Asymmetric Iranian Naval Warfare

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Iran’s Asmmetric

Naval WarareFariborz Haghshenass

Policy Focus #87 | September 2008



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© y the Wshington Institute or Ner Est Policy

Pulished in in the United Sttes o Americ y the Wshington Institute or Ner Est Policy, L Street NW, Suite , Wshington, DC .

Design y Dniel Kohn, Sensicl Design nd CommunictionFront cover: A swrm o Irnin Islmic Revolutionry Gurd Corps Nvy (IRGCN) Ashur-clss smll otsmoilizes during recent nvl exercise in the Persin Gul. Source: Irnin News Agency



Iran’s Asmmetric

Naval Warare

Fariborz Haghshenass

Policy Focus #87 | September 2008



Fariborz Haghshenass is n expert on the Irnin militry who hs pulished widely on the suject. He is the

uthor o the Wshington Institute PolicyWtches “Irn’s Doctrine o Asymmetric Nvl Wrre” (Decemer ,) nd “Irn’s Air Forces: Struggling to Mintin Rediness” (Decemer , ).

n n n

Te opinions expressed in this Policy Focus re those o the uthor nd not necessrily those o the WshingtonInstitute or Ner Est Policy, its Bord o rustees, or its Bord o Advisors.

Abot the Athor



Table o Contents

Executive Summry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Militry Geogrphy o Irn’s Mritime Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Historicl Bckground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Fctors Inuencing Irn’s Approch to Asymmetric Nvl Wrre. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Irnin Cpilities nd Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Conict Scenrios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Appendix . Irnin Militry Rnk Insigni . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Appendix . For Further Reding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Illstrations

Fig. . Persin Gul nd Strit o Hormuz (topogrphicl imge). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Fig. . Strit o Hormuz nd pproches (mp). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Fig. . An Ashur-clss smll ot tted with ZU-- cnnon (photo). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Fig. . An IPS- torpedo ot tted with Kosr nti-ship-missile lunchers (photo). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Fig. . ondr st-ttck cr (photo) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Fig. . A Ghdir-clss midget sumrine (photo) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Fig. . A C- costl nti-ship-missile ttery (photo) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Fig. . Ashur-clss smll ots congured or mine-lying duties (photo) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Fig. . Irnin M- contct mines (photo) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

le . IRGCN Opertionl Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18



The Washington Institute for Near East Policy vii

moile costl missile tteries, modern nti-ship mis-

siles mounted on st-ttck cr, semi-sumersiles,midget sumrines, modern nvl mines, unmnnederil vehicles (possily including “kmikze” ttck versions), nd improved commnd, control, communi-ctions, nd intelligence.

his study concludes tht despite Irn’s overlldeensive posture in the Persin Gul nd the Strit o Hormuz, it could tke preemptive ction in response to perceived thret o imminent ttck. And in the evento U.S. ttck, the scle o Irn’s response would likelye proportionl to the scle o the dmge inicted on

Irnin ssets.

T h i s s T u d y s h e d s l i g h T on Irn’s nvl inten-

tions nd cpilities y exploring the militry geogrphy o the Persin Gul nd Cspin regions, reviewing the historicl evolution o Irn’s pproch to symmet-ric wrre, ssessing its nvl orces, nd evluting its plns or possile wr with the United Sttes. hestudy ends with quick overview o severl possilescenrios.

Since the end o the Irn-Irq Wr, Irn hs investedsustntilly in developing its nvy (prticulrly theIslmic Revolutionry Gurd Corps Nvy) long unconventionl lines. he most importnt devel-

opments in this regrd include the deployment o

Exective Smmar



The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1

Te ongoing dispute over Irn’s nucler progrm

nd the wr o words etween Irn nd the UnitedSttes hve heightened the level o tension in thestrtegic Persin Gul region. As mjor oil exporter with ,-mile (, km) costline on the Gul,Irn is regionl power. Te lst conict in PersinGul wters involving Irn dtes ck to the Irn-Irq Wr (–), when the country’s nvl orcesclshed repetedly with the U.S. Nvy. Becuse o the Gul ’s strtegic importnce nd the potentilor uture conict there, Irn’s nvl cpilities ndintentions—nd its pproch to symmetric nvl

wrre—hve ssumed gret importnce or U.S.militry plnners nd policymkers responsile orthe region.

“We re everywhere nd t the sme time nowhere.”

—Commodore Mortez Sri, commnder,Islmic Revolutionry Gurd Corps Nvy, July , 1

F r o m T h e i r a n i a n m i l i T a r y perspective,symmetric nvl wrre employs ville equip-ment, exile tctics, superior morle, nd the physiclnd geogrphicl chrcteristics o the re o oper-tion to deend vitl economic resources, inict lossesuncceptle to the enemy, nd ultimtely destroytechnologiclly superior enemy orces. More specii-clly, the symmetric nvl wrghter exploits enemy

vulnerilities through the use o “swrming” tctics y well-rmed smll ots nd st-ttck cr, to mountsurprise ttcks t unexpected times nd plces.2

. “Te IRGCN Is Prepred or Direct nd Fr-Rnging Missions in the Persin Gul” [ in Persin], Frs News Agency, July , . Aville online (www.rsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=).

. Eshkoos Dnekr, “Jnghye Gheyre Clssic dr Khlij-e Frs” [Unconventionl wrs in the Persin Gul ], in the proceedings o n event held t thePoliticl nd Interntionl Studies Bureu’s Persin Gul Studies Center, April , ehrn (ehrn: Irnin Foreign Ministry, ), p. . Dnekr

ws n Islmic Repulic o Irn Nvy cptin nd nvl district commnder during the Irn-Irq Wr.

Introdction



2 Policy Focus #87

Militar Geograph o Iran’s Maritime Zones

countries, lthough irly lrge re is still not clerly

demrcted.Te Persin Gul region is home to – percent

o the world’s conirmed oil reserves nd – per-cent o its conrmed gs reserves. Between Jnury ndMy o , the Gul countries (excluding Bhrinnd Omn) erned comined oil export revenues o $ illion.2

ehrn considers the whole Persin Gul seed itsoshore territory, nd in , the Irnin prliment pssed lw extending the country’s territoril wtersto twelve miles, including the re round its islnds.

In principle, the United Sttes recognizes only three-mile limits, ut in prctice it normlly does not chl-lenge wider clims.3

Strait o Hormzhe nrrow Strit o Hormuz is one o the mostimportnt odies o wter on erth. It is pproximtely miles ( km) long, miles ( km) wide t itsestern end, miles (. km) wide t its westernend, nd hs n verge depth o eet ( m) (seeg. ). It is ner vitl components o Irn’s minlnd

inrstructure, including the country’s lrgest seportnd nvl se—Bndr As—nd mjor spur o Irn’s ntionl rilwy system. More thn percent o the world’s interntionlly trded oil, round mil-lion rrels per dy, psses through the strit.4 htincludes more thn ity tnkers dily, ll under the wtchul eyes o Irnin surveillnce ssets, including those on the islnd o Hormuz—once hu o worldtrde tht might e thought o s the Hong Kong o

Persian Gl

he Persin Gul is miles ( km) long ndetween nd miles (– km) wide, covering n re o pproximtely , squre miles (,km). Its verge depth is eet ( m), with mximum depth o – eet (– m) t theentrnce to the Strit o Hormuz (see g. ). Numer-ous coves nd inlets on the Gul ’s shoreline serve ssmll ot hrors nd nchorges, s do Irn’s seven-teen islnds.1

At the Gul ’s northern end, the igris nd Euphr-tes rivers join to crete the Shtt l-Ar wter-

wy, which is , eet ( m) wide nd up to eet ( m) deep s it enters the Gul. According tothe Algiers Accord etween Irn nd Irq, the“thlweg”—the line trcing the deepest prts o given wterwy—is the ccepted oundry etween the two

. For detiled iogeophysicl nd hydrologicl studies o the Persin Gul, see Hns-Jorg Brth nd Nuzrt Yr Khn, “Biogeophysicl Setting o the Gul ”in Adulziz H. Auzind, Hns-Jorg Brth, et l. (eds.), Protecting the Gul ’s Marine Ecosystems om Pollution (Bsel, Switzerlnd: Birkhuser Bsel,); nd W. Adel-Monim Murk nd A. I. Kurykov, “Hydrologicl Structure o Wters o the Persin Gul According to the Dt o Oserv-tions in ,” Physical Oceanography , no. (Septemer ), pp. –.

. U.S. Energy Inormtion Administrtion, “OPEC Revenues Fct Sheet,” My . Aville online (www.ei.doe.gov/emeu/cs/OPEC_Revenues/Fctsheet.html).

. Bernrd E. rinor, “Gul Risks: Mines nd Suicide Bots,” New York imes, August , . Aville online (query.nytimes.com/gst/ullpge.html?res=BDEDBFEFABCA&sec=&spon=&pgewnted=ll).

. Simon Henderson, Energy in Danger: Iran, Oil, and the West (Policy Focus no. ) (Wshington, D.C.: Wshington Institute or Ner Est Policy, June); ville online (www.wshingtoninstitute.org/downlod.php?le=Polic yFocus.pd). Richrd Hllorn, “Pcic Choke Point,” Air Force Maga-

zine , no. (July ), p. ; ville online (www.irorce-mgzine.com/MgzineArchive/Documents//July%/choke.pd).

Fig. 1. Persian Gul and Strait o Hormuz.

w w w . p a r s t i m e s . c o m



Iran’s Asmmetric Naval Warare Fariborz Haghshenass


islnds, together with our other Irnin islnds (Lesserun, Au Mus, Bni Forur, nd Sirri), re prticu-lrly importnt ecuse they lie ner the route tht ll vessels entering or leving the Gul use.5

Gl o Omanhe Gul o Omn hs n pproximte length nd width o nd miles ( nd km), respec-tively. It connects the Persin Gul to the Arin Se/Indin Ocen nd is much deeper thn the PersinGul, with mximum depth o , eet (, m).

Caspian SeaTe Cspin Se is the world’s lrgest lke, mesuring y miles (, y km) with , miles

(, km) o costline, o which more thn miles( km) re in Irnin territory. Te Cspin coversn re o more thn , squre miles (,km). Te wter depth is out eet ( m) in thenorth, , eet ( m) in the center, nd , eet(, m) in the south long Irnin shores.

Hving vst oil nd gs reserves s well s cvirstocks, the se enjoys growing strtegic sttus, ut wterorne ccess is only possile through Russi’sVolg-Don nd Volg-Bltic wterwys. Moreover,the depth o the Irnin side mkes oil nd gs explo-

rtion dicult, nd ny economic ctivity in this rerequires more technology nd investment.6 In thementime, Irn intends to increse its shre o Cs- pin shipping rom less thn percent to percenty douling its Cspin merchnt eet to twenty-veships.

the sixteenth century. he strit’s shipping chnnelsinclude twenty-ve-mile-long, two-mile-wide corri-dor tht ships use to enter the Persin Gul. It is sep-rted y two-mile-wide trc seprtion zone romthe deeper two-mile-wide outgoing corridor used y

lden tnkers on the Omni side. Tere is lso notherity-mile-long seprtion scheme, which is urtherinside the Persin Gul nd entirely within Irnin ter-ritoril wters. Tis scheme regultes trc in piro three-mile-wide corridors, which re overseen ythe Irnin islnds o Greter un nd Forur. Tese

. Rouhollh K. Rmzni, Te Persian Gul and the Strait o Hormuz (Alphen n den Rijn, the Netherlnds: Sijtho & Noordho Interntionl, ), p. ; nd Hugh F. Lunch, “Freedom o Nvigtion in the Persin Gul nd the Strit o Hormuz,” in Myron H. Nordquist nd John Norton Moore (eds.),Security Flagships: Oil, Islands, S ea Access and Military Conontation(Te Hgue: Mrtinus Nijho, ), p. .

