Attitudes towards trade unions in Bangladesh, Brazil, Hungary and Tanzania

International Labour Review, Vol. 141 (2002), No. 4

Copyright © International Labour Organization 2002

Attitudes towards trade unions inBangladesh, Brazil, Hungary and Tanzania

Sukti DASGUPTA*

Unions have traditionally been the principal agency of voice repre-sentation for workers. Voice representation empowers workers

and enables them to bargain effectively and negotiate to their ad-vantage, with the result that their income, employment and workingconditions improve (Freeman, 1980; Booth, 1995). Moreover, besidestheir rent-seeking role (improving their members’ income and workingconditions), trade unions play a larger role as the collective voice ofworkers in a democracy (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, p. 18). The role ofunions as collective voice reinforces the “positive economic, politicaland social effects [of unionization] in pluralist democracies” (Bhattach-erjee, 2002, p. 308), and forms the basis of good-quality, dignifiedemployment (Standing, 1999; Rodgers, 2001).

But union strength depends on membership numbers — as doesunion success as the vehicle for workers’ collective voice in a democ-racy. Both the enabling role of unions and their larger collective voicerole are undermined if unions represent only a small part of the labourforce. Union bargaining power, for example, is most effective whenthere is no large pool of non-unionized workers because of high labourturnover costs, or when union membership numbers are high (Boeri,Brugiavini and Calmfors, 2001, p. 50). Second, the view of unions asexpressing the collective voice can prevail only if their concerns are suf-ficiently broad to encompass those of widely differing types of worker,notably the vulnerable ones. But changes in the world economy in thepast twenty years have posed major challenges to trade unions.

As labour markets have become more flexible in industrializedcountries, there has been a shift from “standard” full-time regularemployment (the traditional union base) to atypical forms of employ-ment. In developing countries, despite moderate economic growth

* InFocus Programme on Socio-Economic Security, ILO.

414 International Labour Review

unregistered and unprotected employment has continued to increase.There has also been a strong tendency for the labour force to becomescattered and fragmented, rendering collective organization more andmore difficult (Mishra, 2001). Trade unions in countries across theworld thus face the challenge of reaching out to many workers whosecontractual situations are less well defined than those elaborated withinthe standard framework. “It is generally agreed that the trade unionmovement has fallen on hard times” (ILO, 1997, p. 6). Trade unionmembership has declined in a number of countries. This both calls intoquestion the representativeness of trade unions and hinders meaningfulsocial dialogue around the world (ILO, 2000). Furthermore, it has beenclaimed that erosion of public support for unions has accompanied thedecline in union power to bargain and organize (Milton, 1986, p. 331).

This, then, is the context in which this article explores the follow-ing questions, based on results from the People’s Security Surveys(PSSs)1 conducted by the ILO’s Programme on Socio-Economic Secur-ity in four countries in different regions — Bangladesh (Asia), Brazil(Latin America), Hungary (eastern Europe) and Tanzania (Africa):

l What is the pro�le of the union member?l Is there a union effect on wages? Or do unionized workers

earn more simply because they occupy an advantageous pos-ition in the labour market?

l In this age of �exibility and declining union membership,what are workers’ attitudes towards unions? Do unions enjoypublic support? Are they trusted by the public?

l What similarities and/or differences are exhibited by the fourcountries in this connection?

The contextVoice representation is one of the seven forms of work-related

security evaluated by the PSSs conducted over the past two years. Rele-vant issues covered include whether the respondent belongs to a tradeunion; the attitude of the respondent towards unions; and the respond-ent’s views on which form of action or protest to take when workers’rights are denied.

This article will focus its analysis on wage and salaried workers,since they tend to be union members. Table 1 presents some detailsregarding the four countries studied and the scope of the PSS in eachcountry.

1 The PSSs are household surveys. For a comprehensive discussion of the PSSs and thequestions and topics covered, see Anker (2001).

Attitudes towards trade unions in Bangladesh, Brazil, Hungary and Tanzania 415

The last column in table 1 reports the percentage of wage and sal-aried workers surveyed who were union members. In Bangladesh,Hungary and Tanzania, the relevant PSS question was whether or notthe respondent belonged to a trade union organization. In Brazil, therelevant PSS question was whether the worker belonged to a tradeunion in the workplace. From the PSS it was found that unionizationrates among wage and salaried workers were 9.8 in Bangladesh, 27.2 inTanzania, 27.6 in Brazil and 22.7 in Hungary.

For Bangladesh and Tanzania, the differences between the figuresavailable from the PSS data and those available from national sourcescan partly be explained by the fact that the national data relate to for-mal sector workers only, whereas the PSS sample included both formaland informal workers. The PSS sample for Brazil showed a lower rateof unionization than the national rate possibly because of the way thequestion was posed — whether the respondent belonged to a tradeunion at the workplace rather than whether he/she belonged to a tradeunion. In Hungary, the difference between the national unionizationrate and that in the PSS sample was relatively small.

It needs to be clarified at the outset that each of the four countriesstudied differ in terms of their institutional approach to industrial rela-tions, as well as in their historical, economic and social contexts.

In Hungary, formerly a centrally planned economy, a large pro-portion of the workforce is employed in wage and salaried work. Thecountry has a long history of trade union activity dating back to itssocialist era, when trade unions were part of the state apparatus. Thetransformation of trade unions — the establishment of their autonomyand internal democracy —was part of the social transformation thatoccurred as a result of the transition from a centralized to an industrialmarket economy (Flanagan, 1998, p. 343).

Table 1. Speci�cities of countries studied*

Country National: GDPper capita in year 2000 US $

National:% of wageand salaried workers

National: unionization rate amongst wage and salaried workers

PSS:geographic coverage

PSS:sample size of wageand salaried workers

PSS: unionization rate among wageand salaried workers

Bangladesh 359.68 12.4 (1996) 29.19 (1999, formal sector)

Dacca 452 9.8

Brazil 4563.30 62.3 (1990) 32.20 (1999) MetropolitanRio de Janeiro,São Paulo, Recife

1 400 27.6

Hungary 3494.50 84 (1999) 25 (2000) National 515 22.7

Tanzania 267.90 ... 51.60 (1995, formal sector)

Dar es SalaamMorogoArusha

152 27.2

* Analyses of PSS data for Brazil, Hungary and Tanzania were carried out on weighted samples.

