Australian Structured Finance Mostly Resilient In Face Of ...

Australian Structured Finance Mostly Resilient InFace Of Protracted RecoveryOctober 13, 2020

Key Takeaways

- Australia's path to economic recovery will be protracted and risks remain.

- We expect most structured finance asset classes and ratings to be resilient, given stronglevels of credit support, but risks are on the downside.

- Structural shifts that may accelerate post-COVID and alter debt serviceability trendsinclude the use of technology in credit decision making, the increasingcontractualization of work, and household indebtedness in an era of very low interestrates.

The economic pain inflicted by COVID has been significant. While Australia has so far fared betterthan we initially expected, the path to recovery will be protracted and risks remain. In particular,the real test for the household sector will come when fiscal stimulus measures are wound backand mortgage relief periods expire.

We expect most structured finance asset classes and ratings to be relatively resilient to thesechallenges given the strong levels of credit support available to many tranches of notes. Ratingsrisk remains elevated, though, for lower-rated tranches of asset sectors more exposed to thepandemic, including nonconforming transactions and small-ticket commercial mortgage-backedsecurities (CMBS) transactions. Prepayment rates in the main are holding up, which means creditsupport will continue to build across transactions. This will be important in building buffers toabsorb higher levels of arrears and potentially defaults in the coming months.

Early Success Softened The Blow

Australia's early success in containing the spread of the virus and large stimulus measures tosupport household income have helped soften the economic contraction thus far. Tax cuts andbusiness incentives announced in the Federal Budget will further support the household andsmall business sectors in the months ahead.

Recovery is in play in most parts of the country, except Victoria where recovery has been prolongedby the lengthy second lockdown, as evidenced by improvements in mobility data (see chart 1 and

Australian Structured Finance Mostly Resilient InFace Of Protracted RecoveryOctober 13, 2020

PRIMARY CREDIT ANALYST

Erin Kitson

Melbourne

(61) 3-9631-2166

[email protected]

SECONDARY CONTACT

Kate J Thomson

Melbourne

(61) 3-9631-2104

[email protected]

www.spglobal.com/ratingsdirect October 13, 2020 1

mailto: [email protected]




chart 2). Australia's enormous fiscal stimulus measures, including the JobKeeper scheme, andability to make superannuation withdrawals, have played a key role in insulating householdincome from the effects of social distancing measures deployed to manage the spread of thevirus. The significant increase in household savings has also enhanced repayment buffers formany households, which will help to support income when fiscal stimulus measures are woundback.

Chart 1


Australian Structured Finance Mostly Resilient In Face Of Protracted Recovery

Chart 2

Risks to the outlook are more balanced but still on the downside. As relief measures taper, thetrue economic costs of COVID-19 will emerge. The key domestic risk is greater commercial sectordamage that weighs on hiring and job creation. We forecast the unemployment rate to average7.1% over 2020 and not return to pre-COVID levels until 2023 (see "Asia-Pacific's Recovery: TheHard Work Begins," published on Sept. 24, 2020). Elevated unemployment levels will weigh ondebt serviceability for some borrowers for some time. This will vary by employment sector,geography, and borrower indebtedness.

COVID Support Levels Are Declining As The Economy Reopens,Gradually

The level of loans under COVID support arrangements is declining in some segments of theresidential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) sector after peaking in May (see table 1). Thisreflects the gradual reopening of the economy in most parts of the country and the resumption ofbusiness activity.



Table 1

COVID-19 Mortgage Relief Levels Across RMBS Sector

COVID-19 hardship summary*

Avgerage level of COVID-19 arrangements

Prime RMBS April May June July Aug.

Majors 7.4% 8.4% 8.0% 7.1% 7.1%

Nonbank originators 6.5% 5.6% 6.0% 6.2% 5.0%

Regional banks 8.3% 9.3% 10.9% 10.4% 9.6%

Other banks 6.7% 6.8% 7.2% 6.0% 5.9%

NBFIs 3.8% 4.2% 4.2% 3.8% 3.8%

Nonconforming RMBS 18.3% 20.6% 18.0% 9.6% 9.6%

Note: Data is based on information available to S&P Global Ratings. *As a % of total loan balances for each securitised trust.RMBS--Residential mortgage backed securities. NBFIs--Non-Bank Financial Institutions. Source: S&P Global Ratings.

