Avicenna - Meta. 9.4 (two pages on one sheet)

8/7/2019 Avicenna - Meta. 9.4 (two pages on one sheet)

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Avicenna (Ibn Sina)

THE METAPHYSICSBOO K IX, CHAPTER IV

A parallel Latin-English text from Avicennas

LIBER DE PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA SIVE SCIENTIA DIVINA,

which was originally translated from the METAPHYSICS portion

of Avicennas THE HEALING (i.e., the AL -I LAHIYYAT of the AL -S HIFA).

Translated from the Latin by JT Paasch.

Last updated April 2, 2009

Note:

The Latin text is taken from Van Riets critical edition in Avicenna Latinus:

Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina, Libri V-X (E. J. Brill, Leiden,

and Louvain, Peeters: 1980). Van Riets page numbers are marked between

forward slashes, e.g., /483/. I have added a basic apparatus to the Latin text

to indicate a few crucial variants not present in Van Riets edition, and to

indicate where the Latin text differs significantly from Michael Marmuras

translation of the Arabic text in The Metaphysics of the Healing (Provo, Utah:

Brigham Young University Press, 2005). References to Fabr. 1508 are to the

edition by Caecilius Fabrianensis of Avicennas Opera that were translated

into Latin (Venice, 1508; reprinted by Frankfurt: Minerva, 1961).

Typeset in TexShop with Latex, ledmac, and ledpar.


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CAPITULUM IV

DE ORDINATIONE ESSE INTELLIGENTIAEET ANIMARUM CAELESTIUM ET CORPORUM SUPERIORUM A PRIMO

/476/ Iam certum est nobis ex supradictis quod necesse esse per se unum est

5 et quod non est corpus nec in corpore nec dividitur aliquo modo, et quod

esse omnium quae sunt est ab eo et quod non potest habere principium ullo

modo nec causam, scilicet nec a qua est res, nec in qua est res, nec per

quam est res, nec propter quam est, ita ut ipse sit propter aliquid. Unde non

potest esse ut esse omnium ab illo sit secundum viam intentionis ab illo,

10 quemadmodum est nobis intentio in /477/ his omnibus quae fiunt a nobis:

tunc enim ipse esset intendens propter aliquid aliud praeter se. Iam autem

expediti sumus ab hoc in aliis quae sunt extra eum, scilicet quod nulla res

intendit aliquid quod sit inferius se; in eo autem hoc evidentius est. Sed

quod proprium sit ei non habere intentionem ut esse omnium sit ab eo,

15 ratio haec est scilicet quia hoc induceret multitudinem in sua essentia. Tunc

enim esset in eo aliquid propter quod intenderet, scilicet quia vel cognitio

eius vel scientia eius faceret debere intendi quia indigeret ea, vel bonitas

quae esset in ea faceret debere hoc, denique intentio alicuius utilitatis quae

prodessit ei, sicut iam praediximus. Hoc autem absurdum est. Omne enim

20 esse quod est ab eo non est secundum viam naturae ad hoc ut esse omnium

sit ab eo non per cognitionem nec per beneplacitum eius: quomodo enim

hoc esse posset, cum ipse sit intelligentia pura quae intelligit seipsum? Et

ideo necesse est ut intelligat sequi ipsum ut esse omnium sit ab eo [ . . .]

inquantum ipse est principium eius, et in sua essentia non sit prohibens

25 hoc eo quod eventus omnium sit ab eo, sic quod sua essentia est sciens quod

1115 Iam autem expediti sumus . . . induceret multitudinem in sua essentia.] The Arabicsays: This part [of our metaphysical doctrine] we have established in another place; thereinit is also manifest. We have endowed [the argument] with the special characteristic ofshowing the impossibility of His intending the existence of the whole [that proceeds] from

Him, in that this would lead to a multiplicity in His essence (translation from Marmura,The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 326, lines 25-29). 2224 Et ideo . . . est principium eius]The Arabic text says: Hence, He must intellectually apprehend that the existence from Himof the whole is a necessary consequence of Himself, because He apprehends Himself only

intellectually, as a pure intellect and first principle. He only intellectually apprehends theexistence of the whole [proceeding] from Him in being its principle. (Translation fromMarmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 327, lines 4-9.)

