Aticle in Military Review: Communist Errors in the Anti-Bandit War 66 77

7/23/2019 Aticle in Military Review: Communist Errors in the Anti-Bandit War 66 77

1/109

THE

OF M #&~

.itary

W6

view

In This Iss? e

i

Intelligence

+ Thoughtson War

~ Howto shoot a Duck

September5


2/109

UNITED STATESARMY COMMANO

AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

COMMANDANT

Maj

Gen Harrg J. Lendeg, Jr.

ASSISTANTCOMMANDANT

Brig Gen E. C. Townsend


3/109

Military Review

P rofessiona l J ourna l of t he U S rmy

How to Shoot a Drfc lI . .. . . . . . . . Maj Donald J. Haid, USA 3

Kinestheti c Warfare . . . . . . . . . Cot Robert B. Rigg, USA 13

Air Mob i l i ty . . . . . .

Col Wladimir A. de Favit ski, French Army 20

Second Thoughts on War . . . . . . . . . . . Br ian Bond 23

In te l l igence . . . . . . . .

Lt Col Fiel ding L. Greaves, USA 33

The Far North . . . . . . . Maj Pierre Vincendon, French Army 39

Khrmen and M at su . . . . . . . . Lt Col Chen Wei-ya, CNMC 45

Uni f ied Force . . . . . . . .

Maj J. N. Elderk hs, Brit i sh Army 48

Quell i ng Mut ini es . . . . . . . Lt Col Wil l iam E. Burr 11,USA 54

The Nonprofessional . . . . . .

Col Shauk at Riza, Paki stan Army 80

Prudence Mi l i tary Necessity . . . . . . . Edmund Mc Caff rey 62

Communist Errors . . . . . . . Lt Col Robert W. Selt on, USA 66

Casualt y Handling . . . . . . . . . Lt Col D. W. Pratt, USA 78

Army Hospit al Ships . . . . . . . . . . Stanl ey L. Falk 85

Necessit y f or Change . . . . . M aj Cli nton E. Granger, Jr. , USA 92

M i l i t ar yNot e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

M i l i t ar yBook s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

The M81i tary Raview, a publi cat ion of the UNITEO STATES ARMY, provi des a forum for t he expression

of mil i t ary thought with emphasis on doctr i ne concerni ng the division and higher l evels of command.

The VIEWS expressed in thi s magazine ARE THE AUTHORS and not nec essari ly tho se of the

US Army or the Command and General Staf f Coll ege.

8


4/109

ditor in Chief

ColDonaldJ. Delaney

Assistant Editor

Lt ColAlbertN.Garland

Features Editor

MajRobertL.Burke

r

Layout Editor

Capt John A. Maclntyre, Jr.

~ SpanishAmerican Editor

Major RerreRamos

Brazilian Editor

Lt Col Luiz de A. Araripe

I

Assoqiate Editor

Lt ColAlgmJ. Hughes

ArmyWarCollege

Production Officer

MajNormanC, Murray

i

}

Staff Artist

Charles A.Moore

i

MILITARY fl EVIEW-Pubhshed monthl y by the U S Army Command and General Staf f College, Fort Leaw

enworth, Kansas, m Eng16h, Spamsh, and Portuguese Use of funds for print ing of th!s pubhcatt on has

been approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, Za May 1965.

Secmrdc lass postage paid at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Subscri pti on rate% $3.50 (US cur rency) a

year m

the Um!ed $tates, Uni ted Stat es mi ldary post ofhces, and those countr i es whtch are members of

the Pan Amerman Postaf Umon (mcludir rg Spain); $450 a year m all othe r count ries. Address subscrlp

l ion mad to the Book Depart ment, U S Army Command and General Staf f College, Fort Leavenworth,

Kairsas 66027.


5/109

The Military Review announces the selection of the following article

from the July 1965 issue as a MILITARY REVIEW AWARD ARTICLE:

China Burma India: Study in Combhed Command

Colonel Charles J. Canella, USA

y almost any standards, the direction of military operations in the CBI

during World War II violated the basic concepts of management and the

rules of war. The author, presently assigned to the staff and faculty of

the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, points out that a

study of the ccmcepts and procedures employed in the CBI provides a

uni@e opportunity to develop valuable lessons for the conduct of future

combined operations.

COMING:

The British Army in the Far East,

by General Sir Reginald Hewetson,

Kermit Roosevelt Lecturer for 1965;

Computers and Service Schools, by

Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Ablett; and Allied CommandEuropes Mobile

Force by Colonel James G. Holland, Jr.


6/109

\


7/109

tiow to

s oot

Major i onald J. Haid,

The views expressed in this ar.

title ar the authors and are not

necessa il~ those of tke Depart~nent

!

o the

rmy, Department of De.

fewer o the U. S. Arrng Command

and Ge era,l staff Co/lege,-Edttor.

f

{~ F ~lIE ducks could shoot back,

there wouldn t

be so many duck

hunters.

Although probably spuri

ous, this remark ie widely attributed

to an ArmY general in answering a

question about the necessity of arm

Soptoinbcr3fi5

a uck

United Statea Arnrg

ing helicopters. Like so many maxims,

the answer contains truth and false

hood, wisdom and folly.

The individual who posed the ques

tion may have beeu stopped for the

moment, but the question has been

asked a thousand times before and

since. It has been asked by reporters;

it has been asked by generals in blue

uniforms; it has been asked by gen

erals in green uniforms; and it has

been anawered truthfully, falsely,

wisely, and foolishly. Helicopter arma

., 3


8/109

SHOOTAOIJCK

tnent may have developed too far for

the question to be meaningful any

longer.

There is, however, a question that

has seldom been posed and never been

answered: What happens when

armed helicopter meets armed heli

copter ? My aim, here, is to justify

the question. If facts can be mar

shaled in a logical fashion, if atten

tion can be focused on the problem,

then, hopefully, the technicians and

the tacticians can solve the problem

and answer the question properly.

ArmyAviationProgram

Until the Korean War, organic

Army aviation was entirely confined

to the employment of small, fixed-

wing aircraft used for directing ar

tillery fire and for carrying out

OCCZI

simml liaison missions. The helicopter,

despite interest dating back to Leo

nardo da Vinci, did not become prac

tical until after World War II, but

the success of the helicopter in medi

cal evacuation missiom+ in Korea as

sured it a place in the military air

craft inventory. The combination of

the establishment of a separate Air

Fore> in 1947 and the helicopters

success ]n Korea resulted in the de

velopment of what has come to be

known as the Army Aviation Pro

gram.

Barely two decades have passed

Major Donald J. ffaid, a veteran

Army aviator, has ffown with 7th

Armv in Europe and 8th A rm~ in

Korea and has served as Chief of the

US A rmg A uiation Human Research

Unit. He is currentlv with the 145th

Aviation Battalion in

Vietnam. This

article is baaed on a treatise prepared

6U Majur Haid while a student in the

1964-65 Regular Cmeree of the U. S.

Arrnzs Command and General Stag

College.

since the first Piper Cubs were as.

signed to a few artillery battalions.

The Army, however, now operates

more than 6,000 aircraft, and aviators

comprise the third largest group of-

officers in the Army. To its credit, the

Army has never lost sight of the fun

damental mission of Army aviation

to support ground combat; nor has

Army aviation lost its fundamental

characteristicthat of being organic

to tactical Army units.

Although the small aviation section

gave way to the aviation company,

and the company to the battalion, the

aviation unit remains organic to the

brigade, division, corps, and field

army. And although the aircraft have

become bigger and more sophisti

cated, the missions more dumerous

and more complicated, the phrase

Army aviation is always used with

only one word capitalized and always

in that particular order.

In both World War II and Korea,

Army aircraft relied on their slow.

speed maneuverability for protection

against enemy fire. The classical lin.

ear alignment of forces usually fur

nished a visual indication of friendly

and enemy territory, There were

losses to enemy fire in both wars, but

Army aircraft were not unacceptably

v@erable.

TransportHelicopters

The advent of the troop transport

helicopter created a new problemat

one particular moment in time and

space, the transport helicopter was

considered to be unacceptably vulner

able. That was the moment when the

helicopter

was

stationary+ ither

hovering or Pandingwhile it disem

barked its load of fighting troops.

