Atlatic Voices - NATO Military Exercises and Deterrence

YOUTH ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION (Supported by ATA)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 04 - Flora Pidoux

Deciding to attack an opponent is often the result of a rational choice calculation whereby the gains of attacking would outweigh the associated costs. In order to prevent an attack, building a strong deterrent force is crucial to make the cost of attacking or the cost or retaliation clearly outweigh the potential gains of attacking. It is based on this idea, and mainly thanks to their nuclear weapons, that the West has been through relatively peaceful times since the end of the Second World War and despite the confrontation with Russia.

In recent years, and even though threatening NATO still risks triggering a nuclear response, Moscow maneuvers on the Alliance’s Eastern front have made the Allies recenter their scope of action back onto themselves. The way Russia is behaving does not seem rational, and it is for that reason that the Alliance must respond with care. At the same time, NATO must respond to the security dilemma Russia created: deterrence must be reinforced.

The first article of this publication focuses on NATO’s deterrence strategy on the Eastern flank of the Alliance, while the second analyses Exercise Trident Juncture, NATO’s largest exercise since 1998.

NATO Military Exercises and Deterrence Volume 6 - Issue 04 April 2016

Contents: Deterrence on the Eastern Flank Mr. Patrick Curran analyzes how deterrence has been a core element of NATO’s strategy during the Cold War but had been put to the side until a few years ago with the worrisome developments to the Alliance’s Eastern Flank. It appears that despite many efforts, NATO’s deterrence is not yet powerful enough to face a potential attack. Trident Juncture and the Return of Large Scale Exercises Mr. Francisco Costa� focuses on Exercise Trident Juncture 2015 which marked the return large scale exercises. Outlined in the Wales Declaration, this exercise appears to be the first step of many new initiatives currently being put in place by the Allies and aiming to reinforce the security of the Euro-Atlantic.

SNMG2 Manoeuvring Exercise as part of Exercise Trident Juncture 2015 (Photo: 2016 BRUNSSUM - Allied Joint Force Command)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 04 2

By Patrick Curran F ollowing the suspension of the Ukrainian Association Agreement with the European Union (EU) in November of

2013, Ukraine was set on a path that would topple the government, alienate populations and subject part of the country’s sovereign territory to encroachment and subsequent annexation by the Russian state. This represents the second time in seven years - the first being the 2008 invasion of Georgia - that Moscow has ignored international law and violated another nation’s territory. While neither Ukraine nor Georgia are NATO members, both cases exhibit Russian forces moving into territory formerly controlled by the Soviet Union. This is not in and of itself a threat to NATO, but with states such as Poland and the Baltics having made the transition from the Soviet sphere towards the West, this sort of behavior from Russia is still a cause for concern. Following the annexation of Crimea, there have been calls from across the 28 members, especially the Baltic states on the eastern border, for an increase in one of NATO’s oldest strategies: deterrence. Since this time, the Alliance has certainly increased its deterrence and reassurance activities in the region with a series of measures aimed at ensuring the security of the 28 Allies, a concern that had been put to the side for the past decades to focus on counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, NATO’s strategy has shown that this sort of action is coming to an end; terrorism is not its key focus. Measures have been taken to shore up defenses on the Eastern flank, but they do not seem to go far enough to guarantee future deterrence of the

nuclear capable, near-peer adversary that is seen in Russia. History of Deterrence in NATO

NATO entered the Cold War with a strong strategy of deterrence in place. It focused almost entirely on nuclear retaliation against any sort of threat, and while the Soviet Union lacked nuclear capability at first, this was enough to act as a true deterrent as none of the blocks wanted to face damage on their own soil. However, upon the USSR gaining this capability, and the subsequent formation of the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) theory, the need for a strong conventional deterrent came to the forefront. In 1967, the North Atlantic Military Committee adopted the MC 14/3 strategy, which established a hybrid deterrent, beginning with conventional forces along the Inner German border and followed up with nuclear weapons at the tactical, theatre, and strategic levels if the conventional forces failed. The importance of this strategy emerged as it became clear that NATO would not initiate nuclear war but would only attack as a second strike. This transition represented an opportunity to provide deterrence toward the Soviet Union and reassurance for the member states without the immediate risk of escalation at the first sign of attack.

