Auditorias Psm Hse Uk

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HID CI / SI Inspection Manual


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Open Gov. Status: Fully Open Issued: 11/04/2001 Review:11/04/2003

HID CI, SI Inspect ion Manual

Introduction Audits Major Hazard Intervention Policy Operation of the Lead Unit System Major Hazard Intervention Plans Assessing Risk Control Systems Incumbents Ratings System Recording Major Hazard Intervention Information on Inspection Techniques CIS

Introduction

1. The Hazardous Installations Directorate is part of the Operations Group. Core processes, including inspection,are controlled by agreements reached by the Operations Management Team (OMT). The OMT sets broadstandards that HID needs to operate within, including the OG wide inspection procedure.

2. HID needs to provide information to its staff and have written procedures to ensure that inspectors carry out theinspection process in the most effective way, drawing on the best practice that has been developed over time. Italso aids consistency across all Units and between inspectors irrespective of their grade and experience.

3. This manual is targetted at the Chemical Industries and Specialist Industries divisions in HID. A separate OSDinspection manual is provided for staff in HID's Offshore Division. This manual should be read in conjunction withother guidance, which is linked by the hypertext. It will be updated and reviewed on an annual basis.

4. A major review of this manual is now underway following introduction of the OG wide investigation procedure.Until this review is complete, discrepencies between this manual and the OG wide inspection procedure mayexist. Staff should note that the OG wide procedure sets the minimum standard, whilst any more onerous HIDspecific standards imposed by this manual will remain valid unless formally withdrawn.

5. A hard copy of the manual will not be produced (although sections can be printed by staff who require it), as it ismore efficient to present the manual on the INTRANET, and make updates and amendments to it in this way.

Definition

6. Inspection is the process carried out by HSE warranted inspectors which involves assessing relevant documentsheld by the duty holder, interviewing people and observing site conditions, standards and practices where workactivities are carried out under the dutyholder's control. It's purpose is to secure compliance with legalrequirements for which HSE is the enforcing authority and to promote improving standards of health and safetyin organisations

ContactHID HQ 1DSt Anne's HouseVPN : 523 3939


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Major Hazard Intervention Pol icy

Introduction LD Industry Groups Priorities Enforcement Non-MH Health & Safety Work Appendix 1 - Summary Contractors Appendix 2 - COMAH Installation Prioritisation Intervention Approaches Table

Appendix 3 - The Intervention Process

INTRODUCTION

1. This Chapter provides guiding principles for inspectors on interventions at LD premises. It covers:

Aims and objectives;

Prioritising sites;

Role of sectors;

Intervention approaches.Scope

2. This guidance applies to LD1, 2 (except explosives sites), 3 and 4. LD2 have separate arrangements in place forexplosives sites to meet HID's intervention policy.

Policy

3. LD's intervention policy is to

Give priority to those premises that have the greatest hazards and risks;

Eliminate or reduce risks of major accidents;

Meet operational priorities;

Adopt intervention approaches that are proportionate to the size, complexity, hazards and risksat those premises;

Ensure that all COMAH installations are inspected at least once every five years.

A summary of this policy is at Appendix 1.

Aims and objectives

4. The aim of all interventions is to prevent injuries and ill health. Within this broad aim:

All interventions aim to fulfil HSE's Mission and to deliver the HSC enforcement policy;

Interventions are consistent with current HSC continuing aims, strategic themes and objectives;

Intervention activity is targeted according to hazard, risk and operational priorities;

Interventions are conducted consistently across the duty holders subject to inspection by theDivision;

There is an appropriate use of a range of intervention techniques.

5. The objective(s) of particular interventions will depend on the intervention topic(s) selected. At a TT COMAHestablishment, for example, an objective may be to reduce the risk of a release of chlorine. At other premises anintervention may be carried out as part of LD's Priority Programme and seek, for example, to prevent falls fromroad tankers.

Principles of intervention

6. Inspectors should apply the following hierarchy, to ensure that duty holders:


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1. Eliminate hazards and reduce risks at source where reasonably practicable e.g.by reducing inventories of dangerous substances or designing processes tominimise loss of containment;

2. Control risks by e.g. employing management systems for maintaining plantintegrity;

3. Minimise the effects of any incidents by suitable mitigation measures.

INTERVENTION PRIORITIES

LD Intervention priorities at major hazard installations Planned interventions at:

existing COMAH establishments existing non-COMAH premises new premises

Identification of new premises

7. Inspectors should use the screening methods below to prioritise installations / sites for interventions.

LD Intervention prioriti es at major hazard ins tallations

8. As a first screen, LD's intervention priorities are (in order):

1. Top-tier COMAH establishments;

2. Lower-tier COMAH establishments;

3. Sub-COMAH premises e.g. premises that are outside the scope of COMAH butwhich have dangerous substances with MH potential such as those subject tothe Planning (Hazardous Substances Consent) Regulations 1992.

9. Units should plan annually to deploy resources proportionately against each of these categories.

10. Screening solely according to hazard based on COMAH thresholds fails to take into account several otherimportant factors, such as the population at risk and the type of installation. A risk calculation tool, ARICOMAH

(an acronym for Approximate Risk Integral for COMAH sites) has been developed and applied to a number of TTestablishments to produce an indication of the magnitude of the societal risks they present. As more ARICOMAHvalues are calculated over the next couple of years, the intention is to use them as the main screening tool forCOMAH installations.

11. In the meantime, units should use the two tools described below to provide a further screening:

For COMAH installations the installation prioritisation table at Appendix 2 should be used.Inspectors may also use this table for sub-COMAH sites when there are significant hazardspresent and they wish to rank these sites against COMAH installations;

For other sites the HID rating system (Incumbents Ratings System) should be used.

12. Neither of these two tools is sophisticated enough to give absolute measures but both provide a broad indicationof relative site / installation intervention priorities.

Planned interventions at existing COMAH establishments

13. All planned major hazard interventions at these establishments are required to be recorded on an interventionplan (see Major Hazard Intervention Plans).

14. All sites should be inspected during the work year that their installation score exceeds 50. This will ensure that allCOMAH installations are inspected at least every five years. Installations with the highest scores should beconsidered for interventions first.

Planned interventions at existing non-COMAH premises

15. The relative priority for interventions at fixed premises that are known to LD is initially determined by either theprioritisation table at Appendix 2 (for sub-COMAH sites with significant hazards) or the rating system (seeIncumbents Ratings System) for others. Premises where the prioritisation table is used should be inspected atleast once every five years i.e. when the score reaches 50. Premises with the highest scores / ratings should betargeted first.

Planned interventions at new premises


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16. All new premises should be contacted within two months of coming to our attention. This may be a telephonecontact to establish, for example, the size, complexity and hazards at the premises. Inspectors will need tocompare this information with their knowledge of existing premises to determine whether an inspection should becarried out and its priority, using the screening methods described under LD Intervention priorities at MHinstallations as a guide. Where the decision whether to inspect is marginal it is better to inspect.

17. The primary purposes of initial inspections of COMAH sites are to:

Assess whether operators have in place management systems for the prevention and mitigationof major accidents;

Identify issues to include in the intervention plan for the establishment;

Bring the establishment into the planning system by giving an inspection rating using theprioritisation table.

18. The purposes of inspections at non-COMAH premises that LD has not previously visited are to:

Identify any serious risks and take appropriate action;

Bring the establishment into the planning system by giving an inspection rating, using either theprioritisation table or inspection rating system.

Identific ation of new premises

19. LD will identify new premises from a number of sources. They include:

Receipt of notifications e.g. COMAH, Factories Act and RIDDOR from duty holders;

Information from the public e.g. complaints;

Information from other HSE directorates;

National and local initiatives focusing on specific sectors and issues, e.g. warehousing, thatrequires the Division to identify previously unknown premises.

20. New premises identified by RIDDOR notifications or complaints may need to be visited urgently depending onthe nature of the incident (see SPC/Enforcement/04).

NON-MAJOR HAZARD HEALTH AND SAFETY WORK

21. Selecting non-MH premises for interventions is based on three criteria:

LD's rating system (for those we know of) and the need to give priority to those not previouslyvisited;

LD's Programmes, which will target particular industry groups and issues;

A means of developing less experienced inspectors.