Since the moment of vulnerability

was, after all, brief, the Army began

to experiment with the idea of deliv-

Military

Review


9/109

I

SHOOTADUCK

ering suppressive fire from

copter. Originally conceived

large volume of essentially

fire designed solely to force

emyto keep his head down

the heli

to he a

unaimed

the en-

until onr

troops could disembark, assemble, and

take UPthe fight, the use of suppress

ive fire marked the actual birth of

the armed helicopter in the US Army.

the nap-of-the-earth

Army will have to

ited or general war:

cable regardless of

vironment.

flying that the

live with in lim~

it will be appli

the nuclear en-

Although the details are still

shrouded in the secrecy of intelli

gence . reports and studies, every

major power in the world today is ex-

US Am

A UH 1

helicopter in flight firing an SS-11missile

Development in weapons and tac

tics eirrceWorld War 11 have paral

leled the development of Army avia

tion. They have, at the came time,

imposed certain limitations. Except

in thoee areaa known to be absolutely

secure, the Army aviator must fly at

analtitude low enough to be below the

acquisition level of radar and infra

red weapons and close enough to the

terrain to make attack by high-per

formance enemy aircraft infemible.

In most cases, this will mean treetop

level, or, if possible, below, This is

September1SS5

perimenting with helicopter arma~

ment. Since the arming of ahelicopter

involves no secret or complicated proc

ess, this fact is not really surprising.

What ie strzbrge is the difference in

weaponry and philosophy among the

Varioue countries. Since there has

not yet heen awar inwhich both sides

have employed armed helicopters,

there will he, presurnnbly, at leaat as

much diversity in the field of tactics,

Ultimate weapona have come and

gone-from Hannibala elephants, to

the Iongbow, to gunpe+yder, to the

5


10/109

SHOOTAOUCK

nuclear weapon. The armed helicopter

is certainly not an ultimate weapon.

But the development of the armed

helicopter employing effective tactics

may well become a significant element

of combat power in future wars.

AlgerianRevolt

For a period of seven yearsfrom

the m]ddle of 1955 until 1962tbe

French colony of Algeria writhed in

the agonies of revolution. Our inter.

eet in the Algerian revolt centers

around the fact that, for the first time

in history, armed helicopters were

extensively used.

At first, the French simply la?hed

an ordinary pintle-mounted nrachine

gun in the doorways of their Vet-to/

44s. When they received the more

powerful CH-34S, they began to uee

more than one machinegun. After dis

covering the limitation of the small-

caliber machineguns, the French

turned to rockets, wire-guided mis

siles, and even multiweaprm instalki

tions. Eventually, they achieved their

greatest success with a World War II

Mawscr 20-millimeter cannon which

they were able to mount so as vir

tual~ to el}minate the problems of

recoil and vihrwtion.

Pierre Habot ]s a lieutenant com

mtinder m the French Navy. He is

also an aeronaut]ca.1 engineer und

.comhat pllut. He flew in World War

11until the French surrendered and

then went underground for the rest

of the war wztb tbe

mayuw.

He later

flew

f ighters

for France in Indocbina,

until D]en B]wt Phu, A httk while

later h~ turned up flying helicopters

against the rebels in Algeria. While

there, he was in on most of the heli

copter armament experimentation.

Before the war ended, Babot had

be,en sh]pped to Frunce and put m

charge of all Frtinch helicopter iirma-

S

ment development. He was instru.

mental not only in the development

of the Mauser 20-millimeter inetaOa

tion, but also in the design of what

was, perhaps, the first true weapons

helicopterthe

Atocmfte III.

Before

the first armed f7H-f flew in Vietnam,

Bahot wae helping to design and pro

duce a 20-millimeter automatic can

non for the A{ouette 111.This weapon

would not only fire a 20-miHimeter

round with an explosive warhead, but

the gun, including its mount and

sight, weighed less than 50 pounds.

OrbitalFire

In addition to their obvious success

in technology, Babot and the French

also developed the first known tactic

for employing armed helicopters

orbital fire. The helicopter would

cruiee along until it spotted a band

of guerrillas. Then, from an altitude

of about 1,000 feet, the helicopter

would begin to circle its quarry. By

the time the angle of hank PIUSthe

angle of depression of the weapon

reached 90 degrees, the gunner was

not only shooting straight down, but

he was doing so with deadly accuracy.

The 20-millimeter cannon and or

bital fire notwithstanding, Pierre

Babot and the French Army felt that

there were no urriversd principles te

b~ derived from their experiences in

Algeria. It had been a special kind of

war, fought under special circum

stances, with equipment wited to the

tiask. If they learned anything from

seven years employment of armed

belmopters, it was that they wanted

a flexlble 20-milIirtreter automatic

cannon that weighed uo more than 50

pounds.

(:olonel Jay f). Vanderpool is not

even a rated US Army aviator. al

thuugh it is widely suspected that he

has done his share of flying. In 1956

MllltaryRoview


11/109

SHOOTADUCK

hewas assigned to what was then the

Combat Development Office of the

Aviation .School at Fort Rucker, Ala

bama. Vanderpool and his staff be

gan testing the feasibility of the

transport helicopter as a weapons

platform. And they did not limit

themselves to the considerations of

defensive fire alone. A wide range of

weapons was tested on various heli

copters.

The experiments were both inge

nious and imaginative. Hampered by

a lack of funds, facilities, and official

encouragement, the development was

spurred by the enthusiasm and ini

tiative of Colonel Vanderpool and his

staff of young aviators.

ACRCompany

To facilitate selling the idea that

weshould arm our helicopter, a unit

known as the 8305th Aerial Combat

Reconnaissance (ACR) Company was

organized at Fort Rucker. Influential

visitors to the US Army Aviation

Center viewed demonstrations of

armed helicopters staged by the

8305th.

By 1960 it had become apparent

that

machineguns, rockets, and

guided missiles offered the greatest

immediate promise for use on our

helicopters. But the essentially un

aimed character of suppressive fire

remaided predominant, and only in

the guided-missile field was any at

tempt made to achieve the accuracy

necessary to attack point Pargets.

The US Army Aviation Test Board,

then under the US Continental Army

Command (USCONARC ), began tu

attack some of the technical problems,

even while the ACR company dealt

with the concepte. Armament systems

for helicopters had always begun by

taking some existing weapon and at

tempting to mount it in some fashion

Sqrtember1965

on the helicopter. For the first several

years ofthe feaaihility studies at Fort

Rucker, all experiments were con

ducted with existing ground weapons.

although, rather late in the period,

experiments were made with actual

aircraft weapons.

As long as the principal concept

was that of unaimed suppressive fire,

any weapon that the helicopter could

lift was reasonable. Under this pro

gram, such pros&ic considerations as

ammunition feeding, effect of recoil

on structural membeks, in-flight re

loading, and ammunition lnad capa

bilities posed tbe major problems.

Degradation of aircraft perform

ance wae accepted as a necessary evil.

Quite hy chance, this degradation

generally manifested itself by reduc

ing speed and payload rather than in

dangerous flight characteristics. The

Fort Rucker people, Cnlonel Vander

pool, the ACR company, and the Avia

tion Test Board had their meet eig.

nificant success with a dual .30-cali

ber machinegun kit (precursor of the

Xlff ), the 4.5-inch rocket (later

abandoned in favor of the 2.75-inch

rocket ), and the French SS-11

(a

wire-guided missile originally d&

signed as a surface-to-surface, anti

tank weapon ).

NoApprovedDoctrine

I?ven though the concept of the

armed helicopter was considered feas

ible, there was no accepted or tw

prnved doctrine as to which aircraft

would he armed, with what weapons,

or in what quaat ities. To remedy this

bwk of offimal doctrine. USCONARC

convened an ml hoc committee on

army aircraft armament systems. In

two months during the summer of

1961, the committe+five generals

tind 14 field grade officers-formu

7


12/109

SHOOTADUCK

lated much of what is now our doc

trine for helicopter armament.

The data and the report prepared

by that committee will atend as mile

stones in the history of the develop

ment of the armed helicopter, al

though events did alter some of their

recommendations. The committee felt

that the division aviation battalion,

the brigade aviation section, the ar

mored cavalry regiment, and the air

cavalry troop should have armed heli

copters. They recommended that no

aircraft he armed with more than

oneweapon system and that transport

helicopters not be armed. They set

forth three categories of weaponry-

light weapons, ~rea weapons, and

point weaprms. They ako pointed up

the necessity of developing a helicop

ter weapon with an air-to-air capa

bility.

VietnamConflict

Just like the French in Algeria and

Indochina, we found ourselves in 1961

fighting a ragged, poorly equipped,

guerrilla enemy o~er some of tbe

worst Jungle, mountain, and rice-

paddy terrain in the world. Just like

the ?&ench, we found t~t only by

using helicopters could we move

swiftly enough to match the guerrilla

advantage jn surprise, stealth, and

initiative.

For more than a year, three com

panies of ancient CH-21s flew the

soldiers of Vietnam into battle with

tbe Viet Cong guerrillas. And then

it happened. We awoke one day to

discover that those ragged guerrillas

were shooting at our helicopters. A.Yif

by magic, machineguns began appear

ing lashed in the doorways. And tbe

cry went back to USCONARC for heli

copter armament. BY this time, how

ever, it was generally accepted that

escort helicopters than to try to bur.

den the tired, old

CH-21S

with any

more weight.

