Auction Design by Peter Cramton – December 2014 OECD discussion on the Use of Tenders and Auctions
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Transcript of Auction Design by Peter Cramton – December 2014 OECD discussion on the Use of Tenders and Auctions
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Auction Design
Peter Cramton Professor of Economics, University of Maryland
www.cramton.umd.edu
15 December 2014
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Auction design
• Establishes rules of market interaction
• Economic engineering
– Economics
– Computer science
– Engineering, operations research
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Auction design accomplishments
• Improve allocations
• Improve price information
• Reduce risk
• Enhance competition
• Mitigate market failures
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Applications
• Spectrum auctions
• Electricity markets
• Natural resource auctions (timber, oil, etc.)
• Emission allowance auctions
• Financial securities
• Procurement
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Objectives
• Efficiency
• Transparency
• Fairness
• Simplicity
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Principle
“Make things as simple as possible, but not simpler” -- Albert Einstein
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Spectrum
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Spectrum auctions
• Many items, heterogeneous but similar
• Competing technologies and business plans
• Complex structure of substitutes and complements
• Government objective: Efficiency
– Make best use of scarce spectrum
– Address competition issues in downstream market
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Key design issues
• Establish term to promote investment
• Enhance substitution – Product design
– Auction design
• Encourage price discovery – Dynamic price process to focus valuation efforts
• Encourage truthful bidding – Pricing rule
– Activity rule
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Simultaneous ascending auction
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Prepare
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Italy 4G Auction, September 2010 470 rounds, €3.95 billion
• Auction conducted on-site with pen and paper
• Auction procedures failed in first day
• No activity rule
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Thailand 3G Auction, October 2012
• 3 incumbents bid
• 3 nearly identical licenses; can only win one
• Auction ends at reserve price + 2.8%
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US AWS-3 auction, 65 MHz, after 91 rounds $43.7 billion, $2.65/MHzPop (paired)
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Electricity
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Goals of electricity markets
• Short-run efficiency
– Least-cost operation of existing resources
• Long-run efficiency
– Right quantity and mix of resources
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Challenges of electricity markets
• Must balance supply and demand at every instant at every location
• Physical constraints of network
• Absence of demand response
• Climate policy
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Three Markets
• Short term (5 to 60 minutes) – Spot energy market
• Medium term (1 to 3 years) – Bilateral contracts
– Forward energy market
• Long term (4 to 20 years) – Capacity market (thermal system)
– Firm energy market (hydro system)
• Address risk, market power, and investment
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Long-term market: Buy enough in advance
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Product
• What is load buying?
– Energy during scarcity period (capacity)
• Enhance substitution
– Technology neutral where possible
– Separate zones only as needed in response to binding constraints
• Long-term commitment for new resources to reduce risk
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Pay for Performance
• Strong performance incentives
– Obligation to supply during scarcity events
• Deviations settled at price > $5000/MWh
• Penalties for underperformance
• Rewards for overperformance
• Tend to be too weak in practice, leading to
– Contract defaults
– Unreliable resources
• But not in best markets: ISO New England, PJM
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The Future of Mobile Broadband
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The future…as with electricity: multiple opportunities to contract
• Long term: investment market like today
• Medium term: one month to three years
• Short term (spot market)
– One day
– One hour
– 5 minutes
– 4 seconds
– (10 milliseconds, 10 microseconds, …?)
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Conclusion
• No auction design is perfect • Design must be customized for setting
– Simultaneous ascending clock • Simple settings (upcoming UK)
– Combinatorial clock • Packaging is essential (UK 4G, Canada 700 MHz)
– Two-sided clock • Incentive auction in US
• Never ignore essentials – Encourage participation – Demand performance – Avoid collusion and corruption
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Telecom:
Energy:
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Auction spectrum
Pay for performance