INTERVENTIONS WITH CONTRACTORS

22. Our intervention strategy is based primarily on contacts with duty holders at fixed LD-registered sites. However,there are other duty holders such as contractors, whose activities can significantly affect health and safety at LDsites. Our approach here is twofold:

a. To continue to focus regulatory effort on the operators of fixed sites who engage contractors andseek to ensure that they have adequate arrangements for selecting and controlling contractors.This will usually entail some direct contact with contractors on site to assess standards andverify that operators' arrangements are effective;

b. Where appropriate to intervene directly with contractors' senior management centrally, possibly jointly with other directorates / divisions. The criteria below provide a guide for when thisapproach may be appropriate:

Contractors who are engaged to carry out safety critical work, includingdesigning plant / equipment;

Major contractors e.g. who work across a number of sectors (and D/Ds);

Contractors who are identified as having poor safety performance.


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INTERVENTION APPROACHES

23. Table 1 indicates the normal intervention approaches and inspector experience required for different types ofpremises. All interventions require a balance of observing workplace standards, verifying hardware and software riskcontrol measures, examining documents and interviewing personnel. As the hazards increase and managementstructure becomes more sophisticated the scope of the intervention approach will continue to involve inspection ofworkplace precautions and controls and extend to examining management systems and senior management influencesuch as leadership.

Table 1: Intervention approaches for different types of LD premises.

Premises Normal intervention approach1. Small firm (5;


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29. All interventions follow a common process. This is described in more detail in Appendix 3 but the elements arelisted below:

Planning and preparation;

Carrying out the contact;

Recording the outcome;

Monitoring action and progress;

Reviewing the intervention.

APPENDIX 1: SUMMARY OF INTERVENTION POLICY

Selecting f orintervention: first

1. TT COMAH Installations 2. LT COMAH Establishments/Installations

3. Non-COMAH Premises

screen

Second screen Prioritisation table (Appendix 2).Select installations with highest

Prioritisation table (Appendix 2).Select establishments /

Prioritisation table for sub-COMAH sites with significant

scores first installations with highest scores hazards. Rating systemfirst (Incumbents Ratings System) for

others. Select premises with

highest scores / ratings firstIntervention Safety management system Safety management system Depends on size, complexity,approach inspection for MH controls (see inspection for MH controls (see hazards & risks. See Table 1 for

Table 1) Table 1) guidance

Operationalpriorities

Published annually by LD6 Published annually by LD6 Published annually by LD6


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number of installations. Inspectors can divide establishments into installations as they see fit. Installations maybe set based on e.g. processes, site layout, safety report submissions or size.

4. Select the most appropriate category for the installation in question and take the corresponding score. Thepopulation at risk is the highest population in the vicinity of the installation and should include people on site, atneighbouring workplaces and, for example, houses, schools, shops etc.

5. Multiply the installation type and population at risk scores. For example, an ammonium nitrate manufacturinginstallation (score 7 for installation type) with a medium population at risk (score 2) would score 14.

Regulatory intervention

6. Identify the relevant score from the HID Intervention column. For example, if the installation has not received aCOMAH intervention, i.e. an intervention that addresses major hazard issues, for 3 years enter 30 (10 for eachyear).

7. Add the regulatory intervention score to the product of the installation type and location scores.

Information and Performance

8. This column takes account of other factors that may affect inspection priorities and frequencies. The factors arelisted in Major Hazard Intervention Plans paragraph 19. Inspectors should record any relevant factors and howthey affect the score. The score may be increased or decreased depending on the factors. For example, aninstallation that has very high standards of control of hazards may have its score reduced. However, theminimum inspection frequency of once every five years should be maintained.

9. The installation's overall score is the product of the installation type and location scores plus the regulatoryintervention score, modified by information and performance factors.

APPENDIX 3: THE INTERVENTION PROCESS

Interventions

1. Interventions are planned processes designed to secure compliance with the law and include:

Inspections and audits - including verification to test conformity with information contained insafety reports and to monitor duty holders' implementation of stated prevention, control and

mitigatory measures; Other methods of contact such as projects;

Interventions do not include incident and complaint investigations.

2. The Intervention Process section lists the five elements of the intervention process. This Appendix provides moredetail on what each element involves. Where appropriate it provides further information on issues or refers toother sources.

Planning and preparation

Intervention priorities;

Deciding which topic(s) to address (see also Major Hazard Intervention Plans);

Deciding on an intervention approach to use (Table 1);

Identifying experience required for interventions (Table 1);

Informing the duty holder (unless an unannounced visit is proposed - see below).

3. HID LD policy is to allow local inspectors a choice of whether or not to pre-arrange visits. There are advantagesand disadvantages of unannounced visiting.

4. Advantages:

Conditions found reflect the normal state of affairs;

Can be more efficient use of inspectors' time because they can go directly from one site toanother with no wasted time between appointments.

5. Disadvantages:


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In practice the ability to significantly improve conditions before an inspector's visit is very limited- companies whose health and safety performance is poor often do not know what standardsapply and inspectors will readily identify duty holders' hasty attempts;

Inspections at larger and more complex sites include a greater scrutiny of safety managementissues and the systems for controlling health and safety. This involves examining documentsand interviewing people in addition to observing workplace conditions. It is more effective to prearrange these visits so that inspectors see the right people who are properly prepared with therelevant documents available.

6. In general, unannounced visits are appropriate at smaller, less complex sites when a relatively short, ie less thanhalf a day's, inspection is proposed.

Carrying out the contact

Explain inspector's role and powers (leaflet HSC14 - see below);

Explain purpose of the intervention;

Gain an understanding of the management structure and interview the right people, examinedocuments and observe workplace conditions;

Use the appropriate intervention approach to ensure that duty holders have SMS in place formaintaining plant integrity (see below);

Inform personnel of the outcome of the intervention; in particular any enforcement actionproposed.

7. Inspectors should ensure that duty holders and their employees whom we contact for the first time are given acopy of leaflet HSC14 What to expect w hen a health and s afety i nspector calls.

8. A suggested process safety management system-based intervention approach for major hazard issues is shownin Figure 1. In this example the process is preventing loss of containment from bulk storage of flammables. Theprocess on which to focus at any particular intervention will be informed by whatever the most significant majoraccident scenario is at the installation under consideration.

9. The smaller solid circles around the perimeter of the central circle represent primary risk control systems (RCS)that are relevant to controlling the process. Inspectors should examine these RCS to the extent that they feel

necessary to be confident that each is adequate. For example, confirmation of adequate plant design for existingplant may require little more than confirming vessel design standards. Planned plant inspection, on the otherhand, particularly for older vessels, may need to be examined in much greater detail.

10. The dotted circles represent secondary (in that they are subsets of the primary RCS but no less important interms of control measures) RCS that are likely to be relevant. Figure 1 shows two examples linked to themaintenance RCS, though they may also be relevant to other primary RCS.

11. This inspection model is currently being developed and more detailed information will be provided in otherchapters of this manual in due course.


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Figure 1 - Example of a Process Safety Management System Based Intervention Approach for the Inspection ofBulk Storage of Flammables Showing Primary & Secondary RCS

Recording outcomes

Confirm matters in writing;

Complete CIS records;

Update intervention plans.

12. The EMM provides guidance on when inspectors should send letters to duty holders. Inspectors may choose toconfirm matters outside the EMM criteria at their discretion.

13. A timeline and inspection report should be completed on CIS following an inspection.

14. For interventions carried out based on intervention plans the plans should be updated following visits eg toconfirm that the visit has been carried out.

Monitoring progress

Check duty holder's progress with action required.

15. Inspectors are required to check compliance with all enforcement notices that they issue. Improvement noticesshould be checked as soon as possible after the date specified on the notice for compliance and in any case


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within 10 days of it. The expectation is that compliance will be checked by site visit except when sufficientconfirmation can be achieved by other means.

16. Audits describes the requirements for audit follow up reports.

17. Inspectors should usually seek confirmation that duty holders have complied with legal requirements andinspectors' recommendations in letters. The expectation is that this would be achieved by eg seeking writtenconfirmation from duty holders or by telephone.

Review

Assess effectiveness of intervention.

18. Inspectors may find it useful to review some of their interventions, perhaps using the five elements listed here asa guide, to consider whether alternative approaches could have been more effective. For trainee inspectors thiswill be a more formal process carried out with line managers and / or more senior colleagues.