By 1962 a company of

UH-1

heli

copters had been mustered in Oki

nawa. Although there had been much

scurrying about in the research and

development agencies, there was still

no

production-model weapon system

for the UH-I. By a combination of

soldierly zeal and outright thievery,

the UH-Is were finally equipped with

machineguns and sent to Vietnam.

Under tbe title Utility Tactical

Transport Helicopter Company, the

armed

UH-I .s began flying shotgun

for the airmobile assauIts that the

Vietnamese Government was launch

ing against the Viet Cong.

UH.1sSuccessful

The armed

UH-Is were an immedi

ate succesk The early

IYH-IA

models

were soon replaced with

UH-lBS

and

the homemade weapons with the

quadruple 7.62-millimeter machinegun

system. In this system, a World War

II

turret

mount was used to provide

flexibility to a pair of M60 light ma

chineguns. These were mounted, one

pair on each side of the helicopter,

and were aimed and fired as a unit

by a gunner seated in the copilots

seat. Later on, the utility tactical

tmmsport was also equipped with 2.75

inch rocket launchers to supplement

the fire of the machineguns. The

SS-21 ~missiies were not used because

they were expensive and because

there were few suitable hard tar

gets to be found.

Just like the French, we had tried

machineguns, rockets, and guided

missiles. The Viet Cong began to dis

cover that the armed

UH-1s

made a

great deal of noise, but that even a

ragged guerrilla could enjoy the

it would be better to provide armed , thrill of shooting at a helicopter if

8,

MilitaryReview


13/109

I

SHOOTAOUCK

he stayed well hidden. Fortunately,

Ithe guerr@as were no more accurate

~with their weapone than were the

i

UJ7-Is.

Suppressive fire worked.

Aimed fire was just not within our

capabilities.

An even more shattering discovery

wae made when the Viet Cong eud

denlyturned UPwith some .50-caliber

machineguns. Now, they could ac

pression cmour senior officers in Viet

nam. Reports began flowing to Wash

ington comparing the cost effective

ness of the armed

T-.%

with that of

the armed

UH-1.

By 1963 there were a great many

officers who had heen to Vietnam, seen

Army hviation at work, and bleseed

the armed helicopter. With something

like two-thirds of the. Army forces


14/109

;HOOTAOUCK

trying to derive universal principles

from a very special kind of war. In

my opinion, if the trend continues,

we shall find ourselves with an avia

tion element admirably suited to fight

in Vietnamand nowhere else.

FrontPage News

Because we are an airminded peo

ple, news stories are even more sen

sational if they involve the shooting

down of aircraft. Somehow the stories

conjure up memories of Eddie Ricken

hacker and the sensational air battles

of World War Ii and Korea. In Viet

nam news correspondents found a new

wrinkle. They could actually go along

as passengers in the helicopter and

thereby write, with thrilling authen

ticity, of their experiences under fire.

The supposed vulnerability of our

helicopters became front page news;

the facts of the matter eeem to indi

cate that the problem has been over

stated.

To the layman, and even to veteran

pilots, the helicopter looks too incon

gruous to fly, It looks as though you

could throw a handful of pebbles into

itsy-otor blades and cause it to thrash

itself to pieces. Even the earliest heli

copters used for medical evacuatimr in

the Korean War put the lie to this.

Although often fired npon at point-

blank range, the pilots discovered

that the bullets made neat little holes,

but that the machine went on flying.

Those early helicopters vibrated so

much under the best of circumstances

that even a rotor unbalanced by bullet

hoIes would still operate. Although

much bas been made of the vulnera

bility of the helicopters in Vietnam,

the documented facts indicate that, in

the light of hours and missions flown,

we have sustained greater losses from

materiel failure and pilot error than

we have from enemy small arms fire.

There is no recorded instance of a

helicopter in combat being shat dow~

by a fighter aircraft. Aside from the

fact that the helicopter is quite at

home in the nap-of-the-earth flight

regime, it is asking too much to bs.

Iieve that any fighter pilot would care

to venture among the tree limbs at

supersonic speeds to engage a ma

chine that can fly from zero to 100

knots, not to mention backwards and

sideways. Simply by using camou

flage paint on the rotor blades, the

helicopter has demonstrated that it

can be flown at treetop level virtually

undetected by tbe pilot of a highfly.

ing jet.

Needless to say, when the jet is it

self at ~a low altitude, the pilot is

hardly in a position to be looking

around for an unwary helicopter.

Yes;

SAYthe critics, bnt we will

have special low-performance aircraft

to use as helicopter hunters. Asids

from the fact that the feasibility of

this approach has yet to be demon

strated, one respects that the 150to

250-knot, fixed-wing aircraft might

find itself unacceptably vulnerable to

the fires of ii,s quarry.

InfraredWeapons

Even if the helicopter manages to

~~dyr~~I~~dthe acquisition ]evels of

antiaircraft weapons,

there is still the doomsayer who feels

that the shoulder-fired, infrared

weapon will end the helicopters sig

nificance on the battlefield. Admit

tedly, the infrared weapon is in its

infancy, but already tests have been

run pitting these weapons in simu

lated combat against the helicopters.

The tests were large]y discredited

when it was discovered that the only

way tbe testers could get any date

waa by requiring the helicopters to

arrive over specified pointe, at stip-

WitaryIIeviw

0


15/109

~

ulated times, and then take absolutely

noevasive action.

Prior to this arrangement, the gun

ners bad been completely unsuccessful

; in even figuring out the direction

from which the helicopter was coming

&henthey heard its engine. The facte

suggest that there may be quite ade

quate means of shielding the infra

red emiesions of the helicopter. And

it might not be too optimistic to pre

dict that someone will invent a mis

sile that will home in on an infrared

weapon.

VulnerabilityMyth

The perpetrators of the myth of

helicopter vulnerability have been un

successful in their efforts largely be

cause no one seriously believee that

there is any requirement for the

Army aviator to be, like Achilles, in

vulnerable on the battlefield. The av

erage Army aviator, as a matter of

fact, considers himself to be far less

vulnerable than the infantry soldier

with his rifle for firepower and his

feet for mobility.

There might he, however, some

compelling questions that need an

swere in the area of the vulnerability

of a helicopter to an enemy armed

helicopter, It is thie question that hae

puzzledsome of the best minds in the

armies, of Germany, France, and

Britain. One can only surmiee that

it isalso the subject of thought on the

other side of the Iron Curtain.

Oddly enough, one of the major un

solved problems in helicopter arma

ment ie the question of who ehould

operate the weapon. By operate, I

mean the total tasktarget acquisi

tion, aiming, and firing the weapon.

The simplest helicopter weapon

syetems are the MI and M$?systems

onthe

OH-19 and OH-29 observation

helicopters. These are dual, fqed,

SHOOTADUCK

machinegun systems which are aimed

and tired by the pilot who simply

points his helicopter in the direction

of a target and pressee the trigger to

fire. By interspersing ball ammuni

tion with tracer bullets, the pilot can

bring the stream of bullets around

and o~ the targetas long as they

last.

SightingSystem

The 2.75-inch rockete are also fixed,

but operation of the eystem requires

the services of both the pilot and his

copilot or gunner. Lack of an ade

quate sighting system for the rockete

has usually necessitated having a

machinegun mounted to assiet in lay

ing the rockets.

The

SS-11 wire-guided missile ia

fired entirely by someone other than

the pilot. This is aleo true of the

l f6

quadruple machinegun system. The

latter, though, can be fired by the

pilot in the fixed, but not in the flex

ible, mode.

There are cogent reaeons for argu

ing that the beet syetem is one

which places the weapon in the

hands of the pilot. On the other eide

are the advocates of using a copilot

or gunner, thus leaving the pilot free

to fly, navigate, and observe. Need

less to say, tbe problem of who will

shoot has not yet been resolved.

Aside from the arguments regard

ing the kind of weapon best suited

for arming a helicopter, there is the

less obvious problem of whether the

weapon should be rigidly mounted on

the longitudinal axia of the helicop

terse certain Marine Corps experte

contend-or whether the weapon

should be flexible in both azimuth

and elevatiouas the French insist.

Again, it seems sufficient to point out

that the problem still exists.

Amore complex problem is involved

September9S5


16/109

SHOOTADUCK

with the question of how to teach heli

copter gunnery. Aside from the fact

that no one really knows the best way

to do this, it should be evident that

the training problems will vary from

weapon system to weapon system and

.from pilot-trainee to gunner-trainee.

Besides, there are today more than

6,000 rated aviators who have never

fired any kind Qf weapon from any

kind of helicopter. It would certainly

be difficult to estimate the order of

magnitude of the training problem

when we have ~large numbers of

armed helicopters, not to mention

three or four different weapon sys

tems.