Deterrence of any kind works towards two specific objectives: prevent any kind of aggression in the first place, and if that fails, containment of a crisis in order to minimize losses. Conventional deterrence works in three ways. First, the presence of military forces in an area increases the uncertainty of an aggressor and dramatically adds to the costs of an incursion if the

Deterrence on the Eastern Flank


deterrence fails. Even if the forces in place are unable to mount a successful defense, the fact that the aggressor is not guaranteed a quick victory creates a certain level of restraint. This was the role of Allied forces in Berlin throughout the Cold War. Second, the deterrent forces have the possibility of mounting a successful defense. Just as before, the forces raise the costs of an enemy incursion. If an aggressor commits an attack that is subsequently halted, it acts as both an actual military defeat as well as a psychological defeat in the minds of decision makers and citizens alike. Third, the defensive forces contribute by offering the possibility of a retaliatory strike. While this can obviously be done with a nuclear deterrent, this again offers a chance of avoiding escalation. The objective of this counter attack is not necessarily in capturing and controlling an area, but simply to draw aggressor forces away from the territory they initially attacked. The first two situations act as denial deterrence, which offers both defender and aggressor a fairly straightforward outcome. While they do increase the uncertainty, as war is always impossible to fully predict, they still allow for a reasonable interpretation of losses on both sides. The retaliatory deterrence offers a much vaguer set of costs, whether nuclear or conventional, in that it is dependent on the availability of high value targets and a high likelihood of implementation.

Recent Trends in NATO Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has had a

general downward trend in both military size and spending across all member countries. While this makes perfect sense following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of NATO’s primary objective, recent developments around the world now necessitate a reversal of this trend. However, actions towards this end have been made since the Russian invasion and subsequent annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. In 2015, sixteen NATO members not only stopped their

defense spending cuts but increased the resources available for that sector. This puts in real terms the insecurity felt by NATO members and the responding effort to remedy it. Although this slight increase alone is not enough to increase deterrent capabilities, when matched with other measures, it can allow for a stronger posture. One of the most important recent developments in NATO strategy came in the form of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) initiated at the

NATO Wales Summit of 2014. The RAP takes measures that “are defensive, proportionate, and fully in line with NATO’s international obligations,” in order to increase preparedness for any number of security challenges. It is divided into two pillars: assurance measures which increase force presence on the Eastern flank in the short-term, and adaptation measures which are geared towards long-term capabilities. The assurance measures include a number of steps to

During the Cold War, NATO positioned 8 Allied corps and 20 divisions along the border between West and East Germany. Today, the border Esto-

nia, Latvia and Lithuania share with Russia is only protected by the indige-nous forces of the three Baltic states (Image: RAND Corporation)


increase the conventional deterrent in the member states that are most exposed to threats from Russia and the Middle East. The majority of this is seen in reinforcing the air policing missions and naval presence in the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean Seas and all along the Eastern border. The long-term adaptation measures are focused mainly on increasing capabilities of NATO forces and interoperability of member forces. This can be seen most in the NATO Response Force (NRF), a division-size joint force tasked with responding to security challenges in member states. The newly formed Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) acts as the spearhead of the NRF. It is made up of about 5000 troops and, once it is operational, will be able to deploy to any member states within three days. These forces are coordinated by the NATO Force Integration Units, multinational command and control centers initially positioned across the Eastern borders. Finally, exercises focused on “crisis management and collective defense,” will be increasing over the next several years. Already, the number of training exercises across Europe has increased substantially, from about 200 in 2014 to more than 300 in 2015.

