Australian Army Journal Summer edition 2014 · Australian Army Journal Volume XI ... Chauvel Prize...

Australian Army Journal Volume XI, Number 2

Summer edition 2014

• OperationalSecurityintheDigitalAge:WhoisBeingTargeted?

• AdaptandOvercome:PromotingTacticalAdaptationinthePost-AfghanistanArmy

• TheUseofArmouredPersonnelCarrierSquadronswithinCombatBrigades

• Logistics,StrategyandTactics:BalancingtheArtofWar

• SirBasilLiddellHart’sInfluenceonAustralianMilitaryDoctrine

The Australian Army Journal is published by authority of the Chief of Army

The Australian Army Journal is sponsored by Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning, Australian Army Headquarters

© Commonwealth of Australia 2014Thisjournaliscopyright.Apartfromanyfairdealingforthepurposeofstudy,research,criticismorreview(aspermittedundertheCopyrightAct1968),andwithstandardsourcecreditincluded,nopartmaybereproducedbyanyprocesswithoutwrittenpermission.

Contributorsareurgedtoensuretheaccuracyoftheinformationcontainedintheirarticles;theEditorialAdvisoryBoardacceptsnoresponsibilityforerrorsoffact.PermissiontoreprintAustralian Army JournalarticleswillgenerallybegivenbytheEditorafterconsultationwiththeauthor(s).Anyreproducedarticlesmustbearanacknowledgmentofsource.

TheviewsexpressedintheAustralian Army Journalarethecontributors’andnotnecessarilythoseoftheAustralianArmyortheDepartmentofDefence.TheCommonwealthofAustraliawillnotbelegallyresponsibleincontract,tortorotherwiseforanystatementmadeinthisjournal.

ISSN 1448-2843

Editorial Advisory Board

ProfJeffreyGrey(ManagingEditor) LTGENPeterLeahy,AC(Retd)MAJGENElizabethCosson,AM(Retd) RADMJamesGoldrick(Retd)BRIGJustinKelly,AM(Retd) AIRCDREAnthonyForestier(Retd)ProfMichaelWesley DrAlbertPalazzoDrRogerLee DrJohnBlaxlandMrsCatherineMcCullagh

AustralianArmyJournalSummer,VolumeXI,No2


CONTENTS

CHAUVEL PRIZE.................................................................................................5

SECURITY

OperationalSecurityintheDigitalAge:WhoisBeingTargeted?............................8

Lieutenant Colonel Martin White

TRAINING

AdaptandOvercome:PromotingTacticalAdaptationinthePost-AfghanistanArmy........................................................................................22

Lieutenant Nicholas Barber

ARMOUR

TheUseofArmouredPersonnelCarrierSquadronswithinCombatBrigades......................................................................................36

Major Mitchell Watson

LOGISTICS

Logistics,StrategyandTactics:BalancingtheArtofWar.....................................48

Lieutenant Colonel David Beaumont

HISTORY

SirBasilLiddellHart’sInfluenceonAustralianMilitaryDoctrine.............................64

Captain Sam Baumgarten

BOOK REVIEWS

Canister! On! FIRE! Australian Tank Operations in Vietnam byBruceCameron..............................................................................................82

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Scott Winter

A Soldier’s Soldier: A Biography of Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Daly byJeffreyGrey....................................................................................................85

Reviewed by Lieutenant Adam Chirgwin

CONTENTS


Afghan Sun: Defence, Diplomacy, Development and the Taliban byStuartYeaman................................................................................................87

Reviewed by Colonel David Connery

Don’t Mention the War: The Australian Defence Force, the Media and the Afghan Conflict byKevinFoster....................................................................................................89

Reviewed by Tom Hill

All the King’s Men: The British Redcoat in the Era of Sword and Musket bySaulDavid......................................................................................................92

Reviewed by Major Tim Inglis

Fromelles the Final Chapters: How the Buried Diggers were Identified and Their Lives Reclaimed byTimLycettandSandraPlayle..........................................................................94

Reviewed by Brian Manns

Australia 1943: The Liberation of New GuineabyPeterDean(ed)...............................................................................................96

Reviewed by Matt Miller

TITLES TO NOTE...............................................................................................99

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS........................................................................104


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CHAUVEL PRIZE

Initsdeliberationsearlierthisyear,theEditorialAdvisoryBoarddecidedtosplittheChauvelPrizeandmakeanawardforthebestarticlepublishedineachissue.WehopeandintendthatthiswillencouragemorereaderstoconsiderwritingfortheAustralian Army Journal.Thewinnersfor2014accordinglyare:

Captain Nathan Mark,‘TheIncreasingNeedforCyberForensicAwarenessandSpecialisationinRASigs’,(Winter)

Lieutenant Colonel Martin White,‘OperationalSecurityintheDigitalAge:WhoisBeingTargeted?’,(Summer)

Congratulationstobothwinners.

Awardedto

Captain Nathan Mark

‘The Increasing Need for Cyber Forensic Awareness and Specialisation in RA Sigs’

LieutenantGeneralDavidMorrison,AOChiefofArmy

For the contribution to the understanding of land warfare

Australian Army Journal Chauvel Essay Prize 2014

Awardedto

Lieutenant Colonel Martin White

‘Operational Security in the Digital Age: Who is Being Targeted?’

LieutenantGeneralDavidMorrison,AOChiefofArmy

For the contribution to the understanding of land warfare

Australian Army Journal Chauvel Essay Prize 2014


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OperationalSecurityintheDigitalAge:WhoisBeingTargeted?LieutenantColonelMartinWhite

ABSTRACT

Althoughnotdeliberate,asignificantrisktoArmy’soperationalsecurityisthecurrentuseofmobiletelephonybyseniorArmyleaders.SeniorArmyleadersusemobiletelephonytoreceiveandprovideinformationthatisdistilled,timelyandaccurate,offeringanenemyforceorastrategiccompetitorhighvalueinformationforlittleeffort.Conversely,significantinvestmenthasbeenmadetosecureArmy’stacticalcommunications,whereinformationismostlydisaggregatedandshort-term.Somebasicactionscanbetakentoreducetherisk.


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Bin Laden’s voice was never heard on cell phone conversations intercepted by the National Security Agency during surveillance.

SeniorUnitedStatesofficial1

TheuseofmobiletelephonybyOsamabinLaden’saidesmayhaveeventuallycompromisedhislocationinPakistanpriortohisdeath,butthereisstrongevidencethatbinLadenandhissupporterswereexceptionallycognisantofthevulnerabilitiesassociatedwithusingmobiletelephonyandinternetcommunications,employingextensiveoperationalsecuritymeasures.Thereisnowalitanyofevidencedescribingtheeasewithwhichmobiletelephonycanbeexploited,amidwarningsfrompre-eminentmilitaryforcessuchastheUnitedStates(US)Armythattheuseofmobiletelephonyentailssignificantrisk.2

Australianpolitical,bureaucraticandmilitaryleadersrelyextensivelyonmobiletelephonytomanagethemostimportantaffairsofstate.WhilethisgrowingrelianceisnotisolatedtoseniorArmyleaders,theevolvingnatureoftheArmy’scommandandcontrolmustbecontinuallyexaminedtoensurebestpracticeandtoavoidunnecessaryrisktonationalsecurity.

Significantly,despitemanywarningsconcerningthevulnerabilitiesassociatedwithmobiletelephony,therehasbeenlittleapparentcuriosityaboutthethreatsposedbyrelianceonsuchtechnology.Indeed,thereisamismatchbetweentheapparentnecessityforthecommunicationssecurityofferedtotacticalforcesbyprojectssuchasLand200,andseniorArmyleaders’useofhighlyvulnerablecommercialcommunicationstopassinformation.Whileakeyaimofelectronicsurveillanceistoobtainthehighestvalueinformationusingtheleastpossibleeffort,thedesireforefficientcommandandcontrolthroughtheuseofmobiletelephonyhasresultedinthepresentationofaconsistenttargettopotentialthreatforcesandstrategiccompetitors.

Concurrently,therelativeimportanceandvalueofinformationischanging.Informationproliferationandthecommercialandmilitarydesiretomanage‘bigdata’continueunabated.Whilethevalueofinformationhasdiminishedasitcanbeobtainedfrommanysourcesandcanoftenbeaccessedbyanyone,informationgainedfromseniorArmyleadershasretainedorincreasedinvaluebecausesuchinformationisdistilled,accurateandtimely,andisconsistentlyavailable.Whensuchattractiveinformationisdisseminatedovermobiletelephony,thepriorityfortheassignmentofscarceelectronicsurveillanceassetsofanenemyforceorastrategiccompetitoriseasilydecided.Despitethis,Armyinvestmentinsecurityforcommandandcontrolhasfocusedonthelowertacticallevel,whereinformationiscomparativelylessvaluable.

SECURITYOperationalSecurityintheDigitalAge:

WhoisBeingTargeted?


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ThisarticlecontendsthattheprimaryrisktotheArmy’soperationalsecurityliesintheuseofmobiletelephonybyseniorArmyleaderstoenablecommandandcontrol.WherebinLadenandhissupportersmadethedecisiontoapplyextensiveoperationalsecuritymeasurestoensureeffectivecommandandcontrol,theAustralianArmyhastakentheoppositeapproach.ThisarticlewillhighlightpotentialareasforArmyfocussoastomitigatethisever-presentrisk.

Mobile-only

AsummarybyDeloitteofthemostdisruptivecurrentandfuturetechnologytrendsrevealsthatthemovementtowards‘mobileonly’hasreplacedtheprevioustrendof‘mobilefirst’.‘Mobilefirst’referstothetrendforcompanies,organisationsorprojectstofavourtheinclusionofamobiletelephonycomponentintheirbusinesspractices.Thetrendtowards‘Mobileonly’reflectsabeliefthatmobiletelephonyshouldnotjustbeacomponent,butratherthefundamentalbasisofcommunicationsfororganisations.3

ThistrendhasalsoinfluencedtheAustralianArmy,anorganisationreliantonmobilecommunicationsforexpeditionaryoperationsandforrapidresponsestohighlydynamiccircumstances.AlmostalltheArmy’scommandandcontrolsystemsrelyoncommercialornon-securecomponentsincludingthenewliaisonofficers’briefcasesystem,tacticalsatellite,INMARSATandtheBattleManagementSystem.However,twocommercialsystemsareparticularlypervasive:GlobalNavigationSystemforSatellites(GNSS)andmobiletelephony.GNSSvulnerabilitiesacrossalmostallsophisticatedmilitarycapabilitieshaveattractedsomeanalysisintheUSmilitarycontext,4andtheriskisalsoworthyofmoredetailedexaminationintheAustralianArmycontext(althoughsuchtreatmentisbeyondthescopeofthisarticle).

SeniorArmyleadersarenowcompletelyreliantonmobiletelephonysuchasGlobalSystemforMobile(GSM)communicationsfortheirworkandpersonalcommunications.AlmostallseniorArmyleadersareallocatedResearchinMotionBlackberrydevicesforvoiceandemailcommunication.Apartfromdomesticpersonalandworkuse,seniorArmyleadersrelyonmobiletelephonywhenconductingoffshoreactivitiessuchasinternationalengagement,andalsowhileonoperationalservice.Forexample,theRoshannetworkinAfghanistanwasheavilyusedbyAustraliansduringOperationSlipper,thevastmajorityoftheseinformationexchangesconcerningoperationalmattersorpersonalcommunication.

OperationalSecurityintheDigitalAge:WhoisBeingTargeted?

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ThisisnottosaythatseniorArmyleadersareknowinglyorwillinglycompromisingsensitiveinformationofnationalimportance.However,themereregularuseofmobiletelephonycouldproducejustsuchanoutcome.Ifusingmobiletelephonyforanylengthoftime,itisalmostimpossibletoadheretodoctrinalcommunicationsdisciplinerequirementswhichincludeavoidingunnecessaryorlongtransmissions,engaginginunofficialconversation,identificationofindividualorunitnames,andensuringthattransmissionsareloggedtoallowreferencetoinformationpreviouslytransmitted.5Indeed,volumesofdoctrineandprocedureshavebeendedicatedtoensuringthattacticalusersdonotcompromisesecurityandcomplywithsecurepractices,yetmanyofthesetime-provensecuritymeasuresarediscardedwhenmobiletelephonyisused.Theinformalityofmobiletelephonycommunicationsmayalsomakeinadvertentcompromisefarmorelikely.

The threat

Recentintelligencecompromises,suchasthosebyformerUSNationalSecurityAgencycontractorEdwardSnowden,demonstratetheextensivenatureofnationalcollectionoccurringoncommercialcommunicationssystems.6ItwouldbenaïvetoassumethattheUSanditsclosestpartnerswerealoneinthecollectionofintelligencefromcommercialcommunicationssystemsorinthetargetingofseniorpoliticalandmilitaryleadersfromcountriesofinterest.

TheUSComputerEmergencyReadinessTeamhasproducedmanyunclassifieddocumentsdescribingthethreatstomobiledeviceusers.Oneofthesedocumentshighlightscriminal(orenemy,asisequallyapplicable)threatstomobiledeviceuse.Enemyforcescanlistentotelephonecalls,secretlyreadShortMessageServicetexts,useahandsetasaremotebuggingdevice,viewthehandsetGlobalPositioningServicelocation,orautomaticallyforwardemailstoanotheraddress.7A2007InternationalSecurityAssistanceForce(ISAF)reporthighlightedthefactthat‘everyGSMproviderintheworldhastheabilitytolocateandtrackaGSMphoneassoonasitisturnedon’,specificallyreferringtotheriskthatseniorISAFleaderscouldbetrackedbyRoshanandlocationalinformationpassedtothreatforces.ThereportalsoreferredtotheconcernthatPakistan’sintelligenceservice(ISI)collectedanddatabasedallRoshancallsandtelephonenumbersfromAfghanistan.8ThecommonargumentthatAfghanistanpresentsan‘uncontestedelectronicenvironment’isnaïveintheextreme.

Itisfairtosaythatnoneofthesepotentialthreatcapabilitieswouldbeasurprisetomostmobiledeviceusers.HoweverthecommonresponsebythelargenumberofArmymobiledeviceusersisoftensurprisinglyapathetic.Furthermore,while


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technicalweaknessesthatallowforintelligencecollectionmaybeaddressedormitigatedbycommercialcompaniesorbysecurityagencies,newtechniquesusedtocompromisecommunicationdevicesappearrapidlyandregularly,includingonerecentexampleknownas‘WireLurker’.9Useofmobiletelephonyisclearlyanoperationalsecurityrisk.

Target-rich environment

Theavailabilityandvalueofinformationhaschangedimmenselyinrecentyears,withspecificinformationdecreasinginvalue.Thesignificantfocuson‘bigdata’analysis10isindicativeofthis,asorganisationssuchastheAustralianArmyfindinformationavailablefrommanydifferentsources,butfacemajorchallengesintheanalysisofthisdatatoconvertittousefulinformation.Furthermore,theimportanceofspecificcollectionplatformsorcapabilitieshasdiminished,asotherplatformsorcapabilitiescaneasilyfilltheinformationvoid.ThelargenumberofcollectionplatformscurrentlyproposedintheDefenceCapabilityPlan(boththosethatarespecificallydesignedtocollectandthosetowhichcollectionisincidentaltotheprimarymission),comparedtothelownumberofplannedcapabilitiesthatsupporttheanalysisofdata,highlightsthereducedvalueofspecificcollectors.

Toemphasisethispointontheavailabilityofinformation,theArmynowhasmanymeansatitsdisposaltolocatealand-basedenemyheadquarters.Itmayuseunmannedaerialvehicles,electronicwarfare,humanintelligence,reconnaissancetroopsorsatelliteimagery.ItcouldrelyonairplatformssuchastheAP-3C,JointStrikeFighterorGrowler,ormaritimeplatformssuchasaCollinsClasssubmarine.Strategicagenciesandeffects,suchascybercapabilities,couldalsolocatetheheadquarters.Manyinternetproductsandapplicationsandcommercialtoolscoulddothesame.IfoperatinginaUS-ledcoalition,themeanstolocatetheenemyheadquartersincreaseexponentially.Itisonlyonrareoccasions,suchasduringthesearchforbinLaden,thatsuchextensiveinformationcollectionoptionstakealongtimetobearfruit,althoughultimatelytheystillachievethedesiredeffect.Importantly,theArmywouldnothavetodefeatordetecttheentirespectrumofenemycommunications,physicalornon-physicalsignatureorpersonalinformationtolocatetheenemyheadquarters.Indeed,asingleindicator,suchasacommander’smobilephone,maybeallthatisnecessary.Alternatively,asmallnumberofminorindicationscouldbefusedoranalysedtoaccuratelydeterminethelocation.Quiteclearly,specificsourcesofinformationarelessimportantbecausetherearemanyothersthatcouldbeusedtoachievethesameeffect.


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However,anenemysurveillanceforceorastrategiccompetitorwillalwaysseektogaininformationofthehighestvalueforthelowestpossibleeffortorcost.Suchintelligencecollectionwillbeconcentratedonwhereinformationismostimportant,whereitisdistilled,andwhereitistimely.Collectioniseasierifinformationisbeingpassedonareliablenetworkthatisnoteasilydisrupted,andcollectionisevenmoreattractiveifvaluableinformationisbeingpassedonanon-secureorpoorlysecurednetwork.

ThisexplainswhyseniorArmyleaderspresentsuchvaluabletargets.Withinthedrossofinformationthatisnowavailabletoallmilitaryforces,targetingthemobiletelephonyuseofseniorArmyleadersisofimmensevaluetoanenemysurveillanceforceorastrategiccompetitor.TheuseofmobiletelephonyformilitarypurposesandoftenalsoforpersonalcommunicationmeansthatitisalmostimpossibleforseniorArmyleaderstoachievetheoperationalsecuritygoalofamilitarycommunicationuserto‘remainanonymous’inanefforttomitigateelectronictargeting.11

Administration only

ItcouldbearguedthatseniorArmyleadersdonotusemobiletelephonyforsensitivepurposesandthatsuchdevicesareusedfor‘administrationonly’.Thisistomisunderstandthenatureofthecommunicationsunderdiscussion.Evenifseniorleadersusemobiletelephonysolelyforpersonalreasons,itisasimplemattertodevelopanaccurateintelligencepictureoftheindividual,ofthenetworkoffriendsandcolleaguesthatheorshemaintains,andofthelocationsheorshevisits.Forexample,whenaseniorleaderandasubordinatecommunicateviamobiletelephony,thefirstspokenwordwillalmostinevitablybe‘Sir’or‘Ma’am’,immediatelyindicatingsenioritytoanelectronicsurveillanceelement.Theleader’spersonaltraitsandattitudesmaybedeterminedafteronlyafewconversations.Iftheindividualhasaconfidant,theidentityofthispersonmaybesoughttoallowfurthertargeting.Finally,whentheinevitablediscussionofoperationalmattersoccurs,sometimesbecause‘extreme’circumstancesexistwhereimmediacyofreportingisessential,thisinformationcanbecorroboratedwithothersources.Itisnotablethatdoctrinesuchasalliedcommunicationspublicationsdefineextremecircumstancesaswhenthe‘speedofdeliveryissoessentialthattimecannotbesparedforencryptionandthetransmittedinformationcannotbeacteduponbytheenemyintimetoinfluencecurrentoperations.’12Withtheeaseofmodernencryption,suchcircumstancesshouldberare.


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Furthermore,theuseof‘veiledspeech’,codewordsorcovertermsispermittedunderalliedandAustraliandoctrinetomitigatesecurityriskswhennon-securesystemsareused.Theoptimumuseofcodewordsoccurswhentheyareappliedonlyonce.13However,veiledspeechisfarfromthesecuritypanaceathatitisoftenconsidered.Thecontextofaconversationisveryimportantwhenusingveiledspeechanditmayonlytakeoneortwoinstancesofthesameveiledspeechorcovertermbeforethetermiscompromised.TherearemanypoorexamplesofveiledspeechandcovertermsinArmyuse.Forexample,whenAustraliansoldiersmakethecommondeclarationthattheyare‘deployingtothesandpit’,fewinterestedpartieswouldbedeceivedintothebeliefthataTimor-Lestedeploymentwasimminent.Ifveiledspeechorcovertermsarecompromisedatalaterdate,suchasthroughsomeoftheSnowdencovertermdisclosures,allpreviouslyrecordeduseoftheveiledspeechorcovertermsmayberetrospectivelyunderstoodandcontextualised.14

Theseventeenth-centuryFrenchstatesmanCardinalRichelieuoncesaid,‘Ifonewouldgivemesixlineswrittenbythehandofthemosthonestman,Iwouldfindsomethingintheretohavehimhanged.’15Whilethisquotemayleadsometoarguethevalueofprivacyoverthepervasivenatureofstatesurveillance,equallythiscanberelatedtothetargetingofthecommunicationsofseniorArmyleaders.Eventually,andprobablysoonerratherthanlater,sensitiveandusefulinformationfrommobiletelephonyusewillbeaccessedbyanenemyforceorastrategiccompetitor.

Misplaced investment

DefenceprojectssuchasJointProject2072andLand75wereestablishedinparttoprovidegreatersecuritytolandtacticalcommunications.The$2.75billionassignedtothetacticalcommunicationsdigitalbackboneandtheBGC3BattlefieldCommandSystemhasprovidedexcellentcontentsecuritytotacticallandforcetransmissions.16Yet,suchaninvestment,whilealmostimpossibletoquestionasanessentialmodernisationoflandcommunicationsandcommandandcontrolinfrastructureintheAustralianDefenceForce,maybemisplacedfromasecuritypointofview.Investmentinotheraspectsoftacticalcommunicationssecurity,suchastheassignmentofpersonnelandresourcesto‘CommunicationsSecurityMonitoringTeams’,mayalsobemisplaced,becausetheyarefocusedonanareaofoperationalsecuritythatisoflowrelativevalue.


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Ifahypotheticalnear-peerthreatforcewastochallengetheAustralianArmy,theelectronicsurveillanceelementofthethreatforcemayseektotargettacticalcommunicationssystems.Aspreviouslymentioned,thismaybesecondarytotargetingthemorevaluablecommanduseofmobiletelephony.However,atcertainpoints,targetingtacticalAustralianforceswillbenecessaryforanenemy,suchastoclearanAustralianelementfromakeygeographicalfeature.Evenwiththe$2.75billioninvestmentincommandandcontrolmodernisation,tacticalelementsstilldemonstratevulnerabilitiesthatanenemyelectronicwarfareelementcaneffectivelytarget.

ThroughtheLand200investment,tacticalforcesnowhavehighlysophisticatedsecurecommunications.Apartfromtheriskofinsiderthreat,itishighlyunlikelythatathreatforcecouldeasilyorrapidlyunderstandtheinformationcontainedwithintacticalvoiceanddatacommunicationsifthesystemisusedasintended.Furthermore,thevalueofinformationisdiminishing,andinformationfromatacticalelementisshort-term,disaggregated(mosttransmissionsonlyemanatefromasingleforceelement)andtakessignificanttimetotranslateandcontextualise.Thisisnottosaythisinformationisunimportant;howeverthereiscomparativelyfarlessvalueforanelectronicwarfareelementintargetingcompanyorbattalioncommandandcontrolthaninfocusinghigherupthechain.

Apartfromthecontentofspecifictransmissions,however,twootheraspectsoftheAustraliantransmissionsremainhighlyvulnerable—thelocationoftheirpointoforigin,anddisruptionofthosetransmissionsthroughelectronicattack.17ProtectingtheunitlocationandensuringanimmediatemessagereachesitsintendedrecipientwithoutdisruptionarearguablyfarmoreimportantforthetacticalAustralianforcethananycompromiseofthelow-levelandshort-terminformationthatisalmostalwayscontainedintacticaltransmissions.

Throughanunderstandingofradiopoweroutputorterrain,orthroughprocessessuchastriangulation,anenemyforcecouldgainimmediateinformationonanAustralianelement’slocationandreactwithforce.Denialordisruptionofcommunicationmayseeimmediatecommandandcontrolmeasures,suchasreinforcementofanAustralianforceunderattack,delayedormisunderstood.Thesecleartacticalvulnerabilitiesarefarmorecriticalthantherelativelylowvalueofthecontentofthetransmissionwhich,evenifthecryptographycouldbebroken,wouldthenrequiretranslationandcontextualisation,processesthattakesignificanttime.


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AnArmyHeadquarters‘BuildingonBeersheba’discussionpaperchallengesthereadertodebatethethreatsandrisksassociatedwithdigitisation,andexpressesconcernovertheeffectoncommandandcontrolifthedigitalnetworkwascontested.Furthermore,thediscussionpaperacknowledgesthattheArmy’s‘understandingofthreats,risksandvulnerabilitiesisimmature’.18WhilethepaperanticipatesthattheArmy’snewdigitalcentreofgravitywillbesubjectto‘vigorousattempts’todefeatthenetwork,itisfarmorelikelythatathreatforceorstrategiccompetitorwouldseelittleneedforthis.Thehigherlevelinformationbeingpassedoverlesssecurecommercialsystemspresentsamorelogicaltarget.However,ifthethreatforcedidseektotargettacticalcommunications,itcouldeffectivelylocateanddisruptsuchcommunicationsusingbasicelectronicwarfareequipment,andthiswouldprobablyachievethetacticaleffectrequired.TheessentialdigitisationinitiativeundertakenbytheAustralianDefenceForcehasdonelittletoenhancesecuritytowhathashistoricallybeenthemostvulnerableelementsoftacticalcommunications,andtheregularclaimsandwidespreadbeliefthatdigitisationprojectshaveprovidedgreater‘security’totheArmy’stacticalcommunicationshavearguablyestablishedafalsebeliefintheprotectionofcommandandcontrol.

Insummary,thelevelofinvestmentincommunicationssecurityhasbeenskewedtowardstacticalusers,ratherthantowardstheseniorArmyleaderswhoprovidethemostimportantsourceofintelligencetoanenemyforceorastrategiccompetitor.Furthermore,theinvestmentintacticalcommandandcontrolisweightedtowardsthearguablyunnecessaryhigh-levelencryptionofshort-term,disaggregated,low-leveldata,ratherthantowardsprotectingthelocationofthetransmissionortheassurancethatthenecessaryinformationwillarriveinatimelymannerwithoutbeingaffectedbyenemyelectronicattack.

Know the threat

ThereareanumberofwaystoensurethatthecommandandcontrolactionsofseniorArmyleadersdonotcompromisenationalsecurity.Mostofthesesolutionsarenotexpensive,butrequireeducation,adviceandconsistency.Leadersappeartoexhibitanaturaltendencytoreverttotheeasiestmeansofcommandandcontrol,particularlyifthereisnoimmediatefeedbackfromathreatforceorastrategiccompetitorwheninformationisgainedthroughtheuseofmobiletelephony.


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UnderstandingthethreatisfundamentaltoensuringthesecurityoftheArmy’scommandandcontrol.TrainingonthethreatposedtotheArmy’scommandandcontrolinAfghanistanandIraqwasconspicuouslyabsentfromtheextensivelead-uptrainingforcontingentsdepartingforoperationsinthosecountries.ThisisstrikingbecausethesemissionsentailedthemostsignificantrisktoAustralianlifesincetheVietnamWar,andtherewasamplewarningwithinISAFofthethreatsposedtospecificcommunicationsinAfghanistan.Indeed,ISAFproducedatleastsixreportsonelectronicwarfarethreatsinAfghanistanin2007alone.19Itisreasonabletoexpectthataspectsofriskandthreatwouldbeconsideredholistically.Thelackofcuriosityandawarenessconcerningthreatstocommandandcontrolshouldbeaddressedpriortofuturemajordeployments,andtheremedymayincludeguaranteedsupportfromorganisationssuchastheDefenceIntelligenceOrganisation.Whiletherearethosewhowillconsidertheissuesraisedinthisarticle‘communications’or‘electronicwarfare’issues,acceptingthemasclearlycommandandcontrolvulnerabilitiesisalsoimportant.