Surely, some research in the selec

tiOn and motivation of armed heli

copter pilots will be necessary. Not

every aviator will want to be a

tiger; not all who do will have the

aptitude. The heterogeneous aviation

unit may not be the ideal environment

for a daring and aggressive armed hel

icopter pilot. This is not to suggest

that the only choice is to be a tiger

or a pussycat, hut it is certainly true

that the average aviation unit is thor

oughly imbued with tbe idea of safe

flyi~

These and other organizational

problems may add weight to consid

eration of homogeneous light observa

tion helicopter and utility tactical

transport companies. It is far more

likely that tbe necessary

esprit

de

corps could be fostered in a unit in

which all tbe aviators had received

the same indoctrination and training.

If one grants tbe premises that

have been presented, it becomes pos

sible to single out one, perhaps over

riding, problemthat of what kind

of weapon, what kind of training, and

what kind of tactics to use when the

armed helicopter, on same future bat

tlefield, meets an enemy armed heli

copter. We can justify tbe arming of

a helicopter for self-clefense and even

for offensive tactics. It is even pOs

sible to hope that our technology wiO

permit the resolution of the questions

about who should handle the weapon

and whether it should be fixedor flex

ible. We can surely decide, in time,

whether rockets are better than mis

siles and whether ball ammunition is .

better than explosive warheads.

One recalls the old cliche that the

best weapon to use against a tank is

another tank. Will this be the only

answer to the ultimate problem of

armed helicopter versus armed heli

copter ? If it is, then it is time to de

sign antihelicopter weaponsj develop

helicopter:fighting tactics, and train

pilots in helicopter-to-helicopter com

bat.

Certainly, we must recognize that

there are many unresolved problems

in weaponry, tactics, doctrine, and

organization. But our past efforts will

have been in vain and the lives of the

men lost in Vietnam will have been

wasted if our helicopters are shot out

of the air the first time they run up

against an enemy who

is

also

equipped with armed helicopters.

&rf it j~ true that the hardest part

of solving a problem is recognizing it,

then let us recognize it. Let us con

cede that it exists; let us direct the

efforts of our scientiata, our indus

tries, our tacticians, and our pilots

toward finding the best weapon, the

best tactics, the best way

to

shoot a

duck if you are that duck.

MilitarfReview

2


17/109

h.

.

w

KltfESTHETIC

WARFARE

Modefor the Future

ColonelRobert B. Rig% United States Armg

VOLVING in the veh~cles, weap

ons, and military means that

American technology promises to pro

duce ie a slightly new form of land

warfare that may someday be termed

kinesthetic, This form of warfare has

its roots in blitzkrieg, but blitzkrieg

is to the past and present what kines

thetic warfare is to the future.

t 0 Robert966 byColonel B.Rigg.

AllRiEhbReserved.

September965 .

Kinesthetic warfare is not alone

ultraswift motion and impact, it is

aIso perception. Thus, the foundation

of such a mode of warfare would reet

not only on unusual mobility PIUSfire

power, but also on a high order of ,

modernized

reconnaissance,

target

acquisition means, and military in

telligence. The term and concept of

kinesthetic is derived from kinesthe

13 ,


18/109

KINESTHETICWARFARE

sia meaning originality:

kimein,

to

move +

aisthi +is,

perception.

It might appear that this is a trite

play on words or semantic doodling.

Actually, it is not, for the basic term

is descriptive of a form of future

warfare that will be:

Best suited for a war of quick

decision.

Served by vehicles, weapons,

and means yet to come,

Four-DimensionalCombat

Kinesthetic Warfare will be rapid

movement, maneuver, and destruction

by virtue of its rapid target finding

and sensing. This form of warfare is

four-dimensional in character: It is

ultraperceptive in its first dimension.

It is through the air in its second.

Thus, in consequence to these, its

third dimensicm is velocity, while its

fourth is shock impact.

In combat ar hitecture, then, these

dimensions cot bine to where the

shockpower and Iimpact of certain US

Army forces w

A

uld be multiplied on

the battleground in disproportional

favor to their numerical strength.

These forces, designed for deep-in

pehtrations of rapid order and vio-

Ience, would be so organized, e

quipped, armed, and transported as to

permit them to operate with more

precision and speed than the normaI

and heavier combat forces.

Colonel

Robert B. Rigg is with the

US Armu Combat

Development CO*

mand Institute of Advanced Studies,

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Dur-

ing World War 11 he served in Eu-

rope as a military observer with So-

viet Army units

and

other Allied

mi{ i tarr j

forcee. He is a graduate of

the United States Arm~ War College,

and wrw previously a88 tL?d

to the

stafl of the

Commander in

Chief,

.Pa@c.

In a sense,

one may

ask: 1s this

just blitzkrieg with better equip.

ment ? No, not quite the case.

Blitzkrieg Warfare

Blitzkrieg is not eempletely

sya.

orrymous with kinesthetic warfare

because the latter embraces not only

ultraswift motion, but also extreme

depth of operation and perception,

This brand of perception would em

brace much more ra~id, accurate, and

automated reconnaissance and intel

ligence than we have today. Once such

a perception system is attained, it

wouId produce unusuaI arrays of

deep-in targets well in the enemys

rear areas.

Whereas in the past an airborue

division jumped deep inside enemy

territory to attack one target area for

a few days, future striking forces of

the type, envisioned would be able to

attack several deep-in targets in the

same few days. These forces, for ex.

ample, should be able to engage, ea

circle, destroy, and disengage rapidly.

Falsely implied here may be hit-and

run tactics. On the ccertrary, the re.

Iated tactics would be deep in, bit

finish, and runand only in an ex

treme circumstance, hit and mu

where survival becomes paramount.

The con~ept of kinesthetic warfare

does not vwualize an entire army or

~ field army specially organized for

this form of combat. It does envisage

some elements of about corps size

that wouid be organized and equipped

for such combatperhaps one els

ment per field army.

To wage kinesthetic warfare, tac

tical (air) mobility must not only be

of the highest order, but balanced and

integrated in terms of the.:

Individual soldier.

Combat unit and system.

Logistical unit and system.

MilitaryRoW4


19/109

.?

KINESTHETICWARFARE

Military hisfiry provides a library also require organic aircraft for ite

of evidetye to the effect that the

role.

progrsss and pattern. of combat is Kineethetie forces will be cost y

directly related to the excellence and

eIementS in terms of materiel and

limitations of logistics. Tactical and dollar investment, plus logistical sup-

logistical elements must be closeIy port. They wiK be costly to organize

related in respect to air mobility.

and ma~ntain, particularly in war.

Amv N.iLIeFeatwe

The foundation for kinesthetic warfare has been laid over the pact decade and a

half in the Armys buildup of Army aviation and its general quest for improved

mobility

Combat unite moved by air must be

But it is essential to weigh their cost

supported logistically by air.

agairmt the value of the results which

In general terms, the pattern en- kinesthetic forces could help to at-

visages a field army that will have

tain. By virtue of their character and

ultramobile striking elements, and

mode of operation, kinesthetic forces

that these kinesthetic combat ele-

could serve to shorten a war.

ments will be air transported and air

The daily average cost of World

supported for swift and deep strikes

War II was something on the order

of bold and multiple nature. Part of

of 221 million dollars; the Korean

tbe field army will largely move and

War about 91 million dollars. It may

fight overlandbut that part will be assumed with some degree of

Swdmrbw 19S5

15,


20/109

KINESTHETICWARFARE

safety that a future war of limited

nature could come to a daily average

of 150 to 200 million dollars--m an

assumed average of about 175 mil

lion dollars per day. Possessed of a

distinctly superior co~bat mobility

inherent in kinesthetic forces, a f u

ture US ArmY would{ likely shorten

a limited war. If a two-year war could

be shortened by only 46 daye, a dollar

saving of approximately 7.8 billion

dollars could be achieved. lhe saving

in human sacrifice and suffering is

obvious, and hefein lies a value that

has no dollar price tag.

While the Armys future quest for

mobiiity must be measured against

the prime objective of victoryand

an early victory, if possible--it must

also be weighed against the human

and dollar costs that would be incur

red if it had to go to war just on a

military-technological par with an

enemy.

Foundation and Principle

The foundation for kinesthetic war

fare has been laid over the past dec

ade and a half in the Armys Resea~ch

and Development Program, its build

up f Army aviation, and its general

ques$ for Improved mobility. The llth

Air Assault Division recently tested

a component of this foundation.

There is still more to be accomplished,

developed, and proved.

In respect to new hardware and re

lated aircraft, kinesthetic warfare

may be a decade or two distant. But

the foundation exists today not only

in concepts, but in American military

mindsand the effort has momentum.

