Australia’s biosecurity system for the import of aquatic ... · Australia’s biosecurity...

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Australia’s biosecurity system for the import of aquatic animal products

27 June 2019

Mr Ian Ruscoe

Director Aquatics Unit

Marine and Aquatic Biosecurity Section

Animal Biosecurity Branch

Department of Agriculture

Presentation overview

• Australia’s biosecurity context

• Australia’s biosecurity framework

• Australia’s international biosecurity obligations

• Australia’s appropriate level of protection (ALOP)

• Aquatic Animal Biosecurity

• Import policy

• Incidence and management of RSIV

• Purpose of visit

2 Department of Agriculture 27 May 2019

Background

• Australia has strict biosecurity requirements

– Island nation and free of many pests and diseases

• The Australian government needs to be satisfied that exporting countries have appropriate systems of regulation, animal health, inspection and

certification.

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20 June, 2019 Department of Agriculture

• We are here to familiarise ourselves with Taiwan’s systems for aquatic animal health and certification for export

Australia’s Biosecurity context

• Geographically isolated

• 60,000 km of coastline

• Millions of passengers, ships, planes, mail parcels, as well as animals, plants and cargo containers

• NT$700 billion agriculture industry, unique environment, unique flora and fauna - tourism industry

Australia’s biosecurity framework

• Aims to protect Australia against the risks that may arise from exotic pests and diseases.

• Australia’s biosecurity system is supported by:

• Commonwealth, state and territory biosecurity laws. - For example, the Biosecurity Act 2015.

• Policies, import conditions, surveillance.

• Shared responsibilities.

Offshore Border Onshore


Australia’s international biosecurity obligations

• The department conducts animal/animal product risk analyses in

accordance with international biosecurity obligations including:

• World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). http://oie.int/

• World Health Organization (WHO). https://www.who.int/

• World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS agreement).

https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm


http://oie.int/

https://www.who.int/

https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm

Appropriate Level of Protection (ALOP)

• Under the SPS agreement, WTO members are entitled to maintain a level of protection they consider appropriate to protect life or health within their territory – this is called the ALOP.

• Australia’s ALOP is defined in the Biosecurity Act 2015:

• The appropriate level of protection (or ALOP) for Australia is the high level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection aimed at reducing biosecurity risks to a very low level, but not to zero.

• Biosecurity risk is also defined in the Biosecurity Act 2015:

• The likelihood of a disease or pest entering, establishing or spreading in Australian territory and the potential for the disease or pest causing harm to human, animal or plant health, the environment, economic or community activities.


SPS measures

• A risk analysis is undertaken to determine whether any SPS measures are required to be applied to an import in order to achieve Australia’s ALOP.

• Under the SPS agreement, SPS or risk management measures must:

• Be based on a risk assessment appropriate to the circumstances or drawn from standards developed by the OIE (for animal products).

• Only be applied to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.

• Be based on science.

• Not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between WTO members, or be a disguised restriction on trade.


Australia’s Aquatic Animal Biosecurity

• 1999 Import Risk Analysis for Non-viable Salmonids and Non-salmonid Marine Finfish.

• Based on OIE Aquatic Animal Health Code and SPS Agreement

• Imports are managed to Australia’s ALOP through:

• On-farm surveillance of the source material

• Age class restrictions of the raw material

• Removal of head, organs and gills

• Prescribing the form of the final product (consumer ready – directing end use – no waste)


Import Policy • Australia has three lists for finfish

• If no other risk management recognised:

• High risk – must be head-off, de-gilled and eviscerated (HGG)

o All aquacultured species

o Wild eels, herring, sardines, flounders, mackerels

• Medium risk – must be de-gilled and eviscerated

o Barramundi, Groupers, Kingfish, Tunas

• Low risk – can arrive whole

o Applies to all other species not listed above


Import Policy (Continued)

• Taiwan and the Philippines have had access for whole farmed milkfish, tilapia and barramundi since 2000

• Based on historical trade and health surveillance and monitoring systems at the time

• Import Conditions were developed :

• identifying the fish species in the consignment (i.e. scientific name) • must be free from visible lesions associated with infectious disease. • product is fit for human consumption. • must be processed in a premises approved by and under the control

of the Competent Authority. must be derived from an aquaculture facility subject to health

surveillance and monitoring under the supervision of the Competent Authority.

can not be derived from a population slaughtered as an official disease control measure.


Incidence of RSIV

• Around 7000 tonnes of barramundi imported from Taiwan in 2016-18; mostly frozen fillets with more than 300 tonnes of whole fish

• All other countries are required to send only processed ‘risk species’ (either eviscerated for risk species, or HGG for high risk (farmed) species)

• In 1999, barramundi (risk species) was not recognised to be susceptible to red sea bream iridovirus disease (RSIV).

• RSIV was known to be present in Taiwan

• The list of diseases of concern and geographic spread continues to grow


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• In 2012, the OIE listed barramundi (Lates calcarifer) as susceptible to RSIV.

• This triggered a review of the risks by DA.

• The review found, consistent with the 1999 IRA, that ‘risk species’ susceptible to RSIV from all countries in, and islands surrounding Asia, must be processed to be at least de-gilled and eviscerated form.

• Whole barramundi imports from areas where RSIV is present, is not consistent with Australia’s import conditions – without additional risk measures

• Monitoring and surveillance

• Avoiding emergency harvesting

Management of RSIV


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• In 2018, BSMI informed us that RSIV had been detected between 2016-18 in passive and voluntary active surveillance

• No SDDV, ISKNV or ISKNV-like was detected

• Where additional risk measures are not in place, it is possible to:

• Declare disease freedom

• Set up zones or compartments (based on surveillance)

• Batch testing

RSIV in Taiwan 2016-18


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• Focus on surveillance and monitoring programmes

• How the Competent Authorities are organised (central and regional controls)

• How relevant legislation is implemented

• What resources are available to the CA’s (human, technical, physical)

• Disease/health surveillance program (especially for exporters)

• Technical capability and authority

• Detection responses

• Are import conditions being implemented appropriately?

Purpose of visit


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• Animal Health Research Institute

• Barramundi and grouper farms

• Barramundi and salmon processors

• Seminar to Taiwan seafood industry

• Closing meeting

Itinerary


Thank you


Mr Ian Ruscoe

Director Aquatics Unit

Marine and Aquatic Biosecurity Section

Animal Biosecurity Branch


Email: [email protected]

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