ATTACKING IRAN IS GOOD · Web viewOne word does capture Bearden's analysis of our current...

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Hegemony in the Middle East Good/Bad

Heg Bad – Middle East Stability................................................................................................................................2Heg Bad – Middle East Stability................................................................................................................................3Heg Bad – Iran..........................................................................................................................................................4Heg Bad – Afghanistan Collapse...............................................................................................................................5Heg Bad – Afghanistan Collapse...............................................................................................................................6Heg Bad – Afghanistan/Pakistan..............................................................................................................................7Heg Bad – Afghanistan – A2: Withdrawal Bad..........................................................................................................8Heg Bad – Afghanistan – A2: Troops Good...............................................................................................................9Afghanistan Collapse Bad – Terrorism...................................................................................................................10Afghanistan Collapse Bad – Nuclear War...............................................................................................................11Focusing on Arabs/Muslims Kills Soft Power..........................................................................................................12

Heg Good – Middle East War.................................................................................................................................13Heg Good – Middle East Stability...........................................................................................................................14Heg Good – Middle East – Deter Iran.....................................................................................................................15Heg Good – Attacking Iran is Good........................................................................................................................16Heg Good – Deterring Iran is Good........................................................................................................................17Heg Good – Inaction on Iran is Bad........................................................................................................................18Heg Good – Iran Prolif............................................................................................................................................19Heg Good – Turkey Stability...................................................................................................................................20Heg Good – Turkey Proliferation............................................................................................................................21Heg Good – Saudi Arabia.......................................................................................................................................22Heg Good – Kuwait................................................................................................................................................23Heg Good – Kuwait – Deter Iran.............................................................................................................................24Heg Good – Kuwait – Deter Iran.............................................................................................................................25Heg Good – Kuwait – Middle East Stability............................................................................................................26Heg Good – Kuwait – Middle East Stability............................................................................................................27Kuwait Democracy Good – Middle East Modeling.................................................................................................28A2: Middle East War – No Escalation.....................................................................................................................29A2: Middle East War – No Draw-In........................................................................................................................30


Heg Bad – Middle East Stability

US hegemony in the Middle East has been a historical disaster – it ensures inevitable conflict.James Richardson, Emeritus Professor at Australian National University. Working Paper 2006. “American Hegemony: A Dangerous Aspiraiton.” http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/anu9794/anu9794.pdf

In other respects US military preponderance has not been conducive to the establishment of a more equitable international order, nor for that matter to the extension of liberal democracy. In Central America, the clearest case of informal American empire, the many interventions have led neither to the creation of liberal democracies nor to the general betterment of the conditions of life. In the case of the Middle East, the American goal of promoting freedom and democracy in the region will be viewed in the light of half a century of American involvement. The intervention in Iran in 1953 to install a dependent regime, precluding the normal course of indigenous political development, produced its eventual backlash in the form of a bitterly anti-American clerical regime. US support assisted Saddam Hussein to consolidate his rule in Iraq and to maintain his war of aggression against Iran. More recently the political cost of the heavy military presence in Saudi Arabia has become clear and, whatever the eventual outcome in Iraq, that country is paying a high price for American intervention. With respect to Israel, American aid has led to a military imbalance in the region comparable to that between the US and the rest of the world, while the US has not restrained Israel from constantly expanding its settlements in Palestinian territory, thus rendering a political settlement increasingly remote. If these are the consequences of a gross imbalance of military power— and there has been no significant counterweight to the US in that region since the 1970s—then the traditional apprehensions over the costs of unbalanced power appear to be amply borne out. A power imbalance may also make for overconfidence, especially if the dominant power is imbued with a sense of its own righteousness, uninformed about the circumstances of lesser countries and insensitive to their values and concerns. While these may be normal attributes of great powers, they are present in the US to an unusual degree.

American hegemony over the Middle East is doomed to fail.Leon Hadar, research fellow in foreign policy studies for CATO. September 18, 2006. CATO Online: “Responding to Anti-Americanism in the Arab World: Has the United States Been Effective Since 9/11?” http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6688

This time the name of the movie is the American Unilateral Moment in the Middle East. But we have a feeling that we've seen that movie before. Different actors. But a similar script: Recreating Iraq. Navigating between the Saudis and the Hashemittes. Preserving influence in Egypt. Bringing an end to another cycle of Arab-Jewish violence. This hegemonic project –like its predecessor --- was bound to ignite counter-pressures in the form of nationalism -- including tribal, ethnic and religious identities. Now the neoconservatives added a Wilsonian soundtrack to the old script. America was going to achieve a strategic hegemony in the Middle East – while making the region "safe for democracy." It's a vision of a Democratic Empire, a creature that could have been conceived only through an unnatural union between President Woodrow Wilson and Queen Victoria. What America ended up doing in Iraq and the Middle East is making it safe not for democracy – but for the revival of tribal, religious and ethnic identities --- for nationalism -- -- a force that is more powerful than democracy. This force is challenging the current hegemon – taking a clear anti-American form.

Hegemony over the Middle East sparks backlash.Leon Hadar, research fellow in foreign policy studies for CATO. February 15, 2006. “Guess Who Is Sticking It To the Man?” http://www.lewrockwell.com/hadar/hadar47.html

By promoting democracy in the Middle East and igniting the forces of nationalism, ethnicity, religion and tribes, or a mix of all of these, the Americans have made the Middle East safe for nationalism and radical, ethnic and religious identity. The US is discovering that mixing hegemony and democracy is producing explosions that are blowing up its interests in two strategic parts of the Middle East – the Persian Gulf (Iraq) and Israel/Palestine – where it has led to the victory of political parties whose values and goals run contrary to that of the US.

http://www.lewrockwell.com/hadar/hadar47.html

http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6688

http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/anu9794/anu9794.pdf


Heg Bad – Middle East Stability

US hegemony in the Middle East sparks resentment.Leon Hadar, research fellow in foreign policy studies for CATO. July 22, 2006. “All Hell Breaks Loose in the Middle East.” http://www.lewrockwell.com/hadar/hadar66.html

On another level, on the "imperial" side of the Democratic Empire in the Middle East, the Americans moved aggressively to strengthen their hegemony in the region directly (Iraq), indirectly (Lebanon) and through proxies (Palestine). They attempted to build up an international coalition to contain and isolate Iran and force it to give up its ambition to develop nuclear capability and adopted a similar punitive approach against Damascus while tying to oust Hamas from power. Was it surprising therefore that these mishmash of idealistic democracy-promotion crusades in the Middle East and a unipolar approach aimed at establishing US hegemony in the region ended up producing an ad-hoc and informal coalition of anti-American players, who were emboldened thanks to Washington's policies and who were trying now to challenge US power?

Heg is ineffective at fighting Middle Eastern terrorism.Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations. “The New Middle East.” November/December 2006. Foreign Affairs. New York: Nov/Dec 2006. Vol. 85, Iss. 6; pg. 2. Proquest.

To ensure this, U.S. policymakers need to avoid two mistakes, while seizing two opportunities. The first mistake would be an overreliance on military force. As the United States has learned to its great cost in Iraq -- and Israel has in Lebanon -- military force is no panacea. It is not terribly useful against loosely organized militias and terrorists who are well armed, accepted by the local population, and prepared to die for their cause. Nor would carrying out a preventive strike on Iranian nuclear installations accomplish much good. Not only might an attack fail to destroy all facilities, but it might also lead Tehran to reconstitute its program even more covertly, cause Iranians to rally around the regime, and persuade Iran to retaliate (most likely through proxies) against U.S. interests in Afghanistan and Iraq and maybe even directly against the United States. It would further radicalize the Arab and Muslim worlds and generate more terrorism and anti-American activity. Military action against Iran would also drive the price of oil to new heights, increasing the chances of an international economic crisis and a global recession. For all these reasons, military force should be considered only as a last resort.

Hegemony doesn’t solve Middle East conflict, instead it exacerbates tensions.Hassan Hamdan al-Alkim, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at UAE University. American Studies International, February 2000.

The US military presence in the Gulf encourages further political rivalries among the Gulf States. On the one hand, the GCC states look at the American military presence as a protective shield and an insurance policy against any possible new Iranian or Iraqi adventure designed to take advantage of their inherited weakness. They view the Iranian and Iraqi regional policies as the main factor for the American presence. On the other hand, Iran and Iraq see the American presence as part of the American dual containment policy that represents a direct threat to their sovereignty and territorial integrity. They blame the US for the low level of interactions among the states of the Gulf. US involvement prevents the setting of the terms for intra-Gulf consultation to create a consensus and tie the different strands of policies to interrelated core goals and priorities on responding to regional security threat, building healthy economies, and promoting the development of democracy. It contributes to widening a gap of differences between the Gulf States rather than helping to bridge them, instigating an arms race, border disputes, different foreign policy undertaking, and greater internal political resentment.

http://www.lewrockwell.com/hadar/hadar66.html


Heg Bad – Iran

A. American hegemony in the Middle East makes a war with Iran immanent.Christopher Layne, Professor of International Studies at the University of Miami. 2007. American Empire: A Debate. Pg. 76-77

Because of the strategy of primacy and empire, the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown. The main source of conflict—or at least the one that has grabbed the lion’s share of the headlines—is Tehran’s evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. Washington’s policy, as President George W. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nuclear-armed Iran is “intolerable.” Beyond nuclear weapons, however, there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation. Chief among these is Iraq. Recently, Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq’s recently elected government. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis, concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. In a real sense, however, Iran’s nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America’s ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. These are reflected in current U.S. grand strategy—which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine’s three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action; determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East; and gaining U.S. dominance over that region. In this respect, it is hardly coincidental that the administration’s policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democratization. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay the administration’s pre-invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy. The key question today is whether these assumptions are correct.

B. The impact goes nuclearJohn Steinbach, Hiroshima/Nagasaki Peace Committee, March 2002, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation , once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration ." (44).


Heg Bad – Afghanistan Collapse

Current US policy in Afghanistan will lead to the collapse of US leadershipNicolas Davies, local coordinator of Progressive Democrats of America, 11-23-2009, “Why Afghans Dig Empire Graveyards,” Consortium News, http://www.consortiumnews.com/2009/112309b.html

In Afghanistan as in Iraq (and Vietnam), despite endless lip-service to phrases like "winning hearts and minds" and "clear, hold and build," American military strategists cling to the core belief that their virtually unlimited capacity for violence can ultimately carry the day if enough legal and political constraints are removed. Instead, the failures of U.S. military force and the success of "Anti-Coalition Forces" everywhere have confirmed Richard Barnet's Vietnam-era judgment that, "at the very moment the number one nation has perfected the science of killing, it has become an impractical instrument of political domination." The United States military budget is higher than at any time since the Second World War because U.S. officials now regard more of the world as critical to U.S. interests than ever before and are determined to militarily control all of it. Fortunately for people everywhere, this policy, if it even deserves to be called one, is neither realistic nor economically sustainable. But the whole world faces a critical period of transition as the U.S. military-industrial complex wrestles with the impossible challenge of an unconquerable world, experimenting with new weapons and strategies at the expense of countless lives and squandering resources that could otherwise be used to solve real problems.