OsamabinLaden’sattentiontocommunicationssecurityprovedextremelysuccessfulforhimoveralongperiodoftime.Otherthreatforces,suchastheTalibaninAfghanistan,similarlydevelopedarefinedunderstandingoftheneedforoperationalsecuritywhenusingcommercialcommunications.Forexample,TalibanmembersavoiddetectionbyusinginternetphoneswithVoiceoverInternetProtocolsuchasSkype.TheyusefakeFacebookprofiles.TheyalsothreatenRoshannetworkemployeesinAfghanistanwhomaybepassingTalibanmobiletelephonenumberstoUSforcesandtheAfghangovernment.20

Similarly,alQaedaoperativesweretrainedtousecodewordsinmobiletelephonecommunications,usedencryption,sentmessagesembeddedingraphicsandaudiofiles,imposedtimelimitsontelephoneconversations,alteredtheirvoiceswhenspeaking,relocatedandchangedtheirhandsets,limitedcontactwithfamilies,andusedcouriersratherthanmobiledeviceswhereverpossible.21Theyalsoregularlyswappedhandsetusersbetweencombatantsandnon-combatants.SuchoperationalsecuritymeasuresarenotemployedbytheAustralianArmy.IntheArmycontext,thecommonlyusedterm‘handingoverthephone’issynonymouswithachangeincommandforseniorpositions,exceptthathandingoverthesamephoneprovideseasy,ongoing,high-levelintelligenceforthreatforcesandstrategiccompetitors.TheTalibanandalQaedamaybeanunsophisticatedmilitaryenemy,buttheyhavedemonstratedfarmoresophisticationincommandandcontrolsecuritybecausetheyareawareofthethreat.


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TheArmymustconsiderpreciselywhichelementofthenetworkrequiresthemostsecurityfortheprotectionofcommandandcontrol.Majorinvestmentstoprovidethehighestlevelofsecuritytotheinformationoflowestintelligencevalueappearmisplacedand,indeed,increasetheworkforcetheArmymustallocatetofunctionssuchascryptographymanagement.Insomeways,leavingthelowestvalueinformationunsecuredcanpresentadilemmatoanenemyforce—doestheenemydedicatescarcetechnicalresourcestocollectingandtranslatingthisinformation,ordoesitfocusonotherpartsofthenetwork?Ensuringthatthe‘redforce’formajorArmyexercisesisassignedasophisticatedelectronicwarfarecapability,withawideremittotargetthe‘blueforce’asitwouldtargetanyenemyforce,wouldprovidevaluabletraining.UsingelectronicwarfareelementstosupportthedeliveryofprojectssuchasLand200wouldalsoaddsophisticationtotheArmy’scommandandcontrol.

TrainingandeducatingseniorArmyleadersconcerningthethreatsassociatedwithusingmobiletelephonyremainsimportant,andshouldbeanongoingtaskforcommunicationsandintelligenceprofessionals.Perhapsmoreimportantly,furthereducationshouldbeprovidedtoleadersonhowquicklyanintelligencepicturecanbedeveloped.Thecommonperceptionisthatintelligenceisbuiltupoverlengthyperiods.Inreality,averyaccuraterepresentationofnetworks,confidants,personalities,keyinformationandmovementscanbedevelopedwithinseveraltelephonecallsoremails.

Finally,iftheArmyispreparedtoinvest$2.75billioninimprovingtacticalcommandandcontrol,policymakersshouldconsiderinvestingasmallfractionofthattoimprovethesecurityofmobiletelephonyusedbyseniorArmyleaders.Availabletechnologysupportsthis,andthe‘mobileonly’trendcanremaincentraltoArmycommandandcontrol.Eventhroughtheuseofcommercialtechnology,greatersecuritycanbeprovidedtotheregularcommunicationsofseniorArmyleaders,andindeedtoallArmyusersofmobiletelephony.

WhiletargetingseniorArmyleaders’useofmobiletelephonyisfarfromtheonlywaythatathreatforceorastrategiccompetitorcangainintelligenceonAustraliaanditsarmy,itprobablyoffersthemostreturnfortheleastinvestment.Similarly,theArmycanachieveahighreturnforalowinvestmentifmobiletelephonyisusedmorejudiciouslyandbetterunderstood.


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Conclusion

Withtherelativeimportanceofspecificinformationdiminishing,threatforcesandstrategiccompetitorswillbelookingforwaystomaximisethevalueofintelligenceandminimisetheeffortrequiredtogainthatintelligence.Whilethereislittledoubtthatsmallpiecesoftacticalinformationaccumulatedovertimecanoffersomethingofintelligencevalue,targetingtheuseofmobiletelephonybyseniorArmyleaders(andindeedbyseniorpolitical,bureaucraticandmilitaryleaders)providesthehigh-gainlow-costtrade-offthatissoughtbyenemyforcesandstrategiccompetitors.Inthissense,thereisanimbalancebetweentheextensiveoperationalsecuritymeasuresrequiredoftacticalsoldierswithlow-levelinformation,andthelackofoperationalsecuritymeasuresrequiredof(andprovidedto)seniorArmyleaderswhohandleinformationthatistimely,distilledandofhighrelativevalue.

Thisarticledoesnotcontendthattacticalinformationisunimportant,orthatseniorArmyleadersshouldnotusemobiletelephony.Conversely,itisaquantumleapindevelopmentfortheArmytohavemovedtowardshighcapacitycommandandcontrolmeansthathaveacommercialcomponent.However,thistransitionmustbeachievedwithaclearunderstandingoftheriskandthethreat,andnotjustconsideredaconsequence-freechangeinpreferredcommunicationsmeans.NotevenAustralia’smosttechnologicallyunsophisticatedenemiesofthe2000sconsideritassuch.


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THE AUTHOR

LieutenantColonelMartinWhiteisaservingAustralianArmyofficer.HehasundertakennumerousmilitarydeploymentstoTimor-Leste,Iraq,andAfghanistan.HeiscurrentlycompletingaPhDthroughLaTrobeUniversity,focusedonAustraliandefencepolicy.

ENDNOTES1 R.WindremandA.Johnson,‘BinLadenaideswereusingcellphones,officialstellNBC’,NBC

News,http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42881728/ns/world_news-death_of_bin_laden/t/bin-laden-aides-were-using-cell-phones-officials-tell-nbc/#.U8oShhb-IQ0,dated5April2011.

2 UnitedStatesComputerEmergencyReadinessTeam,Technical Information Paper-TIP-10-105-01: Cyber Threats to Mobile Devices,15April2010.

3 Deloitte,Tech Trends 2013: Elements of Post-digital,UnitedStates,2013.

4 Forexample,seeD.Parsons,‘Simple,InexpensiveJammersThreatenGPS’,National Defense Magazine,September2013.

5 CombinedCommunications-ElectronicsBoard,Allied Communications Publication 125(F),5September2001,p.4-1,paragraph402.

6 Forexample,seehttps://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/code_names_for.html,accessed23July2014.

7 UnitedStatesComputerEmergencyReadinessTeam,Technical Information Paper-TIP-10-105-01.

8 ‘Afghanistanwarlogs:Talibansympathiserslisteningintotop-secretphonecallsofUS-ledcoalition’,The Guardian,26July2010.

9 Seehttp://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-11-07/iphones-threatened-by-newly-discovered-wirelurker-malware/5873672,accessedon7November2014.

10 Deloitte,Tech Trends 2013,p.43.

11 CombinedCommunications-ElectronicsBoard,Allied Communications Publication 125(F),p.2-6,paragraph207f.

12 CombinedCommunications-ElectronicsBoard,Allied Communications Publication 121(I),October2010,p.3-17,paragraph361.

13 CombinedCommunications-ElectronicsBoard,Allied Communications Publication 125(F),p.2-10,paragraph215.

14 Forexample,seeclaimeddisclosuresonNationalSecurityAgencysignalsintelligenceequipmentatwww.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/more_about_the.html,accessedon25July2014.

15 J.K.Hoyt,The Cyclopedia of Practical Quotations,compiledbyAnnaL.Ward,Funk&WagnallsCo.,London,1896,p.763.

16 G.Ferguson,‘LandForces2014’,LandDefenceAustraliaLimited,17October2013.


SECURITY

http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42881728/ns/world_news-death_of_bin_laden/t/bin-laden-aides-were-using-cell-phones-officials-tell-nbc/#.U8oShhb-IQ0

http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42881728/ns/world_news-death_of_bin_laden/t/bin-laden-aides-were-using-cell-phones-officials-tell-nbc/#.U8oShhb-IQ0

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/code_names_for.html

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-11-07/iphones-threatened-by-newly-discovered-wirelurker-malware/5873672

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-11-07/iphones-threatened-by-newly-discovered-wirelurker-malware/5873672

www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/more_about_the.html


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17 CombinedCommunications-ElectronicsBoard,Allied Communications Publication 125(F),p.2-1,paragraph201.

18 StrategicPlansBranch,ArmyHeadquarters,‘BuildingonBeersheba:TheFutureArmy–DiscussionPaperthree–AdigitalArmy’,Canberra,2014,http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Publications/Research-Papers/Building-on-BEERSHEBA.

19 ‘Afghanistanwarlogs:Talibansympathiserslisteningintotop-secretphonecallsofUS-ledcoalition’,The Guardian,26July2010.

20 S.Tindall,‘Afghanistanwarlogs:NatofearedTalibancouldtapitsmobilephones’,The Guardian,26July2010.

21 D.D.Jessee,‘TacticalMeans,StrategicEnds:AlQaeda’sUseofDenialandDeception’,Terrorism and Political Violence,Issue18,2006,pp.378–82.

SECURITYOperationalSecurityintheDigitalAge:

WhoisBeingTargeted?

http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Publications/Research-Papers/Building-on-BEERSHEBA

http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Publications/Research-Papers/Building-on-BEERSHEBA


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TRAINING

AdaptandOvercome:PromotingTacticalAdaptationinthePost-AfghanistanArmyLieutenantNicholasBarber

ABSTRACT

CommandersintheAustralianArmypridethemselvesonsoundmilitarydecision-makingbasedonthoroughanalysisofthethreat,terrainandtheirhighercommander’sintent.Yetthisself-assuranceismisleading.Theemploymentofexistingmilitaryplanningtoolsshouldleadcommanderstodevelopadaptabletacticalsolutionsthataccountforthevulnerabilitiesinagiventhreatsystem.However,tacticalmilitarycommandersoftendonotconductadetailedappreciationofthethreatsystemor,iftheydo,theyfailtoincorporatethesevulnerabilitiesintothemanoeuvreplan.Asaresult,commandersoftenresorttotheaggressiveexecutionofafamiliartacticaltemplate.ThisarticleaimstostimulatediscussiononthetrainingfocusoftheArmyinapost-Afghanistancontext.ItexaminestheArmy’suniqueopportunitytodeveloptrainingconstructstopromotetacticaladaptation.Atthesametime,itidentifiestheriseofanaversiontothecombatlessonsfromAfghanistan,whichmayseetheArmyreturntothepredictabilityofexercisespriortoEastTimor.ThearticlecloseswiththerecommendationthattheArmyincorporateunknownthreatelementsintoexercisestopromoteinnovationandachievetacticaladaptation.


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Introduction

‘Threatandterraindependent’isaphraseallcommandershaveheardduringtheircareers.Oftenconsideredaninstructor’s‘throwaway’responsetoatraineeinquiryaboutatacticalproblem,thephraseactuallyencapsulatesthetotalityoftheMilitaryAppreciationProcess(MAP)andtherequirementforprofessionalmilitariestounderstandtacticsandremainresponsivetothebattlespace.1Putsimply,tacticsis‘battlefieldproblem-solving’,andtheMAPistheAustralianArmy’smilitarydecision-makingtool.2CommandersemploytheMAPtoassessmultiplecoursesofactionandchoosethemostappropriatemilitaryoptionforthebattlefieldscenario.MostoftheArmy’scommandersapplytheMAPatatacticallevel.Thetacticallevelofwarcentresontheactualapplicationofforceagainsttheadversary,andtheArmytrainsforthetacticalfightonadailybasis,frombrigademanoeuvretoindividualcombatdrills.3Whiletacticalmilitarycommandersgenerallydemonstratethecapacitytoapplytacticstotheterrain,fartoooftentheysimplyacknowledgethethreatratherthanadapttheirtacticstoexploitthreatvulnerabilities.SuchshortfallsshouldbeidentifiedandrectifiedduringtheArmy’strainingcycle.Indeed,apartfromtheconductofactualoperations,theArmy’sprincipalresponsibilityistoconducttrainingtopreparetheorganisationtomeetthecapabilityrequirementsoftheAustraliangovernment.4However,thecurrenttrainingconstructdoesnotaddresswhatitreallymeansfortacticstobe‘threatandterraindependent’nordoesitassistjuniorcommanderstoapplytheintellectualrigourrequiredbytheArmy’splanningtools.Asaprofessionalmilitary,buildingtheappropriatetrainingconstructisessentialfortheArmytoretainitsutilityforfuturecombat.Following15yearsofcontinuousoperations,theArmyshouldbewellplacedtorefineitsapproachtotraininginordertoaccommodatethelessonsithaslearntfromrecentoperationsandreplicatetheconditionsofwartopreparenewsoldiersforthenextbattle.Yetthisisfarfromthecase.

ThisarticleaimstostimulatedebateonthefuturetrainingfocusoftheArmy.Inparticular,thisdiscussionwilladdressthefactthatadaptation,theprincipalcharacteristicofan‘adaptive’army,israrelypractisedatatacticallevel.Tacticalcommandersandstaff,specificallyfromplatoontounitlevel,seldomeffectivelyincorporatethevulnerabilitiesofthreatsystemsintomilitaryplanning.Thisarticlewillalsodiscusstheriseofanapparentaversiontotacticallessonsdrawnfrom‘theAfghanmodel’andconsidertheutilityofreturningtheArmytothe‘basics’practisedpriortoEastTimor.

TRAININGAdaptandOvercome:PromotingTacticalAdaptationinthePost-AfghanistanArmy


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Tactical adaptation?

Whenmostcurrentjuniorcommandersdefine‘adaptive’,itisoftenintermsofthewaytheyfoughttheexistingtacticalmodelor‘drills’throughneworchangingcircumstancesandachievedthedesiredendstate.Acommanderadvocates‘adaptation’asa‘sustain’intheAfterActionReviewwhenhis/hertacticalmodel,suchasacombatteamleftorrightflankingattack,wasrequiredtochangeaxesmomentspriortoH-hourormaintainedmomentumdespitethecommitmentoftheenemyreserve.However,theaggressiveapplicationofaknownmodeldoesnotconstitutetacticaladaptation.Adaptationistheprocessofundergoingchangetosuitnewconditionsorcircumstances.Inamilitarysetting,anadaptiveapproachatthetacticallevelwouldseecommandersdevelopingnewanddifferentmethodstoemploytheirforcetoexploitterrainanddefeattheenemyindetail.5Suchtacticalmethodsmayincludechangestosectioncomposition,modifyingtheemploymentofplatoonweaponsystems,usingunorthodoxcombatteaminsertionmethodsorundertakingboldbutriskybattlegroupmanoeuvre.Infact,commanderswouldencouragesubordinatestoconsider‘alloptionsonthetable’ratherthanresortingtostrictrelianceonexistingtacticalmodels.

Importantly,existingtacticalmodelsareonlybestpracticeagainsttheenemytheyweredesignedtodefeat.Asabasicexample,theleftorrightflankingattackmaybecompletelyineffectiveagainstanenemythatalwaysmaintainsstrongflanksecurity.Consequently,athoroughknowledgeoftheenemyisessentialforcommanderstoadapttheirtacticstoexploitthreatweaknesses.TheArmyhasatoolthatcansupportthisprocess.

TheIntelligencePreparationoftheBattlespace(IPB)isthetoolArmyintelligencestaffusetoassessthebattlespaceandthreatinanareaofoperations.TheIPBprovidesrecommendationstothecommanderbasedonanalysisofthethreatandterrain,whiletheresultingassessmentofthethreat’s‘criticalvulnerabilities’assistsinshapingthemanoeuvreplan.6AstheIPBcontributestotheMAP,planningstaffthenaccountfortheterrainandadoptthebesttacticalapproachtodefeattheenemy’splan.Fundamentally,thisisthebasisofmanoeuvrewarfare.7Staffmustbepreparedtodepartfromexistingtacticalmodelstoadoptapproachesthatwillbestdefeatthethreat—adecisionthatislikelytoincurincreasedrisk.8Whilethisprocesssoundssimple,tacticalcommandersoftenconductconsiderationratherthanappreciationofthreatandterrain.TheArmy’sownreportingsuggeststhatmanycommandersandstaffarguablydonotunderstandtheArmy’smilitaryplanningtools.9Militarydecision-makingbecomesaprocessof‘box-filling’totheextentthatmostjuniorcommandershavepre-setanswerstofillMAPworkbooks.



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Importantly,traineesarenottaughtdifferently,noraretheyexposedtotrainingscenariosthatencouragesuchprocessestobepractisedeffectively.Whenitcomestothefight,thesesamecommandersapplyexistingdrillsandtacticalmodelsinanaggressivemannerwhilehopingthatthethreatisnotsomehowdifferenttothatwhichthemodelwasoriginallyformulatedtodefeat.Suchanapproachisachievableintrainingscenarioswithapredictableopponent,butismoredifficultwhenmilitaryforcesundertakecombatintherealworld.

ExperiencedsoldiersfromAustralia’spreviousconflictsrecognisedhowtodefeatthethreatstheyconfronted—fromMonash’suseofcombinedarmsontheWesternFronttosection/platoon-levelambushsuccessinthejunglesofVietnam.10Yeteventhesesuccessfultacticalmodelsonlyretaintheirutilityagainstthethreatandterraintheyweredesignedtodefeat—platoonjungletacticsfromcounterinsurgencyoperationsarenotbestpracticeinanunlimitedconventionalwarinthemuddytrenchesoftheWesternFront.Unfortunately,thecontinuedprofessionalisationoftheArmyhasperhapsreinforcedaperceptionthatitpossessesarepertoireofdecisivemanoeuvresthatwillalwaysresultintacticalvictory.11DoctrineandStandardOperatingProceduresareread,understoodandemployed,butrarelychallenged.12ProvocativeformerArmyofficerJamesBrownaccuratelyidentifiesthat‘armiesdonotinnovateunlesstheyhavesystemsexpresslydesignedtostimulatenewideas’.13Arguably,suchsystemsarenotpresentwithintheAustralianArmy.14InnovationacrosstheArmyhasbeenstifledandthestrictrelianceonexistingtacticalmodelsisprobablyaresultofthe‘conform-to-pass’environmentcreatedbytheArmy’straininginstitutionsandexercises.15TheArmy’strainingframework,theForceGenerationCycle,isprincipallydesignedtocertifyunitsfordeploymentonoperationsandtosatisfythe‘ready’criteria.16Thisbegsthequestion:‘ready’forwhat?TheassumptionisthattheArmyis‘ready’toundertakecombatagainstAustralia’sfuturethreatelements.YettheArmycannotpredictwhatformthatbattlewilltake.Torespondtothisuncertainty,itespousesaconceptofadaptability,asarticulatedinAdaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept(AC-FLOC).

The Adaptive (tactical?) Army

AC-FLOCpresentsarealisticsummaryoftheunpredictablecharacteristicsoffuturethreatelements.17Whileitistruethatthefutureoperatingenvironmentwillbeinfluencedbytheriseofnewgreatpowers,non-stateactorsandresourcelimitations,theidentityoftheArmy’sfutureadversaryremainsuncertain.18However,



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regardlessofthegeopoliticalsituation,itissafetoassumethatthecommanderofitsnextadversarywillattempttoexposeweaknessesintheArmy’stacticalmodels,potentiallythroughirregularcombatratios,legalstatusambiguityorweaponsystems,particularlyinthechemicalorelectronic/cyberrealm.19Yet,iftheArmy’sfutureenemyisunknown,howcanitbe‘ready’forthenextbattle?

Indiscussingfutureconflictatthetacticallevel,AC-FLOCcondensesthechallengeoffightingthreatgroupsbydeclaringthat‘ComplexWarisacompetitivelearningenvironment.’20Towinthelandbattleinalearningenvironment,theArmyrequiresalearningmodel—asystemthatpromotesinnovation.21However,insteadofprovidingpracticalsolutionstopromotealearningmodel,AC-FLOCsimplyendorsesthe‘act,sense,decide,adapt’cycleandreinforcestheconceptof‘missioncommand’toremedythetacticaluncertaintyoftheArmy’snextbattle.FollowingthereleaseofAC-FLOCinSeptember2009,manymilitarycommentatorsconfirmedtherequirementfortheArmytobe‘adaptive’and,unsurprisingly,Australiahasproventobeoneofmanymilitariestorecognisethatpreparingfor‘awar’requiresafocusonadaptation.22Yet,conceptssuchasAC-FLOChavechieflyconcentratedonpromotingoperationaladaptationandavoidedprovidingpracticalmethodsforachievingadaptationatatacticallevel.

FiveyearsonfromthereleaseofAC-FLOC,theArmyhasarguablyyettodevelopatrainingmodelthatadequatelyaddressesthechallengeoffuturecombat.23AstheAustralianDefenceForcewithdrawsfromoperationalcommitmentsinAfghanistan,theArmyisinauniquepositiontoreconsideritstrainingfocusandhowitaccountsfortheuncertainnatureoffuturethreatelements.Inparticular,theArmyhassome15years’experienceof‘fightingwars’toestablishtrainingenvironmentsthatpromotetacticaladaptation.However,afierceaversiontoexperiencesfromAfghanistanhasemergedinthemodernArmyandtheorganisationisindangeroflosingsomevaluablelessonsintheemploymentofmilitaryforcesonoperations.Ultimately,theArmycouldloseitsbestchanceofestablishingatrainingconstructthatentrenchesalearningmodel.

The Afghan model — a (slow) learning model?24

The‘Afghanmodel’isatermthatmilitarycommentatorsusetodescribetheframeworkofoperationsinAfghanistan.IntheAustraliancontext,the‘Afghanmodel’canbestbedescribedintermsofthreeelements:sub-unit(-)partneredpatrolswithoverwhelmingfiresupportagainstsection(-)dismountedthreatforces;thestrictemploymentofforceprotectionandcountermeasurestosafeguard



Page27

againstimprovisedexplosivedevices(IEDs)andsuicidebombers;andindependenttacticalactivitiesbySpecialForcesagainsthighpay-offtargets.25Suchactionshavebeenadoptedagainstavarietyofthreatforces,includingtheTaliban,theHaqqaninetworkandlocalcriminalsandpowerbrokers.

Importantly,thethreatelementsinAfghanistanarenotconstrainedbydoctrinaltemplates.Infact,likemostparticipantsincombat,theyaredrivenbyasingledesiretowinthefight.TheTalibanhasnotconformedtopredictablemodelsandhasactivelysoughttoidentifyandexploitweaknessesinAustraliantactics,techniquesandprocedures(TTPs).26Ultimately,thishasprovidedtheArmywithaveryimportantexperiencethathasnotbeenadequatelyreplicatedinitstrainingcontinuum—arealandcompetitivethreat.TheadaptivethreatinAfghanistanhighlightedtheessenceofAC-FLOC’s‘competitivelearningenvironment’andillustratedwhytheblindbutaggressiveapplicationofexistingtacticalmodelsisinsufficientforactualcombatoperations.

TimelyandaccurateintelligencewascentraltodefeatingthreatelementsinAfghanistan.27Importantly,anincreasedunderstandingoftheroleofintelligenceinidentifyingandcomprehendingthethreatandterrainwascriticalindevelopingnewandeffectiveresponsestocounterthreatstrengthsandimproveforceprotectionforAustraliansoldiers.Infact,theIPBandMAPprovedtheirworthwhenappliedcorrectly.28Despitethis,somelessonswereneverfullyrefinedatatacticallevelandtheoperationwascloudedbypoliticalsensitivities,casualtyaversionandthecomplexitiesofanunclearmissionandendstate.29Nevertheless,theArmyfoughtarealenemyandisnowwellplacedtousethoseexperiencestounderstandAC-FLOC’s‘competitivelearningenvironment’andrefinetrainingmethodsforthenextfight—thisistheutilityoftheAfghanmodel.AllcommandersshouldstrivetounderstandhowtousethoseexperiencestotrainandfightacombatbrigadeintheBeershebaconstruct.HowdoestheArmylearnfromAfghanistanandremaintacticallyadaptabletorespondtothefuturelandcombatrequirementsoftheAustraliangovernment?Bizarrely,somecommandersappeartobetryingtoachieveexactlytheopposite.

Return to the myth of pre-East Timor perfection

Unitandsub-unitcommandersguidethetacticaltrainingfocusoftheArmyonadailybasis.Inapost-Afghanistancontext,manyofthesecommandersespouseareturntobeing‘brilliantatthebasics’.30The‘basics’comprisedefineddrillsortacticalmodelsthatarerehearsedtoperfectionandgenerateenthusiasmfor



Page28

tacticalmilitarysuccessamongsoldiers.Undoubtedly,commandersatalllevelsshouldimplementrobusttrainingprogramstoimprovesoldierskills.Butwhodefineswhatcomprisesthe‘basics’?AsoldierintheNapoleonicerapossessedadifferentunderstandingofthedrillsandskillsrequiredtoachievetacticalvictorytothatofasoldierfromthesecondAustralianImperialForce.31Mostimportantly,the‘basics’arenotuniversal—noraretheynecessarilyenduring.32TheconflictinAfghanistanhasalreadytaughttheArmymuchaboutthefluidnatureofcombatoperations—theobviousquestioniswhysomecommandersaresoeagertoforgetthis.

Inrecentyears,adistinctloathingofexperiencesfromAfghanistanhasemergedwithintheArmy.ManycommentatorshaveattemptedtobethefirsttoidentifyshortfallsinAustralianTTPsemployedinAfghanistan.33However,aversiontothe‘Afghanmodel’isoftennottheresultofcriticalanalysis,butratheradrivetocondemnthemilitaryframeworkoftheirpredecessorsforthesakeofit—aprocessmostsuitablylabelled‘potentpost-revisionism’.Itisoftenamongunitandsub-unitcommandersthatpotentpost-revisionismismostprofound.34

Potentpost-revisionismhasstronglyinfluencedtheapproachofsomecommandersattherankofO4–O6(majortocolonel).Theiroft-arguedperspectiveonhowtheArmy‘shouldbe’canbebestsummarisedinonequotation:‘theArmywasatitsbestpriortoEastTimor’.35Whenunitcommanderscombinethispre-EastTimormindsetwiththeirdesiretobe‘brilliantatthebasics’,thedirectionoftheArmy’sfuturetrainingbecomesquestionable.Intheirreturntoapre-EastTimortrainingconstruct,the‘basics’advocatedbythesemid-levelleaderscomprisedefineddrillsortacticalmodelsthatweredesignedtodefeatapre-EastTimorenemy—theycannotbeuniversallyappliedasdecisivemanoeuvre.Mostcritically,themythofachievingpre-EastTimor‘perfection’reliesonbuildingtrainingscenariosthatreinforcetheconceptthattheArmywillfaceapredictableadversary—somethingitscombatexperiencehasproventobesimplyfar-fetched.36

Theintelligencefunctionisparticularlyvulnerabletopotentpost-revisionism.Mid-levelcommandershavethepropensitytodevaluethesignificanceoftheintelligencefunctionbecauseexercisingdrillsagainstapredictableenemyrequireslittletonoanalysisofthethreat.37Exercisingandcertifyingthe‘pre-EastTimorbasics’threatenstheArmy’scapacitytoproduceapracticedintelligenceframeworkand,assuch,threatensitscapacitytorespondtothe‘competitivelearningenvironment’identifiedinAC-FLOC.Insteadofprovidingadvicetothe



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manoeuvrecommanderonthreatandterrainbasedonsoundanalysis,areturnto‘thepre-EastTimormodel’mayseeintelligencecellssupplementedbyinjuredsoldiersforthepurposeofmakingmaps,constructingmudmodelsandwritingthreatscenariostosuitacommander’spredeterminedcourseofaction.

Fundamentally,thisapproachlacksintellectualrigour.Concentratingonpre-EastTimortacticalmodelsissuperficiallyattractive—rigidandpredictabledrillswithvolumesofexistingdoctrinewillalwaysappearefficient.38This‘pre-EastTimormodel’iscentredonanassumptionthatthecontentofpre-EastTimordoctrinewas(andremains)correct.Blindlyapplyingandreinforcingthisdoctrinewithoutcriticalevaluationiscauseforconcern.Infact,theover-emphasisonanyspecifictacticalprocess,includinglessonsfromAfghanistan,mustbeavoided,whiletacticaladaptationshouldbeencouraged.39Definingsomedrillsasthe‘basics’isdangerousasitimpliesthatthesedrillsareabsoluteanddiscouragesinnovation.Developingsuitabletrainingthatfocusesondefeatingathreatisaresponsibilityofcommandfromplatoontounit—anditisadecisionthatshouldbebasedonsoundanalysis.Mostimportantofall,simplyrevertingtooldmodelsforthesakeofitshouldnotbetolerated.TheArmyhastheopportunitytochangetheexistingtrainingcontinuumandavoidtheperiloustrendtopredictableexercises,butitappearsthatpotentpost-revisionismisalreadybeginningtotakehold.