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Major Hazard Intervention Plans

Introduction Format of Intervention Plans Aim & Objectives Managing Resources Timing of Preparation & Review Informing Duty Holders & Employees Identification of Intervention Issues Appendix 1 - Summary of Process for TT COMAH Roles & Responsibilities Appendix 2 - Summary of Process for LT COMAH Links with the Environment Agencies

INTRODUCTION

1. COMAH regulation 19 places a specific duty on the competent authority (CA) to have in place a system ofinspection for COMAH establishments. HID policy is to implement this requirement by following the principles setdown in the European Commission's Guidance on Inspections Required by the Seveso II Directive . Thisguidance pragmatically implements relevant parts of the EC guidance through preparation of intervention plans.

2. Arrangements for ensuring that intervention plans are fit for purpose are described throughout this guidance.They ensure that more rigorous quality assurance is applied at those establishments where hazards and risks

are greatest. In addition, CIU will periodically audit the intervention planning procedures.Scope

3. This guidance applies to intervention plans for establishments within HID LD Units 1, 3 and 4. LD2 haveseparate planning arrangements for gas, explosives and pipeline installations.

4. It applies to major hazard interventions at all COMAH sites. Interventions are planned processes to securecompliance and include:

Inspections - including verification to test conformity with information contained in safety reportsand to monitor duty holders' implementation of stated prevention, control and mitigatorymeasures;

Other methods of contact such as projects.

5. Interventions do not include incident and complaint investigations.

AIM AND OBJECTIVES

6. The aim of intervention planning is to produce a programme of interventions to periodically check, by examiningoperators' technical, organisational and managerial systems, that a high level of protection for man and theenvironment is being achieved and capable of being maintained. The objectives of the intervention planningprocess are to:

Identify and prioritise intervention issues, focusing on ensuring that the key risk controlmeasures for preventing and mitigating major accidents are maintained;

Match interventions with available resources;

Show the rationale for intervention issues;

Show how interventions are closed-out.

Quality factors

7. Preparing plans for complex sites can be time consuming but is essential to meet COMAH requirements and isan important element in demonstrating that HID meets the HSC enforcement policy principles of Proportionality,Consistency, Transparency, Targeting and Accountability (PCTTA) and the HSE enforcement statement qualitymanagement principles.

Contents of plans

8. All plans should contain details of proposed major hazard interventions (including estimated resources) for atleast the period between preparing the plan and the start of the next planning year. The basic major hazardplanning templates on CIS default to a five-year plan for TT sites. Inspectors may, at their discretion, identifyfuture years' work in the plans. This information need not be so detailed and may, for example, simply identifyproposed intervention topics with more detail added nearer to the intervention.


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Plans should include verification of the key control measures for preventing/mitigating majoraccident scenarios, starting with the worst-case scenarios. A rolling programme of interventionswill be required to ensure that operators continue to manage these key measures over time;

National / sector priority programmes that address major hazard topics e.g. the occupiedbuildings and plant integrity projects;

Topics identified as requiring improvements based on the assessment of COMAH safety reportsor by other means.

Information about and performance of establishments

19. Factors related to major accident hazards that may affect inspection topics and their priorities and/orfrequencies, are listed below. Not all of these factors will be relevant at all sites.

Outcomes of previousinterventions.

Inspectors should set a time for re-examining the control measures based on thestandards found at the original intervention. Sites that do not comply with legalrequirements or relevant good practice are likely to require more frequent inspectionand be a higher inspection priority.

Size and complexity Large and complex sites are likely to require more frequent inspection. This is toensure that a representative set of major accident scenarios are inspected; andbecause sites with large quantities of dangerous substances, complex processesand processes that operate at high temperatures and pressures tend to have

greater risks - making them a higher inspection priority.Reports of major accidents andother accidents, incidents and nearmisses.

All reports of COMAH major accidents should be investigated promptly. Sites thathave poor incident history are likely to require more frequent inspection and be ahigher inspection priority.

Complaints. All complaints alleging breaches that could lead to a major accident should beinvestigated promptly.

Receipt of revised safety reports. Plans should be reviewed and, where necessary, revised to take account of newinformation when revised safety reports are assessed.

Changes of site ownership. Sites should be contacted within one month of HSE being notified of changes. Thepurpose of the contact is to establish the significance of the change and determinewhen an intervention is necessary.

New knowledge about scientific ortechnical matters.

When inspectors receive new intelligence that could have significant impact onexisting major hazard controls they should contact relevant sites promptly and inany case within one month. The purpose of the contact is to alert duty holders to thenew information and determine when an intervention is necessary.

Reports of modifications,rebuilding, plant extensions etc.where there are significantrepercussions for major accidents.

Sites should be contacted promptly and in any case within one month of HSE beinginformed of developments. The CA will normally receive notification of suchmodifications under regulation 8 of COMAH.

Frequent process chemistry

changes.

Sites which are subject to frequent process changes need to have robust change

management systems which need to be checked/verified during each five yearperiod.

Major changes in staffing levels. Sites should be contacted within one month of HSE being notified of changes. Thepurpose of the contact is to assess the impact of the changes and determine whenan intervention is required.

Lead unit intervention plans. Certain sites which are part of a lead unit company may receive less frequent visitswhen they share common processes and management arrangements with othersand HSE can be confident that intervention findings at one site will be disseminatedand acted upon by others within the company.

20. Plans should identify, in order of priority, all major hazard work that is considered necessary at a site over theperiod of the plan. Priorities will be determined by the major accident potential of a failure of risk controlmeasures: the greater the potential, the higher the priority. For TT COMAH sites the information in safety reportsand advice from predictive and discipline specialists will inform priorities. For LT COMAH sites regulatoryinspectors will need to seek information from operators about major accident scenarios and key controlmeasures, seeking advice from predictive and discipline specialists as necessary.


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21. Inspectors may also include other, non-major hazard work in plans at the discretion of those preparing the plan.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

22. We adopt a team approach to planning and carrying out interventions and follow the principles below:

Regulatory and discipline inspectors should jointly develop, agree and review intervention plans;

Regulatory inspectors manage the intervention programme and all HSE staff visiting installationsshould agree the purpose of their visit with the site regulatory inspector before visiting;

Units should plan to deploy regulatory and discipline inspectors where their respective skills andknowledge are most appropriate to address intervention topics.

23. In most cases the site inspector i.e. the Band 3 regulatory inspector will be responsible for preparing theintervention plan, communicating it to EA/SEPA staff and completing the CIS planning templates. Disciplinespecialists, EA/SEPA staff and line managers are responsible for contributing topics for inclusion, providingdetails of their available resources for implementing plans and recording information on the CIS templates. ForTT COMAH establishments the safety report assessment team is responsible for agreeing the post-assessmentintervention plan. Appendices 1 (TT) and 2 (LT) summarise the roles and responsibilities of those involved in theplanning process.

24. The Band 3 regulatory inspector should liaise with discipline specialists, EA/SEPA and others as necessarywhen carrying out reviews.

25. The Head of Land Division is ultimately responsibility for ensuring that the intervention planning process andprocedures are implemented and that available resources are deployed such that field teams are able toimplement the procedures.

LINKS WITH THE ENVIRONMENT AGENCIES

26. Chapter 11 of the COMAH Manual (SIP Products 2(b) and 2(c)) explains the agreed intervention planningarrangements between HSE and the agencies. In summary, Band 3 regulatory inspectors should includeplanned agency major hazard interventions at COMAH establishments on CIS. Inspectors have discretion todetermine how much detail to include but should at least identify the intervention topic and record when the workhas been completed. EA and SEPA officers should inform HSE of work they have done at COMAHestablishments.

27. COMAH also requires the CA to communicate to operators of TT establishments the conclusions of itsexamination of safety reports. This includes informing operators which topics from the assessment process willbe carried forward into the intervention plan for the period of the plan. See the COMAH Safety Report

Assessment Manual, Part 1 Chapter 4 for more information.

FORMAT OF INTERVENTION PLANS

28. A format for intervention plans can be found as a template on the HID Templates tab in Microsoft Word andshould be linked to the incumbent record on CIS when completed. LD will review the recording arrangementsbecause inspectors have sometimes found the template difficult to use for preparing a single establishment planat large complex establishments with several COMAH installations.