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CHAPTER 4

ON THE ORIGINATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE INTELLIGENCESAND THE SUPERIOR CELESTIAL SOULS AND BODIES FROM THE FIRST CAUSE

/476/ Now, it is certain to us from what we said before that He1 who has

necessary being in Himself is one; that He is not a body, nor in a body, nor 5

divisible in any way; that the existence of all things that exist comes from

Him; and that He cannot have a principle or cause in any way that is, there

is nothing from which, in which, through which, or on account of which

He is a thing, so He does not exist in virtue of anything else. Whence, it

cannot be the case that the existence of all the things that come from Him 10

comes about by way of Him intending it (like how we intend /477/ all the

things that we make), for then He would be intending this on account of

something else beyond Himself. Now, we have explained about other things

(outside Him) that nothing intends something thats inferior to itself, but

this is even more evident in Him. It is proper for Him not to have an 15

intention that results in the existence of all the things that come from Him,

for this would introduce multiplicity into His essence. For then there would

be in Him something on account of which He would intend this. That is,

His cognition or knowledge would make Him intend this because He would

need it, or the goodness in Him would cause an intention for something 20

that would be useful to Him, as we said before. But this is absurd, for the

existence that comes forth from Him does not come forth by way of nature,

so the existence of all that comes forth from Him does not come forth from

His cognition or good pleasure. For how could that even be, since He is a

pure intelligence who understands Himself? For this reason, it is necessary 25

1Strictly speaking, I should say It instead of He, but Avicenna clearly thinks thisnecessary being is God, and besides, Avicenna mentions too many other its here, so Illuse He to refer to this necessary being (God) in order to avoid any confusion.

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sua perfectio et sua excellentia est ut /478/ fluat ab eo bonitas, et hoc est de

comitantibus suam gloriam quam ipse diligit per seipsum.

Omnis autem essentia quae scit quod provenit ex ea, nec admiscetur ei

impedimentum aliquod, sed est quemadmodum iam ostendimus, placet ei

30 id quod provenit ex ea; igitur primo placuit ut ex sua essentia flueret omne

quod est. Veritatis autem primae non est sua prima actio nisi per essentiam.

Ipse enim intelligit suam essentiam et quod sua essentia est principium

ordinis bonitatis in esse, [. . .] quemadmodum oportet esse, non intellectu

procedente de potentia ad effectum, nec intellectu qui movetur de uno intel-

35 lecto ad aliud. Eius enim essentia immunis est ab omni quod est in potentia

omnino, sicut iam supra ostendimus, sed ipse est intelligens omnia ut unum

simul, et ex hoc quod intelligit, sequitur ordinatio bonitatis in esse, et in-telligit qualiter est possibile et qualiter est elegantius provenire esse totius

secundum iudicium sui intellecti. Certi tudo autem intellecta apud eum est

40 ipsa, sicut nosti, scientia, potentia et voluntas. Nos enim ad exsequendum

quod imaginamus, indigemus intentione, motu et voluntate ad hoc ut sit; in

ipso autem hoc non est conveniens, nec potest esse propter suam immunita-

tem a dualitate, in cuius probatione iam multum desudavimus; igitur ipse

intelligit se esse causam secundum quod intelligit illud.

33 [. . .] quemadmodum oportet esse] The Arabic says this: He thus intellectually appre-hends the order of the good in existence and how this ought to be (Translation fromMarmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 327, lines 20-21) 3940 Certitude autem . . .et voluntas.] The Arabic says this: For the reality that is intellectually apprehended withHim is itself, as you have known, knowledge, power, and will (translation from Marmura,The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 327, lines 30-31). 4142 in ipso autem hoc non estconveniens] Van Riets critical edition has this: in ipso autem hoc est conveniens. I havefollowed Fabr., 1508: f. 104vA, line 40, which says In ipso autem hoc non est conveniens.The Arabic text also puts it as Fabr. does (see Marmuras English translation, The Meta- physics of the Healing, p. 327, lines 33-34). Clearly, the argument demands this reading.Unfortunately, Van Riet does not indicate this variant in his apparatus (Van Riet, Avicenna

Latinus, Liber de Prima Philosophia, Libri V-X, p. 478, line 81).

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that He understands the existence of everything that comes forth from Him

[. . .] only insofar as He is its source, and in His essence there is nothingto prohibit that everything that comes forth from Him actually comes forth

from Him. In this way, His essence knows that His perfection and excellence

is such that /478/ goodness might flow from Him, and this accompanies His 30

glory, which He loves in itself.

But as for every essence that knows what comes forth from it, there is no

impediment mixed in to it, but rather it is how we have shown: that which

comes forth from it pleases it. Therefore, it pleased the first cause thateverything which exists flowed from His essence. However, the first action 35

of the First Truth occurs only through His essence. For He understands His

essence and that His essence is the source of the order of goodness in exis-

tence, [. . .] and how this ought to be. But this does not happen by an act ofunderstanding that proceeds from potency into effect, nor by an act of un-

derstanding that moves from one understanding to another. For His essence 40

is immune to everything that is in potency in any way, just as we showedabove. Rather, He understands everything simultaneously as one, and from

this which He understands, there follows the origination of goodness in ex-

istence, and He understands how this is possible and more elegant for the

existence of everything to come forth according to the judgment of His in- 45

tellect. That which, with certitude, is understood along with Him, is this (as

you know): knowledge, power, and will. For when it comes to the things

that come forth from us, we imagine and need them by intention, motion,

and will so that they might come to exist. But this does not belong to Him,

nor can it on account of His immunity to duality, the proof of which we have 50

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45 /479/ Esse autem quod est ab eo est secundum viam consquendi et co-