In essence, this effort can best be

labeled as the principle of invoking

obsolescence: endeavoring to attain

such military technological superior

ity in firepower, mobility, and intel

ligence so as to render obeole~e a large

segment of any enemys armament

and materiel inventory.

The US creation of a really new

tdtramodemized form of tank, for ex.

ample, could render the USSRS enthe

inventory of armor obsolete--m at

least force the Soviet Union into a

major conversion program. The crea

tion of a distinctly new and ultraper

ceptible combat intelligence system

eorrld make enemy forces much more

volnerahle than they are now. The

Armys recent air-assault tests rep

resent a step in the direction of try

ing to attain the means to fight that

will not be in the image of an enemys

meansplainly the principle of in

voking obsolescence in enemy ranks.

This principle is in motion, but it

requires continual injection of em

phasis, originality, and imagination

that will give us more than just a tra

ditional edge or a modernized margin

of military-technological superiority

over

potential enemies. This ie espe

cially true with respect to combat in

telligence and mobility since the at

tainment of intelligence and mobility

superiority can multiply firepower

effects and impact.

Intelligsncs Perception

For thie form of warfare ever to

be a reality, there must be consider

able advances made in the field of

$

erational

intelligence collection

means. Ultramobility and the ability

to penetrate deep into enemy terri

tory wiH be relatively meaningless un-

Iees the intelligence gathering capa

bility matches up. The requirement,

then, is for long-range reconnaissance

means which are speedy, accurate,

and ultraresponsive.

What such future reconnaissance

vehicles will be, no one quite knows.

They may be embodied in earth sat

ellites and long-range Ping Pong

16

Militsry

Review


21/109

KINESTHETICARFANE

missiles, or some new means as vet

undiscovered. The means probably

will be multiple rather than singular

in nature.

Is there hope that such sophisti

cated intelligence gathering means

can be attained? It would seem so

considering the advancee American

technology is making.

Some

15 years

ago it would have sounded outlandish

to predict that an orbiting communi

cation satellite could in one day ex

change with earth stations the num-

VS AmvJ

A future

army will leap over the trsdi.

tiOiIal terrain and man-made harriers to

embrace a cuuntry or continent within

a ahurt capsule of time

ber of worde equal to 6,000 novels.

This the Courier experimental satel

lite did in 1960.

What else is needed to make kines

thetic warfare a reality? Tbe answer

lies in a yet to be created family of

air vehicles. Kinesthetic warfare re

quires the depth of military penetra

tion in combat at least equal to pres

ent-day airborne troops. Such forcee

Mitlember965

mnst be able to strike deep in. Beyond

this, kinesthetic forces must have a

second-wind mobility which airburne

troups do not poseess.

Second-wind mobility meane that

troops uperating deep in enemy terri

tory must be capable of moving tac

tically by-their own organic air means

to attack a geries of objectives. Since

these forces must pussess such mubil

ity unce delivered, it is axiomatic that

their tactical vehicles be air vehicles.

Thus, the aircraft for such a fight

ing force would be of fuur general

categories:

Armed tactical tranaport air

craft ,,carrying cumbat troops.

Air-to-giound attack aircraft

for the traditional air suppurt ru~e,

but traveling with the tactical forma

tions.

Logistical transport aircraft.

Interceptor aircraft.

Aircraft Profiles

Certain general aircraft profiles

can index the future requirements.

One approach to attain better than

foot or ground vehicular mobility is

the concept of placing each individual

soldier in a su-called flying platform

or its future equivalent. Except for

special purpose units, this concept

should be largely discarded. Profile

number one, then, takes the form uf

individual flying platforms for special

purpose use in mountains and jungles,

but the over-all military-air invest

ment will not be in large swarms of

these vehicles.

Profile number two cuuld be in sev

eral imagea. These images could

range from small team air vehicles to

combat unit transports of heavier

variety. The fm%er would embrace a

flying platform or vertical takeoff

landing-short takeoff and landing

(VTOL-STOL) craft carrying a

17


22/109

I

KINESTHETICWARFARE

three-man gun crew and pilot gunner,

whereas the latter image would be a

vehicle that could carry up to a pla

toon of riflemen or an equivalent load.

Dual.Purpose Armament

Both images should be compatible

in speed, hut the smaller vehicle

should be able to land in almost the

space of the vehicle itself. Both should

have dual-purpose armamentma

chineguns, recoilless rifles, or other

weapons that are mounted in the air

craft for air-to-ground fire and yet

can be of the breakaway type which

can be conveniently removed from the

vehicle for ground fighting use.

In present-day terms, one can vis

ualize the so-called flying saucer as

the first image, and the larger STOL

VTOL aircraft as the second. These

are but the prototypes of the more

sophisticated vehicles requiredand

to come.

A third profile may suggest itself

in the form of a much larger capacity

air vehicle. This concept should be

rejected, however, because we do not

want large packages of men and ma

teriel in one aerial basket to the point

whWe the enemy is given just a few,

large, profitable targets. Instead, it is

better to place the military eggs in

multiple baskets, thus reducing sin-

gle-shot liabilities. At the same time,

we would be protecting ourselves

more by providing masses of targets

to the enemy rather than a few large

ones.

Since kinesthetic forces would be

entirely supplied by air, a logistical

cmgo aircraft of some form is neces

sary. The crane-type helicopter with

a detachable cargo pod is presently a

possible prototype, but other aircraft

designs could emerge in the future.

In kinesthetic warfare, supplies would

be both dropped and air landed,

Supplies to be dropped will not al.

ways parachute down. Technology

promises to improve on the parachute,

and it may be that revolving packagw

can be developed to slow vertical de.

scent of supplies as nature has done

in the spinning seed of a maple tree.

Landing supplies by aircraft will

be carried out by STOL or VTOL

aircraft, a process that will have dual

value where evacuation of casualties

and selected prisoners represents the

return load.

Additionally, drone aircargo car.

riers may become a reality; they

could be template flown by remote

computers, and would be very useful

on the more dangerous missions.

Interceptor aircraft would form

the tactical air command umbrella to

keep enemy aircraft off the back of

kinesthetic forces. It would be desir

able for such aircraft to have the

duality to serve also as air-to-ground

attack vehicles.

Drone Reconnaissance Vehicles

Since a high order of intelligence

is necessary to secure profitable tar

gets for kinesthetic war task forces,

the importance of drone reconnais

sance aircraft and missiles is evident.

Over and above just seeking to find

and report enemy targets by such

means is an additional goal for which

we should strive.

Plainly, the concept of one machine,

man, or means finding a target, and

another man and weapon system

shooting and destroying that target, ,

is going to become largely obsolete

in the future. The requirement, then,

will be to combine the seeing eye re

connaissance vehicle with a destruc

tive weapon to create a single pack

age capable of performing both func

tions.

The combat reconnaissance drone

Military

Review

8


23/109

KINESTHETIC WARFARE

or missile

of the future must not be

viewed alone in isolation boOth teym~

of a single characteristic, but in

twins of the complete combat cycle

of find,

fix

and deetroy. The creation

of these weapone would place some

segmente of combat in a stage ad

vsnced even beyond kinesthetic war

fsre, a tactical stage that might be

termed remote-control warfare. For

strategic distances at fixed targets,

we already have this in the intercon

tinental ballistic missile. But for tac

tical and operational level warfare

and against moving targets, we do not

have this complete package.

Some futurs army is going to fight

with certain portions of its men in

swarms of low-flying aircraft, leap.

ing the traditional terrain and man.

made barriers to arrive at multiple

points of its own chooeing, departing

from these destructive scenee to

sweep and swarm in order to create

others. This will be kinesthetic war.

fare, fotw-dimensional combat of a

swift and violent nature that will see

military forces embrace a country or

continent within a short capsule of

time. This is the essence ofia concept

pureued today in the United Statee,

because US Army planners adhere to

this rather singular but traditional

goalwe do not want to fight in the

came image and terms of any of our

potential enemiee.

As a general rule we visualize the future battlefield as one requiring

more dispersion and greater mobility employing either nuclear or corrven

tiondoperations.We must alsn consider the possibility of employment of

Army forces in counterinsurgency operations in remote areas of the world.

To

accomplish these missinns effectively certain advances in tirepnwer are

required.

Major General Frank T. Mildren

.

$eptcmbor965 9
http:///reader/full/tiondoperations.Wehttp:///reader/full/tiondoperations.Wehttp:///reader/full/tiondoperations.We


24/109

AIRMOBILITY

AND

GROUND FORCES

Colonel Wladimir A. de Favitski, French Arm

REPOWER now dominates the

uclear battlefield, shaping all

doctrine and dictating tbe employ

ment of ground units. There is at

least a possibility, however, that this

may not always he the case. The ad

vent of the new airmobile forces may

restore to maneuver many of the tac

tical opportunities which have thus

far heen considered out of the ques

t ion.