29. The plans should identify any follow-up interventions necessary to check that duty holders have complied withrequirements. For COMAH establishments this will help meet the requirement in regulation 19(3)(d) to pursuematters where necessary within a reasonable period following inspections.

MANAGING RESOURCES

30. Major Hazard Intervention Policy provides information on inspection policy and identifies factors to considerwhen prioritising interventions at LD premises. Plans should be realistic and be based on the resources that areavailable. However, Band 1 Heads of Unit should be informed of work that inspectors consider necessary butwhich cannot be resourced. Band 1s are responsible for deploying resources across their units to ensure thatnecessary major hazard work is done. Decisions to re-prioritise planned work in intervention plans due toresource issues should be explained and recorded on the CIS intervention planning template.

INFORMING DUTY HOLDERS AND EMPLOYEES

31. Duty holders and their employees should be informed of the contents of intervention plans, both for individualsites and, where relevant, for lead unit companies. It is not necessary to provide a copy of the plan itself. Thishelps meet HSE's statutory duty under Section 28(8) of the Health and Safety at Work Act and can helpestablish ownership of plans by duty holders and employees. It can be used to confirm that the correct issueshave been identified, particularly if duty holders and employees are given the opportunity to discuss the plans


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and influence priorities. However, whilst these views should be taken into account, responsibility for the planrests with the regulator and inspectors have the final say over its content.

32. It is good practice to meet with duty holders' directors/senior managers to discuss plans. This ensures that thecontrolling minds of duty holders are aware of priority issues. Note that plans should only be released to dutyholders and their employees once resource issues have been resolved. For establishments subject to chargingthe plans will also assist duty holders' budgeting. It is not necessary to provide full details of proposed work andinspectors should retain the option of carrying out unannounced visits.


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Appendix 1

SUMMARY OF INTERVENTION PLANNING PROCESS FOR TT COMAH ESTABLISHMENTS

WHO WHAT WHEN NOTES

Safety reportassessment team

Agree intervention plan. Planshould as minimum include

At safety report assessmentoutcome meetings; or 5 years after

This is the initial plan &framework for future

verification of control measures for receipt of an operator's first safety interventions

major accidents. Topics will be re- reportvisited on rolling programme,frequency depending oninformation / performance factors

Line manager (usually Agree resources for plans. Resolve At safety report assessmentBand 2 site regulatory any disagreements outcome meetings; or 5 years afterinspector) of person receipt of an operator's first safetypreparing plan report

Line manager (usually Refer any outstanding issues, Soon after SR assessmentBand 2 site regulatory especially resource problems, to outcome meetinginspector) of person Band 1preparing plan

Person preparing plan Prepare intervention plan and When the plan has been agreed by(usually Band 3 site complete CIS template the assessment teamregulatory inspector)

Line manager of person Complete 'Band 2 endorsement' When the plan has been agreed bypreparing plan section of CIS template the assessment team

Band 1 Head of LD Take decisions on any outstanding Soon after safety report This action is onlyfield unit issues referred by the Band 2 and assessment outcome meeting required by Band 1s

record the decisions on the CIS when issues areplanning template referred to them

Band 1 Head of LD

field unit

Consider plan and complete Band 1

endorsement section of CIStemplate

Soon after safety report

assessment outcome meeting forinitial plan and annually as part ofannual work planning cycle; and atother times as necessary

COMAH TT only

Person responsible for Monitor implementation of the plan Throughout each year of the planpreparing plan

Person leading specific Record outcome of intervention Soon after each interventioninterventions

Person responsible for Record outcome of agency-only Soon after each interventionpreparing plan interventions

All those identified in Implement their part of the plan As specified in the planthe plan

All those identified in Inform Band 3 site regulatory As soon as possiblethe plan inspector if unable to fulfil

commitments

Band 3 site regulatoryinspectors and their line

Review implementation of previousyear's plan and identify

Annually as part of annual workplanning cycle; and at other times

Need to liaise withothers identified in plan

managers resources/dates for next year's as necessary e.g. when revised to confirm theirplan. Information / performance safety reports are submitted availabilityfactors will influence priorities &frequencies


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Appendix 2

SUMMARY OF INTERVENTION PLANNING PROCESS FOR LT COMAH ESTABLISHMENTS

WHO WHAT WHEN NOTES

Site regulatory Agree intervention plan. Plan Following appropriate This is the initial plan &inspector, their line should as minimum include contact/consideration of MAPP framework for futuremanager, discipline verification of control measures for interventions

specialist inspector(s) major accidents. Topics will be re-and agency officer visited on rolling programme,frequency depending oninformation / performance factors

Line manager of person Agree resources for plans. Resolve Following appropriatepreparing plan (usually any disagreements contact/consideration of MAPPBand 2 site regulatoryinspector)

Line manager of person Refer any outstanding issues, When necessarypreparing plan (usually especially resource problems, toBand 2 site regulatory Band 1inspector)

Person preparing plan Prepare intervention plan and When the plan has been agreed(usually Band 3 site complete CIS templateregulatory inspector)

Line manager of person Complete 'Band 2 endorsement' When the plan has been agreedpreparing plan section of CIS template

Band 1 Head of LD Take decisions on any outstanding Soon after referral This action is onlyfield unit issues referred to them. Record the required by Band 1s

decisions on the CIS planning when issues aretemplate referred to them

Person responsible for Monitor implementation of the plan Throughout each year of the plan

preparing planPerson leading specific Record outcome of intervention Soon after each interventioninterventions

Person responsible for Record outcome of agency-only Soon after each interventionpreparing plan interventions

All those identified in Implement their part of the plan. As specified in the plan.the plan

All those identified in Inform Band 3 site regulatory As soon as possiblethe plan inspector if unable to fulfil

commitments

Band 3 site regulatory Review implementation of previous Annually as part of annual work Need to liaise withinspectors and their line year's plan and identify planning cycle; and at other times others identified in planmanagers resources/dates for next year's plan

Information / performance factorsas necessary to confirm their

availabilitywill influence priorities &frequencies


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Incumbent Ratings System

Introduction Rating file note Application Further information Description of the rating system Annex 1 - Application of the HID (LD) Rating How to allocate rating to incumbents System When to rate incumbents Annex 2 - Rating Criteria Flexibility Annex 3 - Background Information How the rating system is to be used Annex 4 - Example Input Screen Entry to the rating input screen Annex 5 - CIS Ratings Profile

INTRODUCTION

1. This Chapter provides guidance to enable inspectors to understand and use the rating system and Annex 3provides more general background information.

2. The aim of the rating system is to prioritise incumbents for inspection in a consistent, logical and defensible way.It is a facility that can be used flexibly by management to design inspection programmes and is not intended tobe a constraint over professional judgement.

3. The new HID (LD Units 1-4) CIS incumbent rating system replaces the FOCUS rating system that was designedfor the wider range of FOD incumbents. This system is very much simpler but retains the necessary elements toensure that incumbents are inspected on a priority based on risk.

APPLICATION

4. The rating system applies to most incumbents that are inspected by HID LD. The exceptions are where therating would not serve a useful purpose or where we use an alternative system to select incumbents or clients forinspection. The application to particular activities is described below and summarised in Annex 1.

5. COMAH TT establishments

Regulation 19 requires "a programme of inspections for all establishments". For Top Tier establishments thereshould be an inspection by the competent authority at least once in 12 months unless the programme is basedon a systematic appraisal of major accident hazards. This is described more fully in Major Hazard InterventionPlans. Because there is a presumption of annual inspection and an annual review of the inspection plan for eachTT establishment based on a consideration of the risks, the assessment of the safety report and the inspectionhistory, there is nothing to be gained by including a rating. Therefore, TT establishments are not rated.

6. Non Major Hazard aspects of TT establishments

These can be dealt with by creating, using and rating a separate unit or units for these topics and consideredindependently of the TT work.

7. Explosives

For explosives COMAH sites the approach identified in para 5 will form the basis of the inspection programme.For explosives non-COMAH sites the current explosives rating system will continue as it provides a structuredmeans of identifying the essential criteria pertinent to explosives eg. sensitiveness, quantities, quantity distancerelationships and others in determining the risk level and prioritising an inspection programme. This explosivesrating system links into the HID LD rating system at the "initial rating" stage.

8. Pipelines

Inspection priorities are determined by inspectors' knowledge of operators and their professional judgementdrawing on information from Pipelines Notifications, Offshore and Onshore Safety Cases (eg. GSMR). This is amatter for Unit 2 and the establishment of client based inspection programmes.