Sources: World Bank (2001); ILO (1999); IFP/SES Primary Database 2002.


Brazil is a large developing country with a history of military rule.The Brazilian labour movement was fairly strong in the late 1970s andin the 1980s, and provided a major form of resistance to the militaryregime. During this time, union membership in Brazil rose and publicopinion towards unions was favourable. But since the 1990s, a period ofeconomic stagnation, high unemployment rates and industrial restruc-turing, union influence has diminished.2

Bangladesh is one of the least developed countries. It became asovereign state fairly recently (1971), and poverty and informalemployment are widespread. It has a very low unionization rate. How-ever, between 1990 and 2000 it experienced an increase in trade unionmembership. During this period, the rate of growth of membership was1.63 per cent and that of registered trade unions 5.3 per cent (Mondal,2002, p. 14). A majority of wage workers replying to the PSS in Bangla-desh were drawn from the garment industry, and until recently workersin that industry were discouraged from forming trade unions. 3 “Tradeunionism has not developed to a significant level in the garment indus-try in spite of violation of workers’ rights in this sector” (Paul-Majum-dar, 2002, p. 19).

Tanzania, like Bangladesh, is a developing country with only asmall proportion of its total labour force engaged in wage and salariedwork, and very low unionization rates outside the formal sector. Arecent ILO report on Tanzania notes that it is the “voicelessness” of themajority of workers in Tanzania that poses a serious problem to promo-tion of the decent work agenda there (Casale and Pursey, 2002, p. ii).

There are also differences in the coverage and sample size of thePSS in each country. However, despite the variations and divergencesin these countries, trade unions there face certain common challengesin the era of globalization and flexibility. Furthermore, some similar-ities with regard to unions and their functioning transcend nationalinstitutional differences, such that a cross-national study of unionsbased on the PSSs is both useful and interesting.4

Profile of the typical union memberAs unions are essentially membership-based organizations it is

interesting to examine the profile of the typical union member in thefour countries studied. This helps to understand better who unionmembers are, and whether there is some similarity in this regard

2 See Cardoso (2002) for a detailed analysis of the Brazilian trade union movement.3 In cases of grievances and dispute settlements, the power of arbitration rests with the

Bangladesh Export Processing Zone Authority (BEPZA), through its Industrial RelationsDepartment.

4 Hyman (2001), for example, argues for the importance of cross-national research in indus-trial relations, in particular cross-national comparison of trade unions.


between the four countries. Table 2 lists some characteristics of unionmembers and non-unionized workers surveyed.5

In Hungary, over half of union members were women (51.8 percent). However, only 22.4 per cent of wage and salaried women workersbelonged to unions. State sector employees constituted 72.0 per cent oftrade union membership in Hungary. The unionized worker in Hungarywas slightly more likely to have a better educational background — 20.6per cent of unionized workers had post-secondary education, comparedwith 17.0 per cent of non-unionized workers. Moreover, the PSS datafor Hungary showed that younger workers were less likely to be unionmembers. Only 19.8 per cent of those aged 30 and under belonged to aunion, compared with 44.3 per cent of those in the 31-45 age group and

5 All data referred to in this section not appearing in table 2 are drawn from the PSSs’findings.

Table 2. Socio-economic characteristics of unionized and non-unionizedrespondents in Bangladesh, Brazil, Hungary and Tanzania (per cent)

Bangladesh Brazil Hungary Tanzania

U NU U NU U NU U NU

Sex

Women 18.2 29.1 38.4 46.5 51.8 48.7 31.5 24.2

Men 81.8 70.9 61.6 53.5 48.2 51.3 68.5 75.8

Age

30 and under 15.9 41.5 13.9 28.7 19.8 33.7 18.6 19.7

31–45 54.5 43.5 67.3 55.2 44.3 42.5 51.2 49.2

46+ 29.5 15.1 18.7 16.0 35.8 23.9 30.2 31.2

Education

Primary or less 20.5 35.4 18.2 30.2 1.9 1.6 27.9 69.9

Secondary 34.1 29.7 64.8 62.0 77.6 81.4 65.1 22.6

Post-secondary 45.5 34.9 16.8 7.5 20.6 17.0 7.0 7.5

Contract

Under one year 29.5 52.2 3.7 26.8 3.0 8.5 13.9 62.6

Temporary –(more than one year) 2.3 2.0 1.7 3.5 5.8 9.2 16.3 15.4

Permanent 68.2 45.7 94.6 69.7 91.3 82.3 70.0 22.0

Sector

State 52.3 12.3 30.9 10.0 72.0 34.7 69.9 24.7

Informal 15.9 39.8 5.1 28.2 5.6 19.5 0.0 52.7

N 44 405 386 1 014 106 397 43 109

Note: U = unionized workers; NU = non-unionized workers.Source: PSS data.


35.8 per cent of those in the older age group (46+). The average age ofunion members was 40 years, while that of non-unionized respondentswas 35 years. Though major proportions of both types of employee inHungary enjoyed permanent contracts, the percentage of such con-tract-holders among union members was greater (91.3 per cent of unionmembers compared with 82.3 per cent of non-unionized workers).

In Brazil, the PSS found that 38.4 per cent of union members sur-veyed were women. Whereas state sector employees had the highestunionization rate (66.6 per cent), such employees made up only 30.9 percent of union-affiliated respondents. Of the unionized workers sur-veyed, 64.8 per cent had completed secondary schooling and 16.8 percent had completed a college or university degree. In comparison, ofnon-unionized respondents 30.2 per cent had only primary educationand only 7.5 per cent had post-secondary education. Of unionizedrespondents, 67.3 per cent were aged 31-45, compared with 13.9 percent of those aged 30 and under, and 18.7 per cent of older workers. Theincidence of permanent contracts among unionized workers was muchhigher than among the non-unionized.