mitandi eius esse, non quod eius esse sit propter esse aliquid aliud a se,

quoniam ipse est agens omne quod est hac intentione quia ipse est ens a

quo fluit quicquid est, fluxu discrete ab eius essentia. Sed, quod esse om-

nis eius quod fit a primo non est nisi secundum viam comitandi, si certum

50 fuerit quod necesse esse per se est necesse esse omnibus suis modis (iam

expediti sumus ab hoc in praecedentibus), igitur ea quae primo sunt ab eo

et haec sunt creata non possunt esse multa nec numero nec divisione

in materiam et formam, quoniam id quod sequitur ex eo, est ab eius essen-

tia, non ab alio aliquo. Modus autem et iudicium de hoc quod est in eius

55 essentia, secundum quem sequitur ab eo hoc, non est modus et iudicium

secundum quod sequeretur ex eo non hoc, sed aliud ab hoc. Si enim pro-

venirent ab eo duae res discretae per existentiam, vel duae res discretae exquibus fit unum, sicut materia et forma, comitantia simul, illae non prove-

nirent nisi ex duobus modis diversis in eius essentia. Si autem illi duo modi

60 essent non in eius essentia, sed comitantes eius essentiam, tunc remaneret

quaestio de comitantia istorum duorum, quousque essent de sua essentia, et

sic ipsa esset divisibilis in intellectu: iam autem prohibuimus hoc antea et

ostendimus destructionem eius. Manifestum est igitur quod primum eorum

quae sunt a causa prima unum numero est, et eius essentia et eius quidditas

65 est unitas, non in materia. Unde nihil corporum vel formarum quae sunt

perfectiones corporum est causatum eius propinquum, quia primum causa-

tum est intelligentia pura, quia est forma non in materia, et ipsa est prima

intelligentiarum /480/ separatarum, quas numeravimus. Videtur autem ipsa

esse principium movens corpus ultimum secundum viam desiderii.

70 Potest autem aliquis dicere quia id quod fit a primo non prohibetur esse

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already labored so hard to establish. Therefore, He understands Himself to

be the cause, according to which He understands that which comes forthfrom Him.

/479/ Now, the existence that comes forth from Him exists by way of

following-from and accompanying His existence. This is not because He 55

has existence on account of something other than His own self, for He ac-

tualizes everything that comes to be by His thought, since He is the entity

from whom anything that exists flows by a flowing-forth that is discrete

from His essence. So the existence of everything that comes forth from the

first cause exists only by way of accompaniment. And if it were certain 60that He who is a necessary being in Himself is a necessary being in all His

ways (and indeed it is certain, as we explained before), then the first of those

things that come forth from Him and these are created cannot be many,

neither in number nor by division into matter and form, for that which

follows from Him is from His essence and not from something else. But 65

the mode and judgment in His essence from which this first created thingcomes into being is not the same mode and judgment by which not thisfirst created thing but rather something else comes into being. For if therecame forth from Him two things with discrete existences, or two discrete

things that together made one thing (like matter and form simultaneously 70

accompanying each other), they would only come forth from two diverse

modes in His essence. But if those two modes were not in His essence but

rather accompanied His essence, there would still be a question about how

and to what extent those two accompanied His essence; and besides, thenHe would be divisible by the understanding. But we prohibited this before, 75

and we made its destruction known. Therefore, it is obvious that the first

of those things that come from the first cause is one in number, and there

is unity in its essence and quiddity, and it is not in matter. Whence, thefirst cause does not immediately cause anything that belongs to bodies orforms that are the perfections of bodies, for what the first cause causes 80first is a pure intelligence, for it is a form that is not in matter, and it is the

first of the separated /480/ intelligences that we enumerated previously.However, it seems that this first intelligence is the principle mover of the

outermost body by way of being desired.

However, someone could say that theres nothing to prohibit that which 85

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forma materialis, sed ex ea sequitur esse suae materiae. Ad quod dico quod

hoc faceret debere ut ea quae sunt post hanc formam et hanc materiam,

essent tertia in ordine causatorum, et esset eorum esse mediante materia, et

sic materia esset causa essendi formas corporum quae sunt multa in mundo

75 et suarum virium. Hoc autem est inconveniens, eo quod suum esse mate-

riae est esse receptibile tantum, nec est causa essendi aliquid nisi secundum

viam receptionis. Si autem aliqua ex materiis non est sic, tunc non est ma-

teria nisi communione nominis. Si autem fuerit res posita stabilis non ad

modum materiae nisi communione nominis, tunc primi causati comparatio

80 ad eum non erit inquantum est forma in materia nisi communione nominis.