The current training environment

WhenrespondingtotheArmy’scriesfortrainingscenariostoexercise‘awar’ratherthan‘thewar’,currenttrainingmodelsemployfixed/acceptableforceratiosofpredictableMusorianenemyelements.Toadd‘complexity’,scriptwritersintroduceIEDstodisruptconventionalmilitarymanoeuvre.40However,theinclusionofIEDsinfoundationwarfightingdoesnotmakewarinherentlycomplex;theunknownattributesofAustralia’sfutureadversaryarewhatmakeswarchallenging.UnlessareinforcedMusorianbattalionhasconductedanamphibiouslodgementinShoalwaterBay,theArmy’snextbattlewillalwaysbedifferenttotheexercisesithasconducted.Thetruthofpreparingfor‘awar’ratherthan‘thewar’isthattheArmycanneverbefullyprepared—andthisisarealitywithwhichtheArmymustbecomecomfortable.

However,theuncertaintyofthenextwardoesnotcondemntheArmytobeeternally‘unprepared’,butratherreinforcesthenecessitytodeveloptrainingopportunitiesthatpromoteadaptationratherthantheperfectionofdrillsorexistingtacticalmodels.41Toachievesuchtrainingenvironments,theArmy’scommanders



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mustbeconfrontedwithaparticularcauseforconcern.Tofullytestitsabilitytoadapt,theArmyneedsarealisticandconsideredadversarythatchallenges,adapts,recognisesandacceptsriskand,mostofall,fightstowinthelandbattle.42AnadversaryofthiscalibrepresentstheArmywithanuncomfortablerisk—theprospectofdefeat.43Institutionally,theArmyisafraidoffailure,fearfulthatall‘trafficlights’maynotbegreen.Yet,trainingandexercisesshouldbecentredonlearningandimprovement,identifyingweaknessesanddevelopingsolutions,notpurelyoncertificationormilitarysuccess.44

TheArmywillnotlearnvaluablelessonsthroughtrainingscenariosthatcontinuetoplacetheBlueForceinfavourablecircumstances.Mostmilitarieslearnquicklywhenunderthreatandrateofadaptationisanessentialelementofthrivinginacompetitivelearningenvironment.45TheArmyshouldbeconsistentlychallenged,andtrainingscenariosshouldencourageadaptationatalltacticallevelsofcommandtoallowtheorganisationtoquicklyandeffectivelyadapttodefeatanadversary—whateverformthatadversarymaytake.Ultimately,afocusonadaptationratherthanthestrictapplicationofdrillsagainstaconsistentnearpeerenemywillmeanthattheArmywillnotbeasefficientintheannualHamelscenario(infacttheAustraliancommandermayevenlose),butitwillbebetterplacedtorespondtotheunknownthreatwhenitdeploysonthenextoperation.

An alternative path — recommendations to promote tactical adaptation

Currently,theArmyisrightfullyconcentratingonmid-intensityconventionalwarfareasnomilitarycanriskignoringthethreatofunlimitedstate-centricconventionalwar.46

YetaconventionaltrainingfocusdoesnotprecludetheArmyfromintroducingscenariosthatpromotetacticaladaptationinitsjuniorcommanders.Theblindapplicationofsmallteamtacticsthatgrewoutofconflictinthetwentiethcenturywillnotbesufficienttocounterthenextunpredictablethreat.47Infact,testingtacticaladaptationwillnotbeeasy.However,someachievablerecommendationsinclude:



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• AllexercisesinaForceGenerationCycleshouldbeconnected,justasrealconflicthaspeaksandtroughs.Timebetweenexercisesshouldbeusedbystafftoconsolidateandevolvetacticsforsubsequentoperations.

• Commandersshouldconcentrateonimprovingtacticsagainstaconventionalthreatforceinmid-intensitywarfighting.

• Exerciseadversaries,bothstateandnon-state,shouldbefullydevelopedandintroduceunknowntacticsorequipmentduringtheexercisecyclewithincreasedeffectivenessagainstAustralianelements.Suchunpredictabilitymayincludesmall-team,swarm,airborneorsubterraneantactics,orflame,electronic,cyber,chemical,biological,radiologicalandnuclearwarfare.48

• Australianintelligencestaffshouldidentifychangesandvulnerabilitiesintheexerciseadversary’sthreatmodel.

• Commandersshouldpromoteinnovationintheirsubordinatestodevelopandpractisetacticsbetweenexercisestodefeatsuchathreat.

• Allunitsshouldemploynewlydevelopedtacticstodefeatthreatsystemsindetail,orrecognisechangesinthethreatsystemtofurtherrefinesubsequenttacticalactions.

• Followingmajorexercises,unitsandformationsshouldreviewtheirabilitytobetacticallyadaptableandpreservelessonsofinnovationandcreativityinthefaceofanunknownthreat.

• Commandersshouldbeheldtoaccountiftacticaladaptationisnotachieved.

• Unitsshouldbeproudofandrewardedfortheircapacitytobetacticallyadaptable.

SomecommentatorswillsuggestthatintroducingunpredictabilityofthisnatureintotheForceGenerationCycleisunfeasibleandwouldconflictwiththealreadyrigorouscertificationrequirementstoreachtraininglevelsandstandards.Theymayalsoarguethatexercisesarealreadytoolimitedbyresourcesandthatcoreskillsatthelowertacticallevelmuststillbereinforced.Theseargumentsarecertainlyvalid.However,thegradualintroductionofunknownelementsintothetrainingcontinuumrepresentsanattempttobothdevelopcoreskillsandpromotetacticaladaptationwithintheexistingconstraintsofthetrainingconstruct.TherealityofnotpromotingtacticaladaptationisthatAustralianTTPswillonlyevolvewhenconfrontedwiththecatalystofcasualtiesonoperations,aswasthecaseinAfghanistan.49



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Moreimportantly,theArmy’sabilitytoquicklyadapttoanewthreatwillbehindered.A‘game-dayplayer’attitudewillbeinsufficientifsuchunpredictabilityoccursinastate-basedconventionalforcewherethetempoofconflictcouldproducecripplingcasualtiesbeforetheArmyrealisesthattheenemyisnotaMusorianbattalion.

Conclusion

TheArmyisinauniquepositiontoeffectivelyshapeitstrainingfocustopreparelandforceelementsforfutureoperations.Itpossessesthetools,throughtheIPBandMAP,toaccuratelyderiveandexploitthevulnerabilitiesinathreatsystem.TheArmy’srecentcombatexperienceverifiedtheimportanceofrevisingTTPswhenfacedwithathreatthatdoesnotconformtoaknownmodel.However,asurgeofaversionto‘theAfghanmodel’andanemphasisonthe‘perfection’ofthepre-EastTimordaysthreatensthelossoftheArmy’sonlyrecentexperienceofadaptingtactics.Withoutrobustdiscussionbetweenmilitaryprofessionalsandrevisionofthecurrenttrainingmodel,theArmywillbepoorlyplacedtoaccountforthethreatandterraininthenextbattle.TheArmymustreconsiderthelessonsofAfghanistan,promotealearningmodeloftacticaladaptationandintroduceunpredictabilityintotrainingscenariostopreparesoldiersforthevolatilityofthenextthreat.OnlythroughreformwilltheArmyfinallybeposturedtoadaptandovercomeAustralia’sfutureadversaries.



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THE AUTHOR

LieutenantNicholasBarbergraduatedfromtheRoyalMilitaryCollege–DuntrooninDecember2011anddeployedtoAfghanistanaspartoftheAustralianArtilleryMobileTrainingTeamin2012.HeiscurrentlyanIntelligenceOfficeratthe1stIntelligenceBattalion.

ENDNOTES1 AustralianArmy,LandWarfareDoctrine,5-1-4The Military Appreciation Process,LandWarfare

DevelopmentCentre,Puckapunyal,1999.

2 J.B.Brown,The Decisive Point: Identifying Points of Leverage in Tactical Combat Operations,UnitedStatesArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege,Leavenworth,1996.

3 R.Smith,The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World,PenguinBooks,London,2005,pp.14–16.

4 DirectorateofPlans–Army,The Australian Army: an Aide-Memoire,DefencePublishingService,Canberra,2014,p.5.

5 W.Murray,Military Adaptation in War,InstituteforDefenseAnalyses,Alexandria,US,2009.

6 LWD5-1-4The Military Appreciation Process.

7 Brown,The Decisive Point,p.8.

8 R.Barrett,‘Boldnessbemyfriend:Whythehighriskplanisoftenthesafest(andthemostsuccessful)’,Australian Army Journal,Vol.VII,No.3,LandWarfareStudiesCentre,2010,pp.9–18.

9 S.Holmes,‘Decision-MakingattheTacticalLevel’,Australian Army Journal,Vol.IX,No.3,LandWarfareStudiesCentre,2012,pp.89–106.

10 AnotableanalysisoftacticaladaptationinconventionalwarfareisthatofT.A.Lupfer,The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War,UnitedStatesArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege,Leavenworth,1981.OtherrelevantpublicationsincludetheanalysisofAustraliantacticsinVietnaminB.HallandA.Ross,“‘Landmark’BattlesandtheMythsofVietnam”inC.Stockings(ed.),Anzac’s Dirty Dozen,UniversityofNewSouthWalesPress,Sydney,2012,pp.186–209;D.Kilcullen,Counterinsurgency,ScribePublications,Melbourne,2010,pp.19–20.

11 Murray,Military Adaptation in War,pp.2–4.

12 ForagoodexampleofajuniorofficerchallengingexistingmanoeuvredoctrineseeM.Tink,‘Non-LinearManoeuvre:AParadigmShiftfortheDismountedCombatPlatoon’,Australian Army Journal,Vol.X,No.1,LandWarfareStudiesCentre,2013,pp.83–93.

13 J.Brown,‘TheChallengeofInnovationintheAustralianArmy’,Security Challenges,Vol.7,No.2,2011,pp.13–18.

14 TheArmyhasattemptedtocreateelectronicforumsforlessonslearntandeducationprogramstoencourageacademicwritinginitsofficers.Unfortunately,suchavenuesdonotappealtocontemporarycommanders,noraretheytacticallyfocused.

15 H.Bondy,‘PersonalityTypeandMilitaryCultureintheAnglo-West’,Australian Defence Force Journal,No.169,2005,pp.4–14;J.Brown,‘FiftyShadesofGrey:OfficerCultureintheAustralianArmy’,Australian Army Journal,CultureEdition,Vol.X,No.3,2013,pp.250–52.



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16 AustralianArmy,Changes to Army’s Force Structure Under Plan Beersheba,CADirective29/11.

17 HeadModernisationandStrategicPlanning–Army,Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept,Canberra,2009,pp.1–18.

18 DepartmentofDefence,Defence White Paper 2013.

19 D.Ball,‘China’sCyberWarfareCapabilities’,Security Challenges,Vol.7,No.2,2011,pp.81–103.

20 Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept,pp.31–32.

21 K.Gillespie,‘TheAdaptiveArmyInitiative’,Australian Army Journal,Vol.VI,No.3,LandWarfareStudiesCentre,2009,p.15.

22 SeeAustralian Army Journal,Vol.VI,No.3,LandWarfareStudiesCentre,2009;DirectorateofLandConceptsandDesigns,Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow – A Land Operations 2021 Publication,Ontario,2011;J.C.Crowleyetal.,Adapting the Army’s Training and Leader Development Programs for Future Challenges,SantaMonica,2013.

23 Holmes,‘Decision-MakingattheTacticalLevel’.

24 WhilethefollowingdiscussiondoesnotrelatespecificallytotheconflictinAfghanistanandmayincludeaspectsrelevanttorecentoperationsinIraqandEastTimor,‘theAfghanmodel’ismostwidelyknowninthecontextofthemodernAustralianArmy.

25 G.Rice,‘LessonsLearned:WhatdidwelearnfromthewarinAfghanistan?’,Australian Army Journal,Vol.XI,No.1,2014,pp.12–16.

26 QR.Johnson,The Afghan way of war: how and why they fight,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2012,pp.249–98.

27 S.Gills,‘Remainingtimelyandrelevant:keychallengesforArmy’sintelligencecapabilitypost-Afghanistan’,The Bridges Review,Issue1,2013,pp.13–26.

28 M.Bassingthwaite,‘TakingTacticsfromtheTaliban,TacticalPrinciplesforCommanders’,Australian Army Journal,Vol.VI,No.1,LandWarfareStudiesCentre,2009,pp.25–36;AustralianArmy,LandWarfareDoctrine3-0-1Counterinsurgency.

29 J.Brown,‘WhatdidwelearnfromtheWarinAfghanistan?’,The Age,30October2013.

30 S.Kilma,‘CombatFocus:acommander’sresponsibilityintheformation,developmentandtrainingoftoday’scombatteam’,Australian Army Journal,Vol.X,No.2,LandWarfareStudiesCentre,2011,p.105.

31 J.Black,The Battle of Waterloo: A New History,IconBooks,London,2010,pp.3–21.

32 ItisusefultocomparetacticalinnovationpriortotheFirstWorldWar.SeeMurray,Military Adaptation in War,pp.98–106.

33 Brown,‘WhatdidwelearnfromtheWarinAfghanistan?’

34 J.Hammett,‘Weweresoldiersonce…thedeclineoftheRoyalAustralianInfantryCorps’,Australian Army Journal,Vol.V,No.1,LandWarfareStudiesCentre,2008,pp.39–50.

35 Averbatimquotefromacurrentmid-levelcommander.

36 J.Blaxland,The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard,CambridgeUniversityPress,PortMelbourne,2014,pp.121–27.

37 LieutenantColonelS.,‘TheCollectivePreparationofArmyIntelligenceProfessionalsforDeployment’,The Bridges Review,2013,pp.9–11.




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39 G.P.Gentile,‘AStrategyofTactics:Population-centricCOINandtheArmy’,Parameters,UnitedStatesArmyWarCollege,Pennsylvania,2009,pp.12–15.

40 ExerciseHAMEL2014wasagoodexampleofscriptwritersunrealisticallyaddingexercise‘complexity’.TodisruptaconventionalmilitaryforceindepthanddistracttheBlueForcecommander,anunconventionalenemywithnoprevioushistoryofemployingIEDsdevelopedadiverse,sophisticatedandacceleratedIEDcapabilitycommensuratewiththefinalyearsofoperationsinIraq—insevendays.

41 C.Clausewitz,On War(1832),OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2007,pp.68–69.

42 M.Barbee,‘TheCTCProgram:LeadingtheMarchintotheFuture’,Military Review,July–August2013,pp.16–22.


44 Gillespie,‘TheAdaptiveArmyInitiative’,p.15.

45 S.Winter,‘“Fixed,Determined,Inviolable”MilitaryOrganisationalCultureandAdaptation’,Australian Army Journal,Vol.VI,No.3,LandWarfareStudiesCentre,2009,pp.63–64.

46 J.Blaxland,‘RefocusingtheAustralianArmy’,Security Challenges,Vol.7,No.2,2011,pp.47–54.

47 HeadModernisationandStrategicPlanning–Army,Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept,pp.31–32.

48 ExerciseadversariesshouldbedrivenbytheFuture Land Warfare ReportproducedbyModernisationandStrategicPlanningDivision–AustralianArmyHeadquarters.

49 Rice,‘LessonsLearned:WhatdidwelearnfromthewarinAfghanistan?’,p.14.



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TheUseofArmouredPersonnelCarrierSquadronswithinCombatBrigadesMajorMitchellWatson

ABSTRACT

Thisarticleexaminestheroleanduseofoneofthelargestandmostflexiblesub-unitsinacombatbrigade,thearmouredpersonnelcarrier(APC)squadron.Itcontendsthat,withoutabetterunderstandingofallaspectsofthecombatbrigadeacrossthelandforce,theArmymaynotutiliseitscombatassetstobesteffect.Basedontheauthor’spersonalexperience,thearticleexplainsthebestuseofanAPCsquadronandcontraststhearmouredmobilityoftheAPCwiththeprotectedliftprovidedbytheBushmastervehicle.ItalsoprovidesrecommendationsforfuturebattlegroupandbrigadecommandersonhowtoutilisetheAPCcapabilityforoptimaleffect.


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Introduction

Thisarticleisdesignedtoconveymyobservationsonandrecommendationsfortheuseofanarmouredpersonnelcarrier(APC)squadronwithintheAustralianArmy’smodernmanoeuvrebrigade.Thetargetaudienceincludescurrentandfuturebattlegroupandbrigadecommanders,andstaffofficersandplannersacrosstheArmy.IwritefromtheperspectiveoftheAPCsquadroncommanderduringboththe2013ArmouredCavalryRegiment(ACR)trialwiththe3rdBrigadeandwithinthe1stBrigadein2014.AcombatbrigadeunderthePlanBeershebaconstructprovidesabrigadecommanderwiththeabilitytotask-organisehisforcesindifferentwaysdependingonthemissionandthebrigade’semploymentwithinthespectrumofconflict.Theemploymentofthecombatbrigade’sAPCsquadronoughttobewellconsideredasitisasub-unitwiththecapacityandflexibilitytobeusedinmanydifferentwaysandforarangeofdifferentfunctions.

ThisarticleisdesignedtostimulatethoughtanddebateamongprofessionalmilitarythinkersonhowtobestutiliseAPCsquadronswithinthePlanBeershebaconstruct.ThekeythemesincludetheblurringofthelinesbetweenAPCs(atrackedarmouredfightingvehicle)andBushmasters(awheeledtransportvehicle)overthepastdecade,thedifferencesbetweenmechanisedandmountedinfantryinabrigade,thegroupingandregroupingconsiderationsforabrigadeheadquarters,andadiscussionofthetworolesoftheAPCasarmouredmobilityorcavalry.ThearticleconcludeswithanumberofrecommendationsfortheuseofanAPCsquadronwithinthecombatbrigadesofthefuture.

Definitions of armoured mobility (APCs) and protected lift (Bushmasters)

BeforediscussinghowbesttouseAPCsquadronswithincombatbrigades,Iwillstartbydefiningwhatarmouredmobilityandprotectedliftassetsareandwhattheydo.Armouredmobilityreferstothetransportationofforcesinandthemovementofarmouredfightingvehiclesclosetoenemylocations.Armouredmobilityunitsprovideahighdegreeofprotectionfrombothballisticandconcussiveblasttrauma,aswellasimprovedprotectionfortheinfantrycarriedinsidethevehicle.TheAustralianArmycurrentlyusesanAPC—theM113AS4—inthearmouredmobilityrole.Inthefuture,theLand400projectmaydeliveraninfantryfightingvehicle(IFV)variantwhichmayprovidebetterprotectionandfirepowertotheAustralianArmy.1Protectedliftunits(protectedmobilityvehiclessuchasthe

TheUseofArmouredPersonnelCarrierSquadronswithinCombatBrigades

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Bushmaster)transportforcesaroundanareaofoperations.Theyprovidesomedegreeofprotection,particularlyagainstconcussivetrauma,butarenotdesignedtobeemployedinafightagainstadefendedenemy.2

The Army’s blurring of the lines (APC versus Bushmaster)

APCsquadronsexistedwithintheAustralianArmyfromthe1960suntil2006andtheiruseisnotanewconcept.However,inrecenttimes,andparticularlyfollowingthearrivaloftheBushmaster,theroleofanAPCunithasbeenconfusedwiththatofatransportunit.Underthe1970sArmouredCorpsregimentmodel,APCswerefoundinthe2nd,3rdand4thCavalryRegimentsand,until2006,theywerealsolocatedinBSquadron,3rd/4thCavalryRegiment(BSqn,3/4Cav).Since2006,BSqn,3/4Cav,anArmouredCorpsunit,hasoperatedwiththeBushmasterprimarilyinitsprotectedliftrole,causingconfusionovertheroleoftheArmouredCorpsandtheuseoftheBushmaster.Bushmasterswereonlyeverdesignedtoenhancetheprotectionofinfantrywhilemovingasfarasanassemblyarea.WhiletheBushmaster’sabilitytosaveliveswasproveninIraqandAfghanistan,itsusepromptedagenerationofcommandersandsoldierstobelievethateveryvehiclecanbeemployedinthesamemanner—asatransportvehicle.

TheuseoftheBushmasteronoperationsmarkedtheinitialblurringoflinesbetweentransportandarmouredmobility.Tofurtherconfusetheissue,between2006and2013,onlythe1stBrigadewasequippedwiththeM113AS4,whichmeantthatthebulkoftheArmywasnotexposedtoarmouredmobilityandgenerallyhadmoreexperienceinprotectedlift.Asaresult,themajorityoftheArmysawatransportasset,theBushmaster,asthemeanstoclosewithanenemy.TheM113AS4wasalittle-knowncapabilityoutsidethe1stBrigadebutwaslargelyassumedtobeaBushmasterwithtracks.TheArmynowrisksmisusingorunderutilisingtheAPCsquadronsthatarecurrentlyequippedwiththeM113AS4.3TheuseoftheBushmasterwithinBSqn,3/4Cavanditsemploymentastheprimarytroop-carryingvehicleonrecentoperationaldeployments,coupledwiththerecentreintroductionoftheM113AS4totheArmouredCorps,havecreatedtheimpressionthatAPCsaresimplya‘lift’asset.Unsurprisingly,thishascausedconfusionontheuseofAPCsquadronsatthetacticallevel.


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The two roles of APC units — armoured mobility and cavalry

APCunitshavetworoles—armouredmobilityandcavalry—andtheycanbeusedforintelligence,surveillanceandreconnaissanceormanoeuvre.ThusfarIhavediscussedtheAPCstrictlyintermsofitsarmouredmobilityrole—therolethatIexpectAPCsquadronsaremostlikelytofillinaninfantry-heavycombatbrigade.ThearmouredmobilityroleisthemostcommonandthemosteasilyidentifiablewithintheAustralianArmysoIwilldiscussthisfirst.ThelesserknownandpossiblymorecontroversialuseofAPCsinacavalryrolewillbethesubjectofalatersection.

Armoured mobility role

APCunits,regardlessofvehicletype,havehistoricallyhadthecapacitytocarryandfightwithdismountedtroops.TheAPCsquadronsofthearmouredcavalryregimentsareoptimisedandfittedtofightwiththefightingelementsofaninfantrybattalionincludingtheheavyweaponsplatoonorthemortarplatoon,plussomeengineersandartilleryobservers.UnderPlanBeersheba,withtheadoptionofoneAPCsquadronpercombatbrigade,asquadroncanprovidearmouredmobilitytoaroundabattalion’sworthofinfantry,threeartilleryobserversandtwocombatengineertroops.Thesquadroncanbetask-organisedinwhateverconfigurationofcombatteamsandbattlegroupsthebrigadecommanderandbattlegroupcommandersseefit.Inthearmouredmobilityrole,theAPCsprovideaninfantrycommandertheabilitytomanoeuvrehisforcemountedwithintheAPCs,toutilisetheAPCsasaseparatecombatarmphysicallyseparatefromhisdismountedinfantry,4oreveninacombatservicesupport(CSS)role.5Intermsofsupportingindirectfires,theAPCsquadronhasthecapacitytoprovidearmouredmobilitytoonemortarplatoonandenablesartilleryobserverstomovearoundthebattlefieldwiththeprotectionofarmour.ThemortarscanfirefromwithintheM113AS4,allowingabattlegroupcommandertodeployhismortarsquicklyandwithprotection.TheuseofAPCsatthehigherendofthespectrumofconflictisoptimisedwhentheyaretask-organisedwithinfantry,tanks,artilleryobserversandengineers.Inessence,whenemployedinacombatrole,APCssupportthemovementoftroopsinordertoapplyfirepowerandeffectstogainpositionaladvantage.


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Cavalry role

APCunitsaresensorsandapotentialsourceofinformationlikeeveryotherpersonorunitonthebattlefieldandtheycanbeemployedascavalry.6Theindividualvehiclecraftusedinmanoeuvringarmouredfightingvehiclesiscommontoallvehiclesinallroles,andistypicalofthedrillscommontoallarmouredcrewsasspecifiedinLWP-CA (MTD CBT) 3-3-1 - Mounted Minor Tactics.Itisnotadarkarttomanoeuvredifferenttypesofarmouredvehicles.Theperformanceofcavalrysoldiersinthereconnaissanceroleisenhancedbysuchskillsastheuseofgroundtoremainundetectedandstealthinapproachinganenemylocation.Theofficers,non-commissionedofficers(NCOs)andsoldierswhoaremembersofAPCsquadronsarehighlycapablecavalrysoldierstrainedinmountedreconnaissance.TheywillhaveservedinanAustralianlightarmouredvehicle(ASLAV)squadronorwillhavebeenexposedtomountedreconnaissancethroughtrainingattheSchoolofArmour.

WhilethecrewsofanAPCsquadronareproficientinthecavalryrole,theM113AS4hasitslimitationsandisnotascapableastheASLAVormanyotherpurpose-designedreconnaissancearmouredvehicles.Thesightingsystemsarenotthermal-capableandcannotextendvisionasfarasthoseofotherreconnaissancearmouredvehicles.Inaddition,thetwo-mancrewlimitstheamountoftimeanAPCsectioncanremaininanobservationpost.TheAPC’sarmamentisnotdesignedtodefeatotherarmouredvehiclesandthusM113unitsaremorelikelytowithdrawifdetectionbytheenemyispossible.Despitethis,acombatbrigadehaslittledepthinitsarmouredvehiclereconnaissanceandAPCorganisationscansupplementtheASLAVsquadron,canbeattachedasthebattlegroupreconnaissanceassetforanACR-basedbattlegroup,oractasanindependentreconnaissanceorganisationinlessriskyareasofthebattlefield.AnAPCcavalryorganisationwouldbeparticularlypotentinthereconnaissanceroleifgroupedwithdismountedreconnaissancesoldiers,reconnaissanceequipmentsuchasthermalsightsandlaserrangefinders,andotherassetssuchaselectronicwarfare,tacticalunmannedaerialvehiclesorhelicopters.Indeed,whenthisconceptwasadoptedduringthe3rdBrigade’sCombinedArmsTrainingActivityin2014whenBSqn,3/4Cavwasemployedinacavalryrole,theAPCsweregroupedwithsomeofthedismountedreconnaissancesoldiersfromthebrigadeandperformedwellinsupportofthebrigadeplan.WhiletheM113AS4hasitslimitationsinthecavalryrole,theLand400projectwilldeliveranewvehiclethatmaybemorecapableinboththecavalryandarmouredmobilityroles.Thisisthesubjectofalatersection.


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AnAPCsquadronisaninherentlyflexibleunitcrewedbyofficers,NCOsandsoldierstrainedtooperateinboththecombatandreconnaissanceaspectsofmountedmanoeuvre.Theycanbeemployedtoprovidemobilityforinfantryandusedasacavalryorganisation,particularlyiftheyaretask-organisedwithotherreconnaissanceelements.

APC squadron headquarters

TheAPCsquadronheadquartersisaninherentlyflexiblecommandandcontrolnodethatcanaddsignificantvaluetothebrigadeorbattlegroupplanineitherthearmouredmobilityorcavalryrole.TheheadquartersisM113-based,hasVHFcommunications,andiscommandedbyacombatcorps(ArmouredCorps)major.Inthearmouredmobilityrole,theheadquarterscanprovidemobilitytoaninfantrybattlegroupcommander,allowinghimtotraversethesamegroundashisvehicle-mountedinfantryandtankswhilealsocommandingthebattle.TheAPCsquadroncommandercanassistincontrollingthemountedmanoeuvreonbehalfofthebattlegroupcommander,adheringtohisplan.ThesquadroncommandercanalsocommandtheAPCsquadroninitscavalryrole(withitssignificantamountofarmouredfightingvehicles)asdescribedearlier.Ifthebrigadeplanrequiresahighdegreeofflexibilityandgoodcommunications,theheadquartersisideallyplacedtocommandandcontrolamountedcombatteamincludingtanks,APCs,infantry,artilleryobserversandengineers.DuringExerciseHamelin2013,theAPCsquadron’sheadquarterscommandedacombatteaminabattlegroupand,later,the3rdBrigade’sreservecombatteam.TheAPCsquadronheadquartersisaflexiblecommandandcontrolnodethatcanoperateinthearmouredmobility,cavalryorcombatteamrole.

Issues and recommended solutions

Thedifferenttypesoffightingunitswithinacombatbrigadehaveincreasedtheburdenonthebrigadeheadquartersintermsoftraining,detailedtacticalplanningandlogisticalsupport.ThecommonbrigadestructuresthatwillresultfromPlanBeershebawillhaveapositiveeffectacrosstheArmy,butwillincreasethepressureonbrigadecommandersandunitcommanderstoensurethatcombinedarmstrainingachievestheappropriatestandardandcomplexity.ThissectiondiscussesmyobservationsandrecommendedsolutionstoissuesthatareinherentwithinacombatbrigadeandrelatedtotheuseofAPCs.