Unlike Hungary (a former socialist country) and Brazil (a countrywith a strong labour movement) where workers may be expected to beaware of unions, developing countries such as Bangladesh and Tanzaniahave rather low trade union membership. Respondents in these twocountries were asked if they were “aware” of organizations such astrade unions. In the Bangladesh sample, a rather high proportion ofworkers (81.9 per cent) stated they were aware of trade unions. How-ever, only 9.8 per cent of the sample of wage and salaried workers werefound to belong to a union, and only 18.2 per cent of union memberswere women. Moreover, the unionization rate among women workerswas only 6.3 per cent. Again, members of unions were more likely to bewell educated — 45.5 per cent of union members had post-secondaryeducation, compared with 34.9 per cent of non-unionized workers. Statesector employees were more likely to belong to a union. Young workersconstituted only 15.9 per cent of union members, but 41.5 per cent ofnon-unionized respondents. The average age of union members was 40years, while the average age of non-unionized workers was 35 years.More than half of non-unionized workers had contracts of under oneyear, while 68.2 per cent of union members had permanent contracts.

In the PSS sample of wage and salaried workers in Tanzania,knowledge of trade unions was less evident — under 50 per cent ofwage and salaried workers were “aware” of trade unions, and thoseaware included 21.6 per cent who did not belong to a union. Under athird of union members in the sample were women (31.5 per cent). Amajority of union members (65.1 per cent) had a secondary education,while a majority of non-unionized workers (69.9 per cent) had at mostprimary education. In Tanzania, middle-aged workers constituted the


largest group among union members; state sector employees were alsomost likely to be unionized. The difference between unionized andnon-unionized workers was rather remarkable in terms of their con-tractual situation: among non-unionized workers, 62.6 per cent hadcontracts of under one year and 22 per cent had permanent contracts.In contrast, only 13.9 per cent of union members had contracts of underone year, and 70 per cent had permanent contracts.

The PSS data also enabled the identification of workers employedin the informal economy. The Bangladesh and Tanzania PSSs con-tained the following question intended to identify such workers: “Doyou work in the formal (organized) sector such as in industry, office,registered factory, retail store or school?” All those wage and salariedworkers not working in the formal sector were taken to be working inthe informal sector — “informal” thus being defined negatively. ThePSSs conducted in Brazil and Hungary contained no such specific ques-tion, but employment in microenterprises was used as a proxy for infor-mal employment.6 Accordingly, the percentages of informal sectorworkers in the sample of wage and salaried workers were as follows:37.4 per cent in Bangladesh, 37.2 per cent in Tanzania, 21.6 per cent inBrazil and 15.3 per cent in Hungary.

In Bangladesh, informal sector workers constituted 15.9 per centof union members. By contrast, 39.8 per cent of those not belonging toa trade union worked in the informal sector. In the Tanzanian sample,no informal sector worker belonged to a union. All union membersworked in the formal economy, and over half of those who were notunion members (52.7 per cent) worked in the informal sector.

Using employment in microenterprises as a proxy for informalemployment, informal workers made up 5.1 per cent of union membersin Brazil, and 5.6 per cent of the same in Hungary.

The PSS data from these four countries therefore corroborate thesubstitution of the term “unorganized” for “informal” with regard toworkers. There is certainly a correlation between lack of union mem-bership and probability of working in the informal economy. However,the corollary (i.e. those who do not work in the informal economy areunionized) does not hold true. Only 13.2 per cent of wage and salariedworkers in the formal sector were union members in Bangladesh, andin Tanzania 43.2 per cent of those working in the formal sector wereunion members. In Brazil and Hungary, too, formal sector work did notalways involve becoming a union member — in Brazil 34.5 per cent of

6 In keeping with standard national and ILO definitions, this paper uses employment inenterprises employing fewer than five workers as a proxy for informal employment in Brazil, andemployment in enterprises employing fewer than ten workers as a proxy for informal employmentin Hungary.


formal sector workers were union members, and in Hungary only 24per cent of those working in the formal sector belonged to a union.

In spite of the differences in economic structure between the fourcountries, remarkable similarities in the profiles of the unionizedworker emerge from the PSS data in all of them. Thus, the union mem-ber is:

l more likely to be a man than a woman (except in Hungarywhere union membership numbers were almost equally dis-tributed between the sexes, with women having a slightadvantage over men, a fact partly explained by women’s dom-ination in the public services, also the most unionized sector);

l less likely to be a young worker;l more likely to be better educated than the average non-

unionized counterpart;l more likely to have a permanent contract; andl more likely to be from the formal sector.

Do union members earn more than non-unionized workers?Because of their rent-seeking nature, unions can achieve major

benefits for their members through collective bargaining and otherforms of collective action. The most commonly cited example of suchunion effect is a wage premium.7 It has been argued that there are sub-stantial economic gains in the form of higher wages for union members,a fact which also provides an incentive to join (Budd and Na, 2000; Hil-dreth, 2000). Unions are able to achieve this gain for their membersthrough collective bargaining and the threat of strike. However, non-unionized workers can enjoy union-related benefits in so far as the bar-gaining role of unions leads to collective improvements for similargroups of workers (Boeri, Brugiavini and Calmfors, 2001, p. 17). Butunions will be in a position to bargain effectively and bring about collec-tive gains only if there is no alternative pool of substitute workers avail-able in the event of threat of labour withdrawal (Booth, 1995, p. 56).

The impact of unionism on wages has been a subject of long-stand-ing interest in labour economics. The PSS in each country asked workersabout their gross earnings from their main work activity in the previousmonth. Did the surveys find any differences between unionized andnon-unionized workers in terms of their wages? To what extent werethese differences explained by the characteristics of union members,noted above?

7 Other commonly cited union-related benefits are employment protection and safer work-ing conditions.


To compare wages between unionized and non-unionized workers,two aspects of wages that are particularly important for the notion ofincome security were examined. These were wage level and wage regu-larity. To compare these wage issues across countries, scores wereassigned to each level of wages and to each level of regularity. Five wagegroups were constructed, denoted by scores going from 0 to 1 where 0denoted the lowest wage group in each country and 1 the highest wagegroup. Three levels of wage regularity were available from the PSS data,and these were assigned scores on a 0 to 1 scale where 0 denoted “veryirregular”, 0.5 denoted “fluctuating” and 1 denoted “regular”. The dis-tribution of wages by level and by regularity for unionized and non-unionized workers is shown in figures 1 to 8. Below each figure the meanscore for each group and the mean difference between the two groupsare noted.