Nuclear weapons are not equally ef

fective in all tactical circumstances.

In order to achieve a high order of

destruction, they must be used against

forces which have concentrated and

present a signithnt tiarget density.

No ,enemy commander will consider

such a concentration unless he has

to do it in order to fuRill his assigned

mission.

It is possible to force him to con.

eentrate by opposing him with ones

own strong, concentrated force, but

this, in turn, creates a lucrative tar.

cet which the enemv commander mav

Th18

article was

translated and

digested from the original, pub-

lished in

LABM$E

(France) Feb-

ruary 1965, under t A6-title,

ro?nobilitc et Forces Terrestres.

Translation by Mr. LaVergne

Dale, Leavenworth, Kansas.

Colonel de Favit8ki ie amrigned

to the French Armv General

Staff.

MilitaryReview


25/109

.:)

choose to attack with his own nuclear

weapons. The price that must be paid

for strength is increased vulnerabil

ity; the longer it lasts, the more dan

gerous it is. Alrmobile forces, can

greatly decrease this vulnerability by

making it possible to concentrate

quickly, engage the enemy, and then

rapidly disperse.

MobililYand Vulnerability

Greater speed also provides in

creased security in exploiting the

neutralization obtained with nuclear

weapons. Exploitation forces must be

highly mobile in order to obtain max

imum profit from the neutralization

effect of this fire and to avoid the

nuclear reactions of the adversary.

Groundmobile units, always hampered

by the natural difficulties of the ter

rain, are likely to move even slower

on a nuclear battlefield which is dotted

with contaminated zones and obstacles

created by nuclear explosions.

The reserve, aiways a vital part of

tbe commanders plans, must also be

able to move rapidly.

In a

system built

up around the tactical nuclear weapon,

the meet dependable reserve is con

stituted by the nuclear weapons avail

able. But there are cases in which the

commander must use conventional

troop

reservee,

particularly when

forces infiltrate his position or units

become so interlocked with friendly

forces that nuclear bursts are unsafe.

Tbe reeerve has to intervene in

time. Considering the size of the zones

of action in nuclear operations, the

increased terrain difficulties, and the

time required to assemble dispersed

units, there is reason to doubt the

usefulness of earthbound reserves.

They may be able to do no more than

secure small zones adjncent to their

assembly areas. Outside these zones,

it will be necessary to cdl on mobile

AIR MOBILITV

reserves unaffected by terrain obsta

cles.

The vulnerability of forces tied to

the ground deserves some attention.

Even when they are dispersed, Iarge

ground units are faced with a di

lemma. If they disperse enough to

avoid being neutralized by nuclear

weapons, they will be incapable of

defeating the enemy in ground combat.

To be sure, the increase of armor

and tbe possibilities of digging in of

fer some unite reasonable chances of

surviving the devastating salvos of

the adversary. But it will never be

more than random nnits, and the co

herent structure of the parent organi

zation will have dieappeared.

Airmolrile Units

Although tbe aircraft of airmohile

units are more fragile, they will actu

all y be less vulnerable to nuclear fires

because of the rapidity with which

they can concentrate and disperse, and

because of the suddenness with which

they can ehift their combst power.

They could, in fact, remain dispersed

until the moment of their interven

tion, thus eliminating any possibility

of nuclear damage. As targets, they

would be too fleeting to be destroyed.

The ways to escape from the paths

beaten by the track vehicles appear

to converge in the direction of air mo

bilityin the domaiu which extends

from just above tbe surface of the

ground to the tops of the cottonwoods.

Experiments dealing with this mat

ter have already been conducted for

several years in tbe United States, and

tbe problem is being studied in Yiet

nam where helicopter-borne opera

tions are a normal occurrence. In

other armies, efforts are being made

to, perfect a combat helicopter capa

ble of fulfilling at least a part of the

missions now assigned to tanks. New

September1905


26/109

AIR MOBILITY

methods such as air-cushion vehicles,

ducted propeller, and flexible wings

are being tested and could lead to new

typss of airmobile vehicles.

In view of the rapid progress being

made in the formation of airmobile

units, it seems fitting to attempt to

define as accurately as possibk the role

of this adaptation of ground forces.

- We have already noted that, al

though the airmobile forces have less

over-all vulnerability

than other

ground forces, their materiel is much

more vulnerable. Furthermore, air

craft cannot yet navigate adequately

under all conditions of weather and

visibility. Nor can these airmobile

forces secure the ground as well as

conventional units. Moreover, the nu

clear vulnerability of ground units re

sults from the need to concentrate and

the lack of means to do it quickly.

These considerations suggest a for

mula for ground forces, at some ech

elon, which wouk associate:

Mechanized units with an am

phibious capability to hug tbe terrain

and control axes and corridors fav

orable to tanks, while infantry in hel

icopters or fixed-wing airplanes per

form the same task in zones not suit

able for )arge, mechanized units.

Low-altjtude,

airmobile units

equipped with air-to-surface missilee

capable of rapidly concentrating fwe

power at a given point, and dispersing

before tbe enemy can react.

The task of the mechanized units

would be reconnaissance and harass

ment. Units would be so dispersed and

so fluid that they would not constitute

targete which could be seized or at

tacked with nuclear fire. They would

have lese firepower than the airmobile

units whose task would be sudden,

brief, and violent intervention.

Both categories of forces comple

ment each other, and their close coor

dination within the ground forces as

a whole is needed.

Even this cursory examination of

air mobility reveals that the list of

problems still unresolved is a king one,

It includes these important ones:

/

The capabilities and lim tations

of air mobility.

The relative importance of air

mobile forces within the ground

forces. .

The echelon at which they should

be employed with conventional forces.

The organization and equipmsnt

of the airmobile unit.

More advanced studies may show

that todays solution would end in an

impasse in the foreseeable future, or

they may conclude that airmobile

forces will once again return maneu

ver to ts former tactical importance.

What is needed now is to take the

next step in development and to pre

pare for the future. It is not only

trees that require 20 years for growth.

MilitaryR VI

2


27/109

SECOND ONWARHOUGHTS

A ConversationWith B. H. I.jddell Hart

rian ond

This gear marks a notewo?lhy stage in the long career of Cap-

tain

B. H. Liddell Hart British

Army

Retired. His 70th birthdag

will be honored by a

Festschrift

edited by

Professor

Michael Hozu-

ard; his memoirs mill be published in

two

volumes; and

this month

ke ?uill be

in

the United Stutes as Distinguished Visiting Profes-

sor at the University of

California.

In this conversat io?t he answers questions by

Brian Bond lec

turer in

History at Liverpool University on various aePects of his

thinking on military matters.

Mr.

Bond is the author of Some At-

tractions and Pitfalls of Military History which a?JPeaved in the

February 1965 iesue of the

MILITARYREvIEw.-t?ditor.

September1965

23


28/109

Tff fs t f 6t fTS ON WAN

BOND

\

. .

LIDDELLHART

BOND

)

LIODELL HART

hr 1944 yo u p ub l is he d a st imulat ing book ent i t led THOUGHTSON WAR

whichembodiedt he essenc e of your mi l i t ary t hi nk ing bet ween t he

w ar s. In t h e Pr efac e yo u r emar ke d t h at t h is w ss a ne ce ssa ry pr el i mi .

nary to an u l t ima te comple te syn thesis . Has the revo lut iona ry change

i n t he whol e nat ure of w ar mark ed by t he devel opment of nuc lear

w eapons made yo u f eel t h at

a

gener al su rve y on I lausew i t zi an f i ne s

i s no l onger w or th at t e mp t ing?

Cert ai nl y suc h a sur vey w oul d now be mai nl y nf hi st ori c al i nt erest .

si nc e t he expl osi on of t he f i rst at emi c bombs i n 1S45, t he t heor y of

w ar h as been i n a st a te of f l ux, and i n my vi ew t he t r adi t i onal not i on

-of

la

grande guerre i s as dead as a doe rnai l . Nevertheless, a compre

hen si ve stu dy e f st r ate gy on Cl ar rsew i t zi ar r l i nes c oul d w el l ai d t h e

proc ess of readj ust ment t o modern c ondi t ions of f i mi t ed w arf are. I

she rr ld st i l l l i ke t o at t e mpt suc h a stu dy i f t i me, and age, al l ow .

THOUGHTS ON WAR revealed how assiduously you developed and chis

el ed aw ay at your i deas t hrough regul ar not ebook j ot t ings. I k now

you a re st i l l an indefa t igable reco rder o f though ts and conversa t ions,

and I w onder how your present c onc erns c ompare w it h t hose of t he

1920 s and 1930 s. I have i n mi nd t h at i n t ho se d ays yo u w er e a mi l i .

ta ry correspondent t ry ing to in f luence events f rom day to day , whereas

now yo ur posi t i on i s one of g re ate r deta chment . I w oul d expe ct yo ur

mai n i nt e rest s now to be w i t h hi st or ic al r eappr ai sal s?

