1 | P a g e

Attitudes to, and perceptions of, the Iraq and Afghanistan missions amongst the British public and UK Armed Forces

Rachael Gribble, Simon Wessely, Susan Klein, David A. Alexander, Christopher Dandeker & Nicola T

Fear Abstract: Despite the UK’s involvement in missions in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade, there is little robust evidence on British public opinion of the UK Armed Forces’ personnel and their missions or how Service personnel perceive public support. Support for the UK Armed Forces and their missions is important for legitimising government-led military action, sustaining the morale of deployed troops and justifying military budgets. This paper aims to measure British public support for the UK Armed Forces and compare attitudes to the recent missions in Iraq and Afghanistan using data from the 2011 British Social Attitudes survey. Perceptions of support amongst members of the UK Armed Forces deployed on these missions are also examined, using data from a large epidemiological cohort of serving and ex-serving UK military personnel and comparisons made between the two deployments. Where appropriate, the opinions of Service personnel and the public are compared. Overall, we found more similarities than differences in public and Armed Forces personnel opinions of the two missions. There were some divergences concerning perceptions of military support for Service personnel returning from operations and reports of abusive behaviour between the military and some civilians in wider society. Keywords: Public opinion, UK military, UK Armed Forces, Iraq, Afghanistan

Rachael Gribble is a Research Assistant, King’s Centre for Military Health Research (KCMHR) at King’s College London, Simon Wessely is Professor of Psychological Medicine, Head of the Department of Psychological Medicine, and Director, KCMHR, Susan Klein is a Professor of Trauma Research and Director, Aberdeen Centre for Trauma Research, Institute for Health & Welfare Research, Robert Gordon University, David A. Alexander is an Emeritus Professor of Mental Health, Former Director, Aberdeen Centre for Trauma Research, Institute for Health & Welfare Research, Robert Gordon University, Christopher Dandeker is Professor of Military Sociology, Department of War Studies, and Co-Director KCMHR and Nicola Fear is a Reader in Military Epidemiology, and Co-Director of KCMHR.

2 | P a g e

Introduction The attitudes of the British public towards the Iraq and Afghanistan mission have been widely debated within media, political, social and military circles since the first possibility of UK involvement in 2003. Most UK research informing these debates has been conducted via opinion polls (Ipsos Mori. 2001; Ipsos Mori. 2007; Angus Reid Global Monitor 2008; ICM Research 2008), many of which are conducted on behalf of media outlets, with their own agendas. Independent, large scale representative surveys are rare. Few UK based studies have attempted to compare public attitudes to the two missions, with most focusing on demographic determinants of support (Clements 2011; Scotto 2011). In addition, there is little research on the perceptions of UK Armed Forces personnel towards the missions they carry out, despite the fact that military opinions on such matters have become influential factors in defence policy following the debates initiated by General Sir Richard (now Lord) Dannatt1 and Major General Gordon Messenger2. Public support of government-led military action plays an important role in establishing the political legitimacy of missions (Canan-Sokullu 2012), maintaining military effectiveness (Szayna 2007), sustaining the morale of deployed troops (Dixon 2000) and justifying the budgets required to resource the military (Edmunds 2012). As a result of veteran experiences after the Vietnam War, political and military leaders have been concerned about the potential of low public support for missions to result in the stigmatisation of personnel after they return home (Borus 1973; Boman 1982; Yager 1984). Yet despite the UK being involved in the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan for more than a decade, evidence on what exactly the British public thinks of the missions and the personnel involved is lacking. The comparability of public and military attitudes is also an important measure of the ‘civil-military gap’; a theory suggesting serious implications for military effectiveness, respect, support and trust between the government, society and the military if attitudes between these groups are too divergent (Feaver 2001; Strachan 2003). This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by providing high-quality empirical evidence on the attitudes and perceptions to the Iraq and Afghanistan missions amongst the British public and UK Armed Forces. Data from the British Social Attitudes survey (NatCen Social Research 2012) will be used to examine public understanding and perceptions of the Iraq and Afghanistan missions. Our theory that public beliefs about the missions may influence estimation of the number of UK military casualties will be tested. The beliefs of UK Armed Forces personnel about their roles during deployment and their perceptions of military and public support on their return from deployment will be analysed using data from the King’s Centre for Military Health Research’s (KCMHR) health and wellbeing military cohort study (Hotopf 2006; Fear 2010). As it is thought that these factors may influence each other, this relationship will be tested. Where appropriate, the attitudes of military personnel and the public will be compared as a measure the extent to which they may share similar perceptions and attitudes.