In all four countries, the distribution of wage level scores in figures1 to 4 revealed that there were relatively more union members thannon-members at the higher end of the scale. The average score of unionmembers was higher than that of non-unionized workers, and this dif-ference was statistically significant at the 5 per cent level in all coun-tries. The differences between the two groups of workers wereremarkable in all four countries, but especially so in Bangladesh andTanzania. Tanzania reported the highest difference between the aver-age score of the two groups (0.29). In Bangladesh the mean differencebetween the two groups was 0.22, followed by Brazil (0.20). Hungaryreported the least difference between mean scores of unionized andnon-unionized respondents (0.11).

In terms of wage regularity, the difference between unionized andnon-unionized workers was relatively smaller, even though the averagescore for union members was higher than that of non-unionized workersin all four countries. The distribution of wage regularity scores acrossthe two groups showed considerable difference for Tanzania, while thedifference was not statistically significant for Bangladesh or Brazil. InTanzania, the mean difference between unionized and non-unionizedworkers in terms of wage regularity was 0.28, compared with 0.05 forBangladesh, 0.03 for Brazil and 0.09 for Hungary.

Union effect on wagesUsing microeconomic data, researchers have estimated wage

regressions that include controls for education, experience and sex,along with a union membership variable.8 The coefficient of the unionmembership variable is then taken as an estimate of the average impact

8 Booth and Bryan (2001), Butcher and Rouse (2000) and Kalacheck and Raines (1976)have conducted studies using similar methodologies.


0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00

Figure 1. Bangladesh: Distribution of wage level scores, by unionized and non-unionized workers

Union Non-union

Wage level score on a 0-1 scale Unionized mean score: 0.67

Non-unionized mean score: 0.45 Mean tested difference: 0.22 (t statistic 4.081)

Figure 2. Brazil: Distribution of wage level scores, by unionized and non-unionized workers

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0

45.0

50.0

0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00

Union Non-union




0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00

Figure 3. Hungary: Distribution of wage level scores, by unionized and non-unionized workers





Figure 4. Tanzania: Distribution of wage level scores, by unionized and non-unionized workers

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00

Union Non-union

Union Non-union


0.0

20.0

40.0

60.0

80.0

100.0

0.0 0.5 1.0

Figure 5. Bangladesh: Distribution of wage regularity scores, by unionized and non-unionized workers

Figure 6. Brazil: Distribution of wage regularity scores, by unionized and non-unionized workers

0.0 0.5 1.00.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

Union Non-union



Union Non-union




0.0

20.0

40.0

60.0

80.0

100.0

0.0 0.5 1.0

Figure 7. Hungary: Distribution of wage regularity scores, by unionized and non-unionized workers

Figure 8. Tanzania: Distribution of wage regularity scores, by unionized and non-unionized workers

0.0 0.5 1.00.0

20.0

40.0

60.0

80.0

100.0

Union Non-union



Union Non-union




that unionization has on wage rates, controlling for other worker char-acteristics. The analysis in the previous section based on the PSS datashows that union members earn more than non-unionized workers onthe average. However, can these differences be attributed to the unioneffect or can they be explained by worker characteristics (education,experience, sex, etc.)? It is quite possible that unionized workers earnmore simply because they are better educated, or because there is aconcentration of union members in high-paying workplaces. Boothand Bryan (2001) found, for example, that some groups of unionizedworkers earned more than non-unionized workers, but when differ-ences relating to worker characteristics and workplaces were used, thepremium was not statistically significant. The PSSs enable such anexercise on a cross-section of wage and salaried workers, controllingfor education, experience, permanence of contract, and sex. The equa-tion used for this purpose is:

Log Wagesi = b i + b 1Edui + b 2Expi - b 3Expi2 + b 4 Sexi + b 5 Unioni + b 6

Permanent + ui

where:Log Wages is the log of the hourly wage in Brazil and Hungary and thelog of monthly wages in Bangladesh and Tanzania. (In the latter twocountries, there were very few replies to total weekly hours spent atwage and salaried work, hence hourly wages could not be calculated.)Edu refers to education. In Brazil and Hungary, education as a continu-ous variable was not available, so a dummy was used such that Edu = 1indicating secondary or post-secondary education, and Edu = 0 in othercases. In Bangladesh and Tanzania, this variable measured years ofeducation and was a continuous variable.Exp is experience, measured as years in current work (employment ten-ure) in all four countries. The use of the square of the experience termis common in wage equation estimations, to capture the decreasingmarginal impact of experience on wages.Sex is a dichotomous variable, taking the value 1 for men and 0 forwomen.Union is a dichotomous variable, taking the value 1 for union membersand 0 otherwise.Permanent is a dichotomous variable equalling 1 for those with per-manent contracts and 0 for those with other contractual arrangements.Results of the wage regression are presented in table 3.

When education, sex, experience and contract type were con-trolled for, the union effect was found to be still robust in Bangladesh,Brazil and Tanzania. Along with union membership, other explana-


tory variables that had a significant impact on wages in Bangladeshand Brazil were sex, education, experience and permanence of con-tract. In Tanzania, wage differences were explained by union member-ship, education and contract permanence. In Hungary, once othervariables had been controlled for, there was no union effect on wages,but education, sex, contract permanence and experience explainedwage differences.9

When another variable was introduced in the wage equation toaccount for formal (or informal) employment (defined as taking thevalue 1 when the respondent works in the formal sector and 0 in othercases),10 the union effect disappeared in Tanzania as well (see the right-hand part of table 3). Wage differences in Tanzania were then explainedmainly by formality (or informality), and by education. In Bangladeshand Brazil, however, even after controlling for informality, union

9 In eastern European countries, including Hungary, unions practised considerable wagemoderation and accepted significant real wage declines in the face of widespread lay-offs in state-owned enterprises, the traditional locus of union membership (Flanagan, 1998, p. 353).