. Bhmn Aghi Di, “Irn’s Ntionl Interests in the Cspin Se,” Persian Journal (online), Mrch , . Aville online (www.irnin.ws/cgi-in/irn_news/exec/view.cgi///printer).

Fig. 2. Strait o Hormuz and approaches.




4 Policy Focus #87

Historical Backgrond

nd hsty uildup engendered vrious prolems, how-

ever, including resentment o Irn’s dependence on or-eign support, orgniztionl ineiciencies, prolems with equipment operility, lck o prepredness ormjor comt opertions, nd hevy dependence oninpproprite conventionl oreign militry conceptsnd doctrines.

Revoltion and the Iran-Ira WarTe Islmic Revolution o rought out mjorchnge in the Irnin politicl lndscpe, with whichcme new security enorcer, the Islmic Revolutionry

Gurds Corps (IRGC), lso known s “Seph” or “Ps-drn.” he IRGC emphsized nontrditionl tcticsnd revolutionry Shiite vlues—in prticulr, the mssmoiliztion o the ideologiclly committed, doctrineo continuous jihd, nd culture o mrtyrdom. It wssoon to ecome the oremost dvocte or nd prctitio-ner o Irn’s concept o symmetric nvl wrre.

Te Irn-Irq Wr involved mritime dimensionlmost rom the strt, with Irq using torpedo nd mis-sile ots to ttck Irnin merchnt ships nd mineIrn’s northern Gul hrors. But Irq’s nvl cpil-

ity received low in Novemer when Irn’s nvynd ir orce lunched comined ir nd se oper-tion to sink nd dmge severl Irqi nvl vessels. Yet,Irqi shore-sed missile ttcks continued ginstIrnin convoy opertions t Irn’s only commercil port t tht time, Bndr Shhpour, nd ginst itsoil industry. By lte , Irq egn to receive new weponry, nd y erly , it incresed the pce o its mritime ttcks.

Te IRGC’s qusi-nvl role egn during its mphiious oensives in southern Irq, when it mde

extensive use o mrshlnd ots to trnsport troopsnd supplies.3 Lter, in Septemer , the IRGC

i r a n h a s a r i c h mritime heritge. In ncient

times, lrge Persin eets siled s r west s Greecend s r est s Chin to conquer lnd or to trde.In the Mediterrnen Se, Achemenid Persins usedspy ships, disguised s oreign merchntmen, ndsmll wrships or clndestine opertions.1 And it wsthe ncient Persins, during the reign o Xerxes, whoinvented the concept o nvl inntry.2 Lter dyns-ties uilt lrge cities nd ports on the southern costso Persi, mking it the hu o trde etween west ndest.

Following long period o decline, Persi’s spir-

tions in the Persin Gul picked up gin during the ero Nder Shh, when he grdully uilt up smll eettht he used to retke Bhrin in . Tis success ledhim to crete costl nvy in the Gul. Persi thenmde expeditions to Omn in id to tke controlo the strtegic Strit o Hormuz. Te Western pow-ers reused to sell ships to Persi, so Nder creted nindigenous shipuilding industry whose products wereinstrumentl to ringing Omn ck into sumission,nd to the tsk o ghting pirtes. But the nscent Per-sin nvy ws short-lived, nd y , lmost nothing

ws le o it.hroughout history, the Portuguese, Dutch, nd

British ought mny ttles or control o the PersinGul ports, islnds, nd trde routes. Tis led to numer-ous wrs o liertion y the southern Persins ginstoreign occupiers.

More recently, during the Phlvi er, Irnemrked on mjor nvl expnsion y purchsing lrge numers o wrships, helicopters, hovercr, ndsumrines during the s nd s (though someo these were not delivered y the time o the Islmic

Revolution). It lso sent thousnds o nvl cdets tothe United Sttes nd Europe or trining. Te mssive

. Ismil Reen, Daryanavardiye Iranian[Te sering Irnins], vol. (ehrn: Sekeh Pulishing, ), p. .. Iid., p. .. Mehdi Khodverdikhn (ed.), Nabard al-Ommaya: Avalin Amaliyat Daryaie S epah Pasdaran dar Khalij Fars [Bttle o l-Omy: the rst nvl oper-

tion o the IRGC in the Persin Gul ] (ehrn: IRGC Wr Studies Center, ), p. .





interntionlly. In erly , the IRGCN employedmore ggressive tctics using smll FIACs, ollowedshortly thereer y HY- missile ttcks lunched romthe Irnin-occupied Fw Peninsul o Irq.

Yet, the IRGCN’s initil cpilities were limiteddue to lck o proper equipment nd indequte trin-ing or dverse wether conditions.6 When it lunchedone o its most sustntil swrming ttcks ginstSudi Ari’s Khi oilelds—the world’s lrgest o-shore oileld—on Octoer , , the otill o IRGCots ecme strnded in rough ses ter their com-mnd ot lost its wy. his ttck ws in retlitionor the deth o Irnin Hjj pilgrims t the hnds o Sudi security orces the previous July, nd the sinking o IRIN mine-lying vessel Irn Ajr y the U.S. Nvy in

Septemer . A mjor show o orce y the Sudi irnd nvl orces lso contriuted to the termintion o the plnned opertion. At the sme time, smll temo Irnin Specil Bot Service commndos penetrtedSudi territory undetected nd were out to set o explosives on severl mjor Sudi pipelines when they were ordered to ort their mission nd return to se.

Despite these initil setcks, the IRGCN quicklyuilt up its tlly o ttcks on creully identied oiltnkers crrying Kuwiti nd Sudi oil, rom thirty-seven during the rst yer o the nker Wr to more

thn ninety-six in . Mritime opertions weregrdully overshdowing the stlled lnd wr.7

Te regging o the Kuwiti tnkers, nd the su-sequent Bridgeton incident o July , (when tnker in the irst relgged convoy ws hit nd dm-ged y n Irnin mine), ws the turning point or theIRGC in its conronttion with the United Sttes in thePersin Gul, nd mjor escltory event in the ongo-ing low-intensity struggle ginst “the Gret Stn.” Inct, the Gurds were seeking even urther escltionin the Gul, ccording to instructions given to them

y Aytollh Ruhollh Khomeini, ut or resons still

Nvy (IRGCN) ws estlished s n independent rmlongside the Islmic Repulic o Irn Nvy (IRIN). Itsoon ssumed key opertionl role during the seizureo the Irqi Fw Peninsul in Ferury , when

young Bsij rogmen crossed the Shtt l-Ar wterwy nd secured ridgehed or Irn’s irst ssult wve ginst unsuspecting Irqi deenders.4 Only erSeptemer , however, did the IRGCN tke prt incomt opertions in the Persin Gul. Tt month, theIRGCN riey seized derelict Irqi oshore oil termi-nl tht ws used s n intelligence gthering outpostt the mouth o the Khowr Adullh/Shtt-l-Ar,nd ttempted to estlish permnent IRGC pres-ence there. his opertion gve the IRGC conidenceto initite mitious nvl swrming opertions ginst

the U.S. Nvy; ehrn susequently invested signicntdditionl resources in the IRGC’s nvl cpilities.5

Following series o inconclusive mjor Irninoensives into Irq in nd erly , Bghddintensiied its economic cmpign ginst Irn’s oilindustry, especilly ginst tnkers crrying Irnin oil.Soon thereer, Irn egn employing nvl guerrilltctics in wht ecme known s the nker Wr.

At irst, Irn lcked proper mens to retliteginst intensiying Irqi ttcks. he regulr mili-try’s initil ttempts ginst Irqi proxy oil exports

(i.e., Kuwiti nd Sudi tnkers exporting oil on Irq’sehl ) were cutious. Its wepons—ir-lunchedMverick nd AS- missiles, ship-lunched Se Killermissiles, nd nvl surce gunire—proved lrgelyineective, nd their respective pltorms proved vul-nerle to counterttcks.

As result o these lrgely unsuccessul responses, s well s the incresing oreign nvl involvement in theregion, the IRGCN ws tsked with developing ndimplementing unconventionl nvl guerrill wrretctics using speedots—the very rst o which Irn hd

either conscted rom Kuwiti smugglers or purchsed

. Iid. Te Bsij Resistnce Force is the populr reserve militi o the IRGC, which cn e moilized in times o wr or internl emergencies to ll thernks o the IRGC nd to ulll vrious supporting roles. It hs ssumed n even more importnt role thn in the pst s result o the IRGC’s recentreorgniztion.

. Iid., p. .. “A Brie Look t the Unconventionl Wrre t Se” [in Persin], Faslnameye arikhe Jang [History o wr qurterly] , no. (Winter ) (IRGC Wr

Studies Center), p. .. Iid., p. .



6 Policy Focus #87

Fariborz Haghshenass Historical Backgrond

even to cross the Persin Gul nd tke the ght to theenemy, i necessry.12 As result o the wr, Irn identi-ed the ollowing requirements or its nvl orces:

Lrge numers o nti-ship missiles on vrious typesn

o lunch pltorms

Smll st-ttck cr, hevily rmed with rockets orn

nti-ship missiles

More st mine-lying pltormsn

An enhnced susurce wrre cpility with vri-n

ous types o sumrines nd sensors

More smll, moile, hrd-to-detect pltorms, suchn

s semi-sumersiles nd unmnned eril vehicles

More specilized trining n

More customized or purpose-uilt high-techn

equipment

Better communictions nd coordintion etweenn

ghting units

More timely intelligence nd eective coun-n

terintelligence/deception

Enhnced ility to disrupt the enemy’s commnd,n

control, communictions, nd intelligence cpility

he importnce o inititive, nd the voidnce o n

rontl enggements with lrge U.S. nvl surce wrre elements

Mens to mitigte the vulnerility o even smlln

nvl units to ir nd missile ttck

unknown, they did not ct. In ny cse, they hd nerlyexhusted their cpilities nd resources y tht point,8nd towrd the lter stges o the wr, the U.S. militrynd even the Irqi ir orce ecme incresingly success-

ul in detecting nd destroying IRGCN ots.Irnin retlitory strikes during the nker Wr

were proportionl nd creully controlled y ehrn.Irnin orces generlly ocused their ttcks on lrgecrude oil tnkers rther thn well-deended wrships,nd were generlly more successul t striking sttictrgets thn moving ones, such s Seersucker missilettcks on Kuwiti oil cilities nd moored tnkers.9

IRGCN retlitory opertions hrdly ected Irq’s proxy oil exports through the Gul, nd their eect onthe nker Wr ws reltively insignicnt. Tey did

help esclte the conronttion with Western powers,however, culminting in mjor nvl ttle on April, , which the U.S. Nvy clled Opertion Prying Mntis. During the ttle, three Irnin wrships weresunk or dmged, nd U.S. helicopter gunship wsshot down. With the exception o this enggement, theIRIN ws reluctnt to cooperte with the IRGCN orto undertke joint opertions. Insted it ws enggedminly in surveillnce nd inspection opertions.

In erly , joint IRIN/IRGCN hedqurters ws estlished in Bndr As in n ttempt to ring

the IRGC’s nvl ctivities under the control o the reg-ulr militry, nd to limit its role to costl res. Butthe mitious IRGC did not cooperte nd decided tocontinue in its independent opertions.10 Even the Ir-nin Deense Ministry initilly reused to deliver therst tch o Irnin-uilt nvl mines to the IRGC.11Yet, the IRIN’s conventionl ssets proved unsuitleor the kind o comt opertions desired y the Ir-nin ledership nd the nture o the emerging conictin the Gul. By the end o the wr, the politicl leder-ship ws convinced o the IRGC’s ility to deend Ir-

nin shipping, control se lines o communiction, nd

. Iid.. Hossein Alee, “How the IRGC Nvy Ws Formed” [Persin interview], in Mdjid Mokhtri (ed.), Iran-Iraq War Strategic Issues (ehrn: IRGC Wr

Studies Center, ), p. . Alee ws the ounding commnder o the IRGCN nd one o its key strtegists.. Iid., p. .. Iid., p. .. Iid., p. .