Obama’s commitment to Afghanistan undermines US hegemony – overcomes Obama’s changes on international lawFrancis Shor, Professor in History at Wayne State University, 2010, “War in the Era of Declining U.S.Global Hegemony,” Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2, http://www.criticalglobalisation.com/Issue2/65_81_DECLINING_US_HEGEMONY_JCGS2.pdf

As the bodies pile up, however, the ability to maintain hegemony abroad and even at home is eroded. Yet, war, as a political strategy, remains a compulsive choice by those elite forces in the United States waging a losing struggle to retain global hegemony. As argued by one fierce critic of U.S. military imperialism: “All presidents, whether Democrats or Republicans, have sought to shape the contours of politics worldwide. This global mission and fascination with military power has entangled [U.S.] priorities and stretched its resources over and over again”. Although imperial overstretch is even more pronounced in the aftermath of the recent world-wide economic crisis and the proliferation of conflicts in new regions, the fundamental bi-partisan commitment by the political elite to exercising, in the words of President Barack Obama, “global leadership” will continue. Of course, there will be nuances in the exercise of that global leadership. Given the massive violations of international and U.S. laws by the Bush Administration, from abrogation of the Geneva Conventions to renditions to torture and domestic spying, it is not surprising to see President Obama repudiating some of the most egregious policies while retaining others. Although the adoption of these positions by President Obama is certainly part of the restoration of U.S. standing, and, hence, hegemony in the international arena, this new administration is wedded to prosecuting war aggressively in Afghanistan with the expansion of U.S. troops and in Pakistan with increasing attacks by U.S. drones and forays by U.S. Special Forces.

Afghanistan exposed the fallibility of US hard power – hegemony will decline as a resultManish Chand, Staff Writer, 04-23-2008, “Goodbye US Hegemony, Welcome China, Europe,” Boloji Media, http://www.boloji.com/bookreviews/154.htm

So who will win this mother of all battles in the decades to come? Military superiority is no longer the sure-fire guarantee as the disaster of American interventionism in Iraq and Afghanistan brought out starkly, damaging the credibility of American power. And as each of the new empires has nuclear weapons, "economic power is more important than military power," writes the author, a well-travelled author, who directs the Global Governance Initiative in the American Strategy Programme of the New America Foundation. With the legitimacy of American hard power under scrutiny, the US is also fast losing the soft power game, making Washington "merely one of several competing vendors or brands on


the catwalk of credibility". "From hedge funds to online gambling, London and Hong Kong are preferred to New York for listing companies," writes Khanna in what seems like a preface to a post-America world.


Heg Bad – Afghanistan Collapse

Afghanistan will collapse US hegemony unless we pull outTom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project, 02-05-2009, “Tomgram: The Empire v. The Graveyard,” Tom Dispatch, http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175030/the_empire_v_the_graveyard

After all, more than a trillion dollars later, with essentially nothing to show except an unbroken record of destruction, corruption, and an inability to build anything of value, the U.S. is only slowly drawing down its 140,000-plus troops in Iraq to a "mere" 40,000 or so, while surging yet more troops into Afghanistan to fight a counterinsurgency war, possibly for years to come. At the same time, the U.S. continues to expand its armed forces and to garrison the globe, even as it attempts to bail out an economy and banking system evidently at the edge of collapse. This is a sure-fire formula for further disaster -- unless the new administration took the unlikely decision to downsize the U.S. global mission in a major way. Right now, Washington is whistling past the graveyard. In Afghanistan and Pakistan the question is no longer whether the U.S. is in command, but whether it can get out in time. If not, when the moment for a bailout comes, don't expect the other pressed powers of the planet to do for Washington what it has been willing to do for the John Thains of our world. The Europeans are already itching to get out of town. The Russians, the Chinese, the Iranians, the Indians who exactly will ride to our rescue? Perhaps it would be more prudent to stop hanging out in graveyards. They are, after all, meant for burials, not resurrections.

Afghanistan risks the collapse of the US empireJoe Barnes, Baker Institute's Bonner Means Baker Fellow, 01-26-2010, “Afghanistan, the Graveyard of Empires,” Baker Institute, http://blogs.chron.com/bakerblog/2010/01/afghanistan_the_graveyard_of_empires.html

One word does capture Bearden's analysis of our current situation: caution. For centuries, Bearden stressed, the remote region now known as Afghanistan has proven to be the graveyard of empires. The Moguls, the British, and then the Soviets all attempted to subdue Afghanistan -- and all failed. The pattern for would-be conquerors is almost always the same: a swift initial victory followed by a protracted and painful effort to extend control into the countryside. Since 2001, Bearden said, the American experience has run true to regrettable form. Our early attempts to strike at Al Qaeda and topple the Taliban regime in Kabul have morphed into an ongoing effort to bolster the authority of the new pro-American central government. My personal take-away from his presentation was general in nature: it is the terrible temptation of pride. Our policies toward Iraq and Afghanistan reflected an excessive faith in both our understanding and our power. I do not say this, let me stress, from some radical critique of American foreign policy. I believe that the United States has on balance been a force for good in world events. I am no isolationist or pacifist. But -- as our expensive adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown -- there is clearly more room for modesty in our approach to the world. We don't know everything. We can't change everything. And pride can blind us to both truths. This is not an original view. Nor is it a new one. The ancient Greeks had a word -- hubris -- for overbearing pride. The Old Testament, too, reminds us that "pride goeth before destruction." Every American foreign policymaker should have that particular verse from "Proverbs" in mind when he or she embarks on decisions of war and peace.

Continued occupation of Afghanistan will undermine American hegemony – history provesDan Simpson, a former U.S. ambassador and a Post-Gazette associate editor, 02-04-2009, “Get out of Afghanistan, too,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09035/946657-374.stm

Apart from the situation on the ground, the principal reason for the United States to complete its withdrawal from Iraq and not build up a substitute presence in Afghanistan is domestic -- U.S. national interests overall. Afghanistan ground up the British in the 19th century, and probably drove -- with our help -- the final nail into the coffin of a fading Soviet Union.


Heg Bad – Afghanistan/Pakistan

America’s military presence in Afghanistan leads to increased recruits for Pakistani militiasMalou Innocent, Foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, 07-2009, “Should the president announce an Afghanistan exit strategy?,” CQ Researcher, http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/innocent-cq-afghan-exit-strategy.pdf

Some policy makers claim the war is worth waging because terrorists flourish in failed states. But that cannot account for terrorists who thrive in states with the sovereignty to reject external interference. That is one reason why militants find sanctuary in Pakistan. In fact, attempts to stabilize Afghanistan destabilize Pakistan. Amassing troops in Afghanistan feeds the perception of a foreign occupation, spawning more terrorist recruits for Pakistani militias and thus placing undue stress on an already- weakened, nuclear-armed nation.

Perceived military successes undermine Pakistan – lead to cross-border incursionsNorman Soloman, author of Made Love, Got War: Close Encounters with America's Warfare State, 03-27-2009, “Is Your Representative Speaking Out Against Escalation in Afghanistan?,” AlterNet, http://www.alternet.org/world/133744/is_your_representative_speaking_out_against_escalation_in_afghanistan/

In contrast, the letter from the 14 members of the House (eight Democrats, six Republicans) lays down a clear line of opposition to the rationales for stepping up the warfare. “If the intent is to leave behind a stable Afghanistan capable of governing itself, this military escalation may well be counterproductive,” the letter says. And it warns that “any perceived military success in Afghanistan might create pressure to increase military activity in Pakistan. This could very well lead to dangerous destabilization in the region and would increase hostility toward the United States.” More than 400 members of the House declined to sign the letter. In effect, they failed to join in a historic challenge to a prevailing assumption -- that the U.S. government must use massive violence for many more years to try to work Washington’s will on Afghanistan.

A reduced military commitment prevents instability from spilling over to PakistanRory Stewart, Ryan Professor of Human Rights at Harvard, 03-17-2009, “What worked in Iraq won't help Afghanistan,” The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article5920064.ece

We need a much lighter military footprint. We cannot afford to keep 80,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan for a decade. US and European voters won't support it, it is an extravagant distraction from more important strategic priorities, including Pakistan and as long as we are seen as an occupying power, there will be Afghans who want to fight us. We should plan now to reduce the size of our military commitment and decide what we can do with fewer troops. This does not mean abandoning Afghanistan entirely. The US and its allies should use special forces and intelligence operatives to ensure that al-Qaeda never again finds Afghanistan a safe and comfortable environment in which to establish training camps. Even a few thousand international troops and US air support would be a serious deterrent to civil war. But most importantly we must continue to provide generous long-term financial support to the Afghan Government and its military. Policymakers are now more cautious about Afghanistan and say that their only objective is stability. But even this is implausible. Pakistan is 20 years ahead of Afghanistan on almost every indicator and is yet to achieve the kind of stability we dream of in Afghanistan. Instead, we must think in terms of containing and managing a difficult, poor and unstable country without sinking too much into this difficult task. We must husband our resources for the many other crises already erupting - from the British banking sector to Pakistan. There are many small simple things we can do to help Afghan society. All require us to forge a long-term engagement with the country. But such a policy is only possible if we reduce our investment in money and troops and develop a lighter, more affordable and ultimately more sustainable relationship with Afghanistan.


Heg Bad – Afghanistan – A2: Withdrawal Bad

Some instability in Afghanistan is inevitable – history provesMalou Innocent, foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, and Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, 09-14-2009, “Escaping the "Graveyard of Empires": A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan,” Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf

Some analysts, including Carnegie Endowment senior associate Robert Kagan, insist that were the United States to evacuate Afghanistan, the political and military vacuum left by our departure would lead to serious instability throughout the region. But instability, in the sense of a perpetually anarchic state of nature dominated by tribal warlords and pervasive bloodshed, has characterized the region for decades—even centuries. Thus, the claim that Afghanistan would be destabilized if the United States were to decrease its presence is misleading, since Afghanistan will be chronically unstable regardless. Most Americans are simply oblivious to the region’s history.

US troops aren’t key to stability in Afghanistan – there are too many factors they can’t controlMalou Innocent, foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, and Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, 09-14-2009, “Escaping the "Graveyard of Empires": A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan,” Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf

The war in Afghanistan has no simple remedies. Eight years after the fall of the Taliban regime, the country still struggles to survive under the most brutal circumstances: corrupt and ineffective state institutions, thousands of miles of unguarded borders, pervasive illiteracy among a largely rural and decentralized population, a weak president, and a dysfunctional international alliance. As if that weren’t enough, some of Afghanistan’s neighbors have incentives to foment instability there. Given Afghanistan’s numerous challenges, policymakers must consider the unpleasant likelihood that the insurgency might outlast the presence of international troops. But, as explained below, the United States can continue to disrupt terrorist havens without perpetuating a large-scale military presence on the ground.

The US presence can’t provide stability in Afghanistan – it is an impossible taskMalou Innocent, foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, and Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, 09-14-2009, “Escaping the "Graveyard of Empires": A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan,” Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf

The broader goal of long-term development and governance assistance is a Sisyphean task. Indeed, rather than rebuilding, the United States and NATO would be building much of the country from scratch, such as erecting infrastructure and tailoring a judicial system to make it both “modern” and compatible with local customs. Moreover, the U.S.- led coalition would be undertaking such a monumental enterprise in a country awash with weapons, notoriously suspicious of outsiders, and largely absent of central authority. That is an impossible mission. It’s critical that U.S. policymakers narrow their objectives to disrupting those forces responsible for the 9/11 attacks. The United States should not drift further into a utopian nation-building operation. Indeed, America has already sunk too far into that morass.


