Auto Sector

January 2010

Auto component sector report Driving out of uncertain times

2Real valour consists not in being insensible to danger; but in being prompt to confront and disarm it Sir Walter Scott

Auto component sector report 3

Contents

Introduction 4

Thesample 5

Thebeginning 6

Recession 8

Managingoperations 9

Conclusions 11

Appendix:comparativesub-segmentperformance 12

Transmission & steering 12

Engine parts 14

Electrical parts 16

Braking suspension 18

Other equipment 20

Cross sub-segment comparison 22

4Introduction

When economic recession struck the manufacturing industry, companies reacted in different ways. Some did not. Many stopped with doing the easy things and some went ahead and made very difficult, strategic correc-tions. To understand how groups of firms behaved, we analysed the Indian automotive component sector over three years to cover the good times, the recession months and the year when the recession wore off. This sector was chosen for the following reasons:

It was a sector that was affected the most globally

It operates in a highly competitive environment and therefore, there is not much room for complacency. We hypothesised the firms would be unafraid of making changes that would be difficult for some of the lesser competitive sectors to deal with

The eco-system in which these firms operate give them the advantage of learning from their much larger customers and peers, who often have global exposure, and therefore they would be in a position to acquire the tools to deal with the recession

There is fair amount of data and understanding of the sector that it is relatively easier to analyse this sector.

While this paper is about firms dealing with recession, it is important to understand the context. Figure 1 provides some background information of the sector.

In the analysis of the industry that follows, we have attempted to highlight the key factors that drive company performance, how they reacted to the slow down and potentially what could have been done.

Figure1:Asnap-shotoftheautomotivecomponentindustryinIndia

Growth potential of Indian Automotive IndustryAutomotive Industry offers huge growth potential in terms of sales volume (including exports) and so immense employment opportunities. The likely future volumes of different vehicle categories were estimated on the basis of projections made by iMaCS, NCAER and AT Kearney. Value of projected domestic output was computed based on historical average vehicle prices. Export potential was estimated on the basis of current trends and possible opportunities in major export destinations. Demand for after-market auto components and export output was also included in computing growth potential of the industry. The unit value of different vehicle categories in 2016 have been estimated keeping in view the need for compliance with emissions and crash standards.

It is expected that the world production of Auto-Components would reach USD 1.7 Trillion by 2015. About USD 700 billion worth of auto-components shall be sourced out from low cost countries (LCCs) by 2016. If India targets to get a 10% share of this potential, it would mean USD 70 billion, nearly five times current total size of the industry in India. However, this Mission Document has set a modest target of USD 25 billion by 2016 for export of auto components. The projected size in 2016 of the Indian automotive industry varies between USD 122 billion and USD 159 billion including USD 35 billion exports. This translates into a contribution of 10-11% to Indias GDP by 2016, that is, double the current contribution. This would mean a domestic vehicle market

of USD 82 billion to USD 119 billion by 2016, USD 12 billion exports of vehicles and tractors, USD 20-25 billion component exports and more than USD 5 billion after market of components. Another USD 2 2.5 billion in engineering services outsourcing opportunity is expected to develop. The total size of the auto component industry in India is expected to become USD 40-45 billion by 2016. This calls for a major focus and policy initiative to market India as an attractive Manufacturing Destination.

The output estimated would require incremental investment of USD 35-40 billion (Rs 160,000 -180,000 crores) by 2016 as indicated in .-Excerpted from Automotive Mission Plan 2006-2016


Transmission & steering

Engine parts

Electrical parts

Breaking & suspension

Other equipment

100 - 500 Crore INR

501 - 1000 Crore INR

over 1000 Crore

The sample

The sample was chosen to represent the sector (please see Figure 2). The companies were categorised into sub-sectors:

Engine parts Braking and suspension Transmission & steering Electrical parts Other equipment

These sub-sectors account for about 80% of the industry turnover. And, the combined turnover of the sample companies added up to more than 15% of the industry turnover. This would make the sample statistically significant, at least from the perspective of representing medium/large sized companies. The sizes of firms were chosen in a manner that they largely represent the industry pattern.