10 For the definition of informality, see the section on the profile of the typical unionmember.

Table 3. Estimates of wage regression

Dependent variable is log hourly wages in Brazil and Hungary and log monthly wages inBangladesh and Tanzania

Independent variables Bangladesh Brazil Hungary Tanzania Bangladesh Brazil Hungary Tanzania

Education 0.05***(7.774)

0.37***(15.955)

0.31***(5.192)

0.10***(4.947)

0.05***(7.365)

0.34***(14.200)

0.31***(5.025)

0.08***(4.124)

Experience 0.01**(2.874)

0.04***(6.194)

0.01**(2.103)

0.005(0.175)

0.01**(2.799)

0.36***(5.482)

0.005(0.872)

0.01(0.375)

Experiencesquared

–0.004(1.492)

–0.14**(2.249)

—–0.003**(1.691)

–0.0004(0.626)

–0.004(1.448)

–0.11*(1.667)

–0.0005(0.612)

–0.007(1.070)

Sex 0.49***(7.238)

0.18***(7.992)

0.10**(2.712)

-0.11(0.488)

0.51***(7.273)

0.15***(6.415)

0.12***(3.149)

0.02(0.111)

Union 0.29**(2.791)

0.09**(3.788)

0.05(1.105)

0.30*(1.604)

0.27**(2.714)

0.07**(2.852)

0.05(1.570)

0.01(0.076)

Permanentcontract

0.24***(3.418)

0.14***(5.899)

0.12**(2.300)

0.45**(2.299)

0.22***(3.022)

0.11***(4.467)

0.12**(2.196)

0.20(1.069)

Formal sectoremployment

0.06**(1.875)

0.15***(3.255)

0.12**(2.010)

0.89***(4.444)

Adjusted R-square 0.45 0.35 0.11 0.35 0.46 0.36 0.14 0.44

F test 44.906 117.949 8.868 11.294 38.573 98.486 8.533 13.965

Durbin Watsontest

2.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.0 1.7 1.8 1.7

N 329 1 285 449 135 329 1 205 441 135

Note: t statistic in parentheses; *** = signi�cant at 1 per cent level; ** = signi�cant at 5 per cent; * = signi�cant at 10 per cent.


membership had a positive effect on wages, though the estimation withthe informal variable reduced the size of the union co-efficient.11

Attitudes towards unionsThe PSSs’ findings therefore suggest that there was no statistically

significant union effect on wages in two out of four countries, onceother worker characteristics had been controlled for. They also showthat a relatively small percentage of all wage workers were union mem-bers. Moreover, as the ILO’s World Labour Report (1997) claimed, thetrade union movement currently faces many challenges. Given thesecircumstances, what attitude did respondents display towards tradeunions in general?12

The greater awareness of trade unions displayed by wage and sal-aried workers in Bangladesh (discussed earlier) accompanies a gen-erally positive attitude towards unions, namely, 83.7 per cent of union-ized respondents in Bangladesh had a positive view of unions, whileonly 9.3 per cent had a negative view (table 4). Even 79.8 per cent ofnon-unionized respondents showed a positive attitude towards trade

11 Carneiro and Henley (1998, p. 133) note that unions in Brazil have been successful inraising real wages of union members. According to these authors, the transition from a system ofstate wage indexation in Brazil to decentralized employer/union wage bargaining has increasedthe “insider” power of trade unions in Brazil.

12 The PSSs in Hungary, Tanzania and Bangladesh asked respondents whether their atti-tude towards unions was positive, negative, or mixed.

Table 4. Bangladesh, Hungary and Tanzania: Attitudes towards unions (per cent)

Attitude

Positive Negative Mixed N

Bangladesh

U 83.7 9.3 4.7 312

NU 79.8 13.1 4.2 43

All 83.7 9.3 4.7 355

Hungary

U 26.9 17.3 55.8 105

NU 12.0 25.0 55.9 393

All 15.1 23.4 55.8 498

Tanzania

U 47.2 13.9 27.8 24

NU 34.8 39.1 17.4 36

All 42.2 23.7 23.7 60

Note: U = Unionized workers. NU = Non-unionized workers.Source: PSS data.


unions. Broken down by socio-economic group, the PSS data for Ban-gladesh show that women were a little more favourable than mentowards unions; with increasing age and higher levels of educationthere was a move from a positive to a mixed attitude. Unions receivedgreater endorsement if the respondent worked in the state sector andthose from the higher income groups were least likely to think posi-tively of unions (table 5).

The high level of awareness of trade unions in Bangladesh and thegenerally positive attitude towards unions found by the PSS there couldbe reasons for the rise in trade union membership between 1990 and2000 (admittedly starting from a very low level). Moreover, as notedearlier, the presence of trade unions in the Bangladesh garment indus-try is relatively new. This recently established means of promotingsocial dialogue in this industry, plus the belief that trade unions shouldbe in a position to improve working conditions and wages, could also bereasons for the generally positive attitude displayed by workerstowards unions in the Bangladesh sample.

Table 5. Bangladesh: Attitudes towards unions, by different socio-economiccategories (per cent)

Attitude


Sex

Female 83.5 8.8 5.5 91

Male 79.0 14.2 3.7 267

Age group

Under 31 82.6 11.4 3.0 132

31 – 45 79.3 15.9 3.0 164

45+ 77.4 8.1 9.7 62

Education

Primary or less 83.9 8.6 3.2 93

Secondary 87.7 7.9 2.6 114

Post-secondary 72.2 19.2 6.0 151

Sector

Public 79.2 11.1 6.9 72

Private & other 80.6 13.1 3.5 283

Income group (1 = lowest)

1 87.2 6.4 0.0 47

2 83.6 12.3 1.4 73

3 90.8 5.7 3.4 87

4 76.9 12.8 7.7 78

5 63.0 26.0 6.8 73


Once the figures for unionized and non-unionized respondentshad been disaggregated for Hungary, it emerged that only just over aquarter of union members had a positive view of unions (26.9 per cent).By contrast, 55.8 per cent of union members had a mixed opinion, and17.3 per cent had a negative view. Amongst non-unionized respond-ents, only 12 per cent had a positive view of unions, 55.9 per cent had amixed opinion, and 25 per cent had a negative view (table 4).