Factors Inlencing Iran’s Approach to Asmmetric Naval Warare

under cover o drkness, during high tide without ny

specil ccommodtions. Tis would reduce the likeli-hood o eing interdicted en route to their destintionnd increse the likelihood o surprise.2

Camofage and ConcealmentUnconventionl wrghters will seek to void detec-tion y the enemy nd will ttck t time nd plceo their choosing, employing vriety o cmouge,concelment, nd deception mesures. Historiclly,the success o swrming tctics hs depended on supe-rior situtionl wreness to cilitte surprise, nd the

ility to lnd pinul lows ginst the enemy ndthen elude pursuers er reking contct. Irn’s long shoreline is overlooked y mountin ridge tht risess high s , eet (, m) nd continues uninter-rupted long the northern shores o the Gul. More-over, the Gul ’s network o islnds, inlets, nd coves,nd its costl support inrstructure (uoys, onshorehide sites nd unkers, costl oservtion posts), reidel or stging nd supporting extended ptrol ndreconnissnce opertions, precision mining oper-tions, missile rrges, nd swrming ttcks.

Te element o surprise is prticulrly importnt inunconventionl nvl wrre, nd is prticulrly likelyin littorl wters3 ecuse o the reltively smll dis-tnces involved, nd ecuse close-rnge enggementsreduce some o the technologicl dvntges enjoyedy lrger orces such s the U.S. Nvy.4 Tereore, Irnis likely to use terrin, cmouge, concelment, nddeception mesures (including pltorms or weponsincorporting low-oservle technology nd etures)to chieve surprise.

he dily trnsit o more thn , locl ves-

sels nd hundreds o crude crriers nd crgo ships

a n u m b e r o F F a c T o r s would likely inluence

the plnning o uture Irnin unconventionl nvlopertions in the Persin Gul.

Coastal GeographIrn’s unconventionl nvl wrghters enjoy numero geogrphic dvntges, including:

the proximity o ville stging res to nticiptedn

res o opertion (reducing trnsit times or Irninorces nd ville rection times or enemy orces),

the depth nd density o costl rod networksn

(which enhnce Irn’s tcticl options nd exiil-ity), nd

the reltively conined wters o the Gul, whichn

limit the reedom o mneuver o enemy nvl unitsnd could enle Irn to hit trgets on the r side with long-rnge costl missiles.

Bases, Staging Areas, and Roteso operte eectively, unconventionl nvl wrght-

ers nd logisticl support units need secure ses, stg-ing res, nd routes to nd rom their res o oper-tion. Tere re more thn ten lrge nd sixty smll portsnd hrors long Irn’s southern costline, in dditionto the mny scttered shing nd siling villges ndtowns, ll o which oer excellent hiding plces orsmll surce comtnts.1 he IRGC hs numerousstging res in such plces nd hs orgnized its Bsijmiliti mong the locl inhitnts to undertke support opertions.

Some o Irn’s smller speedots cn e lunched

discreetly—or exmple, o the ck o ted truck

. Hossein Alee, “How the IRGC Nvy Ws Formed” (Persin interview), in Mdjid Mokhtri (ed.), Iran-Iraq War Strategic Issues (ehrn: IRGC WrStudies Center, ), p. .

. Iid., p. .. Wyne P. Hughes Jr., Fleet actics and Coastal Combat , nd ed. (Annpolis, Md.: Nvl Institute Press, ), p. .. Dvid B. Crist, “Irn’s Smll Bots Are Big Prolem,” New York imes, Jnury , . Aville online (www.nytimes.com////

opinion/crist.html?_r=&re=world&ore=slogin&ore=slogin).



8 Policy Focus #87

Fariborz Haghshenass Factors Infencing Iran’s Approach

Another preerred symmetric tctic is mush-ing merchnt convoys nd wrships trnsiting knownshipping corridors. Tese mushes might consist o groups o speedots setting out rom smll costl

coves, inlets, hrors, islnds, or rticil ojects suchs uoys. Vrious ctors cn, however, ect smll-ot opertions: wter currents nd wind speeds(which ect nvigtion), wether nd visiility(which hinder nvigtion nd cn lso oscure smllots rom their hunters or their prey), temperturend humidity (which ect crew endurnce nd the perormnce o electronic systems), wter slinity(which ects sekeeping), nd tidl rnge vritions(which ect shllow wter nd chnnel opertions). With yers o opertionl experience in the region,

Irnins would no dout ttempt to use such ele-ments to their dvntge.

Irn’s nvl orces would lso likely rely on mushesnd surprise ttcks originting rom costl or oshorestging res, or usy se-lnes, s well s swrming tc-tics, to limit the enemy’s reedom o mneuver in geo-grphiclly conned wters. Te swrming tctic usedy Irn’s unconventionl nvl orces would lso imto hinder the enemy’s ility to concentrte re, using comintion o rontl, lnking, nd diversionryttcks. Tese include coordinted spirling mneuvers

in so-clled horseshoe ormtions while pproching nd surrounding their trgets.9 (Such tctics were usedy Persin Gul pirtes or centuries.10)

Meteorological andHdrographical Factorshe Persin Gul summer, rom My to Octoer, is very hot nd humid (up to °F/°C nd per-

through the Persin Gul nd the Strit o Hormuz cnmke the tsk o dierentiting riend rom oe verydicult or conventionl orces operting there, espe-cilly when the unconventionl orces use locl civilin

ots nd vessels to pproch nd ttck trgets.5 Anyerror involving collterl dmge nd civilin csulties would lmost certinly enet Irn.

ChokepointsMost o the deep res o the Persin Gul re insideIrnin territoril wters. Te shllower wters in thesouthern reches o the Gul re strewn with numeroussmll corl islnds, oil-well heds, pumping pltorms,nd underwter mounds, ll o which inhiit nvig-tion nd orce trc into designted deepwter chn-

nels ner Irn’s islnds or costline.Irn could exploit this dvntge during se-denil

opertions y engging in lrge-scle oensive mining o chokepoints nd deepwter chnnels.6 Despite thenoisiness o mine lying, countering this tctic is di-cult once the mines re in plce—countermine oper-tions re time consuming nd costly nd cn e undoney urther hostile ction. During the hostilities o –, smll Irnin Ashur-clss mine-lying ots mn-ged to escpe undetected most o the time. During theopertion to plnt twelve mines on the Bridgeton’s route,

the Frsi islnd–sed IRGC ots were within visulrnge o the escorting U.S. Nvy wrships.7

Mine-lying opertions cn e conducted using ny type o vessel, including civilin cr such s lenjes (Persin or “dhow”), rges, or lnding cr, s dem-onstrted y the Iran Ajr incident in .8 Tey cn erepeted s oen s necessry to rustrte the enemy’scountermine eorts.

. Eshkoos Dnekr, “Jnghye Gheyre Clssic dr Khlij-e Frs” [Unconventionl wrs in the Persin Gul ], rom the proceedings o n event held t the

Politicl nd Interntionl Studies Bureu’s Persin Gul Studies Center, April , ehrn (ehrn: Irnin Foreign Ministry, ), p. .. Iid., p. .. “A Brie Look t the Unconventionl Wrre t Se” [in Persin], Faslnameye arikhe Jang [History o wr qurterly] , no. , (Winter ) (IRGC

Wr Studies Center), p. .. See Dnekr, “Jnghye Gheyre Clssic dr Khlij-e Frs,” p. . Te Iran Ajr incident involved n Irnin nvy lnding cr used s mine-lyer. It ws

cught red-hnded o the cost o Bhrin on the night o Septemer , , y U.S. specil opertions helicopters, nd ws susequently ttcked ndcptured. Te vessel ws lter scuttled y the U.S. Nvy.

. Mehdi Khodverdikhn (ed.), Nabard al-Ommaya: Avalin Amaliyat Daryaie S epah Pasdaran dar Khalij Fars [Bttle o l-Omy: the rst nvl oper-tion o the IRGC in the Persin Gul ] (ehrn: IRGC Wr Studies Center, ), p. .

. For more detils on the swrming tctics, see Friorz Hghshenss, “Irn’s Doctrine o Asymmetric Nvl Wrre,” PolicyWatch no. ( WshingtonInstitute or Ner Est Policy, Decemer , ). Aville online (www.wshingtoninstitute.org/templteC.php?CID=).





Bor wind o the Hormuz); the regionl winds usully prllel to the costline tht include the dusty north-erly wind rom the west or southwest (strongest romerly June to mid-July); nd the wind rom the south-

est, which signicntly increses humidity, hze, nd wve heights in lte summer.13 Te winds lso continu-lly chnge direction nd mke wether orecsting diicult. ogether, the winds could dversely ectsmll-cr nd diver opertions in the northern Per-sin Gul.14 Moreover, erly morning og, slt, hze, ordust, especilly rom My to August, reduces visiilityto etween two nd six miles, nd sometimes to s lit-tle s hl mile.15

Economic Factors

With oil prices reching record levels, the minonshore nd oshore production cilities sctteredround the region oer esy high-vlue trgets to theunconventionl nvl wrghter. Te deense o thesecilities would require mjor eort, therey provid-ing dditionl tempting trgets or Irnin orces. Inthe cse o conronttion with the United Sttes, Irn would lso hve the option o using terrorist sleepercells in the southern Gul Ar sttes to destroy oilnd gs cilities there.16 Moreover, ecuse Irn relieshevily on loclly produced equipment, rms, uel, nd

other supplies, it would e le to wge nd sustinn unconventionl nvl cmpign or considerle period o time.

Irn hs severl contingency plns to decrese, ndeventully eliminte, its relince on imported gso-line y . Even i successul, however, it wouldstill depend on the Strit o Hormuz s the chnnelor exporting lmost ll o its crude oil. Tereore, itseems highly unlikely tht Irn would ttempt to hltll shipping through the strit in limited conlictscenrio.

cent humidity in certin res), mking smll-otopertions during the dytime dicult. As result,Irn hs equipped mny smller (nd ll lrger) speed-ots with ir conditioning systems. High humidity

lso seriously disrupts the perormnce o rdrs— prticulrly the type o smll mrine rdrs used onIrnin speedots. Te winter wether is generlly plesnt, though the erly prt o the seson is oenccompnied y hevy rins tht cn cuse usullydry costl rivereds to ood, with devstting eectson costl res.

Wether nd se conditions lso ply key role innvl opertions, nd the locl inhitnts o southernIrn who constitute signicnt prt o the IRGCN’snd Bsij’s nvl orces cn e expected to unction

etter thn oreign orces in the region’s hrsh condi-tions. Bd wether lso dversely ects the electronicso modern wrships operting in the re. Finlly, hot,humid wether nd the occsionl sndstorm cn sig-nicntly reduce visiility.

During prts o spring, the summer months, nd prts o utumn, smll-ot opertions ecome dn-gerous due to sesonl storms.11 Such nnul wethercycles would likely inuence the plnning or, nd tim-ing o, Irnin smll-ot opertions.

iming considertions re lso necessrily ected

y the hydrogrphic chrcteristics o the theter o opertions. For exmple, in one re o the northernPersin Gul, predominnt counterclockwise se cur-rent converges with our other smller currents. PstIrnin nvl opertions in the northern Gul hveoriginted in this re, nd uture Irnin opertions would likely e lunched rom there s well. 12

Tere re vrious types o winds in the Persin Gul tht ect the pttern nd shpe o the surce wves:the hrmless sesonl winds rom northest to southwest; occsionl strong winter storms (the so-clled

. Ismil Reen, Daryanavardiye Iranian[Te sering Irnins], vol. (ehrn: Sekeh Pulishing, ), p. .. Khodverdikhn, Nabard al-Ommaya, pp. –.. Iid., p. , nd Reen, Daryanavardiye Iranian, pp. –.. Khodverdikhn, Nabard al-Ommaya, p. .. Rouhollh K. Rmzni, Te Persian Gul and the Strait o Hormuz (Alphen n den Rijn, the Netherlnds: Sijtho & Noordho, ), p. .. Dnekr, “Jnghye Gheyre Clssic dr Khlij-e Frs,” p. ; nd Div. Generl Muhmmd Ali Jri, interview with Jamejam newspper, June ,

(ville online t www.jmejmonline.ir/newstext.spx?newsnum=).