Si vero fuerit hoc secundum sic ut eo modo quo ab eo est materia sit quid-

dam, et eo modo quo ab eo est forma sit quiddam aliud, ita ut alia forma

non habeat esse mediante materia, tunc forma materialis erit sic quod aget

actionem in qua non indiget materia; quicquid autem agit suam actionem

85 non indigens materia, ipsum per seipsum est non indigens materia. Igitur

forma materialis non indiget materia, et omnino, quamvis forma materia-lis sit causa materiae extrahens eam ad effectum et perficiens eam, tamen

materia habet impressionem in esse illius, et hoc est ipsam appropriari et

signari. Si autem principium essendi fuerit de non materia, sicut iam nosti,

90 tunc sine dubio erit unumquodque eorum causa alterius secundum aliquid,

et non uno modo. Si vero non fuerit ita, tunc destruetur formam materia-

lem pendere de materia ullo modo. Similiter etiam supradiximus quod ad

suum esse materiae non sufficit forma tantum, sed forma est ut partialis

causa. Postquam autem ita est, tunc sola forma non potest poni causa mate-

95 riae omnino /481/ sufficiens per se. Palam igitur non posse esse ut primum

causatum sit forma materialis; sed quod non sit materia manifestius est. Ne-

cessarium est igitur ut causatum primum sit forma non materialis omnino,

scilicet intelligentia.

73 essent tertia in ordine causatorum] Marmura translates the Arabic like this: successi-vely [lower] in the ranks of effects ( The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 328, line 34).

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the first cause made from being a material form,2 and then the existenceof its matter could come forth from it rather than from the first cause.To this, I say that those things which come after this form and this matter

would be third in the order of Gods effects, and the existence of thosethings would then be mediated by matter, so matter would be the cause of 90

the existence of (i) the forms of the many bodies in the world, and of (ii)

their powers. But this is inappropriate, because the existence that belongs to

matter is only that of receptability, so matter is only the cause of somethings

existence by way of reception. But if things are made from matter doesnot mean this, then were talking about matter only in name. And if the 95

proposed permanent thing3 exists in the manner of matter only in name,

then to say that Gods first effect4 is related to it as a form thats embodiedin matter is just to make a comparison in name too. But suppose it were like

this: in a certain way, matter would come forth from Gods first effect, andthen in a certain other way a second form would come forth from it, such 100

that when the first form produced the second form, the second form wouldacquire its existence without the mediation of the first forms matter. Inthis case, the material form of Gods first effect would perform an actionfor which it does not need matter, and since anything that performs its action

without the need for matter does not itself need matter in the first place, it 105follows that the material form of Gods first effect would not need matterat all. In general then, even though a material form is a cause of matter,

namely by drawing it into actuality and perfecting it, matter still plays a role

in the existence of that form, for a material form is only instantiated anddesignated in matter. However, if the principle of existence is not solely 110from matter, as you know, then without doubt matter and form will each be

the cause of the other in their own ways, not in one way. And if this were

not so, then any dependence that a material form has on matter would be

destroyed. Simila rly, we said above that form alone is not sufficient for the

existence of matter. Rather, form is a partial cause. But with this being so, 115

then form alone cannot be postulated as the entire cause, /481/ sufficient by

2Here, a material form is a form that must be embodied in matter. Any form that is

capable of existing apart from matter would not be a material form.3I.e., the body of the outermost celestial sphere.4I.e., the first intelligence that emanates directly from God.

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Tu scis autem quod hic sunt intelligentiae et animae separatae multae.

100 Unde esse eorum non potest esse acquisitum ab aliquo mediante quod non

sit separatum. Item nosti quod, in universitate eorum quae sunt a primo,

sunt corpora, et nosti quod omne corpus est possibile esse quantum in se,

et quod necessarium est per aliud a se, et nosti non esse illis viam essendi

a primo absque mediante aliquo: sunt igitur ex ipso, sed mediante aliquo,

105 et nosti quod medium non est unitas pura; nosti etiam quod ex uno, se-

cundum quod est unum, non est nisi unum. Necesse est igitur ut ex primo

causatis propter esse eorum sint alia in quibus oportet esse necessitatem et

multitudinem, quomodocumque evenerit. Intelligentiis enim separatis non

potest esse aliqua multitudo nisi quemadmodum dicam, quoniam causatum

110 per se est possibile esse in seipso, propter primum autem est necessariumesse. Sed necessitas sui esse est secundum quod est intelligentia, et intelligit

seipsum et intelligit primum necessario. Unde oportet ut sit in eo multitudo

ex hoc quod intelligit se quod est possibile esse quantum in /482/ se, et ex

hoc quod intelligit necessitatem sui esse a primo quod est intellectum per se

115 [. . .]. Non est autem ei multitudo ex primo. Nam possibilitas sui esse est ei

quiddam propter se, non propter primum, sed est ei a primo necessitas sui

esse, et deinde multiplicatur per hoc quod intelligit primum et per hoc quod

105 medium non est unitas pura] The Arabic adds: having no duality (see Marmura, TheMetaphysics of the Healing, English translation, p. 330, lines 1-2; Van Riet also notes this,Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Prima Philosophia, Libri V-X, p. 483, variant for line 50). 106