Heg Bad – Afghanistan – A2: Troops Good

US troops can’t generate stability in Afghanistan Kenneth Theisen, Steering committee member of World Can’t Wait, 10-01-2009, “Commentary: The United States Must Withdraw from Afghanistan,” The Berkeley Daily Planet, http://www.berkeleydailyplanet.com/issue/2009-10-01/article/33852?headline=Commentary-The-United-States-Must-Withdraw-from-Afghanistan

But neither Taliban nor the United States rule, through its puppet allies, is in the interests of the Afghan people. Two historically obsolete and reactionary forces are contending in Afghanistan—the Islamic fundamentalist forces led by the Taliban and the outmoded ruling strata of the imperialist system, led by the United States These two forces reinforce each other, even while opposing one another. Supporting the U.S. government to defeat the Taliban and their allies will not advance the interests of the Afghan or American people.

Troops don’t provide stability in Afghanistan – statistics proves George F. Will, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, 09-01-2009, “Time to Get Out of Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/31/AR2009083102912.html

The U.S. strategy is "clear, hold and build." Clear? Taliban forces can evaporate and then return, confident that U.S. forces will forever be too few to hold gains. Hence nation-building would be impossible even if we knew how, and even if Afghanistan were not the second-worst place to try: The Brookings Institution ranks Somalia as the only nation with a weaker state. Military historian Max Hastings says Kabul controls only about a third of the country -- "control" is an elastic concept -- and " 'our' Afghans may prove no more viable than were 'our' Vietnamese, the Saigon regime." Just 4,000 Marines are contesting control of Helmand province, which is the size of West Virginia. The New York Times reports a Helmand official saying he has only "police officers who steal and a small group of Afghan soldiers who say they are here for 'vacation.' " Afghanistan's $23 billion gross domestic product is the size of Boise's. Counterinsurgency doctrine teaches, not very helpfully, that development depends on security, and that security depends on development. Three-quarters of Afghanistan's poppy production for opium comes from Helmand. In what should be called Operation Sisyphus, U.S. officials are urging farmers to grow other crops. Endive, perhaps?

Even if troops can help, there’s no impact to Taliban resurgence after withdrawalMalou Innocent, foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, and Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, 09-14-2009, “Escaping the "Graveyard of Empires": A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan,” Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf

Moreover, the worst-case scenario—the resurrection of the Taliban’s fundamentalist regime—does not threaten America’s sovereignty or physical security. Many policymakers who call for an indefinite military presence in Afghanistan conflate bin Laden’s network—a transnational jihadist organization—with the Taliban—an indigenous Pashtun-dominated movement. But the Taliban and other parochial fighters pose little threat to the sovereignty or physical security of the United States. The fear that the Taliban will take over a contiguous fraction of Afghan territory is not compelling enough of a rationale to maintain an indefinite, large-scale military presence in the region, especially since the insurgency is largely confined to predominately Pashtun southern and eastern provinces and is unlikely to take over the country as a whole, as we saw in the 1990s.


Afghanistan Collapse Bad – Terrorism

Instability in Afghanistan is the most risky region – collapse causes terrorism and nuclear useDarrell West, vice president, governance studies, Brookings Institution, 03-23-2009, “Arena: On the U.S. in Afghanistan,” Politico, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0309/20333.html

“We have to make a serious effort in Afghanistan because, as my colleague Michael O’Hanlon points out, the stakes are too high if we fail. The Afghan/Pakistan region is the most risky for the U.S. and the world because of the strength of Al Qaeda and the presence of nuclear weapons. An unstable Afghanistan has dramatic consequences for international security and the drug trade. We need to convince our allies that Afghanistan is worth a major effort from them as well.”

The impact is nuclear war Eric Schwartz, JD @ Loyola and Attorney @ the Office of the General Counsel-Sempra Energy, 2008, “U.S. Security Strategy: Empowering Kim Jong-il?,” 30 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1, Lexis

American credibility in the international community, an essential commodity for a world leader, has been severely damaged. Following the preemptive attack on Iraq, anti-American sentiment has risen. Perceived "American exceptionalism," the idea that the United States applies one set of rules to itself and another to the rest of the world, has created international animosity, particularly in the Muslim world. A panel chosen by the Bush administration reported that "[h]ostility toward America has reached shocking levels" among Arabs and Muslims abroad. The preemptive self-defense doctrine is now viewed by some around the world as nothing more than propaganda used to justify U.S. global military actions while the United States pursues its own political or economic interests. This sort of international hostility is harmful to national security when combined with the threat of preemptive attack. In the extreme, this environment could arguably lead to nuclear war.


Afghanistan Collapse Bad – Nuclear War

Instability in Afghanistan will spillover and undermine Pakistan – causes nuclear warJoshua Foust, associate editor for Current Intelligence, 08-27-n, “The Case for Afghanistan: Strategic Considerations,” Registan, http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/08/27/the-case-for-afghanistan-strategic-considerations/

And lest anyone think it is appropriate to write off the India-Pakistan conflict as somebody else’s problem, it is never somebody else’s problem when nuclear weapons are involved. As Jari Lindholm reminded, India and Pakistan have come a hair’s breadth from nuclear conflict twice over Kashmir. And like it or not, it is a compelling and vital American interest to prevent nuclear conflict in South Asia—which makes “fixing” Afghanistan in some way also a vital American interest. Regional security is one of those topics that gets mentioned casually by many pundits but never really articulated. It is by far Ahmed Rashid’s most convincing argument, that supporting stability in Central and South Asia is a compelling interest not just for the U.S., but for the West in general. When it comes to Pakistan, the big danger is not in a Taliban takeover, or even in the Taliban seizure of nuclear weapons—I have never believed that the ISI could be that monumentally stupid (though they are incredibly stupid for letting things get this far out of hand). The big danger, as it has been since 1999, is that insurgents, bored or underutilized in Afghanistan, will spark another confrontation between India and Pakistan, and that that confrontation will spillover into nuclear conflict. That is worth blood and treasure to prevent.

Continued US presence will destabilize Pakistan causing nuclear warTalking Points Memo, 01-26-2010, “Destabilizing Nuclear Pakistan to Chase Ghosts in Afghanistan,” Talking Points Memo, http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/r/u/rutabaga_ridgepole/2010/01/destabilizing-nuclear-pakistan.php

So our new "Terror President" bombs bombs bombs some of the most desolate wastelands in the world in North and South Waziristan, and it makes even less sense than bombing Antarctica on the chance that Usama bin Laden is hiding in an igloo at the South Pole, because if we were bombing Antarctica, we wouldn't be destabilizing nuclear Pakistan. A wave of bombings has swept Pakistan since October, devastating Peshawar but also reaching far beyond the troubled northwest. Attacks on places believed to be safe, such as the military headquarters in Rawalpindi and a popular market in the eastern city of Lahore, have struck fear into the population. Last week, Pakistan's foreign minister warned in a statement that the U.S. troop buildup could magnify the problems by bringing an "influx of militants and refugees from Afghanistan into Pakistan." The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 led thousands of Taliban and al-Qaeda members to flee the fighting and seek refuge in Pakistan. For the United States, the worst-case scenario in Pakistan is nuclear weapons "diverted" to Islamic militants, and in an increasingly fractured Pakistan this possibility has attained sufficient urgency so that Obama and his bumbling Secretary of Defense have been trying to negotiate a deal that would allow "specially trained American units to provide added security for the Pakistani (nuclear) arsenal in case of a crisis."

It’s the most dangerous regionRobin Wright, senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, 12-09-2009, “The real stakes in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/09/AR2009120903678.html

Finally, U.S. interests in the wider region are also at stake, notably on two fronts. Obama's strategy will deeply affect India, the world's largest democracy. Long-standing tensions between Pakistan and India have taken the world closer to the brink of nuclear war than any conflict has since World War II -- and still could, since Pakistan has failed to contain extremists responsible for terrorist atrocities in India, including the Mumbai attacks last year. U.S. failure to help nuclear Pakistan expand or shift its military focus from India to the more immediate threat from its internal extremists risks allowing those tensions to deepen.


Focusing on Arabs/Muslims Kills Soft Power

1. FOCUS ON ARAB COMMUNITIES SQUANDERS AMERICAN MORAL LEGITIMACYFriends Committee on National Legislation September 14, 2004.“Enemy Aliens by David Cole: Book Review,” ENEMY COMBATANTS, GUANTANOMO BAY PRISON, TORTURE, Accessed May 4, 2005, http://www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php?item_id=617&issue_id=70.

In the final section, Mr. Cole explains that the Justice Department’s focus on the entire Muslim and Arab community in the United States is a waste of resources and is counterproductive. The selective targeting of Muslims and Arabs squanders legitimacy, hurts ties with the nations from which they come and, most of all, destroys the democratic principles on which the U.S.’s moral legitimacy rests. Enemy Aliens contains a well-argued, accessible analysis of civil liberties after September 11 that would be useful to anyone interested in learning more about the current state of civil liberties.

2. RACIAL TARGETING IN THE WAR ON TERROR UNDERMINES LEGITIMACYLinda Anderson, Holds a Ph.D. from New York Theological Seminary, and Recipient of a Feminist Theology Award, September 28, 2003.“Civil Liberties,” UUCC SERMON, Accessed May 6, 2005, http://www.uucckingston.org/Sermons/civilliberties.html.

Of the over 3000 people caught up in the special initiative and/or registration, one has been convicted for terrorist activities. How has this made us safer? Such broad-based targeting does not identify those who would harm us. On the contrary, it breeds anti-Americanism, it undermines the legitimacy of our efforts against terrorism and it creates distrust among foreign nationals and naturalized citizens. How can such a policy keep us safe? It feeds upon our fear. It is only politically possible because we are afraid and feel powerless. Such a policy stokes the fires of racism.

3. RELATIONS WITH ARAB/MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IS THE KEY TO DEFEATING TERRORISMBert Ely, Principal in Ely & Company, Inc., June 3, 2002.“Money Laundering Laws Won’t Stop International Terrorism,” ENTER STAGE RIGHT, Accessed May 6, 2005, http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0602/0602moneylaunder.htm.

To defeat al-Qaida inside the United States, domestic terrorist fighters must find the Muslim terrorist cells, penetrate them, and then destroy them. Fishing through financial records will not flag those cells, particularly as future terrorists become more effective in covering their financial tracks. Instead, the search for the terrorists' cells must start where they incubate -- in the minority of Muslim mosques, cultural centers, and similar gathering spots where hatred of America is fomented. Loyal Arab-Americans and non-Arab American Muslims must be recruited for this task, just as Japanese-Americans helped to win World War II.

4. PERCEPTION IN ARAB/MUSLIM POPULATIONS IS NEEDED TO PREVENT TERRORISMPhilip B. Heymann, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Former Deputy Attoerny General, and Former Head, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, 2003.TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY, p. 165.