10 Policy Focus #87

Fariborz Haghshenass Factors Infencing Iran’s Approach

rel-lie exmple o the wrrior-sttesmn Imm Ali—the Prophet Muhmmd’s cousin nd son-in-lw). Pro- ponents o this concept elieve it will ensure successon the ttleeld ecuse o its ocus on duty (takli )

rther thn the militry ojective or end-stte.21Te concept could potentilly e prolemtic, how-

ever, y mking mrtyrdom ighters prone to overlyemotionl responses. On severl occsions during theIrn-Irq Wr, or exmple, IRGC smll-ot unitsresponded to successul U.S. ttcks y swrming wht-ever undeended or insignicnt trget they could nd,resulting in little i ny hrm to the enemy’s orces.22

In recent yers, grdul decline in Islmic com-mitment within the IRGC rised concerns mong theIrnin ledership, prompting the IRGC commnd to

ssign , religious “commissrs” to its units.23 InMy , IRGCN commnders gthered in Mshdto discuss, mong other issues, wys o rectiying this prolem nd “improving religious ith nd politicl prudence,” s well s symmetric militry rediness.24

In Irn’s concept o symmetric wrre, the ideologi-cl or “spiritul” superiority o the community o eliev-ers is considered s importnt s ny other ctor—hencethe importnce ttched to the doctrines o Alvi nd“Ashuri” wrre (the ltter reerring to the mrtyrdomo Hussein in Ali—the Imm Ali’s son nd the Prophet

Muhmmd’s grndson—during the ttle o Krl,on the tenth o Muhrrm, CE).25 A key spect thtconnects these doctrines to symmetric wrre is thespecil ttention devoted to oensive psychologicl wr-

Hman and Ideological FactorsArguly, the humn ctor plys n importnt, i not vitl, role in symmetric wrre, especilly whencomtnts re energized y ntionlist or religious

zel. Te Islmic Repulic hs exploited the historiclresentment o the residents living long the country’ssouthern costline, who hve endured numerous or-eign occuptions. he long nd itter Irn-Irq Wrhelped strengthen these eelings.

Te IRGC plces religious elie t the core o theIrnin concept o symmetric wrre.17 his con-cept rests on three components: politicl nd religious prudence nd ith in the velayat-e aqih (the doctrineo clericl rule tht underpins Irn’s theocrcy); moti- vtion nd resilience in the ce o dversity; nd the

culture o jihd nd mrtyrdom. Te Qurn promisestht the Islmic wrrior who emodies the qulities o ith, prudence, nd ptience will chieve superiorityover his dversry y ctor o ten.18

Indeed, Irn’s ledership seeks to imue its ghters with elie in their spiritul superiority over their perceived enemies— view strengthened y recentencounters with British orces in the northern PersinGul. Tereore, the IRGC’s ledership hs chosen toemphsize the spiritul dimension in prepring orsymmetric wrre.19 o this end, they hve lunched

progrm imed t deepening revolutionry zel ndreligious ervor in the rnks s the IRGC’s “center o grvity.”20 Tis is prt o roder eort to institution-lize its concept o “Alvi” wrre (derived rom the

. Ali Seedi, “Spiritulity s the Minsty o Asymmetric Wrre” [in Persin], Payam, no. (Summer ) (Islmic Reserch Center). Seedi is theSupreme Leder’s representtive in the IRGC.

. Iid. See the Qurn, “Al-Anl” (Te spoils o wr), verse .. Iid.. “Innovtion s the Min Aspect o IRGCN’s ‘li Pln,’” Islmic Repulic News Agency (IRNA), April , . Aville online (www.irn.ir//

news/view/line-/.htm).. “Alvi wrre” is prt o the new lexicon the IRGC hs developed to descri e its doctrine o symmetric wrre, which emphsizes the deterrent nd

wrghting vlue o religious elie. Te IRGC’s current commnding ocer (Muhmmd Ali Jri) is one o the principle’s min proponents. See

“New IRGC Commnder: We Are t the Pek o Rediness” [ in Persin], Mehr News Agency, Septemer , (ville online t www.mehrnews.ir/NewsPrint.spx?NewsID=); Mj. Gen. Yhy Rhim-Svi (ormer IRGC commnder), interview with Mehr News Agency, Septemer , (ville online t www.mehrnews.com//NewsDetil.spx?NewsID=); nd Hghshenss, “Irn’s Doctrine o Asymmetric Nvl Wrre.”

. “A Brie Look t the Unconventionl Wrre t Se,” p. .. “Te IRGC Commnder Announces Relig ious Upliing Pln” [in Persin], Frs News Agency, My , . Aville online (www.rsnews.com/

newstext.php?nn=).. “he th Gthering o IRGCN Commnders” [in Persin], Frs News Agency, My , . Aville online (www.rsnews.com/newstext.

php?nn=). Ironiclly, this conerence ws held t the sme time tht the IRGC sponsored ehrn’s rst rp nd R&B concert.. See Alirez Movhed Alvi, “Asymmetric Wrre nd the Eects o Culturl nd Psychologicl Fctors” [in Persin], Psychological Operations

Quarterly , no. (July ) (this journl is n IRGC puliction); ville online (www.rnet.ir/?lng=&stte=showody_new*s&key=&row_id=&style=no). See lso Hghshenss, “Irn’s Doctrine o Asymmetric Nvl Wrre.”





ghting nd ullling its duty to the ullest—including mrtyrdom—is n end in itsel; the militry outcomeis o secondry importnce. Te IRGCN hs incorpo-rted this concept into its opertionl plns in the Per-

sin Gul nd the Gul o Omn y giving the ideologi-clly committed Bsij more prominent role in wging old swrming ttcks.27

Te IRGC ledership elieves tht Irn’s most er-some wepon is its mrtyrdom culture. hus, cting IRGCN commnder Ali Fdvi recently thretened tolunch suicide missions in the Strit o Hormuz using young Bsijis. He lso reveled plns to etter “incorpo-rte” the Bsij into IRGC nvl opertions, including npprenticeship progrm tht pprently ssigns Bsijis toevery ctive IRGCN unit—including surce nd com-

mndo units—to perorm “expendle” duties.28

re nd “nonmteril” ctors in wrre. Accordingly,even the cretion o “rpid culturl rection unit” tocounter threts to Irn’s revolutionry Islmic vlueshs een proposed.26 Tis demonstrtes the importnce

ehrn ttches to chieving oth morl nd militrysuperiority over its enemies.

Irnin militry thinkers dene Alvi wrre s “deensive wr sed on religious nd ntionl vluesusing ighters who re psychologiclly prepred toght to the deth i necessry, nd who hve enoughmorl cpcity to persevere militrily.” As descriederlier, this Shiite-inspired concept, which is oen usedin conjunction with Ashuri wrre, is dierent romsymmetric wrre to the degree tht it gives priorityto the “cuse” over the “ojective.” In other words, or

militry orce ollowing the concept, the mere ct o

. Alirez Movhed Alvi, “Asymmetric Wrre.”. See iid. or comprison o Alvi nd symmetric wrre.. “Successor t IRGC Nvy: One Smll Action in the Strit o Hormuz Would Also Hve Big Eect” [ in Persin], Keyhan, Octoer , , p. . Avil-

le online (www.kyhnnews.ir//.htm#other).



12 Policy Focus #87

Iranian Capabilities and Intentions

round kilometers) or two Kosr nti-ship missiles.2he IRGCN lso opertes remote-controlled rdrdecoy nd/or explosives-lled ots, to divert enemydeenses or ttck enemy vessels.

Te newest ots in the IRGCN’s eet re the NorthKoren IPS- (see g. ) nd the slightly lrger IPS- torpedo ots, which incorporte low-oservleetures. Both cn crry two -millimeter homing

torpedoes, while the ormer cn lso crry two Kosrmissiles (though this would presumly increse the vessel’s rdr signture). Both were very ctive during the ltest Irnin nvl exercises, nd reports suggestIrn is uilding lrge numer o these vessels. Irnis lso reported to operte smll numer o NorthKoren–designed edong-B nd edong-C semi-sumersile specil opertions ttck cr delivered in.3 At lest one such ot, edong-B, ws usedduring recent wr gmes. Both types re elieved to e

“Unconventionl mens led to unconventionl

ends.” —Anonymous IRGC ocer

i r a n ’ s u n c o n v e n T i o n a l nvl wrre orcesconsist o six elements: surce vessels, midget ndconventionl sumrines, missiles nd rockets, nvlmines, vition, nd militry industries.

Srace VesselsAlthough Irn’s long-rnge costl rtillery nd shore-sed nti-ship missiles cn provide some level o re

denil over sustntil portions o the Gul, surce ves-sels re required in order to ctully control the Gul.owrd this end, Irn hs uilt or cquired numero smll- to medium-size st-ttck cr (FACs) dur-ing the pst decde or opertions within the PersinGul nd the Gul o Omn. Both the IRGCN ndIRIN mke use o these cr.

Although the most numerous vessel in theIRGCN rsenl is the ierglss Ashur motorot(see g. )—which my crry hevy mchine gun, multiple rocket luncher (MRL), or single contct

mine—it lso uses severl o the other smll ots pro-cured or produced y Irn. hese include the req(the Swedish Boghmmer speedot);1 the Zolghdr,Zoljneh, or Bhmn ctmrn ptrol ots, whichre cple o crrying oth torpedoes nd rocketlunchers nd my lso e used or covert mining mis-sions in Persin Gul shipping lnes; nd the Zolghrnd Azrkhsh FACs (versions o the Chin Ct uiltin Irn), which re cple o crrying sixteen-tueHM -millimeter nvl MRL (with rnge o

Fig. 3. An Ashura-class small boat ftted with a

ZU-23-2 cannon.

. Irn lso enets rom ne Itlin design when it comes to nvl wrre. Irn’s Joulee Mrine Industries hs pprently otined license rom the Itl-in compny Fio Buzzi (FB) Design to produce the RIB -SC nd FB -SC high-speed ptrol ots, which would proly e used y the IRGCN.Emnuele Ottolenghi, “Irn’s Deceptive Commercil Prctices,” Perspectives Papers on Current Aairs, April , . Aville online (www.iu.c.il/Bes/perspectives.html).

. Te ide o putting MRLs on ots ws originted y the Soviets during the World Wr II er, with their rmored riverots. Interestingly, RouhollhRmzni oresw s erly s the use o MRLs y guerrills to ttck vulnerle oil tnkers trnsiting the Strit o Hormuz; see his ook Te PersianGul and the Strait o Hormuz (Alphen n den Rijn, the Netherlnds: Sijtho & Noordho Interntionl, ), p. . Te Irnin-mde rocket lunchersused during the nker Wr hd rnge o out . kilometers, compred to the -kilometer rnge o the -millimeter MRL round.

. Bill Gertz, “Kore Delivers Semi-Sumersile Gunships to Irn,” Washington imes, Decemer , .






ings, however, when compred to lrger ships. Forexmple, they re unle to hit trgets t long rngesdue to the limittions o their trget cquisition sen-sors. his mens tht in mny cses they re rmed

with missiles tht cn shoot rther thn the ships cn“see,” which drmticlly reduces their eectiveness.And in littorl wrre, smll missile-rmed ots relikely to drw disproportionte re.4 Teir prospectsor survivl, thereore, re not very good.