3 | P a g e

Methods This study compares data from the British general public, gathered via the 2011 British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey (NatCen Social Research 2012),with that from members of the UK Armed Forces, using the King’s Centre for Military Health Research’s (KCMHR) health and wellbeing military cohort study (Hotopf 2006; Fear 2010). British Social Attitudes Survey The BSA uses a multi-stage design to select a representative sample of adults aged 18 years and over living in the UK. For the 2011 BSA questionnaire, KCMHR, in conjunction with colleagues at the Aberdeen Centre for Trauma Research and NatCen Social Research, developed a module on British public attitudes towards the UK Armed Forces and the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Data were collected from June to September 2011 by fieldworkers who carried out face to face computer-assisted interviews and by self-completion questionnaires. Overall, a total of 3,311 British adults responded to the survey, representing a response rate of 54%, with 47% completing the self-completion sections. During the interview, respondents were randomly allocated by computer to answer questions relating to the missions in Iraq or Afghanistan. A total of 1,673 were assigned to the Iraq group and 1,638 to the Afghanistan group. King’s Centre for Military Health (KCMHR) cohort The KCMHR military cohort is a two-phase survey of UK Armed Forces personnel established in 2003 to examine the health and wellbeing of those deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan (Hotopf 2006; Fear 2010). In brief, initial recruitment included full-time serving, ex-Service and reserve (oversampled with a 2:1 ratio compared with regulars) personnel deployed to the first phase (the war-fighting period) of the Iraq war between January and April 2003 (n=4722) and those serving but not deployed during that time (n=5550). A response rate of 59% was achieved. Participants for phase 2 included those followed up from the initial study (n=9395), a sample of personnel deployed to Afghanistan between April 2006 and April 2007 (n=1789) and a replenishment sample of those who had joined the Armed Forces since 2003 (n=6628). The overall response rate was 56% (n=9986). Non-responders were followed up by post, base visits and phone tracing where possible (Fear 2010). These new samples were incorporated to ensure that the cohort structure represented that of the UK Armed Forces as a whole and to take into account military operations in Afghanistan. Data were collected between November 2007 and September 2009 using voluntary self-completed postal questionnaires covering social and military demographics, self-reported health status and experiences during and after deployment. 4,986 UK Armed Forces personnel who responded at phase 2 had been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. Of these, 2,680 had most recently served in Iraq and 2,306 in Afghanistan. Outcome measures To measure understanding and support of the missions, the BSA asked a range of questions about the participants’ perceptions of the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan (purpose, success, right to go, estimates and acceptability of military deaths). Participants were also asked about their support for returning military personnel, whether they had ‘had a go’ at a member of the UK Armed Forces and how well they thought the military supported Armed Forces personnel on their return. The KCMHR cohort covered broadly analogous themes. Beliefs about the contributions of tasks during deployment to the local population or to the mission as a whole were used to approximate awareness and perceived success of the mission. Perceptions of support were measured via questions covering military support on return, public understanding of their deployment experiences, public support of the missions during deployment and hostile experiences with members of the public since their return.

4 | P a g e

Analysis Data were analysed using weighted survey commands to take account of non-response and sampling strategies within the two studies. Predictors of non-response for the BSA largely concerned gaining access to properties (government office region, dwelling type/condition, barriers to entry and population density)(NatCen Social Research 2012). Non-response in the KCMHR cohort was predicted by gender, age, rank, engagement type (regular vs. reservist) and the sample they were recruited to (Fear 2010). Data from the studies are analysed and displayed according to mission assigned or last deployment unless indicated and adjusted for potential confounders. For the BSA, these were gender, age and education. For the KCMHR cohort, these were gender, age, education, rank, service and engagement type. Both unadjusted and adjusted results are reported. The majority of the BSA data were analysed using multi-nominal regression to account for multiple options in responses and frequency tables. ‘Agree strongly’ and ‘Agree’ were combined, as were ‘Disagree Strongly’ and Disagree’ and compared against ‘Neither agree nor disagree’. ‘Don’t Know’ and ‘Refusal’ were excluded from analysis but generally comprised less than 5% of initial responses. Understanding of the missions’ purposes amongst the British public were analysed using multi-response functions of SPSS© version 15.0. To analyse public estimates of the number of UK Armed Forces deaths during the missions, official Ministry of Defence figures (Ministry of Defence. 2009; Ministry of Defence. 2012) were used to calculate three categories; ‘Under-estimated’, ‘Accurate’ and ‘Over-estimated’. Accurate responses were considered to be those within a range of ±50 deaths of the official estimate, rounded to the nearest hundred. The accurate estimate for Iraq was therefore calculated to be 200, with a range of 150-250 and 400 for Afghanistan (350-450). Differences in the perceptions amongst UK Armed Forces personnel deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan were examined using logistic regression. Demographic differences between the deployment groups were accounted for by the inclusion of gender, age and service in unadjusted analysis models. Further adjustments for educational attainment, rank and status did not alter multi-nominal odds ratios greatly and are not reported. Data are available from the authors. Unless specified, all analysis was conducted using STATA© version 11.2. Statistical significance was defined as p<0.05. Socio-demographic distributions of our two samples are described, followed by a presentation of multi-nominal odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals estimating the difference in opinions regarding the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Percentages and multi-nominal odds ratios are weighted, while cell counts remain unweighted.

5 | P a g e

Results Table 1 shows the distribution of demographic variables for BSA and cohort respondents by mission. The BSA sample was similar across both mission groups in terms of gender, age and education. Military personnel who had last been deployed to Afghanistan were less likely to be female, aged between 25 and 44 years and serve in the Royal Navy but were more than 9 times likely to serve in the Royal Marines. Table 1: Demographic profile of BSA and UK Armed Forces samples

Demographics Number responded (%)* OR (95% CI)

British general public Iraq (N=1673)

Afghanistan (N=1638)

Gender Male Female

739 (50) 934 (50)

711 (47) 927 (53)

1.0

1.11 (0.95 – 1.29)

Age at last birthday (in years) 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+

110 (12) 243 (15) 300 (18) 285 (17) 280 (15) 454 (22)

114 (12) 285 (18) 299 (18) 275 (18) 261 (15) 402 (20)

1.0

1.13 (0.80 – 1.60) 0.93 (0.66 – 1.30) 0.98 (0.70 – 1.38) 0.90 (0.64 – 1.26) 0.85 (0.62 – 1.18)

Education No qualification O level/CSE Higher education/A level Graduates

465 (25) 408 (26) 405 (28) 301 (21)

463 (27) 366 (25) 393 (27) 309 (21)