If the level of terrorism depends, as it may very well, not just on the number of committed terrorists at any one time, but also on the level of resentment of a far broader, supportive population of, for example, Arabs and Muslims, we have to address ourselves to destroying the bridges that terrorists seek to build to some more moderate population.


Heg Good – Middle East War

Withdrawal of American conflict only causes new great power competition, conflict, and American re-engagement.Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, 7-19-2007, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” RealClearPolitics, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/end_of_dreams_return_of_histor.html

The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn 't change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn 't changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to "normal" or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

Transition to multipolarity risks Middle East conflict – even US opponents agree.Dmitry Shlapentokh, Associate Professor of History at Indiana University at South Bend, 7-15-2009, “China, Russia, and the Risk of Explosion in Central Asia,” CACI Analyst, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5148

The consensus among the Russian and Chinese elites seems to be that a weakening of the U.S. would lead to a much-desired “multi-polarity”, beneficial for both Russia and China. The weakening of the U.S., increasingly clear since the end of the Bush administration, seems to confirm Russia’s and China’s anticipation of the emerging “multipolarity”. Still, it is becoming clear to the elites of both countries that a weakening of the U.S. could also bring serious problems for both Russia and China. For a long time, the Russian elite in many ways related American might, in the holistic meaning of the word, with the U.S. economic standing. This was especially clear during the Yeltsin era when the dollar ruled supreme in Russia. The decline of the dollar in the late Putin era was a huge blow to the image of the U.S., regardless of the dollar’s recent rise vis-à-vis the ruble. In the beginning of the U.S. troubles, the Russian elite were quite pleased with the American decline. The assumption was that Russia would benefit from the U.S. predicament. Still, the crisis spilled over into Russia and reinforced in the minds of the Russian elite the notion that not only is the U.S. weak but its weakness could be a source of trouble to others. This change of paradigm, from the idea that the U.S. should be a cause for concern because of its strength to the notion that it should be feared because of its weakness, could be seen in the minds of the Chinese elite as well. Indeed, China recently expressed concern that Obama’s spending spree could undermine the value of the dollar and T-bills that China holds. This change of paradigm clearly indicates that the U.S. decline is not always seen as beneficial for either China or Russia and that the transition to “multi-polarity” entails not just benefits but also dangers. And developments in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan are among these potential dangers.


Heg Good – Middle East Stability

Heg prevents escalating war in the Middle East.Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995

In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination. Iran and Iraq have, in the past, both sought regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection, the weak oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be unlikely to retain their independence. To preclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps by purchase, their own nuclear weapons. If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that dominates the world supply of oil, it could gain a significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country that gained hegemony would have vast economic resources at its disposal that could be used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the United States and other oil importing nations. Hegemony over the Persian Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East under its influence and domination because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the peace process would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and the Israelis. The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf would harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living.

Erosion of hegemony sparks rapid instability throughout the middle east. Ian Lesser, Senior Political Scientist at RAND. 1998. Sources of Conflict in the 21 st Century . pg. 214.

Finally, the most important extraregional variable for the future of regional security will be the United States itself. Our analysis highlights the enduring nature of U.S. interests in the Middle East. The level and character of our engagement and presence, and our capacity for power projection in times of crisis, will be dominant elements in the regional security equation for the foreseeable future. The influence of the United States on the strategic environment across the region under current conditions cannot be overemphasized. American withdrawal—the end of America’s role as preeminent security guarantor—could transform the security picture in profound terms and could affect the propensity for conflict and cooperation far beyond the region, as other extraregional actors move to fill the strategic vacuum. One of the many potentially disastrous consequences of U.S. withdrawal might be the much more rapid spread of weapons of mass destruction as regional powers strive to substitute for American deterrence or capitalize on their newfound freedom of action.

Heg sustains Middle East stability.Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995

At this point, the United States is the preponderant outside power in the Persian Gulf. Its position there helps to discourage the rise of a rival and will put it in a strong position to compete should one arise. U.S. preponderance serves the interests of the members of the zone of peace because it helps diminish the threat of interruption of oil supplies from the region. But the threat of hostile regional hegemony remains. The United States, with support from its allies, needs to maintain adequate military capability to deter and defeat the threat of regional hegemony from Iraq or Iran. The United States should seek greater contributions from its NATO allies and Japan in meeting the security challenges in this region. Washington and its allies must also encourage regional cooperation among the GCC states and help them cope with the contradictory pressures -- liberal and fundamentalist -- for domestic change that beset them. Given the recent progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. security ties with Israel can help in dealing with threats from Iran or Iraq in the Gulf.


Heg Good – Middle East – Deter Iran

Only the U.S. military can contain Iran – regional actors are too weak – withdrawal emboldens Iranian aggression and causes Israeli strikes on TehranMichael Rubin, Analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, November 2008, “Can a Nuclear Iran Be Contained or Deterred?,” AEI Online, http://www.aei.org/outlook/28896

Even with such upgrades, and assuming Congress does not disapprove the sales--188 members of Congress have expressed concern--it is unclear whether the GCC states could contain Iranian aggression for long. No GCC state with the exception of Saudi Arabia has strategic depth. If Iraq could overwhelm Kuwait in a matter of hours, so, too, could Iran overwhelm Bahrain--the central node in regional U.S. naval strategy--or Qatar, where the U.S. army pre-positions much of its heavy equipment. A quick glance at the Iran-GCC military balance is not reassuring. Iran has 663,000 military service personnel, including regular army, IRGC, and Basij. Saudi Arabia, in contrast, has only 214,500 military personnel, and the combined total for the other five GCC states is a paltry 131,300. Iran falls short on fighter aircraft (332 versus 496 for the GCC) but is near parity on battle tanks (1,710 versus 1,912) and dominates with combat vessels (201 versus 94).[42] While Iran may fall short in certain categories, it has a superior ballistic missile capability to any immediate neighbors besides Pakistan. Iran's Shahab-3 missile has performed erratically during tests but now reportedly has a two-thousand-kilometer range. As the Gulf Security Dialogue sales indicate, the GCC states are scrambling to recover from this missile deficit. In order to contain a nuclear Iran, the United States and its allies in the region will need to enhance their military capability to counter the likelihood of successful Iranian conventional action. Iran's other neighbors cannot bring much to the containment table. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan's militaries are negligible. The Russian invasion of Georgia has eliminated the possibility of assistance from Tblisi. Uzbekistan and Armenia are, in practice, hostile to U.S. strategic concerns. Turkey, with its 514,000 troops, nearly four hundred fighter aircraft, and 4,400 tanks, is in theory a NATO ally and, as such, interoperable with the U.S. military. It could bring significant resources to the table, but it is an unreliable ally unlikely to participate in any serious containment; nor will Iraq or Afghanistan who, for years to come, will be more concerned with ensuring internal stability than participating in regional containment. Indeed, with the exception of Turkey, every other Iranian neighbor remains vulnerable to Iranian political or infrastructure sabotage, as incidents such as the Khobar Towers bombing and the 1995-96 Bahraini riots demonstrate.[43] A Kuwaiti parliamentarian has even accused the IRGC of infiltrating Kuwait.[44] Conclusion The Bush administration has treated deterrence and containment as rhetorical pillars, but, beyond the Gulf Security Dialogue, few in Washington appear willing to take the measures necessary to deter or contain a nuclear Iran. Even in the unlikely event they would achieve Iraqi acquiescence, neither Barack Obama nor Joe Biden support permanent bases in Iraq,[45] even though such facilities would be the cornerstones of a containment policy. Simply put, without permanent bases in Iraq, a nuclear capable Islamic Republic cannot be contained. While Senator Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.) laid down the necessary marker to support a deterrence strategy when she declared that the United States could "obliterate" Iran should the Islamic Republic use nuclear weapons, Obama's criticism of her statement[46] undercut the commitment to retaliation upon which any deterrence policy must rest. It may be comforting to Abizaid, Mullen, and the electorate to believe that the United States can

deter or contain Tehran's worst ambitions, but absent any preparation to do so, Washington is instead signaling that the Islamic Republic has a green light to claim regional dominance and, at worst, carry out its threats to annihilate Israel. At the same time, absent any effort to lay the groundwork either for containment or deterrence, Washington is signaling to its allies in the region that they are on their own and that the U.S. commitment to protect them is empty. Arab states and Iran's other neighbors may calculate that they have no choice but to make greater accommodation to Tehran's interests. Should Israeli officials believe that the West will stand aside as Iran achieves nuclear capability and that a nuclear Islamic Republic poses an existential threat to the Jewish state, they may conclude that they have no choice but to launch a preemptive military strike--an event that could quickly lead to a regional conflagration from which the United States would have difficulty remaining aloof.

Iran will trigger all-out regional war if attackedJoe Gelman, President of the Civil Service Commission of Los Angeles, 6-11-2007, “Iran will trigger all-out regional war if attacked, official says”, Neocon Express

“Iran will trigger all-out regional war if attacked, official says” Jun. 11, 2007 (Neocon Express delivered by Newstex) -- "Ballistic missiles would be fired in mass against targets in the Persian Gulf states and Israel ," one Iranian Foreign Ministry official said. "The objective would be to overwhelm US missile defense systems with dozens and maybe hundreds of missiles fired simultaneously at specific targets." The idea is to inflict maximum damage on the oil infrastructure of the Persian Gulf, and to close the straits of Hormuz, causing oil prices to rise, possibly by hundreds of dollars a barral, causing an immediate world-wide recession. Additionally, "Iran will open a freeway for terrorists from Afghanistan all the way to Lebanon, enabling the terrorists to strike in almost every country in the Middle East." Civilians will be targeted, and Israel will be blanketed with rockets, including Tel Aviv.


Heg Good – Attacking Iran is Good

1. PRE-EMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION IS KEY TO PREVENTING AN IRANIAN NUCLEAR THREATCharles Krauthammer, Pulitzer Prize-Winning Washington Post columnist, July 23, 2004.WHAT ABOUT IRAN?, accessed 11/30/05, http://www.townhall.com/opinion/columns/charleskrauthammer/2004/07/23/12447.html

The country should be ripe for revolution. The regime is detested. But the mullahs are very good at police-state tactics. The long-awaited revolution is not happening. Which makes the question of pre-emptive attack all the more urgent. Iran will go nuclear during the next presidential term. Some Americans wishfully think that the Israelis will do the dirty work for us, as in 1981 when they destroyed Saddam's nuclear reactor. But for Israel, attacking Iran is a far more difficult proposition. It is farther away. Moreover, detection and antiaircraft technology are far more advanced than 20 years ago. There may be no deus ex machina. If nothing is done, a fanatical terrorist regime openly dedicated to the destruction of the ``Great Satan'' will have both nuclear weapons and the terrorists and missiles to deliver them. All that stands between us and that is either revolution or pre-emptive strike. Both of which, by the way, are far more likely to succeed with 146,000 American troops and highly sophisticated aircraft standing by just a few miles away -- in Iraq.

