AuthentiThings: The Pitfalls and Promises of Authentication in the IoT

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WEBINAR AUTHENTICATING “THINGS” THE PITFALLS AND PROMISES OF AUTHENTICATION IN THE CONSUMER IoT JUNE 2016 MICHAEL THELANDER

Transcript of AuthentiThings: The Pitfalls and Promises of Authentication in the IoT

WEBINAR

AUTHENTICATING “THINGS”THE PITFALLS AND PROMISES

OF AUTHENTICATION IN THE CONSUMER IoT

JUNE 2016

MICHAEL THELANDER

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AGENDA

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WHAT’S SO REVOLUTIONARY?

Industrial vs. Consumer IoT

Unexpected risks and rewards

AUTHENTICATION IN THE IoTAuthentication standards & guidelines

“Three from Three” Guidance

IF AUTHENTICATION FAILSNew and frightening hacks

What’s next?

4 YOU ARE YOUR DEVICE Your device as your proxy

WHAT’S SO REVOLUTIONARY…ABOUT THE INTERNET OF THINGS?

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A M E R C A N T I L E R E V O L U T I O N

Guns, cloth, iron and beer

Slaves, gold, spices

Slaves, raw sugar, and molasses

Whale oil, lumber, cotton,rum and tobacco

The crown orchestrated a

complex global dance

that leveraged the best

knowledge and the most

favorable terms

anywhere in the world.

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A M E R C A N T I L E R E V O L U T I O N

At the top of the pyramid, Great Britain used these imports to

manufacture and distribute complex

products that created vast wealth and

power.

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A M E R C A N T I L E R E V O L U T I O N

Closer to the raw materials needed for production

Respond immediately to change

Intimate understanding of all parts of a complex process

Organize and manage their own markets

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That’s a bit like what’s happening in the industrial IoT today.

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M IC H A E L T H E LA N D E RP R O D U C T M A R K E T I N G M A N A G E R , A U T H E N T I C A T I O N

n Manages go-to-market, launch and customer education activities for iovation’s authentication products.

n 20 years in VP- and director-level product management and marketing roles for technology and information security companies.

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What about the consumer IoT?

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T WO F A C E S O F T H E I o TK E Y D I F F E R E N C E S B E T W E E N I N D U S T R I A L A N D C O N S U M E R I o T

• Security and privacy standards and guidelines are an inherent part of the picture

• Device lifespan can be measured in decades

• Criticality of RTOS

• Continuity of data is a major consideration

INDUSTRIAL IoT

• Minimal attention to security standards and guidelines, consumers blasé about privacy

• Device lifespan can be measured in months

• Less-than-critical infrastructure in

most current cases

• Expected gaps in data flow

CONSUMER IoT

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“The smartphone will become the

foundational banking tool.”

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Security. Privacy.

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“ B I G D A T A ” B E C O M E S P E R SO N A L

INTERNET-CONNECTED DEVICES

4.9 B in 2015

20.8 B in 2020

450%

10,000 EB in 2015

400%

40,000 EB in 2020

STORAGE REQUIRED FOR THE DATA

(One exabyte can hold 500 to 1000 times the entire content of the Library of Congress.)

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“ B I G D A T A ” B E C O M E S P E R SO N A L

10,000 EB in 2015

40,000 EB in 2020

STORAGE REQUIRED FOR THE DATA

(One exabyte can hold 500 to 1000 times the entire content of the Library of Congress.)

= 20,800 GB400%

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AUTHENTICATION IN THE IoT

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Authentication.

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“Hello. It’s me”.

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“Hello. It’s me”.

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“Hello. It’s me”.

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“Hello. It’s me”.

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“Hello. It’s me”.

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“Hello. It’s me”.

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“These technical guidelines cover remote digital authentication of human users to IT systems

over a network… However do not specifically address machine-to-machine (such as router-to-router) authentication, or establish specific requirements for issuing

authentication credentials and authenticators to machines and servers when they are used in authentication protocols with people.”

