Australian Maritime Safety

Authority

Observations and Deficiencies and Trends

Deficiencies in 2016

During the calendar year of 2016 there

were:

8942 deficiencies issued of all kinds

(there were 9484 in 2015, so a drop

of 542 or 5.7%)

347 detainable deficiencies issued

(there were 353 in 2015 giving a

drop of 6 or 1.7%)

An increase in deficiencies per

inspection to 2.4 (from 2.3 in 2014)

Top 5 – Detainable Deficiencies 2014-16

Port Hedland Deficiencies resulted in detention in 2016

During the calendar year of 2016the

following main deficiencies noted:

ISM – involving Navigation Charts, Safe

work procedures and illegal discharge of

cargo residue;

Emergency fire pump unserviceable;

OWS defective;

MLC (non payment of wages, food);

Quick closing valves,

MF/HF radio,

Emergency Generator;

Sewage treatment plant; and

Loadline watertight integrity.

Other bulk ports deficiencies in 2016

During the calendar year of 2016 the

following main deficiencies noted:

The issues mirror the ones in Port Hedland

except they have more detentions for charts

& ECDIS;

Not so many mooring line and equipment

issues;

Their most frequent incident reports are for

navigation equipment followed by main

engine issues; and

MLC issues, though getting better.

2015 – PSC inspections by ship type

National inspection, detentions & deficiency rate

Average number of deficiencies per inspection

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

Dampier Gladstone Newcastle Port Walcott Hay Point Port Hedland Australia

Detention percentage of ships inspected

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Dampier Gladstone Port Walcott Newcastle Hay Point Port Hedland Australia

Port Hedland PSC Observations and Trends

While the physical condition of ships visiting Port Hedland is improving due to newer tonnage there is a trend towards an increase in “Human Factor” element issues

• Lack of safety culture on board

• Accommodation ladder rigging

• MLC related

• Cargo loading including monitoring of loading plans

• Main engine (fuel pump failures) problems

Incidents Stats during 2016

In the last year there were 355 incidents in Port Hedland

reported by AMSA Form 18 & 19 as follows:

Navigation Equipment - Including GMDSS equipment (101);

Main Engine - Including start failures, slowdowns & stoppages

(63);

Mooring - Including machinery and mooring line failures (47);

Medivac - Serious injuries and illness required hospital treatment

(32);

Generators - Including emergency generators (22);

Loadline related (11)

Fire detection systems (10);

Accommodation and Pilot Ladders (9);

Lifesaving appliances - Including life boats and rescue boats (6);

Deaths - Including accident & illness & missing presumed dead

(5); and

MLC issues (6)

M/E fuel pump failures in 8 ships visiting Port Hedland since June 2017

Comparative MLC inspection snapshot for 2016 and 2015

Only last week a vessel was discovered keeping two sets of wage accounts, covering

up the underpayment of crew by more than $200,000 USD. This vessel is banned to

enter Australian Ports for 12 months

MLC complaints for 12 months Ship IMO Date Complaint MLC Reference Rectification

Baltic Wolf 9492335 12/04/2017 Aircon defective MLC Reg 3.1 Aircon repaired

Anangel Elegance 9648295 6/04/2017 Insufficient provisions MLC Reg 3.2 Provisions purchased

Qing May 9492220 4/04/2017 Insufficient provisions MLC Reg 3.2 Provisions purchased

Edwin 9462471 27/03/2017 Workload & hours of rest MLC Reg 4.1 China MSA PSCI deficiency for hours of rest

Wugang Innovation 9437268 8/03/2017 Suitable medivac means not provided MLC Reg 4.1 Medivac by helicopter provided

Pacific Treasure 9604988 2/03/2017 Drinking water not provided & medical fitness MLC Reg 3.2 & 4.1 Seafaer medically fit

DS Charme 9546904 1/03/2017 Aircon defective MLC Reg 3.1 Aircon repaired prior PSCI

FPMC B Image 9423334 26/02/2017 Inadequate medical treatment by hospital MLC Reg 4.1 Seafarer assisted by Seafarer's Centre