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Combined arms training

Thereisastarkdifferencebetweenthelevelofcombinedarmstrainingprovidedtoinfantryandarmourwhentheinfantryaremechanisedratherthanmounted.Themechanisedinfantryofthepast—infantrysoldierswhousedvehiclesthatwereintegraltotheirunit—wereverypowerful,particularlywhengroupedwithtanks.Inthecurrentstructure,mountedinfantry—infantrycarriedinarmouredvehiclesfromanotherunit(inthiscasetheAPCsquadron)—arepotentiallyjustaspotentaslongastheyaregroupedwithtanks,arefamiliarwiththedoctrineandarewellpractisedintheStandardOperatingProcedures(SOPs)ofmountedunits.CombinedarmsteamsthatincludeAPCs,tanksandinfantryrequiretimeandpracticetoensurethattheycanfighttoandthroughanobjectiveand,foranumberofreasons,thereisariskthatthiswillbedonepoorly.Thefirstreason,asdescribedearlier,isthattherolesofAPCsandBushmastersarecurrentlyconfusedandAPCsareregardedbysomeastransportassets.Bushmastersandutilityhelicoptersareameansofmovementonly,whiletheAPCsquadron’smobilityallowsAustraliancommanderstofightinadifferentway.Second,standardinfantrybattalionswillbepulledinanever-increasingnumberofdirectionsdemandingagrowingnumberofdifferentskillsets,includingthoserequiredfortheinfantry’sdismounted,airmobileandmountedroles.7AhighlevelofskillincombinedarmsmanoeuvrewillonlybeachievedifallinfantryandarmouredcommanderswithinabrigadeinvesttimeandeffortintolearninghowtousecombinedarmstheorywiththeArmy’sneworderofbattle.Ifunitcommandersdonotvoluntarilyconductcombinedarmstraininginthebarracksandinthefield,thebrigade’sheadquartersmayneedtoensurethatthisoccurs.PlanninganddirectionfromkeystaffinthebrigadeheadquartersmayneedtobemoretailoredtowardscombinedarmstrainingtopreventthedifferentarmouredcavalryregimentsandinfantrybattalionsfrombecomingtoodissimilartoachievetheintentofPlanBeersheba,tobeflexibleandreasonablysimilarinutility.

Command versus control

Themostcommonpointoffrictionininfantry-APCcooperationistheissueofwhoisincontrolofthebattleandwhen.WhileMLW 2-1-3 – APC Regiment,8themostrecentdocumenttoenshrineAPCdoctrine,is30yearsold,muchofitremainsrelevant.Forexample,IwouldrecommendthatinfantrycommandersremainincommandoftheAPCunitattachedtothemtomaintainunityofcommandatalllevels.However,itisprudentfortheinfantrycommandertodelegatecontrolofthemountedfighttotheseniormountedcommander(tankorAPC).Anelementoftrustbetweencommandersisessentialandislinkedtomypreviouspointonthe


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needforregulartraining.ThefutureACRdoctrine,thedraftLWP (CA) MTD CBT 3-3-7 – Armoured Cavalry Regiment,9willbevaluablereadingforanystaffofficerorcommanderwithinacombatbrigade.

Grouping and regrouping of APCs

Ifabrigadeistofieldthemajorityofitsunitssimultaneously,brigadeheadquartersfacesanincreasedburdeninplanningthedetailedregroupingwithinacombatbrigadeforbothtacticalandlogisticalreasons.Tactically,theBrigadeMajorandhisoperationsstaffwillplantwodownandtaskonedown;however,inacombatbrigadethatcontainsanAPCsquadron,abrigadeheadquartersmustplanthreedown.ThisisbecauseanAPCtroopisdesignedtofightalongsideaninfantrycompany,andanAPCtroopisthreelevelsofcommanddownfromabrigadeheadquarters.10TheBrigadeMajormustbeawareofthelocationofeachAPCtroopsothathecanplanthegroupingsofinfantrycompanieswithAPCtroops.Thisabilitytoplandownthreelevelsisparticularlyimportantinacombatbrigadegiventhepaucityofmobilityassetsintegraltothebrigade,andbecauseofthemilitaryaxiomthattheremustbethreeofanassetinbarrackstohavetwooftheminthefield(givenmedicalissues,leave,courses,vehicleserviceability,etc).TheremaynotbesufficientAPCs,Bushmastersandhelicopterstomanoeuvrealltheinfantry,particularlyasthemobilitycapacityofthebrigadeisdependentonthemanningandserviceabilityofvehicles.Theremaybeaneedtoprovidearmouredmobilitytodismountedtroopsinsequenceasopposedtosimultaneouslyasisoptimal.TheBrigadeMajorwillthushaveamoredifficultjobmanagingregroupingthaninthepast.

Alongthesamelines,thebrigade’sS4(thekeylogisticsplanner)mustbeawareofthetacticalplansohecanappreciatehowthinlythelogisticsassetsoftheACRandtheCSSBarestretchedwhenregroupingoccurs.ThelogisticsassetsoftheACRwillbetask-organisedtosupportthearmouredassetsofthebrigadebytheCommandingOfficeroftheACR,butthebrigadeS4mustbeawareofthebrigadeplansoastoenablethemanoeuvreplan.ThebrigadeS4staff,muchliketheBrigadeMajor’soperationsstaff,willhaveamoredifficulttimemanagingthelogisticalsupporttothebrigadeifregroupingistooccurfrequently.Irecommendthat,whenregroupingbetweenunitsinthefuture,thebrigadeheadquartersissuesadetailed‘regroupingorder’muchliketheonethatappearsinthecurrentmulti-rolecombatbrigadeSOPs.11ThedirectiontoregroupiscompletedprimarilyatbrigadeheadquarterslevelandaregroupingSOPinclusiveoflocation,unit,radiofrequency,timings,commandstatusandlikelymissionisessential.WithoutsuchanSOP,asignificantamountoffrictionwillbeinducedandtheriskoffratricide


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willincrease.‘Rapidregrouping’—regroupinginthemiddleofamission—wasattemptedonseveraloccasionsduringtheACRtrialof2013withinthe3rdBrigade.Giventhecommunicationssuite,speedandmobilityoftheM113AS4andtheabilityofArmouredCorpscrewmentoconductregularrendezvousprocedure,APCunitscanberegroupedrelativelyquicklyaslongastherequisiteplanningiscompletedatbrigadelevel.Whenacombatbrigadeismanoeuvringtwooreventhreeofitsbattlegroupssimultaneously,theabilitytogroupandregroupassetsacrossthebrigadewillbeanimportantskillforbrigadestaff.

Brigade-wide exposure to APCs — cavalry and armoured mobility roles

WhilePlanBeershebaisstillbeingimplemented,thetemptationtouseAPCsexclusivelyinthearmouredmobilityrolethreatenstobecomeapotentialweaknessinabrigade’sreconnaissanceplan.WhilewarplannerswouldneedtoconsidertheuseofunmodifiedM113AS4sinahighlycontestedbattlefieldinthefuture,therehavebeenoperationalexamplesinthepast15yearsinwhichArmouredCorpsandinfantrysoldiershaveusedtheM113inboththearmouredmobilityandcavalryroles.Inthecomingdecades,theM113AS4fleetislikelytobereplacedbytheIFVvariantoftheLand400project.TheprinciplethattheorganisationsthatcurrentlyuseAPCshaveanarmouredmobilityroleandaseparatecavalryrolewillremainthesamewhentheLand400vehiclesenterservice.Therefore,themoreexposurethatallelementsofthecombatbrigadeshavetotheAPCsintheirarmouredmobilityandcavalryroles,theeasierthetransitiontoLand400inthefuture.TheuseoftheAPCsquadronineitherthearmouredmobilityorthecavalryroleneedstoremainaconsiderationforbrigadeandbattlegroupcommandersinthefuture,particularlywiththerelativereductioninmountedreconnaissanceassetswithintheArmy.

Conclusion

APCsquadronsarenotnewtotheAustralianArmy,buttheiremploymentwithinacombatbrigadewillbenewtomany.Whencorrectlygrouped,trainedandcommanded,thecombinationofAPCs,tanks,infantry,engineersandartilleryobserversamplifiesthecombateffectivenessofthecombinedarmsteam.Thisarticlehasarguedthatthelevelofmountedcombatskillspreviouslyattainedbythemechanisedinfantryofoldwillbedifficulttoachieveunlessthereissufficientdrivefromcommanderstoconductcombinedarmstraininginbarracks,insimulationandinthefield.Pocketsofenthusiasmwithininfantrybattalionsandarmouredcavalryregimentswillnotbeenough.APCunitshaveanarmouredmobilityrole


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(pickingupandfightingwithinfantryclosetoanobjective,nottobeconfusedwithtakinginfantrytotheassemblyarealikeaBushmaster)andacavalryorreconnaissancerole.Forsomethiswillbeasimpleandlogicalargument,whileforothersitwillbeanathemaandsomethingtobeavoided.

Thateveryoneonthebattlefieldisasensorisnotacontestedargument,sotheuseofM113AS4stosupplementareconnaissanceplanshouldnotbediscounted,particularlyiftheyaregroupedwithdismountedreconnaissancesoldiers,electronicwarfareassetsorhelicopters.Thatsaid,theM113AS4doeshaveitslimitations.Itwasneverdesignedtofightagainstanotherarmouredvehicleandhasrelativelylightarmourandarmamentwhichmakesitvulnerabletoenemyattack.Itwasdesignedtosuppressenemyinfantryinacombinedarmsteamcontainingtanksanddismountedinfantryasaminimum.Inthearmouredmobilityrole,theM113AS4islessvulnerablewhencoupledwithtanksandinfantry.Inthecavalryrole,theM113AS4isbetterprotectedwhensitedinconcealedlocations,somethingthatArmouredCorpsofficersandNCOsaretrainedtodo.

Despitetheirlimitations,APCssuchastheM113AS4canaddvalueinboththearmouredmobilityandcavalryroles.ThefewoccasionsinthepastwhenAustraliansoldiershavewalkedintobattleprovidesufficientevidencethatarmouredmobilitywillremainpartofmodernwarfareinwesternarmies.WithinAustralia’sprimaryoperatingenvironment,thereiseverychancethattheArmywillberequiredtoconductcombatoperationsinareasthatarenotpermissibletowheeledvehiclessuchasBushmasters,G-wagonsorUnimogs.InEastTimor,forexample,M113AS1swereusedinboththearmouredmobilityandcavalryroles.IwouldurgeunitandbrigadecommanderstopractisewarfightingskillswiththeAPCsquadronofthebrigadeastheBushmasterelementheldwithintheCSSBswillnotalwaysbethemostappropriatevehicleonfuturebattlefields.TheM113AS4representsaninterimmeasureuntiltheimplementationofLand400,whichwillintroduceanarmouredmobilityvariantdesignedtoallowtheArmy’stwocombatcorps,theinfantryandarmouredcorps,toworktogethertoapproachandfightthroughanobjective.


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THE AUTHOR

MajorMitchellWatsonhasservedasatanktroopleaderinthe1stArmouredRegiment,acavalrysquadronsecond-in-commandinthe2nd/14thLightHorseRegiment(QueenslandMountedInfantry)andasanAPCsquadroncommanderinthe1stArmouredRegiment.Hisappointmentshavealsoincludedrolesasastaffofficeronunit,brigadeanddivisional-levelheadquartersinAustraliaandonoperations.HeiscurrentlyservingastheOfficerCommandingDSquadron(APC),1stArmouredRegiment.

ENDNOTES 1 LCVSProjectTeam,ProgramLAND400–LandCombatVehicleSystemdraftpreliminary

operationalconceptdocument,July2014at:http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/Multimedia/Preliminary_Operational_Concept_Document-9-5887.pdf

2 APMVisanyvehiclewhichhasprotectivecharacteristicstoenhanceitssurvivabilitybutisnotdesignedtodeliberatelyengageincombatwithinthedirectfirezone.Thesevehiclestendtoprioritiseprotectionoverfirepowerandtacticalmobility,butmayhavegreateroperationalmobilityasaresult.

AnAPCisanarmouredfightingvehiclegenerallyequippingarmouredpersonnelcarrierunitsormotorisedinfantry.AnAPCprovidestransportforitsoccupantstoasecureareatodismountandthencommencetheirassaultonfoot.Dependingonitsdegreeofprotection,mobilityandfirepower,theAPCmayprovidedirectfiresupportand/oraccompanythetroopsintheassault.APCsgenerallylacktheprotectionofheavierprotectedIFV.

AnIFVisanarmouredfightingvehiclegenerallyequippingmechanisedand/orarmouredinfantry.Thesevehiclesarespecificallydesignedtofightwitharmouredunitsbytransportinginfantryintotheassaultatspeed,undertheprotectionofarmourandsuppressingfire.Theinfantrymayremainmountedordismounttoassaultwitharmouredvehiclesandprovideintimateprotection.

3 DSquadron,1stArmouredRegimentisthe1stBrigade’sAPCsquadronandisbasedatRAAFEdinburgh,Adelaide.BSquadron,3rd/4thCavalryRegiment,isreceivingitsM113AS4sin2014–2015andwillbecomethe3rdBrigade’sAPCsquadron.Itwillberenamed‘BSquadron,2ndCavalryRegiment’whenthe2ndCavalryRegimentformallycomesundercommandofthe3rdBrigadein2015.ThenameoftheAPCsquadronthatwillresidewithinthe7thBrigadewasyettobeconfirmedatthetimeofwriting.

4 APCscanbeusedinanyphaseofwarwithintheManoeuvreBOS.Forexample,inoffensiveoperationstheAPCscanbeusedinanattackbyfireagainstadismountedenemy,asupportbyfireagainstanentrenchedenemyorinanurbanzone,orascut-offinsupportofaninfantryassault.Indefensiveoperations,APCscansupportacounter-attack,adeceptionplanorprovideintimatesupporttodefendabattleposition.Theseexamplesarenotexhaustive.

5 Forexample,anAPCsection/troopcanholdextraammunition,foodandwaterwithinthevehicletoresupplydismountedinfantryinthereorganisationphaseofanattack,orcanassistincasualtyevacuationintheeventtheambulancecapacityisoverwhelmedinamasscasualtyscenario.

6 TheroleofcavalryasdefinedinLWP-CA (MTD CBT) 3-3-6 – Cavalry Regimentisto‘locate,dislocateanddisrupttheenemythroughtheconductofoffensive,defensive,reconnaissanceandsecurityactivitiesbothmountedanddismounted.’Seep.1-4.


ARMOUR

http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/Multimedia/Preliminary_Operational_Concept_Document-9-5887.pdf

http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/Multimedia/Preliminary_Operational_Concept_Document-9-5887.pdf


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7 PlanBeershebaconceptofemployment,Version1.1dated19May14,p.23.

8 MLW 2-1-3 APC Regiment,p.9-9.

9 LWP-CA (MTD CBT) 3-3-7 – Armoured Cavalry Regiment (draft).

10 Brigade(brigadecommander),unit(ACRcommander),sub-unit(APCsquadroncommander)andsubsub-unit(APCtroopleader).

11 Multi-rolecombatbrigadeSOPs,AnnexBtoSOP3.7–RegroupingOrder,p.304(B-1).


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Logistics,StrategyandTactics:BalancingtheArtofWarLieutenantColonelDavidBeaumont

ABSTRACT

Thispapercontendsthatthethreeprimalconstituentsofthemilitaryart—strategy,tacticsandlogistics—mustbeunitedwithintheAustralianArmy’sfutureconcepts.Ifhistoryisanyguide,thiswillbeasignificantchallengefortheArmy’smodernisationandplanning.Yetthemarriageofthesecomponentsisnotnew.Indeed,BaronAntoine-HenriJominiemphasisedtheinseparablenatureoflogistics,strategyandtacticsinhisclassicworkThe Art of War.Otherauthorsalsoarguethatlogisticscannotbeconsideredinisolation;anyattempttoseparateitfromstrategyandtacticswouldrendereachofthethreeideasequallymeaningless.Thisarticledescribesanumberoffactorswhichhaveconspiredtodislocatestrategy,tacticsandlogistics,andothersthathavesimplyreducedlogisticstothepointofbanality.ThearticlefurtherarguesthatthepropensityoftheAustralianArmytoregardlogisticsasanancillaryscienceorasecondaryconcerndislocatedfromthegreatertheoriesofwarhasadetrimentaleffectonthedevelopmentofitsoperationalconcepts.Thishasonlybeenexacerbatedbytheintroduction


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oflogisticideasinimicaltothetruenatureofwarandwhichviewlogisticsasaburdentobereducedratherthanafunctionthatenablescombatpotential.AstheAustralianArmyreconcilesitsmodernisationprogramswithitsthinkingonfuturewar,itiscriticalthatitsoperationalconceptsrestoretheinviolable‘triptych’ofstrategy,tacticsandlogistics.Withoutthis,theArmyrisksfailureinwar—failurethatisentirelypreventable.

Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act, logistics brings troops to this point.

BaronAntoine-HenriJominiPrecisdel’ArtdelaGuerre,18381

Inpredictingthecharacteroffuturewars,itissufficientlychallengingtodeterminethewayinwhichanarmymustfightwithouttheaddedburdenofconsideringthelogisticsupportrequiredtosustainit.Yetitisimpossibletoconsiderwarwithoutaddressingallitsaspectsandinfluences.MartinvanCreveld’sopeningtoSupplying War,aseminaltextthathasattractedconsiderableacademicdebate,drewontheworkofrenownedNapoleonic-eratheoristAntoine-HenriJominitohighlighttheimportanceoflogisticstowarfare.Supplying Warconfirmedthatmilitarylogisticswasnotsimplytheadministrationofforces.Instead,logisticswasdescribedasfundamentallyconcernedwithresolvingquestionsofstrategyandtacticsandaninherentlynecessary—indeedaprincipalelement—oftheartofwar.

DuringtheconsiderableperiodthathaspassedsinceJominiwroteThe Art of War,theroleoflogisticswithinthetheoryofwarespousedbyWesternmilitaries,includingtheAustralianArmy,hasbeendiluted.AsnotedbyMartinvanCreveldwhenhereturnedtoprefaceSupplying Warsome30yearsafteritsfirstedition,logisticshasbeenconflatedtothepointofconsumingeverythingfromprocurementtoplanningtowarproduction.2Furthermore,andwithspecialrelevancetotheAustralianArmy’sfuturewardebate,logisticshasmovedfrombeingconsideredcentraltothetheoryofwartooccupyingtheroleofanancillaryscience.AstheAustralianArmyseekstodeterminehowitwillfightthenextwar,itiscriticalforlogisticstoregainitsfundamentalimportancesothatitmayproperlyunderpinthewayinwhichtheArmyfightsinthefuture.

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Thisarticlecontendsthat,astheArmyconsidersthepotentialwarsofthefuture,theconceptsderivedfromitsanalysismustreflecttheequivalencyofstrategy,tacticsandlogistics.Theapproachtakenispurposefullytheoreticalinnatureandnecessarilyfocusesonthelanddomain.Furthermore,giventheextensiveliteratureavailable,itdoesnotseektodescribeeitherstrategyortactics.3Itisfromtheoriesthatourfoundationalunderstandingofwarisderived,andthetheoryexaminedheredescribeswarfromtheperspectiveofarmies.Therefore,thisarticlefirstexaminestheideasofthosefewkeywriterswhohavesoughttocoherentlyexplaintherelationshipoflogisticstostrategyandtactics.Second,itseekstocontextualisetheseissueswithparticularreferencetotheAustralianArmy.Duetolimitationsofspace,however,thisdiscussioncanonlyprovideacursoryexaminationoftheseissuesandisthereforelargelydiagnosticratherthanprescriptiveinitsapproach.Nonetheless,inseekingbalancebetweenstrategy,tacticsandlogisticsintheartofwar,thisarticleaimstostimulatedebatesoastofurtherdeveloptheconceptsthatwilldeterminehowtheArmywillfightinthefuture.

Logistics and the triptych

Logisticshasalwaysbeenvitaltosuccessfulmilitaryoperations,andmanycampaignshavebeenfought,wonorlostbecauseofit.Mostcommandersunderstandthat,withouttherequiredresources,vehicles,personnelandotheressentials,armiessimplyceasetobecombateffectiveandplansarerenderedworthless.Mostwouldalsoagreethatthemostimportantroleofthelogisticianinwarisovercominga‘seeminglyendlessseriesofdifficulties’topreventthisoutcome.4However,itisoftenonlythroughfailurethatcommandersrealisethatstrategy,tacticsandlogisticscannotbeconsideredinisolationfromoneanother.Forexample,GermanFieldMarshalErwinRommel,havinglosthiscampaigninAfrica,famouslyconfirmedinapostscriptthat‘thebattleiswonandfoughtbythequartermastersbeforetheshootingbegins’,arevelationthatwouldhaveservedhimbetterattheoutsetofthecampaignratherthanatitsconclusion.5ThatheembarkedonhiscampaignwithoutrealisingtheimportanceofNorthAfricanportstotheprovisioningofhisforce,allthewhilederidingtheItaliansfortheirdefenceoftheirsupplylines,presentsclearevidenceoftheover-valuationofthetacticalcomparedtothestrategicorlogistic.6YetRommelwashardlyaloneindiminishingtherolethatlogisticsplaysinwarbeforeproceedingonanill-fatedcampaign.


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Logisticshasneverbeenregardedbycommandersasthemostattractiveaspectofwarfareinwhichtheyshouldinvesttheirtime.ThederivationprovidedbytheancientGreeks—logistesor‘thoseskilledincalculating’—providesampleevidencethatlogisticscanbeportrayedasahighlyuninterestingtopic.7Attheveryleast,suchuninspiringviewsoflogisticsoftenpromptcommanderstoneglecttoincludeitinthetheoriesofwar.Yetlogisticscannotberelatedtowarfare;inanunbreakableunionwithstrategyandtactics,logisticsiswarfare.Havingevaluated170yearsofUSArmylogistics,JamesHustondescribedthisrelationshipeloquently,writingthatmilitarylogisticsdelivers‘adequatepotentialoractualfirepowerorshock’tocriticalplacesandatcriticaltimes‘forachievingtacticalandstrategicaims’.8Asacomponentofthemilitaryart,Hustonregardedtheprimaryaimoflogisticsas‘askingtherightquestions’toidentifylocations,times,objectivesandthreatsituationsrelevanttotheprovisionofmaterialeffort.9Inanalysingthe‘generalship’ofAlexandertheGreat,MajorGeneralJ.F.C.Fullerwentsofarastodeclarethatsupplywasthebasisofstrategyandtactics.10However,neitherFullernorHustonwasthefirsttoclearlyenunciatetheequivalencyofstrategy,tacticsandlogistics.

BaronAntoine-HenriJomini,inThe Art of War,examinedlogistics(albeitfrustratinglybriefly)atatimeoftransitioninwhichlogistics,strategyandtacticsunderwentconsiderablechange.ForJomini,asamemberofNapoleon’sstaffandanactiveparticipantinhiswars,contemporarywarrevealedconsiderablelogisticchallengesthathadtobeovercomebycommanders.Attheriskofoversimplifyingthecircumstances,thescaleoftheconflictand,mostimportantly,theprojectionofmilitarypowerovercontinentaldistances,broughttotheforeissuesof‘marchesandcamps,andofquartering,supplyingtroops’.11PriortoNapoleon’scampaigns,thesmallerscaleandsizeofpre-industrialarmiesoftenallowedthemtosustainthemselvesdirectlyofftheland,plunderingorpurchasinglocalresourcesandothersupplies.12Jominiregardedhiscommanderaspossessingavirtuallyimpeccablerecordofreorganisationtomeetthenewstrategic,tacticalandlogisticneedsofhisenormousarmy.13However,asdemonstratedintheill-fatedRussiancampaign,thetemptationtoacquireacontinentalempireoutweighedNapoleon’scustomarycautioninrecognisingthelimitsofhislogisticsandlinesofcommunication,andhisambitionswereundone.14

Asarmiesofthetimedevelopedlogisticstructures,formationsandmethodstosupportthemselves,strategyandtacticswerenot‘liberated’fromlogisticsbutboundevencloser.15Armiesbecamelarger,asdidlogisticrequirements.AsJominirecounted,thechangingcharacteristicsofwar,andtheincreasingmobilityof


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armiesrequirednewapproachestologisticproblems.16Chiefsofstaffandtheirsubordinatesbecameconsumedwiththesupplyandmovementsofarmies,respondingtoplansthatwereoftenpreparedbythecommanderinisolation.17Indeedthedevelopmentofmodernconceptsofmilitarylogisticsoccurredvirtuallysimultaneouslywiththeemergenceofwhatisnowknownasthe‘operationalart’,amentalframeworkfordecision-makingwhichwas—amongotherfactors—shapedbytheplanningrequirementstosustainlargearmies.Bothlogisticsandtheconceptionoftheoperationallevelofwarthereforebecameinstrumentalfactorsintheestablishmentofmilitarystaffsystemsandhierarchiesdesignedtoorganisemodernarmies.

ItisunsurprisingthatJomini’simpressionsofNapoleonic-erawarfareledhimtogenerateanumberofideasonwhatpreciselycomprisedlogistics—fromthe‘artofmovingarmies’toamoregeneralisedroleintheexecutionof‘strategicandtacticalenterprises’.18Jominiwasapparentlyperplexedastowherelogisticsbelongedevenwithinhisowntheoryofwar,openingChapter6with:

Is logistics simply a science of detail? Or, in the contrary, is it a general science, forming one of the most essential parts of war? Or is it but a term, consecrated by long use, intended to designate collectively the difference branches of staff duty — that is to say, the different means of carrying out in practice the theoretical combinations of the art?19

Jomini’squestionsmayprompttheresponsethathewasconfusingtheconnectionbetweenstrategy,tacticsandlogisticswitheffectivestaffwork.ThisiscertainlytheargumentofFalklandsveteranandhistorianMajorGeneralJulianThompson,whonotesthatthemilitarystaffofthetimeweresoconsumedbysustainmentissuesthatanydistinctionbetweenoperationalplanningandlogisticswasbarelynoticeable.20CertainlyJomini’scontemporary,themuchveneratedtheoristCarlvonClausewitz,regardedlogisticsasnothingmorethana‘subservient’function,despitebegrudginglyacceptingitasuseful,ifnotnecessary.21Withlogisticssovitaltotheplanningofoperations,itisimpossibletoarguethatitisanythingbutcentraltothesubsequentconductofwarfare.Nonetheless,inemulationofClausewitz’sview,andcontrarytoJomini’sconclusions,modernWesternarmieshavelongsinceviewedlogisticsasoneofanumberofenablingsciencesthatinformschoicesratherthanasaninherent,inseparablefunctionofthechoiceitself.

WiththeincreasingcomplexityofwarfaresinceJomini’stime,militarieshavesoughttospecialisenominally‘subservient’functionssuchaslogistics.However,thisprocesshasalsoperpetuatedthedisjunctionoflogisticsfromitsformerly


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intimaterelationshipwithstrategyandtactics.InthevernacularofColonelGeorgeThorpe’sminorclassic,Pure Logistics,‘applied’logisticsattractsmoreinterestthananyreflectionofthetheoretical‘pure’formboundintimatelyintotheartandtheoryofwar.22MostmodernWesternmilitariesnowregardmilitarylogisticsasanancillaryappliedscience,amongthesetheAustralianArmy,whichdescribeslogisticsasthe‘scienceofplanningandcarryingoutthemovementandmaintenanceofforces’.23Inthismindset,logisticsbecomeslessaboutvictoryandmoreabouttechnocracy—arational,logical,process-drivenandcalculatedsystemofresourcemanagement.Withoutstrategy,operationsortacticstoconstrainit,ascientificapproachtologisticsbecomesanexerciseinnumbers,yetattimesrisksbecomingcompletelydevoidofcontext.

Warisaremorselessteacherand,timeandagain,hasproventobenohomeforaccountants.24Logisticsismorethanascienceormethodforcalculatinganidealisticpathtovictory.InreflectingonhistimeasseniorcoalitionlogisticianduringtheGulfWarof1991,retiredLieutenantGeneralWilliamPagonisdefinedlogisticsasan‘actiononreality’.25Beyondasimplereferenceforlogisticianstoapplyjudgement,intuitionandexperiencetoobservableproblems,Pagonisamplifiedthepointthatlogisticsisrelativetocontext.Logistics,heargued,onlypossessedmeaninginreferencetothestrategyandtacticsbeingapplied,andviceversa.Whilepredicting‘movement’and‘maintenance’requirementsforaforcemightbeimportantlogisticbusiness,logisticsisinvariablyaproductoffactorsknownonlyoncethefightingbegins.Yetparadoxically,aspartofthe‘theoreticalcombinationsofthe[military]art’andthechoicesofcommanders,logisticsitselfinfluencesthewayinwhichawarmightbefought,andthereforemustbeadeterminantofthestrategyandtacticsusedtoachievevictory.26

Thesefactorssuggestthatlogisticsisnotonlyvitaltoanytheoryofwar,butcompletelyinseparablefromitsconceptualandtheoreticalunderstanding.Or,asJominiwrote,asoneoftheprincipalelementsoftheartofwar,logisticsisessentialforthe‘formationandhandlingofagreatArmy’.27Therelationshipoflogisticstotacticsandstrategyisthushighlyintimate,thisvital‘triptych’socriticalthateachelementwouldberenderedequallymeaninglessifnotconsideredalongsidetheothers.28Thismeansthatthewayinwhichanarmyfights,andthestrategyitexiststoserve,mustbedeterminedbylogisticconsiderations,withappropriateattentionpaidbycommanders,plannersandlogisticianstothefundamentalcharacterofthesustainmentrequired.Itisthereforeself-evidentthat,astheAustralianArmyengagesinadebateoverthewayfuturewarsmaybefought,itwillbeinsufficienttoassumethatlogisticsissimplyancillarytothedesiredend.