2. A HARDLINE STANCE ON IRAN IS KEY TO AVOIDING NUCLEAR WINTERDexter Ingram, Director of Information Security Policy at the Business Software Alliance, 2005. ATOMIC IRAN, accessed 11/30/05, http://www.townhall.com/opinion/books_entertainment/reviews/dexterIngram/141014.html

The only apparent obstacle in Iran's path to nuclear success is the world's greatest superpower, the United States. Even the U.S., though, meets opposition at every turn from the "EU-3" (France, Germany, and Great Britain), from the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency, and even from many of its own national politicians and activists. These entities desire to continue negotiations, to compromise, and to give Iran what it's asking for, with mere promises in return, and then to discover whether Iran can be trusted. Corsi uses proven history lessons - from Neville Chamberlain's accommodating Hitler to the Clinton Administration's unilateral compromises with North Korea - to demonstrate why we cannot wait for Iran to betray our trust on the nuclear front. In Corsi's own words, "…one nuclear weapon could destroy Israel as we know it" (see simulation below). Progress in the Middle East under the Bush Administration is rolling along at a pace never before experienced. However, America's friends in the region, from Pakistan to Iraq, from Afghanistan to Israel, stand to lose all achieved thus far if the unelected few who rule Iran are allowed to impose their terrorist regime on the region and the world. For people who think the Holocaust was merely a conspiracy theory developed to rob Palestinians of land, and for those whose greatest goal is to be eternally rewarded for their own martyrdom in destroying Israel and the West, the only thing separating them from the end of the world as we know it is the material needed to create this destruction.


Heg Good – Deterring Iran is Good

Failure to contain Iran causes miscalculation which escalates to nuclear warAlon Ben-Meir, professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU, UPI, February 6, 2007, Realpolitik: Ending Iran's defiance

That Iran stands today able to challenge or even defy the United States in every sphere of American influence in the Middle East attests to the dismal failure of the Bush administration's policy toward it during the last six years. Feeling emboldened and unrestrained, Tehran may, however, miscalculate the consequences of its own actions, which could precipitate a catastrophic regional war. The Bush administration has less than a year to rein in Iran's reckless behavior if it hopes to prevent such an ominous outcome and achieve, at least, a modicum of regional stability. By all assessments, Iran has reaped the greatest benefits from the Iraq war. The war's consequences and the American preoccupation with it have provided Iran with an historic opportunity to establish Shiite dominance in the region while aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapon program to deter any challenge to its strategy. Tehran is fully cognizant that the successful pursuit of its regional hegemony has now become intertwined with the clout that a nuclear program bestows. Therefore, it is most unlikely that Iran will give up its nuclear ambitions at this juncture, unless it concludes that the price will be too high to bear. That is, whereas before the Iraq war Washington could deal with Iran's nuclear program by itself, now the Bush administration must also disabuse Iran of the belief that it can achieve its regional objectives with impunity. Thus, while the administration attempts to stem the Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq to prevent it from engulfing other states in the region, Washington must also take a clear stand in Lebanon. Under no circumstances should Iranian-backed Hezbollah be allowed to topple the secular Lebanese government. If this were to occur, it would trigger not only a devastating civil war in Lebanon but a wider Sunni-Shiite bloody conflict. The Arab Sunni states, especially, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, are terrified of this possible outcome. For them Lebanon may well provide the litmus test of the administration's resolve to inhibit Tehran's adventurism but they must be prepared to directly support U.S. efforts. In this regard, the Bush administration must wean Syria from Iran. This move is of paramount importance because not only could Syria end its political and logistical support for Hezbollah, but it could return Syria, which is predominantly Sunni, to the Arab-Sunni fold. President Bush must realize that Damascus' strategic interests are not compatible with Tehran's and the Assad regime knows only too well its future political stability and economic prosperity depends on peace with Israel and normal relations with the United States. President Bashar Assad may talk tough and embrace militancy as a policy tool; he is, however, the same president who called, more than once, for unconditional resumption of peace negotiation with Israel and was rebuffed. The stakes for the United States and its allies in the region are too high to preclude testing Syria's real intentions which can be ascertained only through direct talks. It is high time for the administration to reassess its policy toward Syria and begin by abandoning its schemes of regime change in Damascus. Syria simply matters; the administration must end its efforts to marginalize a country that can play such a pivotal role in changing the political dynamic

for the better throughout the region. Although ideally direct negotiations between the United States and Iran should be the first resort to resolve the nuclear issue, as long as Tehran does not feel seriously threatened, it seems unlikely that the clergy will at this stage end the nuclear program. In possession of nuclear weapons Iran will intimidate the larger Sunni Arab states in the region, bully smaller states into submission, threaten Israel's very existence, use oil as a political weapon to blackmail the West and instigate regional proliferation of nuclear weapons' programs. In short, if unchecked, Iran could plunge the Middle East into a deliberate or inadvertent nuclear conflagration. If we take the administration at its word that it would not tolerate a nuclear Iran and considering these regional implications, Washington is left with no choice but to warn Iran of the severe consequences of not halting its nuclear program.

That causes extinctionEphraim Sneh, Israeli Deputy Minister of Defense, 3/25/2007, “The Implications of a Nuclear Iran”, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=380&PID=0&IID=1545&TTL=The_Implications_of_a_Nuclear_Iran

Iranian President Ahmadinejad belongs to a school of thought which believes that the return of the Shiite messiah, the Vanished Imam or the Mahdi, is supposed to happen very soon. More than that, Ahmadinejad believes he has a divine role in making this arrival concrete in our lifetime, maybe even within a few years. His faith and convictions say that the messiah, the Mahdi, will come back only if there is a sort of Armageddon, a doomsday or a major global calamity, as a result of which the Shiites will govern the entire globe. When he was mayor of Tehran, Ahmadinejad paved a broad boulevard in the city for the Mahdi to drive on. He is making concrete preparations because he is serious. His actions and declarations are a result of his messianic beliefs, and the elimination of the Jewish state is an indispensable part of the doomsday which must precede the arrival of the Mahdi. More than that, Ahmadinajad says the Mahdi actually advised him to run for president and made his election possible.


Heg Good – Inaction on Iran is Bad

1. U.S. ACTION IS KEY TO REPLACING IRAN’S REGIME WITH A PRO-WESTERN GOVERNMENTBen Shapiro, nationally syndicated columnist and Harvard Law student, July 9, 2003.WHERE CLINTON DIDDLED, BUSH MUST ACT, accessed 11/30/05, http://www.townhall.com/opinion/columns/benshapiro/2003/07/09/160869.html

Without strong American involvement in any regime change, will the threat of Iranian military aggression be subdued? A new regime does not necessarily mean a pro-American regime. If America takes an active role in toppling the mullahs, perhaps Iranian anti-government feeling can be parlayed into pro-America sentiment. If not, any newly instituted Iranian regime could take the same foreign-policy tack as the current government.

2. INACTION ONLY EMBOLDENS THE IRANIAN REGIMEBen Shapiro, nationally syndicated columnist and Harvard Law student, July 9, 2003.WHERE CLINTON DIDDLED, BUSH MUST ACT, accessed 11/30/05, http://www.townhall.com/opinion/columns/benshapiro/2003/07/09/160869.html

The wait-and-see policy also holds the danger that no regime change will occur; the mullahs will have bought themselves months or years in which to manufacture nuclear weapons. Intelligence already shows that the Iranian government is dispersing its nuclear weapons program, making it virtually invulnerable to a 1981 Israeli-style pre-emptive bombing attack. It is not comforting to see the Bush administration relying on the United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency to shut down the mullahs. These organizations didn't get the job done in Iraq or North Korea, and Iran is infinitely more dangerous than either of those countries. Playing the waiting game is not a viable option.

3. APPEASMENT EMPIRICALLY RADICALIZES IRAN – CLINTON PROVESPatrick Devenny, Henry M. Jackson National Security Fellow at the Center for Security Policy, November 2, 2005.EMPOWERING NUCLEAR MULLAHS, accessed 11/30/05, http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=20044

The Clinton policy may originally have had – as its architects forcefully suggest – good intentions. In retrospect, however, the administration’s policy-by-platitude did nothing to chasten the Iranians in their support for Islamic terrorism or their pursuit of regional hegemony. Based on the faulty assumptions that reformists within the Iranian government had far more influence than they actually did, the Clinton administration saw fit to impulsively abandon its national security responsibilities in pursuit of a foreign policy mirage. While defenders of the policy will charge that the rise of Iranian power was made inevitable by strategic and geographical realities, these critics cannot challenge the underlying reality that the United States stood largely prostrate while Iran’s influence grew in numerous respects. Whether a pro-active stance against Iran would have resulted in a more positive outcome is, of course, hypothetical. However, with America now facing an emboldened Iran seemingly hell-bent on expanding its power and influence, it is hard to envision a more negative outcome than the one which eventually stemmed from the appeasement policy of the late 1990s.

4. DIPLOMACY WITHOUT THE THREAT OF MILITARY ACTION CANNOT CHANGE IRANWashington Post Staff Editorial, October 28, 2005.WASHINGTON POST, accessed 11/30/05, http://www.washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20051027-094151-7311r.htm

Iran also has stepped up its efforts to foment unrest in Iraq and has remained energetic in supporting terror groups to challenge the authority of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. The Iranian president's call for Israel's destruction is the latest illustration of the fact that the West's current approach to Iran has failed. The effort to work with the Europeans was worth trying. But the Europeans' unwillingness to consider stronger steps against Iran, combined with the likelihood of Russian and Chinese vetoes at the Security Council, made the European plan unworkable. These developments should be sobering for those who have relied on diplomacy that is not backed up by a credible coercive threat.


Heg Good – Iran Prolif

Heg is key to prevent Iran from building WMD’s. Frederick W. Kagan, resident scholar at AEI. October 13, 2006. AEI Online: “New Thinking, Old Realities.” http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25010,filter.all/pub_detail.asp

Above all, America’s conventional military strength remains critical, traditional power politics continue to control the world, and the lessons of thousands of years of human history still apply. In counterinsurgencies, the first requirement of success is the establishment of security throughout the country or region. This task is [hu]manpower-intensive and incompatible with a small footprint approach. Political, economic, and reconciliation tracks are not sustainable without security, as countless historical examples show. Success in Iraq--and Afghanistan--requires a heavier deployment of U.S. forces with orders not just to train indigenous soldiers, but also to bring peace to those troubled lands. Military strength and the visible will to use it is also essential to persuading regimes like those in Tehran and Pyongyang to abandon programs they wish to pursue. We have been trying the diplomatic approach, unsupported by meaningful military threat, for nearly fifteen years with North Korea, and the result has been utter failure. A similar approach in Iran will not be more successful. It may not be necessary to attack those two states to force them to give up their weapons of mass destruction programs, but there is no hope of convincing them to do so if they do not believe that we can and will defeat them. Nor is there any likelihood that a “small footprint” (almost a “no footprint”) approach in the Horn of Africa will contain the Islamist threat there.

Iranian proliferation bolsters anti-American hardliners, increasing terrorismReuel Marc Gerecht, resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, June 9, 2003, The Weekly Standard

Still the most revolutionary country in the region, Iran has the natural resources, population, geography, culture, and experience with faith-based politics to transform the Muslim Middle East through its successes and failures. A clerical Iran armed with nuclear weaponry might recover some of the dynamism of its early years. The hard-core mullahs' abiding hatred of the United States and its threatening liberal culture could become bolder, fueled by the security of nuclear deterrence and ever-growing anxiety about an "America-inspired" reform movement, which has turned Iran's clerical rulers into dictators in the eyes of most of the country's people. The terrorist reflex in Iran could again start powerfully acting up against the United States, with horrendous results. On the other hand, a democratic Iran, where clerics no longer had dominion, would have an enormous impact on the Middle East. The Islamic revolution would be dead. A secular, democratic alternative would have finally taken root in the heartland of the Muslim world.