Yes, you are ri ght on t he mark . To put i t mi ldl y, I f i nd muc h of t he

w ri t ing on c ont empor ar y mi l it a~ af f ai rs f ul l of j argon and repet i t ion

+-n short , bori ng. si nc e WorldWarN,1havefr equent l yset out my

views on the most hopefu l s t ra tegy

f or t he West , and t hese have

c ome t o be adopt ed af t er a t hne. But i t i s a t edi ous pr oc ess, and I

f i nd mo re i nt er est i n t h e r eappr ai sal o f hi st o ri c al eve nt s.

BONO

In 1934 you not ed: The more 1st udy w ar, t he more I c ome t o f eel

t h at t he c ause of w ar i s f u ndamen tal l y psyc hol ogi c al r ath er t han PO

Ii t i cal or economic . . . .

Unt i l we underst and w ar i n t he f ul lest

24

M i l i t ar y Re vi ew


29/109

THOUWITS ON WAR

.

lIDDELL HART

BOND

sense w hi ch i nvol ves an under st andi ng of men i n w ar , among ot her

el ement s, i t seems t o me t hat w e c an have no mor e pr ospec t of pr e

vent i ng w ar t han t he savage has of pr event i ng pl ague.

Woul d you agree t hat t here i s st i l l a deart h of book s w hi ch i magi

nat i vel y and success ful l y por t ray men s reac t i ons i n war? I somet imes

th ink that THE RED BADGE OF COURAGE remains unsurpassed al thougl i ,

of c our se, St ephen Crane w as not w ri t ing f r om exper ienc e.

Wel l , h arc ll y a d ea rt h . i t h in k yo u ove rva lu e THE RED BADGE OF COUR- ,

AGE fo r , a l thoogh I wou ld st i l l i nc lude i t i n recommended reading l i s t s

as a r emar kabl e w or k of i magi nat i on, I have r eser vat i ons about i t

which probab ly ar ise because Crane then lacked a f i rs thand exper ience

o f b at t l e .

The bock which part ic ularl y exert ed a f ormat ive inf luence on my

t hought a s a c ompl ement t e my ow n experi enc e i n t he Fi rst Werl d

Warwas Ardant du Pi cqs BATTLE STUDIES: AHCIEHT AND MODERN

BATTLE. Fe rd inand Fochs book on THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR put me

on t o Ar dant du Pi cq, and I r ead hi m (i n Fr enc h, I t hi nk ) about 1920.

Thi s w as bef or e t he spat e of w ar beok s si rc h as C. E. M ont ague s

DISENCHANTMENT, and i t c l i c ked w i th my ewn ref l ec t i ons. I t st ressed ,

f or exampl e, t hat , despi t e al l t he t al k and propaganda, sw ords and

bayonet s rarel y c rossed i n ac t i on-bat t l es w ere dec ided, rat her, i n

t he t roops mi nds.

Of mo de rn w r it e rs, S. L. A. M arsh al l , i n b oo ks l i ke PORK CHOP HI LL

and THE RIVER ANO THE GAUNTLET, i s par t i cu larly good in convey ing

t he f eel of c ombat . I do have reservat ions about t he possi bi li ty of

su ch d et ai l ed rec on st ruc t i on s o f ba t t le f ie ld e ve nt s be cau se o f m y e x

per ienc e of t he f al t i t r il i ty o f human memor y- whi c h nat or al l y t ends t o

be al l t h e g re at e r when w i t ne sse s a re t r yi ng t o r ec ol l ec t . e xa c t f ywha t

ha pp ene d i n t h e h ea t o f ac t i on . Wi t h a f a st -mo vi ng t i gh t , t h e di f f i c ul t y

i nc reases. But I i mmenset y admi re Sl am M arshal l s w ork on suc h

c ase hi st or i es-bet t er w ork t han anyone el se has done i n t hat w ay.

I w onder i f you st i ll bel ieve t hat phi losopher s w o~d mak e t he best

r ul er s? I do ubt whet h er m en w i t ho ut t h e l ust f o r p ower woul d do e ve n

as wel l i n o f f i ceas those w i th i t ; a f te r a ll , i n any rea l i st i c se t t i ng, they

woul d be su bj ec t t o e no rm ous p re ssu re s f r om di sc on t en t ed a nd am bi

t i ous contenders. Do you th ink you yourse l f wou ld have been co rrup ted

by pow er i f y ou had hel d, sa y, an i mpor tant hf i ni st r y i n t he 1930 s or

1940s?

Sept embsr1965 25


30/109

THOUGHTS ON WAR

. LIODELL HART

BONO

LIOOELL HART

\

BONO

LIDDELL HART

Not p ro fess ional phi losophers, Bu t Iwould s tand bywhat 1 then wrote ,

You put i t t oo s t rongly in saying a l ust f o r power ; I wou ld say , rather ,

a l i k ing f o r r esponsibi l i t y. So m any men a re wor ri ad by

responsibi l i ty

and f ind i t we ighs on them, whereas I have never f e l t t h i s wax indeed,

I should have a lways wel c omed m or e o f i t .

I wou ld al so m ak e a di st i nc t i on be tween want i ng t o exe rc i se e f f ec t i ve

i nf luenc e and w ant ing t o hol d of f ic e-i t s t he t endenc y t o c ovet a nd

t hen c l i ng t o o ff i c e t hat c o rr up t s. As f o r m y own c ar ee r, I t hi nk I was

f ai rl y r eal i st i c . It w as Lest i e Here-Bel i sha s c ompr omi ses on k ey i s.

sues, in t he hepe o f easing acceptance o f t he general pol i cy o f re form

and moderni zat i on, t hat st ul t if i ed t he ef f ec t of Ids ef f or ts w it hout

appeasing h is c r i t i cs. He came to recogn ize that h imse l f i n ret rospec t ,

a f t er h is r emova l f r om t he War Of f i c e.

Aren t you rea l l y asking for wise professional pol it ic ians who wil l seek

expert advice?

Yes, e ven a phi l osopher i n my se nse w oul d need a sui t abl e t eam o f

c ow or ker s- men w ho w eul d be ment al l y and meral l y r ead y t o r ec oi n.

mend rad ical change i nstead o f s i t t i ng on the fence . I have made th is

poin t s t rong ly whenever I have been approached in recen t years about

under tak ing an o f f i c ial t ask in Whi tehal l .

i n 1936 you not ed t ha t ga s w as pl ayi ng a dec i si ve pa rt i n t he It al i an

c onquest o f Et hi op ia . I t has a lways puzzled m e why gas was not em

p loyed in t he Second World War. I s t h is a curious case

where popular,

ant iwar sent iment and emot ional ism has prevented the use of a rela

t ively indestructive weapon, or do you think soldiers and governments

have been restrained by more practical considerat ions?

A m ixt u re o f r easons and f eel i ngs. Be tween t he war s, c onven t iona fi q

w as t he domi nant f ac tor, and i n t hi s respec t i t i s si gni f i cant t hat

l i t t l e was don~ t o deve lop nonlet ha l t ypes o f gas. Dur i ng t he Second

Worl d War mut ual det errenc e w as t he mai n expl anat i o~ bot h si des

k new t he ot her had new l et hal g ases avai l abl e, and t her e w er e al so

MilitaryReview

.

6


31/109

BONO

IIDDELL HART

P

Now the time was the time of

fhe first ripe grapes.

Theyear was about 1200 B.C.

A iittle later one reads, in the sec.

ond chapter of Joshua, of an early

Lieutenant Colonel Fielding L.

Greates is

with the Ofiee of the As

sistant Chief of Staff for intelligence,

Department of the Arvnv. He served

i?z Europe during World War II, and

subsequentl~ was stationed

in Ger

many, China, and Turkey, and was

assigned to the Brifish Crown CO1OTZII

of Hong Kong. FoUozoing kis com

pletion qf the 1961 Regular Course of

the U., S. An?rtIJ Command and Gen

eral Sfaff College, he served for three

yeffrs on the facultti.

tactical intelligence mission. In this

irrstance, Joshua, one of the agents

sent earIier into Canaan, in

hia turn

sent two spies into the city of Jericho.

Even more ancient than those in.

tel]igence missions is the account of

the Battle of Kadesh. Kadesh was the

scene of a clash in 1288 B.C. between

two mighty kingdoms, and the out

come ended forever the hopes of the

one to invade and conquer the other,

Both Egyptian and Hittite accounts

of the battle, and of a subsequent

treaty, have survived toourtime, and

both record the key role played by

intelligence.