Sbmarines and Torpedoeshe IRIN’s three EKM Kilos re sed t Bn-dr As, together with most o Irn’s leet o ourmidget sumrines. wo o the Kilos re opertionlt ny given time nd re occsionlly deployed in the

estern mouth o the Strit o Hormuz, the Gul o Omn, nd the Arin Se. Te smller, loclly uilt-ton Ghdir (which cn crry two -millimetertorpedoes; see ig. , next pge) nd -ton Nh-ng- littorl sumrines, which oth the IRGCNnd IRIN now hve, will likely operte minly in thePersin Gul.5 Tese sumrines re proly intendedor mine-lying, specil opertions, nd nti-shipping opertions, nd re indictive o Irn’s growing inter-est in developing n underse wrre cpility.6 Inddition, the IRGCN mintins n elorte network

o long-rnge dy/night video cmers in numerousloctions long Irn’s southern shoreline to detect pos-sile clndestine inltrtions, nd perhps even to psstrgeting intelligence to sumrines using underwtercommunictions ger developed y the Irnin Elec-tronic Industries (IEI).

Unlike ir, wter is hostile medium tht distortsnoise very esily, ut it lso llows sound to trvel over very gret distnces. he U.S. Nvy hs vriety o mens t its disposl to detect sumerged sumrines,ut in shllow costl wters, high mient noise lev-

els degrde the perormnce o sonr, mking the joo detecting, locting, nd identiying sumrines very

equipped with lightweight -millimeter short-rnge(– km) torpedoes.

Irn’s ten ondr (North Koren Houdong; seeg. ) FACs provide the IRGCN with its only “conventionl” cpility (s compred to the lrgely conventionl IRIN, which hs hndul o opertionlcorvettes nd some hl dozen missile ots in itseet). With displcement o round tons nd

top speed o knots, ech is rmed with two C-doule-lunchers. FACs suer rom criticl shortcom-

Fig. 4. An IPS-16 torpedo boat ftted with Kosar anti-

ship-missile launchers.

Fig. 5. Tondar ast-at tack crat .

. Wyne P. Hughes Jr., Fleet actics and Coastal Combat , nd ed. (Annpolis, Md.: Nvl Institute Press, ), p. .. Bluer’s Guide to North Korean Naval Power 2007. Aville online (www.ovetopsecret.com/orum/thred/pg).. “Irn ested Missile with Rnge o km” [in Persin], Frs News Agency, April , . Aville online (www.rsnews.com/newstext.

php?nn=).





14 Policy Focus #87

In recent yers, Irn hs gretly expnded its torpedocpility nd hs reportedly lunched productionline or t lest two types o - nd -millimeterhoming torpedoes. he Irnin -, -KE,nd possily ES- wke-homing torpedoes hvernges o up to kilometers. Irn lso clims to hvedesigned torpedo especilly or trgeting sumrinesnd surce vessels in the Strit o Hormuz; it is report-edly in service with oth the IRGCN nd IRIN.10Also purportedly in service is the Hoot supervittionhigh-speed missile torpedo (reportedly sed on the

Russin Shkvl), with speed o miles per hour( km/h, m/s). Irnin possession nd mstery

dicult.7 At the sme time, temperture nd slinitymy cilitte the detection o sumrines in certinres. Extremely high slinity ects sound wve trns-mission; the higher the slinity o wter, the ster the

sound wves trvel through it. Tereore the comin-tion o high temperture nd slinity in the pprochesto the Gul could mke it esier or surce ship with pssive sonr to detect sumrine.8 At ny rte,ecuse Irn’s sumrines would eventully hve toreturn to se to rerm, reuel, nd undergo minte-nnce nd repirs, it would e only mtter o timeeore they were locted— ct tht does not ode well or their survivl in the event o conronttion with the United Sttes.

Elsewhere, t the southern end o the Cspin Se,

the Irnins would ce prolems operting their smlllittorl sumrines. Te wter depth reches more thn, eet there, so the Irnins would hve to designhulls tht could withstnd such conditions.

Irn is lso experimenting with wet sumersiles, which require highly trined nd motivted crews. Teexperimentl Seht- two-set sumersile swim-mer delivery vehicle, designed y the Eshn Under- wter Reserch Center, is one exmple. Although it iseing tested y the IRIN, nd most proly y theIRGCN s well, it is not known whether this GPS-

equipped sumersile is in ctive service yet. Not onlycn such smll sumersiles e operted rom lrgemother ships, they could lso conceivly e xed tothe hull pylons o Nhng-clss ots or longer-rngeinsertion opertions. Irn lso hs “mnned torpedoes”o North Koren origin in service.

Even innocent-looking merchnt ships or trwlerscn hve htches elow the wterline nd cilities ordelivering nd recovering smll sumersiles.9 Such nrrngement would e idel or long-rnge “strtegic”opertions in the Gul o Omn nd the Arin Se,

similr to those crried out y the Itlin Nvy in theMediterrnen during World Wr II.

Fig. 6. A Ghadir-class midget submarine.

. Antony Preston, Submarine Warare (London: Brown Books, ), p. .. Rmzni, Te Persian Gul and the Strait o Hormuz, p. .. John E. Moore nd Richrd Compton-Hll, Submarine Warare: oday and omorrow (London: Michel Joseph, ), p. .. “Modern orpedo Fired ginst Live rget t Strit o Hormuz” [in Persin], Frs News Agency, April , . Aville online (www.rsnews.net/

newstext.php?nn=).


Fariborz Haghshenass Capabilities and Intentions





Chinese C- (see ig. ) , with -kilogrm wr-

hed, n improved ECCM cpility, nd incresedrnge—which my simply e version o the Chi-nese C-. his missile is deployed in moile t-teries in Irn’s costl res nd islnds, including eshm. he Noor includes dtlink or receiving midcourse trgeting dt rom n irorne rdr sys-tem crried y helicopter or ixed-wing ircrt. heIrnins hve integrted Noor with the IRGCNleet o Mi-I helicopters.

he Sedjil, FL-, nd Nssr- seem to e loclly produced versions o the Chinese JJ/L-B nti-ship

missile, which hs ctive rdr guidnce nd mxi-mum rnge o kilometers.

Te most diverse rnge o nti-ship missiles in Irn’srsenl is the smll Kosr series. It includes the opti-clly guided ire-nd-orget Kosr (JJ/L-A) ndKosr- (C-) missiles with -kilogrm wrhedsnd mximum rnge o kilometers. Irn lso oper-tes n ctive rdr-guided version, the KJ/L-B(which might e clled Kosr- in Irn), with rngeo kilometers. Another EO-guided version is theKosr-, closely resemling the C-, ut with

much lrger -kilogrm wrhed nd n extendedrnge o kilometers. ruck-mounted versions o oneor more Kosr vrints hve reportedly een deployedto numer o Irn’s Gul Islnds.

o such system could e potentil gme-chnger inthe Gul, lthough Irn’s clim remins unveried, ndthe sety, reliility, nd cpilities o the originlRussin system on which it is sed remin mtter o

contention.

Missiles and RocketsIRGCN swrms during the Irn-Irq Wr were vulner-le to erly detection nd eril interdiction en routeto their trgets, lthough their losses did not deter Irnrom undertking dditionl missile nd speedotttcks. Furthermore, the Lenon wr showedthe Irnins tht militry victory ws possile ginstn enemy tht enjoyed ir supremcy.

Nevertheless, the IRGCN hopes to reduce this vul-

nerility to enemy ir ttck with the deployment o lrge numers o mn-portle ir deense systems,such s the widely used Misgh- nd - surce-to-ir missiles (licensed copies o the Chinese W- ndW-M) with mximum rnge o kilometers, s well s nti-helicopter rockets nd mines nd shore-sed Pntzir, or M-, nd YZ- Shh hqe(FM-) surce-to-ir missiles.

Te IRGCN prides itsel on its impressive rsenlo nti-ship missiles. Irn hs mde numerous guid-nce/control modictions to the venerle Chinese

HY- Silkworm moile shore-sed missile, whichor long time ws the ckone o its nti-ship-missile orce, with mximum rnge o – miles(– km).11 Irn hs lso produced n extended-rnge version o the HY-, the “strtegic” SS-N- Rd(Tunder). Te Rd, which ws rst tested in militrymneuvers in erly , is designed to y lower thnits predecessor, the HY-G (C-) Seersucker, nd perorm evsive mneuvers during its terminl phse o ight. Equipped with ctive nd pssive guidnce, elec-tronic counter-countermesures (ECCMs), nd ms-

sive ,-pound ( kg) wrhed, this missile could prove dedly even to lrge vessels.

Next in line is the Noor nti-ship cruise mis-sile— license-produced, upgrded version o the

. “C-/HY-/SY-/CSS -N-/CSS- C-/Seersucker,” Federtion o Americn Scientists (FAS). Aville online (www.s.org/mn/dod-/sys/missile/row/c-.htm).

Fig. 7. A C-802 coastal anti-ship-missile battery.




16 Policy Focus #87

he IRGCN could tsk smll speedots, su-mrines, nd nondescript civilin vessels mnned ymilitry crews to covertly mine shipping corridorsnd hror entrnces, while comt divers inserted yIRGCN or IRIN Zodic ots nd wet sumersiles,or dropped y helicopter, could ttch limpet mines toenemy ships or oshore oil cilities.

Little is known, however, out the IRGCN’s mine

countermesure cpilities. While the IRIN still oper-tes our or ve Sikorsky RH-D helicopters (used ythe U.S. Nvy in the irorne mine countermesuresrole), there re no indictions o ny mine-clering sys-

With regrd to rocket systems, the most populr typein the IRGCN inventory is the -millimeter mini-MRL, which comes in -, -, -, nd -tue vrietiesnd hs n eective rnge o out . kilometers. Some

o these MRLs hve reportedly een equipped withgyro-stilizers to improve ccurcy in rough ses. Inddition, the lrger, -tue -millimeter Flq- nvlrocket system hs rnge o kilometers.

In recent yers, Irn hs used shore-sed Fjr rtil-lery rockets in nvl support role. Te Fjr- hs n-kilogrm wrhed nd rnge o kilometers, while the lrger Fjr- delivers -kilogrm wrhed with mximum rnge o – kilometers. Irn islso reportedly producing version o the Fjr- thtcn deliver sumunition wrhed to rnge o

kilometers, s well s mine-dispensing version thtcould sturte shipping lnes in the Gul with smllunmoored mines (see g. ).

Naval MinesHving pprecited the true potentil o nvl mine wrre during the nker Wr, the IRGCN consid-ers mine-lying one o its most importnt missions. It possesses or produces vriety o nvl mines, includ-ing the Sd- ottom-moored contct mine (usedextensively during the nker Wr), copied rom the

Irqi l-Mr mine (which in turn ws sed on thentiquted Russin M- design; see g. ); moorednd ottom-inuence mines incorporting mgnetic,coustic, nd pressure uses; limpet mines or use yspecil opertions orces; driing mines; nd remotelycontrolled mines.

Te dicult-to-detect ottom mines re suitle or wters no deeper thn eet ( m), while mooredmines re used in deeper wters, lthough currents tthe Strit o Hormuz re strong enough to displce llut irmly moored mines.12 he mximum depth o

the strit is eet ( m), nd in the Persin Gul it is etween nd eet (– m), lthoughmost shipping corridors there re no deeper thn eet ( m).

Fig. 8. Ashura-class small boats confgured or

mine-laying duties.

Fig. 9. Iranian M-08 contact mines.

. Richrd Hllorn, “Pciic Choke Point,” Air Force Magazine , no. (July ), p. . Aville online (www.irorce-mgzine.com/MgzineArchive/Documents//July%/choke.pd ).








Sel-Reliancehe unconventionl IRGCN runs n innovtive Sel-Suiciency Reserch Orgniztion with dierentureus deling with nvl engineering, surce nd su-

surce wrre, mrine electronics/communictions/rdr, electronic wrre (e.g., rdr, communictions,nd glol positioning system jmmers), nvigtion,sonr nd coustics, missile technology, nd crtogr- phy. Te orce’s nvl communictions cpilities hvecome long wy since , when nonwterproo rdios went ded in the middle o comt. ody, Shirz Elec-tronics Industries, or exmple, mnuctures vrietyo mritime (surce nd susurce) communictions,nvigtion, nd coustics detection equipment, includ-ing HF modems, costl moile rdr, nd electronic

support mesure (ESM) sttions.15 Likewise, the nvy’ssel-suciency orgniztion hs reportedly lso devel-oped electronic wrre equipment—or use y othsurce nd sumrine units—designed to counter U.S.systems present in the Gul region.