Navios Mars 9747950 20/02/2017 Unpaid allotments MLC Reg 2.2 Ship departed before complaint received

Stella Ivy 9741774 18/01/2017 Crew not permitted shore leave MLC Reg 2.4 Master warned to comply with MLC leave requirements

Stella Charlene 9522661 17/01/2017 Crew not permitted shore leave MLC Reg 2.4 Master warned to comply with MLC leave requirements

Linda Fortune 9560388 14/01/2017 Insufficient provisions MLC Reg 3.2 Provisions purchased

Magnus Oldendorff 9648893 21/12/2016 Unpaid overtime & repatriation MLC Reg 2.2 & 2.5 Seafarer repatriated on leave

Ariadne 9721877 15/12/2016 Payment of wages MLC Reg 2.2 RAP & seafarer removed from ship

Else 9462495 23/11/2016 Workhours, leave, buying water MLC Reg 4.1 Alert in Shipsys

Shaiara 9513816 26/10/2016 Insufficient provisions MLC Reg 3.2 Ship delayed in anchorage & provisions purchased

Navios Joy 9664873 23/09/2016 Insufficient provisions MLC Reg 3.2 Provisions purchased

CDB Brighat 9612961 31/08/2016 Refused medical treatmnet MLC Reg 4.1 Medical treatment & repatriated

Cape Spencer 9461269 30/08/2016 Insufficient provisions MLC Reg 3.2 Provisions purchased

Coalmax 9447184 8/06/2016 Victimisation & workhours MLC Reg 4.1 Seafarer removed from ship

Yasa Dream 9324461 19/03/2016 Insufficient provisions MLC Reg 3.2 Provisions purchased

Port Hedland Maritime Labour Convention issues

The most frequent complaints to AMSA in Port Hedland are

Inadequate or unsuitable provisions for the intended voyage

Mistreatment and bullying

Excessive working hours

Payment of wages including monthly allotments

Accommodation standards including sanitary conditions

Repatriation including payoff allowances

Permission for shore leave

Insufficient provisions

Trivialising of incidents

Early July 2017 a vessel had a main engine failure shortly after

leaving the berth. At the time of the incident there was a very

strong easterly wind. A port emergency was declared, an extra

pilot and 7 tugs were required to bring the ship back alongside.

Fortunately tugs could be redeployed from another ship departing

so 3 additional tugs were available when the incident occurred.

In form 18 the master reported: “VSL MOVED DEAD SLOW

AHEAD AND M/E DID NOT RESPONSE TO INCREASE

REVOLUTIONS”. The form 19 stated: “DURING LEAVING

HARBOUR M/E FAILURE CAUSED. VSL MOVED DEAD SLOW

AHEAD AND M/E DID NOT RESPONSE TO INCREASE

REVOLUTIONS.”

Lack of safety culture

A lack of a safety culture on some ships has led to

• poor safety awareness by crew

• an increase in unsafe work practices

• an increase in near misses

• an increase in accidents (MOB incidents for example)

• injuries and fatalities

Working over open hatches without fall protection

Unsafe ship access

Working at height without fall protection

Crew working

without fall

protection

Working at height without fall protection

Working over the side without PFD

Working at height & over the side

Note one crewman is

barefoot. There has

been several MOB

incidents in Port

Hedland port and

anchorage in recent

years. One MOB in the

anchorage resulted in a

fatality.

Working at height & over the side

Accommodation ladder issues

• Accommodation ladder failures

• Accommodation ladder poor maintenance

• Accommodation ladder rigging – too steep (more than 55 degrees)

– Safety nets not fitted

– Inappropriate secondary means of securing

– Unsafe use

Accommodation ladder failure

In this photo the ship’s

accommodation ladder

hoisting wire failed

shortly after the pilot

disembarked and

moments before the

agent was about to step

on the ladder lower

platform.

There has been more

then 5 accommodation

ladder failures in the past

2 years in Port Hedland

port and anchorage.

