tus of e thn ic and religiousminorities is causing political change.The Elmira researchers saw a decline inthe Catholic Dem ocratic vote. Th eyalso found more Republican votingamong younger Catholics than amongolder Catholics. "The succession ofgenerations seems to be softening thereligious difference." 20 While Jewishdefection from the Democratic ranks issmaII, there are signs that in some com-munities Jewish voting is beginning to

19The investigators recognized their


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implication was tha t rejection of a C ath-olic candidate would result in loss ofCatholic Democratic support. At thesame time a number of prominentCatholic political leaders and religiousleaders were fearful that Mr. Kennedy'scandidacy might meet with enough op-position to change the comfortable cli-mate in which Catholics in public lifehave functioned.Evaluation of the importance of reli-gion in a presidential election is singu-larly difficult because there is little inthe 1960 election that can be comparedwith the past. T he campaign of 1928was hard fought and even vicious. Reli-gious prejudice was fully exploited. I nsome Democratic strongholds the Ca-tholicism of the candidate outweighedpar ty loyalty. Even so, in retrospectit appears that religion may not havebeen a s decisive in the defeat of A1Sm ith a s was originally supposed. Reli-gion aside , 1928 was a year of bat tlebetween country and city, native bornand foreign born, privileged and under-privileged, drys and wets. Af ter a stud yof 173 counties in eight North ern sta tesdistributed across the country, Ogburnand Talbot concluded that prohibitionsentiment was decidedly more importantthan anti-Catholicism in the Democraticdefeat.22 Whatever the effect of thereligious controversy in 1928, th at cam-paign does not answer many questionsabo ut the present. T he pat ter n of poli-tics has changed, as have also attitudeson religion.Studies of voting in local an d sta teelections have limited relevance in as-sessing the influence of religion on apresidential vote. I n local and stateelections the religion of a can dida te maynot be known by ma ny voters. I na presidential election the voter can

hardly fail to know. By common con-sent the presidency has been regardedas a public office requiring a unique setof political qualifications. Catholics andJews have been mayors, senators, andgovernors, but no Jew has been a candi-date for the presidency and only twicehave Catholics been candida tes. Votingto fill offices that have many times beenheld by mem bers of a ll ma jor religiousgroups cannot be compared with anelection in which there is a Catholiccandidate for the presidency.

Moreover, victory or defeat for Mr.Ken nedy is not th e test of the placeof religion in presidential politics. Winor lose, many questions will remain tobe answered. D id the Dem ocratic can-didate receive stronger Catholic supportthan usual? If so, in what areas? Didhe lose votes among non-Catholics? Ifso, in what area s? In areas with largeCatholic populations, what issues otherthan religion might account for strongor weak supp ort? W hat issues otherthan religion might account for strongor weak support in areas with smallCatholic populations? These and othersare questions answers to which will needto wait for a careful analysis of the1960 election.

As this article is being written, theresults of the election are not k nown.Nevertheless, a few observations aboutits possible consequences may be al-lowed. T h e election of a Catholic aspresident almost certainly would modifythe pa tte rn of politics. T he sequelprobably would be a strengthening ofCatholic Democratic loyalty. I t islikely that some Catholics would rallyto the Democratic Party as the party


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T he net effect might be a loss of Ca tho -lic support inasmuch as the election ofa Catholic president would further di-minish the need for a minority-grouppolitical orienta tion. I n the long run,any decline in out-group feeling wouldbe expected to cause Catholic voting tobe determined by more nearly the samefactors as Protestant voting.

If Mr. Kennedy is defeated, the resultwill be different. No m atter what thereal reasons, defeat would be interpretedby many Catholics as a rejection of oneof their own. Th er e would be lingeringfrustration and consequent awareness ofminority status until the last politicaldoor is opened. I n this mood someintensification of Dem ocratic allegiancemight be anticipated.I t is not to be expected that the elec-tion of a Catholic as president wouldalter the struc ture of government. Th efears of direct ecclesiastical con trol of apresident grow out of a failure to un-derstand the nature both of AmericanCatholicism and of American govern-ment. T h a t on some matters a Catho-lic president would hold attitudes influ-enced by his religion is to be assumed.Presidents who have been farmers, busi-nessmen, educators, generals, and Prot-estants have not divested themselves ofall prior attitudes upon entering theW hite House. T h e real question iswhether the issues on which a Catholicpresident might feel bound by his re-ligion are public issues, whether theyare national issues, and whether theyare clearly contrary to democatic tradi-

tion and practice. There are relativelyfew social issues on which Catholicismhas an official position. Divorce, birthcontrol, censorship, an d s ta te supp ort ofparochial schools are among the issueson which there is an official policy. Ofthese the major matter of national rele-vance is sup por t of educa tion. I t is notinevitable that on this or any otherpolicy a Catholic president would shareor feel compelled to support the positionof his church . Moreover, a presiden tdoes not rule from a protected positionof priva te preference. H e governs in apublic role delimited by traditions andprecedents, pressures and counter pres-sures, Congressional co-operation andresistance, a nd political suppo rt a nd po-litical p unishment.For those who are apprehensive ab outa Catholic in the White House, the con-test would not end with the election.T he actions of a president who is aCath olic would be vigilantly scrutinized.Eve ry suspected move would become thesubject of private and public discussionand would be filed for future politicalreference.I t is reasonable to assume th at aCatholic in the presidency would beequally aware of public watchfulness.The presidency is the ultimate symbolof political acceptance, and it does notseem probable that a president who isa Catholic would wilfully and know-ingly do anything to reverse the con-fidence of the electorate th at the du tiesof h is office can be fu lfilled without pa r-tiality to an y religious group.


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Luke Ebersole

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 332, Religion in AmericanSociety. (Nov., 1960), pp. 101-111.

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[Footnotes]

3 Church Policy and the Attitudes of Ministers and Parishioners on Social Issues

Charles Y. Glock; Benjamin B. Ringer

American Sociological Review, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Apr., 1956), pp. 148-156.

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12 Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic Attitude: A Study of Eight Major U.S. ReligiousGroups

Wesley Allinsmith; Beverly Allinsmith

The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 3. (Autumn, 1948), pp. 377-389.

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16 Protestant and Catholic Voting Behavior in a Metropolitan AreaOscar Glantz

The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1. (Spring, 1959), pp. 73-82.

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17 Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic Attitude: A Study of Eight Major U.S. ReligiousGroups

Wesley Allinsmith; Beverly Allinsmith

The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 3. (Autumn, 1948), pp. 377-389.

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22

A Measurement of the Factors in the Presidential Election of 1928William F. Ogburn; Nell Snow Talbot

Social Forces, Vol. 8, No. 2. (Dec., 1929), pp. 175-183.

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