More importnt, rom the perspective o its oper-tionl cpilities, the IRGCN hs reportedly est-lished n extensive er-optics communictions network. Built y the locl Asi Ertet compny, it issid to stretch long the length o the northern PersinGul littorl to ensure secure nd continuous commu-

nictions in wrtime.

Organization and Main BasesTe IRGCN ws estlished on Septemer , ,nd irst commnded y Hossein Alee (currently militry dvisor to Supreme Leder Ali Khmenei). Itsmin hedqurters is in estern ehrn, nd its zoneso opertion consist o our districts, s shown in le. he IRGCN hs ses in lmost every port, hr-or, nd islnd in the Persin Gul nd Gul o Omn,ut its southern hedqurters is the Shhid Bhonr

nvl se nd the Bndr As ir-nvl sttion.

tems in the IRGCN inventory. Te IRGCN hs likelydone considerle reserch on this topic, ut it is notknown to hve elded ny such cpility

AviationTe IRGCN’s nvl units cn expect to receive close irsupport rom the IRGC’s smll inventory o Su-nd EMB- ucno ground ttck ircr, s wells Irnin ir orce F- Phntoms nd Su- Fencersrmed with Noor nti-ship missiles.

Te IRGCN could mount dy or night commndorids y inserting the IRGC ground orce’s “Serin”specil opertions units using their Mi-I helicoptersequipped with IEI night-vision equipment. Tey couldlso use Noor-rmed Mi-Is to mount long-rnge

ttcks on shipping.Finlly, the IRGCN hs deployed severl types

o indigenously produced unmnned eril vehicles(UAVs). Irn commenced work on UAVs eginning in , including models tht could crry rocketsor oms or undertke “kmikze” missions. hesettck UAVs were developed to counter the incres-ingly powerul U.S. nvl presence in the Persin Gul in the mid- to lte s, ut were never used in thenvl ren (lthough rocket-crrying UAV cp-le o holding up to six RPG- rounds ws used in

comt ginst Irqi ground orces—the world’s rstcomt ppliction o n unmnned comt eril vehicle).13

he positive wrtime experience with UAVs prompted Irnin leders to endorse n expndedinvestment in the UAV industry, which now producesseverl milies o the wepon. In Octoer , Irnreported tht it hd successully tested stelth surveillnce UAV (mde o composite mterils) during nvl exercises in the northern Persin Gul. It climedtht the UAV ew y the ircr crrier USS Nimitz

undetected.14

. For detiled stu dy o the Irnin UAV industr y, see Lim F. Devlin, “Irn Exp nds UAV Cpili ty,” Unmanned Vehicles , no. (Decemer–Jnury ), pp. –. Aville online (www.wemgs.co.uk/mg.spx?mgcode=UV_DECJAN_).

. Iid., p. .. See two items on the Rhnm System wesite: “Project itle: Supervision on Desig ning nd Mnucturing Ntionl Rdr” (www.rhnmsystem.

com/English/Proj-e/p.htm) nd “Project itle: Conceptul Design or Equipping Armed Forces Ships in Ground o Electronic, Control, Nvig-tion nd elecommuniction Systems” (www.rhnmsystem.com/English/Proj-e/p.htm).



18 Policy Focus #87

In ehrn, the events o – eectivelyundercut the perception tht religious ervor lonecould deet superior technology nd repower. Tisled to the rethinking o uture requirements nd tech-

nologicl cpilities, lthough the relince on unconventionl tctics remined unchnged. Tereore, erthe wr ended in , it ws decided tht the IRINnd IRGC would oth enet rom greter degreeo interction.16 o this end, n IRGC ground com-mnder ws ppointed commnder o the IRIN. Suchmesures were expected to cilitte coordintion ndcoopertion on the ttleield, nd resolve prolemsrising rom the existence o prllel nvl chins o commnd in the IRIN nd IRGCN.17

Te ltest reports out o Irn suggest the IRGCN is

in the process o ceding, or gretly reducing, its secu-rity role in the Cspin Se to the IRIN. Insted, the

Irn’s other min ses include the Shhid Mhltinvl se; the Bushehr ir-nvl sttion; the Arvndnvl surveillnce se t the mouth o Shtt l-Ar(Arvnd Rood), which secures the Irnin side o

the wterwy; the Imm Ali nvl se in Chhr;s well s ses in Assluyeh, Borzjn (home o theIRGCN’s Engineering Commnd), Bndr heri, Jsk (the Emmt nvl/missile se), nd vriousislnds, including Khrg, Au Mus, the uns, Frsi,eshm, Sirri, Lrk, nd Lvn. Te IRGCN lso pre-sides over n extensive ocer nd noncommissionedocer trining ctivity in its Jvd l-Aemeh MritimeScience nd echnology College in Chlous, on theCspin cost. Finlly, the IRGC hs uilt n extensivenetwork o tunnels nd underground missile unkers

on the Persin Gul islnds, turning them into whtthey cll “sttic wrships.”

Table 1: IRGCN Operational Districts

DESIGNATION KEy BASE NAME LOCATIONCOMMANDINGOFFICER

st Nvl District Shhid Bhonr NvlBse Bndr As, Strit o Hormuz Srdr Alirez ngsiri

nd Nvl District Shhid Mhlti NvlBse

Bushehr, Centrl PersinGul

Srdr Ali Rzmjou

rd Nvl District(North)

— Mhshhr, NorthernPersin Gul

Psdr Col. ghipour-Rezie

th Nvl District — Bolsr, Cspin Se Psdr Cpt. SeiolhBkhtirvnd

— Imm Ali IndependentNvl Bse

Chhr, Gul o Omn Psdr Cptin AliNsiyenekou

. Mehdi Khodverdikhn (ed.), Nabard al-Ommaya: Avalin Amaliyat Daryaie S epah Pasdaran dar Khalij Fars [Bttle o l-Omy: the rst nvl oper-tion o the IRGC in the Persin Gul ] (ehrn: IRGC Wr Studies Center, ), p. .

. Aytollh’s Khmenei’s speech t the inugurl ceremony o the new IRIN commnder, Commodore Shmkhni, Octoer , . Aville online(rsi.khmenei.ir/FA/Speech/detil.jsp?id=A). Some Western sources suggest, erroneously, tht the IRGCN is suordinted to the regulr nvlorces.






Te IRGCN nticiptes tht in wrtime, potentilenemies will try to disrupt its commnd nd control.In response, it is creting decentrlized commndstructure tht will llow or more utonomous district

nd sector opertions. Smll, utonomous, moile,nd gile comt units orm the sic uilding locko this new “mosic” deense strtegy.21 In the nvlren, speedots will e tken out o cmoulgedcostl or inlnd hide sites nd unkers, huled ontrilers to costl relese points, nd given mission-typeorders tht will not require them to remin in contct with their chin o commnd. Ech unit o such tems will e ssigned nvl sector o opertion where, in

IRGCN is concentrting its resources on Irn’s more voltile southern shores, where it will ply dominntrole,18 nd where the newly estlished IRIN lightsqudrons could e rought under the overll theter

commnd o the IRGC—something the Psdrs hvesought since the Irn-Irq Wr.

At the sme time, the IRIN is in the process o mov-ing wy rom conventionl nvl tctics nd towrdmethods usully ssocited with the IRGCN, suchs susurce wrre using midget sumrines, FACopertions, nd oensive mine wrre.19 he com-mnder o the IRIN recently clled this doctrinl ndtechnologicl shi “renissnce.”20

HEADquARTERS (Hq) NAMES DETAILS

Noh cticl H; She-z-Zmncticl H (Strit o Hormuz); NssrAvition nd Air Deense H

Home to the Persin Gul Fleet H nd diving school; eetincludes the IRGCN’s gship Velyt, midget sumrines, nd vrious missile ots.

Mohrm cticl H Home to the IRGCN’s rpid rection speedot group, Slmn(Costl) Missile Group, Ser Communictions Center, the“Nvl Missile Brigde ,” nd vrious missile ots.

Imm Hossein cticl H One o the lrgest IRGCN nvl, missile, nd electronic wrreses, includes the Arvnd nvl surveillnce se t the moutho the Shtt l-Ar, commnded y IRGC Col. AolghsemAmngh; eet includes smll missile nd gunots.

— Home o the Jvd l-Aemeh Mritime Science nd echnologyCollege, under commnd o Psdr Cpt. Nghi Pour-Rezie;eet includes FACs.

— Fleet includes vrious missile ots, nd possily midgetsumrines.

. “Independent Missile Commnd Might Be Formed in the IRGC” [in Persin], Frs News Agency, My , . Aville online (www.rsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=).

. “Irn ested Missile with Rnge o km” [in Persin] , Frs News Agency, April , (vil le online t www.rsnews .com/ne wstext. php?nn=). Tis shi ws predicted y the med wr-gme designer Jmes F. Dunnign; see “Irn’s Nvy Goes Underwter to Win,” April , (ville online t www.strtegypge.com/dls/rticles/ .sp).

. “New Genertion o Irn’s Sumrines Soon to Enter Servi ce” [in Persin], Frs News Agenc y, Septemer , . Aville online (www.rsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=).

. “Irn Chnges Its Deense Doctrine to Fce Extr-Regionl Trets,” Mehr News Agency, Septemer , . Aville online (www.mehrnews.com//NewsDetil.spx?NewsID=). In the so -clled mosic deense concept, smll Bsij groups (Ashur ttlions) re eing ormed in mny townsnd counties, to operte utonomously in deense o their locl geogrphicl re ut under the opertionl control o the provincil IRGC commnds.



20 Policy Focus #87

Brrges o rockets with cluster wrheds could eused to suppress enemy deensive ire nd crrier iropertions.

A wr gme conducted y the U.S. militry in ,

clled Millennium Chllenge, reveled serious eet vulnerility to well-coordinted ttcks y llisticnd cruise missiles nd swrming speedots in litto-rl wters, cusing “the worst [simulted] nvl deetsince Perl Hror.”25 Since then, Western militrieshve studied the concept o “net-centric” wrre inthe mritime environment, especilly ginst swrmttcks, nd expect this concept—which stems rominormtion dvntges on the ttleield—to helpreduce, i not eliminte, their vulnerility.26

Bsed on the doctrine o symmetric nvl wrre,

the Irnin militry hs emrked on remrklerermment nd re-equipment progrm during the pst decde, imed t osetting the U.S. Nvy’s mili-try presence in the Persin Gul region. Te Irninspper condent tht the dense, lyered deense theyhve creted, long with their much-vunted swrm-ing tctics nd the er inspired y their mrtyrdomculture, will deter n ttck ginst their territory orinterests.

Irn’s deense policy is sed on deterrence, nddespite the ct tht ehrn mintins it hs no intention

o ttcking neighoring countries, preemptive strikeginst U.S. nd Gul Ar nvl nd other militryssets in the region cnnot e ruled out under certincircumstnces. In Islm, wr is generlly elieved to hve deensive nture. According to Islmic lw s denedin IRGC textooks, however, “preemptive jihd” cne justiied i deined s deensive ct. Hence, pre-emptive jihd cn e prescried when deemed neces-sry.27 Moreover, the wr in Lenon underscored

the event o conlict, enemy nvl ssets or civilinmritime trc will e ttcked. Under such wrtimecircumstnces, the IRGCN is expected to e directedout o orwrd operting commnd post, the Noh

Generl hedqurters, s ws the cse during the Irn-Irq Wr.

Intentions

“Our wr is wr etween our religion nd ll theinequlities o the cpitlist world; thereore, this wrhs no oundries. Our wr is wr o ith nd devo-tion. And this drws our strtegy.”

