Australian Submarines – Reliable, Available and …...Australia’s potent and enduring submarine...

Australia’s potent and enduring submarine capability

Australian Submarines – Reliable, Available and Maintainable

Defence RAM Conference 10 May 18

CMDR Lindsay Gordon, Navy Strategic Command

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Presenter

Presentation Notes

RAM, LCC Cost. In RAND’s Learning Experience Lessons from the Submarine Programs of the United States, United Kingdom and Australia Volume 1 – the lesson to Clearly State Operational Requirements. And this was latter reinforced by Coles Review into submarine which identified Unclear requirements as another lesson. Operations Research (as drawn from Management Sciences world) and Systems Engineering (as drawn from Design Engineering world) and their application to complex acquisitions projects is certainly not new within Navies or Military or Commercial). To meet the challenge posed by RAND and Coles, Future Submarine Program has consistently applied their principles to decision making since the program inception in 2009. This is a key function carried out between Navy Strategic Command and Capability, Acquisition and Sustainment Group (and by their predecessor organisations (Capability Development Group and DMO) to achieve the program goals of Future Submarine. As you can appreciate this goes to the precise definition of Australia’s unique requirements at the heart of regional superiority that Australia is seeking. However, the concepts and thinking can be described.


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Narrative

• Coles Report: Beyond Benchmark • Australian Submarines – Operating Context • Concept of Dependability • Systems Engineering and Operations Research • How RAM should be understood within

Submarine Design


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Presenter

Presentation Notes

The Study traced the low level of sustainment performance back to five root causes: - operational requirements not defined in a way that can be effectively translated to sustainment activities; lack of performance-based ethos; unclear lines of responsibility; poor planning; and lack of a single set of information to inform decision making.


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Future Submarine Program Goals

• Regionally Superior Submarine Capability

• Sovereignty over Operation and Sustainment

• Cost and Schedule Control • Australian Industry Involvement

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Regionally Superior Submarine Capability. The Future Submarine will be regionally superior. It will have range and endurance similar to Collins class, superior stealth and sensor performance to Collins class, and a combat suite offering high levels of interoperability with the US and based on updated versions of the AN/BYG-1 combat system and Mk 48 Mod 7 heavyweight torpedo. Sovereignty over Operation and Sustainment. Australia will have enduring sovereign control over operation and sustainment (upkeep, update and upgrade) of a seaworthy Future Submarine. Cost and Schedule Control. The program is led strongly to control cost and schedule risk. Australian Industry Involvement. The Future Submarine Program aims to deliver Australia a regionally superior submarine capability, which will be built, operated and sustained with sovereignty. The program therefore seeks to ensure that Australian Industrial capability necessary to support the build, operation and sustainment of the Future Submarine is established. This will involve maximising the involvement of Australian industry in all phases of the Program without unduly compromising capability, cost, schedule or risk


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Presenter

Presentation Notes

Simple to understand – preparedness requirements. Enterprise sustainment performance has effectively supported the delivery of the Navy Requirement (CN10 Product Statement) to have: “two deployable submarines consistently available, with four submarines available to the Fleet Commander and of these four, three submarines consistently available for tasking with one in shorter term maintenance and two submarines in long term maintenance and upgrade” The steady improvement in two submarine availability to 90% is plotted in Figure 1. This is an essential precurser to meeting the Navy requirement.


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Coles - Availability Measurement

MRD


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Collins Class Submarine Capability

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Enterprise sustainment performance has effectively supported the delivery of the Navy Requirement (CN10 Product Statement) to have: “two deployable submarines consistently available, with four submarines available to the Fleet Commander and of these four, three submarines consistently available for tasking with one in shorter term maintenance and two submarines in long term maintenance and upgrade” The steady improvement in two submarine availability to 90% is plotted in Figure 1. This is an essential precurser to meeting the Navy requirement.