When these attitudes were examined by sex, age, education andsector, it emerged that in Hungary, women were slightly more likelythan men to be in favour of unions; attitudes tended to polarize withage; and more highly educated respondents were more ambivalent, andconsidered that there were both positive and negative aspects tounions. Those belonging to the highest income group were also leastlikely to think positively of unions. Public sector workers evaluatedunions more positively than did other workers (table 6).

The absence of positive attitudes towards unions in Hungaryshould be viewed in historical perspective. As a former centrally

Table 6. Hungary: Attitudes towards unions, by different socio-economiccategories (per cent)

Attitude


Sex

Female 15.6 14.8 63.1 244

Male 14.7 31.5 49.0 251

Age group

Under 31 14.7 17.3 56.0 150

31 – 45 14.0 24.3 59.3 214

45+ 17.3 28.6 49.6 133

Education

Primary or less 25.0 37.5 37.5 8

Secondary 15.3 24.6 54.0 398


Sector

Public 17.6 21.9 57.6 210

Private & other 13.3 24.6 54.7 285


1 12.4 27.0 52.8 89

2 17.0 25.5 50.0 106

3 20.8 25.0 50.0 96

4 17.4 14.5 65.2 69

5 12.1 23.1 61.5 91


planned economy (CPE), Hungary has a history of trade union activityand, since unions were formerly an integral part of the governmentmachinery, their role in Hungary (as in other CPEs) is rather differentfrom their role in other parts of the world. The transition process inHungary involved substantial changes in enterprise governance. State-owned enterprises were privatized and new private enterprisesemerged. It has been claimed that the past union-government alliance,coupled with a deepening employment crisis after the breakdown of thesocialist order, have eroded trade union legitimacy in Hungary (Deppeand Tatur, 1997, p. 257).

In Tanzania 47.2 per cent of unionized respondents thought posi-tively of unions, 27.8 per cent had a mixed opinion, and 13.9 per centhad a negative view (table 4).13 Amongst non-unionized respondents,39.1 per cent thought negatively of unions and 17.4 per cent weremixed. This needs to be considered alongside an apparent general lackof awareness of unions and of union activities in Tanzania. The PSS inTanzania found a marked absence of union activity outside the formalsector; in a country with a large proportion of the labour force active inthe informal sector, this calls into question the “representativeness” ofunions. Moreover, the wage estimation for Tanzania shows that wageinequalities in the labour market are mainly explained by informality.When these replies on attitudes towards unions in Tanzania were dis-aggregated by sex, education, sector and income group, it was foundthat men, older workers and those having completed secondary educa-tion were more likely to have a positive attitude towards unions (table7). Public sector workers regarded unions slightly more positively.However, unlike other countries, in Tanzania the PSS found thatworkers with higher incomes were more likely to have a positive atti-tude towards unions. Among those who replied to this question on atti-tude towards unions in Tanzania, there was not a single person from thelowest wage group, because none in this group was “aware” of unions,hence the question was not put to them at all. This is another indicationof the lack of representation of the most vulnerable sections of thelabour force.

The Brazilian PSS phrased its question about attitudes towardstrade unions somewhat differently, and so the results are presented sep-arately (table 8). The question was whether the respondent agreed withthe statement that unions represented workers’ interests. Only 17.6 percent of all wage and salaried workers “fully agreed” that unions, in gen-eral, adequately represented workers’ interests. However, almost halfof the sample (48.9 per cent) at least partly agreed with this statement.On the other hand, 22.6 per cent of the sample fully disagreed that

13 In Tanzania, only 60 workers responded to this question on attitudes towards unions andresults need to be interpreted with some caution.


unions represent workers’ interests, so there is obviously considerablepolarization of views. When broken down according to union member-ship, relatively more unionized respondents (53.6 per cent) at leastpartly agreed that unions adequately represented workers’ interests,compared with 48 per cent of non-unionized workers.

These views about unions in Brazil also emerged from questionsregarding another sphere, namely, the trustworthiness of institutions(table 8). Questions were asked about the trustworthiness not only ofunions but also of various other institutions, e.g. the church, NGOs,neighbourhood associations, political parties, etc. The institution thatemerged as most trustworthy was the church: 59.6 per cent of allrespondents believed that the church was trustworthy; while 29.8 percent believed that unions were trustworthy. However, among unionmembers, this percentage was higher at 37.1 per cent, whereas 27.2 percent of non-unionized workers trusted unions. Moreover, more re-spondents (regardless of union affiliation) placed their trust in neigh-bourhood associations than in unions. From the perspective of workers

Table 7. Tanzania: Attitudes towards unions, by socio-economic category(per cent)

Attitude


Sex

Female 50.0 16.7 22.2 18

Male 38.1 28.6 23.8 42

Age group

Under 31 42.9 28.6 14.3 7

31 – 45 36.4 30.3 24.2 33

45+ 50.0 15.0 25.0 20

Education

Primary or less 31.6 36.8 21.1 19

Secondary 48.5 18.2 27.3 33


Sector

Public 45.9 21.6 27.0 37

Private & other 36.4 27.3 18.2 22


1 ... ... ... ...

2 14.3 57.1 28.6 7

3 20.0 33.3 26.7 15

4 61.0 5.0 30.0 20

5 53.9 23.5 11.8 17


in Brazil, unions came third in terms of relative trustworthiness. Politi-cal parties, for their part, were rated rather low by both groups.

After disaggregating by socio-economic category the degrees oftrust in trade unions expressed by wage and salaried workers surveyedin Brazil, the PSS data showed that older workers were more distrustfulof unions, while women were more likely to trust them. The least edu-cated respondents trusted unions the most; about three-quarters ofthose in the highest income bracket did not trust unions (table 9).14

This lack of trust in trade unions (as well as in political parties) inBrazil has been interpreted by Cardoso as a sign that workers considertheir voice has been “obliterated” (2002, p. 35).15 Though there is rela-tively more trust in civil society associations, these are not strong sub-stitutes for political organizations or unions.