1.0

0.89 (0.72 – 1.10) 0.92 (0.74 – 1.13) 0.93 (0.74 – 1.16)

UK Armed Forces personnel Iraq (N=2680)

Afghanistan (N=2306)

OR (95% CI)

Gender Male Female

2417 (92)

263 (8)

2137 (94)

169 (6)

1.0

0.66 (0.51 – 0.84)

Age at Jan 12, 2008 (in years) 18-24 25-34 35-44 45+

552 (16)

1171 (45) 767 (32) 190 (7)

482 (19) 962 (43) 672 (31) 190 (7)

1.0

0.79 (0.67-0.94) 0.80 (0.66-0.96) 0.84 (0.64-1.12)

Education No qualifications O levels/CSEs A levels/HNDs Degree/Postgraduate

196 (8)

1065 (44) 831 (33) 484 (16)

137 (7)

836 (40) 791 (36) 486 (18)

1.0

1.06 (0.80 – 1.41) 1.29 (0.97 – 1.71) 1.32 (0.97 – 1.79)

Rank Officer NCO Other rank

530 (16)

1559 (65) 591 (19)

497 (18)

1259 (61) 550 (21)

1.0

0.84 (0.71 – 1.00) 1.00 (0.82 – 1.22)

Service Royal Navy Royal Marines Army Royal Air Force

198 (8) 26 (1)

1969 (74) 487 (17)

76 (3)

188 (7) 1581 (70) 461 (19)

0.47 (0.34 – 0.65)

9.36 (5.73 – 15.29) 1.0

1.17 (0.98 – 1.39)

Status Regular Reserve

2454 (94)

226 (6)

2032 (95)

274 (5)

1.0

0.93 (0.74 – 1.18)

*Iraq used as baseline. Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. Percentages and multi-nominal odds ratios are weighted to take account of sampling fractions. Denominators may vary as respondents did not complete all relevant questions.

6 | P a g e

British general public To measure the British public’s understanding of the missions, BSA respondents were asked to select the two purposes they considered to be the main reasons for the deployment of UK Armed Forces to Iraq and Afghanistan (Table 2). Ensuring Western oil supplies and preventing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction were considered to be the main reasons for deployment to Iraq, while terrorism and increasing political stability were believed to be the purposes for Afghanistan. Table 2: British public’s perceptions of the purposes of the Iraq and Afghanistan missions

Iraq Afghanistan

Purpose N (%) selecting item as one of two responses*

N (%) selecting item as one of two responses

To protect the UK from the risk of Saddam Hussein’s support of terrorism/ the risk of terrorism

466 (27) 863 (53)

To ensure Western oil supplies/gain access to oil and mineral resources

770 (47) 377 (24)

To make Iraq/Afghanistan a stable country 281 (17) 797 (50)

To help the US and our NATO allies 327 (21) 362 (23)

To prevent Iraq from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

546 (32) --

To make Iraq/Afghanistan a successful democracy 98 (7) 269 (16)

To make the Middle East a more stable region 228 (14) --

To help the war on drugs -- 131 (8)

To prevent Iraq from threatening its neighbours 162 (9) --

To make Iraq/Afghanistan an economic success 27 (2) 57 (3)

*Totals and percentages are combined from the two purpose questions and will sum to greater than N/100%. Unsolicited responses, Other, Don’t Know, Refusal and non-response at the second purpose question were not included (Iraq n=441, Afghanistan n=420).

A large percentage of respondents disagreed with UK involvement in either mission (Table 3). A small association between lower disagreement with UK participation and those assigned to the Afghanistan group remained after adjustment (p=0.001). Perceived success was also slightly higher for this mission after adjustment (p=0.02). 92% of people had not taken part in any activities supporting or opposing either mission but a moderate association was found between Afghanistan and being less likely to take part in activities disputing this campaign.

7 | P a g e

Table 3: British public’s beliefs about the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan Number responded (%)* OR (95% CI)† Adj. OR (95% CI)‡

Variable Iraq (N=1673)

Afghanistan (N=1638)

Right to go to Iraq /Afghanistan Agree Neither agree/disagree Disagree

383 (24) 269 (17) 983 (59)

460 (30) 324 (20) 805 (50)

1.00 (0.79 – 1.28)

1.0 0.68 (0.55-0.85)

1.01 (0.79-1.30)

1.0 0.69 (0.55-0.86)

Mission achieved/is achieving success Agree Neither agree/disagree Disagree

427 (27) 543 (34) 657 (39)

454 (30) 513 (31) 626 (39)

1.20 (0.98 – 1.47) 1.0

1.10 (0.91 – 1.31)

1.27 (1.03-1.56) 1.0

1.14 (0.95-1.38)

Taken part in activities to … the mission Support Not taken part Oppose

59 (4) 1535 (92)

69 (5)

59 (6) 1501 (92)

33 (2)

1.64 (1.13 – 2.38) 1.0

0.39 (0.25 – 0.63)

1.59 (1.08-2.34) 1.0

0.39 (0.25-0.62)

*Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. Percentages and multi-nominal odds ratios are weighted to take account of sampling fractions. Don’t Know, Refusal not included (n=10-49). Denominators may vary as respondents did not complete all relevant questions. †Iraq/Neither used as baseline. ‡Adjusted for gender, age, education.