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25010,filter.all/pub_detail.asp


Heg Good – Turkey Stability

US-Turkish security cooperation is critical to US power projection and stability in the middle east, Africa, and central asia – its key to overall US hegemonyHüseyin Bagci and Saban Kardas, Middle East Technical University, May 12, 2003, “Post-September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited,” Prepared for the CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, http://www.eusec.org/bagci.htm#ftnref112

In developing this relationship, Turkey's special ties with the region again appeared to be an important asset for U.S. policy. Turkey had a lot to offer: Not only did Turkey have strong political, cultural and economic connections to the region, but it had also accumulated a significant intelligence capability in the region. Moreover, the large experience Turkey accumulated in fighting terrorism would be made available in expanding the global war on terrorism to this region.[43] As a result, after the locus of interest shifted to a possible operation against Afghanistan, and then to assuring the collaboration of the countries in Central Asia, Turkish analysts soon discovered that Turkey's geo-strategic importance was once again on the rise . It was thought that, thanks to its geography's allowing easy access to the region, and its strong ties with the countries there, Turkey could play a pivotal role in the conduct of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, and reshaping the politics in Central Asia: "Turkey is situated in a critical geographic position on and around which continuous and multidimensional power struggles with a potential to affect balance of power at world scale take place. The arcs that could be used by world powers in all sort of conflicts pass through Turkey. Turkish territory, airspace and seas are not only a necessary element to any force projection in the regions stretching from Europe and Asia to the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and Africa, but also make it possible to control its neighborhood... All these features made Turkey a center that must be controlled and acquired by those aspiring to be world powers... In the new process, Turkey's importance has increased in American calculations. With a consistent policy, Turkey could capitalize on this to derive some practical benefits... Turkey has acquired a new opportunity to enhance its role in Central Asia."[44]

US-Turkish cooperation is key to successful leadership on all major foreign policy imperatives Avni Dogru, a political analyst and a freelance writer based in New York, 8-10-2010, “A Break In Israeli-Turkish Relations?,” http://www.countercurrents.org/dogru100810.htm

Turkey, an active member of the G-20, NATO and UN Security Council, has a crucial role in most major U.S. foreign policy issues, including Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran, and can play a vital role in Obama administration’s efforts to mend ties with the Muslim world. Therefore, a downturn in U.S.-Turkish relations may diminish U.S. power and hurt both Turkish and U.S. interests in all these foreign policy issues. In addition, the fact that this political crisis with Israel is also widely perceived as a conflict with the United States in both Turkey and the Muslim world — because of America’s unconditional support for Israel — the continuation of tension will further harm the U.S. image in the Muslim world. Consequently, the rise of anti-Americanism in the region and a more unstable and polarized Middle East would hurt the U.S. standing in the whole of Middle East, but more particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan.

http://www.eusec.org/bagci.htm#ftn43


Heg Good – Turkey Proliferation

Forward military presence prevents Turkish threat perceptionDepartment of Defense, 1995, Security Strategy for Europe and NATO, http://www.dod.gov/pubs/europe/chapter_3.html

U.S. forward military presence in Europe is an essential element of regional security and America's global military posture. Forward deployed conventional and nuclear forces are the single most visible demonstration of America's commitment to defend U.S. and allied interests in Europe. Simultaneously, the presence of overseas forces strengthens the U.S. leadership role in European affairs and supports our efforts to extend stability to the developing democracies to the East. Overall, the presence of U.S. forces deters adventurism and coercion by potentially hostile states, reassures friends, enhances regional stability, and underwrites our larger strategy of engagement and enlargement. The forward stationing of these forces in Europe and the day-to-day interaction of our forces with those of our European allies helps to build and maintain the strong bonds of the Alliance. Our forces train with the forces of our NATO allies on a daily basis, creating a degree of interoperability among NATO forces that we do not share with most other militaries of the world. As a result of these routine interactions, we have the ability to conduct high-intensity joint and combined military operations with our NATO allies both in Europe and in other areas of common interests. The successful DESERT STORM operation to expel Iraqi invaders from Kuwait in 1991 provides the best example of the tangible benefits of forward stationing U.S. forces in Europe to the defense of Western interests beyond Europe. Because of our close cooperation with the NATO militaries in Europe, we were able to conduct sophisticated, large-scale military operations with the forces of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Turkey. These operations were conducted using NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs) for everything from doctrine for land warfare to specifications for refueling nozzles for fighter aircraft. The routine military interaction and habits of cooperation facilitated by forward stationing a sizable operational force in Europe made all this possible.

That leads to Turkism proliferationOliver Thranert, Professor of International Affairs in Germany, 2008, “U.S. Nuclear Forces in Europe to Zero? Yes, But Not Yet,” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22533&prog=zgp&proj=znpp

Second: Nonproliferation within NATO. The U.S. nuclear presence in Europe was always intended to prevent nuclear proliferation within the Alliance. Without a clearly demonstrated nuclear deterrent provided by U.S. nuclear weapons based at Incirlik, Turkey could have further doubts about the reliability of NATO's commitment to its security. Turkey already feels let down by NATO's ambivalent response to its calls for support in the Iraq wars of 1991 and 2003. Sitting on the outer edge of the alliance, facing a nuclear-weapon-capable Iran, and possibly feeling that NATO’s nuclear security guarantee would not actually be extended to it in a crisis, Turkey could seek to develop countervailing nuclear capabilities of its own.

Turkish proliferation devastates US-Turkish relationsIbrahim Al-Marshi, PhD in History from Oxford and, Nishu Goren, Fellow at Monterrey Institute for Non-Proliferation Studies, 2009, “Turkish Perceptions and Nuclear Proliferation,” http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2009/Apr/marashiApr09.asp#author

As official state policy, Turkey complies with the Nonproliferation Treaty, Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, Comprehensive test-ban Treaty (CTBT), and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Even if Turkey were to build a nuclear arsenal it would not be able to deploy nuclear weapons without disrespecting the rule of international law, i.e. noncompliance with the international regimes it has adhered to. In this case, the benefits of acquiring nuclear weapons do not outweigh the costs of economic and political sanctions that the country would face leaving the NATO umbrella and breaking its strategic alliance with United States.


Heg Good – Saudi Arabia

American preponderance is key to protect Saudi Arabia and access to oil.Michael Mandelbaum, Director of the American Foreign Policy program at the Johns Hopkins University. Foreign Policy. Washington: Jan/Feb 2006., Iss. 152; pg. 50, 7 pgs. “David’s Friend Goliath.”

Just as national governments have the responsibility for delivering water and electricity within their jurisdictions, so the United States, through its military deployments and diplomacy, assures an adequate supply of the oil that allows industrial economies to run. It has established friendly political relations, and sometimes close military associations, with governments in most of the major oil-producing countries and has extended military protection to the largest of them, Saudi Arabia. Despite deep social, cultural, and political differences between the two countries, the United States and Saudi Arabia managed in the 20th century to establish a partnership that controlled the global market for this indispensable commodity. The economic well-being even of countries hostile to American foreign policy depends on the American role in assuring the free flow of oil throughout the world.

An embattled Saudi Arabia destroys the economyRobert Baer, former CIA field officer in the Middle East, Sleeping With the Devil, 2003, pg. xxv-xxvi

But all that was calculated on what would have been a then roughly 20 percent rise in the price of crude, a mild bump as economic catastrophes go. The terrorist attack on the Abqaiq oil facility envisioned by the Reagan-era scenarists would remove as many as 5.8 million barrels of crude a day from world markets, double the three million barrels a day taken out of production during the OPEC oil embargo, almost double the daily amount lost to the revolution in Iran and the subsequent Iran—Iraq war, and almost one-fourth the average daily U.S. consumption of crude. What does history tell us about the effects of such a loss? Well, Americans saw double-digit annual inflation only ten times in the last century, four if you exclude the effects of the two world wars: in 1974, in the wake of the OPEC embargo, when inflation soared to 11 percent; and in 1979—81, when inflation topped out at 13.5 percent. By 1981 the price of a barrel of crude had hit $53.39, and regular gasoline was selling at U.S. service stations for over $2 a gallon. The OPEC embargo sent the stock market plummeting. By the time the Standard & Poor 500 bottomed out in September 1974, it had lost 47.7 percent of its value in twenty-one months, almost exactly equal to the 47.8 percent lost in the twenty-eight months beginning in March 2000 as the dot-coin bubble burst. Between 1980 and 1982, the index gave up another 27.1 percent of its value as the unrest in Iran and Iraq rocketed oil to staggering highs. Inflicting selectively heavy damage on the Abqaiq oil-processing center would almost certainly duplicate those inflation figures and send stock indices plunging again. A coordinated attack on Abqaiq, Ras Tanura’s Platform Four, and the East-West pipeline’s Pump Station One, just to pick and choose from dozens of potential targets, would increase both effects exponentially while leaching the last bit of elasticity from the global oil-supply chain. The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve would only help prop up international markets for several months. Unless alternative sources of oil quickly kicked in after that, we’d be in virgin territory—a kind of economic equiv alent of the postnuclear- holocaust world of Nevil Shute’s 1957 bestseller, On the Beach. So what exactly would happen to the price of oil? I’ve surveyed contacts in the oil industry, but no one could come up with even an approximate figure. Apparently, good econometric forecasts on this kind of scenario don’t exist. They tell me, though, that initially we could count on seeing oil hit $80 or $90 a barrel, based on supply and demand. But this does not factor in the panic that would ensue— wild speculative buying. And then there is the wild card of run-of-the-mill disruptions occurring at the same time, like in Nigeria or Venezuela. Now we have oil selling at way over $100 a barrel. But what if chaos in Saudi Arabia slopped over the border into the other Arab sheikhdoms that collectively own 60 percent of the world’s oil reserves? My contacts won’t even touch that one, but my guess is that we’d see oil at $150 a barrel or a lot higher. It wouldn’t take long for everything else to follow suit: economic collapse, world political instability, and a level of personal despair not seen since the Great Depression.