9. CDG

The principle intervention is by roadside checks with reactive visits to head offices. This can be managed bypreparing inspection plans for individual clients rather than incumbents. If the head office is associated with anestablishment inspected by HID then that incumbent would be rated.

10. Section 6


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Supply issues should be dealt with by both reactive and proactive visits and these are described in, "FOD Guideto the inspection of manufacture and supply of products and substances". This does not suit a rating system anda programme of client based inspection should be applied.

11. Other cases

There may be some dutyholders for whom inspection is planned and conducted using a strategic companyspecific approach. The current example is Transco where the Gas Safety Lead Team, under the management ofHID LD 2, have prepared and agreed a three year rolling programme with the industry and provided thisinformation to inspectors. Any additional examples will need to be dealt with on a company basis, be subject to

review and supported by HID MB.DESCRIPTION OF THE RATING SYSTEM

12. The rating system provides a consistent and auditable way of prioritising the inspection of incumbents.

13. It does not propose frequencies of visits or targets but can be used to direct resources where they are most likelyto be needed.

14. The rating system enables this resource to be used to the best effect by identifying those incumbents with thehighest overall rating. The rating is derived by inspectors considering the intrinsic " hazard " of the activity and theadequacy of " control " of the risks leading to an "initial rating". An " elapsed years " factor is added automaticallyto give an "overall rating".

HOW TO ALLOCATE RATINGS TO INCUMBENTS

15.

a. Hazard . (See Annex 2, Table 1) relates to the hazard inherent in the processes carried out by theincumbent. It is not concerned with generic hazards such as the use of fork lift trucks, working fromheights or provision of welfare facilities. The incumbent needs to be put into one of the categoriesaccording to the table which will produce a score from 1-7.

Note:

i. Where an irregular site specific Consultation Distance (CD) has been established take thefurthest distance for categorisation.

ii. If the "consent" Regulations have resulted in an artificially high CD based on the maximumpossible inventory that has been applied for then although a CD for the actually quantity held ismore appropriate for rating purposes the issue is not of sufficient concern to be taken intoaccount. Use the CD applied for planning purposes.

iii. The table illustrates how types of incumbents may be rated but any particular incumbent mayactually be more appropriately placed in a different category from that suggested. That is amatter of judgement (See also para 19).

b. Control . (See Annex 2, Table 2). This is a measure of the duty holders performance in controlling therisks and is linked to the actions that an inspector considers appropriate after the visit. Inspectors'actions should be based on the application of the Enforcement Management Model. This means that this

judgement of control is a fair reflection of the risk . Having established the broad band of control ie good,medium or poor, inspector's can select an appropriate score, taking their confidence in management intoaccount.

These two elements are combined simply to produce an initial rating by averaging. A copy of the inputscreen is included in Annex 4 .

Note: The input of the Hazard and Control are not for explosives incumbents but a figure will be addeddirectly to the "initial rating "box. For other inspections this box does not require an entry as it iscalculated by CIS automatically from the Hazard and Control figures.

c. Elapsed Years. The elapsed years is derived from the time since the last rating. An entry isrequired in the "Date of Rating" box. There is no input required for elapsed years - it isautomatically added to the rating when an entry is made. The elapsed years are measured from

the year of the last inspection and this element does not take account of investigations and otherinterventions.

WHEN TO RATE INCUMBENTS


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16. The aim of the rating system is to provide a means to prioritise the future inspection of the incumbent. Therefore,a rating should be applied after each inspection. It flows naturally from asking the question - "What should thefuture inspection approach be?"

17. However, there may be other interventions such as the investigation of complaints, accidents or dangerousoccurrences which provide information about the control standards that ought to be reflected in the rating. Forexample a previous perception of good control may be undermined when information comes to light during anaccident investigation and this should be reflected by increasing the control element of the rating. If such anamendment is made then it should be recorded in the Rating File Note (see para 25.)

18. If this amendment is made then it is still necessary, because of the built in CIS validation system, to change the"Date of Rating". However, to retain the existing elapsed years it is suggested that the consecutive rather thanactual date be added. eg from 03.07.97 to 04.07.97. (A fudge that may be eliminated with updates of the CISprogramme.)

FLEXIBILITY

19. The rating is dependent on the inspector's judgement and whilst the guidelines should be followed for the scoringsystem there may be some particular issue which suggests an alternative score be given.

20. This is acceptable provided a reason for the change from the guidance is recorded on the Rating File Note (seepara 25.)

21. As an example, some inspectors have devised their own criteria for the prioritisation of visits based on such

issues as inventory coupled with proximity to sensitive areas ie. a larger Chlorine storage facility close to housingwill require prioritisation over a facility in a rural location. These local issues can be taken into account inmodifying the hazard element.

HOW THE RATING SYSTEM IS TO BE USED

22. The rating system will primarily provide a means to prioritise inspections. The outputs from CIS can be used todraw up a profile of ratings for each Field Management Unit (Group), LD Unit or for all of HID LD.

23. Each management unit will then be able to select establishments for inclusion in an inspection programme forthe year. A detailed method for doing this is provided as Annex 5. The process will be as follows:

a. Estimate the resources available for non Top Tier work,

b. Derive from National figures the number of incumbents that can be inspected with that resource.(Approximately one contact per available day).

c. Select a corresponding rating to produce that number of incumbents.

d. Input to CIS which will produce a list that can be saved ,stored, ordered, updated etc.

ENTRY TO THE RATING INPUT SCREEN

24. When reporting on an intervention the Rating Input Screen should be opened and the Hazard and Control ratingsselected from the drop down menu. The "Date of Rating" should be entered in the form dd/mm/ yyyy. ie05/07/2001.

RATING FILE NOTE

25. The Rating File Note can be located at the Issue Screen and has been specifically provided to enable anycomments of references to the rating system to be recorded. For example, when amending the rating after aninvestigation (see para 17) or when making an amendment tot he rating because of local factors (see para 20) itis necessary to record the action taken. This information will be necessary to enable a following inspector to seewhy a particular rating has been given.

26. In addition the Rating File Notes can be analysed centrally to enable consistencies or trends to be identified andto support any audit of the system.

FURTHER INFORMATION

ISSUE CONTACT

Operation and Implementation of Incumbent Rating System David Kyle, LD CSSU

HID Rating System Policy and Procedures Neil Rothwell, HID OPU2

CIS HIDHelp, via Lotus Notes or VPN 523 4194


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Annex 2

Table 1

RATING CRITERIA

Table to determine the appropr iate Hazard category

HazardDescription

Indicators Examples Score

High Incumbents subject to COMAH LT with a CD>/= to 250m.

LPG Bulk storage, 7

Chlorine storage in drums.

Incumbents subject to COMAH LT with a CD < LPG smaller bulk storage. LPG gas cylinder 6250m. (Extending off site) storage.

Chlorine in cylinders.

Incumbents where there is a potential risk to Incumbents that store/use large quantities of 5the public and multiple fatality to employees toxic gas or LPG but are below the COMAH LTinherent in the process. threshold.

Medium Incumbents subject to COMAH LT with a zeroCD or CD entirely within the site boundary.

Premises where COMAH applies due to theenvironmental risk.

4

Some gas holders and storage of flammableliquids sites.

There is potential for fatalities or multiple Paint manufacturers not subject to COMAH. 3serious injuries to employees from the process.

Most pharmaceutical companies.or

There are large quantities of toxic or harmfulsubstances in use.

Low No potential for fatality or serious injury fromthe process.

Production of toiletries. 2

Limited or no use of toxic or flammablesubstances.

Most Laboratory work where chemicals areused on a small scale.

No foreseeable risks from the process. Small scale repackaging. 1


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Annex 2

Table 2

TABLE TO DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE CONTROL CATEGORY

ControlDescription

Ac tion Taken (Based on the EMM) Confidence in Management Score

Good Provision of advice or confirmatory letter onlywith no plans for follow up.

All the evidence shows that the company is selfregulating and standards are likely to be

maintained.

1

The high standards may not be maintained. 2

Medium Letter requiring action to be taken of sufficientconcern to plan a follow up visit or seek

Standards are likely to be improved. 3

confirmation that action has been taken. Standards are likely to be maintained. 4

The standards may deteriorate. 5

Poor Formal enforcement action taken or proposed. Standards may improve. 6

There is no evidence indicating that thestandards will improve.