14 The Brazilian survey also probed into why non-unionized workers were not unionized.The possible responses were categorized into the following groups, each with a possible yes or noresponse: “no trust”; “do not know enough”; “cannot afford to contribute”; “contract does notallow unionization”; and “not interested”. About a quarter responded affirmatively to each of thefollowing three options: “had no trust” (24.9 per cent); “do not know enough” (24.5 per cent) and“not interested” (25.5 per cent).

15 The low level of trust in unions as found in the PSS is in contrast to the situation in the1990s, when 56 per cent of voters declared unions trustworthy institutions, compared to the 82 percent who found the church trustworthy (Cardoso, 2002, p. 4).

Table 8. Brazil: Attitudes towards unions, and extent of trust in various institutions(per cent)

Unions adequately represent workers’ interests

U NU All

Fully agree 19.5 16.9 17.6

Partly agree 34.1 31.3 31.3

Neither agree nor disagree 8.0 14.0 12.4

Partly disagree 17.1 11.1 12.7

Fully disagree 20.4 23.4 22.6

N 350 1014 1400

Trust

U NU All

Church 60.5 59.3 59.6

Unions 37.1 27.2 29.8

Neighbourhood associations 45.2 37.7 39.7

NGOs 32.7 24.9 27.0

Political parties 9.5 7.2 7.8

N (range) 350-386 1014 1364-1400

Note: U = unionized workers. NU = non-unionized workers.Source: PSS data.


In conclusion, after disaggregating respondents into unionizedand non-unionized categories, it is clear from the surveys in all fourcountries that, irrespective of varying economic and social conditions,relatively more union-affiliated respondents think positively of unionsthan do non-unionized respondents. What is of concern, however, isthat even amongst union members, not even half think positively ofunions or trust in them. Bangladesh is an exception. Furthermore, eventhough women, less educated workers and lower wage earning workersare not adequately represented in unions, they are more likely to havea relatively more positive attitude towards unions, or to trust unions.This underlines the need for collective institutions for vulnerableworkers in the labour market.

Respondents’ views on how best to defend their rightsRespondents in Hungary, Tanzania and Bangladesh were asked

for their views on the appropriate course of action when there was

Table 9. Brazil: Attitudes towards unions (“Do you trust unions?”), by differentsocio-economic categories (per cent)

Attitude

Trust Do not trust Neither N

Sex

Female 31.2 64.6 3.7 619

Male 29.1 67.2 3.3 781

Age group

Under 31 33.0 63.2 3.8 342

31 – 45 29.6 67.5 2.4 822

45+ 27.1 65.3 6.8 236

Education

Primary or less 31.8 64.8 3.4 381

Secondary 29.3 66.9 3.2 877


Sector

Public 25.5 69.8 3.1 192

Private & other 30.7 65.5 3.6 1208


1 33.9 62.3 3.2 531

2 28.7 67.7 3.6 279

3 31.5 63.0 5.0 200

4 26.7 69.4 3.9 206

5 22.8 73.9 2.2 184


cause for dissatisfaction with their employers.16 This is another aspectof attitudes towards unions: if most workers feel that unions are viableinstitutions to represent them and bargain on their collective behalf,then turning to unions in case of difficulties at work should emerge asthe most favoured option. The exact question posed in this context wasas follows:

Employees are sometimes dissatisfied with some action of theiremployers. In your opinion, how can workers express their dissat-isfaction in the following circumstances?(1) wages not being paid for three months [this option was probed

only in the Hungarian survey];(2) violation of labour safety codes and regulations; and(3) violation of a collective agreement.

One may speculate that union members would favour action dif-ferent from that preferred by non-unionized workers. In particular,union members would be more likely to consult a union when they weredissatisfied with some action by their employers. Table 10 presents thereplies of unionized and non-unionized respondents.

In Bangladesh and Tanzania, as expected, union members provedmore likely to turn to a union for help: at least half of them were infavour of going to the union when a safety code or a collective agree-ment had been violated. By contrast, in Bangladesh about 30 per centof non-unionized workers favoured taking part in a demonstration inboth cases, whereas in Tanzania nearly 40 per cent of non-unionizedworkers preferred going to a government agency on violations of safetycodes, but to court on violations of collective agreements.17 Strikingly,almost a fifth of the non-unionized workers surveyed in both countrieswere rather pessimistic about the success of any action. They believedthat no help of any sort was really forthcoming in the face of these prob-lems. However, union members in both countries were definitely muchless pessimistic in this respect.

In Hungary, unionized respondents felt that unions were the bestoption in cases of violation of a safety code or collective agreement.However, when the problem concerned unpaid wages, a majority of allworkers surveyed (including union members) felt that the legal routethrough the courts was the better option. Amongst non-unionizedrespondents, a majority favoured going to the union when a safety codewas violated, though a large number also opted for going to court orto a government agency. About 32 per cent were likely to take their

16 This question was not asked in the PSS conducted in Brazil.17 The preference expressed in Bangladesh for participating in a demonstration was quite

marked and can probably be explained by the processions and hartals that are common featuresof any protest in Dacca.


complaint on violation of a safety code or collective agreement to theunion, though a much greater proportion (about 45 per cent) preferredto seek redress for violations of collective agreements in court. In casesof non-payment of wages, a majority of non-unionized workers optedfor going to court (57.2 per cent).