A large proportion agreed that they supported returning military personnel despite their views of the mission (Table 4). The proportion reporting no support for returning personnel was higher in the Afghanistan group but was still only 3%. Only 2% of the public reported having “had a go” at a member of the UK Armed Forces. Perceptions of military support for returning personnel were poor, with less than a quarter agreeing that the assistance provided was sufficient. Compared with the Iraq group, a lower proportion in the Afghanistan group agreed (p=0.05) that veterans were well supported by the military, while a higher percentage disagreed (p=0.06). Both were borderline associations. Table 4: British public’s perceptions of support

Number responded (%)* OR (95% CI)† Adj. OR (95% CI)‡

Variable Iraq (N=1673)

Afghanistan (N=1638)

Support returning personnel despite views of mission Agree Neither agree/disagree Disagree

1572 (94) 74 (5) 12 (1)

1496 (92) 85 (6) 39 (3)

0.85 (0.58 – 1.23) 1.0

2.86 (1.23 – 6.67)

0.83 (0.56-1.22) 1.0

3.04 (1.22-7.61)

Had a go at member/s of UK Forces Yes No

34 (3)

1395 (97)

25 (2)

1356 (98)

0.69 (0.39 – 1.24)

1.0

0.82 (0.45-1.49)

1.0

Forces personnel well supported by military on their return Agree Neither agree/disagree Disagree

365 (24) 511 (31) 761 (45)

301 (20) 469 (30) 842 (50)

0.86 (0.69 – 1.07) 1.0

1.17 (0.98 – 1.39)

0.80 (0.63-1.00) 1.0

1.19 (0.99-1.43)

*Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. Percentages and multi-nominal odds ratios are weighted to take account of sampling fractions. Don’t Know, Refusal not included (n=15-257). Denominators may vary as respondents did not complete all relevant questions. †Iraq used as baseline. ‡Adjusted for gender, age, education.

Most people did not correctly estimate the number of UK military fatalities, with less than a quarter of responses falling with the accurate range (Table 5). There was a borderline association between

8 | P a g e

Iraq and an over-estimation of the number of deaths (p=0.08). Conversely, the Afghanistan group had significantly higher odds of under-estimating military casualties. This remained after adjustment. Table 5: British public’s estimates of UK military casualties

Number responded (%)* OR (95% CI)† Adj. OR (95% CI)‡

Overall Iraq (N=1673)

Afghanistan (N=1638)

Estimate of UK casualties Under-estimated Accurate Over-estimated

130 (11) 300 (24) 853 (66)

600 (43) 252 (17) 520 (39)

5.66 (4.28 – 7.49) 1.0

0.82 (0.66 – 1.02)

5.58 (4.18-7.45) 1.0

0.81 (0.64-1.02)

*Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. Percentages and multi-nominal odds ratios are weighted to take account of sampling fractions. Don’t Know, Refusal not included (n=656). Denominators may vary as respondents did not complete all relevant questions. †Iraq/accurate used as baseline. ‡Adjusted for gender, age, education.

To test our theory regarding the possible effect of British public attitudes towards the campaigns on perceptions of UK military casualties, we examined the accuracy of UK military casualty estimates in relation to whether people believed the UK was right to become involved in the missions (Table 6) (Pearson’s χ2 p=0.009). There was a higher proportion of disagreement (55%) with the missions than agreement (45%) among those who over-estimated military deaths. Conversely, those who under-estimated casualties were more likely to think the UK involvement was right (31%) than not (25%). Table 6: British public’s estimates of UK military casualties and support for the missions Estimate of UK casualties The UK was right to go to Iraq/Afghanistan (%)*

Agree (N=712) Neither (N=465) Disagree (N=1445)

Under-estimated 219 (31) 135 (30) 365 (25)

Accurate 167 (24) 82 (16) 298 (20)

Over-estimated 326 (45) 248 (54) 782 (55)

*Data is combined from Iraq and Afghanistan groups. Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. Percentages are weighted to take account of sampling fractions. Don’t Know, Refusal not included (n=689). Denominators may vary as respondents did not complete all relevant questions.

UK Armed Forces personnel Most military personnel felt that their tasks had successfully contributed to the local population and the mission (Table 7). Deployment to Afghanistan was weakly associated with being more likely to think tasks had been of benefit in both areas. Table 7: UK Armed Forces personnel understanding of the missions Number responded (%)* OR (95% CI)†

Tasks contributed to: Iraq (N=2680)

Afghanistan (N=2306)

Local population Yes No

1295 (52) 1207 (48)

1296 (59) 867 (41)

1.34 (1.16 – 1.55)

1.0

Mission as a whole Yes No

2220 (85) 373 (15)

1998 (89) 230 (11)

1.43 (1.15 – 1.78)

1.0

*Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. Percentages and multi-nominal odds ratios are weighted to take account of sampling fractions. Other, Don’t Know, Refusal not included (n=78-178). Denominators may vary as respondents did not complete all relevant questions. †Iraq/no used as baseline. Model includes gender, age, service.

9 | P a g e

A similar proportion of personnel from both deployment groups felt they had been well supported by the military on their return and that the public understood what they had been through (Table 8). Those deployed to Afghanistan were twice as likely to believe the public had supported the mission and less likely to report hostility from the public, although this was a weak association (p=0.001). Both associations persisted after adjustment. Table 8: UK Armed Forces personnel perceptions of support Number responded (%)* OR (95% CI)†

Perceptions of support Iraq (N=2680)

Afghanistan (N=2306)

Military supported me well on my return Yes No

1755 (68) 807 (32)

1535 (71) 656 (29)

1.12 (0.96 – 1.31) 1.0

People understood my experiences Yes No

1541 (59) 1031 (41)

1312 (58) 886 (42)

0.89 (0.77 – 1.03) 1.0

Public supportive of the mission Yes No

968 (37)

1610 (63)

1311 (58) 907 (42)

2.42 (2.10 – 2.80)

1.0

Someone has had a go at me Yes No

563 (21)

2034 (79)

398 (18)

1818 (82)

0.75 (0.63 – 0.89)

1.0

*Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. Percentages and multi-nominal odds ratios are weighted to take account of sampling fractions. Other, Don’t Know, Refusal not included (n=78-178). Denominators may vary as respondents did not complete all relevant questions. †Iraq/no used as baseline. Model includes gender, age, service.