The highlight of the exercises came in Operation Trident Juncture 2015 (TJ 15). This was the largest training and interoperability exercises since 2002, and it involved the participation of over 36000 soldiers across the territory of Italy, Spain, and Portugal. The goal of Trident Juncture, according to General Jean-Paul Paloméros, former Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, was to “re-invest in a high intensity scenario and re-train in maneuver warfare.” After a decade of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, NATO forces had lost its much preparedness to fight a near-peer adversary in a more conventional (read: not counter-insurgency) war, both in terms of military capital and training. A large amount of the activities in Trident Juncture were focused on the certification of the NRF and

the VJTF. As the VJTF had not been established during the initial planning stages of the exercise, it was not fully tested in all capacities. However, the exercise Noble Jump, hosted in June 2015 in Zagan, Poland, was entirely based around the VJTF and was just the first of many exercises to come that will be testing and developing VJTF capabilities. Noble Jump was a part of the Allied Shield series of exercises held in the summer of 2015. This is just one aspect of a much wider effort to reassure the Eastern Allies of NATO’s commitment to their security.

Following cyberattacks on Estonia in 2008, as well as the application of hybrid attacks in Russia’s campaigns in both Georgia and Ukraine, NATO has also taken steps to increase its cyber security. The opening of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD CoE) in Tallinn, Estonia vastly increased the amount of attention being given to the cyber security of the Alliance. The Centre hosts regular defense exercises to prepare for this sort of hybrid attack and trains NATO, member state, and partner state technicians in the modern systems used in today’s militaries. The annual Locked Shields exercise brings together 16 countries as well as the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability to train for such an incident and prepare a comprehensive response. While the Alliance is very clear that it will only work to protect its own communication and information systems (CIS), these exercises, along with other workshops and seminars throughout the year, help to train and evaluate the member states’ individual capabilities.

Beyond NATO training exercises, there are several other measures in place to achieve increase deterrent capabilities, including the US’ European Reassurance Initiative, a project for funding the deterrence strategy in Eastern Europe. This program has been in place for several years providing infrastructural improvements to military facilities from Iceland to Poland. The fiscal year


(FY) 2017 will be seeing a massive increase in funding. The ERI budget for FY2016 amounted to a total of $789.3 million, the request for FY2017 however, totals $3,4197 billion, an increase of over four times. This increase will allow the US military to vastly improve its forward positioning and deterrent forces in Eastern Europe. The highlights of the plan for FY2017 include a persistent presence of armored brigade combat teams, an increase in naval operations in the Black, Mediterranean, and Baltic seas, reinforcement of Air Force units in Europe, the installation of advanced early warning systems, bilateral reassurance missions to the Eastern Allies, increased support for NATO exercises, prepositioning of equipment across the region, increased special forces activities, theater anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and improved command and control capabilities. Furthermore, the funds for the ERI are derived from the Overseas Contingency Operations fund (OCO), which essentially acts as a as a wartime slush fund. While the money is guaranteed for the present, the OCO is not a part of the base budget and is therefore limited to short-term investments. The ERI obviously shows American support for the assurance and deterrence strategy, but even with this effort, NATO still lacks the necessary posture and presence for forming a true conventional deterrent against a near-peer military force.

The short-comings are not limited to any one member though. Only 5 NATO members achieve the 2% guideline on military spending. Even with the recent increases (the Alliance is collectively spending more than it has since the Cold War), this presents further challenges for establishing an effective conventional deterrent. The issue is not military, but

political. As Jan Techau of Carnegie Europe put it, “The fundamental problem is that Europeans - despite Russia's invasion of Ukraine or the rise of the Islamic State - do not feel threatened. Thus, it is not very realistic that we'll ever get 2% across the board.” Deficiencies in Deterrence