Accommodation ladder failure

This photo was

taken by tug crew

showing the ship’s

crew unrigging the

accommodation

ladder on departure.

The crew were on

the ladder while it

was being raised.

One crew member

just stepped off the

ladder as it was

being hoisted into

the stowed position.

The accommodation ladder was damage by the flow of water due to the forward motion of the ship. The ship was held in position for 2 hours with the port while the accommodation ladder was recovered.

Accommodation ladders safety nets not fitted

Accommodation ladder incline <55 degrees

Requirements of

Section 3.4.1 of

MSC.1/ Circ.1331 -

accommodation

ladders should not

be used at an angle

greater than 55°

from the horizontal.

SOLAS regulation

III/3.13 - sufficient

length that at the

maximum design

operating angle the

lower platform will

be not more than

600 mm above the

waterline in the

lightest seagoing

condition

Accommodation ladder incline > 55 degrees

Is the accommodation ladder overloaded?

Accommodation ladders

are designed to be

landed on the wharf

when in use. The

certified load capacity of

accommodations is

when landed not when

suspended. When

accommodation ladders

are suspended the

hoisting wires must

support the weight of

the ladder and the

persons on board.

Non-approved fall prevention arrangements

AMSA has noted in many

cases that the fall prevention

arrangements fitted are

inadequate for their intended

purpose and introduce

unacceptable hazards and

risks.

Some arrangements are not

adjustable and add a further

risk to safety when the ships

draft changes or due to tidal

variation. Some arrangements

are connected to non-load

bearing parts of the

accommodation ladder and

ship structure or the tensile

strength of ropes, wires, pullies

and fittings is inadequate.

Type approved

secondary means

of supporting a

suspended

accommodation

ladder. For more info

refer to:

https://www.amsa.gov.a

u/vessels/standards-

regulations/documents/

Gangway-Fall-

Prevention-Devices-

Presentation2014.pdf

Navigational Safety – ECDIS

2016 PSC figures show that 27.8% of detentions related

to safety management. A significant proportion of these

ISM issues involved navigational practice.

• ECDIS fitted vessel’s safety management systems which provided

detailed instructions for passage planning and route monitoring

using paper charts, but not for the ECDIS which was the primary

means of navigation.

• Passage planning being carried out on ECDIS using only small

scale ENCs and no route checking is being carried out. As a

result, there have been numerous instances of planned routes

transiting through areas to be avoided, passing perilously close to

shoals/coastlines, passing through traffic separation schemes in

the wrong direction and other dangerous planned routes.

Navigational Safety – ECDIS

……. It has happened to a cruise ship!!!!

The above horizontal lines indicates that the scale is inappropriate. Once you

zoom in then you realise the potential dangers.

Navigational Safety – ECDIS

• The inability of ships’ navigating officers to perform basic squat

and under keel clearance calculations to determine safety depths

and inappropriate setup of safety settings. For example, during

one inspection it was noted that the safety depth had been set and

locked at 10m, when the departure draught of the vessel was

14.5m.

• Settings being ‘locked out’ to prevent changes being made.

• Complete reliance on GNSS as the sole source of positioning

information, and no use of alternate methods to verify the ship’s

position, even on coastal voyages when in sight of land.

• Ships’ navigating officers unable to demonstrate calculation of

compass error by taking bearings of the sun or other celestial

bodies. •

• Ineffective voyage planning. In recent examples, there was failure

to observe the requirements of designated shipping areas, areas

to be avoided and traffic separation schemes

Navigational Safety – ECDIS

• Use of inappropriate, uncorrected and/or outdated nautical charts

including ENCs.

Navigational Safety – ECDIS

• Use of inappropriate, uncorrected and/or outdated nautical charts

including ENCs.

• Use of unofficial and small-scale charts that are inconsistent with

SOLAS Chapter V Regulations 27 and 34.1 as well as Assembly

Resolution A.893 (21).

• Disabling of ECDIS audible alarms or not ensuring the ECDIS

audible alarm is operational at the commencement of a voyage.