7


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Annex 3

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Validation

28. In designing the new rating system account was taken of the views of inspectors and their experience of theprevious FOCUS system. The key elements required by inspectors were:

a. simplicity;

b. clarity;

c. no hidden calculations and adding of weightings;

d. relevance, such that inspectors had confidence that the rating was meaningful.

29. An early draft of the proposal was put to a number of inspectors and a pilot exercise run with a favourableresponse. The only real concern being that some less experienced inspectors thought that they may havedifficulty in making a judgement of the hazard and control elements. The guidance has been expanded followingthe pilot and this issue should be resolved.

30. It is important that any difficulties in understanding what is required or the use of the system is reported to OPPGso that modifications can be made to achieve continuous improvement.

31. The information on CIS will be analysed by OPPG and useful information produced to help direct future prioritiesand particularly to provide evidence of the balance between COMAH and non major hazard work.

Advantages of t he new system

32. HID is not driven by the rating system but can use it to prioritise inspection using the available resources.

33. The rating system is sufficiently flexible to enable inspection cut off points to be specific to groups depending onother demands.

34. It is easy to see what the cut off overall rating (OR) means in practice. For example an OR of 7 means thatmedium hazard/ medium control incumbents are inspected with 3 elapsed years.

35. The system demonstrates equivalencies. That is incumbents with the same OR might either be high hazard/lowcontrol with no elapsed years or low hazard/high control and many elapsed years or any combination of these

factors. As a Division we will be able to judge whether the inspection programme looks balanced and theinspection resource sufficient to include appropriate establishments in the programme.

36. The system sets parameters in that high hazard incumbents cannot have an inspection rating of less than 4 anda low hazard premises cannot have an inspection rating of more than 4.

Limitations

37. The system does not distinguish between health and safety. Experience suggests that this is not necessary andinspectors should rate on the basis of what they see, evaluate and take action on - whatever the topic.

38. The system will not hold historical data of rating. Whilst this might be considered a lost opportunity to analysetrends etc in practice the present system cannot be used for this purpose. To design a system with this capabilitywould require a much more complex equation and substantial time to complete at each visit. The gains insimplicity and clarity outweigh the monitoring option.


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Annex 4

EXAMPLE INPUT SCREEN


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Annex 5

CIS RATINGS PROFILEPurpose

The CIS Rating System provides a consistent and auditable way of prioritising the inspection of incumbents. It does notpropose frequency of visits or targets but can be used to direct resources where they are most likely to be needed.

The outputs from CIS can be used to draw up an:

Overall Ratings Profile; or Inspection Programme;

Each Management Group will be able to select incumbents for inclusion in an inspection programme for the year. Thisannex explains how to do this.

HOW TO CREATE AN OVERALL RATINGS PROFILE

Each management group will be able to select establishments for inclusion in an inspection programme for the year.

To create the Overall Ratings Profile, take the following steps in CIS:

1. Log into CIS.

2. Click on Reports at top of screen.

3. Highlight Reports Li st .

4. Click on 23 (incumbents rating by overall band).

Click nextClick find management group (eg LD3D) (NB. Search in present year).Click nextClick finishThe information will be displayed in a similar format as at Annex 1 and can be copied/pasted into a wordprocessing file or can be printed from the screen.

HOW TO COPY/PASTE INTO A .doc OR .lwp FILE

1. Right-mouse click " properties " remove P from 'display only' " ok. Highlight all text. Right-mouse click " copy.

2. Open up Microsoft word/lotus word and create a new document and paste the information into the newdocument. (Some adjustments may need to be made to the presentation of the table)

HOW TO CREATE AN INSPECTION PROGRAMME

Firstly, you will need to create an Overall Ratings Profile as above (an example is shown below).

An Overall Ratings Profile for a Management Group

Rating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 >10 Total

Incumbents 0 0 9 120 97 58 23 12 6 0 1 326

Units 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 0 0 9 120 97 58 23 12 6 0 1 326

You will need to identify the resource available for inspection of non TT COMAH establishments for the year (e.g. 42 staffdays). Because approximately one inspection can be completed for each available staff day you need to search for 42establishments. From the profile it can be seen that 42 establishments can be identified from a rating of 7.

From this profile you can select the highest rated incumbents for inclusion in the inspection programme.

To create a programme for inspection, take the following steps in CIS:

1. Log onto CIS

2. Click on incumbents icon at top of screen.3. Click on the Ratings tab.

4. Right-mouse click " find " advanced " add. In the field box select management group name from the drop downmenu. In the condition box select is exactly to Type in the management group name (eg LD3D ) (all search


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entries are case sensitive) In the logical box select and In the field box select overall rating from the drop downmenu. In the condition box select ( is after or equal to ) and type in value eg.( 7)

5. Click Start Search (42 rows retrieved) This is the priority list of establishments for inspection. To sort the listalphabetically, double click on the grey area of Client Name at the top of the list. This will sort the list inascending or descending order as required. You can print the entire list at this point if you wish (Step 7).

To find out which of these 42 sites are COMAH LT, steps 1-5 will need to be repeated and the following step included:

6. In the logical box select and In the field box select hazard rating from the drop down menu. In the condition boxselect ( is after or equal to ) and type in value 6 (a hazard rating of 6 or more are COMAH LT). Click StartSearch (11 rows retrieved) This is the priority list of COMAH LT establishments taken from the priority list ofestablishments for inspection.

7. File "print data list " ok . (The information will be displayed in a list format containing client and location details).


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Inspection Techniques

Introduction Follow-up The Inspection Process Techniques Applied Across the HID sector Inspection Techniques Available Mailshots and Seminars Application and Appraisal of Techniques Inspection tools TORCH (Transferring Ownership Responsibility and Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT)

Commitment for Hazard control) Analysis; Investigative Methods Audit Producing Inspection Plans TRAM (Technical Risk Audit Method) Appendix 1 - Inspection Plan

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the ch apter

1. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a guide to inspectors on the aims of inspection, the techniques ofinspection available, their resource implications and benefits, and how they link to inspection plans The guidanceis based on the 4 high level principles agreed by the DMB under the Inspection Strategy Project in 1998. Theyare set out below.

a. A range of techniques should be selected with the aim of obtaining greatest effectiveness for the input ofresource;

b. Methods for assessing the effectiveness of intervention need to be built into the inspection plan;

c. HID should operate longer term inspection plans with some occupiers;

d. Longer term inspection plans should take account of company health and safety plans as well asbusiness changes.

2. The chapter covers 3 areas - the inspection process, inspection techniques and inspection plans

Definition

3. The term 'inspection' covers the wide range of intervention activities from preventive inspections through toaudits and specifically includes investigation. In particular the integration of investigation and inspection iscovered.

THE INSPECTION PROCESS

The aims of inspection and investigation

4. From the paper by PJC Scott (FOD) on The Practice of Inspection the FOD IN code and the HSE frameworkfor investigations the following aims of inspections and investigations can be derived.

5. The aims of inspection are:

a. To satisfy HSE and other stakeholders that those with duties are complying with their legalresponsibilities;

b. To make an assessment of the adequacy of control of risk posed by the work activities to employees andothers, and any measures required to ensure adequate control;

c. To persuade, and if necessary enforce, businesses to take action to achieve compliance with the legalminimum standards, such action being commensurate with the risk;

d. To encourage businesses actively to manage health and safety as an integral part of their business,thereby reducing accidents and ill-health through the application of cost-effective controls;

e. To disseminate information and guidance about how to comply with legal requirements;

f. To encourage employees and their representatives to co-operate and play their part in achievingappropriate standards of health and safety controls;

g. To collect information, for distribution as appropriate, as a means for developing legislation, policy andguidance on health and safety at work.

6. The aims of investigation are to:

a. Identify the immediate and underlying causes and consequences of the event;


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b. Rectify conditions giving rise to the particular accident;

c. Identify any breaches of the law and the appropriate action to be taken in the circumstances;

d. Ensure that similar conditions are not repeated in other parts of the same premises;

e. Satisfy the expectations of the public, the media and pressure groups who expect action from HSE whena serious accident occurs;

f. Act as a starting point for the analytical assessment of management's ability - a starting point as effectiveas a basic inspection in some places;

g. To contribute to HSE's knowledge of the causes of incident;h. Identify any shortcomings in policy, guidance or legislation and any consequential research;

i. Help HSE evaluate the effectiveness of inspection activity; inform duty holders and the public about thecauses of incidents and any relevant findings from investigations and;

j. Meet the reasonable expectations of relevant stakeholders in line with Open Government Commitments.