Earlier this year, the RAND Corporation, an American-based think thank, ran a series of war-games, utilizing a wide range of experts for the opposing forces, that simulated a Russian attack on the two northern Baltic countries, Estonia and Latvia. The simulations worked on the current force posture and deployments as well as the assumption that NATO forces had advanced warning of one week; in every iteration, the Alliance forces suffered catastrophic defeats. Under these conditions, Russian forces were surrounding or entering Riga and Tallinn within 36 to 60 hours. If Russian forces were to bring such a scenario into reality, essentially everything in NATO’s

current posture would be working against the Alliance. The borders that the Baltic states share with the Russian Federation are about

the same dimensions as the Inner German border of the Cold War, however that is where the similarities in deterrence and defense end. During the Cold War, the border was defended by twenty NATO divisions; currently, the Baltics are only permanently defended by their own forces, roughly one infantry brigade each. These forces would be pitted against about 27 battalions from the Russian Western Military District and the Kaliningrad Oblast. Furthermore, the distance that the Russian forces would have to traverse to reach the two capitals are between 200 and 275 km, whereas the closest NATO forces, located in Poland, would be

“The fundamental problem is that Europeans - despite Russia's invasion of Ukraine or the rise of the Islamic

State - do not feel threatened. Thus, it is not very realis-tic that we'll ever get 2% across the board.”�

��- Jan Techau, Carnegie Europe


forced to cover more than 400 km, a large portion of which is spent crossing the Kaliningrad Corridor, an area between the Kaliningrad Oblast, a part of the Russian Federation, and Belarus. This area provides the Russian and Belarusian militaries prime opportunities to bombard NATO reinforcements with local artillery as well as the ability to flank from both sides.

If this sort of scenario were to occur and Russian forces reached the two capitals in less than three days, the report asserts that NATO would be left with three options, and they would all be less than desirable. First, NATO could amass forces in Poland for a counter-offensive. This would take several weeks at least, during which Moscow would be able to take political actions to limit the effectiveness of such an attack, including annexation as seen in Crimea to bring the Baltics under Russia’s nuclear umbrella. Furthermore, due to Russia’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) systems in both Kaliningrad and the Western Military District, this approach would likely require NATO forces to attack targets inside legitimate Russian territory. This strategy, even if it proves successful, could risk nuclear escalation if the bulk of Russia’s military is threatened with destruction. The second option is massive retaliation against Russia, likely a nuclear strike against Moscow. This would also be an obvious prompting for nuclear exchange between NATO and Russia. Finally, the third option is the concession of the Baltics in order to retain the bulk of the Alliance’s strength for the future. This is obviously the worst-case scenario as it would essentially negate any strength that Article 5 previously had. Requirements Moving Forward

The first step toward creating an effective conventional deterrent in the East is to continue the

progress made in FY2016 toward the 2% of GDP for defense spending goal. If this increase were to occur, the Baltic countries would be able to augment their own defense forces and the Alliance as a whole will be able to implement more rotational forces. As for the actual deterrent in the Baltics, the RAND report recommends six brigades, at least three being heavy armor, with corresponding artillery and logistical support to be posted along the borders with Russia. This force, matched with NATO’s air and naval superiority, would be able to hold off a Russian attack for at least three days, greatly increasing the amount of time for NATO to respond with the VJTF and other NRF units, as well as raising the costs for Moscow. From this point, the possibility of aggression becomes a matter of schools of thought. It is impossible to really predict the outcome of geopolitics, as can be seen in NATO’s decrease in focus on the Eastern border, but with this change in posture, NATO’s ability to deter aggression in the region would certainly grow. Finally, the Alliance should begin to increase the size and frequency of training exercises. While the Allies have committed to those of similar size to Trident Juncture every three years, this still pales in comparison to the Russian ‘snap exercises’ taking place across the border which have included as many as 160.000 soldiers. While NATO has no need to engage in activities anywhere near that size, the larger exercises certainly allow for much greater interoperability and general training of forces across the board. This strategy of conventional deterrence, as well as the opposing actors, may be a far cry from the massive military build-up of the Cold War, but today’s security environment calls for a return to NATO’s initial purpose, stop attacks on the Alliance before they even begin.