• Limited understating of the capabilities and limitations of the

electronic navigation equipment being used and the nature of the

information provided on displays. This includes errors in ‘mode

awareness’ where data is relied upon inappropriately (for

example, dead reckoning positions being read and used as GPS

calculated positions).

Navigational Safety – ECDIS

CASE STUDY 1

The vessel sailed from a

southern port in Australia

with the master radar set to

dead reckoning. GPS

positons were recorded but

not checked. No verification

was carried using other

means …. As a result:

The vessel was some 13nm

off course, 5nm off the coast

… and about to hit an

island.

Because they did not know

where they were they

dumped garbage as well.

Navigational Safety – ECDIS

CASE STUDY 2

This vessel had recently

dropped a reef pilot off near

Cairns and was headed

south from Gladstone. The

vessel failed to make the

turn into the two way route

(about 10nm wide) and

almost grounded on Stagg

Patches. The vessel was

prevented from ground by

the intervention of ReefVTS

The bridge watch keeper

had failed to notice the very

large beacon and Racon on

Stagg Patch … or Sudbury

reef nearby.

This beacon was installed after the

grounding of the Bunga Teratai Satu in

2000. This vessel also failed to make

the turn

Navigational Safety ECDIS

CASE STUDY 3 Image shows the path of a 10000 tonne chemical tanker attempting to transit Napoleon Passage in the GBR …..

Without a pilot … or necessary depth of water

Navigational Safety – Appropriate scale charts

If in doubt as to what is expected please read Marine

Notices:

17/2014 – Sound Navigational practices

https://apps.amsa.gov.au/MOReview/Attachment/ShowAttac

hment/2211

05/2015 – Quick guide – Navigation thought the Great

Barrier Reef and Torres strait

https://apps.amsa.gov.au/MOReview/Attachment/ShowAttac

hment/1422

Cargo operations

• Monitoring of agreed loading plans – High loading rates

– Frequent amendments of loading plans

– De-ballasting operations

– Excessive trim

– Recording of observed drafts

– Cargo documentation

And some old issues that

continue…

Lifeboats Sewage Obvious issues not

addressed Fire Safety Measures Oily Water

Separators Load Lines ISM

•

Life Boats - Still an issue ….. Why?

And it is not isolated.

The following have all

be identified in a three

week period on

different ships

Sewage Treatment Plants

•Common problems

•What to expect at PSC

•Port restrictions – options?

•Standards seem to be improving – fewer detentions in 2012

Sewage Treatment Plants

•Dry sludge return lines and high system back pressure are a sure sign of problems …..

•But in some cases you have to look a bit harder ….. You will notice that both spindles are seized.

Sewage Treatment Plants

•Pretty obvious this is not working ……….

Obvious defects are not being

addressed

•The unit had been removed ashore … but no one had been told!

Fire safety measures – Things PM should have

found

•Pump started at 11.55 … but no water pressure!

Fire safety measures – Things PM should have

found

•Quite a bit of head scratching for a couple of hours with no result!

Fire safety measures – Things PM should have

found

•According to the PMS it had been tested just 13 days prior … but it was still not operation 2h and 14m later!

In the end it turned out to be

the inlet valve being ‘stuck’

and it appears the pump

had been tested by

checking it ran rather than

checking running …. and

supplied pressure.

Fire Safety measures - some things are just

dangerous

Fire Safety measures

Fire Safety measures - some things are really

obvious

Oily water separator

deficiencies…

Fire Safety Measures

Fire Safety Measures

Load Lines

Load Lines

Load Lines

ISM

•Reasons for detention – Major Non-conformity

– Evidence based

– Typical elements affected

•AMSA expectations for release – Audit required

– Scope of audit

– Release codes

Cargo Residue discharged in Anchorage

Damage not reported to AMSA or Port Authority

Defective auxiliary engine not accurately reported

It was reported to AMSA

the auxiliary engine was

under maintenance. The

extent of the damage was

such that the engine

required replacement.

Questions

• Email: Inspection@amsa.gov.au