The nonconforming sector has experienced the most pronounced decline in COVID supportlevels.Original mortgage deferral periods for this sector were around three to four months with theoption to extend at the end of the original three month period, subject to a more in depthassessment. Borrowers that have exited mortgage relief periods in this sector have generallyresumed their mortgage repayments.

Variations in the level of COVID support arrangements across originators have not been solelyinfluenced by credit metrics. Operational differences in the way COVID support was initiallygranted at the onset of the crisis have also played a part. Small banks (e.g., credit unions) andsome nonbank lenders in the prime RMBS sector generally have adopted a case-by-caseapproach to granting COVID-19 hardship, while several larger bank lenders used a moreautomated deferral approach for the initial assessment.

Lenders who have been contacting borrowers regularly are more likely to see a higher proportionof borrowers making full or partial payments, or exiting mortgage relief arrangements. Lenderswith a higher proportion of borrowers that are not contactable face greater operational challengesin managing loan repayments due as stimulus measures are wound back. Breaking the connectionbetween borrowers and lenders through the rhythm of regular mortgage repayments, poses moreof a risk for less seasoned borrowers who have not built up a repayment track record.

COVID Has Not Discriminated Materially By Traditional Credit Metrics

In the main, COVID has not discriminated by traditional credit metrics. This reflects the nature ofthe crisis; COVID is a health crisis that has led to large increases in unemployment and declines ineconomic growth as a result of government mandated measures to contain the spread of the virus.

COVID loan-to-value profiles

The loan-to-value (LTV) profiles of loans under COVID arrangements shows that there is a largerproportion of loans under COVID support arrangements in higher LTV categories compared withthe broader RMBS universe (chart 3 and chart 4). This is expected given highly leveragedborrowers are more likely to face greater debt serviceability pressures in the face of reducedincome.



Chart 3



Chart 4

COVID employment type profiles

COVID does discriminate by employment type of full-, part-time, or casual work arrangements.Borrowers who work in employment sectors directly impacted by COVID including airlines,tourism, leisure, and hospitality and more likely to be under mortgage relief arrangements.Self-employed borrowers are also more highly represented in COVID hardship profiles, reflectingthe many small business restricted from usual trade by government lockdowns to slow the spreadof the virus.

COVID SMSF profiles

Less than 1% of self-managed super fund (SMSF) loans are under COVID supportarrangementsacross the Australian RMBS sector. Arrears levels for these loans also remain low.Some anecdotal observations on why mortgage relief levels are lower for this borrower typeinclude the presence of meaningful super buffers pre-COVID, the presence of rental income inaddition to regular superannuation contributions to assist with debt serviceability, and lower LTVexposures because lenders typically take into account super guarantee and rental income only indebt serviceability assessments, as opposed to gross/net income less estimated living expenses.



COVID geographic profiles

At a state level, the level of loans under COVID support arrangements does not appear to bedisproportionate to the typical geographic distribution profile of the Australian RMBS sector (seechart 5). This is based on August data. We expect borrowers under mortgage relief arrangementsin Victoria may take longer to exit these arrangements given the less certain path to recovery forseveral employment sectors.

Chart 5



At a more granular level, some geographic disparities are evident. More tourism-dependent areasand parts of Melbourne, particularly the "mortgage belt," have a disproportionate share of loansunder COVID arrangements compared with the broader RMBS loan universe (table 2).