Patrick Curran is currently pursuing a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations, with a focus on Global Security, at the American University in Washington, D.C. His academic and research focus is global and national security, specifically the Transatlantic relationship.

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About the author

Bibliography


October and November 2015 is the clear example of that strategy. By using scenarios that are more demanding and more complex to reflect the operational environment of current crises, the Alliance tried to prove, once again, that cooperation is the most adequate and viable vehicle of collective defense. The hope is that such demonstrations of force will serve as deterrents against any potential threats coming from either side of the Alliance. Showing Off the Military Muscles

NATO’s largest exercise since 1998, Trident Juncture took place in Italy, Spain and Portugal. It involved over 35,000 troops from 37 countries (28 Allies and 9 partner nations), 18 observer nations (including Russia) and 12 international organizations such as the European Union and the African Union, non-governmental and aid agencies.

It ran from October 3rd to November 6th 2015 and was divided into two parts. The first one (October 3rd to 16th) consisted of tests of the command and control elements of the NATO Response Force (NRF), and aimed at highlighting NATO’s ability to work with external actors. This was followed by a live exercise (land, air and sea) to prepare the Alliance forces to face unusual threats.

Showing off the military muscles of the Alliance, Trident Juncture also included more than 140 aircrafts, 7 submarines and more than 60 ships, advanced technology, cutting-edge military capabilities and the world’s most modern land, see and air forces, providing a unique opportunity to train the military in a very demanding environment.

Trident Juncture and the Return of Large Scale Exercises

By Francisco Costa T he end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015 introduced a dual shock to the international community. NATO

member states saw their security environments challenged in new and inherently destabilizing ways on the Eastern and Southern flanks. The unsettling tactics of Russia’s hybrid warfare to the East and the significant territorial disruption due to the rise of the so-called Islamic State (IS or Daesh) in Syria and Iraq forced the Alliance to revisit, rethink and restructure their situational awareness not only in their near abroad, but also in their national framework which had no longer been a concern since the end of the Cold war. In light of this very complex environment, the Alliance felt the need to prepare for full spectrum warfare and shift the focus back onto NATO’s original tasks. The Wales Summit of September 2014 represented the pivotal moment to change the modus operandi of the Alliance as Heads of States and Governments gathered to reaffirm their commitment to fulfil all three core tasks set out in the Lisbon’s Strategic Concept: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.

In order to do so, an ambitious training and exercise programme was built, which resulted in exercise programmes consisting of not just more exercises, but exercises of greater complexity. As a matter of fact, across the Alliance, the number of exercises conducted grew from around 100 in 2014 to approximately 300 by the end of 2015. More importantly, the quality was also improved. Exercise Trident Juncture (TJ 2015) which took place in


The exercise was centred on certifying that the Headquarters Staff from the Joint Force Command Brunssum are ready to lead the NATO Response Force (NRF), if activated, throughout 2016. It is well known that the NRF is NATO’s shock troops, a high-readiness and technologically advanced multinational brigade, comprising land, air, maritime, and Special Forces that NATO can use if Article 5 were to be invoked. Trident Juncture also tested elements of the United Kingdom-led Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).

Turning to the future, 2016 is supposed to be considered a transition year with the integration of the fully operationally capable VJTF. 2017 is expected to be the first year of an established “Enhanced NRF” for which training and certification steps will be fully integrated into the exercise programme. 2018 will see another exercise that will integrate the full VJTF structure along with other NRF elements into a major Article 5 exercise that will take place in Norway, the Baltics and the Atlantic.

As mentioned by Secretary-General Stoltenberg joined by Spanish Defence Minister Pedro Morenés after watching the demonstration at the San Gregorio Training Area in Spain “Trident Juncture can be regarded as the first step of the implementation of NATO’s new focuses which were outlined in the Wales Declaration”.