7. These aims should be kept in mind and used to guide inspections and investigations.

The integration of i nvestigation and inspection

8. From the above it can be seen that inspection and investigation have much in common and could both bedefined as : "a process for independent assessment of the adequacy of control of work risks, within a legal

framework of duties, standards and sanctions ".9. The list below draws together the key aims of inspection and investigation:

a. to make an assessment of the adequacy of risk control measures;

b. to persuade, and if necessary enforce, businesses to take action to achieve compliance with the legalminimum standards;

c. to encourage businesses to manage health and safety;

d. to disseminate information and guidance about how to comply with legal requirements;

e. to encourage the involvement of employees and their representatives in achieving and maintainingstandards of workplace health and safety.

10. Investigative work has, in the past, been seen as distinct from inspection, and time spent on the two activities is(and will continue to be) recorded separately. These factors have contributed to the perception that the activitiesare entirely separate, which in practice is not the case. Inspection and investigation both require the inspector touse the techniques of observation, document review, questioning, reviewing evidence etc. - the significantdifference lies in the event which triggers the inspection activity. Inspection and investigative activity bothcontribute to HSC/E Continuing Aim 2 - to secure compliance with the law in line with the principles oftransparency, proportionality, consistency and targeting (TPCT) on a risk-related basis.

11. The IN Code also refers to links between inspection and investigation: 'The investigation of an accident can beused as a starting point for basic inspection,.... Accident investigation can in these cases and in others effectivelyform part of the basic inspection. It enables both the inspector and management to discuss gaps inmanagement's arrangements for complying with HSWA section 2.'

12. Since the publication of HSG 65, inspectors in FOD, HID and ODDs have targeted their attention on the

management issues underlying workplace health and safety - and investigative work should be no different.Investigative techniques such as MORT, Events and causal factors analysis and Root cause analysis all link theinvestigation of technically complex incidents back to initiating events including health and safety managementfailings. The conclusions from such an investigation can add significantly to HID's intelligence about a site andmake a major contribution to the inspection plan.

13. The activities of investigation and inspection are closely linked, and should inform each other e.g. the findings ofan investigation should shape the inspection plan, or may indicate that there would be value in applying aparticular inspection technique and the conclusions of an inspection may suggest that particular types ofaccident should be investigated. The two techniques have common purposes, and in order to achieve the mosteffective use of HID's interventions, investigation should not be seen as separate from inspection, but in effect asreactive inspection. The boundaries between inspection and investigative activity are not, and should not be,rigidly defined.

14. HID must make the best use of interventions - whether recorded as inspection or investigation. The existence ofan inspection plan for a site will facilitate this, by identifying topics for inspection, suggesting effective techniques,and indicating the inspection frequency. The inspection plan must cover both proactive and reactive inspection.There are two main factors which determine the effectiveness of investigation within an inspection plan:

a. Selection of the appropriate incidents for investigation;b. Using the findings of investigations to amend the inspection plan.


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15. The topic of inspection plans is discussed more fully later in this chapter (para 93)

16. The OMF (Operations Management Forum) paper (OMF 97/1/6) 'A study of the Application of Quality AssuranceTechniques to the Regulatory Activity of FOD and non-HSE Regulators' considers the role of investigation withininspection, including the extent to which accident notifications should prompt and inform inspections. The paperconcludes that as a source of information on risk, accident notifications are arguably more reliable (if onlybecause they are in 'real-time') than historical data, such as inspection ratings. They also allow for more sharplytargeted inspections.

17. The appropriate selection of accidents for investigation is vital. The HSE Enforcement Statement qualitystandard document for investigation lists the following selection criteria:

a. actual and potential severity;

b. seriousness of potential breach;

c. track record of duty-holder;

d. enforcement priorities;

e. practicality of achieving results;

f. relevance of event to wider range of premises;

g. political factors and public expectations;

h. legal factors.

i. short term resource constraints.18. Other relevant factors to be input to the criteria could include HID objectives, companies' approach to the

problem and the number and frequency of accidents.

INSPECTION TECHNIQUES AVAILABLE

19. This section sets out the techniques commonly used across HID to influence standards of workplace health andsafety. They can be divided into three main groups, depending on who uses them, and how they are applied.

Although some techniques are more commonly used than others each technique has circumstances where itsuse will be appropriate.

20. Techniques applied to specifi c si tes ;

a. To assess and influence the adequacy of risk control measures:

i. Inspection - Proactive and reactive

ii. TORCH

iii. Audit

iv. TRAM

b. To assess the adequacy of response to HID's contact:

i. Follow up

21. Techniques applied across the HID sector ;

a. To assess and influence the adequacy of risk control measures:

i. Projects

ii. Seminars and mailshots

b. To assess the adequacy of response to HID's contact:

i. Follow up

22. Techniques applied by industry ;

a. Benchmarking

b. Self assessment


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23. The relationship between these techniques is shown diagrammatically below.

24. Note: An important and integral part of all inspections, regardless of the technique used, is contact with

employees and safety representatives, whether appointed under The Safety Representatives and SafetyCommittees Regulations 1977 or elected under The Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees)Regulations 1996. HID needs to continue to ensure that contacts are made and that employees have theopportunity to raise concerns.

25. Inspectors use various 'tools' to carry out the techniques listed above. Some of these form part of the corecompetencies for HID inspectors, e.g. legal and technical training, project management, negotiating,presentation skills etc. But in addition there are some recently developed tools which may be used tocomplement/add value to the inspection process. These tools do not stand alone as the techniques listed abovedo, but are used to carry out the inspection technique.

26. These inspection tools include:

a. Climate survey tool;

b. MORT analysis;c. Events and causal factors analysis;

d. Root cause analysis.

27. Further details of the inspection tools are provided later in this chapter (para 81)

APPLICATION AND APPRAISAL OF TECHNIQUES

Preventative Inspection

Background

28. Preventive inspection is the most widely used technique by which HID, in common with HSE's other operationaldirectorates and divisions, assesses standards of control of workplace risks and compliance with legalrequirements, leading to regulation. It tends to be process-orientated and can be either hardware ormanagement systems led. In its application, inspectors draw on visual observation, discussion with managementand employees, and review of relevant documentation. Visits may be unannounced, or carried out byappointment. The technique may be performed by one inspector, or a multi-disciplinary team.

29. The application of inspection is discussed in Section 2.2 of the 'FOD Guide to the inspection of health and safetymanagement' (the 'FOD Guide'), but this section does not apply the term in the broadest sense of the usesuggested in this chapter

How applied

30. Inspection is a flexible technique which can be adapted to a wide range of circumstances. For example, it can beapplied across a whole workplace, or to selected parts of it in unitised premises. It can also be used to assess

discrete activities or processes, in which case the term 'topic' inspection is commonly used. In all cases, thepurpose of the inspection is to assess the adequacy of control of workplace risks.

31. For the purposes of work recording and planning various parts of inspection activity (investigations andenforcement) are separated, and will continue to be so. The recording arrangements are for administrative andpolitical reasons, and should not be taken as implying any difference in application. Inspection can be eitherproactive or reactive. The technique applied is the same in both cases - the triggering event differentiates


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between them. Reactive inspection i.e. investigation will be prompted by a report of an accident, complaint,occupational ill-health or as a result of allegations of breaches of the law (e.g; from local authorities, fireauthorities, insurance companies).

Resource requirements

32. Inspection is generally regarded as a relatively quick process and between 0.5 and 1 day of site time is used asan estimate, but there can be variation from this. Large premises are commonly unitised, with each unittraditionally representing about half a day's inspection. The time required for FOCUS data entry, the productionof letters and the initiation of follow up action are in addition to site time. The 'office' time is recorded on FOCUS

as non-contact time. A 1:1 ratio of site time to office time is typical. Appraisal of Applicat ion by HID

33. Inspection is perceived by HSE as effective because it produces change - immediately if necessary. Howeverlittle has been done in the way of formal evaluation of inspection. It also provides a quick assessment of the levelof risk in a company, informs the HID inspection strategy - the most suitable inspection technique and therelevant topics. The process of preventive inspection is subject to line management review. The technique isflexible - inspectors can modify their approach and priorities during an inspection as circumstances require. Thetechnique is equally valid in large complex workplaces as it is in roadside inspections of the carriage ofdangerous goods by road.