We hypothesised that UK Armed Forces personnel who thought their tasks had contributed to the aims of the wider mission may have different perceptions of support than those who did not (Table 9). Service members who thought their tasks had contributed to the local population were nearly twice as likely to believe that the military supported them on return and that the public supported the mission. No differences were seen regarding perceptions of public understanding of military experiences or experiences of civilian hostility. There was a borderline association for believing that people understood their experiences (p=0.09) A similar pattern was found amongst personnel who felt their tasks contributed to the mission as a whole. Those who believed in the contribution of their roles to the mission were twice as likely to feel supported by the military and more than three times as likely to think the public supported the mission. They were also less likely to believe that the public understood their experiences and reported lower levels of hostility.

10 | P a g e

Table 9: UK Armed Forces personnel beliefs about contribution of tasks and perceptions of support Tasks contributed to the local populations

No. responded (%)* (N=4986)

Perceptions of support No Yes OR (95% CI)†

Military supported me well on my return Yes No

1245 (61) 775 (39)

1905 (76) 632 (24)

1.92 (1.64-2.24)

1.0

People understood my experiences Yes No

1169 (57) 862 (43)

1594 (62) 944 (38)

1.13 (0.98-1.31)

1.0

Public support of mission Yes No

760 (35)

1286 (65)

1415 (53) 1139 (47)

2.10 (1.82-2.42)

1.0

Someone has had a go at me Yes No

391 (19)

1658 (81)

550 (21)

2015 (79)

1.06 (0.88-1.26)

1.0

Tasks contributed to missions as a whole

No. responded (%)* (N=4986)

Perceptions of support No Yes OR (95% CI)†

Military supported me well on my return Yes No

327 (56) 256 (44)

2928 (71) 1194 (29)

2.04 (1.64-2.53)

1.0

People understood my experiences Yes No

401 (68) 188 (32)

2428 (57) 1706 (43)

0.69 (0.55-0.86)

1.0

Public support of mission Yes No

153 (22) 443 (78)

2105 (49) 2050 (51)

3.61 (2.86-4.55)

1.0

Someone has had a go at me Yes No

156 (26) 440 (74)

799 (19)

3370 (81)

0.72 (0.57-0 .91)

1.0

†Data combined from Iraq and Afghanistan deployments. No used as baseline. Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. Percentages and multi-nominal odds ratios are weighted to take account of sampling fractions. Don’t Know, Refusal not included (n=7-96). Denominators may vary as respondents did not complete all relevant questions. †Model includes gender, age, service.

As the BSA and cohort surveys included comparable questions regarding provision of military support on return, public support for the missions and hostility towards military personnel, results from the two samples were compared in order to determine the level of similarity between British public and Armed Forces perceptions in these areas (Table 10). Service members were significantly more likely to agree that the military had provided good levels of support and to report hostile encounters than members of the public. They were also more likely to believe that the public supported the campaigns than the public were to agree with the missions. These associations remained after adjustment.

11 | P a g e

Table 10: Comparison of British public and UK Armed Forces attitudes towards the missions Number responded (%)*

Perceptions of support Public (N=3311)

Armed Forces (N=4986)

OR (95% CI) † Adj. OR (95% CI)‡

Military supportive Yes No

666 (31)

1603 (69)

3290 (68) 1463 (32)

4.88 (4.30-5.53)

1.0

4.02 (3.25-4.98)

1.0

Public support of mission Yes No

843 (33)

1788 (67)

2279 (45) 2517 (55)

1.65 (1.48-1.85)

1.0

1.70 (1.37-2.10)

1.0

Someone has had a go at me Yes No

59 (2)

2751 (98)

961 (20)

3852 (80)

10.05 (7.44-13.57)

1.0

6.65 (4.64-9.52)

1.0

*Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. Percentages and multi-nominal odds ratios are weighted to take account of sampling fractions. Don’t Know, Refusal, Neither not included (n=674-1275). Denominators may vary as respondents did not complete all relevant questions. †BSA used as baseline. ‡Adjusted for gender, age, education, mission (Iraq/Afghanistan).