The exercises to come will only reinforce and further implement programs outlined in 2014, such as the NRF and VJTF. In addition, Trident Juncture was certainly a significant step toward both reassurance and deterrence.

More than anything, Trident Juncture was a clear demonstration of NATO’s new increased level of ambition in joint modern warfare and the will to showcase a capable, forward-leading Alliance equipped with the appropriate capability and capacity to meet present and future security challenges. Between Solidarity & Political Constraints

The aim of NATO exercises is to establish, enhance and display NATO’s military capabilities across the Alliance’s full mission spectrum and to ensure the effective integration of partners. In this context, exercises such as Trident Juncture represent the highest and most complex Education & Training activities. Considering the importance of such initiatives, it was expected from all members to allocate resources to TJ. However, it proved difficult as several Allies, including

Portugal, Spain and Greece are now facing an economic crisis making increasing military spending not a priority for them. Governments need to convince their populations their investments will be used to address the

threat they believe to be most severe. Exercises like Trident Juncture, however, demand for all to contribute to activities that are not directly targeting any particular threat. When the East of the Alliance care most about the Russian threat, and the South about migrations and terrorism, it seems difficult to marshal resources and firm commitments across the 28 Allies on such broad programs. It will also be particularly difficult to ask Allies to develop new capabilities or work together in

Portuguese�Army Build an Air Defence Battery Passage at Tancos, Portugal (Photo: 2016 BRUNSSUM - Allied Joint Force Command )


historically sensitive areas (such as intelligence sharing against terrorism, for example) which are threatening the Alliance as a whole but not necessarily all the individuals Members. Not all Allies want and are able to contribute to fight against threats that are still hypothetical or none of their concerns.

A principal challenge to the Alliance, therefore, is to come to a shared understanding of threats. NATO’s border states are now faced with unconventional threats from Russia and the Islamic State. While the Alliance has previously recognized that an Article 5 response may be launched in response to an unconventional threat, such as a cyber-attack, it has not been defined when an Article 5 response would be triggered. Since assigning blame and agreeing on the severity of such an attack is less clear-cut than a land-invasion, a real risk exists that Allies would disagree over the invocation of Article 5, resulting, at a minimum, in a delayed response. The rapidness and readiness reached in exercises like Trident Juncture would then be diluted due to difficulties in reaching a consensus on any effective solution and the Alliance would not be able to take advantage of a surprise effect.

Further, the lack of seamless coordination with other regional institutions, such as the EU, is a continued drain on the full potential of the Alliance.

In order to both strengthen the transatlantic link and make the Alliance more efficient and effective in today’s budget-constrained environment, it is necessary to reiterate Members’ commitment to collective defense. It also seems necessary for the Allies to understand that the current security landscape has changed in recent years, which requires renewed commitment to the Euro-Atlantic.

TJ actually helped civil populations understand what NATO is about. In fact, according to the

government representatives of the three host nations, Trident Juncture was the perfect occasion to demonstrate to their populations that NATO is extremely important to their security as NATO forces are able to deploy high readiness forces from across the Alliance in a matter of days. TJ 2015 helped demonstrated that the Alliance’s defense capabilities are real and functioning. José Pedro Aguiar Branco, former Portuguese Defence Minister, mentioned after the display of special maneuvers on the Troia peninsula that Trident Juncture helped the Portuguese Government in fulfilling its mission of informing local populations and authorities, as well as national and international, governmental and non-governmental organizations and agencies, about NATO’s military commitment to the region. Solidifying NATO’s Deterrent Capacity

When Trident Juncture planning began in 2014, the initial intention was not to send a message of warning to potential foes. But with the seizure of Crimea and the refugee crisis, it seems that the initial plans have changed as the threats the Alliance have come to be more and more numerous and diverse.