Share of analysed companies per sub-segment Analysed companies grouped by total sales

Figure 2: Sample

17%

17%

28%

17% 17%

21% 55%

28%

The comparisons in the ensuing pages, unless otherwise stated, are on the growth rate over the previous period. For example, in Figure 3, the bars refer to the growth of equity into the sector over the previous year in 2008 the industry median was up 15% over 2007 and in 2009 the median increase was 4% over 2008.

Where cross sub-segment comparisons are made, the sub-segments are shown as 1, 2, etc with the legend below indicating the name of the sub-segment.

All graphs in this report are basis Deloitte analysis

6The Indian auto sector was the place to be in for global OEMs right from the early 2000s. At a penetration of less than ten cars per 1000 persons, the upside was enormous. While many manufacturers were not making huge profits, they did not want to miss out on what could eventually be amongst the top five markets by volume. As the middle class India started to buy to its potential and as the roads became better, the anxiety in companies was not around will we sell. It was more around do we have the capacity and brand position to convert opportunity into revenues. Even in 2008, when the global manufacturers were not finding it easy to sell automobiles, the equity inflow into the researched companies increased between eight and twenty three percent (see figure 3). Many companies in the sector were doing deals with PE funds. This flush of activity happened after a relatively quiet period around 2005 06 when the investment into capacity was not significant.

At a median level of 12-15% in equity increase and the consequent ability to borrow, the sector was creating capacities that would meet the demands of high growth for over three years or so. Perhaps, the announcements the OEMs made on their Greenfield projects or capacity expansions drove the investments.

The beginning

Transmission & steeringEngine partsElectrical parts

Braking & suspensionOther equipmentsIndustry

25

20

15

10

5

02008 2009

Figure 3: Annual growth rate of equity in the sub-segments


This was when the Return on Equity and Return on Investment were declining over 2007 (see figure 4). Clearly, the automotive industry had not understood the import of what was beginning to happen outside India and/or believed India would escape the impact. Equity was going into a sector where the Fixed Asset Turnover Ratio (FATO) was perceptibly coming down over 2007. Clearly, optimism was a powerful reason.

1 Transmission & steering (2007)

2 Engine parts (2008)

3 Electrical parts (2009)

4 Braking & suspension

5 Other equipments

6 Industry

2007 2008 2009

Figure 4: Financial ratios of the sector

ROE

FATO

1 2 3 4 5 6

25

20

15

10

5

0

ROI

1 2 3 4 5 6

15

10

5

0

0%-2%-4%-6%-8%-10%-12%

2009

2008

The focus on growth led companies to create high fixed and structural costs. It is apparent in hindsight that the companies were not giving themselves any room to manoeuvre in the case of a growth slump. The downside risks were clearly not envisaged by them.

Just before the recession set in, the companies were high on cost rigidity, low on ability to bargain with their customers (on account of the relative sizes and the high dependence they have on their major customers), low medium on their ability to bargain with their suppliers

and the industry was highly competitive with many firms operating without any differentiation. Further, the companies in this sector were not innovative from a new product standpoint and they had to compete on price. Applying the Porter five forces model for industry attractiveness, one would have come to the conclu-sion this was not where one would want to invest. But, as mentioned earlier, investments did come in quite rapidly. And, the only way to live up the expectations of the investors was to hope that the sales growth would continue.

8Unlike the western markets, recession did not bring about a big change in the sales volume. There were categories that had huge drop in sales (commercial vehicles dropped by 30% for some time) but on an overall basis, the companies that were supplying to passenger car makers were not hit by the recession from a volume perspective except the late 2008, when there was a perceptible slow down in volumes. In fact, the export sales went up dramatically for companies such as Maruti Suzuki and Hyundai on the back of the small car, cash-for-clunker programs of

some large European markets. However, the OEMs were driving harder bargains and were probably unwilling to commit to off-take which would have been the norm in earlier times.

With high fixed/structural costs and uncertainty about the growth, running auto component business was not easy. Add to this the poor sentiment around the sector and the fears of OEMs, component manufacturers and collapsing system integrators, it was almost a perfect storm confronting CEOs of these companies.

Recession


Traditionally, auto component companies had a repu-tation of being very good at managing their supply chains and keeping them flexible. They had for quite some time talked about moving towards low fixed cost models with increased outsourcing. Was it a myth and what did these companies do when it was required of them to be efficient, flexible and low cost?