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‘Qu’on ne me parle pas des vivres’29

All this will indicate the general influence that questions of supply can exert on the form and direction of operations, as well as the choice of a theatre of war and the line of communication. How far their influence will extend, and how much weight should be in the final analysis attached to the ease or difficulty of supply — those are questions that will naturally depend on how the war is to be conducted.

Clausewitz30

ItiserroneoustosuggestthattheAustralianArmyhasnotconsideredlogisticsinitsconceptualdevelopment.Certainlytherewouldbenocommanderwhodidnotalreadyappreciatethatproposedchangestomanoeuvreformationswillhaveprofoundimplicationsfortheirsustainment,aswilltheideasthatdeterminetheirconceptsofemployment.31Andso,inmovingfrombeingan‘armyatwar’toan‘armyofpreparation’,theAustralianArmyhassoughttodeterminewhetheritsplansandconceptsaresustainable.OverthelasttwoyearsHeadquartersForcesCommand,inimplementingtheArmy’sPlanBeersheba,hasdevelopedacombatservicesupportconceptofoperationsforthecombatbrigade(CSSCONOPS)whichisvirtuallyuniqueinthatitseekstobalancethetacticsofthecombatbrigadewiththerealityofactualforcestructureandlogisticlimitations.32However,inthebroadscopeoftheArmy’sconceptualdevelopment,suchaconstructrepresentstheexceptionratherthantherule.Thereislittleevidencetosuggestthattheinfluenceoflogisticsonstrategyandtacticshasbeenatopicofmorethanpassinginterest.

TheArmyhasnotalwayseffectivelybalancedstrategy,tacticsandlogisticswithinitsconcepts,andthereareanumberofkeyreasonsforthis.Itiseasytoarguethat,becauselogisticslackstheappealofstrategyandtactics,ithasbeenaffordedlessattentionthanitrightfullydeserves.33Thefactthatexamininglogisticstendstorevealweaknessesratherthanstrengthsisalsoapowerfuldisincentiveforanalysis,aproblemalmostcertainlylinkedtotheabsenceofdetailedtestingandevaluationoflogisticsduringmajorArmyexercises.However,thisisnotsimplyaproblemoftheskewedperspectiveofthecombatarms.Veryfewlogisticianswriteonlogisticswithoutbeingcompelledtodoso,letaloneengageindebateconcerningthefutureofwarfare.Fewerstillchoosetocommentoncombattacticsorstrategy,giventheperceptionthatthisisoutsidetheirtraditionalareaofexpertise.Thus,itisunsurprisingthatdebateontherelevanceoflogisticstothedevelopmentofnewstrategies,operationalconceptsortacticshasstultified.


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TosomeextentthelimitedinterestinunderstandingthenatureoflogisticshasbeenaconsequenceoftheArmy’sgoodfortune.OperationallogisticshasbeenrelativelyuncomplicatedforthemodernAustralianArmy.TheArmyofthepost-Vietnamerahasbeenfortunatethatitslogisticcapabilitiesandcapacitieshavenotbeenstressedtoastateofcollapsebyvirtueofstrategyandtacticsalthough,admittedly,ithasbeencloseonoccasion.AshistorianBobBreenwrites,inEastTimortheArmyflirtedwithdisastergivenitstenuousabilitytosustaintheforce,itslogisticcapacitybarelyadequatetosupportwhattheoperationdemanded.34PrecedingyearsofbudgetcutsandtheoutsourcingoflogisticcapabilitiestotheprivatesectororjointagenciesproducedahollownessthatbeliedtheArmy’slogisticcapacitytosupporttheprojectionofmilitarypowerfromAustralianshores.35

Yet,asThompsonwrites,when‘theexperienceofwarrecedes…logisticstendstotakeabackseattothemoreglamoroustacticsandstrategy.’36Adecadeofwarsofchoice,inwhichtheforcesdeployedhavebeenscrupulouslydesignedandstructuredtosuitthecapacity—orlackthereof—ofthelogisticelementssustainingthem,hasalsocontributedtothesupplantingofvaluablelessonswithinthecorporatememory.Moreover,theAustralianArmy’shistoricalpreferenceforintegrationintocoalitionforcesandtheirextensivesupportnetworkshasmeantthatitsweaknessesinlogisticshaveremainedobscured.37

FuturewarsmaymeanthattheArmycannotabsorblogisticriskintoitsforcegenerationcycle,andcurrentchoiceswillresonateintheoutcomesofthefuture.AstheArmyseekstoredirectitsattentionto‘high-intensity’conventionalwarfightingandoperationswithintheurban-littoral,wherelogisticproblemsbecomeparticularlyacute,reconcilingstrategy,tacticsandlogisticswillonlyincreaseinimportance.VitaldocumentssuchasanupdatedFuture Land Operating Concept,dueforreleasein2015bystrategicplannersandcriticaltothefutureshapeandmodernisationoftheArmy,willonlyberelevantiflogisticcapabilitiescansupportitsideas.GiventhecurrentsignificantlimitationsonlogisticcapacitywithintheArmy,questionsofsupplywillundoubtedlyshapetheformanddirectionofthewaysuchconceptsareexpressed,perhapseventotheextentthattheArmy’sveryconceptionsofbattlewillbetested.38AsdemonstratedintheexperimentalExerciseHeadline2014,whilethefuturearmouredcavalryregimentmightbeapotenttacticaladvancement,itwasregardedasvirtuallyunsupportablewithoutsubstantialrevisionoftheexistingmethodsforitssupplyandsupport.39ThisisoneofthereasonsthatcontroversialconceptssuchastheCSSCONOPSaresoimportant—theyattempttobetteraligntheproposedtacticsofthecombatbrigadewiththelogisticcapabilityandcapacityavailabletosupportit.40


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Theproblemsidentifiedinexperimentationorfutureplanningmaycauseconsiderablediscomfort,asmaythesolutions,butitisonlythroughtakingsuchadisciplined,plannedapproachthattheAustralianArmycanprepareeffectivelyforthefuture.Theonlyalternativetothisprocessresidesinguessworkorthemisapplicationofideasfromothersources—ideasthatareseductiveyetfundamentallydivorcedfromthetheoryofwar.Unfortunately,theArmy(andtheAustralianDefenceForcemorebroadly)hasbeenparticularlyadeptattakingtheseeasiersteps.Alreadytherehavebeensuccessivelogisticconceptsintroduced,reinforcedbyideasemergingfromcivilianbusinessschools,whichtendtomeshpoorlywithproposedstrategyandtactics,ifnotwithcombatmorebroadly.Themostdeficientusetheratiooflogistictroopstocombatforcesasameasureofmilitaryefficiency,whileproponentsexpresstheircertaintythatlogisticrequirementscanbemetbylowerlevelsofmanpowerand‘efficient’systemsirrespectiveofthecontextofwarorstrategyandtactics.Popularconceptssuchas‘distribution-basedlogistics’and‘leanlogistics’adoptedfromsupply-chaintheoryhavecapturedtheimaginationofmanymilitaryprofessionalscompelledtoachievemorewithless.41

However,wheretheseideastendtofalterisincombat.Inmisapplyingideasdevelopedspecificallyforthecommercialsector,militaryconceptsactuallysuborntheimportantrolelogisticsplaysindeliveringcombatpower.Whatreallymattersinlogisticsisnotwhetherthe‘toothtotail’ratiocanbekepttoaminimum,buthowmuchfirepowercanultimatelybeusedontheenemy.42Logisticsisnotaburdentobemitigated,butratheristhatcapabilitythatendowsacombatforcewithitspotentialtofight—toparaphrasethetitleofacademicJohnLynn’sbook,‘Marsmustbefed’.43Withthisinmind,‘solving’logisticproblemswithoutunderstandinghowtheforceappliesstrategyandtacticsinaparticularsituationisspectacularlyandobviouslyflawed.Atitsworst,logisticsoperatingbeyondthestrategyandtacticsofwarproduceshollowness,avulnerabilitythatonlyrevealsitselfwhentheviabilityofaforceistestedinbattle.Althoughhewasconsumedwiththeoperationalandmoralratherthanmaterialaspectsofwar,Clausewitzwarnedthat:

Ability to endure privation is one of the soldier’s finest qualities; without it an army cannot be filled with genuine military spirit. But privation must be temporary; it must be imposed by circumstances and not by an inefficient system or a niggardly abstract calculation of the smallest ration that will keep a man alive. In the latter case it is bound to sap the physical and moral strength of every man.44


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InconsideringClausewitz’swords,theArmymustnotforgetthatwarisnotaboutobscurearrangementsbasedonthefinedetailofmilitaryscienceorargumentsoversemantics.Whilelogisticiansmaynowdescribelogisticsusingtermssuchas‘efficient’or‘effective’,suchfalsedichotomiesdonotservethesoldierwell.Whatismoreimportantisthat,whentacticalandstrategicmethodsaredesigned,theyarecomplementedbyaneconomiclogisticplanthatreflects,respectsandadaptstothecharacteristicsofthewarthatwillbefought.

Nonetheless,itisimportanttoavoidoverlyveneratingtheartistryrequiredtobalancestrategy,tacticsandlogisticsattheexpenseofwhatJominicalledthe‘scienceofdetail’.Withoutappropriateconcernfordetail,artishollowandvacuous.HowevertherecomesapointatwhichtheArmymustalignitssustainmentmethodologywiththecharacteristicsofhowitistofight,ratherthanbasingitsmethodsonabstractideas.Solutionspredicatedonwhatcanbeachievedefficientlyinbarracks,suchasthebusinesssolutionsdescribedearlier,areunlikelytobeequallyapplicabletomilitaryoperations.Analysingspreadsheetsofcalculationsandvolumesofdataintheinterestsofseekingscientificefficiency,whilebeingimmenselyusefultoplanning,willneverguaranteesuccessonthebattlefield.Ontheotherhand,logisticconceptscreatedinfullcognisanceoftacticsandstrategy,andviceversa,justmight.

ItwouldthereforebeanunderstatementtosuggestthattheArmy’scurrentplannersfaceaconsiderablechallengeinrealigninglogisticstostrategyandtacticsintheconceptscurrentlybeingdeveloped.Aswarissubjective,determinedbyanincalculablevarietyoffactorsandinfluences,itwillbedifficultforconceptwriterstoproperlyunderstandhowaforceshouldbesustaineduntilithasbeenconstitutedorcommencesoperations.45Giventhattheyarerelativetotime,placeandcircumstance,logisticrequirementswillalwaysbedeterminedbysituationswithinthebroadermilitarycampaign.46Butsotoowillstrategyandtactics,ideasthatarethemselvesvariableyetaredefinedbylogisticsystems,structuresandbehaviouratafundamentallevel.Supportforapriorityordiversionofacommander’sattentiontoanothermaineffortwillinevitablyhaveimplicationsforthesustainment,andbyextensiontherateofeffort,ofotherelementsoftheforce.Thatscenario-basedexperimentationinExerciseHeadline2013revealedthatthreeevenlyweightedbattlegroupswithinacombatbrigadecouldnotbesustainedconcurrentlyisanunsurprisingtestamenttothistruism.47Notingthis,historyisrepletewithremindersthatanarmy’slogisticformationsandframeworksmayneverbeemployedasconceived,therebymakingitdifficulttofullyunderstandhowalogisticplanmightshapestrategyortactics.48However,byproperlyunifyingstrategy,tacticsandlogisticsintheArmy’soperationalconcepts,itispossibleto,attheveryleast,prepareforcesfortheinevitablefrictionofwar.


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TherearemanyotherproblemsandconcernsthatwillinfluencethedevelopmentoftheArmy’sfutureconcepts,notleastofthesetheimplementationofcurrentconceptssuchastheconceptofemploymentforthereinforcedcombatbrigade.IssuessuchasthegreatdisparityofopinionwithintheArmylogisticcommunityhavenotbeenexploredinthisarticle,butwillalsoundoubtedlyshapethewaythatlogisticianscontributepracticallytoachievingthisoutcome.However,itisworthdwellingononefinalpoint:itisunlikely,despitethepleadingsofmanywithintheorganisation,thattheArmywillbeabletoafford(bothfigurativelyandliterally)toaddresstheconsiderablehollownesspresentwithinitslogisticcapabilities.Inthecurrentfiscalenvironment,understandinghowtobeeconomicalwithlogisticswillbeessentialiftheArmyistobesuccessfulinwar.Imaginativesolutionstoanyperceivedlogisticweaknessmustappearinfutureconcepts,andthiscanonlyoccuriflogisticiansandothersproperlyunderstandthenatureofthestrategyandtacticstheysupport.Withthisinmind,itisnolongersufficientforlogisticianstomerely‘directlittle,influenceeverything’.49Theymustbeinvolvedin,ifnotlead,thedevelopmentofsensiblesolutionstoemergingchallengesinwarratherthansimplycritiquefromtheperipheryofthedebate.Thisway,logisticplanswillnotonlyconfirmwhatmightbedesirable,butwhatisactuallypossible.50

Ofcourse,thechallengeforthecombatarmsisnolesssignificantandtheymustdevotetheirowntimetothestudyofallaspectsofthetriptych.Thisgoesbeyondformingcloseworkingrelationshipswithlogisticians,orsimplyinteractingthroughformaltrainingandduringvariouscoursesasisoftenthecase.Thisisbecause,asvanCreveldwrites,logistics‘iscomplexinthesenseofmakingprolonged(andexpensive)studyessential’.51Itisaproblemexacerbatedbytheintroductionofnewtechnologiesandoperationalrequirements.Itisstriking,albeitperhapsunsurprisingonreflection,thatmanyofthemostprominentwritersonmodernlogisticshavenotbeenlogisticians,butmembersofthecombatarmswhoseviewshavebeenshapedbypersonalexperience.52Theyreachedtherealisationthatwarwillnottoleratetheuninformedwhenitcomestologistics.Despitethis,thereareveryfewprinciplesortheoreticalinsightsonthenatureofwartoguidefuturelearningand,despitetheenormousvolumeofliteratureonmilitaryhistoryandtheory,logisticsoftenremainsignoredortreatedinfragmentedfashion.53

IfJomini’sthesisonlogistics—thatlogisticsisaprincipalcomponentofthemilitaryart—holdstrueinthemodernage,nowisthetimetoaddresstheArmy’sunderstandingofthiscrucialtopic.Education,particularlyoftheArmy’sofficersandleaders,willbecriticalinovercomingexistingvulnerabilities.Theunionofstrategy,tacticsandlogisticsmustbenurturedthroughrealistictrainingincollectiveactivities


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suchasExerciseHamel,andexemplifiedinhumanbehaviour.54AlogisticnarrativethatexplainshowlogisticscontributestomodernlandpowerintheAustraliancontextwouldbeequallyvaluableinstructuringfuturedebatewithintheArmy.Butitmaybethatthesolutionwillnotsimplybefoundinimprovinginteractionbetweentrainingschools,developingnewapproachesingeneralcareercoursesandorganisationsorintroducingnewwaysofthinkingaboutlogistics.Therearequiteclearlyculturalovertonestothisdiscussiononstrategy,tacticsandlogistics.EvenJomini,inrevisinghisoriginaleditionofThe Art of War,spokeof‘prejudicesconsecratedbytime’thathadinitiallylimitedhisownconclusionsonlogistics.55Commanderswillthereforeplayavitalroleinachievingabalancebetweenstrategy,tacticsandlogisticsastheypreparetheirforcesforfuturewars.Whenimplementingtheconceptsofthefuture,theywillneedtounderstandhowlogisticsdeterminesthewayforcesfightasFullerdidthroughunderstandingAlexandertheGreat’ssuccesses,andRommeldidinaddressinghisownfailures.56Ifnot,ashistoryconfirms,whenitcomestoactualwarfare,theywillbegivenlittlechoice.

Conclusion

ThispaperhasdescribedlogisticsintermsofthetheoryofwarinanattempttoinfluencethedevelopmentoftheArmy’sfutureconcepts.ThroughdiscussionofJomini’sThe Art of Warandotherhistories,ithasarguedthatlogisticsisabsolutelyinseparablefromstrategyandtactics,supportedbyHustoninhisconceptofthe‘triptych’.Thismightbeanuncomfortableidea,particularlyforthosewhosubscribetothetheoriesofeminentthinkerssuchasClausewitzwhocastlogisticsasmerelyasubservientconstituentofthetheoryofwar.Yetlogisticscannotbesubservientoramereenablertoaplan;recenttrialsandexperimentationhaverepeatedlyconfirmedthatlogisticsexertsafundamentalinfluenceonthewaythatforcesactuallyfightasdescribedbystrategyandtactics.Whilesomemaydismissthisarticleaslargelydiagnostic,lackingprescriptivesolutionstotheproblemsidentified,theproperanalysisoflogisticsanditsincontrovertiblelinkwithstrategyandtacticsrequiresapaperoffargreaterstatureandscope.Ifthisarticlesimplyactstopromptdiscussionorcriticism,theArmywillbericherforit.Whateverthecase,theArmymustaddressthechallengesidentifiedasitexaminestheconductoffuturewarfare,fortoavoiddoingsowillcomeatconsiderablecostinthefuture.

ThecurrentdiscourseonfuturewarwithintheArmyprovidesscantacknowledgementoftheimportanceoflogisticsasaprincipleartofwar—evenbytheArmy’slogisticians.ThisisnottosaythattheArmy’slogisticiansdonot


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understandthenatureofwar,orthatthecombatarmsdonotappreciatetheimportanceoflogisticsintheirownsuccess.Rather,itseemsthatthefundamentalimportanceoflogisticstotheartofwarremainsambiguous.WhileJomini’sworkhasformedthebasisofthispaperhe,likemanywriters,providesonlythebriefestglimpseofthiscomponentoftheartofwarinawaythatisexplicitlyusefultothemodernArmyplanner.ThereforetheArmy,ifnotDefencemorebroadly,mustdevotetimetoexaminingthetheoryofwarintermsofitsownuniquerequirements.ValuablehistoriesandotherworkscanassistintheArmy’songoingmodernisationandinaligningthetriptychofstrategy,tacticsandlogisticsinfutureconcepts.Withthelikelihoodthatlogisticswillattractgreaterfocusinthefuture,theneedfordisciplinedstudyofitsbasicprinciplesisevident.Thismustbesupportedbyexperimentationandplanningthatseeksequivalencebetweenstrategy,tacticsandlogistics,justastheCSSCONOPShassoughttoachieve.Toimplementthisnow,inatimeofpreparationandreconstitutionfortheArmy,isanopportunitythatcannotbemissed.


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THE AUTHOR

LieutenantColonelDavidBeaumontiscurrentlyStaffOfficerGradeOne–LogisticsPlansatHeadquartersForcesCommand.PriorpostingsincludeArmyHeadquarters,1stBrigade,17thCombatServiceSupportBrigade,andthe1stJointMovementGroup.HehasdeployedonfiveoperationaltoursoftheMiddleEastandEastTimor.HisacademicqualificationsincludeaBachelorofArts,MasterofBusinessandaresearchMasterofArts(MilitaryStudies).

ENDNOTES1 A.H.Jomini,The Art of War,translatedfromFrenchbyG.MendellandW.Craighill,

USMilitaryAcademy,1862,p.69.

2 M.vanCreveld,Supplying War(2ndedn),CambridgeUniversityPress,UK,2004,p.241.

3 ThisarticleusestheconceptsofstrategyandtacticsdefinedbyClausewitz.SeeC.Clausewitz,On War,translatedbyM.HowardandP.Paret,PrincetonUniversityPress,USA,1989,p.128:‘tacticsteachesustheuseofarmedforcesintheengagement;strategy,theuseofengagementsfortheobjectofthewar’.Thisarticleconsidersthecombinationofstrategy,tacticsandlogisticsasformingamilitaryoperation.

4 VanCreveld,Supplying War,p.231.

5 Ibid.,p.200.

6 Ibid.

7 W.Kaegi,‘Byzantinelogistics:problemsandperspectives’inJ.Lynn(ed),Feeding Mars – Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present,WestviewPress,USA,p.39.Jominiactuallyregardedtheterm‘logistics’ascorrespondingtotheFrenchterm‘marechal-generaldeslogis’(‘logis’meaning‘quarters’or‘lodging’)asdescribedbyFalkinhisprefacetothee-publicationofThorpe’sPure Logistics,republishedbytheUSNationalDefenseUniversity(p.xvii).JominicitedtheGermantranslationofthistermasquartiermeister,oneresponsibleforthesitingofcampsandcoordinating‘marches’.SeeJomini,The Art of War,p.182.

8 J.Huston,The sinews of war: Army logistics 1775-1953,OfficeoftheChiefofMilitaryHistory,USArmy,1966,p.655.

9 Ibid.,p.656.

10 J.F.C.Fuller,The Generalship of Alexander the Great,Eyre&Spottiswoode,London,1958,p.52,citedinD.Engels,Alexander the Great and the logistics of the Macedonian Army,UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1978,p.2.

11 Jomini,The Art of War,p.69.

12 Lynn,Feeding Mars – Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present,pp.10–11.

13 J.Thompson,The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict,Brasseys,UK,1994,p.3.

14 G.Thorpe,Pure Logistics,NationalDefenseUniversity,USA(1917),1986,pp.18–20.ThorperegardedNapoleon’smostsignificantfailureastheimproperuseofhisstafftocontrolandcoordinatelogisticsinthecontextoftheunfoldingstrategicandtacticalcampaign.


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15 Lynn,Feeding Mars,p.ix.


17 Thompson,The Lifeblood of War,p.6.AsThompsonnotes,thisrelationshippersistedwellintothetwentiethcentury.Forexample,Ludendorff’stitleasChiefofStafftoHindenburgwasFirstQuartermasterGeneral.InGermany,theevolvedpositionofQuartermasterGeneralwasasDirectorofMilitaryOperations.


19 Ibid.,p.252.

20 Thompson,The Lifeblood of War,p.6.

21 Thorpe,Pure Logistics,p.10.

22 Ibid.,pp.5,10.

23 AustralianArmy,Combat Service Support (Developing Doctrine),LandWarfareDevelopmentCentre,Puckapunyal,2009,p.1-1.AstheAustralianDefenceGlossarynotes,thisdefinitionisconsistentwithjointdoctrine,singleservicedoctrineandtheNATOglossary.


25 W.Pagonis,Moving Mountains,HarvardBusinessSchoolPress,USA,1992,p.204.


27 Jominiassessedthefivecomponentsas:strategy,grandtactics(analogoustooperations),logistics,tacticsofthedifferentarms,andthe‘ArtoftheEngineer’whichreferredprimarilytosiegecraft.SeeThe Art of War,p.66.

28 Huston,The sinews of war,p.656.

29 ‘Letno-onespeaktomeofprovisions’,Napoleon,speakingtohisstaff,citedinThompson,The Lifeblood of War,p.3.

30 Clausewitz,On War,p.330.Clausewitzconsideredlogistics‘subservient’tostrategyandtactics.

31 ColonelR.Hatcher,J.MartinandLieutenantColonelK.Burgdorf,‘SustainmentfortheArmyof2020’,Sustainment,May–June2014,USArmy,ArmyLogisticsUniversity,http://www.alu.army.mil/alog/2014/MayJun14/PDF/125006.pdf,accessed1July2014,p.27.

32 HeadquartersForcesCommand,Concept of Operations for Combat Service Support for the Reinforced Combat Brigade,Australia,2014(classified,availableontheDefenceProtectedNetwork).

33 J.C.Moreman,A triumph of improvisation: Australian Army operational logistics and the campaign in Papua, July 1942 to January 1943,PhDthesis,UniversityofNewSouthWales,Australia,2000,p.19.

34 B.Breen,Struggling for self-reliance: four case studies of Australian regional force projection in the late 1980s and the 1990s,ANUe-press,Australia,2008,pp.162–63.

35 Ibid.,p.163.

36 Thompson,The Lifeblood of War,p.3.

37 Moreman,A triumph of improvisation,p.24.

38 Clausewitz,On War,p.330.


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http://www.alu.army.mil/alog/2014/MayJun14/PDF/125006.pdf


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39 ExerciseHeadline2014Quicklookreport(classified).Theexperimentdemonstratedthatrealisationoftheproposedarmouredcavalryregimentcapabilitywouldbeinhibitedbytheinabilitytodividesub-units.‘Disaggregatedmanoeuvre’wasrenderedimpossiblebytheabsenceofsufficientlogisticforceelements.

40 Concept of Operations for Combat Service Support for the Reinforced Combat Brigade,Australia,2014.

41 TheseideasareintegraltoachievingeffectivebusinessprocessesinDefence,particularlyatthestrategiclevel.PaperssuchasAustralian Defence Logistics: the need to enable and equip logistic transformationbyG.WatersandJ.Blackburn,KokodaPaperNo.19,KokodaFoundation,2014,at:http://kokodafoundation.org/Resources/Documents/KP19%20LogisticsPaperWebFINAL.pdf(accessed3July2014)containusefulpracticalguidanceontheemploymentoftheseprocesses.However,theyrarelydwellontheimplicationsoftheseideasforcombat,orfortheiruseoutsidethepeacetimesetting.


43 Lynn, Feeding Mars,p.i.

44 Clausewitz,On War,p.331.

45 Lynn,Feeding Mars,p.23.


47 ExerciseHeadline2013,post-activityreport(classified).


49 Hatcheretal.,‘SustainmentfortheArmyof2020’,p.27.

50 Thorpe,Pure Logistics,p.74.


52 Examples,ascitedinthispaper,includeNapoleonic-erastaffofficersClausewitzandJomini,USMCColonelThorpe,UKArmyMajorGeneralFuller,andUKMarineMajorGeneralThompson.Allothersourcesused,barone(USArmyLieutenantGeneralPagonis),weretheworkofacademics.Majorpapersandwritingsonlogisticiansandlogisticiansinfrequentlyappearbeyondinternaljournals,orastheproductofcoursework.

53 E.LuttwakinLynn,Feeding Mars,p.3.

54 ExerciseHamelistheannualcertificationexercisefortheArmy’scombatbrigadepriortoitsbeingdeclared‘ready’forpossibleoperationaldeployment.


56 Fuller,The Generalship of Alexander the Great,p.52.


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HISTORY

SirBasilLiddellHart’sInfluenceonAustralianMilitaryDoctrineCaptainSamBaumgarten

ABSTRACT

ThetheoriesofSirBasilLiddellHartareareadystapleofAustraliandoctrine.IndeedtheyarguablyrepresentedthemostsignificantinfluenceonAustralianmilitarydoctrinebetweenthe1970sandthe1990s,theperiodinwhichtheAustralianArmydevelopeditsfirstindependentandoperational-leveldoctrine.ThisarticlewillexamineLiddellHart’sinfluenceontheArmy’sdoctrinedevelopmentandthecontinuingrelevanceofhissignaturetheorieswhichespousedtwospecificmilitaryideas.Thefirstofthesewaslimitedwar,anamalgamofdefenceindepthandlimitedliability,whichproposedtheemploymentofmeasuredlevelsofmilitaryforcetoachievestrategicends.ThesecondcomprisedtheindirectapproachwhichsignificantlyinfluencedearlyversionsoftheFundamentals of Land Force Operations,theArmy’sfirstoperational-leveldoctrinepublication.Theindirectapproachwasalsooneofthekeyinfluencesonthedevelopmentofmanoeuvretheory,adominantelementinArmythinkingthroughoutthe1990s.AstheArmyprogressesthroughitscurrentperiodofchange,itwouldbenefitsignificantlyfromrevisitingLiddellHart’stheoriesas,forbetterorforworse,theyexertedaprofoundinfluenceduringaperiodoffundamentalchange.