108 Necesse est igitur . . . evenerit.] The Arabic says: Hence, it is only right that [the body]proceeds from the first innovated things by reason of a duality or a plurality - in whateverform - that must necessarily be in them (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysicsof the Healing, p. 330, lines 3-6). 109111 quoniam causatum per se . . . necessariumesse.] The Arabic says: The effect in itself is possible of existence and, through the First, is

necessary of existence (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 330,lines 8-9). 112115 Unde oportet . . . per se [. . .]] The Arabic says: Hence, there must bein it, by way of plurality, the meaning [(a)] of its intellectual apprehension of its essence as

being, within its own bound, possible of existence; [(b)] of its intellectual apprehension of

its necessary existence, through the First, that intellectually apprehends itself; and [(c)] ofits own intellectual apprehension of the First (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics

of the Healing, p. 330, lines 11-16).

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itself, of matter. Therefore, it plainly cannot be the case that Gods firsteffect is a material form. And its even more obvious that its not matter byitself, without form. Therefore, it is necessary that the first caused thing isa form that is not a material form in any way - namely an intelligence. 120

But you know that here there are many separated intelligences and souls.

Whence, their existence cannot be acquired by some intermediary which is

not itself separated. Moreover, you know that in the totality of those thingswhich come from the first cause, there are bodies, and you know that ev-ery body is a possible being in itself, and it is necessary by something other 125

than itself, and you know that no existence comes to those things by way of

coming from the first cause without some intermediary. Therefore, theycome from the first cause, but by some intermediary, and you know thatan intermediary is not a pure unity. For you know that from one thing,

insofar as it is one, comes only one other thing. Therefore, it is necessary 130

that for the existence of the things that are caused by the first cause, there

are other things in which there must be necessity and multiplicity, howeverit might have come forth. For there cannot be any multiplicity in the sep-

arated intelligences except in the way I say, for what is caused per se5 has

possible existence in itself, though it has necessary existence on account of 135

the first cause. But the necessity of its existence comes in virtue of thefact that it is an intelligence, for it understands itself and it understands the

first necessary being. Whence, it is necessary that there is multiplicity in it

from this: that it understands that it has possible existence in /482/ itself,

5Effects can be caused per se or per accidens. Roughly speaking, the primary effect ofan action is the per se effect, and any side effects are per accidens effects. For example,Socrates parents produce Socrates per se, but they produce his paleness per accidens.

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/483/ Sub unaquaque autem intelligentia est caelum cum sua materia et

135 sua forma, quae est anima et intelligentia inferius ea. Igitur sub omni intelli-

gentia sunt tria in esse; unde oportet ut possibilitas esendi haec tria sit ab illa

intelligentia prima in creatione propter trinitatem quae est nominata in ea,

et nobile sequitur ex nobiliore multis modis. Igitur ex prima intelligentia,

inquantum intelligit primum, sequitur esse alterius intelligentiae inferioris

140 ea, et inquantum intelligit seipsam, sequitur ex ea forma caeli ultimi et eius

perfectio et haec est anima, et propter naturam essendi possibile quae est ei

et quae est retenta inquantum intelligit seipsam, est esse corporeitatis caeli

ultimi quae est contenta in totalitate caeli ultimi. Unde ipsa et id quod estcommune virtuti sunt sic quod ex ipsa sequitur intelligentia, et ex eo quod

145 est commune virtuti, inquantum appropriatur sibi ipsi secundum modum

suum, sequitur sphaera prima cum suis partibus duabus, scilicet materia et

forma; materia autem est mediante forma et consortio eius, sicut possibili-

tas essendi trahit ad effectum id quod est apud eam, /484/ scilicet formam

caeli. Similiter est dispositio in intelligentia et intelligentia, et in caelo et

150 caelo, quousque pervenitur ad intelligentiam agentem quae gubernat nostras

animas.

138 nobile sequitur ex nobiliore multis modis] The Arabic says: the best follows the bestin many ways (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 331, lines4-5). 141143 quae est ei . . . totalitate caeli ultimi.] The Arabic says: enfolded in [the actof] intellectually apprehending itself, is the existence of the corporeality of the outermost

sphere, enfolded in the entity of the outermost sphere, [taken as] a species (translationfrom Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 331, lines 10-13). 143146 Unde ipsa. . . suis partibus duabus] The Arabic says: This [possibility] is the thing that has a sharingin common with potentiality. Thus, inasmuch as it intellectually apprehends the First, there

follows necessarily from it an intellect; and, inasmuch as in one respect [its intellection isapplied] specifically to itself, there follows necessarily from it the first multiplicity in itstwo parts (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 331, lines 13-17).