When the growth happened, it appears they were guilty of focussing on growth and letting efficiency slip a bit. They let inventory and receivables go up at a time when one would believe higher volumes and a good growth pattern would enable companies get them down (see Fig 5). Surprisingly, even after the difficult 2008, the sector still found inventory difficult to deal with there was a marginal increase.

Contrary to the popular belief that the OEMs were difficult to deal with, they were actually understanding of the cash-flow pressures of their suppliers. The receivables went down appreciably during the difficult years. Ironically, the component suppliers were the ones guilty of delaying the payments due to their suppliers.

From a strategic perspective, the companies suffered from lower value addition and also could not change that reality quickly to deal with the new circumstances. By definition, the companies in the sector have somewhat hard-wired product portfolios and therefore, are not strategically nimble.

Nor were they able to bring about any significant shift to other markets (perhaps on account of the difficulties the manufacturers in those markets were facing). Conversely, the exports were perhaps not the reason for lower profits. See Fig 6 and Fig 7.

Managing operations

15%

10%

5%

0%

-5%

-10%

Inventory days

Payable days

Receivable days

Working capital days

2008 2009

Figure 5: Working capital performance

Figure 6: Value addition and growth in value addition

Figure 7: Export sales

6%

5%

4%

3%

2%

1%

0%

-1%

-2%

-3%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6

1) Transmission & steering2) Engine parts3) Electrical parts

4) Braking & suspension5) Other equipments6) Industry

2007 2008 2009

10

Having said all this, it is interesting to note that the cost increase relative to the previous years was not significant (see Fig 8). The good thing is that the companies did not have to deal with enormous cost increase but the bad news is the marginal increase in input costs did impact the profits significantly (see Fig 9).

As one would expect in an undifferentiated, highly competitive sector the margin for error is very low. And the punishment for having a high risk appetite is severe as the stock performance turned out. The component sector under-performed the Sensex quite significantly in 2008 and declined far more than Sensex in 2009 (see Fig 10).

Interestingly, some of the sub-sectors that have their footprints covering non-automotive customers seem to have done better (see appendix). There was no percep-tible difference in profit performance of sub-sectors that have a larger after-market exposure.

4%

3%

2%

1%

0%

20%

0%

-20%

-40%

-60%

-80%

-100%

40%

20%

0%

-20%

-40%

-60%

20%

10%

0%

-10%

-20%

-30%

-40%

-50%

1

1

1

2

2

2

3

3

3

4

4

4

5

5

5

6

6 Sensex

6

Figure 8: Cost increases Figure 9a: Profit growth operating profit

Figure 10: Relative performance of auto component stockApril 2008 - March 2009

Figure 9b: Net profit

Ratio total operating cost to net sales

Ratio raw material to net sales

Value addition %

2008 2009





2008 2009

2008 2009


Conclusions

What emerges from the analysis of the component sector is what may be said of a number of others. There was a certain amount of unbridled optimism that made companies to invest in infrastructure and create some level of strategic rigidity that came in the way of them dealing with the disruption effectively. As in the case of other emerging markets, risk intelligence on the part of companies seems fairly low. There is a tendency to over-play the opportunity and overlook the fact that any market can and will go through cycles both man-made as in this case and those driven by macro-economic factors. The price the auto component sector paid in terms of lost profits on account of the slowdown is in the order of USD 400 million. On a conservative note the value lost would be about USD 3.5 - 4 billion.

Companies seem to have done easy things like slowing down supplier payments and getting their customers to pay faster, but have not been able to make changes to strategic or tactical parameters like inventory or value addition.

It is also interesting to see the relative performance of the sub-sectors. Some have handled parts of the supply chain challenges far better than the others. The slow-down has put pressure on some myths around the most profitable sub-sectors and the most attractive for investors. See appendix for the sub-sector comparisons.

Finally, to run auto component business in India would mean having a margin for error of less than 3-4% on any parameter. In the absence of significant intellectual property that can drive profitable growth, companies always operate on the knife edge.

Extreme efficiency along the supply chain and staying low on fixed costs matter. As can be seen from the data presented earlier, the inability of the companies to make costs elastic is an issue they will think about when they plan their strategies. The ability to manage operations with optimized levels of inventory would determine profits and flexibility.

The financial structure would probably come under more scrutiny given the fact the companies may have missed out on the opportunity to operate a higher leverage during the growth years and improved the return on equity. The structural costs have a greater relevance as the operating profit margins have grown consistently in spite of the recession.

