Australia, Malaysia and the coming politics of climate

change

Malaysia-Australia Dialogue on Asian Futures, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 12-16 August 2009

Richard TanterNautilus Institute

rtanter@nautilus.org

Outline

1. What policy outcomes ought we to be aiming for?2. Reminder: Mitigation and adaptation3. Climate change as a case of the species of “global

problems”4. Climate change as a “security problem”5. Global politics in a carbon-constrained world6. REDD as a paradigm of destructive

interdependence7. Psycho-social and problem definition frames for

conflict and cooperation8. Requirements for an adequate framework

1. What outcomes should we - government and civil society - be

aiming for? • Near-term consequences non-lethal• Adequate recognition of complexity and

understood consequences• Based on knowledge of complexity adequate to

understanding both the problems and their solutions

• Mitigating rather than exacerbating play of fantasies and their political manipulation

• Outcomes based on shared character of problems and necessary cooperation for just anf effective solution

2. Characteristics of mitigation and adaptation (Bosello et al, 2007)Mitigation Adaptation

Benefited systems

All systems Selected systems

Scale of efforts Global Local to regional

Life time Centuries Years to centuries

Lead time Decades Immediate to decades

Effectiveness Certain, in terms of emission reduction; less certain in terms of damage reduction

Generally less certain, especially where local knowledge of likely climate-related changes is weak

Ancillary benefits Sometimes Mostly

Polluter pays Typically yes Not necessarily

Payer benefits Only a little Almost fully

Administrative scale/implementing bodies

(Mainly) National governments/international negotiations

(Mainly) local managers/authorities, households (& community organizations)

Sectors involved Primarily energy and transport in high-income nations, forestry and energy in low/middle-income nations

Potentially all

Monitoring Relatively easy More difficult

3. Climate change as a case of the species of “global problems”

Characteristics of global problems:

• Effects are potentially universal;• Effects are cascading;• Complex/non-linear;• Highly inter-related;• Causes and effects may be separated by time and geography;• Solutions/strategies may be separated;• Knowledge ranges from open knowledge to classified information;• Knowledge is multi-disciplinary/inter-disciplinary;• Solutions must be multiple, interlinked, and close to simultaneous

to avoid destructive feedback

Global problems - one list: Jean-Francois Rischard, High Noon: 20 Global Problems, 20 Years to Solve Them

• Sharing our Planet: Issues involving the global commons

• Sharing our humanity: Issues whose size and urgency requires a global commitment

• Sharing our rulebook: Issues needing a global regulatory approach

4. Climate change as a “security issue”

• Booming field: – different players/interests/definitions of “security”– almost all deeply flawed – Three main groups:

• Informed enthusiasts• Academic sceptics• (>>Academic adaptation approaches as compromise)• Systems approaches

• Comprehensive list of studies, Nautilus Institute:Climate change and security - analysis, Nautilus Institute

http://www.globalcollab.org/Nautilus/australia/reframing/cc-security/cc-sec-policy/

Informed enthusiasts

• Key official document:– Energy, Security and Climate - Security Council open

debate, April 2007; especially the UK concept paper.• Best to date:

– The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change, Center for a New American Security, November 2007

Age of Transitions, CSIS, 2007 - three plausible climate scenarios

Scenario Time span Warming Sea level rise Expected 30 years 1.3oC 0.23 metres Severe 30 years 2.6oC 0.52 metres Catastrophic 100 years 5.6oC 2.0 metres

•Lead authors now Obama senior White House, NSC, Defense and CIA, plus climate specialists.

• Severe scenario motif: “massive non-linear events in the global environment give rise to massive non-linear societal events”.•Looking for security consequences of plausible futures.

–Most to date based on probable futures –in fact levels of uncertainty in CC predictions are high, and have turned out to be conservative

Problems with the enthusiasts

• Sentence structure: too many – “could/may/possibly/might lead to …”– “imagine if …”

• i.e. weak modelling of CC-security impact relationships

• Suspicion that political agenda drives demand for definition of the field

• Still limited models of indirect and adaptation consequences.

Academic sceptics

• Follows from 1990s critiques of environmental security:– Statistically-based evidence not present– Causal chains too long; excluding nothing

• Central criticisms of enthusiasts:– “based on speculation and questionable sources”– “difficult to substantiate given data constraints”– “focus on possible scenarios in the future, which are inherently

difficult to test”

• Best of sceptics: Barnett and Adger:• Vulnerability varies with extent of dependence on “natural resources

and ecosystem services”, sensitivity of those resources, and adaptive capacity

• “Environmental change does not undermine human security in isolation form a broad range of social factors”

Best of the sceptics: Jon Barnett/Neil Adger

• shifted to institutional adaptation robustness/vulnerability focus, with conflict theory/human security emphasis;

• Vulnerability not identical with insecurity• Vulnerability varies with extent of dependence on “natural resources

and ecosystem services”, sensitivity of those resources, and adaptive capacity

• “the more people are dependent on climate sensitive forms of natural capital, and the less they rely on economic or social forms of capital, the more at risk they are from CC”

• “Environmental change does not undermine human security in isolation form a broad range of social factors”

Problems with some of the sceptics• Reliance on past as baseline

– “There is no precedent in human history for a global disaster that affects whole societies in multiple ways at many different locations all at once.” J.R. McNeill, Age of Transitions

• Analytic approach seems to militate against holistic requirements• Conflict and security research models are not wide• To date not a lot of attention to complex interactions of CC with

trade, economic structure, culture (religion), urban structure, public health

• Adaptation as new conflict variable not yet on agenda• Purchase on vulnerabilities of advanced industrial systems?