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Introduction

ThetheoriesofBasilLiddellHartwerehighlyinfluentialinthedevelopmentofAustralianmilitarydoctrinebetweenthe1970sand1990s.HistheoriesoflimitedwarandtheindirectapproachwereconsistentwiththeprevailingstrategiccontextandthusweredirectlyapplicabletoAustralianArmydoctrineduringthisperiod.Howeverinfluenceisadifficultconcepttotrace.Furthermore,LiddellHart’sideashaveseldombeenexplicitlyacknowledgedasasourceofAustralianmilitarydoctrineandthusthereisnoprimaryevidenceoftheiruseinthedevelopmentofthisdoctrine.YetanystudyofArmydoctrineandthewritingofLiddellHartrevealstheclosesimilarityofthemesthatdominateboth.

ThisargumentwillbesupportedbyacomparisonofAustraliandoctrinewithLiddellHart’sownkeywrittenworks,particularlyThe Revolution in War and Strategy,andbytheobservationsofacademicandmilitarythinkers.1TheAustralianArmybeganproducingitsownuniquedoctrineinthe1970sintheaftermathoftheVietnamWarandthisdoctrinewasimmediatelyinfluencedbythestrategiccontextoftheAustralianmilitaryexperience.TheAustraliandoctrinaldesignfromthe1970sadoptedelementsoflimitedwarfarewhichcloselyresembledLiddellHart’stheoriesoflimitedliabilityanddefenceindepth.TheindirectapproachwasLiddellHart’ssignaturetheoryanditexertedasubstantialinfluenceoverArmydoctrine,shapingdoctrinedevelopmentduringitsnascentstages.Theindirectapproachreturnedtoprominenceinthe1990splayingaseminalroleinthedevelopmentofmanoeuvretheory.

Strategic context

AustralianArmydoctrineaftertheVietnamWardevelopedwithintheprevailingstrategiccontext,whichwasfocusedoncontinentaldefenceanddominatedbytacticalproficiency,thelogicalfocusforamilitarywithoutobviousthreat.AsMichaelEvanswrites,‘Inthe1970sand1980stherewasa…lossofconfidenceamongdefenceplannersinthevalueandrelevanceofoffshoreoperations.’2Thiswasadeparturefromthepreviouspositionwhichhadbeenbasedonalliances.EvansdescribesindependentAustralianstrategicposturesasthe‘tyrannyofdissonance’andremarksofthestandardAustralianapproach:‘TheAustralianwayofwarisbestdescribedasbeingbasedonusingstrategyandstatecraftthroughtheagencyofoverseaswarfare.’3ThedoctrinalhierarchythatshapedthefocusoncontinentaldefenceemanatedfromtheDepartmentofDefence.

HISTORYSirBasilLiddellHart’sInfluenceon

AustralianMilitaryDoctrine


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Itwasexpressedinaseriesofguidancedocuments,commencingin1975withStrategic Basis,andevolvingintotheDefencewhitepapersof1976and1987.4JohnBlaxlandobservesthat,‘Fromthenon,throughouttheColdWaryearstheStrategic Basispaperswouldstresstheneedforbeingcapableofrespondingeffectivelytolow-levelpressuresormilitaryattacksandoftimelyexpansiontoresponsestoamoresubstantialthreat.’5TheArmydevelopeditsowncapabilitiesandcontingencies,anditlearnttooperatewithoutthesupporttowhichithadgrownaccustomedinVietnamandinpreviousconflicts.6Evansdescribesthisasaprocesswhichgatheredmomentumbutwasstifledbythe‘lackofaconsistenttop-downapproachtodoctrinedevelopment’.7Oneaspectofthisstrategicindependencewasafocusondevelopmentatthetacticallevel.8Thislegacy—inthecontextoftheVietnamWar—issummarisedbyBlaxland:‘theArmywasalsoaffectedbyanover-emphasisontactical-levelexcellenceandnottheoperationalartorthestrategic-leveldynamics’.9Anotherconsequenceofself-relianceandtacticalemphasiswasthatAustralianmilitaryculturewassusceptibletoinfluencefromspecificmilitarytheoriesasthepreviousfocusonalliancehadpartiallystifledthedevelopmentofauniquemilitarydoctrine.TheideasofLiddellHartenteredthisopportuneenvironmentfromthe1970s.

Liddell Hart’s background, theories and influences

ThebestsourcesofinformationonLiddellHart’sdevelopmentareAlexDanchev’sbiographyandthediverserangeofarticlesthatexaminehistheories.10LiddellHartservedontheWesternFrontinaNewArmyinfantrybattalionin1915andwaswoundedinearly1916.HewassubsequentlydeemedunfitforfurtheractiveserviceandwasemployedasadjutantofatrainingbattalionfortheremainderoftheFirstWorldWar.11HeremainedintheArmyuntil1926,supervisingtheproductionoftrainingpamphletsasacaptainintheArmyEducationalCorps.Thispositionprovidedhimacertaindegreeofexposuretomilitarydevelopmentsandtosomeimportantmilitaryfigures.Aseminalmomentwashispresentationofhis‘TheManintheDark’lecturetotheRoyalUnitedServicesInstituteon3November1920whichpresagedhistheoryoftheindirectapproach.12

Hislectureandsubsequentexpoundingofhistheoriesattractedacceptanceandprestigewithinthemilitaryinspiteofhisjuniorrank.13‘TheManintheDark’theoryconsolidatedhisobservationsoninfantrytactics,specificallytheimportanceofavoidingpointsofeffectiveresistance.Butitwasjustthebeginning.




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LiddellHartenjoyedanextremelyvariedcareer.Hedabbledinjournalism,contributingfeaturesasatenniscorrespondentupto1925priortotakingapositionwithThe Daily Telegraph.14IntheaftermathoftheSecondWorldWarhewasalsoanotedcorrespondentonwomen’sfashion.15HeretainedconsiderableinfluenceasamilitarytheoristaftertheSecondWorldWarandwasdescribedbyoneIsraeligeneralasthe‘captainwhoteachesgenerals’.16Hiswritingwasprolificandenduring,areflectionofhisparticipationinmanyofthekeyeventsofthetwentiethcentury,fromhisenlistmentinKitchener’sNewArmyin1914tohiscriticalcommentaryonAmericanstrategyinVietnamaslateas1970.

The development of limited war

Limitedwarisacollectionoftheoriesthatproposesthelimiteduseofforcetoachievestrategicends.LiddellHart’sfrustrationwiththestrategicrelianceontotalwarsawhimbecomeanadvocateoflimitedwar.Hisapproachwasbasedontheconceptthatmilitaryforcecouldbeusedinalimitedfashiontoachievenationalaims.Hedislikedwar,butwasfarfromapacifistandwaseagertodeveloptheoriesofmilitaryutility.HistorianBrianBondwritesthat‘LiddellHartwasnevera“defeatist”inthatheneverforamomentconsideredBritain’sindependencetobenegotiable.’17Despiteitsroleasamajortheoryofwarfare,thereisnodefiningdocumentonhistheoryoflimitedwar.Hisshortbook,The Revolution in Warfare,isperhapsthemostsuccinctdescriptionofhisrejectionoftotalwar.Itwaswrittenin1944andreleasedin1946withashortepiloguethatdescribedtheimportanceofnuclearweaponsandshouldbereadnotasatheoreticdiscussionofwarfare,butasanarrativeofEuropeanmilitaryhistoryandtheproblemsofanational,totalstrategicapproachtowarfare.18

Limitedwarcomprisedtworelatedapproaches:defenceindepthandlimitedliability.DefenceindepthemergedprimarilyinthecontextoftheincreasinglyinevitablespectreoftheSecondWorldWarinthelate1930sandwasdefinedinhisbookThe Defence of Britain.19LiddellHartwasaferventadvocateoftheadvantagesofdefenceasamorallysuperiorandmoreefficientstrategicuseofforce.Bondobservesthat‘AmajorthemeinLiddellHart’spublicationsinthemidandlate1930sisthatthedefenceismarkedlysuperiortotheattack.’20Heproposedastrongdefensivebeltasaneconomicalmeansofdeterringaggression.Mechanisationwasalsoincorporatedtoenhancedefensivecapability.Hewrote,‘Thisimpliesinthemilitarysphereanactiveandmobiledefence,inwhichtheeffectofdirectresistanceisextendedbyrepostsbothstrategicandtactical.’21Butthis




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wasalsomarkedbyastrategicandoperationalimperative:‘Victimsofaggressionwereunlikelytobebeatenprovidedtheyrefrainedfrom“foolishindulgenceinattacks”.’22

Limitedliabilitydevelopedasarelatedconcept.LiddellHart’sprevioustheorieshadledhimtocontemplatetheuseofforceinalimitedfashion.AzarGathasconductedanexhaustivestudyofLiddellHart’stheoriesandwritesthatheincorporatedtheapproachtowarprevalentintheeighteenthcentury.23LiddellHartadvocated‘relativelycautioustactics,andmorelimiteduseofbattleindecidingtheissueofwar’.24HeopposedmassconscriptionandBritishmilitaryinvolvementonthemainlandofEurope.HistheoriesoflimitedwaralsoinfluencedthecontextofmilitaryengagementandheadvocatedtheselectionofspecialmissionssuitedtotheBritishforcestructure.25Thiswascomplementedbyhisbeliefintheimportanceoftreatiestointernationalsecurity.26Limitedwarhashadaprofoundandongoinginfluenceonthewaygovernmentsuseforceandthewayinwhichmilitaryhistoriansandcommentatorswriteonwarfare.Asrecentlyas2005,retiredBritishgeneralSirRupertSmith’sThe Utility of Forcehighlightedthecontemporaryimportanceoflimitedwarfare.27HoweverLiddellHartintendedlimitedwarfaretobeemployednotinisolation,butincombinationwiththeconceptofdefenceindepth.

Defence in depth in Australia

The1987DefenceofAustraliadoctrinerepresentsoneexampleoftheuseoftheconceptofdefenceindepthintheAustraliancontext.DefenceofAustraliausedtheconceptofdefenceindepthtotasktheAustralianmilitarywiththeprimaryroleofdefendingAustraliathroughsurveillanceandcontrolofthesea-airgap.TheArmy’srolecomprisedsurveillanceofthedefensivebeltandmaintenanceofdeployablelandforcesthatcouldcontainordestroyanyincursion.Asstipulatedinthewhitepaper,The Defence of Australia,‘Australia’sdefencestrategyisbasedontheconceptofdefenceindepth.ThisstrategyandourforcestructureplanninggiveprioritytomeetingcrediblelevelsofthreatinAustralia’sareaofdirectmilitaryinterest.’28ThisemphasisonastrongdefensivebeltwasconsistentwithLiddellHart’stheories.AdefensiveposturewasadvocatedasasuperiorstrategicpostureforAustraliaandameanstoguaranteethesovereigntyofitsinterests.Ultimatelythiswasaresponsiveapproachtocounteranypossibleincursion.TheplacementofscreeningforcesinthenorthofAustraliaalsoaccordedwithLiddellHart’sdescriptionofdefenceindepth.29Subsequentbrigade-sizereactionforces,suchastheOperationalDeploymentForce,andconventionalfollow-onforceswere




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intendedtorepelanyincursion.30ThisconceptoffixinganddestroyingincursionsagainreflectedthestrategicconsiderationsLiddellHarthadespousedinhisconceptofdefenceindepth,anapproachultimatelydesignedtoprotectthenationfrominvasion.TheuseofdefenceindepthfollowingtheVietnamWarmirroredthepolicycontextofthelate1930s,specificallyitsaversiontodecisiveconfrontationandcommitment.Defenceindepthwasemployedbecauseitappearedtoguaranteenationaldefenceinaneraofreduceddefenceforcecapacity.

Australian use of limited liability

TheAustralianDefenceForce(ADF)hasappliedLiddellHart’sconceptoflimitedliabilityprimarilyinthecontextoflimitedmilitaryoperations.Thiswaslargelyaconsequenceofthedoctrinalprevalenceoflow-levelmilitarythreatsandthepotentialbenefitsoflimitedoverseasdeployments.Australianstrategicdoctrinefromthe1970sreflectedthefactthatthemajorityofAustralia’sthreatsandmilitaryrequirementsdemandedalimitedandscopedresponseratherthanaconventionalmilitarydeployment.ThisapproachsoughttoensurethattheADFwouldconductmeasuredandproportionateresponsestothreats,theultimateaimtolimittheconsequencesofaggressionandconflict.Anabidingthemeofthe1976(Australian Defence)and1987(The Defence of Australia)whitepaperswasthethreatofunconventionalandlimitedoperationsagainstAustralia.31Chapter3ofThe Defence of Australiadescribedpossiblethreatsasmostlikelylow-levelorescalatedlow-levelconflict.Itconsequentlyadvisedthat‘TheADFshouldthereforebeabletoconductsuchoperationsasmaritimesurveillance,interdictionandprotectiontasks.’32ThiswasreassuringgiventheAustraliangovernment’sprevioussuccesseswithlimitedconflictduringtheIndonesianConfrontation.AnumberofhistorianshavedescribedthemeasuredandproportionateresponsebyAustraliaaseffectivelyconfiningthisconflictandpreventingfurtherescalation.33

Theimportanceandcomplexityoflimitedthreatsremainedathemeofdefencepolicyinthewhitepapersthatfollowed:‘Thesethreatscouldrangefromharassmentofourmaritimezoneandoffshorerigsorminingofportsatthelowerlevel,throughtosubstantialraidsofshorttermdurationonimportantnortherntargetsorouroffshoreislands.’34Limitedliabilityalsoshapedplanningforlimitedoffshoreresponses.Thestrictlylimitednatureoftheseresponseswasconsistentwiththeprevailingreluctancetoparticipateinsignificantoverseasoperations.Australia’slimitedoperationsintheperiodrangedfrompeacekeepingtotheuseofforceoutsideaUNmandateinthesecondGulfWar.EvansassertsthatAustralian




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diplomacyduringthatperiodwascloselyconnectedwithitsdefencepolicy.Henotes,however,thatAustraliahasbeenabletouseitslimitedmilitaryresourcestoachievesignificantstrategicaims:‘Australiamaywellhavespentmuchofitshistoryasa“dependentally”,butitsdependencyhasalwaysbeenclever,cynicalandcalculated.’35HeliststheGulfWar,Somalia,EastTimor,AfghanistanandIraqaskeyrecentexamples.36Australia’sdefencepolicyfromthe1970sincorporatedlimitedoffshoreoperationsinspiteoftheimportanceofcontinentaldefenceanditsoverallaversiontooverseasoperations.ThesestrategicoutcomeswereconsistentwithLiddellHart’sconceptoflimitedmilitaryinvolvement.

The indirect approach

LiddellHart’sindirectapproachexertedacrucialinfluenceonAustraliandoctrineduringtheperiodofstrategicchangefrom1972untilthe1990s.ThisislargelyexplainedbythefactthatitwasconsistentwiththestrategiccontextoftheperiodandtheprevailingAustralianmilitaryculture.Theindirectapproachisamilitarytheorythatseekstotargetthecohesionandwillofathreatratherthanitsmass.ThisisaconceptthathasinfluencedAustralianmilitarydoctrinethroughtwodistinctavenues.ThefirstofthesecompriseditsdirectinfluenceonthedevelopmentoftheArmy’sfirstsubstantivedoctrinefollowingtheVietnamWar.Thisdoctrinewasareflectionofindependencecomparedwithpreviousiterationsthathademphasisedalliances.37Thisdoctrinealsograduallyintroducedtheoperationallevelofwarfare.Thesecondavenueofinfluencewasmanoeuvretheory.ThekeymanoeuvretheoristswereheavilyinfluencedbyLiddellHartandthiswasdirectlyreflectedintheAustralianadoptionofthisbroadtheory.

Overview of Liddell Hart’s indirect approach

ThestrategyoftheindirectapproachisLiddellHart’smostinfluentialandmemorabletheoryandwasalogicalextensionofhispublishedtheoriesontechnology,infiltrationandthemeanstoavoiddecisivewarsofannihilation.TheindirectapproachwasalsoareactiontothecasualtiesontheWesternFrontthathadaffectedhimsodeeply.AsReidobserves:‘LiddellHartcouldnotescapethepressingrealitythatallofhistheorieswererationalizationsofhisemotionalrevulsionagainstthehumancostofthegreatcampaignsoftheWesternFront.’38

WhileLiddellHart’sStrategyisrecognisedasthemostcomprehensivesummaryoftheindirectapproach,itislessamanualthanadescriptionoffavourablehistoricalapplications.AsDanchevcomments:‘Thisthinkinggrewoutofhisearlywork




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oninfantrytrainingandtactics,informedbyagrandtourofstrategyinhistory—Baedeker’sbattles—andcolouredbyhismorerecentobservationoflivegeneralsrunningwildintheirnaturalhabitat.’39ThisapproachwasfrequentlyoppositionalandsoughttohighlightsuccessfulexamplesthatwereconsistentwithLiddellHart’stheories.Strategywasprimarilypresentedasaseriesofhistoricallessonsandfocussedonneglectedmilitarycommanders,includingScipioAfricanus,40Belisarius41andSherman,42accordingthemstatusassuccessfulindirectcommanders.AsDanchevwrites:‘ClingingtooldidolswasforLiddellHartoneofthecommonerrors.’43

Nature of the indirect approach

Undertheindirectapproach,militarycommanderstargetalternativeenemyvulnerabilitiessuchascohesion,commandandlogistics.TheindirectapproachsynthesisedLiddellHart’sideasthatconflictcouldpotentiallyberesolvedwithoutrecoursetofullmilitaryconfrontation.Hedesignedtheindirectapproachtocounterexistingmilitaryorthodoxywhichtargetedthemassoftheenemyandfirmlybelievedthatanymeansthatdeliveredrealisticandpracticalnationalaimswasanapplicationoftheindirectapproach.Bondcommentsthat,‘IntheoreticaltermsheattemptedtodeviseacountertowhatheregardedasClausewitz’sevillegacy.’44AfurthercomponentofthisapproachwasthemilitaryadvantageprovidedbytechnologicalinnovationandLiddellHartwascloselyassociatedwiththedevelopmentofindependentmechanisedforces.Hebelievedintheoperationalandstrategicadvantagesofafastertempoofwarfare.45Howeverthestrategyoftheindirectapproachhasconsistentlybeencriticisedasreliantonselectivehistoriographyanddismissedasvagueandpotentiallycontroversial.46Danchevdisagrees,writingthatitisimportantnottosearchfortoomuchstructureinLiddellHart’stheory:‘Theindirectapproachismoreanattitudeofmindthananarrowonthemap.’47Thisexplainswhyitwasnotdescribedinlinearfashion,insteaddesignedsimplyasacountertoexistingmilitaryorthodoxy.UltimatelythiswasLiddellHart’saim.Hesoughttochallengeorthodoxthinkingandprovideanapproachthatwouldallowcommanderstoavoidcasualties.

The indirect approach and the development of operational-level doctrine

TheindirectapproachplayedadirectroleinthedevelopmentoftheAustralianArmy’soperational-leveldoctrine.Thiswasprimarilybecauseitwasconsistentwiththeprevailingthemesofstrategicindependenceandanaversiontoconflictwithapeerforce.AstheDefenceofAustraliadoctrinedevelopedfromthemid-1970stothelate1980sthroughStrategic Basisandthewhitepapers,theindirect




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approachinfluenceddoctrinebetweenthestrategicandtacticallevel,shapingwhateventuallybecametheArmy’sfirstoperational-leveldoctrine.Evansnotesoftheperiodthat‘ItwasagainstthebackgroundofaDOA[DefenceofAustralia]strategicframeworkthattheADFbegantomoveawayfromthestrategy-tacticsparadigmthathaddominateditsmilitaryhistory.’48Fundamentals of Land Force OperationswastheArmy’sfirstcapstonedoctrineanddescribedtheoverarchingArmyapproachtowarfare:‘Collectivelythe1977Fundamentals of Land ForceOperationslaiddownthefoundationsforalandforcedoctrinestressinganewindirectstrategy.’49Infact,severalparagraphsweredevotedtotheindirectapproachatthestrategicandtacticallevelandthelanguageofthepublicationstressedindependence.50

Theadoptionoftheindirectapproachhadtwoadvantages.First,atthestrategiclevelitwasamilitaryapproachthatsoughttolimittheroleofarmedconflict,consistentwithLiddellHart’santi-warbutnon-pacifiststance.Thisservedtoreconcilemilitaryoperationswiththestrategicdirectionofaperiodmarkedbyareducedappetiteforconflict.Fundamentals of Land Force Operationsreflectedthisthemeinstatementssuchas:‘indirectstrategyoccurswhentheresultisachievedprimarilybynon-militarymeansandtheuseofmilitaryforceplaysasecondaryrole.’51

Asaconsequence,theArmybecameaparticipantinastrategythatplacedadiminishedrelianceonmilitaryactions.Second,theindirectapproachwasregardedasconsistentwithAustralianmilitarycultureandexperience.Thiswasaperiodthatencouragedinnovativebehaviourtooffsetperceiveddisadvantagesinsizeandfirepoweragainstpotentialenemieswithlargerandbetterequippedforces.Evanscommentsthat,‘GiventheArmy’slow-force-to-spaceratios,the1977pamphletadvancedthepropositionthatthedevelopmentofanindirectstrategy—derivedfromthewritingsofBasilLiddellHartandAndreBeaufre—wasparticularlysuitedtotheAustraliansituation.’52IndeedFundamentals of Land Force Operationsincludedasectiontitled‘TheCharacteristicsofAustralianDoctrine’whichassertedthat‘TheAustralianArmymustbepreparedtooperateagainstsuperiorforces…Thisdoesnotmeanavoidingcombat,butrathertheavoidanceofstrategiesandtacticswhichrelyfortheireffectonthedirectapplicationofmassiveforces.’53Theimplicationwasthataninnovativemeansofmeetingthreatswouldbemoreeffectivethanmereovermatchofmassandfirepower.Evansaddsthat‘TheArmyhadtobepreparedtooperatesuccessfullyonAustraliansoilagainstsuperiorforcesbyavoidingattritionstrategyandtactics.’54




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Further development of operational-level doctrine

Forallitsinnovation,however,theindirectapproachmaywellhavedelayedtheAustralianArmy’sdevelopmentattheoperationallevelofwarfarebecauseitfocusedonprevailinginbattlewithoutconsiderationofthecampaign’sconclusion.Priortothe1990s,theAustralianArmyhadlimitedcapabilityattheoperationallevelandtheindirectapproachdidnotpresentanimmediateremedy.The1977editionoftheFundamentals of Land Force Operationsdidnotspecificallyaddresstheoperationallevelofconflict;indeedthiswasnotintroduceduntilthe1985edition.55EvanswasoneofanumberofhistorianswhonotedthatLiddellHarthadsubstitutedtheoperationallevelofcommandforwhatearliermilitarytheoristshadtermed‘grandtactics’.56Grandtacticslargelycomprisedtheconnectionofaseriesoftacticalactionstoachieveanend.57Theindirectapproachgenerallyfocusesontheexecutionoftacticalactions,althoughitislessdescriptiveintermsofcampaigningandconnectingtheseactions.Thiswasconsistentwiththetacticalbiasprevalentduringtheperiod.TheArmydemonstratedalimitedcapacitytoconductitsownindependentoperationsduringthe1980sandwasconfinedtoconnectingtacticalactions,afactdemonstratedduringthemajorexercisesoftheperiod.58Therewasalsoverylimitedjointinteroperability.59BlaxlanddeniesthattheArmywas‘anadaptivelearningorganisation,responsivetotheemergingstrategicandoperationaltrends’.60IndeedthelimitationsoftheAustralianArmy’soperationalcapabilitieswereclearlyrevealedinthisperiodbythedifficultiesfacedinOperationMorrisDancewhichsawforcesassembledclosetoFijiin1987.AsBlaxlandnotes,thisshortdeployment‘providedasoberingdemonstrationofthelimitationsofAustralianmilitarypowerinthelate1980s.’61TheAustralianArmy’sinvolvementattheoperationallevelrequiredrobustcommandatthejointlevel,whiletheindirectapproachwasconcernedprimarilywiththeuseofcombatforcetodecideconflict.Theproperdevelopmentoftheoperationallevelwastooccurmuchlater.

The indirect approach and the development of manoeuvre theory

TheindirectapproachplayedapivotalroleintheadoptionofmanoeuvretheorybytheAustralianArmy.Manoeuvretheorydidnotfollowaclearpathofdevelopmentbecauseofthedecentralisednatureofitsideas.InsteaditwasaprocessofsteadilyincreasinginfluenceofwhichDanchevnotes:‘LiddellHart’ssignificanceinthissphereisgreaterthanweknow.Heispartofthementalfurnitureofmanoeuvre,partoftheclimateofideas.’62ManoeuvretheorywasalsoinfluencedbyLiddellHart’sparticularbrandofadvocacy,specificallytheuseofpublishedworktochangethemilitaryinstitutionfromtheoutside.Fromthe1980s,however,manoeuvretheoryexertedarapidandsignificanteffectonNATOmilitaries.63




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IntheAustralianArmyitgainedtractionfromtheearly1990s,particularlyasaresultofthespeedanddecisivenesswithwhichthe1991GulfWarwasconcluded.AsBlaxlandwrites,‘IntheyearsaftertheGulfWar,discussionstookplacewithintheArmyconcerning“manoeuvretheory”andtheplaceof“protectedmobility”.’64

The indirect approach and the authors of manoeuvre theory

Theearlydevelopmentofmanoeuvretheoryresembledtheinitialdevelopmentoftheindirectapproachinthe1920sand1930s.Thekeytheoristspublishedbooksandvoicedtheiropinionsinprofessionaljournalswiththeaimofchangingthemilitaryinstitution’swayofthinking.InthistheyresembledLiddellHartinhisadvocacyduringtheinterwaryears.SirJohnKiszelywroteofmanoeuvretheory’smagnetism:‘Indeed,therearestillsomewhoattributesupernaturalpowerstoitasamilitarypanacea,comparabletoLiddellHart’sadvocacyofhisindirectapproach.’65SomeofthekeyearlytheoristsofmanoeuvretheorymadedirectreferencetoLiddellHartanddifferentelementsoftheindirectapproach,includingColonelJohnBoyd,WilliamLindandLieutenantColonelRobertLeonhard,allofwhomhavecontributedtothedevelopmentofAustralianmilitarytheory.FransOsingastudiedtherootsofBoyd’smilitarytheoriesandidentifiedLiddellHartasasignificantinfluence:‘WhatLiddellHarttermstheindirectapproach,BoydreferstoasManeuverConflict,oneofthreekindsofhumanconflict.’66LindconsolidatedthisprocessbyprovidingearlymanoeuvretheoristswithadvocacyinWashington,writingthefirstbookdedicatedtomanoeuvretheoryin1985.67Manoeuvre Theory HandbookwasinpartacritiqueoftheUSArmydoctrinepublicationFM100-5andinpartamanualfortheconductofmanoeuvretheory.68TheactualreferencetoLiddellHartamountstoashortdescriptionofhis‘TheManintheDark’theory,simplynotingthatthiswasabriefpublication.69Leonhard’sbookThe Art of Manoeuvrecontainsachaptertitled‘TheEvolutionofManeuverTheory’whichprovidesavaluablesummaryofthecontemporaryinfluencesandcontributionstotheapproach.HenotedinasectiononLiddellHartthat‘theindirectapproachinvolvessubtlety,deceptionandtheavoidanceofenemystrength’.70Eachofthesebookssoughttodistinguishmanoeuvretheoryfromtheprevailingoperationalart.Thecontrarypositionisoneofthedistinguishingfeaturesoftheindirectapproachandreflectsthefactthatmanoeuvretheoryitselfisaverydifficultconcepttodefine.AsOsingacommented,‘BoydalsoresemblesLiddellHartinhisdidacticmethod.’71TheirapproachmirroredLiddellHart’sformofoutsideradvocacywhichaimedtochangemilitarythinking.72Theindirectapproachcontinuestorepresentoneofthemostenduringinfluencesonmanoeuvretheory.