Table 2

Geographic Areas With Elevated Exposure To COVID-19 Hardship

Geograhpic area StateExpsoure -- Total

RMBS (%)Exposure -- COVID-19

loans (%)Proportional increase

(%)

Cairns QLD 0.9% 1.3% 50.5%

Richmond - Tweed (inc.Byron Bay)

NSW 1.0% 1.4% 48.9%

Mornington Peninsula VIC 1.3% 1.8% 40.5%

Wide Bay QLD 0.6% 0.8% 40.3%

Gold Coast QLD 3.1% 4.4% 39.9%

Darwin NT 0.7% 0.9% 36.4%

Melbourne - North West VIC 1.3% 1.7% 34.4%

Note: Regional areas are based on the Australian Bureau of Statistics Geographic Classification system. SA4 areas outlined above are based onpopulation centres of around 100,000 people. Data are as of August 2020. RMBS--Residential mortgage backed securities. Source: S&P GlobalRatings.

Areas less impacted by COVID with lower proportions of borrowers under COVID hardshiparrangements, relative to the broader RMBS universe, include the ACT and severalnonmetropolitan (regional) areas that are not highly dependent on tourism for local employment.

The degree to which COVID hardship levels translate to rising arrears will vary across states andterritories in the coming months. The flow on impacts to debt serviceability across the regions willultimately depend on recovery timelines and progress on the return to "business as usual."

Geographic diversity across most RMBS trusts will help to mitigate against more localizedemployment downturns stemming from COVID.

Investor loan profiles

The share of investor loans under COVID hardship arrangements is not disproportionate to theexposure to investor loans across the broader RMBS universe.

Most investor loans have an interest-only period. This means they pay down more slowly thanowner-occupier loans, which are mostly amortizing. This results in the LTV profile of investor loansbeing more elevated for longer periods than owner-occupied loans (see chart 6). Higher LTV loansare more exposed to property market declines given the lower level of equity built up in the loan.



Chart 6

COVID has presented some unique challenges for investors including the ability for tenants torenegotiate rent reductions with landlords. Declines in rental incomes and higher rental vacancieshave been more pronounced in inner city areas due to falling international arrivals impactingshort-term AirBNB rentals, and higher job losses in cafes and restaurants where employeestypically rent. This could translate into debt serviceability pressures for some investors dependingon the location of their property and their level of debt relative to their income.

Across the Australian RMBS sector, exposure to investor loans is around 30%. Exposure to centralbusiness district postcodes where rental yields are likely to have experienced more pronounceddeclines is not significant at less than 2% in most transactions.

COVID by transaction vintage

Across most vintages, the average level of COVID support arrangements is roughly similar to theaverage for that sector (see chart 7 and chart 8). The exception to this is the 2010 prime vintage,which is comprised of a small number of transactions, one of which has a high level of COVIDsupport arrangements as a percentage of total loan exposures. COVID support levels across thenonconforming vintages are more variable but this reflects the small number of transactions inthis sector. COVID support levels across the nonconforming sector are more elevated across the2018 and 2019 vintages. This partly reflects the higher proportion of higher LTV loans in thesevintages given the generally lower seasoning of the nonconforming sector. The 2020 vintage hasthe lowest exposure to loans under COVID support arrangements across the prime andnonconforming sector.



Chart 7



Chart 8

Arrears, Prepayments, And Losses: Where To From Here?

Traditional collateral performance indicators including arrears have been "masked" duringmortgage relief periods as a result of nuances in arrears reporting. We do not expect the impact ofCOVID on arrears to meaningfully surface until at least the fourth quarter of 2020 and losses arenot expected to materialize until the second half of 2021 (see chart 9 and chart 10).



Chart 9



Chart 10

Variability in arrears levels across lenders has been further complicated by the differentapproaches lenders have taken in their reporting of loans that were in arrears prior to beinggranted COVID support. In the main, lenders have adopted one of three approaches:

- Freeze arrears day count for loans that were in arrears prior to being granted COVID support.

- Switch the arrears day count to zero for loans that were in arrears prior to being granted COVIDsupport.

- Continue to age the arrears day count for loans that were in arrears prior to being grantedCOVID support.

The most common reporting approach adopted for loans that were in arrears before being grantedCOVID support is to freeze the arrears day count from the time mortgage relief was granted.



Reporting Treatment Of Loans Affected By COVID

The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) has recently published its finalprudential standard and final reporting standard that outline the reporting treatment ofloans impacted by COVID.