12 | P a g e

Discussion There are three main findings. First, public perceptions of the purposes of the missions broadly reflect those portrayed by the government and the media. Second, there are more similarities than differences in attitudes towards the missions in both samples. Third, some divergences between British public and UK Armed Forces perceptions were evident in terms of perceived support for returning military personnel and reported hostility towards members of the Services. British general public Public interpretations of the purposes of the missions generally correspond to those communicated by the government and media during the lead up to UK involvement, suggesting that these messages were widely disseminated and understood, with obvious differences between the missions according to the distinct objectives of each campaign. Public perceptions of the purposes of the Afghanistan campaign largely reflect the official objectives of the mission (stabilisation of Afghanistan and protection from terrorism) (107th US Congress. 2001). On the contrary, the official aims of the Iraq campaign (preventing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and protection from terrorism) (Office of the Press Secretary 2003) were thought to be less important purposes among the public than establishing access to oil resources. This cynicism about UK engagement in Iraq is also evident within the Afghanistan group, with almost a quarter of responses considering gaining access to mineral resources to be a reason for the mission, despite these factors never being mentioned in any official capacity. It is possible that the disclosure of the ‘dodgy dossier’ regarding weapons of mass destruction, which Prime Minister Blair had used to increase support for the mission (Humphreys 2005), may have affected public perceptions of the purpose of the Iraq mission. This in turn may have led to cross-contamination of beliefs about the objectives in Afghanistan (Miller 2010). Research suggests that public attitudes towards the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns differ within countries, especially in terms of levels of support and approval (Midford 2006; Burris 2008; Jacobsen 2010). However, our findings show fewer differences between the two missions than expected. Support for UK involvement in either mission was low, as found in other UK studies (Springford 2003; Clements 2011; Scotto 2011), and most did not feel the missions were achieving success. Few members of the public reported taking part in activities supporting or opposing the missions, but this reflects the specific demographics of those who took part in public protests of the missions (Walgrave 2009). We also found that support for veterans of these campaigns was high but that military support for returning personnel was perceived to be insufficient. A small minority admitted verbally or physically abusing a member of the UK Armed Forces. Some differences between the missions were evident. Those assigned to the Afghanistan group were less likely to disagree with UK involvement or take part in activities opposing the mission. This group were also more likely to think the mission was successful. They were also less likely to support returning personnel. However, as these associations were weak reliable conclusions regarding differences in levels of public support for the missions cannot be drawn. What is apparent from these findings is that there has been a plateauing of support for the Afghanistan mission. Opinion polls indicate that while opposition to the war in Iraq was evident from the early stages of the mission (Ipsos Mori. 2007), support was initially high for intervention in Afghanistan (Ipsos Mori. 2001). It has been suggested that public approval of military action is influenced by not only the aims of the campaign but also whether there is a good chance of achieving these particular goals (Eichenberg 2005; Gelpi 2005/6). Given our findings in this regard, it seems plausible that the perceived lack of success of the Afghanistan mission, combined with confusion over the changing objectives and public fatigue from the mission’s duration, may be responsible for the decrease in support (Miller 2010). Additionally, the declining support for Iraq and the increasing costs of UK involvement for a campaign initiated after an attack on US territory may have influenced attitudes towards Afghanistan.

13 | P a g e

One interesting finding was the differences in estimation of military deaths between the two missions. It has been postulated that improved access to, and therefore interest in, information regarding modern military campaigns is a large predictor of accurate estimations, while approval of the mission itself has little impact (Bennett 2009; Myers 2010). Both the Iraq and Afghanistan missions involved the embedding of journalists into UK Armed Forces units, increasing public access to military information as far as was possible given operational security constraints and were similar in terms of potential public interest and extensive campaign length. So why are there large differences in the estimation of the number of military deaths? Gelpi et al (Gelpi 2005/6) suggest that either the perceived success of a mission or perceptions of the moral justifications for the missions play a major role in the accurate estimation of military deaths. With only a weak association found between the Afghanistan group and perceiving the mission to be achieving success, and no reliable evidence for increased approval of the Afghanistan mission, the first proposition is not supported by the data. We did, however, see a relationship between support or opposition to the missions and estimation of military deaths, indicating a relationship between the acceptability of a mission to the British public and their estimation of casualties. If the perceived objectives of a mission are viewed with suspicion, as suggested with regard to the purpose of the Iraq mission, this may result in an increasing negative opinion towards military action that is seen as unwarranted or needless. The costs of being involved in such a mission, including human fatalities, are then more likely to be over-estimated. Conversely, a mission whose purposes are more palatable to the public, such as Afghanistan, may be viewed more positively, causing a collective “switching off” about the possible human toll. Missions with a humanitarian purpose may also be more able to withstand a high number of casualties before support begins to decrease (Burk 1999). UK Armed Forces personnel It is encouraging that most personnel feel pride in their tasks and reassuring that perceptions of military support and public understanding of their experiences in high. A similar proportion of personnel reported hostile encounters with members of the public as reported elsewhere (Ashcroft 2012). Differences were evident by deployment. Those deployed to Afghanistan were more positive overall, with a higher sense of purpose in their roles and a higher likelihood of perceiving public support as being positive during deployment. What the source of this difference of opinion might be is not immediately apparent from the data as levels of public support between the missions do not differ greatly. However, there may be some link with the vehement public opposition to the war in Iraq, as expressed by the large numbers of people in the UK who took part in the global day of protest in 20033. Reports of hostile encounters with members of the public were also marginally lower in this group. As we hypothesised, we found differences in perceptions of support between Service personnel who believed that the tasks they performed during deployment had contributed to the local population or the mission and those who did not. The direction of this relationship is unknown – does an increased belief in deployment tasks lead to more positive beliefs about support, or vice versa? These two groups may in fact experience similar levels of hostility, but having a sense of pride or satisfaction in their performance might protect against incidents of antagonism. Personnel in this group were also likely to report that the public had understood their experiences, which may suggest that perceptions of support from military and civilian sources might be more important for the morale of deployed personnel than public understanding. Comparison of British public and UK Armed Forces personnel attitudes Service personnel were more likely to feel that they had good support from the military than members of the public thought they had received. This difference may be a reflection of the widening social distance between military and civil society, as fewer members of the public have close contact with Armed Forces personnel (McCartney 2010), or may arise as an unintended effect of continuing media and charity reports about the lack of available military resources for veterans.