And, CEOs would now know trading off efficiency for growth as was seen during the periods of high growth when the supply chain efficiency seemed to take the back seat- is not an option any more. They have to go together.

The manner in which companies develop their strategy perhaps will undergo some interesting changes. There will, and, should be greater focus on building strategic flexibility in their plans. There is likely to be more focus on risk and business cycles.

Over five years in the early 2000s, we benchmarked over one thousand manufacturing companies from around the world. We mapped the manner in which the best performing companies differentiate themselves in terms of the processes and the way they look to develop their strategies. Perhaps, companies in the auto component sector would like to look at this map (see Fig 11) to identify gaps in their management processes to the level where they run synchronized supply chains.

Figure 11: Value chain maturity

Framework: Building a World Class Value Chain

SynchronizedValue Chain

Differentiator

Qualifier

Cap

ability

Customer strategic planning

Collaboration new products

Collaboration - cost reduction

Customer / channel profitability

Inventory replenishment

Collaboration - demand planning

Customer segmentation

Customer service levels - fulfillment

Customer collabo-ration- quality

Customer

Product Lifecycle Management

Design for Manufacturing

Product data management

Common parts / common platform

Product profitability

Design for Quality

Cross-functional design teams

SKU rationalization

Supplier collabora-tion new materials /new processes

Product quality

Product

Supply Chain Network Optimization / Tax Structure

SCM organization

Program Management

Flexible capacity

Production Schedule Optimization

Transportation Optimization

Integrated Sales & Operations Planning

Quick Changeover

Six Sigma / SPC

Demand planning

Lean Manufacturing

ISO Quality Certification

Supply Chain

Scenario Planning

Business Intelligence

Customer / Supplier Portal

Product Lifecycle Mgmt

Advanced Planning Systems

Customer Relationship Mgmt

Transportation Mgmt

Product Data Mgmt

Warehouse Mgmt

Demand planning

EDI

Quality Mgmt

ERP

Technology

12

Appendix: comparative sub-segment performance

The comparisons, unless otherwise stated, are on the growth rates of the corresponding period in the previous year. For example, in the graphic below, it is not as if the net profit was -60% but the net profit decreased by that level over the previous year. Where cross sub-segment comparisons are made, the sub-segments are shown as 1), 2), etc with the legend below indicating the name of the sub-segment. Brief interpretations of each of the graphics are given as relevant without attempting to make conclusions.

Sales increase close to 0% in 09 which is very low compared to industry.

OP growth has been flat in 08 but declined drasti-cally in 09.

Sales and Net Profit growth rate well below industry median

This sub-segment is focused on supplying OEMs. As OEMs sales declined, the volume ordered declined as well and therefore the sales of the sub-segment.

10%

0%

-10%

-20%

-30%

-40%

-50%

-60%

-70%

2008

Turnover OP Net profit

2009

The sub-segment was able to raise their payable significantly, while the receivable days have been kept on a constant level.

The working capital days increased in 09 after no change in 08.

This sub-segment has been the only one to keep the inventory days constant.

16%14%12%10%8%6%4%2%0%-2%-4%

2008

Inventory days

Payable days

Receivable das


2009

Increase in Ratio Raw Material to Sales ratio growth was lowered to only 1% in 09.

6%

5%

4%

3%

2%

1%

0%

-1%

-2%2008 2009



Value addition %

The Operating Profit Margin is only slightly below industry median.

Operating profit marginCost structure & value addition

Sale turnover and profitability Operational performance

Operating profit margin

18%

16%

14%

12%

10%

8%

6%

4%

2%

0%200920082007

Transmission & steering


2008 2009

Asset utilisation

FATO

0%

-2%

-4%

-6%

-8%

-10%

-12%

-14%

Returns

ROE / ROI both decrease equally due to reduced profits. The decrease is the second highest in the industry, only Other Equipment performing worse.

2007 2008 2009

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%ROE ROI

14

Engine parts

Engine parts had a very high OPM, which reduced by over 7% in two years. Ratio Raw Material to Sales increased continuously

from 2% to over 8% while the Total Operating Cost Ratio increased only by 4% each year, resulting in an unchanged Value Addition.

Sales growth in 09 was not as high as in 08 but still growing.