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possible body would come forth from it, and there would only be here a

possible multitude in this way.9 However, it is obvious to us from what has

been said that the separated intelligences are many in number. Therefore,

they do not have existence simultaneously from the first, but it is necessary

that the more excellent of all those things is the first to have existence from 165

the first cause, after which there follows intelligence after intelligence./483/ Now, under each intelligence, there is a heavenly sphere with its

matter and its form (which is its soul), and an inferior intelligence. There-

fore, under each intelligence there are three things in existence. Whence, it

is necessary that the possibility of the existence of these three be in creation 170

from that first intelligence on account of the triad of thoughts which wenamed in it above, so that the noble follows from the more noble in many

ways. Therefore, from the first intelligence, (i) insofar as it understands the

first cause, there follows the existence of another intelligence inferior toit; (ii) and insofar as it understands itself, there follows from it the form 175

and perfection of its outermost sphere, and this is the soul of that sphere;(iii) and on account of the nature of being possible, which belongs to it and

which is retained insofar as it understands itself, there is the existence of

all the corporeity of the outermost sphere which is contained in the total-ity of the outermost sphere. Whence, the first intelligence, as well as that 180

which exists by common power, is such that from that first intelligence,another intelligence follows, and from that which exists by common power

(insofar as that power belongs to it in the appropriate way that suits its own

manner of being), follows the first sphere with its two parts, namely itsmatter and form. However, the matter only exists by the mediation of or 185partnership with the form, just as the matters possibility of existing draws

9That is, there could only be many things in the sense that there could only be a chainof causes and effects, where the first cause produces only one effect, and that effect in turnproduces only one effect, and so on.

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Non oportet autem ut hoc procedat in infinitum, ita ut sub unoquoque

separato sit separatum. Dico enim quod, si ex intelligentia provenit esse

multitudinis, tunc erit hoc propter intentiones multitudinis quae sunt in ea,

155 sed non convertitur ita ut in unaquaque intelligentia sit haec multitudo et

quod eius multitudinem sequantur haec causata, nec hae intelligentiae sunt

convenientes in specie ita ut iudicia suarum intentionum sint convenientia.

Igitur incipiamus ostendere hanc intentionem alio modo.

Dico igitur quod caeli sunt multi supra numerum qui est in primo cau-

160 sato, quantum ad multitudinem eius praedictam, et praecipue cum unum-

quodque caelum dividitur in suam materiam et in suam formam. Igitur

non potest esse principium eorum unum quod sit causatum primum. Necetiam potest esse ut unumquodque corporum sit causa eius quo est prius:

corpus enim ex hoc quod est corpus non potest esse principium corporis.

165 Nec ex hoc quod habet virtutem animalem, potest esse principium animae

in alio corpore: nos enim iam ostendiums quod anima cuiusque caeli est

eius perfectio et eius forma, nec est substantia separata; alioquin, esset intel-

ligentia, non anima, nec moveret ullo modo nisi ad modum desiderii, nec

contingeret in ea variatio ex motu corporis, nec ex consortio corporis con-

170 tingeret imaginatio et aestimatio. Consideratio autem iam perduxit nos ad

stabiliendum has dispositiones in animabus caelorum, sicut nosti.

155156 sed non convertitur . . . haec causata] Van Riets critical edition has sed conver-titur . . . haec causata, but I have followed Fabr. 1508, f. 105rA, line 16, which has sed

non convertitur. . .

haec causata. The Arabic also uses the negative: This statement ofours [however] is not convertible whereby every intellect having this multiplicity wouldhave to have, as a necessary consequence of its multiplicity, these effects (translation fromMarmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 331, lines 26-29, emphasis added). Again, VanRiet does not offer this variant (see Van Riet, Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Prima Philosophia,Libri V-X, p. 484, line 3). 165 habet virtutem animalem] The Arabic says: has a psycho-logical power (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 331, lines38-39).

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into effect that which exists with it, /484/ namely the form of the heavenly

sphere. In a similar way, this disposition passes from intelligence to intelli-

gence, and from sphere to sphere, until we arrive at the agent intelligence

who governs our souls. 190

However, this process cannot go on infinitely such that under each sep-

arate intelligence, there is still another separate intelligence. For I say that

if a multitude came into existence from an intelligence, this would be be-

cause that intelligence has many thoughts. But this is not passed along such

that in each intelligence there would be this same sort of multiplicity of 195thoughts and effects10 that follow from that multpilicity of thoughts. Nordo these intelligences agree in species, so that their thoughts might agree.

But we shall try to show this point in another way.

I say, therefore, that there are many more heavenly spheres than the

number in Gods first effect, insofar as the multiplicity that I just men- 200tioned is concerned, and especially for each heavenly sphere which is di-

vided into its matter and into its form. Therefore, there cannot be onesource - i.e., Gods first effect - for all those things. Nor can it be thateach of the bodies is caused by the body thats prior to it. For insofar as

it is a body, a body cannot be the source of another body. And from the 205fact that it has animal power, it cannot be the source of a soul in another

body. For we showed that the soul of each heavenly sphere is its perfection

and its form, and its not a separated substance. Otherwise, it would be an

intelligence, not a soul, nor would it move anything in any way except by

being desired, nor would it have any variation from the motion of a body, 210

nor would it have any imagination and estimation from its partnership with

the body. But this consideration led us to ascribe these dispositions to the

souls of the heavenly spheres, as you know.