As defended by French Air Force General Denis Mercier, Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SACT) during the first distinguished visitors’ day of the NATO exercise Trident Juncture 2015, in Trapani, Italy, on October 2015 “it was the right moment to spread the word about NATO’s capacity to evolve, meet and adapt itself to the new challenges”. Therefore, TJ 2015 promised to be a resounding success for NATO and its Member States, namely due to the significant effort done by all the NATO structure – and that success was clearly visible to the naked eye.

Inside the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) framework, some experts argue that the deterrent provided by it will


make potential aggressors rethink any significant hostile actions against NATO territories, both military and non-military. The RAP would counter a strategy of escalation dominance - as for example utilized by both sides during the Cold War. Escalation dominance holds that a nation can best contain conflicts and avoid escalation if its capabilities are dominant at each successive rung up the escalation ladder, all the way to the top rung of nuclear weapons.

NATO exercises, adaptation and assurance measures are designed to demonstrate the superiority of the Alliance’s arsenal, which in turn would defy any potential opponent from engaging into a conflict with the Euro-Atlantic community.

In the words of U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter, NATO understands “its need to change, change the way it operates, change the way it invests, change the way it plans, change the way it makes the decision to deal with these new [security] circumstances”. Reapplying Old Principles

In conclusion, Trident Juncture was a significant step in the right direction, but it is important that, by the end, it is one of many in a newly configured toolbox for the Alliance as it faces a new and every single day more complex security environment. Deterrence, perceived as the threat of force in order to discourage an opponent from taking an unwelcome action, is making a ‘comeback’ in the recent past. As Deputy Secretary-General Alexander Vershbow affirmed during his speech at the Berlin Security Conference, in November 2015, “deterrence is a relatively simple idea” and it worked during the Cold War: first, because there was a clear political will on the part of all the Allies to act together as open; second, because it was obvious that “we could back up our words with deeds”; and third, a consisted message was passed – NATO was ready, willing and able to

defend its Alliance. If that is the case or not in the current days is a question that still has no answer. Hopefully, Trident Juncture was a step in the right direction to change the perception and the course of the crises we face nowadays, and will deter future aggressions.

Francisco Costa holds a degree in International Relations and in Marketing and is currently preparing a Master’s Degree in International Economics. Before becoming YATA President in 2014, he also served as YATA Secretary-General. Francisco is currently working for the Portuguese Government at the Trading and Investment Agency (AICEP).

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Bibliography

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Editor: Flora Pidoux

ATA Programs On May 5-7, the 2BS FORUM (To Be Secure Forum), the annual

high-level forum organized by the Atlantic Council of Montenegro and which deals with issues relative to security of importance to South Eastern Europe will return for its fourth edition. This year, topics such as Russia’s geopolitcal awakening, fighting ISIL, the ucoming US elections and the NATO Warsaw Summit will be discussed.

Due to take place at Hotel Splendid in Budva, Montenegro, 2BS will feature high level speakers from around the globe, including Prof. Dr. Julian Lindley-French, ATA Board Member, and Mr. Jason Wiseman, ATA Secretary General.

For more information about 2BS, go to: http://www.2bs.me/en/ The ATA along with the Swedish Atlantic Council is organizing a

NATO SPS sponsored Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) titled “Critical Infrastructure Protection against Hybrid Warfare Security Related Challenges”. The ARW will place on May 18th in Stockholm, Sweden.

The workshop aims to bring together experts and officials to share best practices and recommendations for addressing the hybrid warfare security challenges and provide solutions to protect critical infrastructures.

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Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Associa-tion. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.

The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global net-works and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom, Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37 countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996, the Youth Atlan-tic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially include to the succes-sor generation in our work.

Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and understan-ding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security through its inter-national programs, such as the Central and South Eastern European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.

In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include: à the establishment of new and competitive programs on international

security issues. à the development of research initiatives and security-related events for

its members. à the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to countries in

Northern Africa and Asia. The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy acti-

vism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives. These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of internati-

onal policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with NATO. The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.

Atlatic Voices - NATO Military Exercises and Deterrence

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