Under the standard, for all COVID-19 loans that have been granted an eligible repaymentdeferral, an authorized deposit-taking institution (ADI) must resume the counting of arrearsfor prudential purposes at the end of the deferral period from no less than the number ofdays past-due at the time the initial deferral was granted. Where an eligible repaymentdeferral has been implemented, and an ADI extends the maturity of the loan or variesrepayments over the residual loan term in a manner that fully adjusts for the deferralperiod and any pre-existing arrears, an ADI may reset the counting of arrears to zero.

The onus rests on the lenders' expectation that the borrower will perform in accordancewith the modified terms.

This means that arrears reporting nuances could continue after mortgage relief periodsend, making arrears comparisons across originators difficult.

While increases in arrears will be largely influenced by increases in the unemployment rate,differences in arrears reporting stemming from the variations in relief measures offered and theirreporting nuances will continue to make arrears comparisons difficult across originators for sometime yet.

Based on anecdotal feedback following lenders' three-month check-ins with borrowers, around10%-15% of borrowers on COVID support arrangements (based on peak hardship levels) wereexpected to move to formal long-term hardship arrangements. Given the high level of uncertainty,these figures are subject to change and depend on the proportion of borrowers contacted at thetime and the path of economic recovery. Prepayment rates have stabilized around their historicalaverages and we do not expect material deviations from these levels in the next 12 months.

Despite the significant economic disruption, household income has been well supported byenormous fiscal stimulus measures (i.e., JobKeeper), access to superannuation withdrawals, andother support schemes. Arrears increases will be tempered by historically low interest rates andthe repayment buffers available to many borrowers, particularly in the prime RMBS sector, whichwill help offset any deterioration in household income. Refinancing conditions also remain largelyfavorable to borrowers with sound collateral quality.

Losses stemming from borrower defaults due to COVID are likely to be tempered by the relativelymodest LTV profile of most transactions. We forecast national home prices to fall around 10%from the peak in about April-May 2020. We expect the fall to vary significantly across differentgeographies. Most loans have a reasonable level of equity build up to withstand these declines,and this will help to minimize losses in the event of borrower default.

Across the RMBS sector, lower rated tranches of some nonconforming transactions are the mostexposed to downward ratings migration in the next 12 months. In addition to the weaker collateralquality of these transactions relative to the prime sector more broadly, the lower seasoning of thenonconforming sector means that credit support build up is not as high compared with moreseasoned transactions. Ratings in the 'B' and 'BB' category comprise around 18% of totalnonconforming Australian RMBS ratings and 3% of total RMBS ratings.



COVID Profiles: Non-RMBS Asset Classes

Outside the RMBS sector, the impact of COVID on other asset classes has been relatively mild.Loan deferral levels across Australian auto asset-backed securities (ABS) transactions that werate range between 3% and 12%, based on August performance data. These loans are generallynot being included in traditional arrears reporting.

Employment disruptions due to lockdowns, especially in Victoria, could continue to put stress onsome borrowers' ability to pay their loan obligations. However, the buildup of credit support formost classes of notes due to the relatively low cumulative losses experienced to date wouldprovide a buffer for transactions should there be upward pressure on arrears or an increase inlosses over the coming months. As such, we do not expect there to be many downward ratingactions across the auto ABS sector as a result of COVID at this point in time.

The small universe of small ticket CMBS transactions that have a mixture of residential andcommercial property exposures, have a higher credit risk profile given their larger exposure toself-employed borrowers. COVID support levels for these transactions range between 14%-21%,based on August data. These transactions are likely to experience higher arrears and losses in themonths ahead and some lower rated tranches could be more vulnerable to ratings transition risk.New rules enabling small businesses to trade while insolvent may impact on foreclosure periodsfor SME transactions. Under the proposed rules, lenders of SME borrowers could potentially bedragged into prolonged restructuring process that the borrower may face, extending foreclosureperiods.