10I.e., the body and soul (matter and form) of a celestial sphere.

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/485/ Si autem res ita fuerit, tunc non poterit esse ut ex animabus cae-

lorum proveniant actiones in aliis corporibus, nisi mediantibus suis corpo-

ribus. Formae enim corporum et eorum perfectiones sunt duobus modis.

175 Aut enim sunt formae quarum existentiae sunt propter materias corporum,

et ideo existentia eorum est in materiis illorum corporum; et ob hoc, calor

ignis non calefacit quidlibet, sed quod fuerit obvians suo corpori vel secun-

dum comparationem sui corporis; similiter, sol non illuminat quidlibet, sed

quod fuerit oppositum suo corpori. Aut sunt formae quarum existentiae sunt

180 per seipsas, non propter materias corporum sicut animae, quia unaquaeque

anima non appropriatur corpori nisi quia eius actio est propter illud corpus

et in illo; si autem anima esset separatae essentiae et actionis utriusque ab

illo corpore, tunc esset anima omnis rei, non anima illius tantum corpo-

ris. Iam igitur manifestum est secundum omnes modos quod vires caelestes

185 quae sunt impressae in suis corporibus non agunt nisi mediantibus suis cor-

poribus. Absurdum est autem ut agant animam mediante corpore: corpus

enim non potest esse medium inter animam et animam. Si autem illaeagunt animas absque mediantibus corporibus, tunc habent solitariam exi-

stentiam absque corpore et appropriationem et actionem separatam a sua

190 essentia et ab essentia corporis: hoc autem est praeter propositum. Si autem

non agit illud anima, tunc multo minus agit illud corpus caeleste; anima

enim antecellit corpus in ordine et perfectione.

/486/ Quod autem in unoquoque caelo ponatur aliquid ex quo in suo

caelo proveniat aliquid et impressio sine infusione suae essentiae cum occu-

195 patur circa illud corpus, sed eius essentia sit discreta in existentia et actione

ab illo corpore, nos non prohibemus hoc, quia hoc est quod nos vocamus

inteligentiam spoliatam, ex qua ponimus advenire id quod est post eam; sed

est praeter patiens a corpore, et praeter communicans ei, et praeter formam

eius propriam, et praeter omne id quod diximus cum stabilivimus animam.

200 Iam igitur certificatum est quod caeli habent principia quae sunt nec corpo-ralia nec formae corporum, et quod unumquodque caelorum appropriatur

alicui illorum principiorum; universitas autem eorum communicat in uno

principio.

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/485/ However, if such were the case, then it could only be that the

actions that would come forth from the souls of the celestial spheres would 215

have an effect on other bodies by the mediation of their bodies. For theforms that are the perfections of their bodies are twofold. Either (i) they are

the forms of those things whose existence occurs on account of the matter

of their bodies, and for this reason the existence of those things is in the

matter of their bodies. Thus, the heat of fire does not heat anything unless 220

it touches its body or comes close to its body. Similarly, the sun does not

illuminate anything unless it stands opposite to its body. Or (ii) they are

forms of those things whose existence occurs on account of themselves, and

not on account of the matter of their bodies - like souls. For each soul

appropriates a body only insofar as its action occurs in virtue of and in that 225

body. However, if a soul were separated from its body in both essence and

action, then it would be the soul of everything, not the soul of that body

alone. Therefore, it is obvious in every way that the celestial powers which

are impressed in their bodies only act by the mediation of their bodies. Butit is absurd that they might actualize a soul by the mediation of a body, for 230

a body cannot be an intermediary between a soul and a soul. But if they

did actualize souls without the mediation of bodies, then they would have

a special existence and instantiation without a body, and they would have a

special action separated from its essence and from the essence of the body.

But this is beyond whats proposed. However, if it were not to actualize 235

that soul, then much less would it actualize that celestial body, for the soul

surpasses the body in order and perfection.

/486/ But if in each celestial sphere you were to postulate that there is

something which (i) produces some body and impression within its sphere,and (ii) whose essence is not infused in that body but rather is discrete in 240

existence and action from that body, then we would not prohibit this. For

this is what we call a bare intelligence, from which we postulate that which

comes after it. But it is other than that which is receptive to the body, and it

is beyond sharing with it, and it is other than the proper form of the body,

and it is other than each thing that we ascribed to the soul. Therefore, it is 245certain that the heavenly spheres have sources which are neither corporeal

nor the forms of bodies, and that each of the heavenly spheres belongs to

one of those sources. But the totality of them shares in one source.

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Non est autem dubium hic esse intelligentias simplices separatas quae

205 fiunt cum factura corporum humanorum, quae non corrumpuntur sed per-

manent (iam autem hoc manifestum est in scientiis naturalibus) quae nec

proveniunt a primo principio, eo quod multae sunt, quamvis sint una in

specie. Sed, quia fiunt, sunt causatae primi mediante aliquo. Causae autem

agentes mediae inter primum et illas non possunt esse inferiores eis in or-

210 dine, quia non sunt intelligentiae simplices separatae; causae vero datrices

esse sunt perfectiores in esse, recipientes vero esse sunt inferiores in esse.