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Coles - Availability ‘S’ Curve


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Coles - Availability


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But wait…availability is not the operational effect

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Usage and UpKeep cycles – Time between Major Maintenance matters. Ie Length of the green, not just the amount of green


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Presenter

Presentation Notes

A small detail on the tyranny of distance slide (p.11) as you’ve included the pre ’91. Map of Europe. It sort of immediately jumps out to the folk of my sort, central – eastern European, that Baltic states are missing (NE of Poland) and that Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia are still on the map; that lot split up into 8 countries now. This can be used as an opportunity for a bit of humour or as a test for the audience.


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Presenter

Presentation Notes

Speed of Advance – ½ to 1/3 of a naval surface task group.


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Presenter

Presentation Notes

Long Deployment and Mission durations Independent\Largely Operations Up threat No resupply at sea No\Limited communications


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NOTE: THERE IS NO NRMA

Presenter

Presentation Notes

When it comes to dependability, it may be good to have some details ready for any Q and A or that may need to be reinforced during the presentation. Apologies for stating the obvious. · Conceptually, suitable success metric exclusively for assets and installations that can be maintained during an operation, notwithstanding the need to consider and specify the allowed corrective maintenance time within that operating interval. This is unlike the conventional management of reliability for assets that often have a clear separation between their operation and maintenance cycles and where reliability and maintainability are considered in their own separate domains. Scheme of Complement is the divided into – penalty on operator/maintaineers/ - a single senior maintainer comes. Conventional submarines the engineering department range from ¼ to 1/3 of SOC. Debate about minimum manning on surface ships that perplexed Maritime. Response from all Navies - Multi-train, and lateral transfer.


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But wait…availability is not the operational effect

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Which one would you · Unlike reliability that is an asymptotic value, dependability can be expressed as unity (D=1) for assets, systems etc. that can be repaired for every mission critical and accountable failure during operation. · Maintainability is expressed as probability and as such it should be viewed analogue to unreliability as opposed to reliability (being expressed in a similar manner –easiest to illustrate with exponential distribution of maintainability). The ideal is to have as narrow and small distribution of maintenance times in comparison to the considered allowed corrective maintenance time – highest probability of successful maintenance. · Probabilistic approach to maintenance may influence maintainability analysis as it does not require specification of the 90th percentile tc. This is yet to be considered in full detail for RAM analysis outside the dependability domain. · In addition of OE essential functions managed by dependability specification; allocation and assessment of RAM for safety and environmental protection essential functions is driven by the risk management framework. Acceptability of risk considerations are informing the assessments of likelihood occurrence, representing the likelihood of failure. (something that we may need to discuss in more detail quite soon) · I agree with all of the statements on p.24


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Metric - Dependability

𝐷𝐷 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚, 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 = 𝑅𝑅 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 +M(𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐) × 1 − 𝑅𝑅 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚

•Reliability R(tm): •Maintainability M(tc): •Unreliability F(tm) = (1 – R(tm)): •Mission duration tm: •Corrective maintenance time tc:

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Reliability R(tm): Probability that a system or product will perform in satisfactory manner for a given period of time when used under specified operating conditions, in a given environment. Maintainability M(tc): Probability that an item will be restored to a specified operational state or retained in that state within an allowable interval of time when maintenance is performed by appropriately trained personnel following the procedures delineated . Maintainability is characteristic of a system/product such that it can be maintained with least investment of time, least cost and minimum environmental impact including expenditure of the support resources. Unreliability F(tm) = (1 – R(tm)): Probability of failure for a given period of time, complement of reliability. F(t) is the failure distribution function. It is a key factor determining the frequency of maintenance and impact on the requirements for system support and the life cycle cost. Mission duration tm: is the duration over which the mission reliability of the item is calculated using the appropriate life units (e.g. time, days, starts, km, cycles). For realistic assessment of dependability of a system, it is significant to clearly define the mission duration of the system within the overall mission profile taking into account realistic usage scenario applicable to the system under analysis. Corrective maintenance time tc: represents the Acceptable Fault Recovery Period. Within the FSP, tc represents the maximum acceptable time to return provide (as a minimum), the Allowable Degraded Performance of all Essential Functionality within the constraints of Operating Organic Level Corrective Maintenance capabilities. · Unlike reliability that is an asymptotic value, dependability can be expressed as unity (D=1) for assets, systems etc. that can be repaired for every mission critical and accountable failure during operation. · Maintainability is expressed as probability and as such it should be viewed analogue to unreliability as opposed to reliability (being expressed in a similar manner –easiest to illustrate with exponential distribution of maintainability). The ideal is to have as narrow and small distribution of maintenance times in comparison to the considered allowed corrective maintenance time – highest probability of successful maintenance. · Probabilistic approach to maintenance may influence maintainability analysis as it does not require specification of the 90th percentile tc. This is yet to be considered in full detail for RAM analysis outside the dependability domain. · In addition of OE essential functions managed by dependability specification; allocation and assessment of RAM for safety and environmental protection essential functions is driven by the risk management framework. Acceptability of risk considerations are informing the assessments of likelihood occurrence, representing the likelihood of failure. (something that we may need to discuss in more detail quite soon) ·


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Systems Engineering and Operations Research

• The Future Submarine Program requires Navy to progressively make capability trade decisions to realise an affordable and feasible design

• Defence Seaworthiness explicitly requires Navy to maximise of the operational effectiveness whilst minimising risk to personnel, public and environment

• To assist decision makers to achieve these goals, operations research allows quantification of operational effectiveness through use of modelling and simulation techniques

Presenter

Presentation Notes

The Future Submarine Program requires Navy to progressively make capability trade decisions to realise an affordable and feasible design. Defence Seaworthiness explicitly requires Navy to maximise of the operational effectiveness whilst minimising risk to personnel, public and environment The demand is Capability Trade Decisions balancing affordable, feasible, seaworthiness. Contemplating how to achieve any multi-criteria multi-dimension decision. Put a bunch of people around a table and he/she with loudest voice or strongest belief wins An alternative is a disciplined adjudication for balancing with analytical basis that is repeatable, justifiable and able to scrutinise


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Seaworthiness implies an Optimisation

• Seaworthiness aim is to ensure that the operation of a maritime mission system, in accordance with its Capability Manager’s operating and support intent and enabled by its support system: – maximises the likelihood of achieving the specified operational effect for the

defined tasking, – where efforts have been made to eliminate or minimise so far as is reasonably

practicable (SFARP), hazards/risks to personnel, the public and the environment.

• Operational effectiveness is the ability of a unit to perform its intended function over its intended operating spectrum, in the expected operating environment, and in the face of expected threats when operated by competent and authorised personnel. Aspects of operational effectiveness include longevity, performance and availability.

Source: Defence Seaworthiness Management System Manual (2017)

Presenter

Presentation Notes

CMDR Gordon The common misconception is that Seaworthiness is about safety only – that isn’t the case. While the use of operations research within Future Submarine Program pre-dates the formal introduction of seaworthiness, I first highlight to the aim to as containing two concepts: Maximises – connotation for the quantification (if you can’t measure you can’t maximise) Specified operational effect for the defined tasking – connotation for the definition Intended function, expected threats Note: There are always many dimensions to a decision


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Requirements and Design: Understanding a Quantitative Value

Source: Office of Aerospace Studies (USA) - Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Handbook - A Practical Guide to the Analysis of Alternatives (2013)

Presenter

Presentation Notes

In considering the representation (many ways of expressing this concept – I’ve found this one quite intuitive). Terms such as “Point of Diminishing returns”, “Chasing the last 5%”, “Pareto Front”. Describe the tension that will naturally exist between any Customer and Designer. The tension to be managed is between the relationship between Operational Value (Operational Effect), Performance Parameters (Requirements/Design) and the cost (Indirect, Direct, Analogue as Displacement, Acquisition, Sustainment). The trade-space of interest is the point between escalation in relative cost and decrease in relative operational value – of two the classic “knee in the curve” but not coincident. Use of operations research is to expressing both secondary y axis in quantitatively values.