5. Global politics in a carbon-constrained world

• some assumptions - unless a climatic tipping point is reached early with “visible” socio-ecological major consequences:– Technically efficacious mitigation efforts will be

inadequate in our lifetime– dependent on spatial/national/class location,

conscious, planned adaptation efforts will be inadequate and widely perceived as unjust

– some adaptation processes will have highly negative consequences, with uneven degrees of local, or geographically or sectorally constrained vs universal impacts

Global politics in a carbon-constrained world: best parallel = Cold War, but …

• no historical precedents for carbon-constrained world• global bio-physical systemic driver, with lethal socio-

ecological consequences differentially distributed• global system imperatives will penetrate and shape

domestic national politics• cross-cutting formations of interest and resentment• reluctant and incipiently failing interdependence• more nuclear weapons and nuclear energy• carbon policing missions: disposition to carbon-regime

intervention • new version of “the west vs the rest”, but cross-cut by

contested multipolarity

6. REDD politics as a paradigm of destructive interdependence

• REDD: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Destructive forest practices

• REDD Plus - Bali Action Plan:“Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries”.

• basic model = industrial/rich countries purchase

carbon emission reduction credits by paying developing/tropical rainforest countries to avoid deforestation or plant/manage forests

• to be established as global institution under UNFCC at Copenhagen? Market or fund?

• already pilot schemes, aid projects, carbon credit trading, and widespread consequent crime and unrest

• existing and planned rich country emissions reduction schemes highly dependent on huge REDD Plus plans

REDD problems

• Some variation dependent on scheme structure• Cross-national institutional interdependence for

viability of national carbon regimes• Criminal/fraud possibilities very high• Sub-prime carbon: carbon derivatives markets• With best will, very hard to implement:• Buyer country view: failure of compliance on a

massive scale, and exacerbation of existential threat• Seller country view: imposition of ecological debt;

external exacerbation of social tensions• Carbon-complicance “aid” and intervention

7. Psycho-social and problem definition frames for conflict and cooperationCapacity for highly negative psycho-social dynamics re

climate change impacts and “responsibilities”.– existential and intangible (?) character of threat;

parallel to Cold War structure of nuclear terrors– denial, projection and scapegoating central

mechanisms’ – political utility and resource (Bush/Howard)– religious expressions– already in play: “first world” and “third world”

examples displaying root senses of threat– salient to enforcement of carbon regimes - and

resistance

Mal-adaptation as a feedback element

• treat mitigation an early, relatively straightforward, form of adaptation

• Adaptation not necessarily positive• Mal-adaptation experiences

– Perceptions and “reality”– blindspots

• Will definitely feedback into system

Mal-adaptation possibility: Australian-Southeast Asia energy adaptation

• SEA countries and Australia adapting to climate change by shifting nuclear energy issues

• Indonesian, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Phillipines, nuclear power proposals

• Australian uranium expansion; waste import proposals; uranium enrichment advocacy– last now justified by likely NE Asian and possible SEA

nuclear proliferation• regional response to Australian arms spending and doctrine,

now amplified by Australian nuclear developments.• Perfect vicious circle feedback system unless altered

intentionally by rectification of perceptions and avoidance of maladaptive responses.

Reframing Australia Indonesia security relations through shared global problem solving: strategic goals?

• To document the impact of climate change on the two societies

• to map the impact of climate change on the security relations between the two countries

• to develop policy responses by both government and civil society in both societies and between them.

• to develop a model of bilateral policy responses to shared global problems potentially applicable to other cases.

• Against a background of recurring crises in Australia’s most sensitive security relationship, the aim is to explore security aspects of relations between Australia and Indonesia based on new communities of shared interests to face the challenges of emerging global problems faced by both societies.

• The key hypothesis is that global problems manifest in the fabric of the two societies, and whose causes lie beyond their national systems, not only will generate deep security challenges but also new possibilities of cross-border communities of shared interest.

• The secondary hypothesis is that this process will enhance the capacity to manage the difficult bilateral problems already evident by placing them in a context of larger security collaborations.

Layered frames for analysing bilateral security impacts

• bio-physical and social-ecological systems under consideration

• historically formed relationship between the two societies and states

• intentional collective efforts to address actual and expected climate change through mitigation of greenhouse gas generation and release, and adaptation to specific patterns of climate change

• Reframing Australia-Indonesia security– http://www.globalcollab.org/Nautilus/australia/reframing

• Mapping Causal Complexity in Climate Change Impacts and Responses - Australia and Indonesia– http://www.globalcollab.org/Nautilus/australia/reframing/cc-

security/mapping/

• Australia-Indonesia nuclear dynamics– http://www.globalcollab.org/Nautilus/australia/reframing/aust-

ind-nuclear