Other is sues

34. Team working is being used by HID 1, with inspectors acquiring topic specialisms to be applied as needed. TheRailway Inspectorate are currently increasing their use of team working, to make the best use of inspectors'experience and expertise. This team working is not always formal (although teams are formally set up for worksuch as major investigations), but are created to meet the needs of an inspection or investigation.

35. OSD inspectors end all inspections with a close-out meeting with management - a debriefing with the offshoreinstallation manager followed by a management meeting on shore. Typically HID's practice is for all visits to endwith a summary discussion to give priorities, direction and timescales etc to the occupier.

TORCH (Transferring Ownership Responsibility and Commitment for Hazard control)

Background

36. The principles and application of the TORCH technique are outlined in Section 2.3 of the 'FOD Guide'. TORCHprovides a method of assessing the health and safety management issues in a way which informs HSE butwhich aims to help employers understand health and safety management as applied to their workplace. It aimsto involve the employer in identifying the main risks, controls and management actions required. The 'FODGuide' contains an outline of the technique, and full details are in the 'TORCH pack' produced by the OperationsUnit.

How applied

37. TORCH is mainly based on interviews, with an element of workplace inspection. The technique can be applied toorganisations of all sizes. It is best suited to SMEs which have defined management structure, but whereauditing by HID is not appropriate. It can be administered at a single site or to representatives from a number ofsites at a workshop.


38. The resources required for a TORCH inspection are variable. The application of TORCH at a single site is likelyto require one day on site, with minimal office time, but several brief follow-up contacts, which may notnecessitate a site visit. Carrying out a TORCH workshop for up to 30 occupiers lasting half a day will typicallyrequire about 2 days of Band 6 time to organise it, and five Band 3 staff to deliver the workshop. A half day visitis made to all the sites, and follow-up is important to monitor progress. Office time is generally less than forpreventive inspection - of the order of a 2:1 ratio of site (including workshop) time to office time.

39. TORCH inspections may require a team approach, involving two or three inspectors, and may require input fromother divisional specialists depending on the nature of the risks involved.

Appraisal of Applicat ion by HID

40. Within HID most use of this technique has been made by the Explosives Unit. They have carried out severalworkshops targeted at small to medium sized companies. The technique is considered worthwhile, with manycompanies producing action plans which have subsequently been followed up by inspectors. The key to thesuccess of the technique is this follow up action.


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41. Operations Unit are currently reviewing the application and effectiveness of TORCH across the OperationsGroup, as there is a perception that the application of the technique has moved away from that in the 'FODGuide'. The outcome of the review is to be considered by the Operations Management Forum.

Appl ication by FOD

42. TORCH is regarded by many FOD inspectors as a useful technique because it permits management issues tobe assessed and encourages managers to become involved and take ownership of the management of healthand safety. The experience of FOD suggests that it can be applied successfully and efficiently in place of audit atSMEs.

43. TORCH can usefully be applied at a relatively early stage in the inspection plan for a company, but is likely to bebest used after an initial preventive inspection has assessed the suitability of a company for the application ofTORCH.

AUDIT

Background

44. The audit process as used by HID is defined in HID circular CC/INSPECTION/1rev as: 'a systematic,documented, verification process of objectively evaluating evidence to determine whether an employer hasdeveloped a management system and implemented the arrangements necessary to meet its legal obligations inrespect of health and safety and the control of risks and whether the system and arrangements are effectivelyimplemented'.

45. The circular defines management systems audit as: 'the audit of a company at a defined level of management.'This may be directed at the corporate level, the divisional level or at the level of the management of a single site.HID applies the following definition of risk control systems audit: ' the audit of a defined and restricted risk controlsystem. It includes both auditing the level of compliance with legal requirements and the audit of themanagement of that risk'.

46. The STATAS audit methodology (described in section 2.5 of the 'FOD Guide') was developed from an HSLresearch project to provide a way of assessing loss of containment of hazardous substances from process plantand vessels. The research findings showed that loss of containment could be attributed to one, or a combination,of 10 direct causes and that these in turn could be attributed to one or a combination of eight origins of failure.The audit protocol produced by the researchers did not follow the HSG65 model, so the STATAS 'origins offailure' audit questions were mapped across to the Risk Control Systems questions (or key issues) described inthe 'FOD Guide'. The STATAS methodology is now the same as the methodology described in the 'FOD

Guide', and is no longer used as a 'stand-alone' technique .How applied

47. HID has built up much experience and expertise of auditing. HID's plan of work includes a commitment to auditall top-tier CIMAH sites.

48. The 'FOD Guide' includes criteria for selecting sites for audit. These include major hazard sites, multi-establishment companies, employers with well developed management systems which employ more than 200people or where there are significant hazards. These selection criteria and HSE's application of the audittechnique have moved on since the 'FOD Guide' was published, and in its present form it does not reflect HID'suse of auditing. Possible additional criteria for selecting companies in the HID sector for audit could includecompanies changing status under COMAH (i.e. moving into LT from non-COMAH or from LT to TT), companiesundergoing major structural change to their management or organisational structure (including large shifts in theuse of contractor organisations for hazardous operations) or performing extensive downsizing; companymergers; any other major change events; poor hazardous event record.


49. Auditing is a resource-intensive technique. For the 1997/98 work year HID audits of management systemsaccompanied by one or more risk control systems required an average of 46 hours non-contact time and 35hours contact time, and risk control system audits required an average of 41 hours non-contact time and 25hours contact time. Site audits are normally carried out by at least two inspectors, with a larger team for audits atdivisional and corporate levels. Depending on the issues involved, staff from RSG, DST or other DDs may bepart of the audit team. The ratio of site time to office time may approach 1:2.

Appraisal of Applicat ion by HID

50. In November 1996 the DMB considered a paper (DMB/96/59) which presented the work of the Audit and Lead PIWorking Group. The DMB endorsed the use of audits as part of a continuing strategy to gain information aboutemployer's management arrangements and systems. Additionally, the DMB agreed that it was desirable for anaudit to be completed for each major hazard employer as a starting point and reviewed at the beginning of eachsafety report update cycle. These recommendations are still in place.


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51. The effectiveness of HSE's use of auditing was evaluated by a project commissioned by the OMF in 1996/97,reported as 'The effectiveness of HSE's audit approach'. The project was based on corporate level audits carriedout by FOD, HID and OSD. The review concluded that employers and most inspectors strongly support HSE'suse of auditing and that the technique is appropriate in the present regulatory climate. Further conclusions werethat HSE generally carries out corporate audits well, and such audits usually influence health and safetymanagement as they raise significant issues with senior managers. These topics do not arise during other HSEinterventions. But the review said that HSE does not benefit from the use of auditing to the greatest extentpossible, as post-audit action i.e. follow-up is not well executed and there is an apparent lack of use made ofaudit conclusions to inform and direct subsequent inspections.

52. In 1997, the CIA were involved in a survey to evaluate the effectiveness of audits done by HID (CC/ADMIN/8).The report generally supported HID's current practice and made several suggestions for improvement, but didnot address follow-up work.

53. Because the conduct of audits is a major, resource intensive technique carried out by HID the inspection strategyproject team identified a need to provide very clear policy and guidance on the use of audits. The first stage inpreparing such policy and guidance was a workshop held in July 99 to identify the issues involved and the bestway forward.

54. The outcome of the workshop was a report to DMB with recommendations on further action required. Therecommendations are now being taken forward as a project by HID OPPG Inspection Section. The projectoutcome will be the provision of clear guidance on the policy and practice of auditing by HID.

TRAM (Technical Risk Audit Method)

Background

55. This technique has been developed jointly by HSE and AEA Technology. It is a computer-based system for theassessment of technical aspects of process safety at major hazard sites. It involves the identification andevaluation of the number of 'lines of defence' i.e. control, protection and mitigation measures, needed to reduceoverall risks.

How applied

56. TRAM is still undergoing development, but has been trialed at several HID premises. It has been developed forthe storage of LPG, but there are plans to develop it for appli

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