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Translation - Systems Engineering View • To create the translation,

operational models of scenarios and vignettes to test assumptions, set requirements and evaluate designs quantitatively against an agreed threat, scenario and vignette situation

• Modelling and Simulation (M&S) techniques from Operations Research academic discipline include:

– Agent-based – Discrete Event – System Dynamics

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Systems Engineering - Measures of Effectiveness translate to Measures Performance. Example here is for Anti-Submarine Warfare engagement between submarines. Draw attention to “Test” – hold that thought. Agent-based – Simulation of actors governed by behavioural rules – Two computers playing chess. Computer controlled bots in a First Person Shooter Discrete Event Simulation – Simulation of States governed by logic rules – Maritime Usage and Upkeep Cycle (Docking –> L&C -> System Dynamics – Simulation of interrelated stock and flow relationships between one qty affects one qty affects, 1st, 2nd and 3rd order – Economic/Workforce There are other techniques – Experimentation, Wargaming, use of management science (pairwise and other analytical hierarchy), deterministic, probabilistic, monte carlo


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Operating Area

Features of Operational Models

Measure of Effectiveness

Design Requirements

Measures of Performance at Whole

Boat Level

Platform characteristics of the Balanced Design

at Whole Boat Level

Operational Model

Threat Capabilities Threat Behaviour Operating Area Blue Force Behaviour

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Starting with the Top Line: Definition from your understanding of Operating Concept Evidence based from the sources of information and consistent with strategic direction provided and insight at disposal Assumptions – clearly stated. Threat is temporal – current threat does not equal future threat. Start at any point with the MOE, MOE to Characteristics Can use Requirements = Design in early Requirements Setting phase of CLC Interaction with the Designer in the conversion from Requirements to Design until you have balanced both technically feasible and affordable and produced to a schedule. Any balanced design (which to an operational model is a collection of characteristics (speed, range, endurance, sonar, signature, etc) can be tested in this manner. Results from an Operational Test and Evaluation regime would Future Submarine Design Batch 1 or Batch 2. Results from an in-service submarine. Key points: Draw attention to “Test” – a useful way to think of Virtual “Operational Test and Evaluation”. Simulation at sufficient resolution to provide discrimination between parts of operation model to level that informs the decision.


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Levels of M&S within an Operational Model

Campaign Multi-Mission

Dynamic Mission Engagement

Platform and System Level Performance

Physical and Environmental

Who, what, where, when and why in increasing levels of resolution

Operational interaction over a long period of time

Analytical capture of the tactical interaction

How systems are to be modeled

Choice of appropriate models and databases

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Classical view - Introducing the level of M&S. Campaign – a submarine or multiple submarines over a months Tactical – engagement between submarine and another submarine, submarine and a ASW helicopter Platform and System Performance – Power and energy behavior of submarine or a physics based sonar model acoustic signature with another acoustic sensor. Physical and Environmental – Temperature vs profile vs time of year data set Verification and Validation at each level of abstraction within the model construction. You can’t do any one without the other levels supporting – this is indeed the biggest obstacle to Operations Research. Not modelling itself, not scenario development. Validation = Conceptual validation, Peer Model Validation or Real World Data Data is everything. Understanding and conveying the limitations to give appropriate caveats on the insight gained. Seaworthiness introduced longevity, availability - introduce a concept of M&S at the Enterprise level – Include both submarine then all the support system


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Levels of M&S within an Operational Model