Given the higher default risk associated with self-employed borrowers, credit enhancement levelsfor these transactions can be up to six to nine times higher than prime RMBS transactions (at the'AAA' rating level, after lenders' mortgage insurance) at transaction close, depending on thetransaction, reflecting the increased credit risk of this asset type.

New Issuance; Mostly A Nonbank Affair

New issuance has been dampened by COVID with new issuance rated by S&P Global Ratings in2020 around 50% of 2019 levels as of September 2020. Since the onset of the crisis, spreads havenarrowed and new issuance has gradually picked up, due in part to support provided by theAustralian Office of Financial Management's (AOFM) A$15 billion Structured Finance SupportFund (SSFS). The purpose of the program is to provide support primarily to the non-ADI market tocomplement the Reserve Bank of Australia's Term Funding Facility (TFF).

Most RMBS new issuance this year has been issued by nonbank originators. New issuance isexpected to be dominated by nonbank originators in the next 12 months as banks are expected tocontinue to utilize the TFF and deposit inflows to fulfil their funding requirements. The ongoingsearch for yield is also likely to facilitate demand for more bespoke transactions includingnonresident and SMSF transactions as investors become more familiar and comfortable withalternate asset classes.

Structural Shifts In A Post-COVID World

COVID has accelerated a number of trends that were already in progress pre-COVID. There areseveral trends that we think will influence Australian structured finance sectors in the yearsahead.



Technology, competition, and disruption

Digital disruption was already reshaping the financial services landscape pre-COVID. TheCOVID-19 pandemic--and associated containment measures--will increase consumer adoption offinancial technologies, accelerating Australia's transition to a technology-driven financial systemwith a reduced physical footprint. We believe open banking will increase competition by giving allaccredited parties access to what is currently incumbent banks' proprietary data. (see "TechDisruption In Retail Banking: Australia's Big Banks Hold Their Ground As Tech Takes CenterStage," published June 2, 2020). In addition to driving increased competition, this will alsofacilitate deeper insights into consumer and debt serviceability behavior that will help inform loanservicing practices enabling them to become more "proactive" instead of "reactive."

We expect to see more new issuance from fintech market entrants in the years ahead assecuritization becomes a more regular part of their funding profile.

Household indebtedness in a low interest rate era

Australia's household indebtedness is high by international standards. While historically lowinterest rates have reduced mortgage costs, they have also facilitated increased leverage by manyhouseholds. From a household balance sheet perspective, this has been offset by rising assetprices leading to increases in household wealth and increased equity in underlying properties.Property price growth could reignite, again, once net overseas migration resumes given propertysupply shortages, proposed relaxation in responsible lending rules and the historically lowinterest rates that will prevail in a post-COVID world. This could lead to further pressure onhousehold indebtedness in the years ahead.

Responsible lending in a post-COVID world

Lending standards across the Australian RMBS sector have generally tightened since late 2014 inresponse to greater regulatory focus on household debt serviceability. Proposed changes toresponsible lending laws to stimulate subdued lending growth in the wake of COVID, will placegreater onus on information provided by borrowers. Given the high share of broker originatedmortgages in Australia, information verification processes need to be robust to ensure informationprovided by third parties cannot be falsified.

Technology will facilitate greater visibility over borrowers' spending and expense patterns in anera of Open Banking in our opinion. This will reduce reliance on labor intensive expense verificationprocesses and help to improve debt serviceability assessments by providing deeper insights intoborrowers' spending behavior, in real time.

Tree and sea changers; job mobility

COVID has accelerated the increasing shift to working remotely. Across most Australian RMBSportfolios, around 70% of loans are located in metropolitan (state capital city) areas. Traditionally,population centers have been largely based on "proximity to physical work spaces." The ability towork remotely on a longer-term basis may see some shift in population distribution in the futureas more affordable housing and less commuting make the tree change or sea change phenomenaan attractive proposition for many households. Regional centers within commuting distance ofcentral business districts, for example, could become popular destinations for home owners,



given the greater ease of remote working and lifestyle benefits, particularly coastal areas withgood public transport links.