Heg Good – Kuwait

Continued U.S. presence is key to public support for continued democratization efforts in KuwaitW. Andrew Terrill, Ph.D in IR from Claremont Graduate University, September 2007, “Kuwaiti National Security And The U.S.-Kuwaiti Strategic Relationship After Saddam,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf

1. The U.S. leadership must continue to bear in mind that Kuwait is a more important ally than its small territory and population would imply. Moreover, Kuwait may be especially important during the current time frame as the United States and the region attempt to cope with continuing problems with Iraq, Iran, democratization, and counterterrorism. Kuwait, as has been noted throughout this monograph, can contribute significantly to managing all of these problems. Kuwait’s possession of one of the region’s best harbors, as well as its continued willingness to host U.S. troops, stands as an invitation for U.S. military personnel to be the best possible guests. 2. The U.S. Government must avoid making statements that appear to take the Kuwaitis for granted. U.S. politicians that speak of redeploying from Iraq to Kuwait, for example, might do well to note that such a move would only be done after a careful exchange of views with the Kuwaitis and with Kuwaiti permission. Proclaiming a policy that intensely involves Kuwait while assuming that the Kuwaitis will do just about anything that U.S. leaders say is inappropriate and portrays Kuwait as an unequal ally. Such an image will ultimately be resented and could product a backlash that

harms smooth U.S.-Kuwaiti coordination. 3. The United States needs to speak out in favor of Kuwaiti democracy and note the positive lessons of Kuwaiti democratization. With all of the setbacks that have taken place in the Middle Eastern drive for democracy, it is important to note that Kuwaiti progress in democratization and possible lessons of the Kuwaiti model are too often virtually ignored. This process of speaking out will not only be of interest to the Kuwaitis, but it may also help to educate the American public about the value of U.S.-Kuwaiti national security ties. In the West, Kuwait is widely known to have a parliament but it is not clear if the strength of this parliament is fully understood or appreciated. The United States must also accept that democracy is still democracy when politicians we do not like are elected—so long as these people also respect democratic institutions. We cannot fairly support democracy only in cases where the United States approves of the candidates who are elected. Parliaments support evolutionary change in most instances and the Kuwaiti model may prepare citizens for an ever expanding and deepening democratic outlook. 4. Both the United States and Kuwait must continue to understand that the dominant threat to Kuwait is no longer a conventional Iraqi attack. The United States must continue to work with Kuwait to meet evolving national security challenges with the understanding that subversion, terrorism, and huge refugee problems are becoming more important. Further complications in Iraq leading to an escalating civil war must not be allowed to spill over into Kuwait. Rather, Kuwait must be a force for helping the United States and the world deal with ongoing Iraqi political problems and humanitarian challenges. 5. The United States cannot expect endless gratitude for the 1991 liberation to be the basis of policy towards Kuwait. Gratitude, a highly perishable asset in most cases, is often easy to rationalize away. In this instance, Kuwaitis can plausibly maintain that the United States liberated their country in 1991 for its own geopolitical reasons and concerns about oil rather than because of any special concern about the Kuwaiti population. Kuwaitis should not be thought of as ungrateful when all they seek is to present their views to U.S. leaders or when they disagree with U.S. policies based on a reasonable perception of their own national interest. Clearly, more areas of agreement than disagreement exist between the United States and Kuwait on important issues now and in the foreseeable future. 6. The United States needs to be aware that Kuwaiti-Iraqi differences will continue despite Saddam’s removal from power. While Kuwait will hopefully never have another enemy such as Saddam Hussein, its

problems with Iraq could, under certain circumstances, reach extremely high levels. Kuwaitis need to be given strong signals that the United States is pro-Kuwait and not just anti-Saddam.

Internal stability is key to continued foreign investments in Kuwait – that’s key to their democratic consolidationW. Andrew Terrill, Ph.D in IR from Claremont Graduate University, September 2007, “Kuwaiti National Security And The U.S.-Kuwaiti Strategic Relationship After Saddam,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf

It should also be noted that at least some Kuwaitis view democratization as a national security as well as a political development concern. Kuwait remains interested in maintaining the backing and support of the United States and other nonregional allies against any regional states that might threaten it. These relationships may become vulnerable if Kuwait is perceived as increasingly undemocratic. It has already been noted that the more autocratic Saudi Arabia has experienced tremendous U.S. public criticism in recent years. Whatever the validity of many of the complaints, they would have certainly been mitigated by the existence of a Saudi parliament. Kuwait thus has a strong advantage in reaching out to the United States, but this advantage would vanish if Kuwait was viewed by Americans and others as retreating from democracy. Additionally, reform-minded Kuwaitis are quick to point out that a stable, democratic system in Kuwait serves to promote foreign investments. Increased foreign investment in Kuwait has political as well as economic considerations since a number of large corporations would gain a stake in Kuwait’s future.


Heg Good – Kuwait – Deter Iran

U.S. military presence in Kuwait is key to contain Iran’s regional ambitionsDouglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Director of the Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007, “KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf

Dr. Terrill also considers how an assertive Iran is interacting with Kuwait at the present time and how the two nations have a historic pattern of widely fluctuating relations. While Kuwait and Iran are currently superficially friendly to each other, they nevertheless have strong conflicting interests. In particular, Iran is not pleased with the close U.S.-Kuwait military relationship and would like to replace U.S. influence in the Gulf with its own. Kuwait, conversely, feels the need to maintain open and friendly relations with its much larger neighbor to limit Iranian intrigue and to assuage Kuwaiti Shi’ites who view the Islamic Republic with some warmth. Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti leadership knows not to trust Iranian intentions and is sometimes appalled by Tehran’s assertive rhetoric. Kuwaitis, like the other Gulf Arabs, are deeply disturbed about the Iranian move to acquire nuclear capabilities, which they view as an environmental and security threat. Nor would Kuwaitis like to see the United States depart from the Gulf and thereby remove the most serious countervailing influence to Iranian dominance.

Only U.S. military presence deters Iran – pulling out proves to Tehran that they can be more aggressiveKenneth Pollack, director of research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, Fmr. Director for Gulf Affairs at the NSC, Fmr. Persian Gulf Military Analyst at the CIA, The Persian Puzzle, 2005, p.376

America’~ history with Iran also offers other warnings regarding this approrich. In practice, this policy would be identical to the failed European policy of Critical Dialogue. It is a policy of all carrots at-id no sticks. Just as they did with the Critical Dialogue, Iran’s hard-liners would undoubtedly pocket all of the carrots and do nothing to change. Indeed, as the China example demonstrates, what this approach does is lock in the current regime—at least in the short and medium terms (after all, there is a case to be made that Chinese politics are changing too, just very slowly). In the case of Iran it is even worse, because the hard-liners have argued for more than a decade that the United States would not be able to maintain the sanctions on Iran because the United States needed Iran more than Iran needed the United States. As Graham Fuller has pointed out, this tends to say as much about the remarkably inflated view of their country held by many Iranians—who see Iran as “the center of the universe”—than it does about their objective understanding of the world.16 But by reversing course and lifting the sanctions without securing any change in Iranian behavior in return; the United States would be proving the point of the hard-liners. – Over the past fifteen years, the only things that have caused Iran to change its behavior have been the threat of military action by the United States in 1988 and 1996 and the threat of sanctions by the Europeans in 1997 and 2003. The American sanctions have inhibited Iran’s freedom of action somewhat, but because Tehran could always turn to Europe (and Russia and Japan) for trade and aid, the American sanctions never forced them to do anything. Far from coaxing Iran to become more responsible, a policy of unilateral conces sions is much more likely to convince Tehran’s hard-liners that they can con tinue to pursue their preferred foreign policy of aggressive opposition to the United States and the Status quo without suffering any meaningful repercus - sions.


Heg Good – Kuwait – Deter Iran

Withdrawal from Kuwait emboldens Iranian aggressionW. Andrew Terrill, General, Douglas MacArthur Professor of National Security Affairs @ the Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007, , “KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf

Kuwait and the other Gulf Arab states are known to be deeply apprehensive about the Iranian interest in acquiring nuclear technology, although they are also worried about appearing too confrontational with Tehran.208 The concern about an Iranian nuclear weapons capability is not surprising given that such a system could increase Iranian self-confidence and strongly embolden Tehran in its desire to play a more assertive regional role with conventional and unconventional forces. While Kuwaitis probably do not fear being attacked with nuclear weapons, they are aware that the large and powerful Iranian army is a serious threat that may be employed more readily if Tehran has a nuclear option to protect itself from “regime change” by the United States.209 Moreover, the Iranian danger could be amplified if the United States is seen to be faltering in its commitment to Kuwaiti security due to isolationism that could result from Iraq war setbacks and traumas. The Kuwaitis and other Gulf Arabs have sought techniques to express their concern about an Iranian nuclear capability without implying a threat of Iranian aggression. One of the central ways in which they have done this is to treat the Iranian program as an environmental issue rather than a security issue in their overt diplomacy. In particular, they suggest that a nuclear accident in Iran would have dramatic implications for their own countries if massive amounts of radiation were released into the atmosphere as a result of such an occurrence.210 The Kuwaitis also stress dangers to their desalination plants which are their primary source of fresh water. This approach to the problem also allows Kuwaiti diplomacy and that of the other Gulf states to sidestep the issue of whether or not the Iranian nuclear energy program is also a nuclear weapons program.

U.S. presence is key to stable deterrent against Iran Sami G. Hajjar, Prof at the Strategic Studies Institute, March 2002, “U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf,” https://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB185.pdf

Many U.S. military personnel serving in the Arabian/ Persian Gulf region, it is safe to assume, consider this tour of duty a direct consequence of the 1991 Gulf War that ejected Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, which he had occupied in August 1990 and declared a province of Iraq. The objectives of U.S. military presence involve the enforcement of United Nations (U.N.) imposed sanctions on Iraq, and deterrence to maintain regional security and stability against the potential of renewed threats from possible regional aggressors such as Iraq and Iran.


Heg Good – Kuwait – Middle East Stability

Kuwait presence is key to successful operations throughout the middle eastSandra Jontz, Stars and Stripes, 4-11-2005, “Army preparing to close Camp Doha, shift operations to other Kuwait bases,” http://www.stripes.com/news/army-preparing-to-close-camp-doha-shift-operations-to-other-kuwait-bases-1.31807

“We need to bypass the populated area of Kuwait City, and we want to be less disruptive to the civilian population,” said Maj. Jeffrey Doll, the base’s operations officer. “We’re moving away from populated areas.” The roughly 3,000 to 5,000 stationed troops at Doha will move primarily to Camp Buehring in the north and Camp Arifjan in the south, Smith said. The U.S. military has between 15,000 and 20,000 troops at 10 installations throughout Kuwait. Camp Arifjan, about an hour’s drive from Camp Doha, now serves as the main staging ground for all coalition forces involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Troops will arrive in and depart from the region via Ali Al Salem Air Base nearby. When built two years ago, the U.S. military envisioned Camp Arifjan as a permanent base, Smith said. Even if the country were not at war, the United States wants to keep bases in U.S.-friendly Kuwait as training sites, giving troops an opportunity to drill in the harsh heat and dusty environment that mirror battlegrounds in the region, said Sgt. Maj. Michael Phoenix, Camp Doha’s command sergeant major. “Units will be coming here to train, whether they’re going to war or not,” he said. By August, most of the southern half of Camp Doha will be closed, and the largely logistical functions there will move to Camp Buehring, Camp Virginia and Camp Arifjan. The Army has set February as the target month to completely vacate the site, Doll said. Camp Doha’s AAFES exchange, which soldiers there dubbed the best in Kuwait, will hold its “fire sale” over Memorial Day weekend, and will close by the end of June, Phoenix said. Camp Doha’s loss is Camp Arifjan’s gain. The base continues to add permanent and semipermanent structures to join its already sprawling compound of barracks, gym, community center, Morale Welfare and Recreational facilities, chow halls and even a swimming pool.