Profit declined both years constantly.

Highest decrease in the industry in 09 regarding WC days.

Receivable days increased mainly in 08, whereas the payable days remain constant. During 09, the receiv-able days seem to have reduced.

The sub-segment had an increase in inventory days by 2-4% which is well below the industry median.

15%

10%

5%

0%

-5%

-10%

-15%

-20%

10%

5%

0%

-5%

-10%

-15%

2008

2008

Turnover OP Net profitInventory days

Payable days

Receivable das


Value state the change to previous year2009

2009

10%

8%

6%

4%

2%

0%

-2%

-4%2008 2009



Value addition %



25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%200920082007

Cost structure & value addition


FATO decreased in 09 by over 10%.

2008 2009

Value state the change to previous year

FATO

4%

2%

0%

-2%

-4%

-6%

-8%

-10%

-12%

Asset utilisation

ROE / ROI both decreased due to reduced profits. The decrease is not as severe as the median of the industry.

2007 2008 2009

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%ROE ROI

Returns

16

Electrical parts

This is the only sub-segment with a constant OPM in 08.

The decline by ~3% in 09 is well below industry median.

The sub-segment has been successful in keeping a constant Ratio Total Operating Cost to Sales, even though Raw Material cost ratio went up for 08.

Sales increase in both years but 09 growth rate was higher.

OP & Net Profit also increased in 08. In 09 OP declined only slightly, but the Net Profit has

been dropping severely.

The companies built up their inventory. Even though sales increased ~10% each year, the inventory days grew in 08 by ~16%.

The sub-segment was successful in reducing receiv-able days.

15%

10%

5%

0%

-5%

-10%

-15%

-20%

-25%

-30%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

-5%

-10%

-15%

20082008

Turnover OP Net profit Inventory days

Payable days

Receivable das



2009

6%

5%

4%

3%

2%

1%

0%

-1%2008 2009



Value addition %



16%

14%

12%

10%

8%

6%

4%

2%

0%200920082007




ROE / ROI both decrease due to reduced profits. This sub-segment has the lowest decrease of all

sub-segments.

Electrical Parts is the only sub-segment with a growing FATO in 08.

'07-'08 '08-'09


FATO

4%

3%

2%

1%

0%

-1%

-2%

-3%

-4%

-5% 2007 2008 2009

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%ROE ROI

Asset utilisation Returns

18

Braking and suspension

Sub-segment had a lower Raw Mat Sales Ratio in 08. Ratios Raw Material to Sales and Total Operating

Cost to Sales increased marginally in 09. Change of Value Addition in 08 high.

Sales increased marginally in 08 and further in 09 , yet far below the industry median.

OP & Net Profit both declined significantly.

In 08 all analyzed ratios had increased. In 09 WC days declined, as well as receivable days.

The inventory days grew ~10% each year slightly above industry median.

10%

0%

-10%

-20%

-30%

-40%

-50%

15%

10%

5%

0%

-5%

-10%

-15%

20082008

Turnover OP Net profit Inventory days

Payable days

Receivable das



2009

6%

5%

4%

3%

2%

1%

0%

-1%

-2%

-3%2008 2009



Value addition %



18%

16%

14%

12%

10%

8%

6%

4%

2%

0%200920082007




ROE / ROI both decreased. This sub-segment below the median of the industry.

The FATO decreased due to the fact, that the Fixed Asset Value is increased by 16% (08) and 29% (09).

2008 2009


FATO

0%

-2%

-4%

-6%

-8%

-10%

-12%

2007 2008 2009

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%ROE ROI


20

The OPM had not significantly changed in 08, but declined by over 6% points in 09.

Ratios Raw Material to Sales did not change much (small decline in 08 and small increase in 09).

Total Operating Cost Ratio increased by over 5% in 09. Change of Value Addition highest in industry. Significance of Raw Material reduced.

6%

5%

4%

3%

2%

1%

0%

-1%

-2%2008 2009



Value addition % Operating profit margin

16%

14%

12%

10%

8%

6%

4%

2%

0%200920082007

Sales increased in 08, but only slightly in 09. OP & Net Profit both increased in 08, but declined

drastically in 09, the worst drop of Net Profit in the industry.

The net working capital days actually increased in 09 as against the reduction shown by the other sub-segments.