14 | P a g e

To further complicate this comparison, the “military” that the public or members of the Services are referring to might not be the same organisation. Service members may look to their regiment for support on their return, whereas the public may consider the Ministry of Defence to be responsible. There was also a large discrepancy between the proportion of Service personnel reporting hostility and the percentage of the general public who admit to doing so. Our suggestion that this arises from an over-sensitivity of Armed Forces personnel due to the highly politicised nature of these missions was not supported by the data, as those who did not believe in their tasks were no more likely to report hostility than those who did. It seems more likely, despite efforts to reduce bias via self-completion, that members of the British public under-reported abuse of members of the UK Armed Forces, either as a result of the social stigma associated with confessing to such an act or because people do not feel that their actions constitute abuse, even if construed as such by Service personnel. Although it is hard to judge the accuracy of such reports from such surveys, media reports of recent incidents of aggression towards Service personnel assisting at the 2012 London Olympics suggest that such events may be becoming more frequent4. Public support was also perceived more positively amongst Service personnel than was reported by members of the public. However, it is difficult to draw reliable conclusions from these data as there is a large gap between the dates of data collection, which may affect the comparability of results. Strengths and limitations This study is the first to use robust methodologies to examine British public attitudes towards and perceptions of support during the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is also the first UK study to determine and compare Armed Forces personnel’s and the general public’s perceptions about the missions. Our results should, however, be considered in light of certain limitations. Caution should be applied to the comparison of opinions of military personnel to those of the general public as the questions used were not identical and may therefore be measuring slightly different concepts. The two surveys were also conducted at different time points and while this will not affect the findings for each particular group, it may hinder the comparability of the findings between the two samples. As with any research, it is possible there are potential confounders that we have not adjusted for in our analysis. However, we are confident that we have accounted for those considered to be the most influential in public attitudes of the Armed Forces. Future research should attempt to address the limitations of this study by running concurrent surveys of the opinions and perceptions of UK Armed Forces personnel and the British general public towards defence issues. It might then be possible to study how public support for a mission, and the Service members deployed on it, interacts with Armed Forces personnel perceptions of the same. More explicit questioning could also be used to determine what the British public consider to constitute abusive behaviour towards members of the UK Armed Forces and why. Implications These findings may have implications for civil-military relations and defence and foreign policy issues in the UK. Although the handover of security to Afghan forces is scheduled to take place by the end of 2014, the lack of public support for the continuing mission may have repercussions for the legitimacy of the mission. It is also likely that the current levels of high support for ex-service personnel is due to their involvement in the missions, but this may be short-lived once UK forces have withdrawn from Afghanistan, potentially leading to greater levels of indifference and more instances of hostility. Civil-military relations within the UK may potentially be at risk if perceptions of public support amongst the Armed Forces are low and if the difference between public and Service personnel reports of abuse is not addressed. There may also be political consequences, as the recent surprise win in Bradford West by the Respect party, who included complete UK withdrawal from Afghanistan as a major manifesto issue5,

15 | P a g e

might suggest. The lack of public belief in military support for veterans may have negative implications for reputation of the Ministry of Defence. Charitable donations may be at risk if the public feel they are financing services that should be provided by either by the Services themselves or the Ministry of Defence, especially in the current economic climate, and charities themselves may come under fire, as seen in the recent attack on Help for Heroes6. Conclusions Overall, we found more similarities than differences in both public and Armed Forces personnel opinion towards the two missions. Where we were able to compare these two groups, we found some divergences in perceptions regarding military support and reports of abusive behaviour. This study fills an important gap in the literature regarding public attitudes towards the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq and Service personnel perceptions of support. Acknowledgements Liz Clery, NatCen Social Research helped with questionnaire development, pilot sessions and data queries. Author contributions Design of questions and pilot: SK, DA, NF, CD Analysis strategy: NF, CD, SW, RG Analysis of data and writing of the paper: RG Edited the paper: NF, CD, SW, SK, DA

16 | P a g e

References 107th US Congress. (2001). "Public Law 40 - Joint Resolution for Authorization for Use of Military

Force in Afghanistan." Retrieved 25 July, 2012, from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ40/html/PLAW-107publ40.htm.

Angus Reid Global Monitor. (2008). "Britons Object to More Troops in Afghanistan." Retrieved 9 August, 2012, from http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/34555/britons_object_to_more_troops_in_afghanistan/.

Ashcroft, M. (2012). The Armed Forces & Society: The military in Britain – through the eyes of Service personnel, employers and the public. London.

Bennett, S., Flickinger, RS. (2009). "Americans’ Knowledge of U.S. Military Deaths in Iraq,April 2004 to April 2008." Armed Forces & Society 35(3): 587-604.

Boman, B. (1982). "The Vietnam Veteran Ten Years On." Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 16(3): 107-127.

Borus, J. (1973). "Reentry I. Adjustment Issues Facing the Vietnam Returnee." Archives of General Psychiatry 28(4): 501-506.

Burk, J. (1999). "Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis " Political Science Quarterly 114(1): 53-78.

Burris, V. (2008). "From Vietnam to Iraq: Continuity and Change in Between-Group Differences in Support for Military Action." Social Problems 55(4): 443-479.

Canan-Sokullu, E. (2012). "Domestic Support for Wars: A Cross-Case and Cross-Country Analysis." Armed Forces & Society 38(1): 117-141.

Clements, B. (2011). "Examining Public Attitudes towards Recent Foreign Policy Issues: Britain’s Involvement in the Iraq and Afghanistan " Politics 31(2): 63-71.

Dixon, P. (2000). "Britain's ‘Vietnam syndrome’? Public opinion and British military intervention from Palestine to Yugoslavia." Review of International Studies 26(1): 99-121.