The ability to project power throughout the middle east is contingent on facilities in KuwaitGlobal Security, 04-26-2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-arifjan.htm

Camp Arifjan is a new $200 million state-of-the-art facility built courtesy of the Kuwaiti government. This new army base has literally risen out of the sand. The base will provide permanent support facilities for American troops in Kuwait, replacing temporary facilities that have been used since the Gulf War. The Army component of US Central Command (USCENTCOM), US Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT), maintains a forward presence in the region. Government-to-government agreements were negotiated with the Qatar and Kuwait to allow the prepositioning of military assets. The Army has met major milestones in its security strategy in the Middle East by completing a prepositioning facility in Qatar, and by the rapid pace of construction on a new installation in Kuwait. These facilities support USCENTCOM's efforts to protect US interests in this region in accordance with the National Security Strategy. US forces use these facilities under a variety of agreements, which include host nation involvement with providing and managing the facilities. A new prepositioning facility is under construction by the Kuwait government at Arifjan, south of Kuwait City [Arifjan is also known as Araifjan, Arefjan and Urayfijan]. When complete, the facility will replace Camp Doha, a former industrial warehouse complex that has been converted for use as an Army installation. Camp Doha was leased by the Kuwait Ministry of Defense and provided to the Army to support its three major missions in Kuwait -- to maintain prepositioned equipment, supplies and materials; direct joint exercises with the Kuwait armed forces; and ensure the security of Kuwait. Camp Doha was intended as a temporary facility until the permanent installation was designed and built at Arifjan. A full brigade set of equipment is stored at Camp Doha, much of it outside. The new facility will have most of the equipment sets stored in large warehouses, similar to the ones built in Qatar, to protect them from the harsh desert environment. While troops jokingly call the pair of tall smokestacks near Camp Doha the "Scud goal posts," commanders have had to install makeshift measures around the facility to keep troops protected from terrorist threats. All that will change when the Army shifts its operations to a new facility now being built south of Kuwait City near the village of Arifjan and the headquarters of a Kuwait armored brigade. It will be absolutely state of the art, from force protection to life support. For starters, troops will live in actual barracks instead of the beehives carved out of the warehouses. Instead of hanging Kevlar netting across windows to protect against blasts, the new facility will use shatterproof Mylar glass. Armored


vehicles will get special maintenance bays for the contracted mechanics who keep the equipment at one of the highest availability rates in the Army.


Heg Good – Kuwait – Middle East Stability

US basing is Kuwait is key – no other regional actors will fill inDouglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Director of the Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007, “KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf

The United States has found no shortage of difficulties in recent years as it has moved forward in implementing its security policies toward the Middle East and especially the Persian/Arabian Gulf. Security threats resulting from an Iraq in turmoil and an assertive Iran are near the top of U.S. concerns about its future security. Efforts to deal with terrorism and to encourage and support the efforts of regional states to stem the rise of violent terrorist groups are also important. Kuwait, while a small country with a limited population, nevertheless has many of the same concerns as the United States in that part of the world. While Kuwait cannot act as a major regional power, it can nevertheless still serve as a valuable ally, whose contributions to regional security and democratization should not be overlooked. These contributions center on strategic geography, economic strength, and a willingness to host U.S. forces that is long-standing in a region where such actions can sometimes be seen as controversial.

Withdrawal leads to Iranian hegemony, economic collapse, regional proliferation and Mideast conflagration Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995

In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination . Iran and Iraq have, in the past, both sought regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection, the weak oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be unlikely to retain their independence. To preclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps by purchase, their own nuclear weapons. If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that dominates the world supply of oil, it could gain a significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country that gained hegemony would have vast economic resources at its disposal that could be used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the United States and other oil importing nations. Hegemony over the Persian Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East under its influence and domination because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the peace process would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and the Israelis. The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf would harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living.


Kuwait Democracy Good – Middle East Modeling

Backsliding by Kuwait undermines democracy throughout the middle eastNathan J. Brown, Prof of PoliSci and IR at George Washington University and a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009, “Moving Out of Kuwait’s Political Impasse” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23320

A successful attempt to sustain the Kuwaiti democratic experiment would have mildly positive regional effects for the cause of political reform. In earlier decades, Kuwait served as a positive model for some Gulf states. The Bahraini constitution of 1973, for example, was modeled on the Kuwaiti document. Kuwait no longer seems like such a positive model―in fact, the political stalemate in the country now serves as a negative model. A revival of Kuwaiti democracy will not lead to a “Gulf spring” much less an Arab one. But it will prevent elections and parliaments from becoming symbols of stagnation and paralysis.

Now is key – Kuwait’s democracy is under the spotlight and on the brinkYaroslav Trofimov, Reporter for Wall Street Journal, 4-9-2009, “Kuwait's Democracy Faces Turbulence,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123911916184897231.html

Watched across the Arab world, the unfolding crisis of democracy in Kuwait has implications far beyond this small emirate. The country hosts major U.S. military bases and sits atop the world's fifth-largest oil reserves at the strategic intersection of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran. The standoff puts the spotlight, once again, on a crucial policy dilemma for Barack Obama's administration: whether Washington should pursue the Bush-era commitment to free elections in the Arab world, or whether it should concentrate on propping up friendly autocratic regimes, be they in Dubai, Cairo or Riyadh.

Kuwait is the beacon on the hill for regional democracy effortsRobert F. Worth, NYT Staff Writer, 5-6-2008, “In Democracy Kuwait Trusts, but Not Much,” http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/06/world/middleeast/06kuwait.html

In some ways, Kuwait is the most democratic country in the Arab world, aside from Lebanon. There are Arab republics — in Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Iraq and Tunisia — but despite their democratic forms, those countries have generally been more autocratic and repressive than the region’s monarchies. Even in Lebanon, democracy is limited by a sectarian system of power-sharing. In Kuwait, by contrast, tensions between the majority Sunnis and minority Shiites are minimal. Kuwaitis of all backgrounds mix socially at diwaniyas, the traditional evening gatherings where political and social gossip is shared over tea and coffee. There is some conflict between Islamists and liberals in Parliament, but with no officially recognized political parties, ideology is flexible and shifting. And while there have been setbacks — the royal family suspended Parliament in the late 1970s and again in the late 1980s — Kuwait has grown steadily more democratic. Two years ago, popular pressure forced a change in the electoral districting law, making it harder to buy votes. Women gained the right to vote and run in elections (though none have won seats). In mid-April, Kuwaiti democrats won yet another battle after the government tried to pass a law restricting public gatherings. There were popular demonstrations against the proposal, and the government backed down.


A2: Middle East War – No Escalation

A Mideast war would not escalate or go nuclearElizabeth Stevens, September 19, 2002, http://infomanage.com/nonproliferation/najournal/israelinucs.html

Thus far, Israel has confronted continuous hostility with a strong conventional superiority. It is doubtful that it would resort to a nuclear weapon given the fact that it could repel the attack of any one of its Arab opponents and probably a combination of them. Israel has signed a peace treaty with Egypt, and moderating forces in Jordan are strong. The recent peace treaty with the PLO and differences between Iraq and Syria further reduce the possibility of a united Arab attack. It would appear that Israel does not need a nuclear arsenal.

Middle East war will stay contained – countries lack capabilities for major escalationProfessor Li Shaoxian, expert in the Middle East and a senior researcher in the Institute of Contemporary International Relations, 8-17-2001, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Aug/17671.htm

Although the situation in the Middle East is alarming, it will not start a war. The main reasons are: First, both the international community and international environment will not allow another Middle East war to break out. Peace and development is still the theme of today’s world. No big power wants to see a new war between Arab and Israel in this area so crucial to oil production. Second, war is not in line with the interests of several countries in the Middle East. None of the Israelis (including Sharon himself) wants war, because war would again put the very existence of the country in danger; Yasser Afrafat, as well, does not want war, because war would turn his 10 years peace efforts into nothing; Egypt and Syria, the other two big powers in Middle East, do not want war either. The president of Egypt Hosni Mubarak firmly rejected the possibility of war in an interview with Israeli TV. Bashar al-Assad, the new president of Syria, has put most his attention on domestic affairs. Third, the countries and extremists who do want to see war have neither the capablities or means for war.

No regional escalation—empirically deniedKevin Drum, Reporter for Washington Monthly, 9-9-2007, “The Chaos Hawks,”http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2007_09/012029.php

Having admitted, however, that the odds of a military success in Iraq are almost impossibly long, Chaos Hawks nonetheless insist that the U.S. military needs to stay in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Why? Because if we leave the entire Middle East will become a bloodbath. Sunni and Shiite will engage in mutual genocide, oil fields will go up in flames, fundamentalist parties will take over, and al-Qaeda will have a safe haven bigger than the entire continent of Europe. Needless to say, this is nonsense. Israel has fought war after war in the Middle East. Result: no regional conflagration. Iran and Iraq fought one of the bloodiest wars of the second half the 20th century. Result: no regional conflagration. The Soviets fought in Afghanistan and then withdrew. No regional conflagration. The U.S. fought the Gulf War and then left. No regional conflagration. Algeria fought an internal civil war for a decade. No regional conflagration.


A2: Middle East War – No Draw-In

No great power escalation scenario – Russia is a moderate in the Middle East – they seek to avoid conflict Sergey Ivanov, Russian Defence Minister, 2-10-2006, “Russia's defence chief hopeful of compromise with Iran,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union.

Compared to the West, Moscow has always adopted a very moderate stance towards Iran. What position will it adopt in the event of a conflict? [Ivanov] Our moderate stance, as you call it, is wholly understandable. Political dialogue between Russia and Iran has always been very intense and it involves bilateral issues and common problems. I am thinking of the situations in Afghanistan, in Tajikistan, in the Caspian, in Iraq, and in the Middle East. And I am thinking also of our commercial and economic ties. For instance, our country is currently engaged in helping Iran with the construction of a nuclear power station in Bushehr. That said, we think that the problem must be settled strictly within the framework of the IAEA, because any attempt to call Iran to a show of strength could trigger an opposite, and probably irreversible, effect. It is important for us to maintain our economic ties with Iran, to keep the situation stable in the region, and not to allow a confrontation which could lead to a conflict.

China adopts a non-interventionist posture toward Middle East conflictsChietigj Bajpaee, Power and Interest News Reporter for Asia Times online, 3-14-2006, “China stakes its Middle East claim,” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HC14Ad01.html

While the US has become more willing to engage in humanitarian intervention, preemptive action and regime change, with the Middle East emerging as the most likely candidate for the US to practice these policies, China retains a preference for a traditional Westphalian-style of conducting international relations with emphasis on non-intervention, state sovereignty and territorial integrity.

They win by staying outChietigj Bajpaee, Power and Interest News Reporter for Asia Times online, 3-14-2006, “China stakes its Middle East claim,” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HC14Ad01.html

However, events in these two regions are not mutually exclusive. China's growing economic influence has proceeded in tandem with a growing military capability and more proactive political and diplomatic policy on the world stage, including in the Middle East. Its policy toward the Middle East has emerged as a microcosm of its foreign policy throughout the world, being driven by a desire to maintain a stable international environment in order to focus on its internal development, forming a close bond with the developing world, gaining access to raw materials and markets, and elevating its status on the world stage.

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