Oportet igitur ut causatum primum sit intelligentia una per essentiam, ex

qua non potest esse multitudo conveniens in specie. Intentiones enim quae

multiplicantur in ea secundum quod multitudo potest esse in ea, si /487/

215 fuerint diversae certitudinibus, tunc id quod provenit ex unaquaque earum

aliud est in specie ab eo quod provenit ab alia, et sic non comitabitur unum-

quodque eorum quod comitatur alterum, sed alia natura. Si vero fuerint

convenientes in certitudine, tunc in quo erunt diversae et multae, cum non

sit ibi divisio materiae? Igitur ex causato primo non potest esse multitudo220 nisi diversa in specie. Igitur hae animae terrenae non fiunt a causato primo

absque mediante alia causa iam essente.

Similiter fit ab omni causato primo sublimiore, quousque perveniatur ad

causatum quod fit cum factura elementorum receptibilium generationis et

corruptionis quae multiplicantur numero et specie simul. Igitur multitudo

225 recipientis causa est multitudinis actionis principii quod est unum in essen-

tia. Et hoc est post completionem esse omnium caelestium, et sequitur sem-

per intelligentia post intelligentiam, quousque fiat sphaera lunae, et deinde

fiant elementa et aptantur recipere impressionem unam in specie, multam

numero, ab intelligentia ultima. Si enim causa multitudinis non fuerit in

230 agente, debebit esse necessario in patiente. Opor tet igitur ut, ex unaquaqueintelligentia, fiat intelligentia inferior ea et esset tunc quousque possint fieri

substantiae intelligibiles divisibiles multae numero propter multitudinem

causarum, et usque huc perveniunt. Iam igitur vere manifestum est quod

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There is no doubt here that there are simple, separated intelligences

who are made with the making of human bodies, who are not corrupted 250

but permanent (but now this is obvious in the natural sciences), and who

neither came forth from the first source, for they are many, even though

they are one in species. However, because they are made, they are caused by

the first cause through some intermediary. But the agent causes that areintermediaries between the first and these intellects just mentioned cannot 255

be inferior to these intellects in order, for that would mean that they arenot simple, separated intelligences themselves. For causes that give beingare more perfect in being, and recipients of being are more inferior in

being. Therefore, it is necessary that Gods first effect is an intelligencethat is one by essence, from whom there cannot be a multitude that agrees 260

in species. For the thoughts that are multiplied in Gods first effect, insofaras multiplicity can be in it, if /487/ there were diverse thoughts, then that

which comes from each of those thoughts would differ in species from

that which comes forth from another thought, and in this way, the effectwhich accompanies each thought will not accompany another thought, 265for it will have a different nature. Besides, if these thoughts were to agree,then in virtue of what would there be diverse and many things, since there

would not be any division of matter there? Therefore, from Gods firsteffect, there cannot be a multitude of things unless they differ in species.Thus, these earthly souls are not made by Gods first effect without the 270mediation of other causes already in existence.

The same goes for each thing thats made by a higher cause, and thisprocess continues until we reach some effect that is made along with theelements that are receptive of generation and corruption, and which are

multiplied in number and species simultaneously. Therefore, the multiplic- 275

ity of recipients is the cause of the multiplicity of the actions of a principle

which is one in essence. But this is after the completion of the existence of

evey celestial sphere, and there always follows intelligence after intelligence,

until they make the sphere of the moon, and thereafter they make the ele-

ments that are disposed to receive from the last intelligence one impression 280in species that is many in number. For if the cause of multiplicity is not

in the agent, then it will have to be necessary in the patient. Therefore, it

is necessary that, from each intelligence, another intelligence is made who

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ex omni intelligentia superiore in ordine, secundum hoc quod intelligit pri-

235 mum, provenit esse alterius intelligentiae inferioris ea, sed, secundum hoc

/488/ quod intelligit seipsam, provenient circuli per se tantum; corpus vero

caeli fit ab ea et permanet mediante anima caelesti; omnis enim forma causa

est ut sua materia sit in effectu; ipsa enim materia non habet existentiam.

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is inferior to it, and the same again and again until they can make intelli-

gible substances that are divisible into many in number, on account of the 285

multiplicity of recipient causes. This process goes all the way up to thispoint, where it stops. Therefore, it is truly obvious that from each intel-ligence thats superior in order, insofar as it understands the first cause,there comes into existence a further intelligence who is inferior to it, but

insofar as /488/ it understands itself, only spheres per se will come forth. 290

But the body of the heavenly sphere is made by it, and it is permanent by

the mediation of the soul of its celestial sphere, for every form is a cause

such that its matter exists in effect, for matter does not have existence itself.

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Avicenna - Meta. 9.4 (two pages on one sheet)

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