Attack Modeling for Information Security and Survivability Presented By Chad Frommeyer.

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Attack Modeling for Information Security and Survivability Presented By Chad Frommeyer

Transcript of Attack Modeling for Information Security and Survivability Presented By Chad Frommeyer.

Attack Modeling for Information Security and Survivability

Presented By

Chad Frommeyer

Introduction

• Introduction

• Attack Trees

• Attack Pattern Reuse

• Attack Tree Refinement

• Conclusions

Introduction

• Problem– Attack Data not used for improving Design

and Implementation– Engineers still not learning from the past– Need a better way to utilize past attack data

• Solution (Attack Trees/Patterns)

• ACME Enterprise

Attack Trees

• Definition– a systematic method to characterize system

security based on varying attacks

Attack Trees (Structure/Semantics)

• Root Node

• Tree Nodes– Attack Sub-Goals

• AND-Decomposition requires all to succeed• OR-Decomposition requires one to succeed

AND Decomposition

OR Decomposition

Attack Trees

• Intrusion Scenarios– Scenarios that result in achieving the primary

goal– Generated by traversing the tree in a depth-

first manner– Intermediate nodes are not appear

• Branch Refinement

• ACME Attack Tree

Attack Trees

• ACME intrusion scenarios• <1.1> , <1.2> , <2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4>• <3.1> , <3.2>• <4.1> , <4.2> , <5.1> , <5.2> , <5.3>• <6.1> , <6.2>

Attack Trees

• Refinement of ACME node 5.3

Attack Trees

• ACME intrusion scenarios (Refined)• <1, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1> , <1, 2.2, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1>• <1, 2.3, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1> , <1, 2.1, 3.2, 4.1, 5.1>• <1, 2.2, 3.2, 4.1, 5.1> , <1, 2.3, 3.2, 4.1, 5.1>• <1, 2.1, 3.1, 4.2, 5.1> , <1, 2.2, 3.1, 4.2, 5.1>• <1, 2.3, 3.1, 4.2, 5.1> , <1, 2.1, 3.2, 4.2, 5.1>• <1, 2.2, 3.2, 4.2, 5.1> , <1, 2.3, 3.2, 4.2, 5.1>

Attack Pattern Reuse

• Definition

• Components of an Attack Pattern

• Pertain to Software and Hardware

• Attack Profiles

Attack Pattern Reuse

• Components of an Attack Pattern– Overall Goal– Preconditions/Assumptions– Attack Steps– Post-conditions (true if attack is successful)

Buffer Overflow Attack

Unexpected Operator Attack

Attack Pattern Reuse

• Components of an Attack Profile– Common Reference Model– Set of Variants– Set of Attack Patterns– Glossary of terms and phrases

Attack Reference Model

Attack Tree Refinement

• Refinement Process

• Require security expertise

• Attack pattern libraries

Attack Tree Refinement

• Profile/Enterprise Consistency

• Definition: “Consistency”

• Attack Pattern Relevance

• ACME Example– Org = ACME– Intranet = ACME Internet– Firewall = ACME Firewall

Attack Tree Refinement

• Resulting Reference Model

Attack Tree Refinement

• Pattern Application– Show relevance to the attack tree goal

(relevance)– Applying Attack Patterns

Conclusions

• Objective

• Documentation via Attack Trees/Profiles

• Documentation Reuse

• Questions still to answer

• Continued Research