Edmunds, T. (2012). "British civil–military relations and the problem of risk." International Affairs 88(2): 265-282.

Eichenberg, R. (2005). "Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force, 1981-2005." International Security 30(1): 140-177.

Fear, N., Jones, M., Murphy, D., Hull, L., Iversen, A., Coker, B., Machell, L., Sundin, J., Woodhead, C., Jones, N., Greenberg, N., Landau, S., Dandeker, C., Rona, RJ., Hotopf, M., Wessely, S. (2010). "What are the consequences of deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan on the mental health of the UK armed forces? A cohort study." Lancet 375: 1783-1797.

Feaver, P., Kohn, RH., Cohn, LP. (2001). The Gap between Military and Civil Perspectives in the United States in Perspective Soldiers and Civilians : The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security. P. Feaver, Kohn, RH. . Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press

Gelpi, C., Feaver, PD., Reifler, J. (2005/6). "Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq " International Security 30(3): 7-46.

Hotopf, M., Hull, L., Fear, N., Browne, T., Horn, O., Iversen, A., Jones, M., Murphy, D., Bland, D., Earnshaw, M., Greenberg, N., Hacker-Hughes, J., Tate, R., Dandeker, C., Rona, R., Wessely S. (2006). "The health of UK military personnel who deployed to the 2003 Iraq war: a cohort study." Lancet 367: 1731-1741.

Humphreys, J. (2005). "The Iraq Dossier and the Meaning of Spin." Parliamentary Affairs 58(1): 156-170.

ICM Research. (2008). "Armed Forces Survey." Retrieved 9 August, 2012, from http://www.icmresearch.com/pdfs/2008_mar_sun_tele_iraq_poll.pdf.

Ipsos Mori. (2001). "Support for War in Afghanistan - Trends 2001." Retrieved 1 August, 2012, from http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/2399/Support-for-War-in-Afghanistan-Trends-2001.aspx?view=wide.

17 | P a g e

Ipsos Mori. (2007). "War With Iraq - Trends (2002-2007)." Retrieved 1 August, 2012, from http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/55/War-With-Iraq-Trends-20022007.aspx?view=wide.

Jacobsen, G. (2010). "A Tale of Two Wars: Public Opinion on the U.S. Military Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq." Presidential Studies Quarterly 40(4): 585-610.

McCartney, H. (2010). "The military covenant and the civil-military contract in Britain." International Affairs 86(2): 411-428.

Midford, P. (2006). Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism: Implications for Japan's Security Strategy. Policy Studies. Washington, East-West Centre.

Miller, C. (2010). Endgame for the West in Afghanistan? : explaining the decline in support for the war in Afghanistan in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France and Germany. Letort papers, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.

Ministry of Defence. (2009). "Operation Telic Casualty and Fatality Tables." Retrieved 02 August, 2012, from http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/7E86BD05-D4FF-4677-97AA-CCFBDCFE4E34/0/optelic_31jul09.pdf.

Ministry of Defence. (2012). "Operation Herrick Casualty and Fatality Tables." Retrieved 02 August, 2012, from http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/3C47E538-5EF7-4788-8B3E-B3A476A3EBE3/0/op_herrick_british_casualties_to31may12.pdf.

Myers, T., Hayes, AF. (2010). "Reframing the Casualties Hypothesis: (Mis)Perceptions of Troop Loss and Public Opinion about War." International Journal of Public Opinion Research 22(2): 256-275.

NatCen Social Research (2012). British Social Attitudes 29. London, NatCen Social Research. Office of the Press Secretary, T. W. H. (2003). "President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi

Freedom " Retrieved 25 July, 2012, from http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030322.html.

Scotto, T., Reifler, J., Clarke, HD., Diaz Lopez, JA., Saunders, D., Stewart, M., Whiteley, P. (2011). Attitudes towards British Involvement in Afghanistan - Briefing Paper (03/11) Institute for Democracy & Conflict Resolution, University of Essex Knowledge Gateway

Springford, J. (2003). ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europeans united: public attitudes towards the Iraq war and US foreign policy. London, Centre for European Reform.

Strachan, H. (2003). "The Civil-Military ‘Gap’ in Britain." Journal of Strategic Studies 26(2): 43-63. Szayna, T., McCarthy, KF., Sollinger, JM., Demaine, LJ., Marquis, JP., Steele, B. (2007). The Civil-

Military Gap in the United States Does It Exist, Why, and Does It Matter?, RAND Corporation. Walgrave, S., Verhulst, J. (2009). "Government Stance and Internal Diversity of Protest: A

Comparative Study of Protest against the War in Iraq in Eight Countries." Social Forces 87(3): 1355-1387.

Yager, T., Laufer, R., Gallops, M. (1984). "Some Problems Associated With War Experience in Men of the Vietnam Generation." Archives of General Psychiatry 41(4): 327-33.

1 “General seeks UK Iraq withdrawal” http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6046332.stm,

“Army head calls for more resources“ http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_8155000/8155195.stm 2 “UK Afghan mission was 'under-resourced' before surge“ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11629098

3 “Million march against Iraq War” http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/2765041.stm Sun, 16 Feb 2003 4 “Army servicemen were 'attacked, verbally abused and harassed' during the Olympics”

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/olympics/9517417/Army-servicemen-were-attacked-verbally-abused-and-harassed-during-the-Olympics.html 5 “George Galloway wins Bradford West by-election“ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-17549388

However, we should be cautious in interpreting this event as it was a by-election in a constituency with an untypical socio-demographic profile when considered nationally. 6 “Help for Heroes and MoD criticised by injured troops” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19112550