—Div. Gen. Muhmmd Ali Jri,IRGC generl commnder, July , 22

During the s, Irn repetedly tried to voiddrwing U.S. orces into its wr with Irq, which theUnited Sttes interpreted s sign o prudence ndsel-interested restrint, given the lnce o orcesin the Gul.23 And in uture conronttion withthe United Sttes, Irn might once gin ct withrestrint—to void esclting the conict in wy tht would ply to U.S. strengths in wging mid- to high-intensity wrre—y employing discreet tctics suchs covert mine-lying, limited sumrine opertions,nd occsionl moile shore-sed missile ttcks. A

dress rehersl or just such n opertion took plce on June , .24

Alterntively, Irn could lunch coordinted t-tck involving explosives-lden remote-controlledots, swrming speedots, semi-sumersile torpedoots, FACs, kmikze UAVs, midget nd ttck su-mrines, nd shore-sed nti-ship missile nd rtil-lery re, ll concentrted on U.S.-escorted convoy orsurce ction group trnsiting the Strit o Hormuz.

. “IRGC Prepres with Plnning nd Identiction o Trets to It” [in Persin], Frs News Agency, July , . Aville online (www.rsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=).. Te Persian Gul: Implications o a U.S.-Iranian Conontation, CIA SNIE -, August (declssied in ), p. .. “Jri Emphsized the Need to Improve Rediness nd Deensive Cpilities to Counter Trets” [in Persin], Frs News Agency, June , . Avil-

le online (www.rsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=).. om Ate, “ Wr Gme Re vels Nvy Risk,” San Francisco Chronicle, Mrch , . Aville online (www.ssonline.com/cgi-in/rticle.cgi?=/

c/////MN.DL).. Dvid Gllign, George Gldorisi, nd Peter Mrlnd, “Net Centric Mritime Wrre—Countering ‘Swrm’ o Fst Inshore Attck Cr,” pper pre-

sented t “Te Future o C2,” the enth Interntionl Commnd nd Control Reserch nd echnology Symposium, April . Aville online (www.dodccrp.org/events/th_ICCRS/CD/ppers/.pd) .

. See “Te Chrcteristic Imges o Wr nd Pece in Islm” [in Persin], Hossoun (Fll–Winter ) (IRGC Center or Islmic Reserch).






Repulic.30 Despite this, high-rnking IRGC com-mnder recently cknowledged tht his orgniztion isstill vulnerle to the cyer ge’s “so wr”—the su- versive inuence o the Western “culturl invsion.”31

It is no secret tht ehrn’s ultimte im is to expelU.S. nd Western inuence not only rom the PersinGul region, ut lso rom the entire Middle Est. TeIrnin president hs even clled or the removl o llAmericn militry ses outside the United Sttes.32But or now, Irn’s min ocus is on the Persin Gul.According to Aytollh Khmenei’s representtive tothe IRGC, the time hs come to deet the superpow-ers,33 nd in July , Commodore Sri or therst time promoted the IRGCN s the protector o the world’s energy jugulr through the Strit o Hormuz.34

Ever since the lte s, the min im o the IRGChs een to ensure tht Irn’s nvl cpility is c-tored into U.S. thret ssessments, whether throughheted rhetoric, highly pulicized militry mneuvers,or ctions such s the cpture o British militry per-sonnel nd the hrssment o U.S. wrships in the Gul.Tis trend ws highlighted y militry mneuvers heldin Novemer , when the IRGC rehersed theclosure o the Strit o Hormuz y mens o missileot opertions, ttcks y shore-sed nti-ship mis-siles, nd concentrted long-rnge rtillery nd rocket

res.35Such mneuvers re plnned in conjunction with

the IRGC’s propgnd nd psychologicl oper-tions commnd, however, nd re s much exercisesin psychologicl wrre s they re exercises o Irn’smilitry cpilities. Indeed, the recent merger o the

the merits o preemptive ction—ehrn mintins thtHizllh’s kidnpping nd killing o Isreli soldiersctully preempted lrge-scle Isreli nd Americnmilitry ttck ginst the group nd, ultimtely, Irn

itsel, climing tht sid ttck hd een plnned orSeptemer or Octoer .28

Along these lines, the IRGCN hs helped Hizllhuild up its nscent nvl cpilities through mod-ern militry llince tht ers echoes o the distnt pst. Te ncient Achemenid Persins commissionedthe services o the sering Phoenicins to uild nvy or them, so tht they could expnd the PersinEmpire into the Mediterrnen nd eyond. During the Islmic er, it ws Persin silors nd shipuildersliving in Phoenici, tody’s Lenon nd Syri, who

helped the Ar cliphs crete nvy with which toght the Byzntines.

History repeted itsel when the IRGCN egnhelping Hizllh estlish nd trin its rogmennd nvl units in the s. he tsk ws given tothe experienced IRGCN chie o nvl opertions,Adolh Roudki, who ws instrumentl in devising the IRGCN’s tctics nd opertions ginst the U.S.Nvy in the s. According to n Irnin pulic-tion, he ws wnted y the Isreli nd Americn intelli-gence services when he ws killed y unidentied gun-

men in My .29Te IRGC elieves its chin o commnd extends

through Supreme Leder Ali Khmenei to God,therey investing militry orders with trnscendentmorl uthority nd instilling er in the herts o Irn’s enemies tht God is on the side o the Islmic

. “Aytollh Khmenei Speking with Hugo Chvez: Hizllh’s Preemptive Attck Disrupted Americ’s Pln” [in Persin], Keyhan, July , ;ville online (www.kyhnnews.ir//.htm). See lso other news reports on this issue: Keyhan, Novemer , (www.kyhnnews.ir//.htm); Frs News Agency, July , (www.rsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=) nd August , (www.rsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=).

. “IRGCN Mrtyrs” (IRGN Specil Issue), Boshra Monthly (Mrch ) (Islmic Propgnd Orgniztion o Irn or the IRGCN Culturl

Directorte).. “Psdr Gen. Hossein Slmi: Te World Hs No Cler Assessment o the IRGC’s Power” [in Persin], Frs News Agency, July , . Aville online(www.rsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=).

. Iid.. “Irn’s Ahmdinejd Clls or U.S. ses to e ‘erdicted,’” Agence Frnce-Presse, July , . Aville online (www.rnce.com/en/-irns-

hmdinejd-clls-us-ses-e-erdicted).. “Ledership’s Representtive to the IRGC: It Is the ime to Brek the Superpowers’ Horns” [in Persin], Frs News Ag ency, July , . Aville

online (www.rsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=).. “Mssive Numers o IRGC Missiles nd Vessels Are Redy or Direct Action t the Strit o Hormuz” [in Persin], Frs News Agency, July , .

Aville online (www.rsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=).. “Te IRGC Prctices Blockge o the Strit o Hormuz,” Raja News, Novemer , . Aville online (www.rjnews.com/News/?).



22 Policy Focus #87

tht the IRGCN succeeded in crrying out undetectedits iggest orce dispersl nd live-ire exercise ever, which ws sid to include the lrgest numer o nti-ship missile nd torpedo lunchings ever ccomplished

during n exercise in the region.39Finlly, Irn is in the process o devising doctrine

o “symmetric culturl deense” through psychologi-cl wrre.40 Deending the Islmic Repulic’s revolu-tionry culture ginst Western culturl invsion hseen centrl tenet o Irnin thought since the Islmic Revolution. “Culturl deense” is thereoreseen s n integrl prt o symmetric wrre, one thtincludes ive ctors: psychologicl preprtions or wr; preprtion or psychologicl opertions withinthe context o symmetric wrre; inuencing domes-

tic nd interntionl pulic opinion; monitoring ndcountering enemy psychologicl wrre ctivities; ndexecuting oensive psychologicl opertions on vri-ous levels.41

IRGC’s propgnd nd pulic reltions oces signi-es the importnce given to psychologicl wrre sn element o Irn’s “so power.”36 On Jnury , ,six smll IRGCN speedots mneuvered ggressively

s three U.S. Nvy wrships trnsited the Strit o Hor-muz, in n pprent ttempt to proe the Americnresponse nd intimidte the United Sttes. Tis inci-dent ws not the rst time Irn engged in such tctics.Its psychologicl eorts during the Irn-Irq Wr lsoincluded plcing suspicious ojects such s inltedtrctor tires, lrge pinted wooden oxes, or unmnnedots in the pth o U.S.-escorted convoys.37

Te ltest exmple o this propgnd/pulic rel-tions merger ws the nnouncement, in n nonymousreport relesed y semiocil Irnin news gency, o

the IRGC’s novel “presence everywhere nd nowheredoctrine,” purportedly tested during the ltest round o the Gret Prophet mneuvers in the Persin Gul ndthe Strit o Hormuz in July .38 Te report implied

. “Te IRGC Merges Its Propgnd nd Pulic Reltions Divisions” [in Persin], Frs News Agency, June , . Aville online (www.rsnews.com/

newstext.php?nn=).. Mohmd Sei, We Will Hold America under Our Feet: An Analysis o the Events Aecting Iran during the Past 50 Years (ehrn: Dnesh v AndisheyeMosser Culturl Institute, ), p. .

. “Te Gret Prophet Mneuvers Helps Increse Irn’s Deensive Power nd Speed” [in Persin], Frs News Agency, July , . Aville online (www.rsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=).

. Iid.. See Alirez Movhed Alvi, “Asymmetric Wrre nd the Eects o Culturl nd Psychologicl Fctors” [in Persin], Psychological Operations

Quarterly , no. (July ) (this journl is n IRGC puliction); ville online (www.rnet.ir/?lng=&stte=showody_news&key=&row_id=&style=no). See lso Friorz Hghshenss, “Irn’s Doctrine o Asymmetric Nvl Wrre,” PolicyWatch no. (Wshington Instituteor Ner Est Policy, Decemer , ); ville online (www.wshingtoninstitute.org/templteC.php?CID=).

. Alirez Movhed Alvi, “Asymmetric Wrre.”





Conlict Scenarios

pssing etween Frsi Islnd nd southern shllow

wters—the common shipping chnnel to Kuwit—is suitle plce or mining. And the deeper nd widerchnnel est o Frsi, which is less suitle or mooredmines (though suitle or rising mines), is vulnerleto shore-sed missile ttcks.

In cse o conict, Irn’s conventionl nd unconventionl orces will threten not only U.S. militrycilities in Bhrin, tr, nd elsewhere in the region,ut lso Bhrini nd tri oil nd gs cilities (espe-cilly those tri oshore cilities tht drw romthe vst gs ield the country shres with Irn). he

huge Knock Nevis oting storge nd ofoding unitmoored t the l-Shheen oileld in tri wters—ormerly the Sewise Gint supertnker (nd the world’s lrgest ship), now with cpcity o ,dedweight tons—would e n ttrctive sttionrytrget or Irnin HY- nd Rd missiles.

Strait o HormzIn , the United Sttes estimted tht Irn couldclose the Strit o Hormuz or mximum o one totwo weeks,2 ut Irn’s present cpilities to interdict

trc in the strit r exceed those it hd in the s.ehrn recently indicted tht, in the event o militryconronttion with the United Sttes, its gol would e“control” over (s opposed to “locking”) the strit.3

Irn would proly ttempt to close the Strit o Hormuz only i Irnin vessels were somehow deprivedo the ility to use the wterwy.4 Tereore, even inthe event o n ttck on, or exmple, Irnin nuclercilities, it seems highly unlikely tht ehrn wouldttempt to close the strit to ll trc s long s its ownoil shipments continued to pss through the wter-

wy. Irn would rther ttempt to impose some level o

T h e F o l l o w i n g s e c T i o n provides gen-

erl overview o how, in the event o conronttionetween Irn nd the United Sttes, events couldunold in vrious prts o the Gul region.