It may be argued that non-unionized workers are more likely toturn to unions if there is a union in their workplace. This hypothesis canbe verified only in the case of Hungary, where the PSS asked whethera union was present in the workplace, regardless of whether therespondent belonged to a union. Table 11 contrasts the opinions of non-unionized respondents in this respect according to whether or not aunion was present in their workplace. As expected, the presence of aunion encouraged workers to take grievances to it, whether or not theywere union members. As many as 40 per cent of the non-unionizedworkers said they would take a grievance concerning violation of a

Table 10. Bangladesh, Hungary and Tanzania: Respondents’ preferences onaction to express dissatisfaction with employers, by union membership(per cent)

Preferred action Bangladesh Hungary Tanzania

Violatedsafetycode

Violatedagreement

3-monthwagearrears

Violatedsafetycode

Violatedagreement

Violatedsafetycode

Violatedagreement

Unionized workers

Strike 2.7 2.7 6.9 1.0 2.2 2.4 0.0

Go to union 59.5 56.8 37.1 53.8 50.9 52.4 41.9

Have meeting/demonstrate 29.7 27.0 2.7 4.4 2.1 4.8 4.7

Go to court 8.1 13.5 45.4 15.6 32.5 21.4 39.5

Go to govt. agency 0.0 0.0 7.2 23.4 9.5 11.9 7.0

Other 0.0 0.0 2.2 1.1 2.0 4.8 4.7

Do nothing 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 2.4 2.3

N 37 37 111 112 110 42 43

Non-unionized workers

Strike 1.2 1.6 5.6 3.1 2.9 2.3 2.3

Go to union 19.7 15.6 16.6 32.1 32.7 2.3 4.7

Have meeting/demonstrate 30.7 30.7 3.6 4.2 2.6 4.7 4.7

Go to court 21.3 25.4 57.2 27.2 44.6 18.6 39.5

Go to govt. agency 1.2 1.6 12.2 25.8 12.0 39.5 23.3

Other 0.0 0.0 2.8 2.3 1.7 14.0 9.3

Do nothing 24.6 23.8 2.1 5.3 3.6 18.6 16.3

N 244 244 461 445 434 43 43

Source: PSS data.


safety code to the union, if there was a union in the workplace. One cantherefore conclude that, though non-unionized workers were not aslikely as union members to turn to unions, when there was one present,they were willing to make use of it.18

Conclusion and policy implicationsThis article set out to examine issues relating to voice representa-

tion through unions in Bangladesh, Brazil, Hungary and Tanzania,based on the PSSs conducted there. It found that a relatively small pro-portion of wage and salaried workers interviewed in these surveys wereunion members and that these were more likely to be male, older, rela-tively better educated, and working in the formal sector. Women,younger workers, less educated workers and those working in the infor-mal sector — groups already at a disadvantage in the labour market —were less likely to be represented through unions. It also found that,compared with their non-unionized counterparts, union members fared

18 Levison, Anker and Ritter, 2001.

Table 11. Hungary: Non-unionized respondents’ preferences on action to expressdissatisfaction with employers (per cent)

Preferred action 3-month wagearrears

Violatedsafety code

Violatedagreement

Non-unionized workers, union in workplace

Strike 4.2 2.8 2.2

Go to union 27.6 40.6 38.5

Have a meeting 4.7 6.0 3.1

Go to court 50.1 27.4 44.5

Go to govt. agency 11.6 19.8 8.5

Other 1.8 1.4 1.2

Do nothing 0.0 2.0 1.9

N 150 147 146

Non-unionized workers, no union in workplace

Strike 6.8 3.6 3.8

Go to union 9.2 23.6 25.0

Have a meeting 4.0 3.3 2.8

Go to court 62.1 27.0 48.3

Go to govt. agency 11.8 31.8 13.1

Other 4.2 4.0 2.7

Do nothing 1.8 6.6 4.4

N 216 206 200

Source: PSS data.


better in terms of wage level and wage regularity. When other labourmarket characteristics (such as sex, education, experience and contractpermanence) were controlled for, the union effect on wages disap-peared in Hungary, but continued to be statistically significant in Ban-gladesh, Brazil and Tanzania. Furthermore, when a variable controllingfor informality was introduced, the union effect on wages disappearedin Tanzania as well. Compared with non-unionized workers, unionmembers did enjoy some wage-related advantages, but much of thiswas attributable to the fact that union members are drawn from rela-tively more secure labour market segments in the formal economy.

Membership of a union is a necessary — but not a sufficient —condition for voice representation security. Also important are atti-tudes towards unions, and trust in unions as credible vehicles forworkers’ representation. The PSS data show that under a half of theunion members surveyed in Brazil, Hungary and Tanzania, and an evenlower proportion of the non-unionized workers surveyed, had a posi-tive attitude towards unions, or agreed that unions representedworkers’ rights adequately. This obviously calls into question both therepresentativeness and legitimacy of unions, from the workers’ per-spective. Again, Bangladesh is an exception: the positive attitudetowards trade unions in Bangladesh complements the positive unioneffect on wages there. But these thrive amidst very low levels of union-ization, large-scale informal employment, and denial (until fairlyrecently) of the right to organize in the garment industry. However, thePSSs also found that, when safety codes were violated or collectiveagreements not respected, a substantial proportion of union membersin Bangladesh, Hungary and Tanzania were likely to turn to the unionfor help and advice. In Hungary, it was also clear that a non-unionizedworker was likely to go to the union regarding these problems whenthere was a union at the workplace, whether or not he/she belonged tothe union. The need for unions as the credible institutions to helpensure respect for workers’ rights and benefits can therefore hardly bedoubted.

As noted by many authors, the trade union movement faces a chal-lenge of legitimacy in the current economic and political scenario.Macroeconomic instability, industrial restructuring, flexibility and highunemployment rates have undermined union efforts to organize andbargain, and their ability to focus on a common set of interests of anincreasingly divergent workforce. The challenge that trade unions faceis even greater because growth in the labour force in the coming yearsis likely to be concentrated in the very groups that are excluded fromunion membership: women, younger workers, and informal sectorworkers. If decent work is to be enjoyed by all workers, then tradeunions will need to reach all these types of worker, or new forms ofvoice representation will have to be devised for the vulnerable groups


which unions cannot reach. This may require strategic alliances withmembership-based organizations working in the informal economy, aswell as with community bodies and other social movements, because inan era of globalization and flexibility, the traditional means employedby trade unions to organize and mobilize workers are likely to becomegradually more difficult to use. To be really effective in their role as thevehicle of workers’ collective voice, and to retain or regain their legit-imacy, trade unions will need to establish that they exist for the benefitof all workers, and to foster trust in their credibility as the institutionsensuring workers’ voice representation.

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Attitudes towards trade unions in Bangladesh, Brazil, Hungary and Tanzania

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