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The nature of Liddell Hart’s influence on Australian manoeuvre theory

TheinfluenceoftheindirectapproachonAustralianmanoeuvretheoryisevidentinthethemesofAustraliandoctrineandthebiasforspecifichistoricallessons.TheAustralianArmyreadilyadoptedmanoeuvretheoryfromthelate1980sinakeydocumententitledDirective Control.73TheintroductiontoDirective Controlannouncedthat:‘Themainthrustofconventionaltacticaldoctrinehasshiftedfrombattlesofattrition…toanemphasisonmanoeuvre.’74EvanswritesthatDirectiveControlhadaprofoundinfluenceontheArmy’scommandarrangementswithkeytextsonmanoeuvretheoryemphasisingthedistinctionbetweenattritionandmanoeuvre.LiddellHart’stheories,particularlytheindirectapproach,hadamarkedinfluenceondoctrineandonmilitarythoughtinthewiderprofessionalmilitaryforuminAustralia.First,theselectiveuseofmilitaryhistorytosupportAustralianmilitarydoctrine,atechniquebelovedofLiddellHarthimself,wasincreasinglyapparent.Australianmilitarydoctrinetraditionallydismissescampaignsitidentifiesasattritional.75MilitarycampaignssuchastheSommeandevensomeoftheoperationsconductedinVietnamaredescribedasattritionalandtheirfailureisattributedatleastinparttotheirrelianceonfirepowerandmass.ThisisconsistentwithLiddellHart’swritingashewashimselfcriticalofthesetypesofcampaigns.76ManoeuvrecampaignsareaccordinglydistinguishedbytheirdecisivenessandcreativitywithexamplesthatfocusonLaeandthewiderPacificcampaign.77Akeydistinctionofthesebattlesistheattempttoavoidfrontalassaultsonenemystrongpoints.

TherearealsoreferencestoLiddellHart’sworkinbothjournalsanddoctrinepublications,includinganarticlepublishedintheADF Journalin1996whichexplorestheindirectapproachandtheconnectionbetweenLiddellHartandSunTzu.78AustralianArmydoctrineoftenusesquotesfromtheworkofLiddellHart.79

SuchreferencesacknowledgetheinfluenceofhistheoriesonAustralianmilitarythought,particularlyduringthedevelopmentofmanoeuvretheory.Likewise,theArmy’srelationshipwithmechanisedwarfareisanexampleofthespecificinfluenceoftheindirectapproachonitsdoctrine.ManoeuvretheoryisinextricablylinkedwithmechanisedwarfareandmanyofitskeyproponentssuchasLeonhardwerethemselvesmechanisedofficers.However,neithermanoeuvretheorynortheindirectapproachrepresentsablueprintformechanisedwarfare.Instead,mechanisationisusedtoenhancetempoanddecisionsuperiority.ThisisconsistentwithLiddellHart’sviewsonmechanisationwhichwerefocusedmore




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onspeedofdecision-makingthanfirepowerandprotection.TheArmy’sdoctrinalfocusondecision-makingmayhavebeenaresultofthereluctanceofADFplannerstoinvestintotallymechanisedforces.Thispointwasreflectedinthe1997documentRestructuring the Australian Armywhichsoughttojustifythegroupingofarmour,firesupportandaviationintotask-organisedunitsbynoting:‘ThecurrentArmyapproachtothebattlefieldreflectsananticipatedscarcityofsomecombatandcombatsupportunits.’80TheBritishArmyexperiencemirroredthatofAustraliaandtheauthorsofBritish Military DoctrineintroducedmanoeuvretheoryatthebehestofFieldMarshalSirNigelBagnallin1989.British Military Doctrineclearlylinkedtheindirectapproachtothemanoeuvristapproach.81

Conclusion

ThetheoriesofBasilLiddellHartconsistentlyinfluencedthedevelopmentofkeyareasofADFandArmydoctrinefromthe1970sto1990s.Whilethisinfluenceisnotdocumentedassuch,thefootprintofthosetheoriesisreadilyapparentinthepresenceofconsistentthemesinAustraliandoctrinethatreflecthisapproach.ThestrategiccircumstancesofthisperioddemandeduniqueideasandLiddellHart’stheorieswereappropriatetothesecircumstancesandwerecharacterisedbyinnovation.TherequirementtomitigateambiguousthreatswithlimitedresourcesdictatedalimitedresponseandLiddellHart’sdefenceindepthandlimitedliabilityprovidedanidealsolution.DefenceindepthrepresentedameanstodefendAustraliaagainstpossiblethreatswhileacknowledgingtheprevalentaversiontomilitarism.Limitedliabilitysoughttoemploymilitaryforceforstrategicendswithoutescalation.TogethertheseapproachesformedthetwinarmsoflimitedwarandexertedasubstantialinfluenceontheDefenceofAustraliadoctrine.

Similarly,theindirectapproach,whichrepresentedakeyinfluenceontheArmy’sfirstoperational-leveldoctrine,hasconsistentlyallowedAustralianplannerstodevelopoperationalandstrategicdoctrinethatisnotreliantonmassandfirepower.ItspecificallyinfluencedtheArmy’sfirstcapstonedoctrine,Fundamentals of Land Force Operations,continuingthatinfluencewiththedevelopmentofmanoeuvretheory.Indeed,theAustralianuseofmanoeuvretheorywasdefinedbyLiddellHart’sspecificperspectiveonconflict.LiddellHart’sinfluenceonthedevelopmentofsuchabroadrangeofmilitarydoctrinemarkshistheoriesasfundamentaltodoctrinedevelopmentduringtheperiodfromthe1970stothe1990s.ThesetheorieswereinfluentialbecausetheysuitedthecircumstancesoftheperiodandreflectedthetimelessnessofLiddellHart’sparticularbrandofmilitarythought.




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Thatheshouldexertsuchaprofoundinfluenceonmilitaryconceptualanddoctrinalthoughtdecadesafterhisdeathin1970isatributetotheinnovativeandenduringnatureofhistheories.TheAustralianArmyoftodaywoulddowelltorevisitLiddellHart’stheoriesandpondertheirrelevanceinthistimeofchange.




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THE AUTHOR

CaptainSamBaumgartengraduatedfromtheAustralianDefenceForceAcademywithaBachelorofArtsbeforecompletinghisfinaltrainingattheRoyalMilitaryCollege,Duntroon,in2006.HewasallocatedtotheRoyalRegimentofAustralianArtilleryandservedin16ADRegiment,1RTBand16ALRegiment.HehasdeployedonOperationCatalystandOperationSlipper.CaptainBaumgartenmovedtotheArmyReservein2013,recentlycorpstransferringtotheRoyalAustralianEngineersandiscurrentlypostedto8ER.HeisstudyinggraduateentrylawattheUniversityofNewcastleandworksasalawclerk.

ENDNOTES1 SirBasilLiddellHart,The Revolution in Warfare,Faber&Faber,London,1946;SirBasilLiddell

Hart,Strategy,The Art of the Indirect Approach,Faber&Faber,London,1967.

2 MichaelEvans,The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s strategic culture and way of war 1901-2005,StudyPaperNo.306,LandWarfareStudiesCentre,Canberra,2005,p.62.

3 Ibid.,p.55.

4 DepartmentofDefence,The Strategic Basis of Australia’s Defence,October1975,Chapter5.

5 JohnBlaxland,The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard,CambridgeUniversityPress,Melbourne,2014,p.37.

6 Ibid.,pp.20–22.

7 MichaelEvans,Forward from the Past,StudyPaperNo.301,LandWarfareStudiesCentre,Canberra,2005,pp.68–71.

8 Ibid.,pp.71–74.

9 Blaxland,The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard,p.22.

10 AlexDanchev,The Alchemist of War,Weidenfeld&Nicolson,London,1998.

11 Ibid.,Chapter2.

12 B.H.LiddellHart,‘“TheManintheDark”TheoryofInfantryTacticsandthe“ExpandingTorrent”SystemofAttack’,The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution,Vol.LXVI,No.461,February1921.

13 Danchev,The Alchemist of War,pp.102–03.

14 Ibid.,pp.78–79.

15 AlexDanchev,‘“Cross-Dressing”:LiddellHart,Fashion,andWar’,Alternatives: Global, Local, Political,Vol.24,No.2,pp.257–58.

16 Danchev,The Alchemist of War,pp.227–28.

17 B.Bond,Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought,Cassell,London,1977,p.129.

18 Ibid.,pp.166–67.




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19 SirBasilLiddellHart,The Defence of Britain,Faber,London,1939.

20 Bond,Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought,p.97.

21 LiddellHart,The Defence of Britain,p.43.

22 Bond,Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought,p.97.

23 AzarGat,A History of Military Thought,OxfordUniversityPress,UK,2001,pp.677–80.

24 Ibid.,p.678.

25 RobertH.Larson,‘B.H.LiddellHart:ApostleofLimitedWar’,Military Affairs,Vol.44,No.2,April1980,p.72.

26 BrianHoldenReid,‘YoungTurksorNotSoYoung?TheFrustratedQuestofMajorGeneralJ.F.C.FullerandCaptainB.H.LiddellHart’,The Journal of Military History,Vol.73,Issue1,January2009,p.163.

27 JamesGow,‘TheNewClausewitz?War,force,artandutility–RupertSmithon21stcenturystrategy,operationsandtacticsinacomprehensivewar’,Journal of Strategic Studies,Vol.9,No.6,December2006,pp.1161–62.SeealsoRupertSmith,The Utility of Force,AllenLane,UK,2005.

28 DepartmentofDefence,The Defence of Australia,AustralianGovernmentPublishingService,Canberra,1987,p.31.

29 Ibid.,pp.56–57.

30 Ibid.,p.54;DepartmentofDefence,The Army in the 1980s,Canberra,1982,pp.6–8.

31 DepartmentofDefence,Australian Defence,AustralianGovernmentPublishingService,1976.

32 The Defence of Australia,p.25.

33 Forexample,GarryWoodward,‘BestPracticeinAustralia’sForeignPolicy:“Konfrontasi”(1963-1966)’,Australian Journal of Political Science,Vol.33,No.1,pp.93–97.

34 The Defence of Australia,p.30.

35 Evans,The Tyranny of Dissonance,p.57.

36 Ibid.,p.49.

37 AustralianArmy,Division in Battle, Counter Revolutionary Warfare 1965,PamphletNo.11,ArmyHeadquarters,Canberra,1966.

38 Reid,‘YoungTurksorNotSoYoung?,p.164.

39 AlexDanchev,‘LiddellHartandtheIndirectApproach’,The Journal of Military History,Vol.63,Issue2,p.315.

40 LiddellHart,Strategy,pp.24–33;LiddellHart,A Greater than Napoleon: Scipio Africanus, W. Blackwood & Sons,Edinburgh,1927.

41 LiddellHart,Strategy,pp.39–53.

42 Ibid.,pp.131–37;LiddellHart,Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American,Dodd&Mead,NewYork,1929.

43 Danchev,The Alchemist of War,p.158.

44 Bond,Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought,p.38.

45 MichaelHoward,‘ThreePeople–LiddellHart’inMichaelHoward,The Causes of Wars,UnwinPaperbacks,London,1983,pp.240–41.




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46 AustralianArmyDoctrineCentre,‘ManoeuvreTheory’,Australian Defence Force Journal,No.111,March/April1995,pp,30–31;WilliamF.Owen,‘TheManeuvreWarfareFraud’,RUSI Journal,August2008,Vol.153,No.4.

47 Danchev,‘LiddellHartandtheIndirectApproach’,p.313.

48 MichaelEvans,‘TheClosingoftheAustralianMilitaryMind’,Security Challenges,Vol.4,No.2,winter2008,p.115.

49 Evans,Forward from the Past,p.20.

50 AustralianArmy,The Fundamentals of Land Force Operations,pp.2-2–2-3,paras206–208;213–216.

51 Ibid.,p.2-2,para206.

52 Evans, Forward from the Past,p.18.

53 The Fundamentals of Land Force Operations,p.4-1,para405.

54 Evans,Forward from the Past,pp.18–19.

55 Ibid.,pp.27–28.

56 Evans,‘TheClosingoftheMilitaryMind’,p.107.

57 WallaceP.Franz,‘GrandTactics’,Military Review,Vol.LXI,No.12,p.34.


59 Ibid.,p.62.

60 Ibid.,p.71.

61 Ibid.,p.67.

62 AlexDanchev,‘LiddellHartandManoeuvre’,RUSI Journal,Vol.143,No.6,p.33.

63 MajorGeneralJohnKiszely,‘TheMeaningofManoeuvre’,RUSI Journal,Vol.143,No.6,December1998,pp.37–38.


65 Kiszely,‘TheMeaningofManoeuvre’,p.38.

66 FransOsinga,Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd,EburonAcademicPublishers,Delft,TheNetherlands,2005,p.56.

67 WilliamLind,Manoeuvre Theory Handbook,WestviewPress,Boulder,Colorado,1985.

68 USDepartmentoftheArmy,FM100-5 Operations,WashingtonDC,1993.

69 Lind,Maneuver Warfare Handbook,p.9.

70 RobertLeonhard,The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and Airland Battle,PresidioPress,Novato,California,1991,p.46.

71 Osinga,Science, Strategy and War,p.53.

72 Reid,‘YoungTurksorNotSoYoung?’,pp.169–71.

73 AustralianArmy,Directive Control,HeadquartersTrainingCommand,Sydney,1988.

74 Ibid.,para3.




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75 DepartmentofDefence,The Australian Approach to Warfare,NationalCapitalPrinting,June2002,pp.23,5;AustralianDefenceForceWarfareCentre,ADDP 00.1 Command and Control,DefencePublishingService,Canberra,2009,para.2.13.

76 SirBasilLiddellHart,A History of the World War,Faber&Faber,London,1930,Chapter6.

77 DirectorateofPlans–Army,The Australian Army: An Aide Memoire,Canberra,2014,p.3.

78 MichaelKrause,‘ClassicalStrategistsandtheIndirectApproach’,Australian Defence Force Journal,No.119,pp.17–20.

79 TherearenofewerthanthreeinLWD-3-0 Operations.

80 AustralianArmy,Restructuring the Australian Army,DirectorateofPublishingandVisualCommunication,Canberra,1997,p.54.

81 ColonelAlexanderAlderson,‘Influence,theIndirectApproachandManoeuvre’,RUSI Journal,Vol.157,No.1,p.37.




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BOOK REVIEW

Canister! On! FIRE! Australian Tank Operations in Vietnam

BruceCameron,BigSkyPublishing,2012,

ISBN9781921941993,968pp(twovolumes),$64.99

ReviewedbyLieutenantColonelScottWinter

InNovember2012,the1stArmouredRegimenthostedtheofficiallaunchofCanister! On! Fire! Australian Tank Operations in Vietnam.Acontingentoftheregiment’sveterans,ledbyauthorBruceCameron,MC,joinedthemenandwomenoftheregimentfortheoccasion.AfterastirringpresentationbyformerChiefoftheGeneralStaffLieutenantGeneralLaurieO’Donnell,AC,veteransreadexcerptsfromthebook.Thiswasapoignantandmovingoccasion.Itwasalsoareminderthat,some40yearsafterthelasttankswerewithdrawnfromVietnam,serviceinthisuniquearmoftheAustralianArmyremainsstrikinglysimilar,withenduringchallenges.

Thistwo-volumehistoryofAustraliantankoperationsinVietnamprovidesacompletenarrativeofthecommitmentoftankstotheconflict,fromthebackgroundtothedecisiontodeploytankstothetheatrethrougheveryactionfought.Thelastoftheseactions—andthefinaldeploymentoftanksinacombatrole—saw


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theauthorleadhistroopagainstadeterminedenemy.ExhaustiveresearchbyBruceCameronaddsconsiderabledetailtotheaccount,whetherinthetechnicalstrengthsandvulnerabilitiesofthevehiclesorthedailyexperienceoflivingandfightingfromthetanksunderthemostdemandingofconditions.Thisisultimatelythestoryofthetankcrewsthemselvesandrepresentsthefirsttimetheuniqueexperiencesofthesemenhavebeenaccuratelyandeffectivelyrecorded.Forthisreasonalone,thishistoryisaworthyadditiontothepantheonofliteratureontheVietnamWar.

Fromacontemporaryperspective,however,thereisanimmediateandenduringresonancetothishistory.Thebackgroundtotheemploymentofarmourintheconflict,thedecisiontodeploytanks,andtheirsubsequentintegrationintotheverycoreofthewayinwhichtheAustralianArmyfoughtthegroundwarinVietnam,provideclearandimportantremindersforthesoldiersoftoday.

AnalysisofthedecisiontodeploytankstoVietnamreinforcestheenduringplaceofthetankinthewaytheAustralianArmyfights.AsCameroncomments,intheaftermathof6RAR’sexperiencesduringOperationBribie,‘thelackofdirectfirepowertoenabletheAustralianstosuccessfullyassaultevenahastilyprepareddefensivepositionwasobvious.’Howeverthedecisiontodeploytankswaspoliticallychargedandthesubjectofheateddebate.Ultimately,therealityofthechangednatureofwarfare,theconvictionoftheAustralianTaskForcecommanderandhisdeterminationtoensurethatsoldiershadeveryadvantageintheclosefightledtothedecisionin1967tosendCSquadrontoVietnam.

The‘shockaction’effectofthetankasa‘gamechanger’onitsintroductiontothetheatrewasclearlyhighlightedbytheinitialdeploymentoftanksduringthereinforcementofFirebasesCoralandBalmoralinMay1968.Theaggressiveuseofcanisterrounds(thatgivethebookitstitle)inthedefence,andtheabilitytocounter-attackwith‘moreconfidence’astheTaskForceCommanderreflectedafterthebattle,meantthat,fromthispointon,tankswouldbeintegratedintothecombinedarmsfightinVietnam.

Anotherall-too-familiarbattlefieldchallengewastheenemy’sresponsetothearrivaloftanksintheprovince—theescalationofminewarfareandcomplexambushing.Theneedtoadapttothemine(IED)androcket-propelledgrenadethreatthroughtacticalandtechnicalingenuityisarecurringthemeofthisstory,andthenatureofthethreattothetankcrewswouldbeveryfamiliartothosewhohavedeployedinarmouredvehiclesintheMiddleEasterntheatreofoperationsinrecentyears.Thereisthusagreatdealinthishistorytocommendittotoday’sscholars;indeed,

BOOKREVIEW


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theexperiencesandchallengesofdeployingtanksinVietnamshouldbenotedbyallthoseengagedinmilitarypreparednessplanning,andthedifficultiesofthesustainmentandmaintenanceofarmouronoperationsprovidesmuchusefulmaterialforlogisticspecialists.

Aboveall,forcontemporaryreaders,thebookrelatesthetimelessimperativeofclosecooperationofallelementsofthecombinedarmsteam.ThebattleofBinhBa,forexample,remainstestamenttotheneedforclosecoordinationofcombinedarms.InCameron’sretellingofthetale,whatemergesarethecomplementaryrolesoftanks,APCs,infantryandaviation,andindeedtheirinherentvulnerabilityifisolated.Theessentialsupportofartilleryandengineersisalsohighlighted.Inreadingthisaccountofthebattlehowever,itisthe‘coolleadershipandgallantry’ofcommanders,the‘adherencetocrewdrills’oftheArmouredCorpscrewmen,andthetirelessworkofthe‘bluebells’(theRAEMEmechanics)thatareidentifiedascriticaltoachievingvictoryunderconditionsofsustainedclosecombat.

AsayoungofficerinthisregimentIwaskeenlyawareofthelegacyofthosewhoservedbeforeus.Theregiment’sbattlehonours,emblazonedontheArmy’sonlyRegimentalStandard,presentedadailyreminderofthesacrificeofmypredecessors.BruceCameron’sbooks,liketheStandard,representanenduringmonumenttothestrugglesofthetankcrewsandmaintainerswhofoughtinthejunglesofVietnam.Whatthebooksalsooffer,however,isthefinedetail,thehumanexperiencesandtheenduringlessonsbehindthebattlehonours.AstheArmyrestructurestoincludetanks,APCsandcavalryineachbrigade,thesestories,andparticularlythedetailandthehumanexperienceofhowtotrain,fight,andadaptremaininviolable.Formanyyearstheregimentsustainedthemantra‘TanksSaveLives!’toillustratethevalueofthetanktotheinfantryintheclosefight—thishistoryexplainsinvividdetailwhythismantraistrue.

Withtypicalhumility,BruceCameron’saccountoftheactionforwhichhewasawardedtheMilitaryCrossisunderstatedandheconcentratesonthefactsandthebraveactionsofothers.Canister! On! Fire!reflectsthisselflessapproachthroughout,asitisthedeedsofthetankandRAEMEcrewstogetherwiththeirattachedengineermini-teamsthatstandasproofoftheenduringlessonsofcombinedarmsinbattle.

BOOKREVIEW


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BOOK REVIEW

A Soldier’s Soldier: A Biography of Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Daly

JeffreyGrey,CambridgeUniversityPress,2013,

ISBN9781107031272,264pp,$64.99

ReviewedbyLieutenantAdamChirgwin

AsauthorJeffreyGreyobservesinhisopeningtoA Soldier’s Soldier: A Biography of Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Daly,theAustralianArmydoesnothaveatraditionof‘greatcaptains’.Asaresult,thereisoftenaprofoundlackofknowledgeandawarenessofAustralia’sleadingmilitaryfigures,bothinsocietyasawholeandwithintheArmyitself.GreyseekstoredressthisshortcominginhisexaminationofthelifeandcareeroftheVietnam-eraChiefoftheGeneralStaff(CGS),LieutenantGeneralSirThomasDaly.

A Soldier’s Soldier isthefirstattempttopublishabiographyofDaly.ItcovershiscareerfromhisarrivalattheRoyalMilitaryCollege,Duntroon,in1930tohisretirementasCGSin1971asAustraliawaspreparingtowithdrawfromVietnam.Whilehiscareeriscoveredinitsentirety,themajorfocusofthebookisonDaly’scareerfollowingattainmentofseniorrankafterhisreturntoAustraliafromcommandingthe28thCommonwealthBrigadeinKorea.Thiswasatransitional


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periodfortheAustralianArmy,characterisedbyexpansionduringtheVietnamWarandthelossofpublicandpoliticalsupportresultingfromthatunpopularconflict.ParticularattentionispaidtoDaly’sinteractionwithseniorNavyandAirForceofficers,politiciansandseniorforeignmilitaryofficers.ThebookalsoexaminesstructuralchangewithintheArmyinwhichDalyplayedamajorrole,includingdevelopmentsinArmyaviationandthepre-independencePacificIslandsRegiment.

ThecareerofanofficersuchasDalycontainsimportantlessonsforprofessionaldevelopmentincludinghowtoeffectivelytrainandmanagetroops,regardlessofrank.Dalypossessedasignaturecommandandleadershipstylethatheappliedthroughouthiscareertogreateffect.Hisemphasisonsoldierandfamilywelfarewaswellreceivedbybothhispeersandhissubordinates,astheextensiverangeofinterviewsandpersonalaccountsthroughoutthebookattests.ExaminationofDaly’scommandatalllevelsalsoprovidesvaluableinsightintoeffectiveunittrainingandmanagementintimesofaffluenceandausterity,andinbothpeaceandwar.Daly’sstruggleasCGStoleadanarmythatwasundergoingsignificantstructuralchangefollowinganextensiveoperationaldeploymentisalsoparticularlytopicalforthecurrentAustralianArmyintheaftermathofthewithdrawalfromAfghanistanandthechangesheraldedbytheimplementationofPlanBeersheba.Dalyoffersastrongexampleofhowthesechallengescanbemanaged.

A Soldier’s Soldierisacomprehensiveandwell-balancedportrayalofamanwhoplayedapivotalroleinleadingtheAustralianArmythroughaperiodofupheavalanduncertainty.ThebookanalysesthebroadrangeofpressuresthatDalyfacedduringhiscareer;frommanagingsubordinatesandtheirfamilies,tointerservice,internationalandwholeofgovernmentrelations.WhilethesepressuresarecommonacrosseveryperiodinthehistoryoftheAustralianArmy,Daly’sactionswarrantparticularexamination.Hisabilitytomaintainunityinthefaceofmountingpublicandgovernmentmistrust,andhiseffortstopromotetrustandcommunicationbetweenthehigherechelonsoftheArmyandgovernment,ensurethatA Soldier’s SoldierisparticularlypertinenttothecontemporaryArmy.Theauthor’scarefulanalysisofDaly’scommandstyleatalllevelsalsoprovidesmuchthatwillbenefitthecurrentgenerationofAustralianArmyofficers.A Soldier’s SoldiercontainsvaluablelessonsforcurrentandfutureAustraliansoldiersastheArmyonceagainentersaperiodofstructuralchangefollowingalengthyoperationalcommitment.Thecommonelementslienotsimplyinthechallengesfaced,butmoreimportantlyinthewaythesearemet.

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BOOK REVIEW

Afghan Sun: Defence, Diplomacy, Development and the Taliban

StuartYeaman,BoolarongPress,2013,

ISBN9781922109910,360pp,$34.95

ReviewedbyColonelDavidConnery

Mostbooksreviewedinthisjournalarewrittenbydetachedobserversandacademics.Afghan Sunisdifferent.ItistheworkofformerAustralianArmyofficerColonelStuartYeaman,AM,andisapersonalaccountoftheunithecommandedinAfghanistan.ThisbookwillprimarilyinterestreaderswithaconnectiontotheunitorthosewithadeepappreciationoftheAfghanconflict.FuturecommanderswillalsofindsoundadviceoncounterinsurgencyandengineeringoperationspresentedthroughinsightsintoColonelYeaman’sthinkingandinfrequentlyofferedpersonalviews.

Afghan SunisadetailednarrativeofReconstructionTaskForce4(RTF4)anditstourofAfghanistanfromApriltoOctober2008.Thebookcoverstheformationandtrainingofthetaskforceanditsinitialdeployments.ThestorythenmovesinchronologicalsequencethroughthemajorconstructionoperationswhichfocusontheimpressivedeploymentstobuildanewpatrolbaseintheBaluchivalleyandthe


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long-rangebridgerepaireffortinsouth-easternAfghanistan.Thesestoriesillustratetheconsideration,preparationandteamworknecessaryforsuccessfuloperations.TheyalsodescribehowRTF4commandersanalysedrisk,theirmissionandtheirenemy.Thebookisparticularlystrongintheseareas,andthestoriesofeachoperationareconveyedclearlyandcrisply.

Providingcontextforthereadercanbeatoughtask,particularlywherethebookonlycoversasmallpartofalargewar.Yeamanprovidesthisbackgroundbytakingthereaderthroughthe‘why’oftheconflictandthe‘who’ofsomeimportantactorsinwell-consideredandlogicalways.HemixesthiselementofthenarrativewithanecdotesdescribingformerPresidentKarzai’slinkstotheprovince,explanationsofAfghansociety,anddetailsofmilitaryequipmentandtactics.Thelattersection,toldfromanArmyengineer’sviewpoint,isfascinating,particularlyasthistopicisrarelybroachedinthebroaderliteratureonwarfare.Asbackground,thesesectionsperformadequately,althoughtheyareunlikelytosatisfythosewhoseekadeeperunderstandingofAfghanistanandthisconflict.

ThenarrativeproducessomesharpobservationsontheAfghanwarandAustralia’srole.Yeamanlamentsthelackofmediacoverageofthewarandhisunit,whichhefeltcouldhavehelpedconvinceAustraliansto‘own’thewar.Whilethatoutcomewasalwaysunlikely,itdoeshighlightthegeneralestrangementoftheAustralianpeoplefromthetoughanddangeroustaskperformedbytheirarmy.Hisobservationsonpost-traumaticstresssyndromearepoignantandhisviewsonteam-buildinganddisciplineareworthyofconsiderationbythosewhomayundertakeasimilarjobinthefuture.HeprovidessomeinsightintothelocalleveldiplomacyanddevelopmentinUruzganduring2008,butmakesnorealattempttoplaceeitherintheirbroadercontextortoevaluatetheirrelativesignificance.Thatsuchadviceandviewsarerareisdisappointing,butgenerallyconsistentwiththeauthor’snarrativestyle.

Unithistoriesdonotalwaysmakeinterestingreadingforgeneralaudiences.Theymustbalancetherequirementtoexplainunitactionswiththeneedtorecognisethosewhowereinvolved.Afghan Sunachievesthatbalanceandisaworthwhileadditiontothegrowingliteratureonthisprotractedandongoingwar.

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BOOK REVIEW

Don’t Mention the War: The Australian Defence Force, the Media and the Afghan Conflict

KevinFoster,MonashUniversityPublishing,2013,

ISBN9781922235183,168pp,$24.95

ReviewedbyTomHill

KevinFoster’sDon’t Mention the WarseekstoexplainthelackofobjectiveanderuditereportingontheAfghanistanconflictbytheAustralianmedia,arguingthatthecoveragewascharacterisedbyanabsenceofinsightandinvestigation.Instead,themediawereforcedtoperpetuatetheADF’sstrategicandoperationalnarrativetothedetrimentofpublicdiscourseanddebate.Insupportofhisargument,thebookanalysestheADF,governmentandmedia’sattitudestoreportinginAfghanistan.Hisanalysisrevealsacomplexinterplayoffactorswhichconspired,directlyandindirectly,againsttransparentandunbiasedreportingofthewar.Asaresultthebookprovidesacomprehensiveunderstandingofthearrayoffactorsbehindthelowstandardofreporting.However,thereaderislefttodeliberatetheeffectofthecollectivefailuretoprovokeinsightfulandobjectivedebateinAustralianpublicdiscourseonthequalityandlegitimacyoftheADF’sparticipationintheAfghanistanwar.