Fidse Infnrmstion

Ramses II of Egypt, marching

northward along the Orontes Rivet,

reached a point about halfway be

tween the present-day cities of Horns

and Dam4seus when he fell victim to

a counterintelligence gambithe took

at face value false information prO

vided him by two Hittite agents. Ac

cepting them as deserters from the

Hittite Army, and believing theirre.

port that King Muvattallish and bis

Hittite warriors had withdrawn far

to the north, he allowed his strung

out and divided forces, moving with

out adequate reconnaissance, to be

ambushed and taken in flank while on

the march, and a large part of his

army was routed.

The victorious Hittites then fell to

looting the camp of the foremost

Egyptian march unit, whkh had en

camped earlier, and in their eager

pursuit of plunder they failed to sta

tion sefurity guards. This, combined

witbthe timely arrival of an Egyptian

detachment which had marched by a

different route, prevented the com

plete destruction of Ramses army

The heavy Egyptian losses, brought

about as a result of their intelligence

MilitaryReview

4


39/109

zore important,

the prompt piecing together of these

bit~ and scraps to. make a pattera,

David United States Nauv could

never have coped with the Japanese

Goliath.

Although Tarawa wasan American

victory, an intelligence failure re

35


40/109

INTELLIGENCE

.mdted in landing craft grounding

some 450 meters from shore, forcing

the marine landing force to wade that

entire distance exposed to a murder

ous fire. A large part of the first days

1,500 casualties were thus directly

attributable to faulty terrain intelli

gence.

General Douglas MacArthurs mas

terful uee of terrain intelligence, tO-

US troops

head for the heath on Wohai

in

1950

-gether with the failure of North

Korean intelligence to anticipate his

move, saw the daring and eminently

successful landing at Inchon, deep in

the enemy rear, This was counterbal

anced later by the failure of Ameri

can intelligence fully

to

appreciate

Chinese Communist intentions prior

to their massive intervention south

of the Yalu.

The Bay of Pigs is another classic

example, this time of a three-way in

telligence failure. Security was nrac.

-

tically nonexistent, and Fidel Castro~s

intelligence was aware of the impend.

ing landing, as evidenced by the fact

that the landing force waa met and

destroyed on the beach. Althaugh it

was known that the security was bad

and that rumors and reports were

even appearing in the public press of

an impending operation, the force

US

Island dnring the Inchon landing operations

was sent in. And the appreciation of

the attitude and intentions of the

Cuban populace at large-that the

people would rise to support the land

ingproved disastrously wrong.

The number of such examples is

legion. Speaking of legion-consider

hnw the three legions of Quintilius

Varus were annihilated in A.D. 9 in

the Teutobu rger Wald by the German

Arminius. Varus fault, as the reader

may have guessed by now, was faulty

MilitaryIteview

6


41/109

INTELLIGENCE

reconnaissance-lack of intelligence.

The reader may exercise his imag

ination to consider how the outcomes

of these battles cited might have dif

fered had the quality of the intelli

gence available to the commander

been different. Rather than extend

the liet indefinitely, we will coneider

only two more battles, claesic battlee

which have received much attention

from students of military history.

Cannae

The Battle of Cannae has been held

up as a model for the tactical double

envelopment, as an excellent example

of the defensive-offensive battle, and,

above all, ae the claesic battle of an

nihilation. It is also a prime example

of the role of intelligence as the key

to victory.

Roman habitual failure to provide

adequate reconnaieeance had earlier

allowed Hannibal to destroy two

Roman Armies, one at the Trebbia

in 218 B.C. and the other at Lake

Trasimeno the following year. Han

nibals inteRigence chief had spice in

Rome itself, and Hannibal wae well

informed not only of the mood pre

vailing at the capital, but also of the

quality of the newly raieed levies led

jointly by the coneule Luciue Aemil

ius Paulue and Marcus Terentius

Varro, levies which outnumbered his

own army nearly 2 to 1.

In addition, he wae aware that

Paulus was a conservative, experi

enced soldier, while Varro was impet

uons, a newly elected consul with

little or no previous military experi

ence. And he knew tbe key fact

that when two consuls took the field

together, they commanded on alter

nate days. He knew when the eager

but unskilled Varro would be in com

mand. On that fateful eummer day

September1965

in 216 B.C., therefore, he made hie

move and hrred Varro into battle.

The Carthaginians also took ad.

vantage of the occaeion to practice

two deceptions. Early in the action,

we are told by Livy, a party of come

500 Numidian horsemen pretended to

defect from Hannibals army, were

accepted as defectore,

and were

passed to the rear of the cavalry on

the Roman left. From that vantage

point they later struck the Roman

rear and haetened their defeat. Later,

in the main infantry battle, Hanni

bals thin but carefully placed infan

try center allowed itself for a time

to be pushed back to form a pocket,

anchored by stronger units on both

flanks, into which the eagerly ad

vancing Roman infantry was first

lured, then compressed before being

hit in flank and rear, and, thereby,

annihilated.

Tannenberg

Tbe other claesic battle is Tannen

berg. It, like Cannae, ,is taught both

at the United States Military Acad

emy to cadets and at tbe United

States Army Command and General

Staff CORege to more senior practi

tioners of the military art. The em

phasis ie always placed on tbe skiR

ful use by the Germans of their

interior lines, and their brilliant ap

plication of aIl of the principles of

war.

But again, Tannenberg is more

than just an example of masterful

tactics, or of the application of the

principles of war. It is a classic ex

ample of both victory and defeat owed

to intelligence-good intelligence on

the part of tbe Germans, faulty intel

ligence on the part of the Russians.

Russian communication problems

and equipment shortages led to their

extensive reliance on commercial tele

37t


42/109

INTELLIGENCE

phone and telegraph facilities. On

two successive daystwo critical

days ae it turned outthe Russians

used radio to communicate in un.

coded, clear text their troops loca.

tions and planned moves. German in

telligence, in historys first use of ra

dio

intercept correctly estimated that

the broadcast were genuine and not

Russian efforts at deception. General

Paul von Hindenburg was thereby

emboldened to str ip the German

forces from opposite General Pavel

K. Rennenkampfs Ist Army and to

mass all his forces to meet General

Alekeandr Samsonovs 2d Army,

leaving only a single cavalry division

as a screen to delay the Ist Army.

An additional bit of intelligence in

formation was available to the Ger

man intelligence staff, namely, that

Rennenkampf and Samsonov were

not kindly disposed toward one

another and, therefore, might not be

ardent iB coming to one anothers as

sistance. A German officer then on

Von Hindenburgs staff had, as an

observer in Manchuria during the

Russo-Japanese War, seen those same

two individuals engaged in a fist fight

on t

h

e railway station platform at

Mukden. It is interesting how such

seemingly trivial affairs may contrib

ute

to

great events in later times.

On the Russian side of the inteRi

gence battle, in addition to the lack of

commurucation seeurity, there was

another serious shortcoming. The

Russians

generally

reconnoitered

adequately to their flanks, but con

ducted practically no reconnaissance

to their front. Thus, tbe 1st Army

dawdled instead of knifing through

tbe hne cavalry division opposing it.

Thu~ too, 2d Army marched head

long :into the German trap, Samsonov

himself being unaware of the danger

nntil an entire corps had been deci.

mated.

By then it was too late; his army

was doomed. This lack of adequate

reconnaissance by the Russians is

doubly curious, inasmuch as all three

Russian commandersboth

army

commanders and their superior, Gen

eral Jilinski, the army group tom.

manderwere generals of cavalry,

that branch of the service most closely

devoted to the business of reconnais

sance.

Without his precise knowledge of

the present and future positions of

tbe main Russian forces, Von Hin.

denburg would have been unbeliev.

ably reckless to move units as he did

to meet and destroy tbe 2d Army.

Had tbe Russians reconnoitered ag

gressively to the front, 1st Army

would not have been deceived and de

layed by a mere division of cavalry,

and 2d Army, instead of blundering

headlong into disaster, would have

had time to form up properly to meet

the Germans at Tannenberg.

Thue, both Cannae and Tannen

berg, long cited as claesic examplee of

the battle of annihilation, are also

classics of another sort-classic bat

tles won, and lost, by intelligence.

It matters not what the field of en

deavor or the professionwbether

battle or commerce or politics, med]

cine or footballthe basic rule is uni.

versal end invariable. To make a good

decision, the decision maker requires

good information.

In the conflicts of today and to

morrow, we can never lose sight of

the lesson learned from the battles of

yesterdayintelligence is tbe key

which unjocke the door

to

victory.

Mil i tary Revie

Aticle in Military Review: Communist Errors in the Anti-Bandit War 66 77

Documents

Transcript of Aticle in Military Review: Communist Errors in the Anti-Bandit War 66 77