The sub-segment had the highest increase in receiv-able days in the industry.

The inventory days increase is also the highest in the industry.

20%

0%

-20%

-40%

-50%

-60%

-100%2008 2009

Turnover OP Net profit

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

-5%

-10%2008 2009

Inventory days Recievable days

Payable days Working Captial days

Other Equipment

Operating profit marginCost structure & value addition



ROE / ROI both decrease drastically in 09, even though in 08 there is only a slight decline.

The decline in 09 of this sub-segment is the worst in the industry.

Highest decline of FATO in the industry.

2008 2009


FATO

0%

-2%

-4%

-6%

-8%

-10%

-12%

-14%

2007 2008 2009

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%ROE ROI


22

Cross sub-segment comparison

Turnover


Electrical Parts and Braking & Suspension have been able to realize a higher sales increase in 09 than in 08. All other sub-segments had a much lower growth rate in 09 than in 08.

None of the sub-segments have been successful in reducing their costs per unit. On the industry median the ratio doubled between 08 and 09

Whereas in 08 two sub-segments had a positive OP growth, the whole industry was realizing negative growth in 09.

The raw material cost to sales declined in 08 only in two sub-segments (Braking & Suspension, Other Equipment). In 09 the ratio increased for all sub-segments. Engine Parts took a lead with over 8%.

Same as OP, only that the negative growth was much higher (up to 80%).

While in 08 the value addition was high in Braking & Suspension, in 09 Electrical parts has the highest increase.

Operating profit


Net profit

Value added

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

20%

0%

-20%

-40%

-60%

-80%

-100%

20%

10%

0%

-10%

-20%

-30%

-40%

-50%1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6

1) Transmission & Steering2) Engine Parts

3) Electrical Parts4) Braking & Suspension

5) Other Equipments6) Industry




2008 2009

2008 2009

6%

5%

4%

3%

2%

1%

0%

-1%

10%

8%

6%

4%

2%

0

-2%

-4%

6%

5%

4%

3%

2%

1%

0%

-1%

-2%

-3%

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6


Depreciation & amortization Interest







Operating profit margin Debt/equity ratio

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%1 2 3 4 5 6

1.40

1.20

1.00

0.80

0.60

0.40

0.20

0.00

1 2 3 4 5 6

2007 2008 2009

2008 2009

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6

The Operating Profit Margin got reduced by up to 5% points in 2009 in all sub-segments.

The sub-segment Engine Parts has the highest OPM growth in the industry. The least profitable sub-segment is Other Equipment, with almost 10% points less.

The Depreciation and Amortization increased signifi-cantly in 09. The growth rate on industry median went up from 8% in 08 to 23% in 09.

The industry seems to have had higher growth as interest paid increased stronger in 09 (~30%) than in 08 (~20%).

The comparisons are against actual D/E ratios rather than the growth rates as in the case of other figures.

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CoimbatoreShanmuga Mandaram, 41 Race CourseCoimbatore 641018, IndiaPhone: +91 (0422) 24392801

NCR7th Floor, Building 10 Tower B, DLF Cyber Ciity Complex, DLF City Phase II, Gurgaon 122002, IndiaPhone: +91 (0124) 679-2000

Goa5th floor, Suyash Complex, Panaji, Goa 403 001, IndiaPhone: +91 (0832) 2431821

Hyderabad1-8-384 & 385, 3rd Floor, Gora Grand, S.P. Road, Begumpet, Hyderabad 500 003, IndiaPhone : +91 (040) 40312600

Jamshedpur8-B ,Circuit House Area, North-EastRoad No.11, Jamshedpur 831 001, IndiaPhone : +91 (0657) 2225883

KochiFirst Floor, Wilmont Park, Business CentreWarriam Road, Kochi 682 016, IndiaPhone: +91 (0484) 2354305

Kolkata1st floor, BlockEP & GP, SectorV, Salt Lake Electronics Complex Kolkata 700 091, IndiaPhone : +91 (033) 6612 1000

Mumbai12, Dr. Annie Besant Road, Opp. Shiv Sagar Estate, Worli, Mumbai 400 018, IndiaPhone : +91 (022) 6667 9000

Pune706, B - Wing, 7th floor, ICC Trade TowerSenapati Bapat Marg, Pune 411 016, IndiaPhone : +91 (020) 6624 4600

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