Shatt al-Arab and NorthernPersian GlGiven uncertinties regrding the loctions o ordersnd oundries in the northern Gul, clsh etweenU.S., British, or other colition orces nd IRGCNunits ttempting nother “otnpping” opertion in“disputed” wters is rel possiility. Should such

clsh led to humn or mteril losses on the Irninside, Irn could respond with nti-ship-missile ttcksrom lnd-sed sites est o Mhshhr, s well sttcks on colition helicopters operting in the re.Such ctions would signiicntly increse the chnceo hostilities spreding to the southern sections o theGul or the Strit o Hormuz. I the colition responseinvolves ny Irnin oil industry trgets, the Irnins would most likely retlite in kind y trying to dm-ge, or even riey seize, the two strtegiclly impor-tnt Irqi oshore oil terminls, which re mnned y

colition troops who reportedly operte rdr, electro-opticl, nd other surveillnce equipment.

Central and Sothern Persian GlA nvl lockde o Irn (s suggested y Isreli primeminister Ehud Olmert in his My discussions with U.S. ocils in Wshington1) or strike ginstIrn’s nucler cilities could led to n Irnin responseimed t ports, hror cilities, oil tnkers, oil ter-minls, nd other strtegic instlltions elonging tothose countries either prticipting in or supporting

such ctions. Moreover, the nrrow shipping chnnel

. “Olmert to U.S.: Impose Nvl Blockde on Irn,” Haaretz, My , . Aville online (www.hretz.com/hsen/spges/.html).. Iran and the Superpowers in the Gul , CIA Specil NIE //-, June (declssied in ), p. .. Div. Gen. Muhmmd Ali Jri, interview with Jamejam newspper, June , . Aville online (www.jmejmonline.ir/newstext.

spx?newsnum=).. “We Will Not Allow the Use o the Strit o Hormuz i Irn’s Interests Are Undermined” [in Persin], Frs News Agency, July , . Aville online

(www.rsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=).



24 Policy Focus #87

Fariborz Haghshenass Confict Scenarios

go to llow pssge o Irnin wrships through itsinlnd wterwy (sed on Moscow’s reding o nold ilterl trety).

Irn is trying to keep low prole in this region or

now, given tht its shre o Cspin shipping is lessthn percent. It lso depends on Russi or rms,nucler know-how, nd, most importnt, politicl support. Yet, given the economic importnce o the regiondue to its energy endowments, the yet-to-e nlizedlegl regime governing reltions etween its littorlsttes, nd the potentil or n enlrged U.S. role in theCucsus, the Cspin re remins potentil lsh point tht the IRGCN could e expected to reinorcey rod, ril, nd ir i need e.

Given the ct tht the threts emnting rom the

Cspin region do not touch on the core mission o theIRGC (i.e., segurding the chievements nd prin-ciples o the Islmic Revolution nd politicl system),the IRGCN preers to concentrte its resources in thePersin Gul region. Supreme Leder Khmenei, how-ever, hs stted tht Centrl Asi, with its lrge Muslim popultion, is likely to e Irn’s next theter o struggle with the United Sttes, nd even Russi,5 implying thtthe Cspin region might somedy ecome n ren o opertions or the IRGCN.

control over the strit y denying ree pssge to tnk-ers rom countries supporting such ttcks, lthoughthis could led to urther escltion.

Gl o Oman and BeondIn Persin Gul militry conronttion, Irn couldseek to expnd opertions into the southern Gul o Omn nd Arin Se. Te nchorge o the Omnicost, which is used y oil tnkers prior to entering theGul, might e tempting plce to ly mines, s it wsduring the Irn-Irq Wr. But with most Irnin ves-sels designed or costl opertions, it could e di-icult or Irn to operte in this re. Nevertheless,even occsionl orys or strikes ginst trgets in these wters would suce to stir pnic in oil nd insurnce

mrkets.

Caspian SeaIn the very dierent geogrphicl environment o theCspin sin, where other littorl countries, espe-cilly Russi, hve roust militry presence, Irnis t cler militry disdvntge. It hs, however,een trying to redress this shortcoming y construct-ing nd deploying its own missile ots nd rigtesin the Cspin, ollowing Russi’s reusl ew yers

. “Irn’s Regionl Issues rom the Point o View o the Supreme Leder” [in Persin], Hossoun (Spring ) (IRGC Center or Islmic Reserch).




Conclsion

cple o executing its unique doctrine o symmetric

nvl wrre.Irn’s ppliction o this doctrine in such vitl

region could produce highly destilizing nd surpris-ing results. At the sme time, there re limittions to wht my e ccomplished y mens o symmetrictctics ginst much more powerul dversry likethe United Sttes, which enjoys vst technologicldvntge, is cple o employing similr tctics ndtechniques, nd my lso ct in n unpredictle mn-ner. Nevertheless, with the IRGCN ssuming domi-nnt role in the Persin Gul nd the Gul o Omn,

nd nucler negotitions etween Irn nd the inter-ntionl community entering more dngerous nduncertin phse, urther tensions nd conronttionsinvolving the IRGCN, the U.S. Nvy, nd U.S. coli-tion prtners re likely.

i r a n h a s d e v e l o pe d comprehensive doctrine

o symmetric wrre, sed on its experience dur-ing the Irn-Irq Wr s well s more recent conictsin Irq, Aghnistn, nd Lenon. And thnks to itseorts to develop roust symmetric wrre cpil-ity in the nvl ren, the Islmic Repulic holds thePersin Gul nd the Strit o Hormuz—the world’s oillieline—in its grip.

As prt o this eort, Irn hs gretly expnded theIRGCN’s role nd cpilities, including its ility toesclte the scope nd intensity o ny conict nd to project Irnin power in this strtegic ren. It should

e rememered tht during the events o –,the IRGCN ws still in its inncy nd hd limitedresources nd experience during its conronttion withthe U.S. Nvy. Te IRGCN in its current incrntion is highly motivted, well-equipped, well-nnced orce,



26 Policy Focus #87

Appendix 1. Iranian Militar Rank Insignia

IRGCNa (ORIGINAL) TRANSLATED IRGCa (ORIGINAL) TRANSLATED

Naavi Semn Sarbaaz Privte 2nd Naavi Semn nd Clss 2nd Sarbaaz Privte nd Clss

1st Naavi Semn st Clss 1st Sarbaaz Privte st Clss

Sar Naavi Chie Semn Razmyaar Corporl

3rd Naavyar Petty Ocer rd Clss 3rd Razmavar Sergent rd Clss

2nd Naavyar Petty Ocer nd Clss 2nd Razmavar Sergent nd Clss

1st Naavyar Petty Ocer st Clss 1st Razmavar Sergent st Clss

2nd Naavdar Chie Petty Ocer 2nd Razmdaar Mster Sgt. nd Clss

1st Naavdar Senior Chie PettyOcer

1st Razmdaar Mster Sgt. st Clss

3rd Naavban Protionry Ensign 3rd Sotvaan rd Lieutennt

2nd Naavban Ensign 2nd Sotvaan nd Lieutennt

1st Naavban Lieutennt JuniorGrde

1st Sotvaan st Lieutennt

Naavsarvan Lieutennt Sarvaan Cptin

3rd Naavsalar LieutenntCommnder

Sargord Mjor

2nd Naavsalar b Commnderb 2nd Sarhang b Lt. Colonelb

1st Naavsalar Cptin Sarhang Colonel

2nd Daryaadar Vice Commodore 2nd Sartip nd Brigdier Generl Daryaadar Commodore Sartip Brigdier Generl

Daryaaban Rer Admirl Sar Lashgar Divisionl Generl

Daryasaalar Vice Admirl Sepahbod Corps Generl

Daryabod Admirl Arteshbod Force Generl

. IRGCN nd IRGC rnks re generlly suxed in Persin with the word “Psdr.”. From lieutennt colonel upwrd, the specic rnks re colloquilly replced y, or prexed with, the word “Srdr” (“rontline militry commnder”).c. Te highest existing rnk in the IRGC.d. Apprently nonexistent in the IRGC.




Arsli, Jhngir, “Osolete Wepons, Unconventionl

ctics, nd Mrtyrdom Zel: How Irn Would ApplyIts Asymmetric Nvl Wrre Doctrine in FutureConlict,” Occsionl Pper no. (George C. Mr-shll Europen Center or Security Studies, April). Aville online (www.mrshllcenter.org/site-grphic/lng-en/pge-pus-index-/sttic/xdocs/reserch/sttic/occppers/occ-pper_-en.pd ).

Clwson, Ptrick, nd Michel Eisenstdt, he Last

Resort: Consequences o Preventive Military Action

against Iran (Policy Focus no. ) (Wshington, D.C.:

Wshington Institute or Ner Est Policy, June). Aville online (www.wshingtoninstitute.org/downlod.php?le=PolicyFocus.pd ).

Cordesmn, Anthony H., nd Khlid R. l-Rodhn,Gul Military Forces in an Era o Asymmetric Wars (Lon-don: Preger, ). An erly dr (“Te Gul MilitryForces in n Er o Asymmetric Wr: Irn”) is villeonline (www.csis.org/medi/csis/pus/_gul_irn.pd).

Dickey, Christopher, “Blu nd Bloodshed,” News-week, My , . Aville online (www.newsweek.com/id/).

Edwrds, Sen J. A., Swarming on the Battlefeld: Past,

Present, and Future (Snt Monic, Cli.: RAND,). Aville online (www.rnd.org/pus/monogrph_reports/MR).

Eisenstdt, Michel, Iranian Military Power: Capabili-

ties and Intentions, Policy Pper no. (Wshington,

D.C.: Wshington Institute or Ner Est Policy, ).

Ktzmn, Kenneth, Te Warriors o Islam: Iran’s Rev-

olutionary Guard (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,).

Kelley, Stephen Andrew, “Better Lucky thn Good:Opertion Ernest Will s Gunot Diplomcy,”Nvl Postgrdute School thesis, Monterey, Cli., June . Aville online (www.ccc.nps.nvy.mil/reserch/theses/kelley.pd ).

Lloyd, Richmond M. (ed.), Economics and Maritime

Strategy: Implications or the 21st Century, Willim B.

Ruger Chir o Ntionl Security Economics Pperno. (Newport, R.I.: U.S. Nvl Wr College, );ville online (www.nwc.nvy.mil/Acdemics/courses/nsdm/d ocuments/RugerPperWe.pd ).his pper contins the proceedings o workshopheld t the Nvl Wr College on Novemer –,.

“Mritime Security in the Gul” (issue theme), Secu-

rity & errorism Research Bulletin no. (Dui:Gul Reserch Center, My ). Aville online

(d.scrid.com/docs/oohhjiurjj.pd ).

Sirrs, Owen, “Opertionl Art Cn Neutrlize theAsymmetric Smll Bot hret in Mjor Oper-tions” (U.S. Nvl Wr College report, Ferury, ). Aville online (hndle.dtic.mil/./ADA).

Appendix 2. For Frther Reading



Exective Committee

President

Howrd P. Berkowitz

Chairman

Fred S. Ler

Chairman Emeritus

Michel Stein

Founding President and Chairman Emerita

Bri Weinerg

Senior Vice Presidents

Bernrd Leventhl Jmes Schreier

Vice Presidents

Chrles AdlerBenjmin Bresluer Wlter P. Stern

SecretaryRichrd S. Armson

reasurer

Mrtin J. Gross

Committee Members

Richrd BorowMurice Dene, emeritus

Gerld FriedmnRoert Fromer

Roger Hertog Peter LowyDniel MintzFred SchwrtzDimitri Sogolo Merryl ischGry Wexler

Next Generation Leadership Council

Jerey ArmsAnthony BeyerDvid EigenAdm HerzViki RivkinZchry Schreier Jonthn orop

Board o Advisors

Wrren ChristopherLwrence S. EgleurgerAlexnder Hig Mx M. KmpelmnSmuel W. LewisEdwrd LuttwkMichel MndelumRoert C. McFrlneMrtin PeretzRichrd Perle Jmes RocheGeorge P. ShultzR. Jmes WoolseyMortimer Zuckermn

The Washington Institte or Near East Polic

Asymmetric Iranian Naval Warfare

Documents

Transcript of Asymmetric Iranian Naval Warfare