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Foster’sbookissituatedwithinthewell-establisheddebateontheinfluenceofthe‘4thEstate’onpoliticaldecision-making.HisworkprovidesfreshinsightsintoitsrelationshipwiththeADFandhowthisdistrustfulandattimesantagonisticrelationshiprestrictedobjectivereportingontheAfghanconflict.HebeginshisanalysisbyquestioningthelegitimacyofADFattitudestoreporting,citingthelongshadowcastbynegativeattitudestothemediaduringtheVietnamWar.HecontendsthatthisunjustifiednegativityreflectedtheattitudeofAmericanforcestothemediaatthetime.ThiswasreinforcedbythefrequentsubstitutionofAmericancontentforAustralianbythebetterresourcedAmericanbroadcasters.SuspicionhascontinuedtodominatetheADF’sapproachtothemediadespitethepassingoftime.

FosterassertsthatthisperceptioncontinuedtounderpintheADF’smediaengagementwithjournalistsinAfghanistan.Itseffectwasmostpronouncedinthemediaembeddingprogram.HearguesthattheprogramlackedstructureandanestablishedagreementbetweentheADFandmediaorganisations.Consequently,itwassusceptibletothepersonalitiesandattitudesofDefencepersonnelwhichlimitedjournalists’exposuretotheADF’swork.HecontraststhiswiththeembeddingprogramconductedbyCanadianandDutchforces.Apartfromthepoliticalandculturalissueswhichdrovetheirengagementwiththemedia,Fosteremphasisesthattheirsuccesswasbuiltonawillingnesstoformalisemutuallybeneficialrelationshipswhich,heasserts,theADFlacked.

Fosteralsofocusesontheshortcomingsofboththemediaandthepublic.TheAustralianmedia’sunwillingnesstoinvestinoverseasbureaus—duelargelytofallingrevenueslinkedtothemodernrevolutioninmedia—tendedtorestrictoriginalreporting.Furthermore,thepubliclackofinterestorpropensitytoquestionthereasonsandstrategybehindAustralia’sinvolvementinAfghanistanlimitedtheconflict’scommercialmediaappeal.Thisstablepublicsupportforthewar,Fosterargues,wasnurturedbytheADFandtheDefenceMinister’sofficethroughaconstant,ADF-generatedstrategicnarrative.

Foster’sanalysisweavesthroughacomplexinteractionofhistorical,culturalandpoliticalargumentstosupporthiscentralthesis.Howeverhisdetailedhandlingofthemultifacetedandbroad-rangingissueswhichmadeobjectiveandinsightfulreportinginAfghanistanchallengingmakesclosereadingnecessary.Thereadercangetlostinhisoftenlongandconvolutedsentences.Thismakesthebookslightlyunfriendlytoanon-academicaudienceandisexacerbatedbythelackofadominantnarrativeatsomepoints.Giventhecomplexityoftheissue,astrongercentralnarrativewouldhavehelpedbindmanyoftheinterrelatedissues.

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Howeverthebook’scentralargumentisconsistentlywellsupportedandconvincing.Foster’suseofevidencebasedonface-to-faceinterviewsandacademicresearchreinforcesanalreadywidelyheldassumptionthatreportingonAfghanistanlackedobjectiveinsight.Foster’sbookneatlyexplainswhyobjectivereportingonthewarwasconstrained.HetiestogethershortcomingswithintheADF,mediaandgovernmentandsignalsacollectivefailuretoobjectivelyinformthepubliconAustralia’slongestwar.Don’t Mention the WarisinsightfulreadingforthosewhoseektoimprovethequalityofmediacoverageofanyfutureoperationconductedbytheADF.

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BOOK REVIEW

All the King’s Men: The British Redcoat in the Era of Sword and Musket

SaulDavid,Penguin,2013,

ISBN9780141027937,592pp

ReviewedbyMajorTimInglis

ThecentenaryoftheGallipolicampaignisnottheonlymilitaryanniversaryin2015.ItwillalsobethebicentenaryofthebattleofWaterloo,whichendedtherevolutionaryeraanddrewtheNapoleonicWarstoaclose.Itisthereforehardlysurprisingthatmilitaryhistoriansarebusyrevisitingtheeventsthatleduptothebattle.OneofthebestaccountsincirculationisintheclosingchaptersofSaulDavid’sAll the King’s Men,inwhichhereviewstheentireWaterloocampaignincludingthecriticalforerunneractionsatQuatreBrasandLigny.Thisisawell-researchedaccountthatstepsoutsidetraditionalWellingtonhagiographyandavoidsfacileexplanationsofhowNapoleonsnatcheddefeatfromthejawsofvictory.ThereissufficientbreadthinDavid’saccounttoseetheebbandflowinthefortunesofwar;yetthereisdetailenoughtocatchglimpsesoftheearlystirringsofmanoeuvrewarfareinopposingcommanders’useofgapsandsurfaces,occasionalapplicationofmissioncommandandserendipitousassemblyof


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de factocombinedarmsteams.Fromacommandandcontrolperspective,therearehintsattheconsequenceofanearlyformofthestaffsystemamongBlucher’sPrussiansandspecificallyinitsimpactoncombateffectiveness.

All the King’s MenisthemostrecentworkfromtheauthorwhobroughtusthepoignantChurchill’s Sacrifice of the 51st Highland Division,Victoria’s Wars,The Indian MutinyandZulu.David’sstrengthasaspecialistinBritain’scolonialwarsexplainstheauthorityhebringstothisbroadsweepfromMarlboroughtoWellington,aperiodinwhichBritainsufferedonlyonemajormilitarydefeat,inNorthAmerica.Thescopeofthisbookincludestheevolutionoftacticsthroughthedevelopmentsinmilitarytechnology,trainingmethods,commandandcontrol.ThusweseehowMarlboroughexploitedsprungsupplywagonstogivehisarmyalogisticedge,howtherollingmusketvolleycameintobeing,andwhenthefoundationsofdefenceindepthwerelaid.

Davidisathismostincisivewhenheexaminestheshibbolethsofpopularwisdom,suchastheclaimthattheBritishlearnednothingfromtherevolutionarywarwithAmerica.HisassertionthatMooreappliedthelessonslearnedtoraiseabrigade-levelunitforrapiddeploymentandflexibleoperationsispursuedtoitsconclusionwithMoore’sfightingretreattoCorunna.Moorediedofhiswoundsinthefield,withouttheglorythatsurroundedWolfe’sassaultontheHeightsofAbraham.ButhesnatchedasignificantpartoftheBritisharmyfromtheenemy’sgrasp,divertedNapoleon’sattentiontonorthernSpainandestablishedaroleforlighttroops.David’streatmentofWellington’srisetopre-eminencehasacompellingobjectivity.HeproperlyrecognisesWellington’sbattlefieldcourageascommoncurrencyamonghissubordinatecommanders,butnotesotherqualitiesthatenabledWellingtontofunctionmoreeffectively,suchashisabilitytolearnquicklyfromhisownerrors,hisintuitivesenseofterritorialopportunity,andhisalmostherculeansenseofpublicduty.

ThereisanironyinSaulDavid’sheadlinetitleAll the King’s Men,sincetherecordismoregeneroustothegeneralsandtheircampaignsthantotheirmenwhofoughtsodoggedlyinthiscenturyandahalfofBritishmilitarydominance.Perhapsthistitlehintsatthedeep-runningloyaltiesthatunitedBritain’sgeneralsduringthisperiodofalmostuninterruptedsuccess.Forthosewholiketolivedangerouslyandgostraighttodessert,thelasttwochaptersareasgoodarevisionasyoucouldfindforcommemorationeventsinJune2015.Butthosewhodomakethetimetoreadthisbookfromcovertocoverwillberewardedwithmanyfineinsightsintotheriseoftheredcoat.

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BOOK REVIEW

Fromelles the Final Chapters: How the Buried Diggers were Identified and Their Lives Reclaimed

TimLycettandSandraPlayle,PenguinAustralia,2013,

ISBN9780670075362,288pp,$29.99

ReviewedbyBrianManns

Ibeganreadingthisbookwithgreatinterest,keentoknowhowTimLycettandSandraPlayleplannedtotellthestoryof‘howtheburieddiggers’recoveredfromseveralmassgravesnearFromellesinFrancewereidentified.TheprocessofexhumationandidentificationwassocomplexthatIdoubtedtheywereequippedtotellthecompletestory,particularlyastheirinvolvementintheFromellesProjecthadremainedontheperiphery.

From2008to2010thejointAustralianandBritishFromellesProjectinvestigated,recovered,recordedandreburiedthehumanremainsof250AustralianandBritishsoldiersfromseveralmassgravesnearthetinyFrenchtownofFromelles.TheremainswerethoseofsoldierskilledduringtheBattleofFromelles(19–20July1916)andburiedbytheGermanArmynearasmallwood(PheasantWood)onthe


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outskirtsofFromelles.ThebodieswerereburiedinthenewestCommonwealthWarGravesCommissioncemetery,theFromelles(PheasantWood)MilitaryCemetery,in2010.ThebattlerepresentsthelargestsinglelossofAustralianlivesinanywarwithover5000menkilled.

InmypositionasManager,UnrecoveredWarCasualties–Army,IhavebeenresponsiblefortheAustraliancontributiontothejointprojectsinceAugust2010,withmostoftheworkfocusedontheongoingidentificationoftheAustraliansoldiers.ThejointnatureoftheprojectwillconcludeinJuly2014withtheAustralianArmythen‘goingitalone’untileveryopportunitytoidentifytheremainingAustraliansisexhausted.Iwasalsoamemberoftheexpertpanelconvenedin2005toconsidertheevidencepresentedbyLambisEnglezosandhisteam.So,IwaseagertoreadhowLycettandPlaylewouldtellthestoryoftheidentificationprocess.Notsurprisingly,theyhavenotexplainedtheentireidentificationprocessbuthaveprovidedaninterestinginsightintohowgenealogycontributed,innosmallway,totheoverallsuccessofidentification.Todate,124Australiansoldiershavebeenidentifiedbyname.

ThisbookisnotintendedtoprovidethedefinitiveaccountoftheBattleofFromelles,althoughitdoesincludeanoutlineofthebattle.Nordoesitattempt,asitssub-titlemightsuggest,toexplainthevariousaspectsoftheidentificationprocessemployedbytheprojectteam,althoughitdoesexplainhowtheprojectunfolded.WhatitdoesistoprovidethereaderaninsightintothepassionofbothwritersforthestoriesofAustraliansandtheGreatWar.Itisclearthroughoutthebookthatbothauthorshavespentyearsresearchingthesubjectandthattheyhaveemployedtheirinterestsinmilitaryhistoryandgenealogytofulleffecttoprovideinsightfulaccountsofthelives(anddeaths)ofanumberofAustraliansoldierswhoservedinthatdreadfulwar.

ThebookassiststhereadertounderstandtheimportantrolethathistoricalresearchandgenealogyplayedinlocatingtherelativesofAustralianswhowerelistedas—andremain—missingintheBattleofFromelles.LocatingrelativesandidentifyingthosewhoaremostsuitableforDNAmatchingwitharecoveredsoldieristhefirststepinestablishingasoldier’sidentification.WhenaDNAmatchissupportedbypostmortemandantemortem,artefactandhistoricalevidenceanindividualidentificationmaybeestablished.

TimLycettandSandraPlayleprovidetheirreadersafascinatinginsightintotheworldofgenealogyheightenedbytheirpassionfortheirwork.ThebookalsoassiststhereadertobecomeacquaintedwithmanyofthebraveAustralianswhoansweredthecallandwhogavetheirlivesduringtheGreatWar.

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BOOK REVIEW

Australia 1943: The Liberation of New Guinea

PeterDean(ed),PenguinAustralia,2013,

ISBN9781107037991,337pp,$59.95

ReviewedbyMattMiller

Australia 1943: The Liberation of New GuineaisanexcellentsnapshotofbothfamiliarandunexploredaspectsofthewarinNewGuinea.NewGuineawasacomplicatedbattlefieldwithavastgeographyandunfamiliarnameswhichwillchallengetheuninitiated.ThebookendeavourstoexplorethebattleforNewGuineafromthestrategicheightsofpoliticalchallengesinAustraliatothecombatlogisticsservicesinthejungle.Thecaptureofasingleyearofwarandthebroadcross-sectionoftopicshas,toanextent,streamlinedwhatwouldhavepreviouslyrequiredthereadingofnumerousvoluminoustextstogainfamiliaritywiththetopics.

ThefirstchallengefortheuninitiatedistounderstandthevastscopeofNewGuinea’sgeography.FortheAmericanreader,thesheerscaleofunfamiliarnamesoflandingsandbattlesiteswillpresentasignificantchallenge.ThesegeographicchallengeswillbeexacerbatedbythegeneralignoranceoftheNewGuineacampaigninfavourofplacessuchasTarawa,IwoJimaandOkinawa.ThroughoutAustralia 1943,theauthorsofindividualchaptersprovideanexcellentframework,withmapsandgeographiccontextforacampaignthatstretchedacrossoneoftheworld’slargestislands.


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Australia 1943capturesanimportantyearoftransitionsintheSouthWestPacificArea(SWPA).First,theJapanesetransitionedintoaretrogradeandsometimes‘dieinplace’defenceacrossthetheatre.ThesecondmajortransitionwasthatoftheUnitedStateswhich,aftersomeinitialstumblesintheSWPA,becamethedominantcombatpowerinthePacific,firstoffsettingtheRoyalAustralianAirForceandtheRoyalAustralianNavyandfinallytheAustralianArmy.

Thisvolumeaddressestheevolutionofstrategyin1943fromthreeangles—theUnitedStates,AustraliaandJapan—providingahealthylookatthestrategyunderwhichthebattlesofNewGuineawouldunfold.ReadersfamiliarwithGeneralMacArthur’scomplicatedandsometimesquestionablecommandstylewillfindtheAustralianperspectiveontheatrecommandpoliticsthroughoutthebookhighlybeneficialtounderstandingthecomplexrelationshipsbetweenthecountries.EquallyimportantistheinclusionofachapteronJapan’sstrategyintheSWPA,offeringadeeperviewofthereasoningbehindJapan’sactionsasopposedtopublicationsthatmorecommonlyuseJapan’sroleandactionstohighlightAlliedstoriesofPacificvictory.Asnoted,1943wasasignificantyearforJapanesemilitarystrategywiththeshifttoretrogradeoperationsinunforgiving,disease-infestedterrainwherethepossibilityofwithdrawalorreliefseemedeverlesslikely.

Theoftenlesseracknowledgedfieldsofmilitaryendeavours,suchaslogistics,areprovidedtheirownchaptersinAustralia 1943.ThishelpsthereadertograspthemonumentalchallengeofAustralianandAmericansupportforgroundcombattroopsinthemudandmountainsofNewGuinea.ItalsohighlightstheinabilityoftheJapanesetosupporttheiroverextendeddefensiveringintheSouthPacific.Althoughitisuncommonforsupportfunctionssuchaslogisticstobegivensuchprominenceinthistypeofbook,thisinformationisinvaluabletounderstandingthescopeofoperationsinNewGuinea.

Australia 1943 offersfairpraisefortheAustralianinfantrywho,inthistimeandspace,hadtransitionedfromthedesertsofNorthAfricaandtheMiddleEasttobecomeahighlycompetentjungleforce.ThepartnershipwiththeUnitedStatesturnedatacticallysavvylightinfantryintoacombinedarmsmachineinNewGuinea.Aswaskeenlynotedinthebook,1943sawtheAustralianinfantry’sincreasedcommandofbothartilleryandairsupportagainsttheJapanesefortificationsintheMarkhamandRamuvalleys.

ThecontributorstothisvolumepresentthewarinNewGuineainafreshlight.Atfirstglance,thechaptersappeartodrawextensivelyonpreviouslypublishedsources.Normally,thiscouldbeconsideredagreatdisadvantageasmanyofthe

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booksonNewGuineaindulgeincircularsourcingtotheextentthatthereaderreceivestheimpressionthatnothingnewhasbeenwrittenonthesubjectsincethe1970s.Fortunately,noneofthechaptersinthisbookengagesinthereissueoffamousquotes,redundantstatistics,orverbatimaccountsofbattlesfromtheofficialhistories.

AbeneficialadditionwouldhavebeenachapteronthevariousAustraliancapabilitiesandechelonsofintelligenceoperatinginNewGuineaduring1943.ThisunexploredareaoftheonlytheatreoftheSecondWorldWardevoidoftheOfficeofStrategicServicescouldhaveprovenavaluableadditiontothestudyoftheAustralianmilitaryandtheliberationofNewGuinea.

WhilethisbookwillcertainlybeofgreatinteresttotheAustralianreader,IbelieveitwillbeofgreaterimportancetotheAmericanreaderwhowillbelessfamiliarwithNewGuinea.Inaddition,thehistoricalinsightsintotheconductofjungleandamphibiouswarfareinacoalitionenvironmentoffermorevaluetofuturemilitaryleadersthanthestudyofassaultsagainstisolatedcoralatolls.IwouldrecommendthatAustralia 1943: The Liberation of New GuineaanditscompanionAustralia 1942: In the Shadow of WarbeaddedtoanymilitaryreadinglistrelatedtotheconductofmilitaryaffairsinthePacific.

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TITLES TO NOTE

Kidnap in Crete

RickStroud,Bloomsbury,2014

ISBN9781408851753,288pp,$32.99

In1941theGermanarmyinvadedthestrategicallyimportantMediterraneanislandwiththelargestairborneforceinhistory.TheyearsofNazioccupationthatfollowedsawmassexecutions,widespreadstarvationandthebrutaldestructionofhomes–butamidthehorror,theCretanresistance,theAndartes,withthesupportofahandfulofBritishSOEagents,foughtonheroically.

ThisisthestoryoftheabductionofGeneralKreipebyLeighFermor,hissecond-in-commandWilliamStanleyMossandtheirtight-knitgroupofpartisans;ofthemidnightambushofthegeneral’scarandtheperilousdrivethroughthegarrisontownofHeraklionandtwenty-twoheavilyguardedroadblocks;oftheirepic,dangerousjourneyonfootandmuleacrossrockypeaks,hidingfromtheirGermanpursuersinmountaincavesandditches,towardsthecoastwhereaRoyalNavylaunchwaswaitingtospiritthegeneraltoEgypt.Butsuccesscameatapricefortheislandersleftbehind:Germanreprisalswereswift,unsparinganddevastating.

Withunprecedentedaccesstofirst-handaccountsoftheCretanguerrillafightersthemselves,aswellasSOEfiles,LeighFermor’sownaccountandotherprivatepapersanddiaries,thisastonishingtruestoryofdaringinthebattleagainstHitleristoldinfullforthefirsttime.


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Australian Soldiers in the Asia-Pacific in World War II

LachlanGrant,NewSouth,2014

ISBN9781742231419,276pp,$39.99

HalfamillionAustraliansencounteredanewworldwhentheyenteredAsiaandthePacificduringWorldWarII:differentpeoples,cultures,languagesandreligionschafingunderthegripofcolonialrule.Movingbeyondthebattlefield,thisbooktellsthestoryofhowmid-centuryexperiencesoftroopsinAsia-Pacificshapedhowwefeelaboutournation’splaceintheregionandtheworld.SpanningthevastregionfromNewGuineatoSoutheastAsiaandIndia,LachlanGrantuncoversaffectingtalesoffriendship,grief,spiritualawakening,rebellion,incarceration,sexandsouvenirhunting.Focusingontheday-to-dayinteractionsbetweensoldiersonthegroundandthepeopleandculturestheyencountered,thisbookpaintsapicturenotonlyofindividuallivestransformed,butofdramaticallyshiftingnationalperceptions,asthegazeofAustraliaturnedfromBritaintoAsia.

Fallujah Redux: The Anbar Awakening and the Struggle with Al-Qaeda

DanielR.GreenandWilliamF.MullenIII,NavalInstitutePress,2014

ISBN9781612511429,192pp,US$37.95

FallujahReduxisthefirstbookabouttheFallujahAwakeningwrittenbyOperationIraqiFreedommilitaryveteranswhoservedthere,providingacomprehensiveaccountoftheturningofFallujahawayfromtheal-Qaedainsurgencyin2007.ThecityofFallujahwilllongbeassociatedwithsomeoftheworstviolenceandbrutalityoftheIraqWar.InitiallyoccupiedbyU.S.forcesin2003,iteventuallyservedastheheadquartersfornumerousinsurgentgroupsoperatingwestofBaghdad,includingal-QaedainIraqanditsleaderAbuMusabal-Zarqawi,untilforciblyretakenattheendof2004.ThisbookdescribesthecampaignthatturnedFallujahfromaperennialinsurgenthotspottoanexampleofwhatcanbeachievedbytherightcombinationofleadershipandperseverance.ManybookshavetoldofthemajorbattlesinFallujah—thisbooktellstherestofthestorythatnevermadethenews.

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Zero Night

MarkFelton,AllenandUnwin,2014

ISBN9781848317925,320pp,$27.99

Warburg,Germany:Onthenightof30August1942–‘ZeroNight’–40officersfromBritain,Australia,NewZealandandSouthAfricastagedthemostaudaciousmassescapeoftheSecondWorldWar.Itwasthefirst‘GreatEscape’–butinsteadoftunnelling,theescapersboldlywentoverthehugeperimeterfencesusingwoodenscalingcontraptions.Thiswasthenotorious‘WarburgWireJob’,describedbyfellowprisonerandfighteraceDouglasBaderas‘themostbrilliantescapeconceptionofthiswar’.Monthsofmeticulousplanningandsecrettraininghunginthebalanceduringthreeminutesofmayhemasprisonerschargedthecamp’sdoubleperimeterfences.Tellingthisremarkablestoryinfullforthefirsttime,historianMarkFeltonbrilliantlyevokesthesuspenseoftheescapeitselfandtheadventuresofthosewhoeludedtheGermans,aswellasthecourageofthecivilianswhoriskedtheirlivestohelptheminenemyterritory.

ANZAC: The Unauthorised Biography

CarolynHolbrook,NewSouth,2014

ISBN9781742234076,266pp,$34.99

RaiseaglassforanAnzac.RunforanAnzac.CampunderthestarsforanAnzac.IsthereanythingAustralianswon’tdotokeeptheAnzaclegendatthecentreofournationalstory?ButstandingfirmontheothersideoftheAnzacenthusiastsisachorusofcriticsclaimingthattheappetiteforAnzacismilitarisingourhistoryandindoctrinatingourchildren.SohowarewetomakesenseofthisstruggleoverhowweremembertheGreatWar?

Anzac, the Unauthorised Biographycutsthroughtheclamourtoprovideamuch-neededhistoricalperspectiveonthebattleoverAnzac.Ittraceshow,since1915,Australia’smemoryoftheGreatWarhasdeclinedandsurged,reflectingthevariedandcomplexhistoryoftheAustraliannationitself.Mostimportantly,itaskswhysomanyAustralianspersistwiththefictionthatthenationwasbornon25April1915.

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Ambon

RogerMaynard,Hachette,2014

ISBN9780733630484,334pp,$35.00

InFebruary1942theIndonesianislandofAmbonfelltothemightoftheadvancingJapanesewarmachine.AmongthecapturedAlliedforceswasaunitof1150AustraliansoldiersknownasGullForce,whohadbeensenttodefendtheisland–astrategydoomedfromtheverybeginning.SeveralhundredAustraliansweremassacredincoldbloodsoonaftertheJapaneseinvasion.Butthatwasonlythestartofacatalogueofhorrorsforthemenwhosurvived:incarcerated,beatenandoftentorturedbytheircaptors,thebrutalitytheyenduredlastedforthenextthreeandahalfyears.Andinthishellholeofdespairandevil,officersandmenturnedagainsteachotherasdisciplineandmoralebrokedown.Yettheepicstrugglealsoproducedheroicactsofkindnessandbravery.Justover300ofthesegallantmenlivedtotellofthosegrimdaysbehindthebarbedwire.InAmbon,survivorsspeakofnotjustthehorrors,butofthecourage,enduranceandmateshipthathelpedthemsurvive.ThestoryofAmbonisoneofdepravityandofmemorieslongburied–butalsothetriumphofthehumanspirit.Ithasnotbeenwidelytold–untilnow.

Flight Command

JohnOddie,AllenandUnwin,2014

ISBN9781743319819,316pp,$32.99

John’sappointmentasdeputycommanderofAussieforcesintheMiddleEastcappedaremarkablecareerofservicetoAustralia.Sadly,thishonouralsoinvolvedtheheartbreakingdutyofinformingfamiliesofthedeathsoftheirhusbandsandsonsinAfghanistanandoverseeingdepartureceremoniesforthefallensoldiers.

AswellascoveringthewarinAfghanistan,Flight Commandprovidesaninsider’saccountofbeingacombatpilotinthefirstGulfWar,acommandersupportingpeaceinBougainvilleandsecurityinCambodiaandtheoftenharrowingexperienceofbeingafirst-responsecommanderdealingwiththeaftermathoftheBoxingDaytsunamiinIndonesia.

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The Lost Legions of Fromelles

PeterBarton,AllenandUnwin,2014

ISBN9781742377117,425pp,$32.99

TheactionatFromellesinJuly1916isAustralia’smostcatastrophicmilitaryfailure.Thestoryhasalwaysappearedsimple,butintruthhistorydidnotunfoldinthewaywehaveforsolongbeenledtobelieve.PeterBartonhaswrittenanauthoritativeandrevelatorybookonFromelles.Hedescribesitslongandsurprisinggenesis,andoffersanunexpectedaccountofthefighting;heinvestigatestheinterrogationofAnglo-Australianprisoners,andtheresultsofshrewdGermanpropagandatechniques;andheexploresthecircumstancessurroundingthe‘missing’PheasantWoodgraves.HealsobringsanewperspectivetothewritingsofCharlesBean.

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NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

TheeditorsoftheAustralian Army Journalwelcomesubmissionsfromanysource.Twoprimecriteriaforpublicationareanarticle’sstandardofwrittenEnglishexpressionanditsrelevancetotheAustralianprofessionofarms.Thejournalwillacceptletters,featurearticles,andreviewessays.Asageneralguideonlength,lettersshouldnotexceed500words;andarticlesandreviewessaysshouldbebetween3000and6000words.Readersshouldnotethatarticleswritteninserviceessayformatarediscouraged,sincetheyarenotgenerallysuitableforpublication.

EachmanuscriptshouldbesubmittedtotheAustralian Army Journalemailaddress,dflw.publications@defence.gov.au.Formoreinformationseewww.army.gov.au/Our-future

Pleasemakesureyoursubmissionincludesthefollowingdetails:

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Pleasealsoincludethefollowingfieldsinyoursubmission:

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• Acronym/abbreviationslist

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• 1.5linespacing

• 12-pointTimesNewRoman

• 2.5cmmarginonallsides

• Automaticwordprocessedendnotes


Page105

General style

Allsourcescitedasevidenceshouldbefullyandaccuratelyreferencedinendnotes(notfootnotes).Bookscitedshouldcontaintheauthor’sname,thetitle,thepublisher,theplaceofpublication,theyearandthepagereference.Thisissueofthejournalcontainsexamplesoftheappropriatestyleforreferencing.Whenusingquotations,thepunctuation,capitalisationandspellingofthesourcedocumentshouldbefollowed.Singlequotationmarksshouldbeused,withdoublequotationmarksonlyforquotationswithinquotations.Quotationsofthirtywordsormoreshouldbeindentedasaseparateblockoftextwithoutquotationmarks.Quotationsshouldbecitedinsupportofanargument,notasauthoritativestatements.Numbersshouldbespeltoutuptoninety-nine,exceptinthecaseofpercentages,whereArabicnumeralsshouldbeused(andpercentshouldalwaysbespeltout).Allmanuscriptsshouldbepaginated,andtheuseofabbreviations,acronymsandjargonkepttoaminimum.AustralianEnglishistobeused.

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• Purposeofthepaper

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• Conclusionsthatyouhavereached,andifrelevant,anyrecommendations.

Biographies

Yourbiographyshouldbeabrief,conciseparagraph,whoselengthshouldnotexceedeightlines.Thebiographyistoincludethecontributor’sfullnameandtitle,abriefsummaryofcurrentorpreviousservicehistory(ifapplicable)anddetailsofeducationalqualifications.ContributorsoutsidetheServicesshouldidentifytheinstitutiontheyrepresent.Anyotherinformationconsideredrelevant—forexample,sourcedocumentationforthosearticlesreprintedfromanotherpublication—shouldalsobeincluded.

NOTESFORCONTRIBUTORS

Australian Army Journal Summer edition 2014 · Australian Army Journal Volume XI ... Chauvel Prize...

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