The increasing contractualization of work

Australia's share of part-time employment as a percentage of total employment has grown fromaround 20% in the 1980s to around 30% today. This is one of the highest shares acrossAsia-Pacific countries. A longer-term structural shift toward the contractualization of work andincreasing growth in part-time jobs that lack the security and benefits of full-time roles, couldalter the debt-servicing patterns of some borrowers. COVID is likely to continue to acceleratethese trends as firms seek to utilize a lower cost and more flexible workforce. While AustralianRMBS transactions' exposure to casual and part-time employees is low, at less than 3%, theselonger-term structural shifts may see these percentages rise over time.

Chart 11

S&P Global Ratings acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about the evolution of thecoronavirus pandemic. The current consensus among health experts is that COVID-19 will remaina threat until a vaccine or effective treatment becomes widely available, which could be aroundmid-2021. We are using this assumption in assessing the economic and credit implicationsassociated with the pandemic (see our research here: www.spglobal.com/ratings). As thesituation evolves, we will update our assumptions and estimates accordingly.

Related Research

- Credit Conditions Asia Pacific: Asia-Pacific's Recovery: The Hard Work Begins," published onSept. 24, 2020Credit FAQ: How Will COVID 19 Affect Australian Structured Finance RMBSRatings? June 16, 2020



- Tech Disruption In Retail Banking: Australia's Big Banks Hold Their Ground As Tech TakesCentre Stage, June 2, 2020

- Credit FAQ: How Will COVID 19 Affect Australian and New Zealand ABS Transactions? May 11,2020

- Jobs and the climb back from COVID19, May 6, 2020

- Credit FAQ: How Will COVID 19 Affect Australian Structured Finance? March 25, 2020

This report does not constitute a rating action.

S&P Global Ratings Australia Pty Ltd holds Australian financial services license number 337565 under the CorporationsAct 2001. S&P Global Ratings' credit ratings and related research are not intended for and must not be distributed to anyperson in Australia other than a wholesale client (as defined in Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act).





STANDARD & POOR’S, S&P and RATINGSDIRECT are registered trademarks of Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC.

S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors.S&P reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites,www.standardandpoors.com (free of charge), and www.ratingsdirect.com (subscription), and may be distributed through other means,including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information about our ratings fees is available atwww.standardandpoors.com/usratingsfees.

S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of theirrespective activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&Phas established policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain non-public information received in connection with eachanalytical process.

To the extent that regulatory authorities allow a rating agency to acknowledge in one jurisdiction a rating issued in another jurisdiction forcertain regulatory purposes, S&P reserves the right to assign, withdraw or suspend such acknowledgment at any time and in its solediscretion. S&P Parties disclaim any duty whatsoever arising out of the assignment, withdrawal or suspension of an acknowledgment aswell as any liability for any damage alleged to have been suffered on account thereof.

Credit-related and other analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they areexpressed and not statements of fact. S&P’s opinions, analyses and rating acknowledgment decisions (described below) are notrecommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions, and do not address the suitability of anysecurity. S&P assumes no obligation to update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied onand is not a substitute for the skill, judgment and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors and/or clients when makinginvestment and other business decisions. S&P does not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor except where registered as such. WhileS&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of duediligence or independent verification of any information it receives. Rating-related publications may be published for a variety of reasonsthat are not necessarily dependent on action by rating committees, including, but not limited to, the publication of a periodic update on acredit rating and related analyses.

No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, valuations, model, software or other application or output therefrom) or anypart thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database orretrieval system, without the prior written permission of Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC or its affiliates (collectively, S&P). TheContent shall not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers,shareholders, employees or agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or availability of theContent. S&P Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, for the resultsobtained from the use of the Content, or for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an “as is”basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OFMERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THATTHE CONTENT’S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARECONFIGURATION. In no event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive,special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits andopportunity costs or losses caused by negligence) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of suchdamages.

Copyright © 2020 by Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC. All rights reserved.

Australian Structured Finance Mostly Resilient In Face Of ...

Documents

Transcript of Australian Structured Finance Mostly Resilient In Face Of ...