However do not specifically address machine-to-machine (such as router-to-router) authentication, or establish specific requirements for issuing

authentication credentials and authenticators to machines and servers when they are used in authentication protocols with people.”

New v 63-3

Due Soon

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T H R E E F R O M T H R E EG U I D A N C E F R O M T H R E E P I E C E S O F R E C E N T R E S E A R C H

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“Others have pointed to the need to research

methods that provide context-based authentication

as a new factor in an authentication process. .”

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1. Identity Relationship Management (IRM) replaces IAMn Consumers and things over employeesn Internet-scale over Enterprise-scalen Borderless over perimeter

2. Use of smartphones as a primary means of authentication in the IoTn Context-based authentication over MFAn Enterprise-level local authentication to IoT devicesn Single sensor for multiple authentication methods:

T H R E E F R O M T H R E E : C SAC L O U D S E C U R I T Y A L L I A N C E – I R M A N D S M A R T P H O N E S

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3. Leverage the security controls built into standards-based IoT protocols

T H R E E F R O M T H R E E : C SAI o T S E C U R I T Y F O R C O N S U M E R D E V I C E S

Protocol M2M Auth Options

MQTT Username / password

CoAPpreShared KeyrawPublicKey

XMPP Multiple options

DDSx.509 Certificates (PKI)

Tokens

Protocol M2M Auth Options

Zigbee Pre-shared keys

Bluetooth Shared key

Bluetooth LE Connection signature

resolving key

HTTP/REST TLS or OAUTH 2

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3. Leverage the security controls built into standards-based IoT protocols

T H R E E F R O M T H R E E : C SAC L O U D S E C U R I T Y A L L I A N C E S U M M A R S Y G U I D A N C E O N I o T

• Low memory: works on micro-controllers was low as 10 KiB of RAM

• Default choice of DTLS parameters is equivalent to 3072-bit RSA keys

• CoAP integrates with XML, JSON, CBOR, or data format of choice

• REST model integrates with typical sites and applications

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“No single method for peer authentication and end-to-

end data protection meets the Internet of Things (IoT)

device security and operational requirements.”

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1. Mobile devices can be gateways, consumers, or IoT nodes

T H R E E F R O M T H R E E : G A R T N E RI T ’ S N O T J U S T A P H O N E

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2. Understand domains, classes of devices, and “delegation of trust”n Class 1: Simple sensors or actuators

n Class 2: Can perform storage or analysis, e.g. hubs, concentrator, gateways

n Class 3: Complex devices, servers than can act as aggregators, e.g. security analytics

T H R E E F R O M T H R E E : G A R T N E RN O T A L L D E V I C E S A R E C R E A T E D E Q U A L

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3. Building a trust model based on “hops”

n No hop: trust is achieved by device authenticating to local gateway

n Single hop: Device authenticates to gateway, and gateway to an IoT service or application

n Multihop: Trust achieved by devices authenticating to trust anchors (gateways), and then the trust anchors federate trust across all required domains and trust models

T H R E E F R O M T H R E E : G A R T N E RT R U S T M O D E L S M A T T E R

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“Authentication is the process of verification that an

individual, entity or website is who it claims to be.”

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1. The only guidance using three different perspectives: n Manufacturer IoT Guidance: The goal of this section is help

manufacturers build more secure products in the Internet of Things space.

n Developer IoT Guidance: The goal of this section is help developers build more secure applications in the Internet of Things space.

n Consumer IoT Guidance: The goal of this section is help consumers purchase secure products in the Internet of Things space.

T H R E E F R O M T H R E E : O WA SPI o T S E C U R I T Y G U I D A N C E I N T H R E E C A T E G O R I E S

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2. A comprehensive framework:

n 1 IoT Framework Security Considerations: Definitions

n 2 Edge: Framework Considerations for Edge Component

n 3 Gateway: Framework Considerations for Gateway Component

n 4 Cloud: Framework Considerations for Cloud Component

n 5 Mobile: Framework Considerations for Mobile Component

T H R E E F R O M T H R E E : O WA SPM U L T I - P A R T S E C U R I T Y A N D P R I V A C Y F R A M E W O R K

• Communications encryption

• Storage encryption

• Strong logging

• Auto updates / versioning

• Update verification

• Cryptographic ID capabilities

• No default passwords

• Offline security features

• Configurable root trust store

• Device and owner authentication

• Transitive ownership capabilities

• Defensive capabilities

• Plugin or ext. verify, report, update

• Secure M2M

• Secure Web interface

• Utilize established protocols

• Latest, updated 3rd-party components

• Use of hardware device

• Support MFA

• Temporal and spacialauthentication

• Tracks data from insecure sources

• Features disabled by default

• Written in programming languages that possess security countermeasures

• Device monitoring and management capabilities

2 Edge: Framework Considerations for Edge Component

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3. Provides a unique focus on authentication testing

T H R E E F R O M T H R E E : O WA SPF O C U S O N T E S T I N G

n Assess the solution for the use of strong passwords where authentication is needed

n Assess the solution for multi-user environments and ensure it includes functionality for role separation

n Assess the solution for Implementation two-factor authentication where possible

n Assess password recovery mechanisms

n Assess password recovery mechanisms

n Assess the solution for the option to require strong passwords

n Assess the solution for the option to force password expiration after a specific period

n Assess the solution for the option to change the default username and password

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91. Identity relationship

management – not IAM – is key

2. Smartphones will be the primary means of authentication in the IoT

3. Leverage built-in security controls

4. Mobile devices will fill multiple roles in the IoT scheme

5. Domains & classes drive delegation of trust models

6. Build your trust model based on “hops”

7. Multiple perspectives matter

8. Provides a comprehensive framework

9. Provides a unique authentication focus

SU M M A R I Z I N G T H E “ T H R E E F R O M T H R E E ”

AUTHENTICATION FAILINTRIGUING HACKS IN THE IoT

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YOU ARE YOUR DEVICEYOUR TRUSTWORTHY PROXY?

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“Hello. It’s me”.

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“Hello. It’s me”.

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BIOMETRICS

IP ADDRESS JAILBROKEN OR ROOTED

GEO LOCATION

ASSOCIATIONSSECURITY RISK

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n MD5 Hash of the full font list n Random sample of 15 fonts

n Flash SharedObjects not writable n Flash socket 843 based ip (real IP)

n Boolean indicator: flash took longer than expected to execute

n Accepted Char Sets in HTTP headern Accepted languages in HTTP header

n Browser user agent comment string n Browser name / OS / Ver / language

n Cookie writes excluded n Boolean indicator, javascript enabled n Count of fonts in the full list

n Flash 3-part version (16.0.0) n Flash 4-part version (16.0.0.305)

n List of browser plugins n JavaScript screen resolutionn Simbar toolbar GUID from HTTP hdr

n Timezone offset in minutes n ... and more

n WiFi (or Bluetooth) MAC Addressn Network configuration

n iOS Device Modeln Battery level / AC mode

n Device orientationn File system sizen Physical memory

n CPU Type / Count /Speedn Number attached accessories

n Has proximity sensor?n Screen brightness and resolutionn System uptime

n iOS Device Name (MD5 Hash) n OS Name and/or version

n Device advertising UUIDn Kernel versionn iCloud Ubiquity Token

n Application Vendor UUID /name/versn Locale language / currency code

n … and 100s more

n Model and Device Modeln Build.DEVICE & Build.HARDWARE

n Build.HOST & Build.IDn Manufacturer

n Build.PRODUCT & Build.TIMEn Network Operator ID & Name n Sim Operator ID & Country

n System Uptime in Secondsn Is the device plugged in

n CPU Typen Physical memoryn Unique build fingerprint of app

n Android SDK Leveln Android Build Number (DISPLAY)

n Android Device System Versionn Detected attempt at hiding root detect n Kernel Version (was AKV)

n Android Locale Country Code n Desktop Wallpaper Hash

n … and 100s more

DEVICE-BASED AUTHENTICATIONTHE USER’S DEVICE AS A ROBUST, INVISIBLE SECOND FACTOR

Web Device Print iOS SDK Android SDK

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Q&A

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