Campaign Multi-Mission

Dynamic Mission Engagement

Platform and System Level Performance

Physical and Environmental

Who, what, where, when and why in increasing levels of resolution

Operational interaction over a long period of time

Analytical capture of the tactical interaction

How systems are to be modeled

Choice of appropriate models and databases

Concept of Dependability

Sustained submarine Fleet Presence

RAM

Systems Engineering

Operations Research

Defined Individual Submarine Mission Profiles

Mission and Support System

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Classical view - Introducing the level of M&S. Campaign – a submarine or multiple submarines over a months Tactical – engagement between submarine and another submarine, submarine and a ASW helicopter Platform and System Performance – Power and energy behavior of submarine or a physics based sonar model acoustic signature with another acoustic sensor. Physical and Environmental – Temperature vs profile vs time of year data set Verification and Validation at each level of abstraction within the model construction. You can’t do any one without the other levels supporting – this is indeed the biggest obstacle to Operations Research. Not modelling itself, not scenario development. Validation = Conceptual validation, Peer Model Validation or Real World Data Data is everything. Understanding and conveying the limitations to give appropriate caveats on the insight gained. Seaworthiness introduced longevity, availability - introduce a concept of M&S at the Enterprise level – Include both submarine then all the support system


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Presenter

Presentation Notes

RAM in CAN – Is used. Allocation of dependability - Dependability, as the functional performance requirement applicable to systems / subsystems that are essential to operational effectiveness, will need to be decomposed to the functional level having a single equivalent system/subsystem essential to operational effectiveness linked to it. Decomposition of the requirement to the functional level having a single equivalent system/subsystem essential to operational effectiveness provides assurance of the accuracy of the synthesised predictions and allows for efficient consideration of dependability related trade-off scenarios. Decomposition of the requirement to such functional level will also enable efficient in-service tracking of system/subsystem performance in relation to the dependability requirement that will allow for prompt analysis of performance and generation of corrective actions (if required). Allocation of dependability within the Tripartite Arrangmeent – GFM, LMA and Naval Group


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Decisions like…

RANGE

ENDURANCE

DEEP DIVING DEPTH

SENSORS

SIGNATURE

DEPENDABILITY


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Mission System Analyais Framework

Define Capability Baseline

Develop Design Options for Trades Update Baseline

Program Envelopes

Capability

Cost

Schedule Decide on Preferred

Option

Capability Cost Schedule

Analyse Options Operational

Analysis Cost/Schedule

Analysis

Presenter

Presentation Notes

What role does this have in a Program View. Elevating this circle into the Analyse options.


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Wider Mission and Support System Analysis Framework

Define an Enterprise Transition Plan “Hypothesis”

Identify Decisions and Options within Enterprise

Transition Plan

Update Transition Plan “Hypothesis” Monitor within Enterprise

Envelopes Capability

Cost

Schedule Refine Options explaining:

Analyse Decisions and Options for direct and indirect impact on

individual FIC areas through Working Groups

Infrastructure

Capability

Workforce

Facilities & Infrastructure

Command and Management

Collective Training

Supplies Industry Support

Personnel

Organisation

PROPOSE

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Hypothesis on the Enterprise must be tested and reviewed by Quality Analysis – there is not one right answer, we have to arrive at the optimal compromise between many competing factors. Monitor against the Capability Assurance Components – Deployability, Adaptability, Resilience and Support


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Knowledge, Decisions and Design Maturity

Source: Mats Nordin - A Novel Submarine Design Method based on technical, economical and operational factors of influence (2014)

Presenter

Presentation Notes

As 2nd Why? Use of an decision support (and operations) is component to de risking strategy in Submarine Design. Principle is not new: many rules of thumb “80% displacement at end of concept“. I found this most intuitive - graph from a case study from Swedish Submarine A17 delivered between 1987-1990. The decisions that are made in Conceptual Design phase set the capability and cost that is realised as later as the process matures. The Ability to Ease of Change without significant impact reduces. Your knowledge of the design and capability/cost implications improves with inverse to your ability to change the design. Use of an decision support (and operations) is crucial to de risking strategy in left shifting the knowledge curve sign using evidence not belief.


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Questions

Australian Submarines – Reliable, Available and …...Australia’s potent and enduring submarine...

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